Introduction

This chapter discusses land issues in southern Africa in general, and in Zimbabwe in particular. At independence most African states with settler white farmers inherited a skewed land distribution in favour of the white commercial farmers. Countries like Namibia and South Africa, among others, embarked on some land redistribution programmes in a bid to reduce the imbalances in the distribution of land and to reduce poverty through empowering the indigenous people. When the German government occupied the land of Namibia their focus was on making use of the land resources. Tapscott (1994) notes that at independence, some 45 per cent of the total land area and 74 per cent of the potentially arable land was owned by less than four thousand one hundred people, mainly white commercial farmers, who comprised less than 0.2 per cent of the total population. It should be noted that about 40 per cent of land in Namibia is commercial, surveyed and fenced and is overwhelmingly in the hands of a white minority (Van Donge, Eiseb and Mosimane 2005). According to the same authors, 45 per cent of the Namibian population lives in about 7 per cent of the territory’s surface, a clear indication that there is overcrowding and pressure on resources. The land question in Namibia centres around two important issues, firstly, individual claims are emerging in communal areas as rich farmers fence land which is threatening access to land by the poor. The government of Namibia has thus removed authority and power over land from the local traditional leaders (Van Donge et al 2005).
Secondly, the government of Namibia introduced a market-led land reform dictated by the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ principle (Harring et al 2002). It was agreed that historical claims were not to be entertained, and, as a result, the government started purchasing land to resettle the landless indigenous people. However, the rate of land acquisition has negatively impacted on Namibia’s land reform programme (Tapscott 1994). In addition, some of the farms designated for sale to government were in marginal agricultural areas. Few black nationalists have been willing or able to buy the land at commercial rates. The willing buyer willing seller principle slowed the land reform process (Tapscott 1994).

The history of the land issue in South Africa followed a pattern similar to that of Zimbabwe. The ANC was founded in 1911 in response to what became the Land Act of 1913. From then on, the pressure groups and political parties including the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union and the South African Communist Party spearheaded the struggle for land. The ANC committed itself to land redistribution through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to address injustices of the apartheid era. The aim of the programme was to ‘supply residential and productive land to the poorest section of the rural population and aspirant farmers’. In practice, the land reform programme rested on two pillars, namely, ‘restitution’, i.e. establishing legal channels for claims of, return of compensation for land lost through illegal means; and ‘redistribution’- i.e. where the government would help aspirant farmers to buy land on a willing buyer willing seller basis. A third pillar, namely, the reform of land tenure was added to regulate evictions of labour tenants. In this respect, the 1997 Extension of Security of Tenure Act was passed. The government had in mind a policy that would contribute to reconciliation, stability, growth and development in an equitable and sustainable manner.

The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 was passed in 1994, and the Land Claims Court constituted by 1995. By April 1997, some 14,898 claims had been lodged. In order to speed up processing, the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill was passed in 1997. At the end of 2001, less than 2 per cent of the land had changed hands from the whites to the indigenous through the land reform programme. Of the 68,878 restitution claims, only 12,678 had been settled, a clear indication of the slow pace of the land reforms. By 31 March 1999, about 480,400 hectares had been transferred to 45,454 households, against a target of 25.5 million hectares specified in the RDC. Another interesting feature was the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme (LRAD) of 2001 which targeted full-time farmers and required beneficiaries to pay R5,000, effectively excluding the poor majority. The market-based willing
seller willing buyer approach to land reform in South Africa is constrained by provisions of the constitution (Section 25 (5) which requires the state to implement land reform within its available resources. Considering that the Department of Land Affairs gets about one per cent of national expenditure, the pace is bound to be slow, just as it was in the Zimbabwean experience.

Given the above examples, the chapter looks at the Zimbabwean Land Reform programme, focusing on its goals, objectives, models, achievements and failures. It also highlights the different legislations that gave birth to the land reform exercise. The first phase of the land reform is covered by the period 1980 to 1998. This came about as a result of the Lancaster House Agreement. As noted in Chapter Three, the liberation struggle was fought as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of the indigenous Zimbabweans who lost good fertile land to white settlers.

**Basis for Land Reform Programmes**

At independence, Zimbabwe inherited a racially-skewed agricultural land ownership pattern with 45 per cent of the agricultural land being occupied by white commercial farmers who were less than one per cent of the total population (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement 2003). The same report states that 75 per cent of the white-owned land was in the high-rainfall areas, making the rest of the indigenous Zimbabweans occupy marginal areas that were prone to drought. Agrarian reform in Zimbabwe therefore centres on land reform where the systematic dispossession and alienation of the land from the indigenous people during the period of colonial rule, are adequately addressed. It is this skewed distribution that formed the basis for the land reform in Zimbabwe with different objectives as set by the new government. It is interesting to note that during the colonial era, the roles of traditional leaders in the management of natural resources were removed and replaced with modern state-controlled institutions. Vudzijena (1998) states that the local people were being gradually alienated from their cultural, spiritual and governance aspirations. This shook the communal-based natural resource management systems. There was the replacement of indigenous knowledge systems with modern ways of managing the environment. However, recent trends have shown that there is need for indigenous knowledge systems and, hence, these management tools are now being used in combination. In any environmental management programme, there is need to involve local communities for the sustainable use and management of natural resources, hence the need to incorporate indigenous knowledge systems which have a bottom-up approach and are more acceptable.
There was therefore need to give back the rights of the black majority in the management for their resources, hence the need to redress this imbalance and bring sanity to the communal management of natural resources.

It should be noted that economies of African countries, Zimbabwe in particular, depend on agriculture. It therefore follows that the main livelihood strategies for these communities revolve around farming – whether crop or livestock production. It is thus important to look at access to land so that the local people can benefit from this resource which enables them to practice their agricultural activities. It is clear that any empowering process would increase access to the means of production which in the context of this study is land. It is justified for the government of Zimbabwe to redistribute land to the landless by expropriating land from the white minority. It is these few whites who were controlling the economy, a fact that proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the economy is in the land. The white colonial masters understood the role played by land in the development process of the Zimbabwean economy and thus targeted key resources like land. If one is to give a fair judgement, there is need to redistribute this finite resource so as to empower the indigenous farmers.

**Goals of the Land Reform Programme**

Agrarian reform in Zimbabwe centres on land reforms which seek to address the imbalance in land ownership fostered by the colonial regime. The reform programme includes restructuring of access to land and an overall transformation of the existing farming systems, institutions and structures (Ministry of Lands 2003). The goals of the agrarian reforms include improving access to markets, credit, training and social developmental economic amenities (Ministry of Lands 2003; Tshuma 1997; Lebert 2003). The reform programme also seeks to enhance agricultural productivity, leading to industrial and economic empowerment and macro-economic growth in the long run. Lebert (2003) goes on to state that the agrarian reform aims at creating political stability and an acceptable property rights regime, promote economic growth through wider equity and efficiency gained from land redistribution. The programme seeks to promote national food security, self-sufficiency and agricultural development through labour-intensive small farmer production, optimal land productivity and returns to capital invested. It should be noted that the agrarian reform programme was targeted at the landless, war veterans, the poor and commercial farm workers. It is clear that the overall objective was to empower the indigenous people and also to provide the necessary inputs and ingredients for the improvement of the local majority. The scholars cited agree on one important theme, ‘the reversals’ of the
unfair distribution of land under the white settler administration. The need to boost production so as to promote national food security has implications on the services that are to be made available for farmers and this research sought to pinpoint the opportunities and challenges faced by the resettled farmers in their endeavour to provide for the nation and achieve the goal of national food security.

**Resettlement Programme Targets**

After the launch of the resettlement programme in September 1980, targets were set to guide the whole process. The first target was to resettle 18,000 peasant families on 1.1 million hectares of land from the white agrarian bourgeoisie (Tshuma 1997; Lebert 2003). This was to be achieved over a period of three years. This figure was, however, increased to 54,000 families over a period of three years. The progress was slow, with only 64,000 families resettled by the end of January 1982 (Tshuma 1997). The target was again raised to 162,000 families to be resettled over 9 million hectares between 1982 and 1985 (Tshuma 1997). By 1985, only 35,000 families had been resettled, which indicated that the resettlement process was marred by resistance. The first five-year National Development Plan (1986-1990) came up with a target of 15,000 families per year. Tshuma (1997) notes that by 1990 only 52,000 families had been resettled on 2,847,102 hectares of land. The resettlement phase was set to follow the strategies and models stated below.

**Resettlement Models**

*Model A*

The main objective of this model was to relieve land pressure in overpopulated areas while at the same time maintaining the social and cultural fabric of the settlers by, as much as possible, settling households with common origins, i.e. originating from the same village. The aim was also to extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector and to provide basic social and infrastructural services which facilitate the growth of a new, cohesive society. It also sought to provide an administrative system for the social management of the new settlers and to eliminate squatting and other disorderly settlements in both urban and rural environments (Ministry of Lands 2003). The gross amount of land allocated per settler for each given natural agro-ecological zone was basically the same for the villagised or the self-contained model.
The target group for the villagised model was the landless peasants in the communal areas who form the majority among the land-hungry. Approximately 20 per cent of all resettlement stands under this model were reserved for war veterans (Ministry of Lands 2003). Under this model, settlers were allocated individual residential and arable plots, but they owned grazing land, woodlots, water points and other biodiversity resources communally. The land is owned in trust by the president and settlers operate under communal tenure systems having only usufruct rights over the land. The targeted groups got 3-5 hectares of arable and common grazing land. The government of Zimbabwe supported these farmers with the following services:

i) A borehole per village of 20-25 families;
ii) A clinic for 500 families;
iii) A dip tank for 1,400 herds of cattle;
iv) A primary school for every 20 families;
v) Scheme boundary and village woodlot fencing material for all projects;
vi) A decent housing unit per household through the Rural Housing Programme Loan Fund; and
vii) A Blair toilet per household.

It should be noted that this form of assistance by the government has been realised in varying degrees. Model A is divided into two models which are A1 and A2. Model A1 is subdivided into two variants which are self-contained units and Three-Tier models. Figure 4.1 is a diagrammatic representation of Model A1.

**Figure 4.1: Structure of Model A1**

![Diagram of Model A1](image-url)
**Self-Contained Units**

The main objectives of this resettlement model were:

i) To relieve land pressure in overpopulated areas;

ii) To extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector;

iii) To provide basic social and infrastructural services which facilitate the growth of a new cohesive society;

iv) To provide an administration system for the social management of the new settlers; and

v) To provide for the conservation of natural resources.

The target for this model was the landless peasants in the communal areas, with 20 per cent of the land being reserved for war veterans. Under this variant, settlers were given individual stands in a village with each farmer getting a self-contained subdivision for all land uses – that is grazing, arable, residential, woodlot, among others. The tenure system is a 99-year lease with the option to purchase accruing to approved leases after a ten-year period. Basic infrastructure was provided in this variant.

**Three-Tier Model**

It should be noted that Zimbabwe is divided into dry and wet regions. This means that farming practices differ with the type of region. This model was meant for dry regions where cattle ranching is the major focus. The objectives of this model were:

i) To provide land for commercial grazing and thus increase the communal herd; and

ii) To recognise communal areas in line with the three-tier structure of the model.

Government bought land and divided it into three tiers that include the following:

i) Land reserved for residential, arable and social services like schools;

ii) Second tier known as the near grazing area was reserved for grazing of animals kept for day-to-day use like draught power; and

iii) The third tier was reserved for grazing of the commercial animals.

The target was overcrowded communal areas and 20 per cent of the land was reserved for war veterans. The settlers in this model are under a communal tenure system. The services provided were like those in model A, showing that the government was playing a crucial role in the provision of services in these resettlement areas.
Model A2 (Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme)

Vudzijena (1998) and Ministry of Lands (2003) argue that this model was implemented in terms of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 20:01) that is administered by the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement. They state that this model was aimed at increasing the participation of black indigenous farmers in commercial farming through the provision of easier access to land and infrastructure on full cost recovery basis. The Ministry of Lands (2003) goes on to state that this model was implemented following principles mentioned below:

- Based on full cost recovery;
- Based on 99-year lease with option to purchase;
- Lease agreement provides for rent to buy; and
- Beneficiaries need to show proof of experience and/or resource availability/entrepreneurship.

Objectives of Model A2

Many scholars like Vudzijena (1998), Lebert (2003) and Ministry of Lands (2003) concur on the objectives of such a model. They agree that this model had the following five objectives:

- To create a cadre of black indigenous farmers;
- To open access to small, medium and large-scale commercial farming to black indigenous farmers;
- To break the gap between white and black commercial farmers;
- To facilitate access to input support for commercial agriculture by indigenous farmers; and
- To empower black entrepreneurs in the economy of Zimbabwe.

The Ministry of Lands (2003) further explains that it was envisaged that the small, medium and large-scale commercial farmers would engage in either crop or livestock farming or a combination. The report goes on to state that the peri-urban farmers were expected to engage in horticulture, market gardening or crop farming. It is clear from the description above that this model, introduced in 1996, had the black empowerment principle in its approach. One can, therefore, argue that this model was not only looking at rural areas but also urban dwellers; proving that the aim was to empower the black majority irrespective of where they were coming from. The approach did not give special treatment to war veterans but considered every Zimbabwean
who wanted to venture into commercial farming. The structure of this model, as indicated in Figure 4.2, suggests that the approach was for every black farmer whether on a small scale or on large scale. The model thus sought to empower the black majority.

**Figure 4.2:** Variants of Model A2 in Zimbabwe

![Model A2 Diagram](image)

**Source:** Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement (1999).

**Model B**

The interest here was on farms suitable for specialised enterprises that could be run as a unit by co-operative groups on business lines. Vudzijena (1998) states that all facilities are used collectively but there are individual stands of 0.5 hectares. The report goes on to note that tenure system under this model is represented by 99-year leases with the option to purchase after a period of 10 years. However, the option to purchase is based on the level of productivity, and in 1980 the target was $1,000 Zimbabwe dollars as share capital.

**Model C**

This model involved intensive resettlement of beneficiaries around a core estate. It is noted by Vudzijena (1998) that the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) and out-growers run a central core estate. This estate supplies essential services to the settlers such as mechanical draught power, transportation of produce and inputs in bulk, production of seedlings for specialised crops, crop processing and marketing, to mention but a few. These services are provided to the settlers at a cost. Lebert (2003) goes on to mention that cropping land within this scheme was allocated on an individual basis with settlers also gaining access to grazing land which, is managed communally.
Model D (Commercial Grazing for Communal Areas)

This model was implemented in the arid regions of southern parts of Zimbabwe. Lebert (2003) states that commercial ranches were purchased next to communal areas and thereby co-existed side-by-side. He goes on to mention that livestock were purchased from these neighbouring trust areas and allowed to fatten on the ranches before being sold. The thinking, according to Lebert (2003), was that communal farmers would be able to reduce grazing pressure on communal lands. Thus the target group for this model were the communal areas in the dry southern regions of Zimbabwe.

The first phase of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe was guided by these models. These models had varied levels of success but their goal was to try and improve the skewed land distribution and to empower the Zimbabwean majority.

Agro-ecological Regions

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The country is subdivided into five agro-ecological zones with different climatic conditions (refer to Map 4.1). It should be noted that climate is the determining factor in the categorisation of the country into agro-ecological regions. However, other factors like edaphic factors play an important role in determining the type of agricultural activities to be practised within each region. Rainfall reliability decreases from north to south and also from east to west. Only 37 per cent of the country receives rainfall considered adequate for agriculture (Rukuni 2006).
**Agro-ecological Region 1**

This region occupies 1.56 per cent of Zimbabwean land. It is located in the eastern parts of Manicaland province bordering Mozambique. The region receives an annual rainfall of 1,000mm or more per year with some rain in all the months of the year due to the effects of relief high-rise mountains promoting orographic rainfall. The temperatures are relatively low and the region is suitable for intensive and diversified farming. Important agricultural activities include the production of coffee, tea, deciduous fruits, market gardening (potatoes, peas, and other vegetables) and dairy farming. Flowers are grown for export. The country’s timber production is in this region. The region is characterised by high altitudes, steep slopes and rich volcanic soils which are good for tea and coffee production.
Agro-ecological Region 2

This region covers 18.68 per cent of Zimbabwean land. It is located in the middle of the country. The region extends over three provinces, which are Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland West. It receives reliable rainfall which ranges from 700 – 1,050 mm per year with relatively high temperatures. The region is subject to seasonal droughts. This is the major crop farming area of Zimbabwe with 75 – 80 per cent of farming area planted with crops. In this region important dry land crops that are planted include tobacco, maize, cotton, wheat and soya beans. The crops are planted from November to March. Horticulture is also practiced in this region. There is a sizeable land that is under irrigation and is concentrated in the months between May and September and the crops under irrigation include seed maize and barley tobacco.

Agro-ecological Region 3

This region comprises 17.43 per cent area of Zimbabwe and accounts for 15 per cent of arable land. Annual rainfall ranges from 500-750 mm and is characterised by mid-season droughts. The region is suitable for the production of drought-tolerant crops such as cotton and sorghum. It is also suitable for raising beef cattle. In this region, maize is grown as the staple crop, while sunflower and groundnuts are grown as cash crops.

Agro-ecological Region 4

The region covers approximately 33.03 per cent of the area of Zimbabwe. The amount of rainfall received in this region ranges from 450-600 mm annually with frequent droughts. There is some crop production in this region but focus is on dryland crops such as maize, millet, sorghum, legumes and cotton. Due to low amounts of rainfall, periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells are common during the rainy season. Crop production is therefore risky except in certain very favourable localities, where limited drought-resistant crops are grown as a sideline production activity. Farming is based on livestock and drought-resistant fodder crops.

Agro-ecological Region 5

The region comprises 26.2 per cent of the area of Zimbabwe. This region covers the low veld areas below 900 feet above sea-level in both the north and south of the country. In this region rainfall is less than 600 mm and is
very erratic. Although agro-ecological zone five receives reasonable rainfall in the northern part of Zimbabwe along the Zambezi River, its uneven topography and poor soils make it unsuitable for crop production. Where crop production is practiced, the focus is on dryland crops which include maize, millet, sorghum, legumes, and cotton. Crops such as sugarcane and wheat are produced under irrigation around Chiredzi, Hippo Valley and Triangle estates in the south-eastern parts of the country. Due to low amounts of rainfall received, it is risky to grow crops under dry-land farming. In this region, cattle and game ranching are the recommended farming activities.

**Remainder:** The remaining 3.1 per cent of land is unsuitable for any form of agricultural use.

### Management of Areas of Origin

The land reform process in the early 1980s had its merits and demerits. The Zimbabwean government had to assess its reform programme against set goals and objectives. In 1985 the government realised that moving people from overpopulated areas was not sufficient to promote rural livelihoods (Vudzijena 1998). It was agreed that the remaining communal areas needed to be developed on a planned basis. Thus the Communal Land Area Reorganisation Programme was implemented simultaneously with the resettlement programme. In the first five-year National Development Plan (1986-1991), Agritex was mandated to reorganise and replan villages for sustainable development. However, according to Vudzijena (1998), the programme did not achieve the intended goals due to the following constraints:

i) The new village boundaries created after 1984 did not coincide with the formally recognised traditional village boundaries. There was therefore no social cohesion necessary for collective resource management.

ii) The programme policy objectives and targets were not made public and local implementation institutions lacked clear guidelines.

iii) This was viewed by the community as an imposition from the top.

iv) The implementation of completed village plans was slowed down due to financial constraints.
Land Reform Changes

The Communal Land Act of 1981

In 1981, the Communal Land Act was changed and this saw the shifting of authority over Zimbabwean land from traditional rulers to local authorities. The shift saw the transformation of Tribal Trust lands into Communal Areas. This led to resistance because the resettlement programme was being imposed on the local people without consulting their local leaders (Vudzijena 1998). This had negative impacts on the management of the environment.

Land Acquisition Act of 1985

As pointed earlier, the resettlement programme was based on the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ principle as dictated by the Lancaster House Agreement. This, however, slowed down the resettlement programme because the government of Zimbabwe had no power to seize land by force. Thus this Act came into existence, giving the Zimbabwean government first preference to purchase excess land for redistribution. Tshuma (1997) states that a person wishing to sell land was enjoined to offer it to the Minister of State before offering it to any other person. The Act also showed a detailed procedure for land acquisition as follows:

i) Compulsory acquisition was to be initiated by the publication of a preliminary notice which had to be served on all interested parties;

ii) Had to describe the nature and extent of the land to be acquired;

iii) State the purposes for which it was acquired;

iv) Had to call upon interested parties who disputed the acquisition to lodge their objections with the authority within 30 days of publication of the notice; and

v) Required to call upon any person wishing to claim compensation to submit a claim (Tshuma 1997).

Chitsike (2003) echoes the same sentiments and notes that the Act allowed the government the right of first refusal on all large-scale commercial farms put up for sale. He, however, mentions that the provisions of the 1980 constitution were retained. Tshuma (1997) goes on to argue that the Act required the court to decide on fair compensation to be paid to the claimant. This meant that the State had to pay compensation for any land compulsorily acquired. Also under this Act, a Derelict Lands Board was established and this was to determine whether land was derelict or not (Tshuma 1997). The Act gave the President powers to acquire derelict land without paying compensation. In terms of acquisition of under-utilised land, the
state had to compensate in foreign currency and this proved to be a difficult option for the government which was still faced with other challenges financially (Tshuma 1997). Thus the only advantage that was brought about by this Act was that the government was given first preference in terms of purchasing land available on the market. Thus the Act did not help the state financially and compensation needed to be paid. Tshuma (1997) concludes by arguing that many offers of land which were made to the state in terms of the Act were not accepted and that the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ concept did not give the state the freedom to purchase land in large tracts to facilitate planning. He further argues that attempts to introduce a system of land designation which would have given the state power to designate large tracts of land for acquisition were abandoned during debates on the Land Acquisition Bill when it was realised that the proposed procedure would have contravened the constitution. Tshuma (1997) also comments that the first priority given to the state may have facilitated the acquisition tendencies of government ministers and senior civil servants who knew which land was on offer. This is further supported by Lebert (2003) who argues that the Act had limited impact in that the government had no money to compensate landowners.

**National Land Policy of 1990**

After realising the conditions and the way the resettlement programme was carried out in the first ten years, the land reform objectives were revised to suit the desires of the local indigenous people. According to Chitsike (2003), the National Land Policy of 1990 came with the following objectives:

i) To resettle deserving and landless people;

ii) To extend and improve the base of productive agriculture in the small-scale farming sector through the provision of training and extension for the promotion of good husbandry and social development;

iii) To alleviate population pressure in the communal areas through an integrated linkage between Resettlement and Communal Area reorganisation and development. This was discussed earlier after realising that the land resettlement programme needed to go hand-in-glove with the reorganisation of areas of origin;

iv) To improve the standard of living of the largest and previously disadvantaged sector of the population through the provision of infrastructure and services and the execution of a resettlement programme that will ensure the attainment of sufficiently high levels of income; and

vi) Land to be acquired was revised to 8.3 million hectares from the revised 1982 figure of 9 million hectares. The number of beneficiaries was maintained at 162,000 families.
The government also introduced the land tax to encourage the proper use of land and avoid speculation. The government was also interested in controlling subdivisions of land, citing that white settlers were dividing land for speculative rather than genuine agricultural purposes (Chitsike 2003). It is clear that white settlers were selling land at high prices, making it difficult for the government to purchase it, since the government had other commitments like rebuilding the nation. Thus more and more amendments were introduced in a bid to acquire more land.

The Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990

In December 1990, the Parliament of Zimbabwe enacted the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act Number 30 of 1990. Tshuma (1998) states that it was agreed to continue with compulsory acquisition of land, but to be authorised by law. Prior to this amendment there was only compulsory acquisition of under-utilised land for settlement for agricultural purposes. In this constitutional amendment, the government was allowed to compulsorily acquire any land including that which was inefficiently used (Chitsike 2003; Tshuma 1998). The prompt and adequate compensation requirement was replaced with the requirement that the acquiring authority should pay fair compensation for the acquisition before or within a reasonable time after acquiring the property. There were principles which were set for the acquiring authority to follow and these included:

i) Specify the principles upon which compensation for land acquisition is to be determined and the manner in which it is to be paid;

ii) To fix the amount payable and the period within which it shall be paid; and

iii) The law which lays down the principles upon which compensation is payable cannot be questioned by any court on the grounds that the compensation provided is not fair (Tshuma 1998).

It should be noted that earlier compensation was in foreign currency and that it was to be remitted out of Zimbabwe. This condition was cancelled in the Constitutional Amendment Number 30 of 1990. Chitsike (2003) states that payment for land acquired was to be in local currency. This, however, faced criticism from the agrarian bourgeoisie, their allies and the judiciary. Tshuma (1998) points out that the issue of compensation was not to be contested in any court of law. In the context of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP), those opposed to the amendment suggested that it would scare away foreign investors. This clearly shows that the government of Zimbabwe was bent on speedy processing of land transfer from the white settlers to the black majority. These factors show that the state was desperate to resettle people
from overpopulated areas but the conditions set by the Lancaster Agreement were proving to be an impediment.

**The Land Acquisition Act of 1992**

This Act saw the repealing of the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ principle in order to speed up the resettlement programme. The Act empowered the Government of Zimbabwe to acquire land compulsorily with some compensation as determined by the government. Chitsike (2003) adds by noting that a process of land designation was established under which government specialists, farmers’ interest groups and policy makers identified land for acquisition. This, according to Lebert (2003), saw many white farmers taking the government to court in protest against the prices set by the government.

**Comments on the First Phase of the Land Reform Programme**

Lebert (2003) states that by June 1988 approximately 52,000 households had been resettled on approximately 2.8 million hectares of land acquired by the state for redistribution. This represented about 16 per cent of the commercial farm land at independence. This was a clear indication that not much was done in the first 8 years after independence in terms of giving back land to the indigenous people. The acquisition of land was, however, not evenly distributed as shown in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1:** Land Purchased for Resettlement 1980/1981 – 1987/1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Land (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>223,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>900,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>939,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>159,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>75,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>85,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>133,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>20,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 (total)</td>
<td>2,558,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (total)</td>
<td>2,713,725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Lebert (2003)
It is clear from the table that there was uneven distribution and this, according to Lebert (2003), has been attributed to:

i) The period 1980 to 1983 was characterised by massive distribution because most of the white farms were abandoned during the liberation war.

ii) The period after 1983 saw a decline in the number of farms distributed due to the fact that farmers held on to their productive land and sold off marginal land, and land prices were beginning to increase due to post-war stability.

iii) The white farmers were obliged to sell their land to the state first and if the government had no money to purchase, a ‘no present interest certificate’ was issued which was valid for a year. This saw the indigenous elite and senior members of the government acquiring farms through taking advantage of the state’s ‘no present interest’.

iv) The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) played a big role in slowing down the land reform process because it dragged the government to the courts. The CFU’s argument was that rapid land distribution would lead to low export earnings and unemployment.

v) By 1983 the budget of Zimbabwe was overburdened and there were calls from the World Bank for the government to tighten its land redistribution programme. Government complied and this slowed down the agrarian reform process greatly.

vi) There was a severe drought in the mid 1980s and settlers returned to communal areas in search of better conditions and the government had to use a lot of its financial resources on drought relief. This made it impossible for government to purchase land for redistribution and thus the state was issuing ‘no present interest certificates’.

The Controller and Auditor General Audit of 1993

An audit was carried out in 1993 to try and assess the effectiveness of the land reform programme. Chitsike (2003) gives a summary of the results as follows:

i) The audit concluded that the programme was well planned in accordance with policies and procedure;

ii) The programme benefited mostly the rural poor who were landless;

iii) Concentrated on achieving immediate social and political objectives;

iv) The standards of living for most settlers in Model A and Model C schemes significantly improved. Income levels increased and settlers had access to clean drinking water, improved sanitation facilities, housing and clinics; and
v) Standards of living in models B and D were not improved and the models were described as unsuccessful.

The report noted a number of problems which hindered the attainment of desired goals. The report stated that there were 19 government departments involved in the programme which made the coordination of the various stakeholders difficult as each department had its own priorities and objectives. The report also discovered that the political interference in the implementation at all levels led to difficulties in implementing plans. As recorded by Chitsike (2003), the report found out that resettlement officers had insufficient capacity to provide the nature and scale of assistance required by settlers and that extension services were thinly spread. The report also noted that the state failed to get land from regions 1 and 2 in sufficient quantities. All these problems made it impossible for the intended goals to be realised.

However, the land reform programme had managed to secure its positive aspects for the indigenous people. According to Vudzijena (1998), about 70,000 families of the intended 162,000 families or households were resettled on over 3.3 million hectares in 1997. She goes on to say that, over the same period, the communal area population increased by over 200,000 households, implying that the resettlement programme managed to spin off 25 per cent of the population increase. It therefore means that in terms of releasing pressure on communal areas, the resettlement programme failed to meet its target. Land pressure actually increased, leading many scholars to question the achievements of the resettlement programme. Vudzijena (1998) notes that the capacity of the 70,000 settled families to create additional jobs has been questioned since there were reports that in the resettlement areas there were food deficits. It is argued that once there is a deficit, the settlers are not able to employ workers because they might be operating below full capacity.

Some scholars paint an even gloomier picture of the land reform. For example, Kinsey (1996) states that in the 1990s, less than one million hectares (2.47 million acres) were acquired and fewer than 20,000 families were resettled. He goes on to say that much of the land acquired during the first phase was of poor quality and only 19 per cent of resettled land was considered prime. It means, therefore, that fewer than targeted households were resettled and they were resettled on marginal land. The purpose was to empower black indigenous people yet they were resettled on land of poor agricultural value, putting them at a disadvantaged position.

Each resettlement model had its own level of achievement. Chitsike (2003) states that Model A schemes have predominated, accounting for about 3
million hectares of land under the programme and 66,000 settler households. He goes on to say that Model B schemes accounted for about 165,000 hectares of land and 4,200 settler households. Model C was in third position in terms of its contribution, with 800 households on 17,000 hectares of land. Chitsike (2003) adds by noting that the three-tier scheme, which succeeded the Model D scheme, provided 20,000 households in natural regions 4 and 5 with 250,000 hectares of grazing land.

From the arguments above, one can see that the reform process failed to meet the intended goals over the set period. This probably was due to the fact that the reform process in the first phase was controlled by the white settler through the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ principle and not the Zimbabwean majority. Lebert (2003) states that the first phase of the resettlement programme proved that:

i) The amount, quality, location and cost of land were driven by land holders and their own interests;

ii) Neither the government nor beneficiaries drove the process in terms of their needs; and

iii) The state being the key buyer of land distorted the land market through setting parameters in terms of pricing and location.

All this led to poor quality land being made available for redistribution to the Zimbabwean majority. Lebert (2003) concludes by saying that the land offered to the state had been geographically scattered. As a result, moving beneficiaries from communal areas to isolated farms in small groups was both expensive and logistically inefficient. A new and accelerated programme was needed, thus the government introduced Phase Two of the land redistribution programme in 1998.

Moyo (1998) states that under the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ basis the state played a dominant role in acquiring land for the poor and supported resettlement schemes. However, under this agricultural land market transfer, land was still concentrated in the hands of a few white minority and some elite black farmers, and the imbalances persisted showing that the redistribution process was very slow. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) reinforced the market based and induced land reform programme. In other words, the government of Zimbabwe was crippled in its ability to expropriate more land from the large commercial farmers. Thus government’s efforts to help the small-scale farmers and these new beneficiaries were reduced since the government of Zimbabwe’s operations were controlled by the ESAP. Moyo (2005) states that the market mechanisms
for land transfer limited the redistribution efforts in various ways. Firstly, landowners led the identification process and the supply of land to be made available for resettlement while the government of Zimbabwe only bought land that was on offer. Thus the government of Zimbabwe could not choose the land to be distributed. There was therefore no match between supply and demand and also demand from the increasing number of black elite leading to the sky-rocketing of land prices. Moyo (2005) has observed that few peasants or poor working class families and women could afford the high costs. The land reform process during this era failed to meet the high demand. Peasant farmers were forced to invade commercial farming areas because the prices set were too high for their pockets (Moyo 2005). Thus farm occupations counteracted the slow pace of the reform programme under ‘willing buyer willing seller’ principles. These invasions in the early 1990s were regularised into the market-based land acquisition approach and did not lead into serious and violent invasions as witnessed under Fast Track (Moyo 2005).

Secondly, the coming in of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) advocated for the reduction in government subsidies. Moyo (2005) states that SAPs led to reduced state support for land resettlement and agriculture, increased retrenchments in towns and people’s incomes were heavily eroded. This led to increased demand for land from town-dwellers who had failed to secure sources of livelihood in towns after massive retrenchment which characterised the SAPs era. Moyo (1998) argues that during the 1990s, land occupation expanded in content and form, ranging from illegal access to land to the widespread poaching of natural resources targeting not only private lands but also state and communal lands. Starting in the mid 1980s, the state evicted at an accelerated rate sometimes with violence those deemed to be occupying land illegally in commercial farms, communal lands, national parks and state land (Herbst 1987). This is a clear indication that the land reform process in the 1980s through to the 1990s was filled with frustration on the part of the black majority due to the slow pace of the resettlement programme. The suffering of people was further worsened by the coming in of SAPs which removed all government subsidies on essential services like health and education. The suffering of the indigenous people forced them to look to land as the only source of livelihood.

The indigenous people’s predicament was further darkened by the 1992 drought and forced more peasants to demand for land. This led to the government of Zimbabwe to acquire land compulsorily, but this did produce the desired results due to the successful court challenges by landowners throughout the 1990s (Moyo
2005). One may be persuaded to conclude that the developments in the 1990s led to accelerated land invasions which became the main characteristic feature of the land reform programme which began in 2000 under the name ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The rate at which land was being expropriated in the 1980s through to the 1990s frustrated most of the indigenous local people leading to violence and fights for this precious finite resource.

Impacts of the market-driven land reform statistics have been provided to show the changes that took place for those who got land. Kinsey (1999) noted that those who got land gained access to new and related natural resource assets realised improved farm and woodland resource production, incomes and consumption benefits. Moyo (2005) suggests that over 20 years the land beneficiaries tripled their livestock wealth, productivity increased and their overall incomes were five times higher than those in agro potentially similar communal areas.

Policies directing the land reform process were changed and these had repercussions on the demand for land. Moyo (2005) states that the SAPs reduced state support to farm households, and this was exacerbated by the fact that landlessness had grown to 30 per cent as reported by the Rukuni Commission of 1994. The removal of subsidies was also supported by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) who did not benefit much from the subsidies. SAPs called for the commercialisation of marketing boards and conversion to purchasers of the last resort whereas private dealers were encouraged to compete (Moyo 2000). All these forces worked to the detriment of the indigenous people who were not in control of the means of production. One of the SAPs’ requirements was for the state to reduce its budgets and this also meant a reduction in extension services, subsidies on inputs and credit to smallholders, which along with the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar eroded farm incomes. Moyo (2005) argues that these problems, coupled with job losses meant that living standards of the indigenous people were going down. One may safely say that the SAPs led to the reversal of gains made in the agrarian reform process. No wonder the programme was blamed by many African states for the suffering of the people. The criticism against SAPs is also shown by the way African leaders have reacted by saying that ‘whether you are suffering from dysentery or malaria IMF will always give quinine’. It is an indication that the programme brought more harm than good in the African setup. Thus the land reform process led by market forces failed to achieve much in reducing poverty.

Moyo (2000) states that the integration of smallholders into seed and fertiliser markets controlled by transnational corporations left more and more peasants vulnerable and at the mercy of those corporate giants. The same author goes on to note that the extension of peasant farming on marginal
grazing land increased, together with the introspection of women’s casual labour, proving beyond any reasonable doubt that the local peasants had no access to land.

**Entry Barriers to the Commercial Agricultural Sector**

Most indigenous farmers found it difficult to break into the Commercial Agricultural Sector due to factors highlighted in Figure 4.4.

**Figure 4.4:** Entry Barriers to the Commercial Agricultural Sector

![Diagram showing entry barriers to the commercial agricultural sector]

**Source:** Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme (2003)

**Financial Resources**

The issues of capitalisation and the problems of credit finance are a major determinant in the success or failure of individual farmers. When farmers have been under-capitalised and where they have resorted to credit financing to fill this gap, the tendency, according to Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme (2003), is that farmers are trapped in a vicious circle of poverty.

Ministry of Lands and Resettlement programme (2003) states that Zimbabwe’s commercial farming sector is serviced by a developed and regulated financial system. Until its privatisation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) (now Agribank) was the only public-lending institution servicing all farmers. Successive colonial governments and institutions only supported large-scale commercial farmers who were only white and neglected
the majority of the people. Thus black commercial farmers entered an already hostile agricultural environment. No specific programme was put in place to support blacks acquiring large-scale commercial farms through the market process. Finance was available from the AFC on regular conditions applicable to all farmers irrespective of race. The emerging indigenous commercial farmers have struggled to maintain their farming operations. Most of them borrowed heavily to acquire the farms and essential durable assets (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme 2003).

In order to acquire and operate a large-scale farm in 1994, an emergent indigenous farmer required on average Z$1,5 million split into one million for land purchase and Z$500,000.00 as working capital (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme 2003). AFC inputs credit attracted an interest rate of 27 per cent for communal farms. In 1993 the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development estimated that seasonal and land purchase repayment required an average of over Z$800,000.00 annually, and in such a situation large-scale farmers would only break even at an interest rate of 9 per cent.

Farmers find it difficult to access loans because of the conditions set by financial institutions. These range from collateral requirements, credit worthiness, production performance and the cost of money. Leases and other unclear tenure arrangements are not acceptable as collateral by financial institutions. Low and unsuitable production levels give rise to repayment uncertainty and this leads to defaults (Moyo 1998). As a result, financial institutions limit the amount of money given to emergent farmers by charging prohibitive interest and requesting for collateral. Given these conditions, the farmers tend to operate to maintain basic subsistence. These financial constraints deter farmers from making long-term investments such as capital-intensive production practices to avoid increasing the level of risk (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme 2003).

Most farmers have limited information about available sources of credit, terms of loans and correct structuring of farm debt. They lack knowledge, have poor debt management skills in the unprofitable enterprises and the high cost of borrowing, and tend to finance their capital requirements from own sources (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme 2003). Farmers often reduce credit requirements by reducing inputs use and selecting low cash cost enterprises. Some farmers cut production by reducing areas under production and maintaining high fallow levels to reduce cash requirements. Indigenous farmers, in the absence of public financial institutions which offer concretionary interest rates, have developed a desire to remain debt-free
because of the fear of bankruptcy risk and farm closure. Without adequate credit investments in productivity-augmenting technologies like fertilisers, chemicals and machinery, a farmer is unable to make profit (Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme 2003).

The emerging indigenous commercial farmers in Zimbabwe in general have struggled to maintain their farming operations. There was no specific programme to promote and support indigenous people acquiring large-scale commercial farms. Aspiring individuals borrowed heavily to acquire the farms and essential durable assets. In addition, farmers had to borrow seasonal loans for production and to finance durable and productive investments such as dams, infrastructure, fences and tobacco curing facilities. Moyo (1998) argues that some of the indigenous farmers lacked experience in large-scale farming, especially in farm management within the local environment. This has resulted in the lack of meaningful development in terms of land improvement and other investments required to maximise productivity. It is unlikely that government will have adequate funds to finance the indigenous farmers. Efforts should be made to harness funds from the private sector and channel them to the indigenous farmers at preferential rates.

**Second Phase of the Pre-Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme**

In September 1998 the government launched the second phase of the land reform process. The main objective was to redress and correct iniquities in land resource allocations to provide a more efficient and rational structure. Thus, according to the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (2003), this programme was going to be achieved through:

- Ensuring greater security of tenure to land users;
- Promotion of environmentally sustainable utilisation of land;
- To retain a core of efficient large-scale commercial agricultural producers;
- Transferring some land from the few white farmers to the rest of the population; and
- Promotion of investment in land through capital outlays.

For this phase to go ahead there was need for some changes in the constitution so that the new phase would not be slowed down by the dictates of the restrictive conditions of the previous constitutions.
**Land Identification**

The identification of land to be acquired for resettlement in the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II of Pre-Fast Track was guided by the following principles:

- Derelict Land;
- Under-utilised Land;
- Multiple-owned Land;
- Foreign-owned Land; and
- Land near Communal Areas.

These principles were just administrative guidelines to assist land identification committees in carrying out their work. They were neither a legal requirement nor were they conclusive criteria for land identification. The principal goals behind the identification of land for compulsory acquisition were:

- Reducing the extent of the large-scale commercial farm sector from 15.5 million hectares to 6 million hectares;
- To sub-divide the 6 million hectares in the large-scale commercial sector so that farms conform to the Maximum Farm Sizes Regulations (Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000); and
- Introduce an Agricultural Land Tax, which will improve land delivery for re-distribution and resettlement.

Government then did not consider farms on their identification list using the following guidelines:

- Plantation farms engaged in the large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit, sugarcane, etc;
- Agro-industrial properties involved in the integrated production, processing and/or marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products and seed-multiplication;
- Properties with Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) permits; and
- Farms belonging to church or mission organizations; and
- Farms acquired and belonging to foreign nationals and are protected by country-to-country agreements.

**Policy Guidelines in the Distribution of Land**

It should be borne in mind that one of the objectives of land reform was to distribute land equitably to the landless. Therefore this objective shaped the way the reform was to take place and determined the farm sizes. For everyone
to benefit the sizes of land given to beneficiaries were to be small, however, the sizes needed to be viable for effective production. Guidelines were developed by land planners for viable farm sizes on the basis of agro-ecological zones and model type (Moyo 2009). Arguments have been raised against the Fast Track Reform Programme, especially the redistribution of white commercial farms because of the unwarranted fears that these commercial areas would drop in terms of production and would have negative effects on food security and the inflow of foreign currency in the country. Sukume et al (2004) note that the relationship between farm size and level of production has not shown a positive relation. The partitioning of large commercial farms and redistributing them among landless local indigenous people was criticised. However, some scholars argue that there is no need for the alarm. The same scholars go on to give examples of negative relationship between land size and level of production, especially in capitalist farming due to supervision costs associated with hired labour. The fears were just based on assumptions. Hence land planners had to come up with guidelines to promote effective production (Sukume et al 2004).

Moyo et al (2009) state that farm size determination was guided by considerations of viability of the farm size and these included the adequacy of land to enable a competent person to derive a livelihood from making the land or an income adequate to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the person and his entire household. Many scholars have tried to come up with a definition for ‘a reasonable standard of living’, because if this is not defined, someone’s reasonable standard of living may differ from the other’s, which would be very subjective. The Government of Australia Land Act (1994) defines farm size as:

The area of grazing or agricultural land that will be adequate to enable a competent person to derive from working the land, according to the use for which the land is suited, an income adequate to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the person, the person’s spouse and the dependent children, as well as provide a reserve to meet adverse seasons and the cost of developing and maintaining the land at a sustainable rate of production throughout average seasons....

In this study, the definition by Moyo et al (2009) was used which states that a reasonable standard of living should be one that enables the entire household to provide for its own consumption needs, keep some of the produce in store in case of production stress, be able to trade a portion of the produce to access cash in order to buy other food and non-food items that
are not locally produced, and also be able to afford reasonable healthcare, pay school fees for children and afford transportation costs. Thus allocation and determination of farm size was guided by this principle.

According to Sukume et al (2004) planning guidelines indicate that A1 households were to be allocated farm sizes ranging from 5 to 7 hectares in wetter regions, that is regions 1 to 3, and 10 arable hectares, and at least 30 hectares for grazing in the drier regions. These, according to the guidelines were adequate for effective production at household level on a small scale. These sizes were also justified on the grounds that, under Fast Track, more beneficiaries needed to be allocated land. Under A model, there were four classes of farm sizes, that is: small, medium size, large scale and peri-urban plots. Table 4.2 shows the allocations.

**Table 4.2: Farm-size Guidelines for Resettlement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>A1 Farm Size (ha)</th>
<th>A2 Farm Size (ha)</th>
<th>Access Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Lands (2001)

The allocations have always tended to separate arable land from grazing land because this has implications for sustainable utilisation of the land resources. Moyo et al (2009) observe that land allocations tended to fall below the prescribed thresholds and if this is analytically studied, the management of grazing land will be inefficient since beneficiaries will concentrate on crop production and thus encroach on grazing areas leading to grazing areas becoming too small resulting in overgrazing and land degradation.

According to Lebert (2003), phase two of the Pre-Fast Track resettlement envisaged the compulsory purchase over 5 years of 50,000 km\(^2\) from the 112,000 km\(^2\) owned by commercial farmers (both blacks and whites). In 1998, the government of Zimbabwe called a donors’ conference and explained
the importance of going ahead with this land redistribution programme. It was agreed that the programme should go ahead and its inception phase was to start immediately after the conference. It should be noted that the pace was still being controlled by the landowners. In the initial stage of Pre-Fast Track’s second phase, 2.1 million hectares were to be acquired; infrastructure and farmer support services were to be provided by the donor community (Ministry of Lands Resettlement 2003). White farmers contested the acquisition of their farms and the donor community failed to provide the funds.

By 1997 the government had acquired 3,498 hectares and resettled about 71,000 families. Between 1998 and 2000 (inception stage of the land reform and resettlement programme phase two, 168,264 hectares had been allocated to 4,697 families (Marongwe 2003). The government of Zimbabwe was only able to acquire 144,991 hectares and resettled 4,697 families between October 1998 and June 2000 (Ministry of Lands Resettlement 2003). According to Marongwe (2003) land reform in Zimbabwe has emphasised poverty alleviation and this has been put into operation through programme objectives that sought to allocate land to the poor. This has been mainly achieved through the A1 resettlement model. The number of people who were resettled fell short of the initial targets, thereby forcing the government of Zimbabwe to change the constitution in a bid to try and speed up land acquisition process.

Other Causes of High Demand for Land

Grievances of the War Veterans

Linked to the high demand for land were several grievances of the war veterans, among which the following topped the list:

- The majority of the war veterans were living in poverty which precipitated them to think that the government had forsaken them;
- A good number of the war veterans who sustained injuries during the war of liberation had not received compensation as per the government’s promise; and
- By that period, very few war veterans had been allocated land during the Pre-Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme.

The above grievances, coupled with the hard socio-economic challenges of the time, provided a recipe for farm invasions, which culminated into the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme.
Urban Evictions

There has always been a shortage of housing for low-income workers and the government estimated this at 600,000 units nationwide in 1995 (UN Economic and Social Council 1995). As a result, people started building structures that did not comply with building regulations. This went on for years with the authorities turning a blind eye to the practice. However, in May 2005, without warning and in military style, the government launched Operation Murambatsvina, (Operation Remove Filth/Operation Restore Order), bulldozing or burning all illegal structures in the urban, peri-urban and rural areas.

The Tibajuka (2005) report estimates the total number of people directly or indirectly affected by Murambatsvina stood at 2.4 million or 18 per cent of the population. Of this number, an estimated 40,800 female-headed families were directly affected. These figures are disputed by the government, but it is evident that a large proportion of the urban population was displaced as a result of this operation. A big percentage of those displaced moved to the rural areas, and others engaged in illegal mining, or set up squatter camps near the towns or in the farms. All these displaced persons became candidates for land resettlement as a means of survival. Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle (Restore Hope), which was launched to provide housing for the victims of Murambatsvina did not have any impact as a negligible number of housing units were erected, because the government did not have money to fund a large-scale housing project.

Evictions in Mining Areas

A sizeable number of the Murambatsvina victims and displaced farm workers turned to illegal gold panning for a living. However, in November 2006, following the discovery of diamonds in the Marange area, another operation code-named Operation Chikorokoza Chapera (No More Illegal Mining) was launched. Thousands of gold panners throughout the country were displaced and left with no source of income. Yet another operation, this time code-named Operation Hakudzokwi (No Return) was unleashed in the Marange diamond fields in October 2008 and led to further displacements. All these displaced people were left with no alternative but to seek to eke out a living from land.

Constitutional Amendment Act No. 2 of 2000

The Constitution Amendment Act No. 2 of 2000 according to the Ministry of Lands achieved the following:
i) It placed the responsibility of paying for land compulsorily acquired for resettlement firmly into the court of the former colonial power, i.e. Britain.

ii) As is also mentioned by Chitsike (2003), it obliged the government of Zimbabwe to pay full compensation for any improvements on or to land compulsorily acquired for resettlement.

This was going to take place together with the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 in a bid to try and speed up the agrarian reform process.

**Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000**

According to the Ministry of Lands (2003), the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 achieved the following:

i) It removed the time-consuming designation process which in the past preceded compulsory acquisition.

ii) It removed the requirement for prompt payment of compensation in full. It allowed for the spreading of payment through cash, bonds or other securities issued by the government over a period of five years. This was done after realising that financial constraints were slowing down the acquisition of land.

iii) It also provided for the revocation of acquisition orders and subsequent re-gazetting of the same farm if the need arose in the future.

After the drafting of a new constitution in 1999, a referendum was held in 2000 to give the indigenous Zimbabweans a chance to participate in the activities of their country. However, the result was that the constitution was rejected on political grounds. The then opposition Movement for Democratic Change together with the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) mobilised support against the new constitution. They anticipated that this was going to put an end to ZANU (PF) rule. The desire by the then ruling ZANU (PF) party to speed up the agrarian process was slowed down and pressure was mounting from the liberation war veterans who needed land which they had fought for. This forced the ushering in of a new or second phase referred to as the Fast Track Land Reform Resettlement Programme in the context of this investigation.

**Fast Track Resettlement Phase**

*The Invasions of White Commercial farms*

The white commercial farmers had supported the Movement for Democratic Change to defeat the acceptance of the draft constitution of 1999. It is against
the background of an angry electorate that the following elections were held in 2002. There are different schools of thought regarding the drivers of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. One school of thought supported by President Mugabe is that the invasion of the farms was a spontaneous process of land-hungry peasants, former freedom fighters, farm workers and urban people. The other school of thought argues that the ZANU (PF) government took advantage of the former freedom fighters’ demand for land to try and resuscitate its declining support in rural areas. By identifying with the needs and demands of the peasants, ZANU (PF) managed to increase its support at a time its popularity was at its lowest ebb.

From 26 February 2000, war veterans, peasants and youths invaded white-owned farms throughout the country (Martin 2000). The war veterans started pegging out plots in commercial farms. Martin (2000) suggests that the reason for the invasions had been to crush the popularity of MDC opposition in rural areas in the run-up to the elections. While, to a certain extent, it is true that commercial farm invasions were done in order to crush opposition influence that had grown due to problems facing the country and the unpopular policies of government, the white commercial farmers played into the hands of government. Since independence, the government had tried to negotiate with commercial farmers to sell their farms on a ‘willing seller willing buyer’ basis. However, instead of being magnanimous and voluntarily giving the land to government, they made it difficult for government to secure land for resettlement. When the invasions started, the police deliberately refused to get involved. The police commissioner claimed that there was nothing that police could do to stop the invasions since he claimed that it was a political issue (Martin 2000).

A land issue had been turned into a political issue with a senior ZANU (PF) official saying, ‘The whites have themselves to blame because they shot themselves in the foot by mobilising people to throw away the draft constitution; they are now reaping the fruits of their actions’ (Martin 2003:56). Such a comment amply demonstrates that the land invasions became a means of punishing the white commercial farmers who financed and supported the MDC as it advocated the refusal of the draft constitution of November 1999.

As a consequence, Zimbabwe was accused of being a pariah state since law and order, according to the west, was not followed. Judges who sympathised with the white commercial farmers were either ignored or dismissed. New judges who were sympathetic to the cause of the government were appointed.
As a response to the farm invasions, a junior British Foreign Office official suggested that Britain would make arrangements to evacuate 20,000 British nationals from Zimbabwe. The government passed an amendment to the constitution empowering the government to take white-owned farms without compensation.

The government attempted to reverse a High Court order directing the police to evict the land invaders. The High Court judge, however, refused to budge and declared on 13 April 2000 that the farm invasions were illegal. The President was advised that it was in the interest of the country and the rule of law to bring an end to the farm invasions.

**Fast Track Compulsory Land Acquisition**

There are a number of events and issues that influenced the adoption of the Fast Track land reform. Moyo (2006) highlights the following issues:

- An angry electorate that rejected the draft constitution which could have facilitated speedier government land acquisition. The white commercial farmers had supported the Movement for Democratic change to defeat the acceptance of the draft constitution of 1999;
- The collapse of the negotiations with the British government over the financing of land acquisition; and
- The repeated use of the courts to legally challenge the listed farms that the government had chosen also fuelled animosity between the white farmers and the government.

The ultimate objective of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme was to accelerate both land acquisition and redistribution (Marongwe 2004). The land occupations in 2000 were a combination of a top-down, state-driven, populist initiative and a bottom-up, locally-driven process (Moyo 2002; Marongwe 2003). The major problem with the invasion of farms was that there was no coordination of activities (Moyo 2002). Four hundred farms had been occupied within two months. Some groups merely caused disruptions while others were aggressive, slaughtering cattle, and demanding transport from the farmers. Chitsike (2003) notes that after the rejection of the new constitution, the ruling ZANU PF party adopted as its slogan ‘Land is the economy and the economy is land’. This was in a bid to mobilise more land-hungry people to demand for more land, considering that it was acknowledged as the backbone of the economy.
There was new war between the then opposition MDC and the then ruling ZANU (PF) party, with more scholars arguing that ZANU (PF) saw the issue of the land as the only survival strategy. The economy was not performing well and liberation war veterans were demanding for land and hence the ruling ZANU (PF) party was forced to focus on land to try and please the electorate. According to the Ministry of Lands (2003), Fast Track was an accelerated phase where activities which could be done quickly would be done in an accelerated manner. The objectives of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme according to the Ministry of Lands were:

i) The immediate identification of compulsory acquisition of the outstanding 5 million ha for the Resettlement Programme Phase 2. This was to benefit the landless peasant households and the identification of this 5 million ha was targeted for completion by the end of the year 2000;

ii) The immediate gazetting of the identified 5 million hectares; and

iii) The immediate planning, demarcation and settler emplacement on all acquired farms.

Chitsike (2003) and Sachikonye (2003) concur that this accelerated phase was marked by violent occupation of white owned farms by war veterans. Sachikonye (2003) goes on to mention that in this programme the size of land earmarked for acquisition rose from 5 million to 8.3 million hectares and the number of intended beneficiaries rose from 91,000 to 160,000 in 2001. There was also an additional of 54,000 medium scale and large scale commercial farmers who were beneficiaries of the A2 model. The target further increased to 11.4 million ha and about 300,000 families had been resettled under the A1 model (Sachikonye 2003). These achievements came at a cost in terms of intimidation, violence, displacement, lawlessness and disruption of production (Chitsike 2003; Sachikonye 2003).

When this phase was implemented it left a lot of questions on sustainability and governance. Sachikonye (2003) notes that it was argued at the Abuja Conference on the land issue between the Zimbabwean and British governments organised by the Commonwealth in September 2001 that there was linkage between land reform and good governance. It meant that there was need for a systematic planning of the reform process to ensure its long-term sustainability. Many scholars have tried to comment on the land distribution process. UNDP reported that the land reform process could have been more participatory with the involvement of rural communities; the process could have been more transparent and that the selection of beneficiaries could have been improved with priority given to those in greatest need (Sachikonye 2003).
It is these and other problems stated by the British for stopping funding the agrarian reform programme as alluded to previously.

**Achievements under Fast Track**

The Presidential Land Review Committee of 2003 stated that about 127,192 A1 settlers had been allocated land under Fast Track Land Reform. When combined, over 200,000 families had been allocated farm land via the small holders A1 model since 1980. Thus in terms of the government’s policy, the first step on poverty alleviation had been accomplished for the over 200,000 beneficiaries. This was based on the assumption that those who benefited were landless and coming from congested areas. Until around 1992, household heads were not allowed to work off their farms nor could they migrate to cities and leave their spouses to work off their plots. This helped in boosting production and in fighting poverty. This policy was, however, relaxed after 1992 and during the Fast Track reform was never mentioned.

However, the statistics on the ground do not show that there was reduction in poverty. The 2003 National Assessment Report shows that between 1995 and 2003 there was increase in the incidence of poverty. Those below the poverty datum line increased from 20 per cent in 1995 to 48 per cent in 2003; those below the total consumption poverty line increased from 42 per cent to 63 per cent during the same period. The report went on to state that in all the land use and land tenure categories (communal, resettlement, large-scale and small-scale commercial farms) more than 50 per cent of the households were below the total consumption poverty line.

It has also been argued that during Fast Track Land Reform Programme poverty reduction was no longer the driving agenda. A study carried out in Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Masvingo and Matabeleland South provinces on A1 farmers showed that 53 per cent of the beneficiaries were unemployed and landless (Zimbabwe Independent Institute 2007). It meant that the rest were not the poor and landless. If almost half of the beneficiaries are not poor then in what context is the issue of poverty reduction addressed?

**Plight of Workers**

Moyo (2007) argues that farm workers who were expecting to get land as part of the land reform programme lost their jobs and received little redistributed land. They were not given land because they were perceived to have been against the Fast Track Land Reform programme (Chambati and Moyo 2004).
It is argued that out of 175,000 full-time farm workers before Fast Track Land Reform programme, 80,000 remained employed on unoccupied commercial farms. Chambati and Moyo 2004 go on to note that 95,000 former farm workers were either dispersed into communal areas, re-employed in A1/A2 farms, living on informal settlements or doing non-farm work. The report states that only 5 per cent were given land during the Fast track land reform programme. It clearly shows that farm workers and their families were negatively affected. Their livelihoods were destroyed. However, literature has failed to explain the relations between workers and their new employees. It is true that those who failed to secure employment were negatively affected. Nothing is said about those that were employed by new farmers. Did their welfare improve or decline? This research is going to look into the welfare of workers on their new jobs.

The government of Zimbabwe has a clear-cut policy on the fate of farm workers. It should be noted that farm workers worked for commercial farmers; but now with the coming of resettlement programmes, some of the white commercial farmers left their pieces of land, especially under Fast Track. The concern now is on the fate of farm workers who were working for these farmers. However, one should remember that not all white commercial farms were expropriated. According to Chambati and Moyo (2004) implicit in Zimbabwean government policy on farm workers is the position that a substantive proportion of them would remain employed on non-acquired farms. Those that are affected by the acquisition of commercial land under Fast Track are covered by policy measures. The policy measures include the obligation of the large-scale commercial farmers to pay severance packages to the retrenched workers. Secondly, the Government of Zimbabwe assists in the repatriation of those who wish to be repatriated; and thirdly, there is the provision of resettled land to some former farm workers.

Chambati and Moyo (2004) go on to mention that the general policy perspective of the government of Zimbabwe is that workers who lose their jobs as a result of compulsory farm acquisition and remain in the country be absorbed into the wider economy like other unemployed people. The government also provides a variety of social and administrative services to farm workers as a particular social group within its general social welfare and social services, policies and services (Chambati and Moyo 2004). The same authors go on to give the various policies that the state is embarking on to help improve the social welfare of workers.
Re-employment and retrenchment of farm workers

There are laws and statutory instruments that seek to protect farm workers in the event that they lose their jobs or are retrenched. The Company Act of Zimbabwe makes it clear that when a company is taken over, the new owner becomes responsible for the business and the labour force. Chambati and Moyo (2004) note that in the case of compulsorily acquired commercial farms, the legal position was altered with Statutory Instrument No. 6 of 2002, which allocated the responsibility to large-scale commercial farm owners. There is also the responsibility to pay retrenchment packages to farm workers that lose their jobs due to the acquisition of the land. Zimbabwe Statutory Instrument No. 6 requires the large-scale commercial farmers whose property is compulsorily acquired to pay their workers severance pay equivalent to three months pay and wages in lieu of notice. Lieu of notice under the contract of employment or the Agricultural industry agreement comprises an amount equivalent to twice the employee’s current monthly salary for each completed year of continuous service with the employer. An amount of ZWD 5,000 (starting in 2002) was to be paid for the relocation of the employee. Gratuity on termination of employment in terms of section 23 of the Agricultural industry agreement and the cash equivalence of vacation leave accumulated by the employee in the year in which the termination of employment occurred was to be paid (Chambati and Moyo 2004). It is clear from the statutory instruments that the government of Zimbabwe was trying to compensate farm workers. However, the practicability of the instruments was questionable bearing in mind that the white commercial farmer who was the employer was evicted with violent attack under Fast Track. How would these farmers compensate workers when they themselves were not compensated for the losses suffered during the violent expropriation of land?

Land Access

It should be borne in mind that under the inception phase framework plan for the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase Two (LRRP II), the target group included evicted farm workers. However, looking at the publication by the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Programme (2003), the target group under Fast Track excluded farm workers and concentrated more on landless peasants and war veterans. The policy on farm workers was applied differently from one province to another and one district to the other because, according to the guidelines, no land allocation quotas were set aside for farm workers. It therefore follows that the farm workers lagged behind and
could not partake of the national cake. After realising that the farm workers were not benefiting, the government of Zimbabwe enjoined state officials to district land committees so as to try and increase their allocation of land to former farm workers (Chambati and Moyo 2004). One can argue that the Government of Zimbabwe was trying its level best to include farm workers in the distribution of land. This study sought to look at the extent to which farm workers benefited on the ground.

There was also a policy by the government of Zimbabwe to protect and help those farm workers wishing to go back to their countries. It should be noted that there were agricultural workers from other countries who worked on commercial farms for years. Some of these workers came from other countries like Zambia and Mozambique. The repatriation was done through Social Welfare Assistance Act. However, to be eligible for this assistance, one needed to be classified as destitute and this was done in collaboration with the applicant’s embassy or high commission in Zimbabwe (Chambati and Moyo 2004). It should be noted that there is an agreement on the repatriation arrangements under a memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Labour of Mozambique and Zimbabwe signed in 2003. However, there were problems with processes to assist such foreign workers due to problems of citizenship. Workers from other countries married Zimbabweans and hence their children had Zimbabwean citizenship while the fathers were not citizens. This, according to Chambati and Moyo (2004), slowed down the pace at which these people were assisted. The bottom line from these arguments is that on paper the government of Zimbabwe was doing a lot to help evicted farm workers. The question is how implementable were these policies?

**Environmental Degradation**

It is also argued that there is environmental degradation in the resettlement areas. Marongwe (2008) gives examples of felling down of trees, grass burning, and hunting of game, soil degradation and gold panning activities as contributing to environmental degradation. The reasons mentioned are that there is lack of natural resources management skills and the beneficiaries do not hold freehold title to land. While it is true that lack of title deeds can lead to overuse and destruction of natural resources, scholars have failed to link environmental degradation to population pressure. Literature is concentrating on issues of tenure and lack of skills while turning a blind eye to demographic factors.
The State-driven Redistributive Outcome

The land redistribution in 2000 and beyond had varied results and resulted in different social classifications. According to Moyo (2005), by November 2004, smallholder (A1) allocations were granted to 140,866 families while commercial (A2) beneficiaries numbered 14,500 new farmers on 4.2 and 2.3 million hectares respectively. The same author notes that the number of commercial farm units increased by 64 per cent, although the sector’s area dropped by 62 per cent. The drop in commercial area may be attributed to the conversion of some commercial areas into villagised resettlement areas. Smallholder control of land increased from 56 per cent of the total land area to 70 per cent. The statistics indicate that the rate of land appropriation was faster compared to the period between 1980 and 1998. There is clear evidence that the land reform programme took place at an accelerated rate, hence the name Fast Track. Moyo (2005) also notes that some irrigated land, that is, 7.618 hectares or 6 per cent of the national irrigable land, went to small farms, while commercial beneficiaries received 12.448 hectares and communal area smallholder irrigation schemes got 11.861 hectares. All these achievements were realised by the year 2003, showing that under Fast Track even prime land was redistributed. The state was now in control of the resettlement programme, no longer the white commercial farmers. Moyo (2006) highlights (in Table 4.3) farms gazetted under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.

Table 4.3: Farms Gazetted under Fast Track Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Farms</th>
<th>Area (Ha)</th>
<th>% of Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>1,814,270</td>
<td>14.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1,402,116</td>
<td>11.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>976,655</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>682,257</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1,350,483</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>2,043,764</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>2,129,171</td>
<td>17.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>1,992,158</td>
<td>16.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,712</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,387,158</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government changed policy from persuading the white commercial farmers to willingly sell land to acquiring land through force. When the commercial farmers obtained court orders restraining the veterans from occupying the farms, these orders were just ignored. As a consequence, Zimbabwe was accused of being a pariah state since law and order, according to the West, was not followed.

The government passed an amendment to the constitution empowering it to take white farmer-owned farms without compensation. The government attempted to reverse a High Court order directing the police to evict the land invaders. The High Court judge, however, refused to budge and declared on 13 April 2000 that the farm invasions were illegal. The President was advised that it was in the interest of the country and the rule of law to bring an end to the farm invasions.

The Fast Track resettlement brought about a number of challenges. Marongwe (2003) highlights the following:

- The capacity of the government to assist the newly resettled farmers;
- The development of infrastructure and social services;
- Government to come up with an appropriate land tenure for the new settlers;
- Resource management was not well developed in the organised resettlement programme; and
- The international image of Zimbabwe so as to attract foreign investment.

Marongwe (2003:23) further suggests ‘the fast track program created a highly explosive situation that is contributing to the escalation of land-based conflicts’.

**Agricultural Production After Year 2000**

According to the Red Cross Emergency Appeal (2000), the food supply situation started to deteriorate in Zimbabwe due to a number of reasons. There is evidence that the impact of climate change, drought, and the disturbance that took place regarding the commercial farms contributed to the negative effect on grain production. Estimates suggested that 5.1 million people would be without adequate food in 2008. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (2008) joint crop and food assessment, the total number of people without adequate food was 2.4 million persons in July to September 2008, 3.8 million in October to December 2008 and 5.1 million persons in January to March 2009. The expected harvest of the 2008/9 season would only be adequate for 40 per cent of the Zimbabwean population.

The situation would be compounded by the poor harvest recorded by most people in 2007. The Red Cross report (2008:2) highlights that, ‘The 2007 rainy
season was characterised by inconsistent rainfall, leading to droughts and floods in some parts of the country. Combined maize and wheat production dropped 750,000 tons in 2001/2. Maize production for 2002/3 was forecast at 1 million tons. Wheat production in 2002/3 was expected to drop by 40 per cent due to lower acreages. Commercial farmers used to produce 30 to 40 per cent of Zimbabwe’s maize crop but during drought years they produced 70 per cent of the total output. Total maize production has been trading downward since 1988/89. A number of commercial farmers left the country after 2001 to Zambia, Uganda, Mozambique and other British Commonwealth countries.

Commercial wheat area dropped by 50 per cent to between 20,000 and 25,000 hectares around 2002/03. On 24 June 2002, the government of Zimbabwe ordered 2,900 out of about 4,500 white farmers to stop all farming activities (FAO and World Food Programme 2002). If any farmer whose farm had been designated was found engaging in farming activities, he would be arrested and prosecuted. The United Nations (FAO) and World Food Programme (2002) argue that the disruptions and uncertainty surrounding land had negative effects on the production of maize. Areas where maize was grown dropped by 88,000 hectares in 2000/1, which meant that production fell by 50 per cent. FAO suggests that agriculture contributes about 15 per cent of Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product. Agricultural products generate 40 per cent of the country’s foreign currency earnings. According to the local commercial reports, 30 per cent of the commercial beef herd was destroyed through poaching, theft and diseases.

Moyo (2007) argues the information and statistics on agricultural production are scanty. The analysis that is provided in his study is based on estimates derived from triangulation of various sources. He makes it clear that there is evidence that the fast track resettlement programme led to a decline in agricultural production. Table 4.4 summarises agricultural production from 1999 to 2006.

**Table 4.4:** Output Trends for Key Crops FTLRP vs. 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Output (000 Tons)</th>
<th>% Change vs. 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>1,476.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>195.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>286.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya beans</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>175.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*GoZ estimates
There are a number of reasons why production fell drastically from 1999 onwards. The disturbances on the commercial farms meant that the commercial farmers could not practice their normal farming activities. Some of the reasons for poor production after the Fast Track Resettlement Programme will be discussed in this research.

**The Impact of HIV/AIDS**

HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are declining in Zimbabwe. According to the Central Statistics Office (CSO 2006), prevalence rates have declined from the mid-twenties to 15 per cent for males and 18 per cent for females. However, it is interesting to note that these changes may be attributed to change of methodology from antenatal statistics to statistics that covered the whole population including males and non-pregnant women. Though the prevalence rates are declining, the impact of HIV/AIDS on agriculture cannot be ignored. Sukume et al (2004) argue that not much has been said on HIV/AIDS and the agrarian reforms in Zimbabwe. The impact has been generalised to agriculture and not been particular regarding agrarian reform programmes. Impacts of HIV/AIDS range from loss of labour to reduced agricultural productivity.

**Loss of Labour**

According to Ncube (1998), the major impacts are on loss of labour due to death and sickness which has led to reduced productivity. Sukume et al (2004) also state that sickness due to HIV/AIDS has negatively affected extension work, thereby reducing investment in agriculture. They further note that the impact is more marked in smallholder agricultural practices. This is so because these rely heavily on family labour. This entails that the impact can be projected to be high in resettlement areas because land reform programmes have seen commercial farms being converted to smallholder farming practices. Scholars like Jackson (2002) and Ncube (1998) share the same sentiments and argue that labour days are lost due to sickness and caring for the sick. They further note that even the quality of labour is negatively affected due to physical and emotional stress that families go through when the health of their beloved ones deteriorates. Thus more and more time is wasted caring for the sick and, which ultimately leads to the reduction of labour output. The impact of the HIV/AIDS virus on the health and productivity of the nation has dealt a major blow to the economy. According to United Nations statistics, between 1.5 and 2.7 million people, out of a population of 12 million people, in Zimbabwe were living with HIV/AIDS as at the end of 2001.
Land Reform Programme

Loss of Agricultural Productivity

It should be emphasised that smallholder farmers rely on family labour for their agricultural production. If HIV/AIDS attacks the family and labour is reduced, productivity will also be affected. Ncube (1998) in his report points out that more land is left unutilised due to lack of labour resources. This is also supported by the UN (2010) report which states that affected households typically shift to less labour-intensive production and in some cases leave land fallow or use sharecropping arrangements to raise money. As farming communities were disrupted, the economy deteriorated leading to increased poverty and reduced access to education and health care services. The UN report states that many farm workers were forced to move to different areas and, in some cases, families separated. These widened sexual networks and increased the risk of HIV transmission. Sukume et al (2004) also note that when experienced farmers die due to HIV/AIDS, there is loss of skills including knowledge relating to indigenous farming practices. They die before passing on the knowledge and skills to young farmers, which has a bearing on levels of production. The above-mentioned scholars also agree that in smallholder farms, there is lack of draught power. Their argument is that smallholder farmers rely much on draught power and yet they sell the livestock to get money to purchase of medicine, and some are slaughtered at funerals to provide food for the mourners. This is an indication that HIV/AIDS has drained the resource base of many smallholder farmers. More negative impacts can thus be realised in resettlement areas because commercial farms have been converted to smallholder size and status, making them more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS.

Conclusion

The chapter has traced the history of the post-1980 Agrarian revolution in Zimbabwe by focusing on the aims, objectives, achievements and challenges of both phases of the land reform in Zimbabwe. It has also highlighted the legislation that gave power to government to compulsorily acquire the land of white commercial farmers and the role played by the war veterans in the government’s implementation of the Fast Track land reform programme. The next chapter discusses the role of gender in the reform programme.