Onalenna Doo Selolwane
Monopoly Politikos: How Botswana’s Opposition Parties Have Helped Sustain One-Party Dominance

Abstract
The main thesis of this paper is that Botswana’s opposition parties are accountable for their failure to provide the voting public with a meaningful alternative to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party. While conceding the explanatory importance of other factors such as resource capacity, this paper departs from conventional wisdom by focusing on the strategic and ideological weaknesses of the opposition parties. It argues that the opposition parties made a number of strategic errors which rendered them electorally unattractive before they could establish their legitimacy as contenders for government power. To break the monopoly of power that the ruling party has so far enjoyed, Botswana’s opposition must transform itself into a meaningful competitor and government-in-waiting. To do that they must a) demonstrate that they have a viable, alternative economic management strategy to better satisfy the interests of a diverse voting public and b) develop broad based political strategies targeting the diverse voting public to build voter confidence in the capability of the party as a possible government. The ruling party’s track record of four decades of sustained economic growth leaves a formidable challenge to the opposition.

Introduction

On the 16th October, 1999 the citizens of the Republic of Botswana went to the polls to determine which party would govern the nation for the next five years. This eighth round of General Elections, like the seven which preceded it, returned the same political party to power. Both the fact that the popular mandate has been monopolised by one party over eight five year terms and the fact that this has happened under conditions of free elections and adherence to the rule of law, have drawn a fair amount of debate and analysis over the past three decades. Analysts have pondered why, in a continent characterized by coercive rule and divisive politics, Botswana’s multi-party system has endured way beyond the first elections that marked the end of colonial rule (Danevand, 1995; du Toit, 1995; Stevens and Speed, 1976; Wiseman, 1976). And in the light of post colonial Africa’s record of single party and/or single person dictatorships, hard questions have also been raised over the failure of Botswana’s seemingly multi-party electoral system to produce a change of government over such a lengthy period (Stedman, 1993; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Wiseman, 1996; Bratton and de Walle, 1997; Daniel et al, 1998), particularly in the context of wide income differentials and persistent poverty.
In established modern liberal democracies, non-exclusive elections and multi-party competition for government power have come to be recognised as critical components of a functioning democracy. Ideally these processes are good indicators of the extent to which the political system allows for a) reasonably unfettered exercise of choice over who governs and b) accountable governance. In virtually all post-colonial polities in Africa, however, elections, if held at all, have not necessarily reflected unfettered choice on the part of those who vote. Nor have political parties consistently offered the electorate a meaningful choice. In Botswana, despite a legal-
rational apparatus that has guaranteed the integrity of free elections and multi-party political competitions for an unbroken record of more than thirty years, there are still many obstacles in the political system that undermine the quality and meaningfulness of electoral choice. One of these is the inability of the opposition parties to respond to electoral need by offering a meaningful alternative. For instance, there are 22 out of 40 contestable constituencies where the opposition can give the ruling party serious competition for the electoral mandate if it chose to take the voters more seriously. And of these 22, four are unequivocally opposition strongholds, another four are fairly strong opposition constituencies weakened by spoilers, a further five are marginally strong opposition constituencies which the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) wins on account of big opposition split votes, and the rest are marginal BDP constituencies. In addition to the 22, there are other constituencies which appear as strong BDP constituencies at Parliamentary level, but where the opposition has been making significant inroads at local government level. The most dramatic of these inroads have been in the South East constituency where the electorate gave the ruling BDP 77 percent of its parliamentary mandate, but only 55 percent of the Local Government vote.

The ruling party’s monopoly of the electoral mandate has been slipping as evidenced by the fact that support for the BDP dramatically dropped below 60 percent of the electoral mandate during the 1994 and 1999 elections, while that of the opposition climbed to an unprecedented high of more than 40 percent. Indeed, a thorough examination of the distribution of the votes suggests that the downward trend in the ruling BDP’s support is significant and substantial, setting Botswana firmly on the road to plural politics despite considerable voter apathy. This paper will now examine how the opposition parties, particularly the two that have occupied the position of official leadership of the opposition, have contributed to ineffectual contestation for the ruling mandate.

From False Start to Political Oblivion: The Botswana People’s Party

By all accounts, the Botswana Peoples Party (then Bechuanaland People’s Party, BPP) was the first political party to engage in sustained nationalist politics in colonial Botswana. It had a head start on all subsequent parties in terms of mobilisation of both supporters and funds. Logically therefore, as the first political party to agitate for the transfer of government power from the British colonial administration into national hands, this should have been the party to lead Botswana to independence, had it won the confidence of the electorate sufficiently. But this party failed to attract enough electoral support for a number of reasons. Most observers have cited the split of the party before the first General Elections as a major contributory factor (Polhemus, 1983; Nengwekhulu, 1979; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Stevens and Speed, 1976; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). There has been some debate on whether this split was due to personality clashes among the founder members of the party or serious ideological differences. Another factor that has also been cited is the deliberate sponsorship of a rival but more moderate national party (the BDP) by the colonial administration (Nengwekhulu, 1979; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). Further, lack of financial resources has been recognised as a major constraint, making it difficult for opposition parties to campaign effectively in all constituencies (Molutsi, 1991; Molomo, 1991; Otlhogile, 1991; Holm, 1987; Danevand, 1995).

While these factors have indeed played a very significant role in undermining the capacity of the
BPP to contest effectively for power, it is however also important to highlight the role played by
the political strategy adopted by this party itself from the outset in the 1960s. As a party aiming to
bring an end to colonial domination and build an independent state-nation, a major problem
confronting its leaders was the issue of establishing both its own legitimacy and that of a
democratic electoral process along conventional lines. This party was founded by Botswana
nationals who had cut their political teeth in the black nationalist movement in South Africa as
migrant workers (Nengwekhulu, 1979; Parsons, 1990). They had returned home when the black
nationalist organisations there were banned. While their nationalist aspirations for independent
statehood were considered legitimate among the local citizenry, their major challenge was to
convince other contenders as well as the majority of the ordinary citizenry that this party and its
leaders had a legitimate claim to be heirs to the colonially constructed polity. Principally, they
faced the challenges of the colonial administration and western interests generally, and specifically
the minority white ethnic group, the local intelligentsia, hereditary chiefs, and a yet to be captured
electorate.

Botswana’s hereditary rulers saw themselves as the most logical legitimate heirs to the polity the
British had administered as a protectorate. They therefore envisaged an eventual transfer of power
to themselves as a college of hereditary rulers representing the traditional tribal polities. To this
college might be added a few educated nationals and perhaps representatives of the minority white
settlers. Throughout the British colonial oversight, these chiefs had enjoyed a large measure of
their traditional authority under the system of indirect and parallel rule. That is, they had governed
their tribal subjects in tandem with representation of a white ethnic minority as members of the
Joint Advisory Council. They could not envisage a situation where their right to power could be
superseded by any other contender at the end of colonial rule: thus their vehement opposition to
political parties and politicians generally, and to the Botswana People’s Party as the first sustained
organised political group.

For the BPP, however, both the hereditary rulers and colonial rule were to be a thing of the past
in the building of a post-colonial state. The party envisaged no political role for hereditary rulers
whatsoever and sought instead to build a state nation founded on equality of citizenship and
popular conferment of government power. And in their campaigns for autonomous statehood for
Botswana they made it strikingly clear that they were constructing a state-nation where arbitrary
power would not be accommodated. Led by individuals who themselves had no traditional power
base, the party’s unequivocal rejection of traditional authority put the BPP on a collision course
which would alienate them from the most powerful chiefs in the centralised Tswana Chiefdoms.
And in the context of a predominantly (about 90 percent) rural population used to a traditional
constitution where legitimate authority to govern was vested in the chiefs, the BPP’s
uncompromising stand on the chiefs did not resonate with the broad values of the population they
sought to politicise, and from whom they would seek the mandate to govern.

Not surprisingly, the BPP and its leaders were seen as would-be usurpers: commoners who were
challenging the legitimate traditional authority for power. This image did considerable damage to
the BPP and overshadowed their nationalist calls for independent statehood. However, among
detribalised urban populations as well as some of the ethnic groups who occupied a subject status
among larger Tswana tribal polities, the BPP’s unequivocal rejection of the chiefs symbolised a
promise to end second class tribal citizenship. This was the case, for instance, among the Bayei
ethnic groups in the Batawana tribal polity. It was also true of the Kalanga ethnic groups in the
concession area of the Tati Company (in Francistown) as well as the North East administrative
district. Not surprisingly, these localities were the areas where the BPP was most successful in gaining the confidence of the electorate at the first general elections in 1965. It should be noted, however, that the BPP’s view of the role of chiefs in post-colonial state building was not unique to the party. Most of Botswana’s educated elites held similar views about the chiefs. In fact the precursors of the BPP had been founded as attempts to ensure that in the transition from colony to statehood, the chiefs should not be seen as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Botswana. Leetile Raditladi’s short lived Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party, for instance, had been founded out of fear that post-colonial modernist government institutions might come to be dominated by traditional chiefs and white settlers as had been the case with the Joint Advisory Council (Maundeni, 1998; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). He and other nationalist reformers, including the founders subsequently of the BPP, wanted a political dispensation which would ensure a greater political role for non-chiefs. But where earlier reformers had envisaged a greater share of political space for commoners, the BPP envisaged political space only on the basis of popular legitimation, and the abolition of the institution of hereditary power. When the BDP later came into existence, it had a similar view of eventually stripping hereditary rulers of political power, which was to be transferred constitutionally to elected institutions. But unlike the BPP, this was not an objective they trumpeted loudly during their initial search for political legitimacy (Polhemus, 1983; Charlton, 1993; Parson, 1990). One of the BPP’s false starts in search of political power was therefore in adopting a strategy that alienated powerful chiefs before the party could secure its own legitimacy and the necessary popular mandate. And the fact that the visible face of the BPP was that of commoners without a single traditional leader among them did not help allay the fears of their chiefly contenders to the post-colonial throne. A large part of this strategic failure on the part of the BPP probably arose from the fact that the leaders had spent a considerably amount of time immersed in South African politics, and were therefore not very sensitive to local power politics in their national home. This ‘foreign touch’ and lack of local sensitivity would alienate them, not only from the chiefs but from other powerful contenders such as the educated elite who had not participated in the migrant labour system (Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). But in relation specifically to the chiefs, the BPP strategy lost them potential strategic allies. Thus alienated, the chiefs used their powerful position to undermine the capacity of the party to canvas for political support in their tribal polities (Polhemius, 1983).

This contrasted sharply with the chiefs’ attitude towards the BDP when that party later emerged under the leadership of one of their own, Seretse Khama. Although initially hostile to all political parties, the chiefs capitulated to the Khama-led BDP, assuming that at least this party would be more accommodating of hereditary rulers, being led by one. They therefore actively canvassed for electoral support for the BDP, and only appreciated after delivering the electoral mandate to this party that it was in fact no different from other political parties in terms of where it would seek to position the chiefs in the power structures. For the BPP, their strategic false start meant that it became effectively a party of the urban populations in Lobatse and Francistown. When it splintered before the first General Elections, this greatly reduced the nationalist appeal of both portions of the splintered party and permanently relegated them to the margins of political power, where they have since degenerated into political have-beens. Another strategic false start which led to this sorry state of affairs was how the BPP managed its canvassing of support and membership among the local intelligentsia. There is some evidence to suggest that in its initial recruitment drive, the BPP had attracted notables among the local
intelligentsia who had shared membership of the short-lived Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party with Philip Matante and KT Motsete, two of the three founder members of the BPP\textsuperscript{3}. Ramsay and Parsons (1998: p136) noted that by April 1961 some of these political luminaries had been alienated from the BPP. Seretse Khama similarly seemed to have briefly flirted with this party before dismissing it completely. But few analysts have really discussed in any significant detail why the educated elites were turned off by the BPP after initially flirting with it. Certainly, the composition of the membership of political organisations which had attempted to exist prior to the BPP suggests that the local elites were variously attracted to these emerging parties, and that there tended to be a coalescence of interests in such organisations from political activists who would later feature significantly in the major parties that contested the first and subsequent general elections.

In explaining the waning elite support for the BPP, most analysts tend to focus on the emergence of the BDP as a political contender, and the vision and leadership of Seretse Khama’s stewardship of this party (Morgan, 1980; Charlton, 1993; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). But for purposes of understanding the weaknesses of the BPP as a party and the opposition generally, it is critically important to establish what it was that repulsed the critical mass of local political elites from the BPP and its splinters, and what therefore drove these politically active individuals to search for a new political home.

Historians and political scientists have tended to make a great deal of the fact that the Colonial administration actively solicited and sponsored the emergence of the BDP as a more acceptable face of nationalist politics (Stevens and Speed, 1976; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998; Maundeni, 1998; Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000). This however tends to underplay the importance of the expressed desires and active search for a political alternative to the BPP by a number of educated local modernists. Long before the BDP came into existence, these political activists had been searching for a party that would adequately articulate their interests, and a leader with the right credentials to win their party the legitimacy it would need to muster a sufficient electoral mandate (Parsons, 1988). Their sojourn in several short-lived political formations, and their short flirtation with the BPP itself, is indicative of this search.

The BPP could not, however, house the aspirations of the emerging class of the educated and cattle-owning elites. The reason was that the BPP portrayed itself as a socialist party whose aim was to build a state which would seize and retain the basic means of production, including land and its resources, all industry, transport and communications, etc (Polhemus 1983:405). To a cattle-owning elite aspiring to transform their cattle holdings into wealth-creating commercial enterprises, this socialist rhetoric was hardly likely to attract their support and membership. Both the black elite and the minority white cattle ranchers aspired for a materially richer future based on private ownership of cattle and grazing land.

The colonial administration had made this aspiration an attainable possibility during the last decade of colonial rule by a) transferring unprecedented levels of capital resources into the Protectorate to support the development of the cattle-beef industry and b) releasing Crown Lands for the expansion of private freehold tenure (Morrison, 1993: 35). The full potential to realise the material wealth portended by this transfer of capital and privatization of state land was not an automatic right to be handed over to nationalists. Rather it was a bargaining tool subject to negotiation: principally in a political environment which would guarantee the continued ability for western capitalist investment to yield profit.

The strategic failure on the part of the BPP was not to recognise what was negotiable and the
terms of negotiation. In their promotion of hard line pan-African radicalism, the party had failed to appreciate a significant change in imperialist policies which was ushered in by the end of the Second World War when British dominance as the leader of the industrialised world declined and was replaced by the United States of America. Fearing a Soviet led socialist threat to the capitalist system among territorially colonised peoples of Africa, South America and Asia, the United States of America advocated an imperialist agenda where territorial possessions became outdated as mechanisms of world domination and political control. With this change of guard, former colonial territories would be kept safe for capitalist expansion through a strategy of political independence and economic development. By the beginning of the 1960s the American strategy had crystallised into the United Nations First Decade of Development which would see considerable technical and financial resources transferred from the West to former colonial territories to help them out of poverty under the ambit of capitalism and away from communism (Singer and Roy, 1993; Rist, 1997; Mason, 1997; Cuperer et al, 1997).

War-torn Europe would, in the meantime, also be assisted to reconstruct itself with loans and other assistance from the United States, thus firmly establishing the United States as a driving force of world events in both western Europe and the European colonies. The American agenda for the post-war period thus made it possible for a very reluctant colonial Europe to relinquish her colonial territories while investing in the economic development of these territories (Singer and Roy, 1993; Rist, 1997; Mason, 1997; Cuperer et al, 1997; Parsons, 1988). Most importantly for Botswana and other colonial subjects, the American-led agenda for ‘de-colonisation with development’ meant that successful nationalist movements would only benefit from western development assistance if indeed they could guarantee a safe haven for promoting capitalist accumulation while eschewing communism. The array of development assistance programmes that were unleashed with this American strategy had no counterpart of similar magnitude in the Soviet dominated socialist bloc, thus making a meaningful choice of development partners practically non-existent for emerging nationalist movements.

In relation specifically to political developments in Botswana and the development of the Botswana People’s Party, this meant that the party’s socialist rhetoric would not win it western support. In contrast, the decolonisation-with-development agenda spelt out by the United Nations First Decade of Development coincided with the aspirations of Botswana’s budding elite for a materially richer national citizenship and statehood. In that context, the BPP’s political strategy had, in the run-up to the first General Elections in 1965, alienated the most powerful potential allies among the local elites and the western industrialised world, effectively depriving the party of the following:

- A critical mass of the intelligentsia it needed to field contestants in all the constituencies as well as eventually to run a government;
- Sources of financial and technical assistance it required first to mount an effective election campaign throughout the whole polity, as well as to invest eventually in the economic transformation of Botswana (a country which then ranked among the poorest in the world);
- A large segment of the electoral support of powerful traditional chiefs and their tribal constituencies. It needed this support to win the mandate to form a government.

The end result was a party strong in socialist rhetoric but totally out of the league in the fight for the commanding heights of political power. And to crown it all it suffered internal conflicts and splits that reduced even the electoral support it had initially garnered among urban constituencies and tribally discriminated ethnic groups. Lacking both the human and material resources to
regroup and reformulate its policies to attract a wider constituency of supporters, the BPP eventually shrunk to localised political contests in a few constituencies, finally fading out of meaningful political existence in 1984.

**Shaky Beginnings on Scientific Socialism: The Botswana National Front and an Ideology Without a Constituency**

As the BPP declined, the mantle of leader of the opposition was taken over by the Botswana National Front which had come into existence after the 1965 elections. The founder of this party, Kenneth Koma, belonged to a genre of African leaders and political analysts who believed firstly that the greatest challenge facing the peoples of Africa was how to ensure that liberation from colonial domination would in fact free them from the shackles of exploitative systems of production that had historically characterised the advent of capitalism in the continent. These leaders also believed that in the postwar period, it was now possible for formerly colonised societies to harness the technological advances of modern science and, with the aid of a political system where the state controlled the major means of production, engender non-exploitative economic development by by-passing capitalism (Ulyanovsky, 1984; Rodney, 1972; Abdi, 1973; Rosberg and Callaghy, 1979; Kader, 1985). According to this world view, political independence based on collaboration with western industrialised countries and capitalist enterprise was more of a change of guard than a substantive transformation of exploitative relations of production. As such, if these relations were not fundamentally geared towards the development of a socialist system they were seen as a mere change of the form (i.e. from colonialism to neo-colonialism) rather than change in the nature and extent of that exploitation. Indeed, the leadership of the BNF perceived the Botswana Democratic Party as more reactionary than the imperialist power it had replaced because it was a national party which governed under conditions of economic collaboration with its former colonial master.

But, like all other political organisations before it, the BNF has had to confront the practical reality of establishing its legitimacy as contender for government power, but now within the context of a post-colonial polity. Unlike in other African countries where similarly inclined Marxist leaders had first sought a revolutionary take-over of state power as a critical step towards establishing what they perceived as non-capitalist relations of production (Jowitt, 1979), Koma’s party sought to contest for government power within the rules established by the ‘neo-colonial’ BDP dominated state (i.e. through electoral competitions). However, Koma charted for his party a strategy he envisioned would first build alliances among various disgruntled groups. With this ‘front’ he would wrest electoral power from the BDP, and then, guided by the principles of scientific socialism, gradually mould Botswana towards an equitable society dominated by workers, where, ultimately, there would be no exploitation of the labour of one class by another. As he emphatically stated, his party did not believe that ‘the profit motive, individual material incentives, money, capital and private entrepreneurs are indispensable pre-requisites to development’ (Polhemus, 1983: 409). But was this a view shared by the electorate and those that would be the vanguard of the socialist enterprise? Unlike the BPP before it which had dismissed any significant role for the chiefs in its nationalist socialist agenda, the BNF sought actively to harness the power of the chiefs as the most important allies of the time. What the party had to offer in terms of political power to these temporary allies was actually much more than what the ruling BDP had offered. For instance, where the BDP
sought to strip the chiefs of power and transfer it to democratically elected institutions, the BNF proposed to accommodate them in the Legislature as full members (Parson, 1990: 110; Picard, 1987: 158). This strategy won the initial support of the electorate in the tribal constituencies of Chief Bathoen II of Bangwaketse, when the chief resigned his hereditary leadership position to take over the leadership of the party. But the strategy failed generally to attract more adherents from tribal constituencies essentially because, although it accommodated chiefs in the political power structure as a means of winning tribal votes, it threatened the material base of these traditional power holders.

Like the BPP before it, the BNF’s commitment to vesting control of productive resources in the state and abolishing private land tenure basically meant that the royals, like other cattle owning elites, would not be able to realise the commercial value of their cattle-beef enterprise for private gain. On balance, therefore, the political gains by the chiefs would be greatly outweighed by their material losses in a socialist system of government. This was true not only in relation to the chiefs, but for all other cattle-owning elite classes, including the increasing number of educated individuals joining the formal sector of wage employment and the civil service (many of these initially invested their earnings in the expanding cattle-beef industry).

Independence under the leadership of the BDP had seen some increased transfers of western development resources into Botswana which made it clear that large cattle owners were going to reap material benefits of a magnitude they could not have envisaged previously. The combination of infrastructural developments (water, veterinary services, transport, etc), the opening up of access to international beef markets, as well as the BDP strategy of transferring the profits of this cattle-beef trade back to the cattle owners was an inducement that worked greatly in favour of convincing elites that their material future was safest under a non-socialist regime.

What this meant was that electorally, the BNF started off with a strategy that could not possibly win it wide support among the governing and propertied classes. And in the context of a largely rural society where political activists tended to be drawn predominantly from among the educated and cattle-owning elites, this did not augur well for the BNF’s ability to attract a critical mass of political activists. With regards specifically to the chiefs as allies, by the 1980s it was clear that the BNF had milked all the political gains it could in trying to capture them as a constituency that would bring tribal votes to the party. The BNF had gambled on an assumption that such a group could be induced by the promise of political power to forgo the material benefits of their class and that they could later be discarded once they had served their purpose. But in fact most of these chiefs stayed firmly in support of the BDP despite that party’s systematic stripping of their political power. And although most of their powers have in fact been transferred to more democratic institutions, they still play a considerable political role as symbols of past power structures and ethnic inequalities as witnessed by recent national debates on representation and the rights of minority ethnic groups.

Another not so successful area of alliance that the BNF sought to exploit for electoral gain was the issue of ethnic discrimination. Following in the footsteps of the BPP and its splinter groups, the BNF politicised the inequalities of citizenship stemming from a national identity that privileged Setswana culture and ethnicity above other ethnic identities and symbols (such as language). The BDP failed to address this as an issue and in fact seemed to perpetuate the problem by constitutionally recognising only the dominant Tswana polities as the ‘principal tribes’. The BNF calculated that it could mobilise electoral support by highlighting the injustices of Botswana’s tribally biased constitution and promising to deliver a constitution that gave all ethnic and tribal
groups equality of national citizenship. While this political strategy had initially seemed to work in favour of the BPP and other opposition political parties in certain localised contexts, it did not bring any sustainable votes for the BNF. In fact, although ethnic inequalities (cultural, social and economic) and conflicts have been issues of political concern from the run-up to independence and since, as political issues they have never been successful vote catchers on any sustained basis. A possible explanation for the electoral failure of this strategy of politicising ethnic grievances was that it did not quite tally with the BNF’s policy of maintaining the hereditary rights of chiefs in the legislature for the immediate future. The centralised former polities of Tswana chiefs encompassed a numeric minority of ethnic Tswana dominating a plural majority of other ethnic groups, many of who had their own traditional leaders. If the BNF was therefore going to give the powerful Tswana chiefs recognition as members of Parliament, then it also had to deal with the knotty problem of determining the limits of traditional hereditary power of dominant tribes vis-à-vis those of the subject peoples. In other words, the BNF had to determine which of the subject tribes would win recognition as traditional polities deserving representation in Parliament through their own chief, and which would be subsumed under the jurisdiction of the dominant Tswana chiefs. A more compelling possible reason for the failure of the ethnic question as a vote catcher, however, is that as with the question of chieftaincy, the BNF strategy tended to focus on the cultural aspect of peoples’ grievances and did not pay sufficient attention to the material base. So while indeed there were clear signs that for some ethnic groups such as the Bakalanga, Bayei, Bakgaladi, and Basarwa, the conferment of an equal national citizenship on individuals had not resolved outstanding local grievances concerning their subordinate ethnic status vis-à-vis the dominant local Tswana groups, independence under a BDP led government not only promised but actually delivered, material benefits that cut across the ethnic spectrum and have thus tended largely to outweigh the indignity of cultural subjugation. Arguably, this gave most ethnic groups space to separate their struggle for cultural equality from the question of political party affiliation.

For instance, the Bakalanga, who are often portrayed as the most likely constituency for politicised ethnicity, have never consistently supported any single political party as the sole legitimate representative of their aspirations for ethnic equality. While this ethnic group clearly initially supported the national opposition party in the North East and Francistown constituencies in the 1960s and 1970s, they have also largely supported the ruling party and other political contestants outside the situational specificity of the North East and Francistown areas. For instance the predominantly Kalanga council constituencies of Mathangwane, Marapong, Mosetse, Tutume East and West, Sebina and Maitengwe have historically supported the BDP with mandates which in 1989 ranged from 51 percent (Tutume West) to 84 percent (Mosetse) and averaged 60 percent. By 1999 this support was averaging 55 percent and ranging from 48 percent in Tutume to 75 percent in Sebina.

Of particular interest is the role the BNF assigned to students and student movements. Following the socialist strategy of identifying a revolutionary vanguard which would act as a vehicle of socialist ideology and help raise political awareness until the weak working class had developed enough to take on that role, the BNF targeted students for radical ideological, political and organisational activity. This led to strident accusations from the ruling Botswana Democratic Party in the 1970s that the national university was being used for clandestine meetings at which plans were being made for a revolutionary and unconstitutional takeover of government (Picard,
1987: 172). It also saw some of these BNF youth and their leaders having their passports confiscated by the State on the eve of a planned travel to attend a youth conference in Cuba in 1978 (Polhemus, 1983:426). The clandestine nature of ideological study groups among students and other identified allies of the socialist revolution led to an unprecedented level of strident politicking in the 1970s with both the BNF and the ruling party accusing each other of undemocratic and unconstitutional tactics and threatening to use violence in their competition for power (Picard, 1987; Charlton, 1993).

As an electoral strategy however, the BNF’s battle for the ideological soul of student politics and support effectively meant that the party was targeting a transient group that could afford to be highly revolutionary in rhetoric, safe in the knowledge that a university degree guaranteed them a secure place in the ‘reactionary world’ of civil servants and cattle-owning elite where they would not anticipate any revolutionary change in their lifetime. But it also meant that the party was building a cadre of potential elite recruits whose ‘inherent proneness to turn bourgeois’ (Ulyanovsky, 1984: 58), might be compensated by enhanced ideological conscientisation and the prospect of political power as revolutionaries who would, in the interim, become part of the governing class on behalf of the yet to develop working classes. To enhance the potential vote of the youth in support of the opposition, the BNF pushed for electoral reforms which would lower the voting age from 21 to 18 years.

The strategy of politicising students later paid off when some of these graduates of revolutionary study groups became electable in sizeable numbers in Botswana’s urban areas in the 1994 elections. But the strategy suffered a backlash in the 1999 elections when competition for the commanding heights of the party’s echelons of power led to major internal conflicts and the breakup of the party into factions, each claiming a revolutionary ideological purity not quite in congruence with the reality of the material position of these political activists. This resulted in the loss of half the gains the party had made in parliamentary seats in 1994.

But perhaps the weakest aspect of the BNF’s political strategy for government power is that the party did not really have a coherent strategy at all from the formative years till the 1990s. During the first two decades, the party’s attempt to wrest electoral power from the BDP were poorly directed and gave little acknowledgement to the importance of the voters. For instance, Stevens and Speed (1976: 387) noted that opposition parties did not seem concerned to make any political capital out of the fact that the BDP government’s economic strategies were increasingly characterised by failure to meet the development needs of the poor and lowly paid working classes. Cohen (1976) similarly observed the lack of concern and debate over Government’s economic strategy on the part of political candidates during the 1974 elections. Picard (1987) also raised concerns that ‘opposition parties in Botswana appear to be caught in the historical circumstances of their formation and are becoming irrelevant to Botswana’s evolving political systems’ and that they do not focus on contemporary political issues.

The BNF set itself the task of opposing the dominant BDP not so much as a potential government-in waiting, but as a ‘front’ for a wide-ranging set of grievances which did not have a common base other the ruling party as their source. In fact, the party started off as an attempt to broker unity among existing ‘socialist’ parties (such as the BPP and its splinter groups) and other political contenders (such as traditional chiefs) who had lost the contest for the control of the state. When the attempt to unify existing opposition parties failed, the decision to create yet another socialist party was made which initially drew membership from the existing opposition groups, leaving those parties with dwindling numbers and eventual political oblivion. Correctly
judging the conditions unripe at the time for a potential socialist revolution, the BNF leadership calculated that they could use the rhetoric of scientific socialism to justify the array of conflicting interests that they would attempt to unify in opposition to the ruling party.

For a party with the ultimate aim of representing the interests of the workers, however, the BNF strategy was particularly instructive for its failure to address the growing plight of these workers under the economic management of the BDP government. It was only with the 1984 elections that Holm (1988:192) was able to observe that ‘the BNF has appealed to the working class groups by criticizing the BDP for not allocating a sufficient proportion of the country’s increased income to wage earners’. But he was skeptical about whether this critique had mobilised target voters since it did not form part of the BNF’s campaign material. Parson (1990; 128) also noted that by capitalising on the economic concerns of the mass base in rural areas and social concerns on housing and working conditions in urban areas, the BNF had become the most successful party in capturing support from both the disaffected working class and disgruntled elites (Parson 1990: 129). But he also recognised the failure of the party to translate criticism of the BDP into electoral campaigns, attributing the failure to the BNF’s inability to offer a clear and consistent alternative to the organisation and programme of the ruling party.

Molutsi and Holm (1990; 333) recognised similar electoral weaknesses occasioned by the reluctance of opposition parties to explore public opinion so as to prepare their political campaigns in response. They also noted that challenges to the government were rarely well coordinated nationwide, and that this reduced the threat of opposition activities to the top political elites (Molutsi and Holm ( 1990; 337). The party’s political gaucheness was also demonstrated by its inability to seize the moment of its first major critical mass of parliamentary seats after the 1994 general elections to make political capital out of the BDP’s failures. The BNF entered Parliament with 13 representatives but no clear strategy on how to use this power to score effective political points against the ruling party. Informative reports like the statutory Auditor General’s Reports were not made much use of even though they clearly indicated serious lapses in the management of public resources by civil servants and poor accountability on the part of supervising Ministers.

For most of its political existence, therefore, the BNF does not seem to have made enough effort to develop clear, effective programmes and policy strategies that took full cognizance of the electorate as a source of potential power. While the same could be said about the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, incumbency gave the ruling party advantage as it has relied on technocratic civil servants to provide the necessary national development policies and strategies which the party could then legitimately claim for its own. But the BNF, as a party outside government power, needed to have alternative strategies to win the support of voters. However, the ruling party always took advantage of its position in power to react to the most electorally damaging criticism from the BNF.

By and large, the BNF’s electoral failures can be traced to its strategy of attempting to be a political home for every elite group with a grievance, whether cultural, related to power politics, or specifically relating to structural problems of socio-economic inequality. As a result it has had no single coherent national policy addressing the specific problems of any single constituency. Each interest group was left to interpret the political goals of the party in relation to their own interests, and this led to persistent internal conflicts as each group attempted to take the commanding heights of power in the party structure to advance their side. The result has been a weak party with an unclear message for the electorate. Or, given the ideological inclinations of the
founder, it has been a party with a scientific socialist ideology that had no electoral constituency. For unlike similar socialist parties in western Europe which used scientific socialism as a political guide to action under clearly capitalist conditions (Sassoon, 1997), the BNF did not have a numerically significant working class constituency it could claim to represent.

The BNF’s organisational weakness has also been reflected in the party’s failure to come to terms with the reality of changes heralded by political independence - thus for instance its habitual dismissal of independence as having brought changes only in the flag and the national anthem. But for the rapidly increasing number of educated elites, cattle owners and small entrepreneurs, the reality was that independence brought real material gains. Similarly, for the vast majority of the population who benefited from improved health and educational facilities, transport and communications, access to water, etc, independence was more than a simplistic symbolic change. So, though these qualitative changes also brought large and persistent income inequalities, the majority of the voting public saw both the shortcomings and the benefits, and therefore continued to give the ruling BDP government their electoral support. For the BNF, the result has been that thirty five years after it came into existence, it has remained largely on the sidelines of political power, skirting the BDP, but not making sufficient inroads into its power base to occasion a change of government.

The Road to Political Damascus: The BNF Discovers the Voters

Three years before the 1999 General Elections, a public forum was held at the University of Botswana to debate the question of whether the BNF was in fact ready to govern. The background to this public debate was rising concern over the anomalous situation where the electorate seemed to be heading for a possible transfer of government power to the BNF, while the BNF had not itself started to behave organisationally like a government in waiting. The example of Zambia’s President Chiluba who seemed to spend more energies ensuring that his predecessor would not come back to power than in the actual governing of the country raised concerns that Botswana might be heading that way if there was an electoral victory for a party which was not ready to take on the mantle of government. This question (i.e. is the BNF ready to govern?) is still very relevant as it concerns the serious issue of whether Botswana’s multi-party democracy will ever be seriously tested as an assurance of its consolidation.

Many of Botswana’s political analysts will agree that the BNF is the only opposition party that has been persistent in its attempt to wrest electoral support from the BDP over the past three and a half decades. Some observers also concede that at least since the 1980s, but particularly in the 1990s, there have been signs that the party may at last be awakening to the realisation that the outcome of its quest for power depends on the electorate, and that therefore it must begin to address voters more directly. Molutsi and Holm (1990:337) for instance were encouraged by the development of dialogue between the grass roots and party leadership which they saw as portending the strengthening of the party’s electoral campaigns. They also observed that policy debates had begun to emerge within the party congresses, which could lead to new initiatives relevant to changing socio-economic conditions and the needs of a rapidly urbanising population (Molutsi and Holm 1990 339). Charlton (1993: 350) also observed that the BNF has in recent years ‘begun to tap the rich veins of academic research … both more coherently and to much greater effect than hitherto’.

These are just tentative indicators. There is as yet no concrete evidence that the BNF is generating
practical strategies to respond to the electorate through qualitative programme development and cogent policies. For instance, the leader of the BNF caused some activists to pull out of the party when he declared at a party conference in 1998 that the BNF was not a political party, but a Front. For those who joined the party in the hope that it was seriously considering contesting for the right to govern and that way to meaningfully represent the interests of its supporters, this statement suggested that it was not ready to take the mantle of government power. The party has still to clarify who its electoral constituency is given the current structure of the electorate. The party’s ambivalence contrasts very sharply with the historical development of socialist parties in Europe where political activists realised early in the last century that to win the electoral mandate, they had to win the confidence of not just the working class but of middle class voters as well (Sassoon, 1997).

The BNF has yet to state clearly what the various constituencies it claims to represent as a ‘Front’ should expect to gain from this party by giving it their vote. Botswana’s burgeoning class of local entrepreneurs has indicated a desire for a party which was serious both about contesting government power and about giving local entrepreneurs priority over competing foreign business. When, for instance Mr Leach Tlhomelang left the ruling BDP to form his own party in 1989, he argued that he was disillusioned with the BDP government’s lack of commitment to local business, stating that government paid only lip service to the needs of local entrepreneurs. Similarly, he left the BNF when he realised it would not adequately represent these interests. Ephraim Setshwaelo’s ill fated United Action Party similarly attracted professionals and business classes who had become disillusioned with the ruling party’s ability to serve the interests of Botswana’s growing class of potential entrepreneurs.

The verdict of Botswana’s voting public seems to also suggest that both the poor rural and urban constituencies, and the burgeoning class of local entrepreneurship, are losing confidence in the economic strategies pursued by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party since independence. For the poor, this is in spite of large state transfers towards drought relief, support of small arable agriculture, small and medium enterprises, and various others programmes aimed at raising the livelihoods of these vulnerable groups. The younger generation of Batswana now clearly want jobs and have turned their back firmly on those production areas which tend to perpetuate poverty rather than alleviate it. Between the 1981 and 1991 censuses for instance youth participation in agriculture dropped from 70 percent to 30 percent. The 1997 Poverty Study showed that they want the security of formal sector incomes. The BNF has not developed a clear strategy of addressing these various electoral demands.

Despite this lack of clarity, the electorate has detected enough signals of response to reward the small overtures the BNF has made by cautiously increasing its support for the party. The 1994 elections gave the BNF its largest vote of confidence when that party won a third of the contested parliamentary seats. Although this support dropped to just 15 percent of the seats in 1999 due largely to the party’s failure to remain internally cohesive in the face of possible electoral victory, indications are that the voters’ confidence will hold. And that, theoretically, it could increase as the population becomes more urbanised, their economic base more diverse, and the party more responsive and proactive in its electoral campaigns. The strength of this support is reflected in the fact that despite a major split that dramatically reduced the party’s organisational capacity in the run up to the 1999 elections, the BNF as a party was able to maintain between 25 percent to 57 percent of the aggregate local government votes in 60 percent of the national constituencies. However, the large gaps in voter support suggest that there is still some way to go before the
BNF can garner adequate voter confidence to wrest the mandate from the BDP. In the capital city where the BNF has a well established electoral support, it has an absolute majority only in the predominantly poor suburbs of the Gaborone South constituency. In the more affluent Gaborone Central and the mixed areas of Gaborone North and Gaborone West, its support is undermined by competition from its estranged off-shoot, the Botswana Congress Party. This support structure suggests that whether as a reflection of protest against the ruling party or affirmation of support for the opposition, the BNF enjoys support from a cross section of socio-economic classes in Gaborone: the poor as well as the affluent. In other urban areas, however, support for the BNF is more qualified (20 percent to 50 percent), suggesting that the party needs to work even harder before it can win the confidence of the voters in these constituencies.

A significant factor in voter cautiousness towards the BNF may stem from the fact that in the three and a half decades of its existence, it has been characterised by major splits on the eve of important electoral contests. For instance on the eve of the 1989 elections the party broke into factions which almost certainly cost it two constituencies (Mokopakgosi and Molomo, 2000: 8). The break-up in the run-up to the 1999 elections lost the party even more constituencies: occurring as it did after the BNF had made a historic break-through by winning a third of the 1994 parliamentary seats. The concern over the proneness to factional splits was raised at several fora around the countryside during public debates in the last two months before the 1999 General Elections.

Conclusion

The question of whether the Botswana National Front will ever rise above its internal conflicts to develop a vision that will help it to respond to electoral demands for meaningful competition for government power in the immediate future has not been settled. It would seem that this party will need dramatic transformations from within to rise above the shackles of its ideological inclinations towards meaningless elite alliances and consequent proneness to factional break-ups. The Botswana voters have sent clear signals that they are ready to give the opposition a try. But as the past patterns of voter behaviour also indicate, this promise is a qualified one dependent largely on how much the party is prepared to demonstrate concretely that it can be trusted with the popular mandate.

One of the challenges the BNF faces is whether it has the political maturity to develop an economic and political strategy where the aspiring local entrepreneur and the job seeker can be convinced they have a joint enterprise of mutual dependence which will be protected and nurtured by the state. Or will the party’s inclination towards a state controlled economy lead it to reject the entrepreneur as nothing but an exploiter, and thus seek to perpetuate those sections of the BDP’s past economic strategies that have demonstrably shown the greatest propensity for failure? Local private sector entrepreneurs have become a reality in Botswana despite the hostile environment within which they have had to operate under successive BDP governments. Job seekers have also become disillusioned with the state dominated economy’s capacity to create jobs. In an assessment of the size of the employment problem in Botswana H C L Hermans (1988) noted, after taking into account the country’s resources held in the whole banking system and foreign reserves, that Botswana did not have adequate domestic resources to marshall into creating jobs at a rate that would meaningfully dent the rate of demand. He argued that this country would have to rely to a considerable extent on attracting foreign capital to complement
local resources. This poses yet another political challenge to the Botswana National Front and other socialist oriented opposition parties. Given their stated antipathy towards western capitalism how will the party deal with the problem of gaps in domestic capital resources? Will it, like the BDP before it opt for strategic alliance with ‘the devil’? The BDP’s past strategy has proven its merit by ensuring that the Botswana state came to accrue resources that it could not possibly have accumulated without access to the technology, management skills and market savvy of its multinational partners. But re-distributing these accrued resources into productive, employment creating activities has proven to be one of BDP’s failures, resulting in a situation where persistent poverty has co-existed with increasing national wealth.

Notes

1. That is a chunk of the vote too small to constitute a split, but large enough to dent the main opposition needs to beat the ruling party.

2. The BDP won the marginal opposition constituencies of Kgatleng West (46 percent), Francistown West (48 percent) Ngwaketse West (48 percent), Gaborone Central (48 percent) and Selibe Phikwe (48 percent) through split opposition votes. Similarly Kgatleng East (40 percent) went to the BDP due to splits.

3. These include AM Tsoebebe, Lenyeletse Seretse, Gaoleles Koma, MLA Kgasa, Benjamin Thama and other political activists who would later go on to found a rival party in the BDP (Maundeni, 1998; Ramsay and Parsons, 1998). See also Neil Parson (1988) for an insightful historical account of the emergence of the educated elite in Botswana between 1930 and 1960.

4. This has since been followed by several ‘Decades of Development’. But the decade of the 1980s has been recognised generally as a ‘lost development decade’, because whatever gains poor countries made during the first two decades through infrastructural and social development were greatly reversed during the era of Structural Adjustment.

5. This debate arose out of an attempt by ethnic minority groups to remove, from Botswana’s statutes, discriminatory sections that identity only the Tswana speaking groups as principal tribes whose paramount chiefs enjoy the right of membership of the House of Chiefs. Elsewhere (Selolwane 2001) I have argued that the timing of the debate is significant because it suggests that the nation has matured enough to deal with sectional interests and problems of group discrimination without fear of destroying national unity and stability. The debate can also be seen as a forum for re-negotiation of terms of realignment of interests and thus follows similar negotiations which had earlier led to the reduction of hereditary power and the ascendancy of a democratic distribution of power. The role of hereditary power in the development of democracy is once again being questioned as interest groups seek to balance the interests of cultural traditions with the interests of expanding democratic rights.

6. At the onset of British colonial domination in the nineteenth century, the people occupying the current territory of Botswana varied in the level of political organisation they had reached. Generally the Tswana-speaking groups had developed larger, centralised polities while the non-Tswana groups tended to be less centralised and therefore more susceptible to incorporation into and subjugation by the more centralised states. But the process of subjugation of the non-Tswana groups under the centralised Tswana was not fully completed before European colonisation, and was in fact facilitated to its conclusion by this colonial process which conferred upon some polities the status of principal tribes, while reducing others to a subject people under the
administrative authority of the principal tribes.
7. For many western analysts who have commented on politics in Botswana, ethnicity and tribal identity has often been identified as a possible fault line along which the people of Botswana are divided and could be politicised. John Holm (1988: 191), one of the foremost promoters of the thesis of tribal politics, sees ethnicity as a major determinant of electoral choice, and has persistently argued that the citizens of Botswana vote along ethnic/tribal lines, deeming some political parties to represent their ethnic group. This view is also shared by Roger Charlton (1993: 347), Jack Parson (1993) and to some extent also du Toit (1995). As far back as 1977 Phillip Morgan had also identified ethnicity as holding possible clues to the direction of the party system in Botswana. Interestingly, hardly any citizen scholars except Patrick Molutsi (1997) share this perception on the political role of ethnicity, or give it the same prominence.
8. A myth that has been perpetuated in western scholarly circles is that Botswana is ethnically and tribally homogenous, and this is often used to explain why this country has never suffered divisive politicised ethnicity ( Du Toit, 1995). But as Motsamai Mpho (1989) indicated, in the Batawana tribal polity alone, ethnic Tswana or Batawana accounted for just 20 percent of the tribal population the last time statistics were gathered along ethnic lines.
9. As Jacqui Solway (1994) noted with regards to Bakgaladi, the material benefits accruing from the educational and employment opportunities accorded by the fairly even national distribution of these services across the ethnic spectrum boosted the confidence of the youth from these historically subjugated people, thus making their national citizenship materially meaningful. Educated Bayei who have similarly benefited from the even distribution of educational and employment opportunities, have made it clear that their struggle for ethnic equality is not an issue for partisan politics.
10. In Marxist theory the working class is the class historically assigned the ultimate revolutionary role of ushering in socialism and the end of class societies.
11. Similar contradictions characterised the socialist movements in Western Europe where for decades up the end of the Second World War there was considerable debate on the timing of the workers’ revolution and the end of capitalism (See Sassoon, 1997).
12. Comparisons can also be made with the development of socialist and communist parties in western Europe. According to Sassoon (1997), the socialist movement in Western Europe initially saw their ultimate political goal as the ending of capitalism and the capitalist state. But as the conditions of the working class clearly improved and demonstrated that it was not inevitable that they would be impoverished, by the end of World War Two most of the parties had come to terms with the fact that they would have to live with capitalism into the foreseeable future. Many political activists here began to reconstruct their parties as agents representing a wider circle of constituencies besides the working classes. And this led to electoral victories which saw many socialist and working class parties come into power either through outright electoral victory or in coalition with other parties.

Bibliography


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**Onalenna Doo Selolwane**

*Department of Sociology*

*University of Botswana*

*Private Bag UB 00705*

*Gaborone*

*Botswana*