Botswana and Uganda as Developmental States(?)

Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor

The construction of democratic developmental states in Africa must now be seen as one of the most urgent tasks facing the continent in the new millennium. The Structural Adjustment Programmes of the last two decades have plainly not worked to the benefit of the average African. This is not to say that a strong dirigiste project is the necessary counter-weight to neo-liberalism. Instead, it is probable that the state’s role is best suited devising broad developmental programmes and then implementing such projects. The success of this hinges upon the involvement of individual homes, entrepreneurs and private—as well as public— institutions. As Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) have written:

Two important lessons from Africa’s development experience have been that failure to mobilize the resource-allocative functions of the market can only contribute to the inflexibility of the economy; and failure to recognize the weakness of market forces in a number of fundamental areas can lead to failed adjustment. Development policies will therefore have to be keenly responsive to the capacities and weaknesses of both states and markets in Africa and seek to mobilize the former while correcting the latter. Dogmatic faith in either planning or markets will simply not do.

There is of course a major problem in defining a developmental state simply from its economic performance: not all countries with good growth rates are developmental states. The definition of the ‘developmental state’ runs the risk of being tautological since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is ‘developing’, and equates economic success to state strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies. In Africa, there have been many examples of states whose performance up until the mid-1970s would have qualified them as ‘developmental states’ in the
sense conveyed by current definitions, but which now seem anti-developmental because the hard times and especially political turmoil, brought the economic expansion of their countries to a halt. Recognition of episodes and possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development. We will discuss this definition in greater detail below but at this point we state that the purpose of this book is to critically interrogate the whys and wherefores of Botswana and Uganda as ‘developmental states’.

At the same time, this study will cross-examine the dominant discourse vis-à-vis development namely, the idea that the market is the be-all and end-all of all discussions pertaining to economic progress and that, concomitant with this line of thinking, the role of the state must be curtailed from involvement in economic planning and management (Shaw 1997). The liberalisation mantra, so intricately bound up with certain, arguably dominant, readings of globalisation, negates any active role for the public sector in promoting development, except perhaps as a minimalist regulator. This particular understanding of globalisation is highly problematic, particularly as it is precisely those administrations that have maintained a role for the state in promoting social and economic development—the so-called ‘developmental states’—that have the most impressive track records vis-à-vis growth and economic progress.

Despite this, there has been an attempt to re-interpret and re-frame the notion of the developmental state in order to justify the form of globalisation favoured by transnational capital viz. neo-liberalism. We can see this as a ‘transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy…generat[ing] guidelines that are transmitted into the policy-making channels of national governments and big corporations’ (Cox 1994: 49).

This project is immensely important when discussing the role of the state in Africa in promoting development in the era of globalisation as there has been a concerted attempt to assert that the course best suited for Africa is an active stripping away of the state and its role in African economies. Official bodies like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the IMF, and the G-7 ‘shape the discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that circumscribe what can be thought and done [and] also tighten the transnational networks that link policy-making from country to country’ (Cox 1994: 49). Attacking the developmental state is part and parcel of this. As Gosovic remarks, very accurately in our minds:

The discrediting of the ‘developmental state’…of public institutions and endeavours (that are deemed a ‘bad’, and in contrast to the private and hence privatization which are considered an unmitigated ‘good’), and of the development record of earlier decades have, together with the delegitimization,
and making into an anathema key aspects of the UN’s development work and of the traditional North-South agenda, contributed to and constituted the outcomes of the current intellectual hegemony (Gosovic 2000: 453).

Yet, many other post-independence states have had an ‘activist’ role for the state in the economy making them relatively successful. This study aims to identify the nature and quality of this role, comparing it to Botswana and Uganda, in order to distinguish the differences (and perhaps similarities) that stake out the two countries’ developmental record and the comparative role and style of state activity. Indeed, a further purpose of this book is to discuss the debate over the developmental state and its potential in fostering growth and development within the constraints of a globalised world and with particular reference to Africa, focused on Botswana and Uganda.

At the same time, this study will naturally recognise that within the ‘practice of development’, there now exists states but also increasingly civil societies and private companies—both directly and indirectly. The ‘triangle’ or ‘tri-sector’ of this trio of actor types, as encouraged by the World Bank (1999) et al, exists at all levels, from the local to global and constitutes the prevailing contemporary form of ‘governance’ (MacLean, Quadir and Shaw 2001). These triangles can be managed and directed to enhance sustainable long-term human development as well as for shorter-term profit or image. Such ‘trilateral partnerships’ became increasingly popular in the 1990s as states and other actors sought to rebalance their relationships in the interests of democracy and sustainability as well as development and add an interesting and novel dimension to the notion of an African developmental state, as Shaw in his chapter amply demonstrates.

For Africa, the various international financial institutions have argued that African states lack the capacity to pursue policies similar to the developmental states of East Asia, whilst being far too susceptible to vested interests in the political realm. Known as the ‘impossibility thesis’, African states that remained in the business of guiding development threatened to bring disaster and had to be reined in by SAPs. Elites in Africa have frequently taken on board such advice and have come to believe that a minimalist role for the state is required. Whilst recognising the problematic nature of a great deal of African state formations, across the board liberalisation and state rollback has been similarly dubious. It is thus extremely important to challenge the thesis that state involvement inexorably leads to economic decline and that developmental states in Africa are an impossibility. Examples do exist in Africa that contradict to a large degree this position. Botswana is one such case and some of the developmental efforts promoted in Uganda by the state are of interest.

For sure, there is a definite need to challenge the current dominant rubbishin of the state’s role in facilitating development. Even in Tanzania, which is often held up as an African ‘basket case’ and an example of what the African state
should not do, recent research has found the orthodox condemnation of Tanzania’s development trajectory misplaced. As Mathew Costello has written:

[I]n nations with scant industry and thin capital markets, such as Tanzania, state-led investment is necessary to establish conditions under which private investment can generate growth. Where there is little expectation of investment, and where the conditions for private sector investment appear weak, the state may have a role to play in strengthening the market and providing initial investment (Costello 1994: 1518).

Yet before we go into greater detail vis-à-vis ‘developmental states’ in Africa, we briefly turn to the wider global context of the debate over development policy and the role of the state, initially concentrating on East Asia, the region where ‘developmental states’ were ostensibly born.

Developmental states and the East Asian experience:
Rewriting history

To talk of an ‘East Asian model’ may appear quixotic as there is a variety of forms that the developmental state in Asia has exhibited. Clearly, the type of interventions aimed at promoting the economy and at sharing the benefits across the wider society have been varied. Having said that, it seems clear that if we are to speak of a lesson learned from the recent past in Asia, it is that government intervention can and has played a crucial role in propitiating the development of factors that facilitate some form of auspicious participation in the global market. The regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service of building up local capacity and employment has been a key to this strategy. The literature on the developmental state is immense and multifaceted and space precludes an in-depth interrogation.

The first major study on the developmental state was produced by Chalmers Johnson in his 1982 book MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Johnson 1982). In this important book, Johnson drew up four constituent parts of a model of what became termed ‘the developmental state’. These four segments were: the presence of a small but professional and efficient state bureaucracy; a political milieu where this bureaucracy has enough space to operate and take policy initiatives independent of overly intrusive interventions by vested interests; the crafting of methods of state intervention in the economy without sabotaging the market principle i.e. the concept of ‘market-conforming’; a pilot organisation such as Chalmers found in MITI. The notion of what market-conforming means is not simply where a government makes sure there is enough investment in people, fosters a competitive climate for the private sector or maintains on ‘open economy’. Rather, Johnson saw the market as a device that could be utilised for advancing a developmental agenda whereby the state involved itself in ‘setting…substantive social and economic goals’ (ibid.: 19). As Öni writes, ‘it is the “synergy” between
the state and the market which provides the basis for outstanding development experience’ (Öni 1991: 110).

This understanding undermines those who see the state as being in opposition to the market and rather points in the direction of the successful developmental state:

Industrial policy is not an alternative to the market but what the state does when it intentionally alters incentives within markets in order to influence the behaviour of civilian producers, consumers and investors... Altering market incentives, reducing risks, offering entrepreneurial visions and managing conflicts are some of the functions of the developmental state (Johnson 1999: 48).

As Mbabazi and Mokhawa demonstrate in their chapter in this book, this is indeed reflected in government policies in both Botswana and Uganda.

Although various authors have questioned aspects of Johnson’s work, particularly the historic uniqueness surrounding Japanese development at the time which lay the foundation for the attainment of the developmental state, the success of other Asian states that used strategic interventions and achieved high growth periods (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan etc.) arguably demonstrates the conceptual purchase of the developmental state. Leftwich (1995: 401) asserts that:

Developmental states may be defined as states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic growth, or by organising it directly, or a varying combination of both.

Part of the rationale for this book is to explore the applicability of these comments to concrete examples in Africa, a continent which is usually thought of as the last place where ‘sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre’ is said to exist.

It should be noted that in talking of ‘developmental states’ we really mean ‘state capitalist’ developmental states, following Gordon White’s three typologies: state capitalist, intermediate and state socialist (White 1984).

Some authors have argued that the developmental state is unique to East Asia (Öni 1991: 13). Cline (1982) has asserted that the Asian model cannot be generalised because of its inherent constraints on international markets i.e. that only a certain number of states can pursue the export-oriented growth model side of the developmental state otherwise everyone else would introduce protectionist barriers to them. The problem with Cline’s argument is that it contradicts our experience after he wrote his paper: the barriers he envisioned actually came down, rather than were erected in the 1980 and 1990s. And as
Mbabazi and Mokhawa demonstrate in their chapter, this is not wholly the case in either Botswana or Uganda, particularly taking advantage of AGOA. In fact, other recent work has demonstrated that developmental states are not limited to East Asia but have been achieved elsewhere. In his study of Mauritius, Richard Kearney found that ‘continuation of NIC (and Mauritian) development presumes effective government macro-economic policy leadership in both monetary and fiscal areas. It further presumes the maintenance of an entrepreneurial climate so that diversification and exploitation of new manufacturing niches, can proceed in the private sector. Government policy choices are critical to development’ (1990: 8). Other authors have indeed concluded that Mauritius is a developmental state (Meisenhelder 1997).

What hasn’t worked has also been held up as evidence of the existence of a broad model associated with features of the developmental state. In his study of India, Ronald Herring points out that the aspirations of India’s developmental trajectory were derailed by the very conditions that contributed to success elsewhere: New Delhi was committed to planning and strategic intervention but the state was too soft and embedded to govern the market. State bureaucrats, although generally competent, were too estranged from the business of the market whilst at the same time equally estranged from the broader, poorer population and thus contributed to an erosion of legitimacy that opened the way for economic populists (Herring 1999: 309). In their study of Burkina Faso, Kevane and Englebert (1999) found that Ouagadougou lacked any notable entrepreneurial class of sufficient size, whether domestic or international, to create wealth and generate growth, from which development might be advanced. Looking at Brazil and Mexico, Schneider found that the bureaucracy was a major impediment to the implementation of the developmental state, despite an official ideology proclaiming a commitment to development, as the bureaucracy was a political player in itself and could not act in an administrative fashion à la Weber (Schneider 1999).

Leftwich has arrived at some defining characteristics of a typical developmental state, which have been kept in mid by all authors in this book as they researched their chapters. According to him, six major components define the developmental state model:

- a determined developmental elite;
- relative autonomy;
- a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy;
- a weak and subordinated civil society;
- the effective management of non-state economic interests; and

We can say that there appears some form of consensus on the ingredients for a successful developmental state. Evans, in his influential work, agrees that a capable
and autonomous bureaucracy that makes use of the market and formulates national goals and one that has the competence and resources to implement these goals is crucial (Evans 1995). In a comprehensive review of neo-liberal objections to the developmental state, Ha-Joon Chang argues that successful developmental states have pursued policies that co-ordinate investment plans; have a national development vision implying that the state is an entrepreneurial agent; that engage in institution building to promote growth and development; and that finally, play a role in conflict management, mediating in conflicts that arise out of reactions and counteractions to the development trajectory: between the winners and losers as it were (Chang 1999: 192–99). In their chapters, contributors touch on some of these themes when evaluating different aspects of development policy in Botswana and Uganda.

Clearly, there are degrees of success. And acknowledging this we have to be careful vis-à-vis the purpose and intentions of this book. We do not advance the idea that developmental states in Africa can be or will be similar to those found in Asia. This would be ridiculous and empirically impossible. Nor are we trying to argue that the experiences in Botswana or even Uganda are comparable in scope or practice to those found in the East. The point of this book is to critically examine whether or not any elements of the developmental state model, as outlined by Leftwich above and as commented on by other analysts, has any purchase in Africa, by examining the cases of Botswana and Uganda. Our book is thus quite modest and is certainly not making any grand claims that Botswana or Uganda can be considered in toto ‘developmental states’. Nor is it trying to promote Botswana or Uganda as ‘models’ that we think the rest of Africa should be followed. No, the prime purpose of this book is to thoughtfully interrogate the developmental experiences of the two countries, in comparative perspective, to see if any commonalities can be identified that have contributed to development. In doing so, we aver that elements that contributors identify throughout the book show that in the context of Africa, a state that is purposefully-driven to promote development and that utilises the offices of the state in order to facilitate improvement, alongside other actors such as the private sector and civil society can, in the particular circumstances the content finds itself, be regarded as ‘developmental’. By examining Botswana and Uganda, we are not seeking to privilege these two states over others, though the track record of Botswana in particular does stand out from much of the rest of the continent (though we of course acknowledge its failings and problems).

Having acknowledged the above caveats, we note that the hegemonic discourse suggests that state intervention in Africa was disastrous in the 1970s (the Berg Report has been particularly influential in this regard). But is this true? Firstly, relatively high levels of growth, savings and investment rates were achieved. In addition, the dirigiste policies pursued at the time reflected contemporary theory (and, it should be added, were supported by IFIs). Import-substitution policies
were approved of as common sense, particularly as the local African bourgeoisie was quite weak. But it is not as if the developmental state has been tried across Africa and has failed. Sure, many states in the 1970s (i.e. before the lost decade of debt peonage) had developmental agendas (Ujamaa, Afro-Marxism etc), but the developmental state model as is widely regarded, was not efficiently executed. In most states on the continent, due to a weak local bourgeoisie, there was very little—or even none—involvement by the capitalist class in formulating policy.

In addition, during the 1970s comparative advantage in the global economy was seen as the key to Africa’s development, encouraging single-commodity economies and effectively inhibiting real diversification, thus closing off space for any sort of strategy akin to the developmental states of East Asia who constructed fresh comparative advantages as they transformed their export portfolios. Yet, examples do exist in Africa that contradicts to a large degree the globalisation mantra of the hegemonic guardians, as well as the impossibility thesis.

**Selection of the two case studies**

Botswana has, since independence in 1966, been governed uninterruptedly by the Botswana Democratic Party. This party has pursued state capitalist policies, even during the heyday of African experimentations with socialism. Both the growth and developmental record of independent Botswana has been impressive. From being one of the poorest countries in the world at independence, Botswana has enjoyed rapid economic growth and is now classified by the World Bank as an Upper Middle Country, with a per capita GDP of more than $6000. Yet, when it became independent, it had a per capita income equivalent then to roughly US$80.

Uganda though still a poor country, has made tremendous strides over the recent past and by the dawn of the new millennium it could well be considered an emerging economy. Uganda is now often referred to as a useful example for countries in Africa experiencing rebuilding, having reversed decades of maldevelopment and now with an average annual growth rate of approximately 6 percent for the last six years or so. Uganda, which was once torn by civil war, has developed into an almost ‘stable’ nation in East Africa, although there are still pockets of insecurity in the north and south-west (Kabwegyere 1995; Karugire 1996; Kasozi 1999). There is no more talk of the bloody deeds of dictator Idi Amin, but plenty about the economic successes of President Yoweri Museveni. Uganda is now largely seen by the international community—of non-governmental organisations and corporations as well as states—to be doing good things, for example: liberalisation of the economy, tax collection, the fight against AIDS, the ‘Movement’ system of governance, relatively clean leadership, women’s empowerment, inaugurating a Ministry of Ethics and Integrity etc (Dicklitch 1998; Hansen and Twaddle 1998).
Conversely, many other African countries have experienced economic decline and a retreat from most developmental indices post-independence, as Nyamnjoh and Malizani-Jimu detail in their chapter. Although this has not been a linear process and many countries experienced relative ‘golden periods’, the history of many post-independence states in Africa has been comparatively disappointing. However, discussion of the nature of the state in Africa has tended to be captured within the normative framework of traditionally Western models. As one analyst remarks, ‘what needs to be recognised is that the African state is not failing as much as our understanding of the state’ (Dunn 2001: 49).

The source of Botswana’s development trajectory has been the use of fortuitous deposits of diamonds and minerals, a welcoming posture towards Foreign Direct Investment and a tourism policy that has courted the top-end of the market (see Taylor, this volume). A beef export industry that has preferred status with Europe further contributes to state receipts. But, an abundance of natural resources such as diamonds or cattle is no guarantee of success and does not explain Botswana’s developmental record, as Taylor and also Sebudubudu point out in their chapters. In the immediate aftermath of independence, Zambia enjoyed high prices for its mono-export, copper, and yet from the mid-1970s onwards has experienced rapid economic decline, with severe implications for the country’s development. Similarly, Zimbabwe was blessed with a burgeoning agricultural sector and, at independence, had the most developed and diversified economy in the region outside of South Africa. Unlike Zambia, Botswana has largely avoided the pitfalls of the ‘Dutch Disease’ i.e. the effect of a large change in wealth resulting from a sudden and dramatic change in the price of a primary product or of a sudden and dramatic discovery of a primary resource. Certainly, the growth of the Botswana economy is not simply a story of a mineral enclave with an ever-growing government, attached to a stagnating traditional economy, as Sebudubudu remarks in his chapter.

Uganda, as mentioned above, experienced a turbulent past particularly in the 1970s and 1980s and has undoubtedly come a long way to its present state of relative calm and quite impressive levels of economic progress. Uganda has laboured under the legacy of slavery and colonialism, economic backwardness, past corrupt and oppressive leaderships, and to some extent, a brutal geography and an unforgiving climate (e.g. in northern Uganda). Much of these elements are commented on in Akampumuza’s chapter. To date, however, as a result of relatively committed leadership, aided by an engaged world, Uganda—that is, the state, civil society and private companies—has made tremendous improvements which have had reverberating effects in the country and region as a whole (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001; Mbabazi and Shaw 2000). The NRM government of Yoweri Museveni, in particular, has in many ways tried to empower Ugandans to take charge of their economic fate (Brett 1997; Onyango 2000). There is some degree of freedom of expression and a much greater rule of law in comparison to
previous regimes. Indeed, contrary to past regimes, this government at least recognises that the most valuable resource is the Ugandan population and investment in basic education has been substantial with the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE), and so have been improvements in health care provision. These have had important ramifications vis-à-vis gender, as Mbabazi, Mookodi and Parpart point out.

It is worth mentioning though that the country is still faced by numerous challenges that have impacted on human development and one area that the present NRM government has tended to focus on is the promotion of agro-processing industries as well as commodities for export. These have no doubt made a significant impact on the progress of the economy. Mbabazi and Mokhawa’s comparative chapter on the case of the textile industry in both countries covers this in some detail.

On the whole therefore, Uganda’s ‘success story’ can be largely attributed to, among other factors, the visionary leadership of the NRM government, favourable policies pursued by the government which have created an enabling environment for the thriving of the private sector (as Roberts points out in his chapter), and the support by the international financial institutions and a host of donors. The decentralisation process, as outlined by Murembe, Mokhawa and Sebudubudu, has also facilitated movement in this direction, empowering local communities and using the state as an agent of grassroots development.

The key to the differences between ‘successful’ states and the experiences of others, is seen as the effective construction of a ‘developmental state’, as opposed to the development in other countries of a rapacious and inefficient state which has hampered development. Identifying the comparative reasons why this has occurred and seeking out lessons that other African countries could learn from Botswana and perhaps Uganda (or conversely, if any lessons can be taught in the other direction) is the main thrust of this book. In all, this book seeks to analyse the developmental record of Botswana and Uganda and seek to examine this record, with reference to the notion of a ‘developmental state’. In doing so we try to compare and contrast this developmental state with the types of state structures inherited and developed by selected African states in the post-independence period and to explain how and why the type of state structures in other African states developed and how these hampered development in these countries.

In doing so we hope to contribute to an investigation into the economic and social development of Botswana and Uganda and provide a comparative perspective of development in African countries. This may help policymakers identify, for potential future development strategies, key aspects that may be utilised by other African states, although we are cautious of this and advise reflection upon the particular historical contexts within which both countries spring from. But certainly, the study aims to interrogate what has been happening in Uganda
and put it into comparative perspective through an analysis of Botswana’s trajectory. In doing so, we wish to refute the one-size-fits-all prescription of the International Financial Institutions, whilst flagging the need to move away from dirigiste preoccupations. It is hoped that our study will help the discipline of Development Studies move away from isolated case studies on particular countries and rather mesh together in a methodologically comparative fashion, studies from different parts of Africa that will inform analysts in a rich comparative manner.

Methodology
The project consisted of collecting secondary literature on the two countries economic and political development. This was the methodological first step and was done in support of individual scholarly research (in practical terms, this meant that individual researchers were required to collate as much data as possible within their own countries). Once created, this data was then brought together and decisions were made, initially at a workshop held in Gaborone in April 2003, as to which features allowed for comparative analysis. Once the basic structure and arguments had been developed during this workshop, the project then began to systematically develop a comparative study on the historical, political, social and economic nature of the developmental states under review. Primary sources and interviews were then utilised to construct each individual chapter’s contents.

It should be noted that many of the contributors had already conducted a fair amount of preliminary work on their topics; in deed most contributors were recruited due to their expertise and previous knowledge, although the project was committed to empowering and helping advance the careers of junior academics in both countries (something which we hope this book will help facilitate). Because of the comparative nature of this study, a discussion of the theoretical problems the research team faced was conducted, mostly over electronic mail, although a second workshop in Mbarara (in February 2004) was very helpful in this regard. Essentially, the first methodological workshop produced a great deal of analysis and discussion with the other writers and this was then built upon as the project unfolded.

As noted above, the initial literature was evaluated in the light of primary information gleaned from interviews and the collection of government and non-government (e.g. Chambers of Commerce, think-tanks, NGO consortiums etc) data in Gaborone, Kampala and Mbarara. The study followed the comparative method and seeks to help contribute to the construction of a specifically Africa-oriented comparative methodology of use to further research into the development processes in Africa.

Lay-out and overview of the book
The following chapter, by Nyamnjoh and Malizani-Jimu, looks at the past experiences of Africa in pursuing development. They outline the continent’s
historical encounter over the past four to five decades with the pursuit of development and provide an overview and analysis vis-à-vis economic and social policies and the political and global context which the two authors see as circumscribing Africa’s development experience. In doing so, Nyamnjoh and Malizani-Jimu quite correctly and succinctly urge cautious optimism about the applicability of the developmental state model. Indeed, the two assert that what Africa needs is not a strong state but rather a capable one able to chart a path to sustainable development. But in advocating this position, the chapter notes that African states currently have to grapple with two simultaneous dilemmas: how to develop economically and how to build nation-states. Resolving this tension is a key problematic faced by all countries on the continent.

Shaw’s chapter seeks to look at Uganda as a democratic developmental state but by rethinking what we mean in an era where contracting-out, flexibilisation/feminisation, regionalisms, the privatisation of security, supply chains etc. stake out the modern state. In doing so, he pushes us to rethink some key assumptions, stressing the need to broaden our definition of the state and—in the context of this volume—the developmental state. Certainly, the features Shaw mentions are no longer aberrations but rather central features of the political cultures and economies of the majority of the world’s states and are typical of Africa. Indeed, such distinctive forms of capitalisms confirm that there are important differences around the world and it is unhelpful to try and fit the world into one single model of development. Thus the current political culture/economy of ‘Africa’ has to be situated in a range of interrelated contexts, from global to local. Certainly, definitions of and relations among states, economies and civil societies are everywhere in flux, not least in Uganda, as Shaw notes. In doing so, he provides us with an interesting ‘take’ on what an African developmental state may look like, one outside the usual parameters outlined in most literature.

In his chapter, Taylor argues that in Botswana the commitment to development by both the political and bureaucratic elites has been central, but that this has been put into practice by the strategy of putting into place institutions which have helped sustain long-term growth as part of a broader national developmental vision. With the state acting as an entrepreneurial agent, there has been, to varying degrees, a co-ordination between the private and the public sectors, with the developmental state being based on a foundation of capitalism in which the government, through a wide variety of incentives, actively promotes private investments by national and multinational corporations. Taylor argues that this has been facilitated by an efficient and well-trained bureaucracy that has resisted the descent into corruption that has been the hallmark of much of the civil service in other parts of the continent. Indeed, skills development, not only in the bureaucracy but also in the wider private sphere have been an important aspect of Botswana’s success. Taylor details some of the criticism, particularly with regard to inequality in the country, that has been levelled at the country, but
margines that Botswana perhaps proves that capable state intervention can play a vital role in creating conditions for sustained trade growth. In this he shares with Nyamnjoh and Malizani-Jimu ‘cautious optimism’. Certainly, the Botswana developmental state has achieved respectable accomplishments, whatever the downside to this story. But perhaps the key thing that Taylor notes is that for a developmental state to ‘succeed’ or even exist, the primacy of politics in the complex process of development is fundamental and decisive. In other words, it is not how much state intervention should take place, but rather what kind.

The following chapter, by Akampumuza, looks at Uganda’s institutional framework, arguing that it was consciously underdeveloped by colonialism and further weakened by postcolonial regimes, particularly their ill-advised policies and chronic instability. The results of this still inform the developmental agenda in Uganda today. Trying to recuperate, Uganda has through a wide variety of incentives, actively promoted private investments by liberalising and privatising public enterprises, embedding these initiatives in the various policy frameworks adopted, often under donor-inspired development schemes. The Asian question and the government negotiating framework for promoting Foreign Direct Investment are used to illustrate the challenges facing Uganda’s institutional framework for development. Although enforcement and monitoring institutions supposed to facilitate the realization of these policy objectives are found structurally and operationally weak, they have nevertheless facilitated positive economic developments, though some pointed out reforms could even help achieve more. Akampumuza’s chapter essentially stresses that institutions matter and that, as with Taylor’s findings, it is not how much state intervention should take place, but rather what kind and in what context. Sound institutions competently managed help provide this favourable context.

In a similar vein, Sebudubudu discusses the institutional framework of Botswana’s developmental state. According to Sebudubudu, and echoing Taylor, the Botswana state has since independence established a number of institutions to drive the economy forward. It is through these institutions that the Botswana state has played a leading role in economic development. The focus of this chapter is on these key institutions that were put in place by the Botswana state to promote economic growth and development. In particular, the chapter examines pilot institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), a powerful ministry, and service organisations such as the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC), the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) / Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA), the Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority (BEDIA) and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), amongst others. The chapter examines the reasons for creating them as well as the role they have played in Botswana’s economic development.
Murembe, Mokhawa and Sebudubudu then discuss in a comparative chapter how the state in Uganda and Botswana has sought, through decentralisation, to promote development. In Uganda, despite the threats to the system of decentralisation, and unlike in other developing countries such as Nigeria, Uganda’s experience has brought benefits to the ordinary person, arguably leading to participatory and collective responsibility in the development of the country, particularly in the rural areas. The authors emphasise the context, whereby any recovery process has had to take place after a massive degeneration of public service provisions. In this light the authors argue that the benefits from the decentralisation process in Uganda are surely visible, highlighting that the involvement of women and the disabled is institutionalised—something which even in the developed world is rare to find. Resource mobilisation has equally increased and this is now matching the area covered in service provision and quality of service given. In Botswana, although local authorities are allowed to make an input in the development process through district development plans, the final decision as to what goes into the National Development Plan rests with the central government. Nevertheless, local authorities play an important role in Botswana’s developmental process and have aided the development trajectory of the country. They have not only brought services such as basic education, roads, health facilities etc closer to the electorate but have also played a key role in their provision. However, the authors assert that a lack of resources is one of the major hurdles local authorities face, as they are overly dependent on central government for resources. But in both cases, the authors argue that decentralisation has been used as a tool by the government to improve service delivery and also, and this is contentious, to open up democratic space for input into both policy planning and implementation. In doing so, decentralisation can be said to help legitimise the regimes in both countries, visibly demonstrating to the populace that ‘their’ governments are delivering. As delivery is key to any notion of a developmental state, this can be said to be of high importance.

In their chapter on gender and the ‘developmental state’, Mbabazi, Mookodi and Parpart provide a comprehensive overview of the situation concerning gender and the state in both countries. They ask whether the ostensible benefits of ‘developmental states’ are gendered and in what ways. Bearing in mind the importance of institutions in such states, the authors ask whether or not there is more gender equality in Botswana and Uganda and whether or not women are more able to access political and economic opportunities and institutions. Indeed, are relations between the sexes more tolerant and flexible in developmental states? Certainly, as the chapter makes clear, both Botswana and Uganda have demonstrated a strong commitment to improving the lives of women and both countries have also been influenced by the demands of local women’s associations, though in Botswana such groups are more closely tied to the state than is the case in Uganda. However, as the chapter shows, patriarchal assumptions and practices
continue to hold sway in many arenas, and in both countries issues of domestic violence and HIV/AIDS remain crucial. Ultimately, both cases remind us that economic development is not in and of itself a panacea for women’s problems and that patriarchy and paternalism are difficult to change. A truly gendered approach within a developmental state must take history and culture seriously. As the authors argue, this is a prerequisite before even the most successful ‘developmental states’ in Africa can claim to be truly developmental for all.

Following on from this, Roberts argues in his chapter that policy implementation is one of the crucial elements in the success of every state’s economic programme. The chapter examines the challenges and prospects Uganda’s privatisation policy has met, especially in its implementation process, arguing that Uganda as a nascent ‘developmental state’ has had some weaknesses as well as some strengths in facilitating privatisation. This chapter seeks to document the factors which have hindered the implementation of privatisation policy in Uganda and discusses its’ prospects in today’s Uganda. The chapter does not address in detail the question whether or not Uganda is a developmental state, but rather stresses the challenges state policies have met in their implementation. It highlights the challenges that should be addressed by the state in its development initiative and hence draws lessons for other countries based on Uganda’s experiences.

Finally, Mbabazi and Mokhawa examine the role of the state in promoting the development of the textile industry in both Botswana and Uganda. According to the chapter, in Botswana the state has been strategically interventionist and as such been able to formulate a series of policies aimed directly at infrastructural development and economic growth within the country. As for Uganda, the authors argue that the state is in many ways trying to be developmental and is struggling to industrialise. That it faces numerous challenges is undeniable, but attempts at such policies are evident. In both cases, the relative successes enjoyed in Botswana and Uganda has been due to state intervention. Certainly, in both countries, the state has consistently intervened in the development of the textile industry. But, as the authors note, given global neo-liberal pressures for limiting state involvement in industry this is difficult and under constant criticism. However, developmental activism is regarded as not optional but vital. The authors suggest that both countries need to practice developmental state activism to produce goods that have a potential to penetrate global markets. In both Botswana and Uganda emphasis on high-level bureaucratic competency and a conducive institutional framework are vital. Concluding, the authors argue that both countries need to recognise the potentiality that the textile industry offers for national development. Finding the appropriate measures, involving both the state and the private sector, will remain one of the greatest challenges for the textile industry and the government in both countries.