The Airport Geography of Power as Site and Limit of NEPAD’s Transnational African Assemblage

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Abstract

This article mobilises the Deleuzian analytical category of ‘assemblage’ to distinctly bring to view how racial profiling in South African airport spaces operationalises a paradoxical discourse of invidious visibility and invisibility that flies in the face of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as articulated in the vision embraced by the member states of the African Union, of which South Africa is part. The said discourse, this article argues, runs counter to the spirit of NEPAD as it becomes an inscribing socius in a territorial machine that is geared towards not only processing entries and exits of African migrants into the airport. It recolonises the African airport into a zone of exception, reterritorialising the African assemblage into a space definable by the particularities of race and nation. The airport becomes a veritable zone of exception: no recognition of movement rights for African migrants despite proclamations of priorities of regional integration in Africa. Over South African airports now hover signature meta-narratives that are at variance with NEPAD. Nothing exemplified this more than the unfair detention of Wole Soyinka in a South African airport, especially because the Nobel Laureate was officially invited to give an address in honour of Nelson Mandela.

Keywords: Assemblage, NEPAD, Airport, migrants, South Africa, terrorist, tourists

Résumé

Cet article mobilise la catégorie analytique deleuzienne de l’« assemblage » pour clairement illustrer comment le profilage racial dans les espaces aéroportuaires sud-africains opérationnalise un discours paradoxal de visibilité et d’invisibilité injustes qui va à l’encontre du Nouveau partenariat pour le développement de

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l’Afrique (NEPAD) dans sa vision adoptée par les États membres de l’Union africaine, dont l’Afrique du Sud. Ce discours, selon le présent article, va à l’encontre de l’esprit du NEPAD, qui devient un socius inscriptible dans une machine territoriale qui n’est pas axée uniquement sur le traitement des entrées et des sorties des migrants africains dans l’aéroport. Il recolone l’aéroport africain en une zone d’exception et re-territorialise l’assemblage africain dans un espace définissable à travers les particularités de la race et de la nation. L’aéroport devient alors une véritable zone d’exception: non reconnaissance des droits de circulation des migrants africains en dépit des proclamations de priorités d’intégration régionale en Afrique. Dans les points d’entrée sud-africains, il existe des méta récits distinctifs, en contradiction avec le NEPAD. Rien n’illustre mieux cela que la détention injuste de Wole Soyinka dans un aéroport sud-africain, surtout que le prix Nobel avait officiellement été invité à prononcer un discours en l’honneur de Nelson Mandela.

Mots-clés : Assemblage, NEPAD, Aéroport, migrants, Afrique du Sud, terroriste, touristes

Whereas Africa is generally deemed ‘a major theatre of migration activity’ with the greatest prospect to disrupt and destabilise this continent (Cross and Omoluabi 2006: 1), South Africa in particular has become the vortex of profiling African and Asian migrants who enter ports of entry unduly cast under the cloud of suspicion in advance. Based on the Masemola and Chaka (2011: 190) research pointing to the relationship between the steady removal of socio-economic vectors of exclusion and misplaced belonging, coupled with closer monitoring of access and use of technologies’ at the South African airports, this article argues that South Africa’s profiling discourse has not yet leveraged the developmental thrust envisaged in its espousal of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). This shortcoming is exemplified by the Soyinka fiasco of 2005. According to Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, ‘the role of NEPAD is to facilitate, with its new mandate, the implementation of regional programmes and projects in transport, in power, in energy, in agriculture and so on, and make policymakers understand the necessity to have regional programmes on these issues’ (2011: 4). The transnational African assemblage, shaped on the anvil of the nomos of migration, is challenged and arrested in the abstract machine of the airport as a ‘zone of exception’ and not a Fanonist ‘zone of occult instability’ (1963: 183) where African people are in fluctuating movement towards the assemblage of regional integration and participation. In the difficult, if paradoxical, conflation of the two zones enabling the motors of surveillance and profiling, there is not only the disabling of the vectors of the transnational African assemblage but also an undermining of
the integrity of NEPAD, the African Renaissance and the spirit of diasporic homecoming and passage. Entry into the airport space is an exit, even an exception, from the positive edicts of an inchoate geopolitical African unity in whatever official, nascent and nondescript forms.

Drawing observations from the airport traffic regulation processes 2010 World Cup hosted by South Africa, Masemola and Chaka (2011:178) have demonstrated the South African airport’s surveillant assemblage and the abstract machine it operationalizes on the African body that arrives at the pint of entry. In light of this, and extending the latter findings here, the infamous Soyinka airport incident shows the airport site and its profiling protocols of surveillance as culturally disavowing the transnational archive from which South Africa drew figures of political memory: from Kwame Nkrumah to Mahatma Gandhi, from Julius Nyerere to Jawaharlal Nehru (Hofmeyr 2007: 14–15). Also, through NEPAD, South Africa and Africa of which it is part are but one assemblage, something not yet manifest in the protocols and procedures of entry and exit into South African ports of entry. Interestingly, Deleuze asks: ‘What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a “sympathy”’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 69). To be African in the presence of the abstract machine of the airport’s screening dataveillance is to experience fully the absence of co-functioning, symbiosis and sympathy.

Strangely, the resultant profile picture of surveillance is in monochrome: black criminals/traffickers and white tourists. The notion of assemblage whose provenance is Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical work on deterritorialisation – based on the destabilisation of traditional concepts of territory – is extended to critique aviation ports of entry, particularly how transnational African assemblages encounter airports that discursively transmogrify into points of entry into the public discourse of the Islamic/Arab/African militant terrorist-cum-trafficker with the aid of profiling, biometrics and even nanotechnology. Accordingly, this article takes its cues from Hempel and Töpfer (2009) as it grounds the question of airport regulation on the notion of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ to explain regulation as part of a surveillance consensus that creates ‘the illusion of total inclusion’ by means of technologies that increase visibility as they work invisibly. In this context, airport regulation of exits and entries into airport terminals arguably renders that space as what Bigo (2006) calls the ‘ban-opticon’ (which is distinct from Foucault’s ‘panopticon’ with regard to emphasis on mobility instead of the fixed gaze), in that ‘only the few profiled as “unwelcome” are monitored by a few’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 160).
To arrive in an airport which still has a separate check-in stall for Africans vis-à-vis South Africans and Europeans is symptomatic of a baseline premise of difference that not only contradicts geopolitical realities of interconnectedness but also diminishes the scope of intergovernmental interventions. Interestingly, survey results from a study by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) clearly demonstrate that targeted screening of airline passengers raises conflicting concerns of efficiency and equity, owing to hindsight biases and embeddedness effects in terrorism risk beliefs.

Figure 1: South African airport signpost

As per Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of representation, this article takes its cues from Hempel and Töpfer (2009) as it grounds the question of airport regulation on the notion of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ such as it is applied by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) to explain regulation as part of a surveillance consensus that creates ‘the illusion of total inclusion’ by means of technologies that increase visibility as they work invisibly. Surely this exclusive visibility does not redeem what the socially invisible and unnamed Afro-American protagonist in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) decried. Drawing from the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti, this article endorses the view, that the community (even in the inclusive and broader conception of NEPAD) is acknowledged as the source of one’s humanity (1984: 180) – especially at the African airport. This would readily counter the abstract territorial machine that is made concrete the moment it invisibly territorialises and racially objectivises the body as visible in the space configured by the Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA). No matter what negative images the mainstream media popularizes about Chibok abductions in West Africa and the memory of terror in East Africa, it must be borne in mind that – the anti-terror agenda profiling notwithstanding – ‘in the African view
it is the community which defines the person as a person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory’ (Menkiti 1984: 172). In the same vein, Fredric Jameson sees this as ‘a problem with the body as a positive slogan’, particularly when it is conceived of as a unified entity:

We experience the body through our experience of the world and of other people, so that it is perhaps a misnomer to speak of the body at all as a substantive with a definite article, unless we have in mind the bodies of others, rather than our own phenomenological referent. (Jameson 2003: 713)

To work invisibly on the ‘other’ body, the body of an African, that unified entity of terror-cum-trafficker ‘suspecthood’ in South African airports, is for profiling and CCTV cameras qua abstract territorial machine to be hidden. Ironically, it is also to latch on to the surveillant assemblage that mobilises media reinforcements and an inscribing *socius* of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’: the abstract machine, of which invisible surveillance technologies are both metaphor and limit, inaugurates exclusion of deviant behaviour profiles of terror and media arrangements of coverage of white/European terrorism through heightened visibility. Such was the visibility of Wole Soyinka, based on exclusion. Exclusion on the basis of profiling is here understood to be exceptional in ‘the way it excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behavior’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 161).

**The Invidious Visibility of the African Assemblage**

However, exclusion does not only advance the ‘otherness’ of terrorism: it also naturalises ‘sameness’ through the illusion of total inclusion of everyone occupying spaces such as throughout South Africa. From the moment of entry into the abstract territorial machine, i.e., the racialised discourses of profiling, the illusion of total inclusion represents more a totalising discourse than a function of security. Even on the airport on African soil, the African and Asian body are caught up in the problematic of being credibly conceptualised, in the fashion of Jameson (2003: 713), except only as a positive slogan – positive in terms of invidious visibility. Belonging to the racial profile and its associated edicts, the suspect’s body only becomes real in relation to the body politic attending security protocols: it becomes an essentialised body-without-organs, an object of the invisible inscribing *socius* of the abstract territorial machine.

The visible body without organs is therefore non-white and, in the wake of the anti-terrorist agenda, is positioned as an object whose visibility resonates with the north London riots of August 2011, such as they hark back to the racial sentiments in the London of 1958:

There were anti-black riots in London in 1958, and the first Commonwealth Immigrants Bill became law in 1962... This was a period of instability and
realignement, when the newly independent African colonies and the increasing Caribbean presence played their part in bringing about a shift of ideas on the transference of culture, and when debates on ideas of cultural mutuality rather than one-way dominance were on the agenda. (Gunner 2010: 261)

Cultural mutuality, if not NEPAD’s regional integration objectives, at any rate should facilitate the transference of culture right through the South African ports of entry. Whereas transference is a function of a fundamentally transnational travelling culture, it has since been chaperoned on its routes by the anti-terrorist off-spin of globalisation that (as an intended or unintended consequences) guaranteed free movement of capital flows and not visible bodies without organs. Failure to regulate stereotype-linked profile biases can prove disastrous. With a history of anti-racist struggle, the South African airport as a zone of exception abdicated a role in enabling, through interaction with Soyinka in the public sphere, what Paul Gilroy deems a transnational black culture that qualifies itself as a counterculture of modernity on the basis of a philosophical discourse that unites ‘ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics’ (Gilroy 1993: 38–9). The arrival of Soyinka, given the scale of his ethical stance through the public effect of his literary aesthetics, gives content to a counterculture of modernity in the same way that Nelson Mandela’s inspiration by S.E.K. Mqhayi’s assegai to mount the beginnings of the ‘Assegai of the Nation/Umkhonto we Sizwe’ with the material support he marshalls all over Africa. In his autobiography, The Long Walk to Freedom (1994), Nelson Mandela remembers that the underground movement took him abroad, literally all over Africa, where he spoke face to face with Julius Nyerere (Mandela 1994: 279), had private discussions with Kenneth Kaunda (ibid.: 284), met Tunisian President Habib Bourgiba who enthusiastically offered training for MK as well as offered 5,000 pounds (sterling) for weapons (ibid.: 286) as did President Tubman in Liberia, who offered US$5000 for weapons and training, right after Mandela had received ‘generous material assistance’ from prime minister Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone (ibid.: 288) and before he would receive an audience and a suitcase full of bank notes from Guinean Sékou Touré (ibid.: 289) and then have his diplomatic passport and plane fares to England arranged and paid for by President Leopold Senghor subsequent to a personal meeting in his hotel in Senegal (ibid.: 290).

A month before the Soyinka fiasco in South Africa’s O.R. Tambo International Airport in August 2005, the fatal shooting in the head of Brazilian national Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell tube station on the London Underground by unnamed Metropolitan Police after being mistaken for a suicide bomber was a culmination of profiling-aided anti-terrorist surveillance. Since that fateful day of 22 July 2005 CCTV footage profiles have had to be queried. To question whether there is a symmetrical relationship between profiling and combating
criminal(ised) terrorist resistance is to test the hypothesis that advances in aviation security are directly proportional to the efficacy of preventative surveillance methods but inversely proportional to the rate of criminal incidents. This is to be tested against the historical background of the 1972 bloodbath in Munich’s Furstenfeldbruck airport in the aftermath of the hostage-taking of 11 Israeli athletes by a small band of Arab terrorists.

Whereas the stench of xenophobia-cum-racism hardly peters out, in South Africa today, ‘whiteness is invisible to most white people’ (Steyn 2001 quoted in Seekings 2008: 6). The South African airport then becomes a point of confluence of social and cultural dimensions of ‘race’; a place where stereotypically banned individuals (Arab/African/Asian Muslim), instead of entire populations, are made visible beyond the available means of dataveillance but paradoxically within the configuration of the surveillant assemblage. In this (dis-)order of things, the lot of black African and Arabic sports tourists is far greater than imagined anywhere else, because, the deracialisation of citizenship and public policy in post-apartheid South Africa society notwithstanding, race still has a salience, ‘remaining distinctive in terms of the social, political or economic roles played by “race”’ (Seekings, 2008: 2). I am not certain if the same can be said of English fans of Asian and African descent – lest we overly glean cultural racism against British blacks vividly captured by the titular significance of Paul Gilroy’s There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (1987). Racialisation qua profiling remains pervasive. However:

Because Racialization implies a set of differentially racialized cultural contexts it also constitutes a move away from the common assumption that such a context is formed by a single, coherent racist ideology. Instead, it allows for an understanding of the contradictions and incoherencies within and between the expressions of racism in different domains of soccer culture. (Müller, van Zoonen and de Roode 2007: 338, emphasis added)

In the current political climate, where media profiling as a function of agenda setting projects militancy as the hallmark of right-wingers versus the radical President of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), Julius Malema, racialisation has taken over to a point where it is convenient for tourists to play ‘victim’ to South African blacks in advance. The much-publicised Dewali murder case, though an exception, has shifted the binaries of the African/Asian versus the European in no small measure – except to the extent that African and Asian of European naturalisation seemingly entrenches their ‘suscepthood’ in a manner that unwittingly foregrounds white/European victimhood. Consider then the invisible right-wing terror threat that, despite reports of its thefts of arms caches from military bases being reported (Cape Times 2010), is discounted on the basis of a de-emphasis, a silence, an invisibility of whiteness.
White Tourists-cum-investors vis-à-vis African Terrorists-cum-Traffickers

We must also consider the discursive interaction between white South African expatriates abroad and potential tourists. In fact, this influential discourse is symptomatic of what Melissa Steyn terms ‘white talk’, whose ‘main function is to manipulate the contradictions of diasporic whiteness, in order to maximise the advantages of whites in South Africa’ (2005: 127).

As Figure 2 attests, the airport renders the spectre flagrant as tourists catch on the prevalent dynamic of protecting the invisible yet endangered white (and especially Afrikaner) species against ‘die swart gevaar’ (or black peril). This is symptomatic of what Jeremy Seekings terms the salience of race in social and political life of a multi-cultural and constitutionally non-racial South Africa (2008: 6).

Figure 2: Foreign tourists in a South African airport.
Picture courtesy of P.M. Lubisi

The wearing of the t-shirts (as shown in Figure 2) give South Africa unwanted attention to things other than its intended attractions. In its capacity as a World Cup host country South Africa aimed for ‘visibility and advantage in the context of competitive market liberalisation’ (Black and Van der Westhuisen 2004: 1196). Has this concern superseded South Africa’s commitments to NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals? Public spectacles of the ‘other’ visibility are the unintended consequences of the larger liberalisation project. Airport traffic security protocols, however, are not as liberal as market forces; nor are the attitudes and profiles that interact in the airport territory.
The South African airport becomes what Bigo (2006) calls the ‘ban-opticon’ (which is distinct from Foucault’s ‘panopticon’ with regard to emphasis on mobility instead of the fixed gaze), in that ‘only the few profiled as “unwelcome” are monitored by a few’ (Hempel and Töpfer, 2009: 160). If precedent is anything to go by, since the London bombing of July 2005 public discourse about CCTV in the UK ‘now places less emphasis on crime prevention and more on the ability to prosecute offenders on the basis of CCTV footage’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 158). Will the ACSA abstract machine behind the airport security apparatus acknowledge a mea culpa moment?

Like the United States, South Africa runs the risk of imposing amnesia about historical racial imbalances when it promulgates laws that do not synergise with the NEPAD policy landscape and its vision, fast becoming ‘society that has intensified its racism behind the cloak of colorblindness and other post-racial myths while at the same time exercising with more diligence its policing and punishing functions’ (Masemola 2014: 54). This, however, raises questions as to how terrorists slipped the net at secure airports on 19 January 2010, when Mossad secret service agents entered the Dubai airport using forged Australian passports and proceeded to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, who was considered by them to be a senior commander of a radical Palestinian group, thus raising profound questions about the responsibilities of states (Abeyratne 2010). The jury is out as to whether in the aftermath of the passport falsification diplomatic scandal an attendant alteration of profiles took place. Passport falsification, however, officially remains the profiled mark of African visibility at South African and international ports of entry.

Figure 3: Profile-based searches of Africans

Today, however, as the profile of the terrorist clearly mutates, ACSA’s answer comes in three parts: CCTV public area surveillance, in biometric data sets that, through Interpol’s dataveillance, are readily accessible to airport security and, if
not, in profiling. Used in tandem, with the right balance (depending on each situation), biometric data and profiling could arguably prove a redoubtable combination for combating both human trafficking and terrorism. In an advent where ‘deviant behaviour has been correlated with crime, crime with terrorism and terrorism with war’ (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 156), traffickers and terrorists on ‘most wanted’ lists can be reliably and scientifically vetted thorough the data of their scanned iris and fingerprints yet, critically, profiling can be a matter of para-scientific conjecture, the scientific criminological scholarship feeding it notwithstanding. While profiling decidedly criminalises both human traffickers and terrorists by its very methodology (Hempel and Töpfer 2009: 165), it fails to recognise movements and changing patterns of profiles in an uncertain geopolitical landscape across the North–South axis. With economic instability and high unemployment in the European Union rising in proportion to xenophobia and racism, calls for anti-terrorist security have bolstered the violent backlash against immigrants, particularly if they look Arabic or African in Islamic dress code. A study by Miller et al. (2008) has shown evidence of disproportionality of police stops, especially in a fashion that singles out particular racial groups for unwanted attention. This phenomenon of racial profiling underscores that ‘police use of racial or ethnic characteristics to decide whom to investigate for, as yet, unknown criminal offences’ (Miller et al. 2008: 162–3). As a synecdoche of the profiling discourses that shape the South African airport ‘ban-opticon’, the Soyinka debacle shows the tendency criminalises African migrants.

**African Assemblage vis-à-vis the Rainbow Nation?**

In the spirit of NEPAD, there has to be a disavowal of racial profiling, for the terrorist is not Arabic as a rule, nor is it true that every Nigerian is a criminal, nor every Jew entering a South African airport an Israeli agent on a fake Australian passport (Abeyratne 2010). The ‘Islamicised’ terrorist could be an intolerant African in West or Central Africa forcibly appropriating commercially viable land in the name of religious righteousness from conveniently labelled ‘Christian’ owners; or, the terrorist could be a breakaway Orthodox Muslim Caucasian from Eastern Europe acting on the heat of a backlash against sanctimonious graffiti on their relatives’ graves; the terrorist could be merely a self-styled patriotic racist in former East Germany incapable of handling the trade-offs of social features in EU citizenry; an armed right-winger in the US or South Africa, a secessionist in the former Eastern bloc or, indeed, in West Africa. Clearly there is no such thing as ‘the usual suspects’, only the visibly excluded and isolated targets of the surveillant assemblage’s invisibility. Whilst all of the foregoing racially ‘non-profiled’ types could land in any South African airport, the mere mention of secessionists in Africa gives occasion to pay attention to the recent shooting of
Togo national soccer team players by a separatist group called the Front for the Liberation of Enclave of Cabinda during the African Cup of Nations held in Angola, plus the suspected presence of al-Shabaab militants in South Africa, over and above the South African and Kenyan protests against excessive Israeli military raids in Gaza – there is a chance that the lens of aviation biometric data might be inevitably eclipsed by binary demarcations of the Arabesque/African trafficker-terrorist and the European/white investor-tourist.

It is here instructive to depart from binarism and instead takes cues from survey results (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2003) which clearly demonstrate that targeted screening of airline passengers raises conflicting concerns of efficiency and equity, owing to ‘hindsight biases and embeddedness effects’ in terrorism risk beliefs. Such terrorism risk beliefs are buttressed by distrust born of what Jeremy Seekings identifies as an ‘official multiculturalism [that] serves, however, to reproduce the culturally-based racial identities of the past’ (2008: 6) in South Africa’s racially-defined redress strategies. The surveillant assemblage, then, has a different nature to the sympathetic relations arising out of the assemblage of a non-racial, multicultural ‘Rainbow Nation’ (to borrow a term from the Nobel Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu) that thrives on difference, diversity and tolerance. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a “sympathy” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 69). In the current context, however, the liaisons between the heterogeneous racial terms of the Rainbow Nation evince no unity of co-functioning but ‘the illusion of total inclusion’ so aptly described by Haggerty and Ericson (2000) and applied by Hempel and Töpfer (2009). The Rainbow Nation is an assemblage that, in the case of sub-Saharan Africans, is even in denial of its heterogeneous terms inspired by the African Renaissance.

Proceeding from the observation that major events like the world conference on racism, and even on sustainable development are unlike the World Cup in that the latter gives licence to patriotism and powerfully emotional shared experiences, Black and Van der Westhuizen argue that such sporting events have ‘the capacity to shape and project images of the host, both domestically and globally’ (2004: 1195). The emerging Pan-African narrative of NEPAD is oftentimes halted at the airport, where Africans are profiled as the unlikely host, as drifters from ‘other’ African countries with unstable politics and ethno-religious conflicts. All that profiling renders visible – and overgeneralises – what has already been observed as ‘labour migration from eastern and southern African countries to South Africa’ (Adepoju 2006: 25).
At the same time, Blain and Boyle caution us about the role of the media as and when it project images of the host country: even the manner in which sport is written about or broadcast in South Africa ‘constitutes a source of information about our beliefs and attitudes, in other words a sense of who we are and what other people are like’ (1998: 370). This became axiomatic in the run up to the ‘African’ World Cup, for example: local and international media deliberately emphasised and de-emphasises successes and failures resulting from South Africa’s political beliefs and cultural attitudes. Even then, ‘[d]ominant Western definitions of issues are preferred, even if these have imperial overtones, and this is regarded as “greater objectivity” and the avoidance of vested interests’ (Steyn 2005: 12). To shape and project images of the South African destination country for Africans and Asians, in or out of the broader African continental context, is to provide a supplementary country profile rather than the socio-economic demographic profile in which, say, the protocols of NEPAD and free movement take priority. Embedded stereotypes provide the cues.

Like crime in general, terrorism and human trafficking through South African airports attenuate what Black and Van der Westhuizen (2004) conceptualise as the ‘marketing power’ of ‘semi-peripheral’ polities and spaces such as South Africa that seek to celebrate human rights and national identity. Such ‘marketing power’, by extension, marshalls the apparent allure of global games to serve the NEPAD-inspired political imperative of showcasing the balance between socio-economic development, political liberalisation and human rights to tourists. The problem with this perspective, on balance, is that development is more closely allied to market liberalisation: the organisers – not the country, not the continent nor NEPAD – stand to benefit, at the expense of scoring high on human rights values that deracialise profiling. Failure to achieve this balance, according to Dunning (2000), is symptomatic of major ‘fault-lines’ of particular hosting countries: effective policies are urgently needed if South Africa is to be protected from the serious threat posed by a combination of misdirected profiling and politically-loaded anti-African agenda-setting in the media. In the South African airport ‘ban-opticon’, the Peace Laureate Desmond Tutu’s vision is attenuated by the invidious visibility of Wole Soyinka, the Literature Laureate.

Conversely, are possibly efficacious security measures in and beyond airports being overshadowed by a steadily ossifying ideology of anti-terrorism in the name of democracy? This discussion runs the risk of being bogged down in the axiomatic inference that ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist, an innocent bystander an agent of imperialist oppression’ (Dingley 2001: 24). Yet there is no glory in the gore of these resistance activities. For one thing, White (1991) and Nettler (1982, discussed in Vito and Holmes 1994) are agreed that crimes assume greater importance the moment they are labelled as terrorist,
and terror groups by the very nature of their operations thrive on (and exploit) the publicity they receive from the media to advertise their causes. What of assumed crimes and perpetrators? What of Wole Soyinka? The Abuja bombings in Nigeria filtered into the public consciousness through the images on SABC, CNN television and other news networks internationally. This brutality often wins no sympathy to the causes they advocate but rather entrenches the political and social degrading of their causes such that, purely from an abhorrence of such brutality, terrorist resistance becomes firmly understood (1) from a moral viewpoint (Jenkins 1980) for the lack of a superior or humane morality relative to society as well as the governments it is used against, and (2) becomes a fittingly 'pejorative term' (Wilkinson 1994; Dingley 2001). In South Africa, that nation that owes the Nigerian Laureate Wole Soyinka more than a million apologies, agenda setting in the media prefers to latch on to the Abuja bombings and focuses more on the discourse of terror and anti-terror.

But then again, whilst the terrorist holds a different view of the moral content of the actions, it is imperative that criminal theory delves into the ethno-theories that inform identity-making, how terrorists belong to a cause they fully identify with. Islamicisation of political causes, for example, is not consistent with an ‘isolation process’ in which ‘the norms of society are rejected and new ones created by which they judge and justify their actions’ (White 1991: 11o). It is foolhardy, then, to Islamicise the cause of, say, MEND\(^2\) in the name of waging a war against terrorism. There is a thin and fine moral dividing line between terrorism and anti-terrorism:

What terrorists are doing is in itself no different from what governments do; and just as governments resort to war as a ‘mere continuation of policy’ by other means’ so terrorists use the same arguments, e.g. ‘only after just demands have been ignored ... Of course it is the terrorist who arrogates to himself the right to define what is right. Here lies an important moral distinction between the use of terror and by governments: governments normally have to answer to a larger constituency (Dingley 2001: 25, emphasis added).

This may hold as true for terror-sponsoring states as it does for countries that allow Al-Qaeda free reign in the Middle East as well as right-wing militia in the West. The same should be said of countries in the West, such as the US, that denounce terror yet take a soft approach to right-wingers who peddle xenophobic, supremacist agendas to further their political ambitions. In fact, internal terrorist threats have been known to be tolerated, if only to supplement the governments’ terror/anti-terror projects abroad. Such public domain knowledge, filtering into the public conscience as back-up rather than vigilante in protecting a nation’s ‘way of life’, has ironically stimulated real economic value in the definition of risk and risk prevention. A sizeable security industry has burgeoned, prioritising the
anti-terror agenda over NEPAD and the African Renaissance. In terms of the African Renaissance and NEPAD, as well as its own diversity, South Africa has no such exclusive claim to a national way of life, especially given its history of the liberation struggle and its geopolitical space in Africa.

**Conclusion**

Whereas Mandela’s travails made him iconic beyond South African borders, Wole Soyinka’s difficult passage through a South African port of entry became a scandalous synecdoche of the South African airport’s geography of power. The ‘ban-opticon’ first rendered Soyinka visible, then proceeded to exclude him. If the schematic motors of dataveillance reify the post-9/11 agenda, the conditions that regulate entries and exits are transmuted in the surveillance discourses of airport (in-)security. In this self-styled zone of exception, the hue of profiles remains in the monochrome of black and white in a ‘Rainbow Nation’. Owing to ‘a conservative turn that has taken place in (especially American) Western politics’ (Steyn 2005: 129), relative tolerance of white extremist anti-terror/terror groupings simply stimulates a market for media and/or military products such that what is known as a ‘national way of life’ is ultimately worthy of economic investment, by the state, in technologies of war advancing national interests.

More significant in currency than NEPAD’s regional integration plans, which in themselves value trade and infrastructure over persons, the value of military hardware and surveillance technologies in this context is stimulated by threats ranged against interests in projected actuarial values. That explains why this article finds extant South African airport security lagging behind, overtaken and overwhelmed by events that attend to the economic fulcrum on which terrorism and anti-terrorism rest. Perhaps it is time the praxis of South African airport regulation took stock of NEPAD’s priorities as well as diversity within continental African societies, reimagining South Africa as part of the African assemblage, instead of rendering African and Asian groups visible and invisible under the illusion of total inclusion. Profiling has to call time on zoning ‘the usual suspects’ within the ban-opticon of the South African airport’s surveillant assemblage.

**Notes**

1. Ordinary employees of the South African Home Affairs at the point of entry either have carte blanche to be stricter with African migrants or are simply ignorant of the Pan-African agenda and unitary drive of NEPAD and its policy concessions at the level of prioritization of regional integration and mobility.
2. UK NGO established in 2014 to tackle Islamophobia and encourage political, civic and social engagement within British Muslim communities.
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