

1

Introduction: Roots of the Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe

Sam Moyo and Walter Chambati

Introduction

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) implemented during the 2000s in Zimbabwe represents the only instance of radical redistributive land reforms since the end of the Cold War. It reversed the racially-skewed agrarian structure and discriminatory land tenures inherited from colonial rule, whereby over 6,000 large-scale white farmers and a few foreign and nationally-owned agro-industrial estates controlled most of the prime land, water resources and bio-reserves, while relegating the majority of the population to marginal lands and cheap-labour services. The land reform also radicalised the state towards a nationalist, introverted accumulation strategy, against a broad array of unilateral Western sanctions. Indeed, Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform, in its social and political dynamics, must be compared to the leading land reforms of the twentieth century, which include those of Mexico, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe's land reform may be unique in the post-Cold War period, but the social and economic conditions which brought it about are not. In the last three decades, the whole of the South has been subjected to a neoliberal regime of accumulation under the leadership of monopoly-finance capital, which reversed many of the socio-economic gains obtained in the aftermath

of decolonisation, spawning a new generation of land movements (Moyo and Yeros 2005a.) The successful redistribution of wealth ushered in by the FTLRP, therefore, places Zimbabwe at the forefront of an emergent nationalism in the South, which is still poorly understood (Moyo and Yeros 2011). Even among 'progressive' circles, the debate remains fixed only on the resurgence of left politics in Latin America under similar socio-economic conditions (e.g., Sader 2011), although none of these cases has progressed to the point of a radical redistribution of wealth, as in Zimbabwe. The only other major case of substantial redistribution and economic re-orientation of recent years, though under very different political conditions, has been that of Cuba (Altieri and Funes-Monzote 2012).

The fact that the Zimbabwe case has not been recognised as a vanguard nationalism has much to do with the 'intellectual structural adjustment' which has accompanied neoliberalism (Moyo and Yeros 2005b) and a hostile media campaign (see Chari, Chapter 8 in this volume). This has entailed dubious theories of 'neopatrimonialism', which reduce African politics and the state to endemic 'corruption', 'patronage' and 'tribalism' (see de Grassi 2008; Olukoshi 2011; Mustapha 2002; Mkandawire 2012), while overstating the virtues of neoliberal good governance. Under this racist repertoire, it has been impossible to see class politics, mass mobilisation and resistance, let alone believe that something progressive can occur in Africa. Such intellectual trends have also been found among some scholars who espouse Marxism, who have similarly ignored the advances made in Zimbabwe by reproducing the right-wing repertoire of 'corruption' and deploying tactics to suppress or distort the evidence, especially via their control of publication outlets.

Yet, it should come as no surprise that there was a re-radicalisation of nationalism in Zimbabwe. Land reform was a central demand of the nationalist movement and the armed liberation struggle, which more broadly sought popular sovereignty and majority rule, including control over land, natural resources and the economy (Mkandawire 2001), despite its flirtation with socialist ideals (see Saul 2005; Mandaza 1986). Accordingly, the FTLRP is most likely to be remembered in Zimbabwe and Africa as the culmination of the anti-colonial struggle, despite the liberal democratic deficit (Mamdani 2008) and economic policy contradictions that accompanied it.

It is often pointed out that structural change was suspended during the first two decades of independence. Indeed, land redistribution was compromised by the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, which protected settler political power and proscribed land expropriation, leading to limited

land redistribution, using market-based land acquisition mechanisms (Moyo 1995). Even this market initiative hibernated in the 1990s when the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was adopted and as land concentration and foreign land ownership expanded, reinforcing historical land alienation (Moyo 2000).

Yet, another constraint was the simultaneous transition in neighbouring South Africa, which had posed security threats in the region as a whole and further mitigated radical politics through ‘destabilisation’. Even as the apartheid regime unravelled in 1994 and neoliberal restructuring spread throughout Africa, a new phase of foreign land alienation, led by South African white farmers, intensified in the sub-region as a whole. This converged in the 2000s with extensive foreign land grabbing in non-settler Africa, as the crisis of monopoly-finance capitalism unfolded (Moyo 2011b).

The general trends on the continent have been adverse for radical politics, but they have not been able to stem the tide completely. Notably, the return of the land question as an issue of national sovereignty in Zimbabwe has rowed against the current of foreign land-grabbing and the intensification of export-oriented large-scale farming. The Zimbabwe case has also challenged the received wisdom in international land reform debates, which predicted the replacement of popular and state-sponsored land reforms by market approaches, due to the political and institutional constrictions imposed by neoliberalism (Borras 2006; Rosset et al 2006). Even within South Africa, the so-called ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer’ approach has since been questioned by that state (Republic of South Africa 2005).

Before we delve further into the issues of how the causes, process and outcome of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform has been interpreted, it is important to understand its historical background and the challenges that it poses for agrarian transformation, democratic politics and national development.

Accumulation by dispossession in former settler-colonial Africa

Since colonisation in the late-nineteenth century, Zimbabwe was integrated subordinately into the world capitalist system, mainly through the settler-colonial mode of political rule and social relations of production, based largely on unequal and repressive agrarian relations which defined the character of the state. Land dispossession and extra-economic regulation and taxes turned Zimbabwe into a labour reserve economy (Amin 1972) reliant on cheap domestic and foreign migrant labour (Arrighi 1973), while repressing the

peasantry and small-scale rural industry and commerce, without creating full-scale proletarianisation (Bush and Cliffe 1984; Weiner 1988; Yeros 2002). Large-Scale Commercial Farms (LSCF) were consolidated by discriminatory subsidies to the white farmers and a few black Small-Scale Commercial Farmers (SSCF) (Moyana 2002).

Although the Zimbabwean economy at independence was relatively semi-industrialised, it remained in a disarticulated pattern of accumulation. Agriculture contributed about 20 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 40 per cent of the exports and employed 70 per cent of the workforce (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989; Yeros 2002). The essentially bi-modal agrarian structure involving large-scale farms and marginal small capitalist and peasant farms was tied to industrial interests wholly-owned by the local white minority and foreign capital. Individual white settlers held average land sizes of 2,000 hectares, while foreign and domestic agro-industrial estates (plantations) held average landholdings well above 5,000 hectares. In the 1950s, the settler-colonial state sought to turn the peasantry into full-time agricultural, industrial and mining workers disconnected from the land (Yeros 2002), while allowing for 'subsistence-based social reproduction' of the black migrant labourers and their families in the labour reserves. But the top-down methods of this policy and the limited scope for wage increases doomed it to failure.

Rhodesia's strategy for agricultural transformation from the 1960s also entailed accumulation through large-scale estate farming structures supported by the state (e.g., through irrigation facilities, dams, rural electrification and other infrastructures) to expand exports and reduce sugar and wheat imports (see Moyo 2011b). Such private estates were largely owned by South African and British transnational corporations, as well as by domestic white-owned agribusiness conglomerates, involving pioneer white family landowners, some of whom held mining concessions. The estates also created outgrower farms among whites, including new Mauritian and South African immigrants, with average landholdings of 217 hectares (European Union 2007). Around 1971, the privately-owned Mkwasine Estate created black sugar outgrowers with 10 hectares each (Moyo 2011b). During the 1970s, state-owned farm estates were created, including through the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, formerly called the Tribal Trust Lands Development Authority, the Cold Storage Commission and other parastatals.

However, the narrow import-substitution and export-led development strategy involving mining and agriculture continued to serve mainly the consumption and investment interests of the white minority and the mother

land (Stoneman 1988), while repressing indigenous capitalist classes (West 2002) and limiting wage-goods consumption. The Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) began to falter by the early 1970s after a final boom in the late 1960s (Arrighi et al 2010).

Zimbabwe's 'sub-type' of ('semi-peripheral') neocolonialism, derived from white-settler colonial capitalism, entailed perennial contradictions between introverted and extroverted capitalist accumulation strategies (Moyo and Yeros 2005a) and the organisation of labour through both 'direct' and 'indirect' power over indigenous populations and institutionalised racial segregation. These social relations of production induced the 'sale' of cheap and 'semi-bonded' black labour among a growing landless population (Yeros 2002), restricting the peasantry's social reproduction and accumulation from below. Petty-commodity production in the Communal Areas (CA) and especially unwaged female labour, subsidised the social reproduction of male labour-power on mines and farms. Neither a settled industrial proletariat nor a viable peasantry was established. A workforce in motion, which can best be conceptualised as a semi-proletariat, was established instead (ibid). This labour force straddled communal lands, white farms, mines and industrial workplaces, aggregating peasant-worker households, differentiated by gender and ethno-regional divisions.

These structural parameters established the basis of an enduring process of super-exploitation of the semi-proletariat, as well as severe economic and political contradictions. These class and racial features of the agrarian and national question defined the dynamics of the liberation movement and its visions of land and agrarian reform. After independence, such aspirations were fuelled by mounting grievances over the failures of the market-based land reform and the social crisis generated by structural adjustment policies by the mid-1990s (Moyo 2000). Furthermore, since Zimbabwe, like most African countries, remained largely an agrarian society, with the majority of the population being dependent on low-intensity agricultural techniques, its agrarian question continued to require reforms which transform productivity and diversify employment opportunities in the face of rising unemployment and food insecurity.

The prospects and challenges of Zimbabwe's land and agrarian reform

Agrarian reform requires restructuring the role of dominant agrarian classes (such as land owners, merchant capital and agribusinesses), particularly with regard to their super-exploitation of labour, as well as of the extroverted state, towards improving the social relations of agricultural production and the

productivity of land and labour. The overall goal is to enhance agriculture's contribution to national accumulation and economic sovereignty, while the immediate purpose is to 'create the conditions for a rise in [agricultural] productivity, such that [the] raw materials and wage-goods needs of a growing manufacturing sector can be met, while labour is released' (Patnaik 2003). Since 'national' commodity and capital flows intersect with and are shaped by, global processes of production and markets, involving transnational capital (Bernstein 2002), the regulation of trade and industrial policy are critical mechanisms which shape the agrarian transition (Chang 2009). Mal-adjustment and mal-integration into the world economy, entrenched by the neoliberal policies adopted in Africa since the 1980s need to be reversed to realise development (Amin 1990; Mkandawire et al 1999).

Land reform is a necessary dimension of agrarian reform in settler societies, but it is not on its own a sufficient condition for national development (Moyo and Yeros 2005a). Agrarian reform requires state-facilitated land redistribution and support to build the productive and social capabilities of small producers (Evans 2009). Re-orienting agricultural production to the home market, broadening the consumption of wage and industrial goods and services and promoting cooperativism is essential to increasing intersectoral linkages and agricultural productivity growth, in synergy with rising domestic wages and laying the basis of a deeper process of democratic transformation (Moyo and Yeros 2005a). For small and middle-sized farms to realize their employment and productive potential, there has to be a synergy between state interventions in industrial, trade and rural development policies, so as to enhance the potential multiplier effects of agriculture and to increase aggregate demand. A basic related concern is how to address food security, which in Africa was increasingly undermined by neoliberal economic policies and manipulation by dominant monopoly capital (Mafeje 2003) and the underdevelopment of irrigation resources. The recent world food price crises hurt Africa the most, largely due to its weak food production trajectory and dependence on food imports (FAO 2010).

However, for land reform to be redistributive, it need not transfer all the landowners' land to the non-landed poor, but a substantive amount enough to alter agrarian relations and state power (see Borras 2005). Diminishing the influence of agrarian elites through land reforms (as happened in China, Korea and Taiwan) is necessary to remove conservative pressures on development policy-making, that is, the economically powerful and politically reactionary landed classes that monopolise land, force the population to be

landless labourers and reduce incentives among landowners and workers to invest (Evans 2009). Accumulation from below is thus a key objective of redistributive land and agrarian reform.

Zimbabwe's historical processes of accumulation by dispossession of land and labour power eschewed accumulation from below and undermined social reproduction (see Arrighi et al 2010), while post-independence policies failed to resolve the national questions of broad-based development, social inclusion and national integration, including substantive democratisation (Moyo and Yeros 2009). Zimbabwe's agrarian question thus concerned the transformation of the dominant settler-colonial agrarian relations towards a racially and socially equitable structure of access to economic and natural resources by the majority of the peoples towards building a diversified economy.

Agrarian reforms in former settler-Africa were expected to re-orient state intervention towards broader-based rural development and to redress entrenched racially-unequal political and economic power relations. This required the reversal of the territorial and spatial segregation of society maintained through unequal control of land and retrogressive agrarian labour relations, so as to free labour and uplift the lives of working people, straddling between rural and urban areas. Land reform implies restructuring the distribution of land ownership towards a more democratic agrarian structure in order to promote social, economic and political transformation, which creates security of land tenure for all (ANC Conference 2007).

Zimbabwe's land reform experience since 1980 has entailed three different approaches to the acquisition and reallocation of land (see Moyo, Chapter 2). Until 1990, it was a market-based and state-managed land redistribution process, which primarily targeted landlessness, 'overcrowding' and land shortages among the rural and urban poor and unemployed (Moyo 1995). However, some political leaders lobbied for the 'de-racialisation of commercial farming' (Nkomo 2001) and a few black middle-class actors and political elites secured land on the market (Moyo 1995). Meanwhile, various localised illegal land occupations were mobilised to gain access to land (Moyana 1987; Tshuma 1997). This was followed by an unsuccessful attempt between the state and landowners to negotiate land transfers during the ESAP regime, which began in 1990, alongside limited attempts at land expropriation by the state between 1993 and 1997. In 1998, Zimbabwe's revised Land Reform Programme sought to redistribute 5 of the 12 million hectares owned by white farmers, most of which were deemed to be underutilised and near congested Communal Areas and to tackle multiple farm and foreign land ownership (Moyo 2000).

The land and agrarian reform strategy became explicitly bi-focal in 1990 when it sought to redistribute land to small-scale family farms (called A1 schemes) and to smaller-sized capitalist farmers called A2 schemes (GoZ 1998),¹ reflecting the growing influence of the domestic black petty-bourgeoisie on policy-making. *A priori* therefore, the outcome expected was a differentiated pattern of access to land, driven by the belief that it was desirable to maintain some large-scale farms which, it was believed, could use agrarian resources 'efficiently' (ibid). This policy proposed secondary redistributive mechanisms targeting the new larger landholdings, including progressive land taxes, lease rental fees and charges for the use of infrastructures left on the redistributed land, to further the redistribution agenda through revenue transfers. A share-equity transfer approach to the indigenisation of business (including of large agro-industrial estates and conservancies) was also debated in the 1990s, but this was gradually adopted from the early 2000s. The popular expectation was that such shares would be distributed proportionately among a broad base of beneficiaries, including neighbouring communities.

Whereas the land reform process was initially technocratic and conservative in terms of liberal market criteria, it became radicalised through the use of land expropriation on an extensive scale from 1997. In 2000, the FTLRP, which was fuelled by extensive land occupations, mobilised and led by the veterans of the liberation war (see Sadomba and Masuko, Chapters 3 and 4), entailed state land expropriation (see Moyo, Chapter 2), leading to intense conflicts over land, as well as over the numerous elections held from 2000. By 2010, the FTLRP had redistributed over 10 million hectares of Zimbabwe's prime agricultural lands, which in 2000 were held by over 4,000 white Large-Scale Commercial Farmers (LSCFs) and about 200 black LSCFs, to over 145,000 peasant families and over 20,000 small and middle-scale capitalist farmers, while retaining some large-scale farms, agro-industrial estates and conservancies (see Moyo, Chapter 2; Moyo 2011a, 2011b).

This process reconstituted Zimbabwe's agrarian structure (Moyo 2004), altering the nature of property rights and labour relations based on new forms of access to resources and markets. Land redistribution also increased access to farm infrastructures and natural resources which were previously dominated by a racial minority and partially reconstituted gender and ethno-regional dimensions of land and resource control, although it also led to some exclusion, especially of farm workers. This outcome has generated new forms of social differentiation (Moyo and Yeros 2005b), although wider access to land created a new basis for the social legitimacy of land tenure relations,

despite the persistence of some land tenure insecurities and demands for the re-institution of private property relations in agricultural land.

As we had observed, before the FTLRP (Moyo 2000; Yeros 2002) and during its early phases (Moyo and Yeros 2005b), the ‘illegal’ land occupations and official land reforms were reinforcing an incipient process of re-peasantisation and enabling broader-based small-scale capitalist farming. We argued that this was creating prospects for accumulation from below, while generally modifying the semi-proletarianisation process and the conditions of labour exploitation. Contrary to the alleged process of ‘de-agrarianisation’ (Bryceson 1996), re-peasantisation led by radical movements was found to have a wider incidence in the South (Moyo and Yeros 2005a).

The overall outcome of the FTLRP has essentially been the constitution of a qualitatively different tri-modal agrarian structure, in which various classes compete for control over land, labour, water and natural resources, as well as for access to state support and influence over the regulation of markets (see Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6). This pits production for domestic needs against a resurgent export orientation, as capital reconstitutes itself and redefines its role, in a context of growing diversification towards the East. Radical state interventions have pervaded the last decade, in the context of sanctions and hyper-inflation. Various economic contradictions emerged, leading to a renewed liberalisation from mid-2008, although this has in turn introduced new contradictions arising from unequal access to and exploitative, commodity and financial markets (see Chapter 6).

Nonetheless, the structural reforms of the FTLRP promise a deeper form of substantive democracy, in a society previously pervaded by deep racial and class inequities, than the limited demands focused on good governance reforms. True, the immediate conflicts over the land reform process and around the elections held within a context of ‘regime change’ politics during the 2000s led to the narrowing of democratic space and a human rights deficit (Moyo and Yeros 2009). Despite these notable casualties during the period (Mamdani 2008), land reform itself has created the social and economic foundation and potential for broad-based development and democratisation. New forms of rural mobilisation are promising in this regard (see Masuko and Murisa, Chapters 4 and 7).

Moreover, critical deficiencies in the agrarian outcome, such as low levels of agricultural land and labour productivity, the security of land tenure for the various classes of small producers and the weak protection of peasant markets, reflect continuing struggles over development and democratisation. Also in question is the character of Zimbabwe’s re-integration into global circuits.

The structural adjustment of intellectual discourse: some methodological notes

It remains imperative to engage with the dominant interpretations of the Fast Track Land Reform, as these continue to deflect the debate from addressing the requirements of realizing further social progress, while enabling aggressive 'regime change' politics, now justified through the 'right to protect' (R2P) on humanitarian grounds. As we have noted, the inability of most analysts to come to terms with the causes, the process and the outcome of the land reform is related to a profound process of 'intellectual structural adjustment' which has been underway since the 1990s.

To be sure, dubious intellectual positions always existed in and on Zimbabwe, but in the 1990s they germinated with a number of new tendencies. Specifically, these have included: a peculiar mix of liberalism and Weberianism peddled by American political science, especially via the notion of 'neopatrimonialism'; a rudderless culturalist theory of 'identity politics', whose post-structuralism has managed to replicate with great success the settler-colonial obsession with fragmented cultures; and, not least, an escapist 'left' critique, which has often sought refuge in pseudo-Gramscian theories of 'hegemony', whereby patrimonialism and culturalism substitute for class analysis. Indeed, some 'Marxists' succumbed to similar imperialistic and anti-nationalist impulses, to the effect of silencing class analyses which demonstrate the progressive nature of the land reform (see, for instance, Moore 2004).

More recently, some have openly acknowledged the redistributive outcome of the FTLRP, but have redirected the debate into an essentially liberal perspective on 'livelihoods' (e.g., Scoones et al 2010; Scoones et al forthcoming). This approach eschews the interrogation of class formation processes and exploitative relations of production (especially in the emerging labour relations) and the continued extraction of surplus value (particularly from peasants) through exchange relations driven by monopoly-finance capital. The critical role of state intervention in the overall outcome is also visibly downplayed by its liberal-populist orientation. As its main audience is the donor industry, sanctions are not featured in this narrative.

Overall, this is fed by the persistence of inappropriate theoretical perspectives applied to the analysis of the state and society in Africa and the general diversion of scholarly attention away from Marxian political economy. Thus, there is a systematic neglect of the continent's subordinate relations to monopoly-finance capital, as well as empirical analyses of class formation, political alliances, emergent social movements under the current crisis and

the implications for state intervention and development. Furthermore, the nature and sources of external intervention have been reduced to a celebration of a narrow humanism, together with a condemnation of especially the East, rather than a careful understanding of the strategic economic and security changes underway and the new forms of resistance to the new assault on national sovereignty.

In the specific case of Zimbabwe, a new revisionist historiography (e.g., Ranger 2004; Alexander 2006; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004) has downplayed the long historical legacy of settler-colonial relations of production and their ideological power structures. Such historiography has absorbed the legacy of technocratic thought and planning associated with large-scale farming and production practices and its corollary view of blacks mainly as cheap-wage labourers with limited social aspirations and capabilities. Furthermore, struggles over ‘property rights’ are reduced to abstract concerns with formal procedures of land tenure (e.g., Matondi 2011; Cross 2012), rather than conceptualising land tenure as a social relation of production shaped by historically specific class relations and the attitude of dominant forces to political and economic sovereignty (Moyo 2007).

The dominant Africanist writings, largely by self-proclaimed Zimbabweanists, but also the ‘structurally adjusted’ Zimbabwean intellectuals, have been able to offer only a peripheral critique which calls for limited social and political reforms. In the past, they had claimed to give ‘voice’ to various forms and sources of national resistances (proto-nationalists, nationalists, cultural nationalists, ethno-regional protests and local ZAPU nationalists), but restricted their notions of ‘resistance’ around identity-based organisation (e.g. Alexander et al 2000), rather than elucidate the dynamics of class-based social formations and political alliances.

This is the historical intellectual tendency which has now eclectically disaggregated the nationalist resurgence of the late 1990s from its variety of inter-connected social elements, so as to privilege the agency of a narrow civil society (read NGO) mobilisation supported by foreign donors. As neoliberalism gained ascendancy, the dominant intellectual current had concluded that no alternative political economy and no radical agency against the settler-colonial edifice could be envisioned. Radical nationalism, now treated narrowly as ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger 2004), has been rendered as a patrimonial, politically self-serving exercise of rent-seeking by black capitalists associated to the ruling party and as an anathema to the ongoing progress of a ‘globalised world’. Consequently, the analysis of agrarian politics overlooks

actual class struggles over land, labour and markets, including the ways in which new farmers have organised themselves (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7). In this schema, all nationalist forms of social mobilisation and their redistributive outcomes are foreclosed by conceptual fiat.

Indeed, debates on the FTLRP were hinged around contested interpretations of the motives and political party alignments of Zimbabwe's land occupation movements, to the neglect of political economy processes which led to the gradual radicalisation of the land reform policy. The dominant literature has alleged that the FTLRP was centrally directed by ZANU-PF 'elites' and the state (for a rendition of this view, see Marongwe 2011 and Zamchiya 2011) and that, as such, it could only represent the narrow motives of an authoritarian nationalism seeking to retain receding electoral support, while marginalising farm workers who had voted against it (Raftopolous 2003, 2009; Scarnecchia et al 2008). Aspects of the violence which occurred were selectively highlighted, deducing 'disorder' and the wanton abrogation of the rule of law (Hammar et al 2003; Hellum and Derman 2004). Rather than systematically examine the nature of violence that did occur (Moyo and Yeros 2007, 2009), the entire land occupation movement itself was vilified by equating it with extreme human rights violations (Johnson 2009). This volume debates the actual FTLRP process extensively.

Even the structural transformation that has occurred in Zimbabwe since 2000 has been subjected to either prolonged silence or abstract contestations, despite the growing volume of empirical evidence. Among 'progressives', the tendency has been to deny radical or progressive change (Saul 2005; Raftopoulos 2010), or to accept it with reservations (Bernstein 2002, forthcoming), in order to uphold a narrowly-based, essentially liberal narrative of authoritarianism and despotism.

Most liberation war veterans regard the FTLRP process as nothing short of a 'Land Revolution',² while some of them qualify this to reflect a 'completion of the national democratic revolution' (see Sadomba 2008 and McCandless 2011, quoting interviewees). This view is in stark contrast to caricatures of the notion of 'land revolution' (Hammar et al 2003) or the more benign counter-positioning of the process as part of a liberal democratic 'revolution' (Madhuku 2004). Indeed, some elements in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) claimed credit for instigating the radical land reforms, arguing that the FTLRP would never have happened without their agency of challenging ZANU-PF politically (see Gwisai 2002). The evidence points to a variety of local and regional processes of decentralised socio-political

mobilisation (see Masuko, Chapter 4) which shaped the dynamics of the ‘revolution’. Its direction entailed compromises within a two-pronged land allocation strategy seeking to accommodate peasants and small capitalist farmers, as well as negotiating normalisation with sections of transnational capital (e.g., some agro-industrial estates).

Instead, it is alleged that the FTLRP only benefited a few cronies (Scarnecchia et al 2008), reducing the Fast Track struggles for land to an elite affair dominated by ZANU-PF (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011). The language of ‘land grabbing’ was used to create a moral and political equivalence between the restitutive appropriation of colonially- dispossessed lands through the state for land redistribution and externally- inspired land grabs. Only ‘elite capture’ could be envisioned through the dominant neopatrimonialist lenses. Although some elites grabbed land during the FTLRP (Moyo et al 2009; Scoones et al 2010), by overstating the agency of the domestic political elite, the class and wider social dynamics of struggles and competing claims over land, between a range of elites and the landless, vis-à-vis foreign and white domestic capital, were overlooked (Moyo 2011b). Few have examined how the staggered shifts in the FTLRP land allocation processes that characterised the 2000s evolved through various contradictions (see Moyo, Chapter 2).

By 2005, the debate had shifted to claims that agricultural production had collapsed and that food insecurity had reached levels of humanitarian crisis (Richardson 2005; Campbell 2008; Bond 2008). It was assumed that the FTLRP outcome was an unstructured replacement of ‘commercial farming’ with ‘subsistence farming’ and that this could not feed Zimbabwe’s limited agro-industrial structures (Tupy 2007). Others continue to purvey a strange pessimism on the prospects for agricultural recovery (Dekker and Kinsey 2011; Cliffe et al 2011), despite evidence to the contrary and at the expense of understanding the social and structural basis of the agrarian change that is underway (e.g., as proposed by Moyo 2011c; Chambati 2011).

Moreover, there has been a failure to examine the nature and sources of the radical state intervention towards agrarian reform and its evolution over time during the 2000s (see Moyo and Nyoni, Chapter 6) and thus to decipher the contradictions entailed in the face of a highly polarised political landscape and a capital strike, shaped by external isolation and economic sanctions. Thus, the reconfiguration of domestic agrarian markets and struggles over these, in relation to changing forms of state intervention, in the context of a gradual re-orientation of critical commodity and financial markets to the East, have been overlooked. This oversight leads many analysts to ignore the struggles

during the decade between the state and capital over domestic production and supply of agrarian inputs and to miss the wider economic contradictions which shaped the agrarian reforms and their distributional outcome. Few have examined the more recent sources of pressures to indigenise the economy, in relation to the imperatives for agricultural finance, beyond speculating over the likelihood of elite capture.

Consequently, numerous neoliberal visions intended to 'rationalise' the FTLRP landholdings and agrarian policies have been proffered to: re-privatise land; reinstate large-scale export oriented farming; integrate farming into agribusiness; and deepen trade liberalisation (Richardson 2005; Tupy 2007; Adam Smith International 2007; UNDP 2010; USAID 2010). Fortuitously, calls for the 'reversal' of the FTLRP land redistribution were dealt a political blow in 2008 when the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe signed against this, calling instead for improved land tenure security, wider access to land, including for women and for measures to improve land utilisation (For the GPA 2008, see Inclusive GoZ 2009).

Much of this ungrounded discourse against the FTLRP is a consequence of its over-reliance on media renditions of the FTLRP process and outcomes,³ and related reports issued by western funded NGOs (e.g., JAG/ RAU 2008; HRW 2004), Commercial Farmers unions (see CFU 2003) and a few MDC aligned 'public intellectuals', who are routinely pitted against ZANU-PF 'patriotic intellectuals' (see Tendi 2010). Such research has mostly focused on the 'victims' of the land reform (e.g., former land owners and farm workers), to the neglect of the views and experiences of key actors within and protagonists of the FTLRP (such as the land occupiers, land beneficiaries, former and new farm workers and war veterans), as well as of local and central state officials, local NGOs engaged with the FTLRP and the key actors in agribusiness. Official reports and policies are often ignored,⁴ while empirical researchers who go contrary to the dominant narrative are labelled as defenders of the FTLRP (e.g., Cliffe et al 2011; see also Hungwe 2011; Chiweshe 2012). Moreover, the limited empirical analysis pursued has tended to focus on spotting the 'elite' beneficiaries, many of whose unequal access to land is not the real dispute, although what is in question is the definition of such elites and the extent to which they benefited. Such 'elites' are not treated as a differentiated class of people, whose dynamic growth or demise in the process of class formation is worth examining. Beneficiaries employed by the state and war veterans are all assumed to be state and/or ZANU-PF 'elites', let alone assessing their class status and/or rank in such institutions. The many private sector executives

who got land are not readily identified as elite beneficiaries, unless they can be tagged as ZANU-PF members. Thus, diverse social groups are lumped into the category of elites, despite their social differentiation in terms of labour relations, assets and access to finance, let alone their varied positions in the political hierarchy and economy (see Moyo et al 2009). Such ‘elites’ are all deemed to have used political connections and/or corruption to gain access to land and inputs.

Furthermore, in such narratives, only high-profile formal policy statements in the media are considered worthy of note in examining the role of state intervention, to the exclusion of policy shifts induced through informal structures and planned or spontaneous struggles over land and agrarian resources (Moyo 2011a). Thus, the actual substance and politics of agrarian policy-making since 2000 is understudied, leading to a failure to identify its defensive and proactive dimensions, as well as the nuanced and shifting attitude of the state towards capital (which was not fully ousted). The ideological and political influences of big business in relation to the wider race-based intra-capitalist relations and conflicts, including within the ZANU-PF leadership and among other black capitalists, is rarely examined to gauge the reaction of capital (and donors), including the mechanisms they deployed against the FTLRP. The capacity and planning deficiencies of the state are not commented upon, since all the contradictions of the FTLRP are explained as instances of neo-patrimonial corruption and ZANU-PF patronage, within an ‘authoritarian state’, led by atavistic nationalists, supported by violent liberation war veterans.

Yet the origins, processes and outcome of the FTLRP cannot be explained away as being driven merely by a monolithic neopatrimonialist agenda. For, the FTLRP experience raises wider and fundamental questions regarding the ‘best practise’ of implementing redistributive land reform under a neoliberal policy regime, while sustaining electoral democracy. In Zimbabwe’s historically specific context, grievances over settler-colonial dispossession and wider race-class inequalities and the limits to reform imposed by political compromise and market reforms after 1980, shaped and sustained land struggles which culminated in the FTLRP experiences. The political power struggles that ensued and the mobilisation of radical land movements, as well as the authoritarian posture of the state towards a new political opposition from 1999, reflected wider social struggles, which provoked confrontations with the judiciary, capital and the non-state media, as well as with the western donors and related NGOs, most of which were opposed to radical land reform.

Outline of the chapters

This volume presents the findings of eight scholars, who have undertaken sustained empirical work on Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) since 2000, in order to redress the conceptual malaise and the empirical deficiencies of the debate on FTLRP. The chapters examine the nature and implementation of the FTLRP, the social forces which mobilised the land occupations, the transformation of the labour regime during the FTLRP, the patterns of agrarian change that have emerged, the organisation of new farmers at the local level and the media representations of the FTLRP. A concluding chapter distils the key findings.

Research by these scholars entailed local field surveys undertaken between 2000 and 2011 and a national baseline survey in 2005 and 2006, which were organised by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) (see AIAS Baseline Survey 2007),⁵ and numerous follow up field visits undertaken during 2007 and 2011 by the authors. The authors examined multiple local and national sources of secondary data over the decade and undertook interviews with various actors.

Most of the authors have pursued class-oriented ethnographic analyses of a wide range of actors involved 'within' and 'outside' the FTLRP and agrarian reform processes, as well as wider political economy analyses of the process and outcome. The studies build on earlier efforts to trace the social basis of the FTLRP and the social differentiation that has emerged within the newly redistributed areas and related Communal Areas and nationally (see Moyo and Yeros 2005b; Moyo et al 2009),⁶ and seek to understand the character of land and agrarian change since 2000, within its historical context. Various social and economic factors which characterise the new landholders, the agrarian structure and related struggles in relation to control of land, natural resources, production assets and control of labour, as well as their access to markets and the role of capital and the state were explored.

In the second chapter, Sam Moyo identifies the phased manner in which the FTLRP process was implemented over a decade since 2000, in relation to various social struggles and legal changes and examines the redistributive outcome of the FTLRP. His results reinforce earlier projections that both re-peasantisation and the growth of small-scale capitalist producers have widened the prospects for accumulation from below, despite the new class struggles observed (Moyo and Yeros 2005b). He argues that the reform has triggered wider progressive changes in access to land for farming, natural resources and various non-farm work and self-employment 'opportunities', as well as

various symbolic benefits, including the recognition of communities' rights and place in society. Indeed, the FTLRP unravelled the wider roots of unequal power relations, including the territorial segregation inherited from settler-colonialism. The extent to which some economic and political elites benefited more from the FTLRP process and some foreign-owned agro-industrial estates and conservancies were retained, are demarcated. This highlights the persistence of land ownership inequalities in class, gender and ethno-regional terms, which are also reflected in the differentiated access among beneficiaries to farming resources, services and infrastructure and varied capacities to hire labour. This foments new social differentiation processes and agrarian struggles (as discussed in Chapter 6).

Wilbert Sadomba, a war veteran and scholar who participated in the land occupations, traces the role of Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans in the FTLRP process, beginning with their re-organising in the 1990s. He examines how they were mobilised into a militant organisation which confronted the state, demanding welfare benefits, recognition and land redistribution, as well as their eventual leadership of the 'land revolution', involving peasants, farm workers and other urban homeless people. He argues that failing neoliberal economic policies, increasing authoritarian rule and heightened external interventions in the country led to the mobilisation into two formidable movements pitting sections of civil society NGOs and trade unions and the political opposition (the MDC) against the land occupation and wider liberation movement. The nationwide land revolution challenged elitist state tendencies by transforming the localised peasant struggles into a national class struggle with critical ramifications for the structure of state power, leading the state to institute the formal dimension of the 'fast track' land reform programme, in order to simultaneously co-opt the 'land revolution' and suppress political opposition. He contends that the state failed to co-opt the land movement, despite military style and retributive violence, hence the stalemate which led to the sharing of power through a Government of National Unity (GNU).

Louis Masuko, also a war veteran and scholar who participated in the land occupations, extends this debate, arguing that suggestions that the land occupation movement was a top down movement conceived of and directed by a beleaguered state and that it was a one-issue movement, are empirically unfounded. He shows how the land movement was deeply rooted and argues that its long-term social, political and economic sustainability is guaranteed by this origin. Using the Nyabira-Mazowe War Veterans Association as

a case study, he conceptualises how groups of land seekers were mobilised and organised for collective action, using strategies that addressed individual and collective deprivation. He argues that beyond land ownership, the land movement has created new social structures which place new demands on the agrarian policy agenda, including land tenure security and state support for improved land use.

Walter Chambati traces how the FTLRP substantially reformed labour relations due to the restructuring of settler-colonial agrarian structures. He argues that the dominant literature misses this point because of its blindness to the redistributive outcome of the FTLRP and inadequate examination of the labour processes within the emerging agricultural production structures, as well as due to a conservative orientation towards protecting the poorly remunerated former LSCF workers' jobs and an overestimation of formal job losses. He elucidates the new and diverse sources of rural employment that have emerged, including the shortage of wage-labour, as more people work for themselves on their own farms. Wage-labour continues to be provided mostly on a part-time basis to various classes of farms and through new forms of agrarian labour supply, including the increased supply of independently organised specialist labour to larger farms by skilled workers. He also highlights the persistence of labour-tenancy on some farms and the differentiated patterns of labour hiring which are associated with the unequal command over larger land sizes and access to farming resources. He suggests that the FTLRP could improve the social relations of labour by redistributing more land to former farm workers and improving state interventions to protect labour and support social reproduction.

Sam Moyo and Ndaba Nyoni trace the phased introduction of agrarian reform policies instituted on the heels of the equally phased redistributive land reform implemented since 2000 and examine the nature of change in some of Zimbabwe's agrarian relations, as well as their contradictions. They argue that by broadening the agricultural producer base, the sources of food production and the consumption base have been extensively expanded, creating wider prospects for social reproduction, despite the failure to realise past levels of output in some commodities. This highlights the new inequities in access to land and farm input and output markets based on class and regional differences and a growing focus on export-oriented production, although wider sections of rural society have attained food security and realise new sources of income and self-employment. The chapter also explores the re-composition of agricultural outputs and questions dominant behaviourist

approaches which focus on new farmers to explain output decline, providing evidence on the structural limitations imposed on the new producers, including declining inputs and credit supplies, droughts and the rise of exploitative but diverse forms of contract farming. The role of agro-industrial capital and its gradually increased dominance in reconfigured domestic markets, as well as the increased influence of Asian capital, is also explored in the context of the new agrarian politics and persistent sanctions. The chapter reflects on the uneven prospects for accumulation and social reproduction within the new tri-modal agrarian structure, highlighting the wider social and structural changes which place the question of national and economic sovereignty and democratisation on the agenda.

Tendai Murisa argues that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme led to a fundamental re-structuring of the agrarian landscape beyond just the physical repartitioning of large-scale farms into smaller A1 farms and medium-sized A2 farms. It altered previously existing social relations of ownership, access and utilisation of land, by relocating people from diverse areas and backgrounds. The chapter demonstrates the manner in which the land beneficiaries are forging new social relations of production, involving 'strangers' from diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, including from customary land tenure, urban and former Large Scale Commercial Farming areas. The case studies presented discuss the factors which shape the emergence of Local Farmer Groups (LFGs) and their contribution, through a variety of mobilisation strategies, to their social reproduction.

Tendai Chari argues that the FTLRP was an enduring issue in the media over the past decade, although the attention paid to it was not matched by adequate factual information. He examines how the international, locally owned private and state-owned media 'framed' the land and agrarian reform issue and contributed towards shaping public opinion and perceptions about them, using samples of news articles, interviews with key informants and document analysis. The framing of the FTLRP, he finds, was circumscribed by ideological, partisan and commercial motives, limiting the media's ability to broaden and deepen public understanding of land reform and its ramifications for Zimbabwean politics. Whereas the state-owned media accentuated the necessity of redistributing land to correct historical imbalances, they routinely downplayed the negative aspects of the Fast Track Land Reform, some of which were public knowledge. The private domestic media and international media converged to downplay the West's imperialist project in Zimbabwe, while foregrounding neoliberal discourses (such as human rights, democracy,

rule of law and good governance and ‘commercial farming’) as the only basis on which to measure success and ignoring the redistributive outcome. The selective voicing of different actors, self-serving and ‘simulated’ evidence of failure or success of the FTLRP and sweeping generalisations, undermined critical analyses of the FTLRP. He thus queries neoliberal conceptualisations of the media as ‘public spheres’ or ‘watchdogs’, especially in fragile societies grappling with unresolved post-colonial national questions.

The concluding chapter by Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros synthesises the key lessons arising from Zimbabwe’s FTLRP and agrarian reform based on the chapters in this volume and their previous work, highlighting key gaps in the dominant narrative and the scope for further research. Their chapter argues that the case of Zimbabwe presents distinct and innovative characteristics when compared to other cases of radicalisation, reform and resistance. The process of mobilisation includes a number of key elements, namely the multi-class, decentralised and anti-bureaucratic character of the movement, its adherence to radical nationalism, its capacity to articulate grievances across the rural-urban divide and also the radicalisation of its petty-bourgeois components. The process of reform and resistance has entailed the deliberate creation of a tri-modal agrarian structure to accommodate and balance the interests of various domestic classes, the progressive restructuring of labour relations and agrarian markets, the continuing pressures for radical reforms, through the indigenisation of mining and other sectors and the rise of extensive, albeit relatively weak, producer cooperative structures. A final element has been the emergence of a non-aligned foreign policy (despite its official naming as a ‘Look East Policy’), largely in response to political isolation and sanctions from the West and in search for an alternative accumulation strategy, in the context of the growing East-West scramble for resources in the region and emerging global security re-arrangements.

The concluding chapter also highlights some of the resonances between the Zimbabwean land struggles and those on the continent, as well as in the South in general, arguing that there are some convergences and divergences worthy of intellectual attention. Thus, the chapter calls for greater endogenous empirical research which overcomes the pre-occupation with failed interpretations of the nature of the state and agency in Africa.

Notes

1. The A1 model targeted landless and poor families, providing land use permits on small plots for residence cropping and common grazing, while the A2 scheme targeted new ‘commercial’ farmers, providing larger individual plots on long-term lease to beneficiaries supposedly with farming skills and/or resources (including for hiring managers).
2. Personal Communication by John Gwitira to Sam Moyo in Harare, June 2000.
3. These depend on reports from the media (*e.g. Financial Gazette; The Independent; The Standard*) and the commercial farmers’ unions (Commercial Farmers’ Union [CFU]; Justice for Agriculture [JAG]) and some NGOs [Human Rights Forum etc.]).
4. A few studies use official GoZ audit reports (Buka 2002; Utete 2003) and local land allocation distribution data, to which they otherwise give little credence (*e.g. Zimbabwe Institute 2007*).
5. The baseline survey districts were of varied agro-ecological potential with diverse mixed farming systems, ethno-regional and local political situations. Questionnaire surveys, key informant checklists and interviews, focus group discussions, field observations and other opportunistic open interviews were used in both the A1 and A2 settlement schemes. These covered 2,089 households, with 79 per cent of these being A1 settlers, as well as 761 farm workers. This captured data on land tenure, socio-economic characteristics, production, markets, labour and farmer organisational issues. This data is cited as AIAS (2007), while its analysis was reported in Moyo et al (2009). Most of the authors undertook further case studies on their own and/or through the AIAS and some did work for the government’s land audits (Buka 2002; Utete 2003) and participated in studies organised by the European Commission in 2004 and the World Bank in 2006.
6. See Moyo and Sukume 2004; Chambati and Moyo 2004; World Bank 2006; Chambati 2009; Moyo et al 2009; Moyo 2001; Yeros 2002; Helliker 2008; Murisa 2008; Moyo 2006; Masuko et al 2008; Moyo et al 2009; post-graduate theses by Sadomba 2008, Murisa 2010, Chambati 2011.

References

- Adam Smith International, 2007, '100 days: An agenda for Government and Donors in a New Zimbabwe', *Paper from Adam Smith International's Fragile States and Post Conflict Series*, July 2007.
- AIAS Baseline Survey, 2007, 'Inter-district household and whole farm survey', Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS).
- Alexander, J., 2006, *The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003*, Harare: James Currey and Weaver Press.
- Alexander, J., J. McGregor and T. Ranger, 2000, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*, Oxford, Portsmouth, Cape Town and Harare: James Currey, Heinemann, David Philip and Weaver Press.
- Altieri, M.A. and F.R. Funes-Monzote, 2012, 'The Paradox of Cuban Agriculture', *Monthly Review*, Vol. 63, No. 8, pp. 23–33.
- Amin, S., 1972, *Neocolonialism in West Africa*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Amin, S., 1990, *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure*, London: Zed Books.
- ANC Conference, 2007, 'ANC 52nd National Conference 2007– Resolutions', ANC Conference held at the University of Limpopo in Polokwane, 16–20 December 2007.
- Arrighi, G., 1973, 'The Political Economy of Rhodesia', in G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, eds., *Essays in the Political Economy of Africa*, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, pp. 336–77.
- Arrighi, G., Aschoff, N. and Scully, B., 2010, 'Accumulation by Dispossession and its Limits: The Southern Africa Paradigm Revisited', *St Comp Int Dev*, Vol. 45, pp. 410–438.
- Bernstein, H., 2002, 'Agrarian Reform after Developmentalism?', Presentation at the Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, *Taking Stock*, Social Research Centre of the American University in Cairo, 14–15 October 2001.
- Bernstein, H., 2012, 'Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities – by Ian Scoones, Nelson Marongwe, Blasio Mavedzenge, Jacob Mahenehene, Felix Murimbarimba and Chrispen Sukume', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 12, pp. 170–173.
- Bond, P., 2008, 'Response to Lessons of Zimbabwe'. (<http://links.org.au/node/815/9693>) 8 June 2011.
- Borras, S.M. Jr., 2005, 'Can redistributive reform be achieved via market-based land transfer schemes? Lessons and evidence from the Philippines', *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 90–134.
- Borras, S.M. Jr., 2006, 'The Philippine land reform in comparative perspective: some conceptual and methodological implications', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 69–101.
- Bryceson, D., 1996, 'Deagrarianization and rural employment in sub-Saharan Africa: A sectoral perspective', *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 97–111.
- Buka, F., 2002, A preliminary audit report of the Land Reform Programme. Unpublished report, Harare: Government of Zimbabwe.

- Bush, R. and Cliffe, L., 1984, 'Agrarian Policy in Labour Migrant Societies: Reform or Transformation in Zimbabwe?', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 29, pp. 77-94.
- Campbell, H., 2008, 'Mamdani, Mugabe and the African Scholarly Community.' (<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/52845>). 8 June 2011.
- CFU, 2003, 'An overview of commercial Agriculture in Zimbabwe', 11 June 2003.
- Chambati, W., 2009, 'Land reform and changing agrarian labour processes in Zimbabwe', MA Thesis, Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.
- Chambati, W., 2011, 'Restructuring of agrarian labour relations after Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 1047-1068.
- Chambati, W. and Moyo, S., 2004, 'Land Reform and the Political Economy of Agricultural Labour', Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies. Mimeo.
- Chang, H., 2009, 'How to "do" a developmental state: political, organisational and human resource requirements for the developmental state', in O. Edigheji, ed., *Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potential and challenges*, Cape Town: HSRC Press. pp. 82-96.
- Chiweshe, M., 2012, 'Farm level institutions in emergent communities in post fast track Zimbabwe: case of Mazowe district', PhD. Thesis, Grahamstown: Rhodes University.
- Cliffe, L., Alexander, J., Cousins, B. and Gaidzanwa, R., 2011, 'An overview of Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe', editorial introduction, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 907-938.
- Cross, E., 2012, 'The issue of property rights in Africa'. (<http://eddielcross.africanherd.com>). 15 January 2012.
- De Grassi, A., 2008, "'Neo-patrimonialism" and Agricultural Development in Africa: Contributions and Limitations of a Contested Concept', *African Studies Review*, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 107-133.
- Dekker, M. and Kinsey, B., 2011, 'Contextualizing Zimbabwe's land reform: long-term observations from the first generation', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 995-1019.
- European Union, 2007, 'Zimbabwean adaptation strategy to the European Union', Sugar regime reform final report, Brussels: European Union.
- Evans, P. B., 2009, 'Constructing a twenty-first century developmental state: potentialities and pitfalls', in O. Edigheji, ed., *Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: potential and challenges*, Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 37-58.
- FAO, 2010, 'Food Outlook: Global Market Analysis', Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Food Programme.
- GoZ, 1998, 'Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II: A Policy Framework and Project Document', Harare: Government Printers.
- GoZ, 2001, *Fast Track Land Reform Programme*, Harare: Government Printers (Draft 2000).
- Gwisai, M., 2002, *Revolutionaries, resistance and crisis in Zimbabwe: anti-neoliberal struggles in periphery capitalism*, Harare: International Socialist Organisation/Socialist Worker -Zimbabwe.

- Hammar, H., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S., eds., 2003, *Zimbabwe's unfinished business: rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis*, Harare: Weaver Press.
- Helliker, K., 2008, 'Dancing on the same spot: NGOs', in S. Moyo, K. Helliker and T. Murisa, eds., *Contested terrain: land reform and civil society in contemporary Zimbabwe*, Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishers, pp. 239–274.
- Hellum, A. and Derman, B., 2004, 'Land reform and human rights in contemporary Zimbabwe: balancing individual and social justice through an integrated human rights framework', *World Development*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 1785–1805.
- Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2004, 'The politics of food assistance in Zimbabwe', A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Human Rights Watch.
- Hungwe, M., 2011, 'In Search of "Community" in Zimbabwe's Fast Track Resettlement Area of Mazowe District', PhD Thesis, Lund, Sweden: Lund University.
- Inclusive GoZ, 2009, *Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe*, Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, September 2008.
- JAG/RAU, 2008, 'Land, retribution and elections: post-election violence on Zimbabwe's remaining farms 2008', A report prepared by the Justice for Agriculture (JAG) Trust and the Research and Advocacy Unit, May 2008.
- Johnson, D., 2009, 'Mamdani, Moyo and "Deep Thinkers of Zimbabwe"'. (<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/54039>), 12 February 2009.
- Madhuku, L., 2004, 'Law, Politics and the Land Reform Process', in S. Masiyiwa, ed., *Post Independence Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Controversies and Impact on the Economy*, Harare: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of Development Studies. pp. 124–146.
- Mafeje, A., 2003, 'The Agrarian Question, Access to Land and Peasant Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, UNRISD Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 6 May 2003, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
- Mamdani, M., 2008, 'Lessons of Zimbabwe', London Book Review.
- Mandaza, I., 1986, *The State and Politics in a Post-White Settler Colonial Situation in Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980–1986*, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Marongwe, N., 2011, 'Who was allocated Fast Track land and what did they do with it? Selection of A2 farmers in Goromonzi District, Zimbabwe and its impacts on agricultural production', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 1069–1092.
- Masuko, L., 2008, 'War veterans and the Re-emergence of Housing Cooperative', in S. Moyo, K. Helliker and T. Murisa, eds., *Contested Terrain: Land Reform and Civil Society in Contemporary Zimbabwe*, Pietermaritzburg: S&S Publishers.
- Matondi, P., ed., 2011, *Inside the political economy of redistributive land and agrarian reforms in Mazoe, Shamva and Mangwe districts in Zimbabwe*, Harare: Ruzivo Trust.
- McCandless, E., 2011, *Polarisation and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change*, Lanham: Lexington Books.

- Mkandawire, T. and Soludo, C., 1999, *Our Continent Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Mkandawire, T., 2001, 'Thinking about Developmental States in Africa', *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 289–314.
- Mkandawire, T., 2012, *Neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: Critical reflections*, London School of Economics.
- Moore, D., 2004, 'Marxism and Marxist intellectuals in Schizophrenic Zimbabwe: How many Rights for Zimbabwe's left? A comment', *Historical Materialism*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 405-25.
- Moyana, H.V., 1987, *The Victory of Chief Rekayi Tangwena*, Harare: Longman Publishers.
- Moyana, H.V., 2002, *The political economy of land in Zimbabwe*, Gweru: Mambo Press.
- Moyo, S., 1995, *The land question in Zimbabwe*, Harare: SAPES Books.
- Moyo, S., 2000, *Land reform under structural adjustment in Zimbabwe: land use change in Mashonaland provinces*, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
- Moyo, S., 2001, 'The Land Occupation Movement and Democratization in Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Neoliberalism', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 311-330.
- Moyo, S., 2004, 'The overall impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme', AIAS monograph, Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies.
- Moyo, S., 2007, 'Emerging Land Tenure Issues in Zimbabwe', AIAS Monograph, Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies.
- Moyo, S., 2011a, 'Three decades of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 493-531.
- Moyo, S., 2011b, 'Land concentration and accumulation after redistributive reform in post-settler Zimbabwe', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 38, No. 128, pp. 257-276.
- Moyo, S., 2011c, 'Changing agrarian relations after redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 907–934.
- Moyo, S., Chambati, W., Murisa, T., Siziba, D., Dangwa, C., Mujeyi, K., and Nyoni, N., 2009, *Fast Track Land Reform baseline survey in Zimbabwe: trends and tendencies, 2005/06*, Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS).
- Moyo, S., Helliker, K. and Murisa, T., eds., 2008, *Contested terrain: land reform and civil society in contemporary Zimbabwe*, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: S&S publishers.
- Moyo, S. and Sukume, C., 2004, 'Farm Sizes, decongestion and land use: Implications of the Fast Track Land Redistribution Programme in Zimbabwe', Harare: AIAS Mimeo.
- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2005a, 'Introduction', in S. Moyo and P. Yeros, eds., *Reclaiming the land: the resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, London: Zed Books. pp. 1–7.
- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2005b, 'Land occupations and land reform in Zimbabwe: towards the National Democratic Revolution', in S. Moyo and P. Yeros, eds., *Reclaiming the land: the resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, London: Zed Books. pp. 165–208.

- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2007, 'The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe's Interrupted Revolution', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 111, pp. 103-121.
- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2009, 'Zimbabwe ten years on: results and prospects'. (<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/54037>). February.
- Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2011, 'After Zimbabwe: State, Nation and Region in Africa', in S. Moyo and P. Yeros, eds., *Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, London: Pluto Press.
- Murisa, T., 2010, 'Emerging forms of social organisation and agency in the newly resettled areas of Zimbabwe: the cases of Goromonzi and Zvimba districts', PhD. Thesis, Grahamstown: Rhodes University.
- Nkomo, M.J., 2001, *The story of my life*, Harare: Sapes Books.
- Olukoshi, B., 2011, 'Democratic Governance and Accountability in Africa: In search of a Workable Framework', Discussion paper, no. 4, Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
- Patnaik, U., 2003, 'Global capitalism, deflation and agrarian crisis in developing countries', *UNRISD Social Policy Paper Series*.
- Raftopoulos, B., 2003, 'The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe', in A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen, eds., *Zimbabwe's Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis*, Harare: Weaver Press.
- Raftopoulos, B. and Phimister, I., 2004, 'Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion', *Historical Materialism*, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 355-82.
- Raftopoulos, B., 2009, 'The crisis in Zimbabwe', in B. Raftopoulos and A. Mlambo, eds., *A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008: becoming Zimbabwean*, Harare: Weaver Press. pp. 201-32.
- Raftopoulos, B., 2010, 'The Global Political Agreement as a "Passive Revolution": Notes on Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe', *The Round Table*, Vol. 99, No. 411, pp. 705-718.
- Ranger, T., 2004, 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 30, pp. 215-234.
- Republic of South Africa, 2005, 'Report of the National Land Summit', *Nastec*, Johannesburg: Land Affairs, 27-30 July 2005.
- Richardson, C., 2005, 'The loss of property rights and the collapse of Zimbabwe', *Cato Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 541-565.
- Rosset, P. and M. Courville, 2006, *Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform*, Oakland, CA: Food First Books.
- Sader, E., 2011, *The New Mole: Paths of the Latin American Left*, London: Verso.
- Sadomba, W., 2008, 'War veterans in Zimbabwe: complexities of a liberation movement in an African post-colonial settler society', PhD. Thesis, Netherlands: Wageningen University.
- Saul, J.S., 2005, *The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa*, Between The Lines, London Toronto: UKZN Press; Scottville: Monthly Review Press; New York: The Merlin Press.

- Scarnecchia, T. and 33 other scholars, 2008, 'Response to lessons of Zimbabwe'. (<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n01/letters.html>). December 2008.
- Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Murimbarimba, E., Mahenehene, J. and C. Sukume, 2010, *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities*, Harare: Weaver Press and Oxford: James Currey.
- Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Murimbarimba, E., Mahenehene, J. and Sukume, C., 'Livelihoods after Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Understanding Processes of Rural Differentiation', *Journal of Agrarian Change*.
- Stoneman, C., 1988, *Zimbabwe's prospects: issues of race, class, state and capital in Southern Africa*, London: Macmillan.
- Stoneman, C. and L. Cliffe, 1989, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society*, New York: Pinter Publishers.
- Tendi, M., 2010, *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: -Politics, Intellectuals and the Media*, Oxford: Peter Lang Publishers.
- Tshuma, L., 1997, *A matter of (in) justice, law, state and the agrarian question in Zimbabwe*, Harare: SAPES Books.
- Tupy, M.L., 2007, 'A four-step recovery plan for Zimbabwe', CATO Institute. (http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id!48191). 9 October 2008.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 2010, *Human Development Report: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, New York: UNDP.
- USAID, 2010, 'Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Market Study', Washington D.C.: Weidemann Associates, Inc.
- Utete Report, 2003, 'Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee', under the chairmanship of Dr Charles M.B. Utete, Vols. 1 and 2: Main report to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC), Harare: Government Printers.
- Weiner, D., 1988, 'Land and Agricultural Development', in C. Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class and Capital in Southern Africa*, London: Macmillan., pp. 63-89.
- West, Michael O., 2002, *The Rise of an African Middle Class: colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- World Bank, 2006, *Agricultural Growth and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Assessment and Recovery Options*, Report No. 31699-ZW, Harare: World Bank.
- Yeros, P., 2002, 'The political economy of civilisation: peasant-workers in Zimbabwe and the neo-colonial world', PhD. Thesis, University of London.
- Zamchiya, P., 2011, 'A synopsis of land and agrarian change in Chipinge District, Zimbabwe', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 1093-1122.
- Zimbabwe Institute, 2007, *Understanding the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Resettlement Programme*, Cape Town: Zimbabwe Institute.

