

PART 1

Times of Confrontation

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Arab-African Relations from Liberation to Globalisation

Is it legitimate today to sub-divide the African continent according to the races it contains? Can this, moreover, be simply done with an a-historic content for race, or an idealistic concept of identities? Or are we going to talk about the Arabism of Egypt, Libya or Maghreb as if it were an identity gained with the advent of the Arab race, implying that these were 'lands with no people' – a sort of 'No Man's Land' or fragile spaces that could not confront the invading empire? Or will Arabism equate with Bantuism or negroism sometimes, and Hausa and Swahili cultures at other times? If we continue in this vein, we will end up with Arabism confronting Africanism with no scientific definitions, and thus quit the domain of social sciences and enter the realm of easy ideologies, in an epoch of the great phantom ideologies.

There is no scope here for a comprehensive study, nor does the author assume an apologetic attitude towards the stances of geography or history, while the catastrophic imperialist globalisation and its product in the continent and the Arab world leave no place for escape into past models. However, the scientific mode of thinking may help us comprehend the social, cultural and historic reactions, governed by the laws of 'dialectics' and contradiction in the epochs of the great migrations and empires, until all were encompassed within the logic of the polarising world capitalist system. Thus, the Arabs and Africans entered the colonial era as products of the world capitalist system. In the colonial era, identities did not develop, for they developed and crystallised only in the era of national liberation, as we shall see later.

The phase of demographic intermingling and interaction, or acculturation, through the advent of the historic empires (which were far more respectful

of the peoples than the present-day imperialist empire) saw the Roman Empire, followed by the Arab Islamic Empire. In the latter, the Arab race played a limited role, for a short period of time only, but its Islamic Arab culture was disseminated mainly by various elements (from the East, West, or even South of Europe), which prompted the peoples in the North of the continent, and other parts as well, to adopt this political and social culture. For historic reasons, Egypt and Maghreb became the centres for dissemination, anthropologically as well as politically, and the same factors stood behind its acceptance, or otherwise, at the borders of the Sahara, and limited parts of East Africa, Andalusia in Europe, and Persia in Asia, etc. The intensity of the force of the local reaction, and the specific historical and geographical circumstances decided the fact that Egypt identified itself as 'Arab', Maghreb to a lesser degree, while Spain and Iran refused the Arab identity. In Africa rose the empires of Mali and the Songhai, as well as the city states in Kilwa, Lamu and Mombasa.

The Spread of the Arab Islamic Empire

The spread of the Islamic Empire in African Sahara did not lead to the disappearance or distortion of societies or languages as happened later on under colonial rule. Ajayi, Davidson, Ogot and others speak a lot about this phase of interaction, and the emergence of the empires of the Hausa, the Fulani, the Manding, and the Amhara or Abyssinians, who could not, in their turn, annihilate the Yoruba, or the Mossas, or the Somalis. No one belonging to the Cape Town school or any other can deny the product of all these empires in two fields: the existence of various forms of class of social exploitation, or enslavement; and the absence of the concept of Africanism in these conditions. The same is true of the absence of 'Arabism' in the domain of Islamic culture. The dominant feature was the resistance offered by these peoples through the centuries, in various traditional forms, to colonialism: as demonstrated, for instance, by the peoples of Egypt, the Fula and the Zulus in their isolated local cultural units. Such empires and kingdoms of the pre-colonial era could have developed into modern states had it not been for the colonial intervention. All these countries lived through the beginnings or the embryo of the modern state during the same era as the European states, but were distorted or interrupted by capitalist colonial invasion. These countries did not suffer the same defeat during the period of the Arab-African interaction. Hence, new conditions for the development of new identities emerged, but gave rise to deformed identities in Mamluki Egypt, and Maghreb under the Bays, and isolated elsewhere in the

continent. We should note here that Egypt and parts of North Africa suffered under Islamic Ottoman occupation prior to the capitalist expansion in the rest of the continent, and this Ottoman citizenship predominated up to the environs of Mali and Zimbabwe, with no intimation of Arabism. Similarly, the Jihad meant for a long time the management of the interaction in Maghreb and West Africa, still on an Islamic basis.

It will be necessary to point out the fact that Egyptian historians do not generally speak about one Egypt, but rather about Pharaonic, Coptic, Mamluk, or Ottoman Egypt, then modern state Egypt, and Arab Egypt since the Nasser era. Thus, stress is not laid upon any one identity, but rather, on the dynamism of the identity, or its development according to the laws of dialectics. However, some stabilising elements may prove their importance in influencing future developments, even if not consciously concerned with the identity. Here, we note the deep presence of the Arabic language and its traditions in the African North, while Islamic sciences and Islamic *ulamas* played the biggest role in the rest of the continent, to the extent of writing some of their contributions in Ajami (African languages in Arabic characters), rather than in Arabic. Such a close loyalty to Islam, and not Arabism, lay behind the different degrees of interaction between the various regions of the continent. It is therefore astonishing to see some African scholars follow their colonial predecessors in denying the existence of a certain Islamic-African identity (or even Arab as in the case of the Hausa or Fulani), which need not be in full agreement with the models of the identities born of the ideologies in vogue.

Phases of Modern Identity Building

Following this dialectical methodology, we can proceed to the study of one of the main phases of modern identity building – and I insist on speaking of phases and not stable conditions – which shows new characteristics in conformity with the new dialectics imposed by the colonial and imperial epochs.

To be brief, we shall proceed directly to the phase of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism, which were concurrent with all similar pan movements, whether Islamic, Turanic, Slavic, or even Arian (German or Nazi). We shall first examine the traditions inherited by our Arab and African region prior to the emergence of these pan movements, i.e. inherited from the period of the colonial invasion, after the hegemony of the world capitalist system. During that period of two to three centuries, the colonial ideology, the ‘negation from history’ was imposed (Cabral 1966 and Rodney 1972). The big social entities were negated, as well as the principal linguistic entities at the hands

of colonial anthropologists (Prah 2001). Another instance of this 'negation' which had almost become a self-choice after being imposed was the ideology of tribalism (Mafeje 1971).

The emergence of pan-Arabism or Africanism was more of a political phenomenon than a socio-political development. We have therefore to question the popular content of these pan movements, their spontaneous consistence with the socio-political movement, and the role of the new consciousness in reforming that movement. Now that building consciousness has become an endeavour in itself, we have to ascertain the role of its actors, and the masses that adhere to it, in order to make sure that this new Africanism or Arabism is the same as the pan movement of before! Since any 'policy' has its own social, political and cultural base, it is imperative to define these elements very clearly when studying Africanism and the pan movement. The same holds in the case of Arabs, Arabity and pseudo-Arabism. Such a study will show that the new Africanism is much more recent than pan-Africanism, and similarly, pseudo-Arabism is more recent than pan-Arabism.

The pan-African movement was conceived in the diaspora, and the 'other' in its view was not colonialism in particular, but the oppressor, which gave rise to various tendencies within the movement that were not directly related to liberation from colonialism. Such tendencies appeared with Garvey, or Blyden, or the leaders of the Negritude or Francophone movements, who did not take a clear anti-colonial attitude except after the development of the national liberation movements after the Second World War. Although Du Bois and James were clearly anti-colonial, unfortunately they were not the most vocal within the movement, and this condition still persists up till today. This may explain partly its weak influence among the peoples of the continent. We may even contend that the weak anti-colonial stand at the inception of the African movement led to its weak relation with the Arab movement, which was openly anti-colonial from the start.

On the other hand, the pan-Arab movement was conceived around the beginning of the 20th century, like its pan-African counterpart. It started in similar conditions on the initiative of certain groups of politicised Christian intellectuals opposed to the tyranny of the Ottoman coloniser. While the African movement started – alienated – in the diaspora, the Arab movement was also partly alienated at the start for three reasons: first, it was mostly Levantine in origin; second, it was mainly Christian in a predominantly Muslim world; third, it did not gain the whole-hearted support of Cairo and its intellectuals at its start, nor did it get the full support of Maghreb which

was on the throes of its 'Islamic' insurgence against the French who gave their efforts for subjugation an anti-Muslim character from the start. Thus, the pan-Arab movement in its turn did not gain much popularity until after World War II. A thorough analysis of both movements shows that national liberation retained the commanding position of the rise and deterioration of both movements, and their inter-relations as well.

In brief, we may conclude that the political turmoil attached to both movements was the driving force for their charismatic leaderships after independence, and which put the independence of the Congo at the heart of the Arab liberation movement (before that of Aden, and during the Algerian revolution). It also kept the fight against apartheid at the heart of both movements, and led to the creation in Casablanca, in 1961, of a group combining three countries of the Arab North, and three countries from sub-Saharan Africa. This group created its common post and customs units, as well as ministerial committees of all sorts, soon to be followed by the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. In the latter, Egypt and Algeria played prominent roles, and especially outstanding was the role played by the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of the Colonies. At that time in the sixties, the author was a researcher in the team of the bureau detailed by Gamal Abdel Nasser for African affairs, was responsible for the various offices belonging to more than 22 African liberation movements, and a member of the expatriate committee that was responsible for the presence and wellbeing of some 20,000 students from all parts of Africa (north and south), who were getting free education, like all Egyptian students, in all grades of education.

Of course, we had to face certain everyday problems from some unruly youths, and a certain cultural tradition of aversion against 'black' youth. There was also some exaggerated talk about the 'Black Giant' (Nasser), and also about the civilising role of Islam and Arabism in Africa, and the insistence of the Islamic movements on the importance of dissemination of Islam and the Arabic language, etc. Some African governments complained that it was not of much use to have their youth receive religious education in Al-Azhar and not in regular schools and universities, and Abdel Nasser responded by creating special sections to teach in English and French in the universities for African students.

We lived all through such problems of interaction. However, the discourse against Arabs, and the historic legacy of slave trade, came only from openly reactionary sources as we used to say, and it was no coincidence that such

talk came from some of the leaders of the Negritude Movement and capitals such as Abidjan, Dakar and Nairobi, which are well known for their entente with imperialist powers. This was no surprise since the revision of history is an ideological process as much as a cultural one. However, I would stress that the tune of the common national liberation was the more prominent, and was much more credible for African unity than the racist accusations or the negative versions of the historic relations between the Arabs and Africa. This confused attitude to the assessment of social history should receive more attention in future.

From Liberation to Solidarity

From liberation to solidarity and from solidarity to cooperation: this was the trend of Arab-African relations up till the 1990s when the interaction came almost to a standstill. By the end of the 1960s, the symbols of national liberation had almost all been toppled, by *coups d'état*, or in Egypt's case, by the imperialist Zionist aggression. The leading political voice grew weaker at the beginning of the 1970s, although the armed struggle was still rising in Africa and Palestine as an indication of the continuing unrest of our peoples. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 was an attempt at taking breath, but it had ambivalent effects. It showed the depth of the African-Arab solidarity (with Egypt, Syria and Palestine) on the one hand, but caused some losses to the development plans of the newly liberated nations of Africa, due to the rise in petrol prices, on the other hand. At the same time, the imperialist powers started their counter attacks against the Third World, by imposing the newly conceived policies of so-called economic reform and structural adjustment, which meant the wave of privatisations, the reduction of the commitment of the state, and the resulting deterioration of public services. To better achieve these goals, the mechanisms of Third World solidarity such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the UNCTAD were reduced to ghosts of the past.

However, we must note that during the 1970s, the revolutionary fervour was still apparent in Africa: we saw Algeria assume the role of Nasser at the head of the Group of 77 to build a new economic order; in the heart of the continent, the armed struggle achieved good results in Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique; and the struggle against apartheid rose to new heights in South Africa. The Arab and African liberation struggle got world recognition when Arafat and Sam Nujoma were received at the United Nations, as the General Assembly recognised 'the right of the struggle against colonialism by all means' (meaning the armed struggle). Severing political relations with

Israel was another sign of the continued solidarity between peoples whose main concern was still national liberation. On the Arab side, we saw Libya try to continue the role of Egypt in helping the African liberation movements, and Sudan sign the historic reconciliation agreement with the South in Addis Ababa in 1972, and Maghreb recognise Mauritania. This led to Arab solidarity with African nations in their plight due to the rise of oil prices, when the Arab Summit in Algiers created a special fund to compensate the African states for any difficulties caused by the rising oil prices.

Still, we must admit that the discourse of 'common liberation' was being replaced by that of 'solidarity' in an economic crisis that looked very much like the poor relatives were being helped by their more affluent relatives. It was a shift from the discourse of 'revolution' to that of 'riches'. The issue was no more one of cooperation, but one of give and take. This left the door wide open to compromise solutions with racist regimes, as in the case of the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel (1979) and the Komati Agreement between Mozambique and South Africa (1984). This all led to the demise of the solidarity trend itself as time went by.

Yet, the relations between the two groups continued to develop even against the trend pursued by the world order to contain any independent blocks, which culminated in the destruction of the socialist block itself – the main antagonist to the imperialist capitalist block. We shall not elaborate on the continued institutional forms of Arab-African cooperation, which prove the will of the two sides to keep interacting, even under these unfavourable conditions. This will is structural as well as functional, and is bound to stay alive unless the globalisation mechanisms manage to stifle all such trends for cooperation between the oppressed, and not only between Arabs and Africans. Thus, after an Arab-African Summit in Cairo, attended by 62 countries in March 1977, a development bank, a fund for technical assistance, and permanent cooperation committees were created between the two sides. There was also an agreement to create a joint Arab-African cultural institute and a permanent trade exhibition. All this demonstrated the deep wish for a common historical presence within Third World structures, yet it also indicated the nature of the regimes that stood behind that entire endeavour. Those regimes were an integral part of the world capitalist system, and not merely on its periphery, as proved by the investment of the integral amount of the oil capital in American and European financial institutions, and in US government bonds. They also comply fully with the policies of the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) of privatisation, reducing the role of the state, and the exclusion of the masses in the Arab and African

worlds from any real participation in the production process. All these ended with the reduction of the above framework to an empty structure, with no effectiveness whatsoever starting from the 1980s.

The Spirit of Liberation Loses Its Heat

When the spirit of liberation loses its heat, the feelings of solidarity lie low and the cooperation institutions deteriorate between groups of people already imbued with mutual mistrust, it becomes very difficult to mobilise them for united action. This becomes even harder as the governing regimes get more involved with the militarised imperialist leaderships which dare, these days, to resort to direct colonisation (in Iraq) to which they had not dared resort for almost a century. In this new atmosphere of globalisation, rife with the ideas of conflict of civilisations – where Islam had assumed the role of ultimate evil in place of communism – Arab-African relations are imbued with new hallucinations about the close connection between Islam and Arabism, as a follow-up to the old doubts about the connection between Arabism and Islam in the first place.

There are enough residual problems to keep such doubts lively, as well as certain elements that might entrain a country or another in this anti-cooperation direction. There is also an intentional confusion in the presentation of certain issues. This situation may be better understood when we remember the global framework in which Arab-African relations take place. The Arab world has been subjected to open oppression since the early nineties (in Iraq and Palestine), as an exercise in the military projects of the USA since it assumed the role of the single military pillar. In such a framework, it is easy to make the connection between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Then, over and above, came the terrorist attacks against the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, and the application of Sharia law in some Nigerian states. Of course, the American media, in spreading such accusations, intentionally ignore that it was the US that was the first to cooperate with the Islamic fundamentalists in the Arab world to confront the forces of the Left, and recruited and trained the terrorists of Osama Bin Laden to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We shall not elaborate on this issue here, but it is closely connected to the American and European position in Somalia and Mauritania (on the border between Arabs and Africans). Similarly, the whole issue of South Sudan is now presented in the light of the 'Arab sin', in the framework of Muslim-Christian conflict. This is instead of studying it as social historical problems, as it is not

the Arabs who are in Nigeria or Somalia, or were in Rwanda some or all of the time, as some friends in the Cape Town school would like to assert!

More problems may afflict Arab-African relations with the rise of the role of Israel in the world arena in contrast with the situation in the 1970s. Israel is now playing a prominent role in the Arab region on behalf of the United States, and enjoys a position of strength in the world financial lobby. A special position is reserved for Israel in the measures adopted by the European Union for the Mediterranean Partnership Project. It also plays a leading role in the world market for diamonds, and hence meddles in the illicit diamond trade that fuels the ethnic conflicts in central and western Africa. It is even trying to meddle in the recent trend for renegotiating the partition of the Nile waters.

Although all these problems have a global dimension, the constant efforts of the Zionist movement to increase its influence, on the one hand, and the nationalist and fundamentalist reaction, on the other hand, urge the Arab side to look forward to some kind of breathing space from the Africans, in order to keep their relations on course as they used to be. It remains to be seen to what extent the protagonists of the pan-African movement and the African Union will respond to this requirement in order to preserve this important block of the Third World. Is it possible to rise above the narrow limits of the local or regional considerations, and let this power realise its due position in the WTO and OPEC? Could these two groups realise that the future of the world order is not necessarily American, especially in the light of the difficulties the US encounters in the Middle East, and the greater role played by an enlarged European Union and a renewed role for the United Nations? I believe that within such a framework, Arab-African relations may experience better conditions in spite of the unfavourable situation caused by the hegemonistic mechanisms of American globalisation. Arab and African intellectuals will have to overcome some issues in the field of ideology and methodology considering the following:

- (i) History cannot be arrested and transformed to non-historic facts or phenomena, and the dialectics of the relations between peoples have resulted in the re-reading of such phenomena.
- (ii) Analysis according to race or colour, or even tradition or region, is not appropriate in the era of globalisation. Therefore, Arab or African identities cannot be read as 'closed units' in an open theatre of the anti-globalization movement.
- (iii) The ideological mechanisms and the media trumped up by the globalisation circles create the issues that keep us, consciously or unconsciously, at each other's throats.

2

Mohammad Fayek: African Memories of the July Revolution *

Great national events remain alive in the memories of nations. They stand fast against all tempestuous attempts to obliterate them from the national memory, and they implant other images that once again foster opposing interests.

After World War II, Africa lived through some dramatic events concerning the destinies of its peoples. The July Revolution in 1952 was foremost among these events, not only because of its deep impact on Egypt, but also due to its echoes in the wide field of the Arab, African and Asian worlds. The revolution confronted vested interests and accepted postulates, revived hopes and aspirations, and set up alliances that constituted the elements of an experience of the national liberation movement all over the world, and in Africa in particular. Such an experience cannot be obliterated from the memory of the peoples in question for a long period of time. Such considerations impose a study, in depth, of the July Revolution in Egypt, and its ramifications in Africa. A record of this experience is necessary, to be based on the recorded documents, but also on oral history as kept in the hearts and minds of the makers of the revolution, and their close aids and confidants, who are intent on keeping the memories of the great events in Egypt and their relations with the African liberation movements. Hence this contribution, which presents the experience of Mr Fayek – the man responsible for African affairs in Nasserist Egypt. The following is a summary of the true record of the events of the period 1952-70 as remembered by Mr Fayek, and is presented under the main headings of:

* The author conducted 5 sessions, totaling 10 hours, of dialogue with Mr Fayek during the period from 2 June to 1 July 2002. The material was reviewed by Mr Fayek before preparation for publication.

- The Climate that Imposed Egypt's Outreach Towards Africa
- The July Revolution's Concepts of Africa: The Identity and the Strategy
- Institutionalising the Egyptian Action in Africa
- The African Policies of Egypt and the Relations with the Liberation Movements
- Some Final Remarks: An Open Conclusion.

Lately, there has been a proliferation of books recording the memories or memoirs of various personalities purporting to contribute to the history of the revolution. Few of these make an authentic scientific contribution despite media embellishments. Yet, oral history, if true and authentic, has become part and parcel of the history of nations.

In some cases, however, the narrator lets loose his memories of the events, trying to reshape them to suit his point of view, or to utilize them to further his own purposes. With the absence of many essential documents of the revolution, we still have to rely on the oral document, at least, to point the way for research; and that, more than 50 years after this great event.

Our guest, Mr Fayek (born in 1929), never tried to sit down and record the momentous events in which he took part, or in which he played the leading role. Yet, among the chief figures of the revolution, he may be considered a living document. However, because of the nature of the field he devoted his life to, and the clandestine conditions of most of the liberation leaders with whom he had to deal, it was inconceivable to keep full records of such meetings, either in the form of a verbal process or confirmation letters. Thus, he may be considered a living oral document. In addition, the special relationship between Mr Fayek and Gamal Abdel Nasser in this context could not take the form of official directives via official paperwork, in view of the nature of the measures taken and the quick pace of events of the African liberation action.

The oral document we are recording now is the outcome of a lengthy dialogue between Mr Fayek and the author, who does not pretend to have participated in shaping the events, but who was all the time near Mr Fayek, between the African Affairs offices in Helliopolis and more than 20 national liberation movement's offices in Zamalek, plus missions to some African capitals after independence.

I remember the first time Mr Fayek appeared in the premises of the African League in Zamalek one day in March 1956, where we were, a group of young men from Egypt, Somalia, Eritrea, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, reading an article in the *Newsweek* magazine of March 1956, entitled

“The Black Nation”. This young group was attracted to the relation of the revolution with the Black Giant as Africa was known in those days in literature and the poems of Al-Faitoury and Abdou Badawi (and maybe some of the over-sensitivity between the blackness of Africans and the white skin of some Arabs was softened by the nickname of Nasser as the ‘dark-skinned giant’). Our protector, Abdel Aziz Isshak, introduced us to Captain Fayek, whom he described as the sponsor of African renaissance in Egypt. We were surprised by the appearance of this white-skinned young man (he was only 27 years old then), who was a most polite and quiet person. That was the start of a lifelong partnership, not only in action, but in a sacred mission of participation in the message of national liberation, not only in Egypt, but in the Arab and African worlds as well.

Mohammad Fayek graduated from the Military Academy in 1948, which he had joined after finishing his secondary education at Ibrahimieh School in Cairo. After graduation, he was posted to an anti-aircraft unit at Helwan near Cairo and, until 1952, he attended several training courses at military administration schools. There he was noticed by his instructor, Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, for his meticulousness in his work and his strict discipline. In the early morning of 23 July 1952, the leadership of the revolution detailed him to one of the units besieging Abdin Palace. A few months after the revolution, Nasser assigned him to work with Zakaria Mohyi Ed-Dine who was creating a new General Intelligence Command as part of his responsibility for internal security. However, Fayek had direct access to Nasser wherever African affairs were concerned. Nasser asked him to study Economics, for which purpose he joined the Faculty of Commerce, and took him as one of his aides to all the international conferences that he attended. Fayek began his education about Africa in a general form by reading *Inside Africa* by John Gunther (1955), but he continued through more sophisticated material, ended with a thorough reading of Karl Marx’s *Das Capital*. He also read some writings of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a stress on self-education through intensive reading in a variety of cultural disciplines was typical of some of the more prominent July officers.

All through our 10-hour dialogue, over a period of one month, Fayek never tried to pose as the man of destiny as many others do, although he was often the sole actor in his field of action, due to the special conditions that I mentioned above. On my part, I did not want to limit myself to the role of the outside interlocutor, inasmuch as I had, at least, some knowledge of the events in question. Thus, I had my own agenda for the historical document

when posing my questions, while he would go forth in narrating the events with no apparent scheme in mind, but to remember as much as he could. It was clear that his memories were strained somehow by the ordeal of the ten years he spent in prison (1971-81). He felt the pain of having lost all documents pertaining to the efforts he had deployed during eighteen of his most active years, after his arrest on the orders of President Anwar Sadat on 13 May 1971. He knew he had to rely solely on memory because of the absence of the documents, and in reply to my provocative questions, he would ask for my contribution as a part actor or witness.

It was notable that Fayek seldom mentioned his fast ascension in the state hierarchy, except for stating that he was responsible for African affairs. Indeed, this was a general heading which covered a succession of responsible positions. Fayek held successively the position of responsibility for African affairs until 1965, then Councillor for African and Asian Affairs (1966), then Minister for National Guidance (1967), then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1968), and then Minister for National Guidance and Information until 1971.

Some readers may infer from the above how modest he is; others may deduce how responsible and close to the leader he was. Some may even conclude that Africa was a space apart from the main cultural atmosphere, or the vicissitudes of the responsible persons in charge of its affairs. However, Fayek did not deny the existence of some obstacles he had to face with African action as far as the media were concerned, or his own problems with the media. He also complained of the bureaucratic hurdles he had to overcome, but in the end, his enthusiasm for liberation movements that looked up to Egypt and to Nasser, its leader, for guidance and help gained some ground in response to a sentimental gesture of appeal. Although many in similar positions would pour forth about July and Nasser, and their 'historical role', Fayek, after his long years in prison, published just one book entitled 'Nasser and the African Revolution 1979, which took the form of memoirs rather than a book of history or a political historical study. This latter fact made me very conscious to guide the narrator into areas he had not touched in his book, and to help make his narrative more precise and in a more chronicled context.

The Climate that Imposed Egypt's Outreach Towards Africa

Fayek mentions the preconceived ideas he had – in common with his leader – about Egypt's relations with national liberation movements. He had not actively participated in the Palestine War against the Zionist colonial project, nor was that a topic of immediate concern in view of the deteriorating situation

in Egypt itself. Yet, since his graduation, he had been acutely conscious of the colonial presence of the British troops in the canal zone, which was a topic of his studies for the grade of captain, together with the schemes of the Europeans and the Americans regarding the Middle East. His nationalist sentiments were nurtured by the British presence in the canal-zone, as explained by his teachers, foremost among whom was Nasser.

This nationalist sentiment was so strong that when he was detailed to the Intelligence Command, under Zakaria Mohyi Ed-Dine, with the duty of intelligence gathering about Israel, he would slip out in his spare time to join Kamal Refaat in helping the Fedayeen to harass the British troops in the canal zone. At the time, the negotiations for the withdrawal of British troops, as well as the question of Sudan, were on the agenda of the revolution. So, Fayek moved on to the Sudanese section of the Intelligence Command, which later became the African Section of that command, before being detached to join the Presidency itself in the 1960s.

Fayek explains Nasser's position on the right of self-determination for the Sudan. He stresses that Nasser could not distinguish between liberation from British colonialism and the Sudan question. He thought it was inconceivable to demand the ousting of colonialism everywhere and the right of self-determination for all peoples, especially in Africa, and deny that right to Sudan, under the traditional slogan of the 'unity of the Nile Valley'. Fayek recognises that the aspiration was that Sudan would choose unity with Egypt afterwards, but Nasser foresaw the complications with large sections of Sudanese public opinion if he refused the independence of Sudan. Indeed, he thought the British expected that the young officers would not relinquish the demand of unity with Sudan, and thus make the question of the independence of both countries more remote. Thus, he decided early on how to outflank the British and American schemes by accepting the right of self-determination for Sudan. Simultaneously, and while the negotiations about the evacuation of British troops from Egypt were on-going, he started action against British colonialism in East Africa, and against American and Israeli influence in Ethiopia. Such action took the form of programmes broadcast to East Africa, about which the British complained during the negotiations, and certain activities in Ethiopia, such as putting a stop to anti-Egyptian activities in Sudan, in solidarity with for Egypt stopping the said activities. This explains the numerous meetings, publicised in the Egyptian press, between Egyptian leaders, including President Naguib, and personalities from Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria (British colonies at the time) in 1953. Fayek also remembers the

broadcasting of special programmes for some of the southern Sudanese tribes such as the Dinka and the Shellook, in an attempt to create special relations with the southern Sudan, and through them to East Africa, as exemplified by the broadcasts in Swahili and Tigrean.

The July Revolution's Concepts of Africa: The Identity and the Strategy

An important point in Mr Fayek's narrative was the cultural and political atmosphere that decided the priorities of the revolution in its contacts with the surrounding world, such as exemplified in the *Philosophy of the Revolution* written by Nasser in 1954. He stressed, as I had expected, the difference between the basics of historical loyalties, of belonging to certain civilisations, and of the strategic imperatives of the security of Egypt. The young officers were keen to know everything about Israel, and when the Israeli aggression on Gaza came as an ugly surprise, their first priority was to ensure Egypt's security by any means. Thus, it became clear that the Palestinian question was inseparable from the concerns of defending Egypt's interests against the colonial occupation and imperialist machinations. This meant their Arab concerns were mainly the continuation of their fight for independence and national security. Yet, they also found that the same problem of independence from colonialism was looming on their neighbours in Africa.

When I pointed out to Mr Fayek the question of the three circles in the *Philosophy of the Revolution* and the order of priorities in that booklet, he replied that it was obvious that Egypt belonged to the Arab World and the Islamic as well, but then we had to confront colonialism in Egypt, the Arab World and in Africa. He said:

While we were trying to gain as much intelligence about Israel and its imperialist connections, I was reading John Gunther's book *Inside Africa*, from which I learnt about the problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I learnt how Wold Ab Wold Mariam was helping Emperor Haile Selassie in his attempts at the complete annexation of Eritrea instead of the federal status of that country (Fayek 2002).

Fayek then enquired about the whereabouts of Wold Mariam and invited him to Egypt, and then they also welcomed other African leaders such as Idris Mohammad Adam and Ibrahim Sultan. This quest for African personalities opposed to colonialism led Fayek to visiting the Azhar area and making the acquaintance of African and Asian students there, in order to gain the maximum information about their countries. He also chose those who could participate in the broadcasting programmes and, hence, the African League in Zamalek was the chosen venue for those youth. I personally witnessed how

some of them became leaders of national opposition groups, or liaison officers with their national leaders, who arranged for those leaders to be invited to Egypt, and meet with those responsible for African affairs in the country. Other Islamic personalities from Chad, Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana visited Egypt in those days, and were welcomed into the African League, where we made their most instructive acquaintance.

Fayek also mentions another area of involvement of Egypt in African affairs. In those days Egypt was appointed as one of the members of the Consultative Council for Somalia which the UN put under Italian tutelage. When the Egyptian member of that Council, Kamal Salah Ed-Dine, was assassinated, Fayek went to the Egyptian Consulate in Mogadishu to take part in the ongoing investigations. The Italian authorities took the decision to deport him, but Nasser threatened to disrupt the Egyptian-Italian relations if that decision was implemented.

In that atmosphere, Fayek never felt a priority of Arab over African affairs in the Egyptian strategy. On the contrary, the whole context was that of a growing national liberation movement worldwide. The culmination of this trend was the participation of Nasser in the Bandoeng Conference in April 1955, after the signing of the treaties on Sudan and on the evacuation of British troops from Egypt. There was what Fayek calls 'the Discovery of Asia', with its vast populations and great leaderships, hitherto apparently unknown to the leaders of the revolution. Egypt gained its importance there as a representative of Africa (there were only three independent African states at the time). In Bandoeng, Nasser started the warm relationship with Chou En Lai, which led him on to the crucial relationship with the Soviet Union and the first transaction of Soviet arms to Egypt in September of the same year.

This warm relationship continued despite the Sino-Soviet conflict, and was rivalled only by the warm relationship with Nehru of India. Thus, Bandoeng delimited strongly the first circle of Egypt's national liberation strategy, which widened its outlook on Asia, as its relationship with Sudan was its first outlook on Africa.

Starting from 1955, and after the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression of 1956, the action in support of the Algerian revolutionaries continued and even looked like some sort of revenge on the French colonialists. The opening on the African North thus began with the role of Fathy Al-Dib of the Afro-Asian circle. Similarly, the action in East Africa went on to counter the British and Israeli influence there. Also, the relations with Syria in the East were stressed in order to encircle Israel, and make adherence to the Arab national unity an integral part of the strategy of national liberation.

However, despite the strong adherence to the principle of Arab unity as a basis for the Nasserist concept of the national state, there was no attempt, according to Fayek, to institutionalize this concept in the light of this new spirit. The reason for this may be the existence of the Arab League with its traditional pact, and the existence of other forms of institutions, both official and non-governmental, such as the Union of Arab Lawyers and the Union of Arab Workers, etc. However, these institutions never showed the warmth of the Bandoeng Conference, the following Conference of Afro-Asian Solidarity in Cairo in December 1957, the Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958, or the Conference of all African Peoples, also in Accra in December 1958. In these conferences, the Algerian revolution was adopted as an African cause, a status that the Palestinian Question did not gain except in the Kampala African Summit in 1975. All participants to those conferences were conscious of their institutions of national liberation, which was crystallised in 1960, in the Progressive Group for National Liberation in Casa Blanca, after its role in opposition to the American influence in Congo. Thus, the three circles were combined into one anti-imperialist and anti-colonial circle with no particular priorities within, as some writings still insist today.

Institutionalizing the Egyptian Action in Africa

I kept back the forms of institutional action in African affairs until after the talk of the beginnings and the concepts. It appears that the great events were, sometimes, the moving factor and not a theoretical anti-imperialist stand. Such pragmatism was also imposed by the nationalistic attitude which took the decision to back this nationalist movement or another as was dictated by their respective conditions, or their ability to come to Cairo or make contact with any of those charged with African affairs. The structure of the new national state in Egypt made such a state of affairs possible. It was neither a typical liberal state with a strict hierarchy or division of institutions and authority, nor was it the revolutionary ideological state that planned to export its revolution in a centralised manner, or set its revolutionary standards to evaluate the different forces of national liberation, as in the Soviet or Chinese cases.

While Egypt was conscious of the imperialist plots against it in the Nile Valley, which was the motive for its retaliatory action in that region, it also took action in other regions as in the case of confronting French colonialism in support of the Algerian revolution. So, we see the revolutionaries of Cameroon early in Cairo with Dr Momie, or Egypt taking an active part in

support of the Congo and confronting the imperialist plots in that country. This general attitude of confronting imperialism sheds light on Fayek's role in supporting all the African liberation movements, and the support of the revolutionary opposition for some 'neo-colonial states', although this latter support was kept within close limits.

Hence, we note the multiplicity of personalities in contact with these liberation movements, whether in an institutional manner or otherwise. We note from Fayek's words the multiplicity of persons or positions, together with a certain degree of centrality. This latter had its origin in the charisma of the leader, and not merely the president, which colours all aspects of the state action. Yet, Fayek mentions a multiplicity of positions of contact with such movements, which becomes the project of a major state which was getting ready to play a prominent role in international politics, the absence of which today is not our subject here. Such a multiplicity was not even noted in the Soviet and Chinese relations with African liberation movements.

I shall not repeat here the details mentioned in Fayek's memoirs, but shall merely mention that such multiplicity occurred after the Bandoeng Conference in 1955 and the Peoples' Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo in May 1958. According to Fayek, the African Affairs started in 1953 as an offshoot of the General Intelligence Command under Zakaria Mohyi Ed-Dine, who did not follow its work closely except in so far as the Sudanese affairs were concerned. All other African affairs were the concern of Mr Fayek who went around visiting Al Azhar University and the Islamic student quarters in Bo'oth, looking for the Eritreans, the Nigerians, the Senegalese, etc. Although some press reports in 1956 mention a prominent role for Zakaria Mohyi Ed-Dine and Al-Qaissouni in running African affairs, Fayek did not feel any such role.

Another venue for Africans was the African League in Zamalek, where Fayek met the concepts and efforts of some intellectuals, researchers, businessmen and former diplomats. The League and its periodical African Renaissance were the first attempt of Egyptian cultural society to look at Africa. There, a limited number of young Egyptian intellectuals, myself included, had the honour to show their cultural and political interest in African affairs. Yet, no similar interest was demonstrated by the Ministry of National Guidance, or by any of Egypt's universities. I would add here my personal testimony as the person responsible for relations with African national liberation movements, within the framework of the African League, the latter being a main source of live information about Africa. Fayek would invite interested pressmen and writers to frequent the League and get first-hand information there.

After the Afro-Asian Peoples' Conference, interest in African affairs was renewed, and the Institute for Sudanese Studies was renamed the Institute for African Studies, but its scope remained limited within the traditional disciplines of geographical and anthropological studies until such time as the new generations of professors of political sciences took over the leadership.

The Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) headed by Youssef Al-Sibaai was another axis of popular action in collaboration with African liberation movements. Fouad Galal of the People's Assembly also played a prominent role. In addition, after the African Peoples' Conference in Accra (December 1958) and the meetings with African Trade Union Leaders, such as Titga (Ghana), Seddiq (Maghreb) and Tom Mboya (Kenya), Ahmed Fahim's role as their Egyptian counterpart became prominent too. This multiplicity of roles and efforts, as well as the growing problems in Congo, made it imperative to combine all these efforts under a central leadership. So, in 1960, the Office for African Affairs was created at the Presidency with Mr Fayek at its head.

We must remember that Egypt had always had a prominent role to play in African affairs in the UN since its appointment into the Consultative Council for Somalia in 1953, and later on, with the problems over the recognition of the new government of Congo, and the opposition to South Africa's schemes against South-West Africa (Namibia), and southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Several Egyptian diplomats, such as Mohammad Hasan Al-Zayat, Murad Ghaleb, Mostafa Rateb and Emran Al-Shafei, played prominent roles in these problems. However, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs never showed particular interest in African affairs, nor were there any marked initiatives by the ministers in such affairs.

With the wave of independence of African states in the early 1960s, Egypt started to note the importance of economic activities; so, the Nasr Company for Exports and Imports was established with Mohammad Ghanem at its head. This was another lever in the African action of Egypt. So was the developing role of Al Azhar University, and the Islamic Council under Tewfik Eweida.

Thus, according to Fayek, all these seemingly independent institutions were governed centrally by the leader who gave such instructions through his only aide for African affairs, namely Fayek himself. In taking such decisions, Nasser was guided by the detailed reports supplied by Fayek, as well as the various notes and memoranda submitted by some of the above responsible persons via his Secretariat for Information. This secretariat would also receive reports from Egypt's embassies abroad and from the African sections of General

Intelligence. The leader's instructions went to Fayek alone in his capacity as Director of African Affairs, thus he became the façade behind which all the above institutions operated. He was later promoted to the post of Deputy Minister in charge of Asian and African Affairs, then Minister of National Guidance in 1966, at the age of 37. Despite the wide-ranging responsibilities of this post, he expressed his satisfaction to his leader that he still retained the responsibility for African affairs as before. All through this dialogue, Mr Fayek reiterated the fact that despite these numerous institutions and agencies, the African character of Egypt was never expressed in the media and cultural venues in a manner strong enough to suit its real weight in the continent, or what he called the historical roots of Egypt's belonging to Africa.

The African Policies of Egypt, and the Relations with the Liberation Movements

The memories of Mr Fayek are rich in details of African action in Egypt, but they also carry the reader to the heart of the events and personalities concerned. When he talks of South Africa, for example, he frequently refers to the role of Oliver Tambo, the president and long-time leader of the African National Congress (ANC), before his illness and death soon after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. Mr Tambo's role is seldom mentioned in the media when referring to the nationalist movement in South Africa. Fayek also warmly refers to his relationship with Patrice Lumumba since their first meeting in Accra in 1958, and the complications of the problem of Congo in 1960, and Egypt's involvement in that problem, which seemed hard to explain by many observers. Similarly, he explains the intricacies of Egypt's stand on the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Despite the close relationship with the Soviet Union, and facilitating their contacts with African liberation movements through AAPSO, the relationship between Nasser and Chou En Lai was as warm as ever. He describes how he personally enjoyed his relationship with the Chinese Prime Minister during the latter's stay in Cairo for 10 days in 1965.

I may add here my own experience in this connection, where I kept my contacts, obviously with Fayek's approval, with six offices in the African League, for members of close friends of the Chinese side, ranging from the Cameroonian Opposition, to the Pan-African Congress. I even witnessed the conflicts between these pro-Chinese movements and the pro-Soviet ones known as the 'authentic movements', such as the ANC of South Africa, the MPLA of Angola, the PAIGC of Guinea Bissau, the FRELIMO of Mozambique, the SWAPO of Namibia and others. Egypt's consistent policy

was not to differentiate between such conflicting movements on account of their Soviet or Chinese affiliations. Indeed, this was the official policy adopted by the Committee for the Liberation of Colonies in Dar es Salaam, and Egypt followed it consistently.

Fayek also recounts how Nasser looked with respect at Emperor Haile Selassie and Ethiopia's role in Africa, and how he did not contemplate the secession of Eritrea, hoping that some sort of federal relationship would prevail. Egypt did not take a stand on the Eritrean problem on ethnic or religious grounds, nor did it try to push forward the leaders of the Eritrean Liberation Front after it was declared in Cairo in 1960. Similarly, Egypt never tried to use the centuries' old affiliation of the Ethiopian Church with the Egyptian Orthodox Church, after the Emperor severed the relation between the two churches. Indeed, Nasser never started skirmishes with Ethiopia except after it had started its action against Egypt with both the North and South Sudanese leaders. This was always Egypt's position towards the question of legitimacy and national unity of African states. As soon as a legal government was established, even if reactionary in nature, Egypt severed its relations with the respective liberation movement. The only exception was the case of Cameroon, as a sign of support for Algeria against France, and the case of the Congo, which was international in nature from the beginning.

As for national and territorial integrity, Fayek stresses the firm conviction of Egypt's revolutionary regime in such values. He cites Egypt's rejection of any special status for the Arab protectorates in the shore towns of Kenya, or for the Somalis in its northern district. Egypt also refused to support any secessionist movement in Congo, or in Nigeria where it cooperated with the federal government against the Biafran secession even under the conditions of Egypt's debacle of 1967.

Fayek considers that the norms adopted by the July Revolution and state, with regard to African conditions, have made it easier for Egypt to maintain cordial relations with African states than with Arab countries. Some may consider this to have been a pragmatic rather than a revolutionary stand while others may explain this by saying that in Africa, the question was simply the confrontation with colonialism, while the goals in the Arab world went much further.

Readers may find a possible answer to such questions when they note the principle of recognising the legitimacy of all systems of national independence (in many cases formal independence only), as opposed to the logic of 'states

of national liberation', which was the guiding principle of all peoples' conferences until the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The acceptance of such legitimacy meant the end of peoples' conferences, both Cairo and Accra acquiescing to this principle. The purpose was to avoid giving the opposition movements the chance to use such conferences as a springboard for their own ends. Thus, support was only given to the struggle against the remaining colonial positions. This firm stand helped prevent Egypt's involvement in many crises such as that of the Democratic Congo or the recognition of Mauritania. In the latter, a failure of communication meant that the Egyptian delegation to the Chatoura Arab Summit conference adopted the decision prompted by Maghreb of non-recognition, of Mauritania as independent State while the official Egyptian stand was to recognise the new state in view of Egypt's African considerations.

Fayek expounded the Egyptian position of non-intervention in the internal affairs of African states by citing the example of the Arab communities in East and West Africa where Egypt expressed its reservations on any illegal claims, and even on their conservative positions in many African countries. I asked Mr Fayek about the Egyptian practices towards the OAU and other African institutions, and it seemed Egypt was keen on institutionalising its African action as much as possible. I also asked if there were any feelings of rivalry with certain African countries, and he cited many facts that show how Egypt put the overall strategies above any passing details. Such a vision does not show the whole perspective, except after a certain lapse of time. Thus, we can contemplate Nkrumah's stance towards the Arab North, Nyerere's position after Egypt recognised the revolution in Zanzibar that led to the establishment of Tanzania, or the cooperation with Algeria in the Colonial Liberation Committee, etc.

The two thorny questions in our dialogue appeared to be that of El Nasr Export and Import Company, and of the African position towards Egypt after the debacle of 1967 and the vicissitudes of the national liberation policies after that debacle. Mr Fayek did not show any reservations about the El Nasr Company, and explained that it was the expression of a real need for creating new economic and commercial relations with this vast new economic sphere, and that it played a very constructive role in that field. The Egyptian commercial fleet also contributed towards this goal. The fact that it contributed in transporting some military hardware to some liberation movements in Africa was only a sideline activity that does not change the whole perspective.

As for the thornier question of the African position towards Egypt after 1967, he gave a simple explanation in the context of the pressure of the imperialist powers on African states. He explained that the debacle of 1967 did not mean the defeat of the July Revolution, nor was it an end to the national liberation struggles worldwide. Indeed, such struggles continued in the Arab world, in Vietnam, in Africa and Latin America for a whole decade after that, such that Nasser instructed him to follow the Asian affairs and widen his responsibilities to encompass Afro-Asian affairs.

Some Final Remarks: An Open Conclusion

The realities and memories remain open as long as life goes on with Mohammad Fayek as General Secretary of the Arab Organization for Human Rights and as a keen observer of African questions. He may feel satisfied to see Mandela active in the African arena, looking after the peoples' interests; Sam Njoma still president of Namibia and SWAPO who kept his office in Cairo for so long; Ibrahim Mokebi of the youth of the African League become the foreign minister of Uganda, and then ambassador to Cairo in 2002; and Ben Bella with his ever-lively enthusiasm heading an active forum to promote North-South dialogue. However, he may be concerned to see the one-time revolutionaries of the Congo, or their offspring, still fighting under the slogans of the insurgents of East Congo with Kinshasa; and the problems in the way of settling disputes in Angola, Rwanda or Sierra Leone. He may be happy that his aspirations of African unity in the 1960s have at last borne fruit at the beginning of the new century by the creation of the African Union, but he may be dismayed by the scheming of the imperialist powers to gain control of this union.

Mohammad Fayek will surely be concerned about Egypt's role in all these momentous events. He may wonder where Somalia stands today, and what Egypt's reaction towards events is. He may wonder where Egypt stands towards the conflicts in Congo. He may wonder where Egypt stands with the active African regional groupings such as SADC, COMESA, the Sahel and Sahara, or even the Maghreb Union. Does Egyptian action and Egyptian diplomacy in this vast African arena correspond to Egypt's interests and political weight, or is our limit the Arab European *partenariat* alone? Or is there still hope for a different ending?

3

Abdel Malek Ouda: Egyptian Nationalism and Africa*

I

To speak of a personality of the scientific and cultural calibre of Professor Abdel Malek Ouda is a task that needs more than my modest capabilities. Yet, my cordial relation with him for more than forty years gives me the courage to make such an adventure in his honour. The first lesson gained by such an adventure is the significance of the deep scientific relationship between the two of us that has lasted for more than forty years, despite occasional differences. Such a friendship with the many shared concerns is only possible because of Ouda's open mindedness and hard work, as well as his sincere feelings of amity towards his friends and followers.

Our discussions and debates have extended for well over forty years, since the 1960s, in the rooms of the African League and later the African Society in Egypt, and in numerous African conferences on political economy in various African cities. I believe the 1970s, with their changing conditions of Arab-African cooperation, saw much of our common concerns and unhappy feelings.

In those days, Africa and the Arab world were bubbling over with transformations from their previous stagnant states to systems of democracy, single party, or scientific socialism, or else to coups and new roles for the military, the intellectuals and businessmen. The conscientious intellectuals had their legitimate concerns about the structure of the national state, and the interests of the popular masses. No wonder, such concerns led to the creation of the Third World Forum in Cairo and Dakar, and the Council for

* This article was presented at the ceremony held in honour of Professor A. Ouda by the African Association of Political Science 2003 and also at the ceremony held in his honour at the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University.

the Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) in Dakar. In the same period, the intellectuals in Dar es Salaam, Makerere and Cairo got together to found the Society for African Political Sciences, with Professor Ouda as one of its pillars in Cairo, at the north-east tip of the continent.

This conception of Africa was not a novelty in Egypt, nor was it new for Professor Ouda who was in his mature forties then (the 1970s), and he had enriched the Arab literature with his numerous works on Africa such as: *Politics and Governance in Africa* (1963), *The Idea of African Unity, 1963 The Determining Years in Africa* 1969, *Israeli Activities in Africa* 1961, *Socialism in Tanzania* 1968, *The Negro Revolution in America*, 1964 and many others, all through the 1980s and 1990s and even up to the present. His main works are in excess of twenty such volumes, and he has carried out a lot of expert research and many studies, plus hundreds of articles published in the press.

I was proud to join Professor Ouda in 1976 on a trip to Lagos to re-establish the African Association for Political Sciences, after its earlier foundation in Dar es Salaam in 1973. There, we were joined by a number of eminent scholars such as Ali Mazrui, Professor Williams and Shamuyarira, the (then) young scholars Nabudere, Tandon, Shifts and Mamdani, and many other young African scholars. In those years, Cairo and Dar es Salaam were the base for many African national liberation movements, and this kept the banner of revolutionary transformation high in the air. Yet, these were also the years for social and political change, for the open door policies, and for the sudden flow of petro dollars in the Arab region and over to Africa. This gave precedence to a comprehensive scientific study of development projects and their requirements. Thus, this array of scholars – originating from various schools of thought – went to Lagos to define the role of social and political sciences in assessing these new phenomena, and their impact on Arab-African relations. No wonder then that the group included Professor Ouda, who was then already an eminent professor of Political Science, the Dean of the Faculty of Economy and Political Science, the Dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication and also the Dean of the Institute of African Studies, in charge of the prestigious Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, as well as Editor of the *Al Siyassa Al Dawliya* (J.I.P). He also consolidated his insight into Arab and international affairs in his capacity as visiting professor in Yemen, Bahrein, New York, Tokyo and UNESCO.

With this prestigious background, Professor Ouda led opinions in the sphere of Arab and international relations from the tribune of the African Society in Cairo, and in his capacity as Director of the Fund for Technical

Aid to Africa, established by the Arab League. In this latter capacity, he was the focal point of a process of institutionalising Arab-African cooperation, a process that needed his truly scientific approach and nationalist sentiment. Unfortunately, this process failed to achieve its professed goals despite the tremendous efforts deployed by Ouda and some of his associates, and this failure was deeply regretted by him as demonstrated in some of his recent studies that deplored the insular attitudes of some donors, or the failure to honour their formal undertakings.

I find it difficult to be satisfied with this summary appreciation of Professor Ouda's rich achievements, but I cannot enumerate all his works that I hope you may be able to come across all over the Arab and African worlds. May he continue this very rich career during a long and fruitful lifetime.

Let us now contemplate together the value of the well-known contributions of Abdel Malek Ouda in the Arab and African fields of knowledge. You may be surprised to learn that the young university student that I was in 1956 attended the discussion of the doctorate thesis of Professor Ouda, and admired his masterly exposition of the subject of the nation and the state to a distinguished group of experts on international relations and international law, who could scarcely emulate his development of that subject. In these times, when scores of new states were being formed after World War II, there was a wave of new African independent states, and there were new conditions in Egypt after the July Revolution. So, there was a special need to understand such subjects. No wonder that Ouda's first book was *Politics and Rule in Africa* (1963) to demonstrate to a new generation of researchers the new systems of government in the newly independent African countries. At the time, all we knew about Africa were the had were traditional geographic narratives of the European explorers, some stories about the Arab role in diffusing Islam in the continent and some headlines on 'discovering' Africa, in very superficial attempts to touch on the subject.

For some time, Ouda was taken up by the concept of the modern state in Africa, although he started from the position of the functional role of the state as demonstrated in Egypt in its concern with national security, such that we often meet with references to the Egyptian state in his works. Yet, he never overlooks the ramifications of these interests and their connections with our neighbours, or with African unity, but through the 'national interest'. He never overlooks the fact that the Nile joins ten countries along its course, nor does he ignore the needs for liberation or integration in deciding the policies of states whether their tendencies were socialist or capitalist, provided they fulfilled the function

of protecting national interests and security. Such a vision had its impact on the different dimensions of Ouda's thoughts about the course of African unity and Egypt's role, or Israeli activities in Africa in the light of its role as an imperialist outpost in the region, taking advantage of the needs of newly independent states for technical aid. He studies the military coups in certain African countries in the light of the capability of the governing elites to safeguard the concept of the state and its role. He studies how the bureaucrats lose ground to the military, and how the socialist ideologies fail, to the benefit of the traditionally conservative elites. He is also concerned about the continued international conflict over Africa, and the effects of the Cold War and its corollaries. All such concerns have been expounded in his various works, from *Politics and Rule in Africa* (1963) to *Political Changes in Africa* (2005).

The issue of the Arab-African relations reveals the methodology of Professor Ouda, as he tried, starting with the 1970s, to monitor its political roots in his capacity as a honest examiner and not an apologetic historian. At times, we would differ in our ideological visions, or on the national liberation nature of Arab-African relations, and the role of the different leaderships about them. We might feel far apart about the differences between the functional role of the state, or its national liberation nature, but we always agreed about the deplorable conditions in neighbouring countries, the oil countries or those with fundamentalist regimes that leave no space for unity – even on a functional basis – with the countries of the South in the context of the end of the Cold War, and the impending drive for imperialist globalisation.

However, we never disagreed about the role of the intellectual and his responsibility towards his society. If we look at the works of Professor Ouda, we cannot fail to see his constant role in building a political culture of knowledge of Africa whether in Egypt or in the whole Arab world. He is always present at the scientific societies and conferences whether Arab or African; he publishes his edifying articles in the *Al Abram* newspaper and other publications. He always encourages his students who include scores of eminent university professors, journalists and leaders of public opinion, to make their contributions to the illuminating mission that he pursues.

II

Professor Ouda was never officially an adept of a given ideological trend, although as a thinker, he has his cultural stand that must naturally be related to one given tendency or another. Judging by our frequent debates, I cannot simply rate him as a conservative bourgeois thinker, because his political

consciousness always comes before his social connections. Yet, originating from the petty bourgeoisie, one cannot place him on the side of the populist or bureaucratic elite.

Judging by his whole work and his discourse to the academic circles, he stands out as an Egyptian nationalist deeply concerned about the affairs of the Egyptian state in its renaissance moments under the July Revolution, although he cannot be considered one of the protagonists of that regime due to well-known historical and family factors. Thus, he may well belong to the ideology of technocrats, if we may venture to say so, who are members of the bureaucracy of the national state. Such an ideology may lead him to accept the ascendancy of the military, even if imposed by force, but that may be fruitful if it is nationalistic in nature, as it will encourage the technocrats to give their best. In this light, Professor Ouda became dean of three important faculties, but did not become a university president. He also served as the advisor to Hasanein Heikal when he became Minister of Information, but did not aspire to take one of the prominent positions in the sphere of information, despite the close relationship between the two men when Ouda served as Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Al Ahram and Heikal was its Editor-in-Chief.

With this nationalist concern in the background, he published most of his basic works about Egyptian politics with regard to the Nile and the countries sharing its valley. These included *Egyptian Politics and the Nile Valley* (1999), following an earlier work in 1993 entitled *Egyptian Politics and African Issues*. He also edited an exhaustive study on Eritrea, and another on Somalia and the Arab-Ethiopian understanding in 1996.

As I followed him providing analysis, expertise and advice in Arab-African relations all through the troubled 1970s and 1980s, I noted that he does not raise great hopes of the credibility of Arab aid to Africa. He maintains that the Arab leaders were not philanthropists but merely rulers driven by their immediate interests. He even openly criticised the proceedings of Arab-African cooperation in a big colloquium in the 1980s, and published in 2000, in the review of the Arab League, a study on the future strategies of Arab-African relations in the hope that some leaders may make use of it to mend the deteriorating situation.

Despite the fact that Ouda neither appreciated the populist policies nor liked the demagogy of certain charismatic leaders in the recent history of the Arab world and Africa, he was always keen on the issue of African unity. However, he was always concerned about the coherence of the national state in Africa as the guardian of the unity of societies rife with ethnic and religious

fragmentation, and that irrespective of his appreciation of their leaders. I mention here his concern over the armed insurrection in Eritrea and its possible effect on dismantling the Ethiopian state, and also his stand with regard to the issues of the Maghreban Sahara, or South Sudan. In all such issues, he had his reserves about the Arab countries that aided the insurgents.

We once disagreed on the nationalist struggle of the blacks in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and whether it could be considered an armed struggle like that carried out in neighbouring Angola and Mozambique, although the latter started from outside the country. He maintained that this was a development of a violent struggle, preparing the ground for a negotiated settlement. At the time, I was overseeing a study comparing that of South Africa with Palestine, and thought both could be termed an armed struggle, in view of the drastic change in South Africa from non-violent Gandhian-style resistance to violent resistance.

Now, I am not quite sure about which of our conflicting views was the correct one, since the outcome of the negotiation with the white colonialists was the dismantling of the apartheid system and the creation of a democratic South Africa. Was it the outcome of the ideological resolve of the blacks to go to the armed struggle, or was it a pragmatic decision by both parties that the armed struggle would lead nowhere and acceptance of the interference of the West in favour of a compromise that would fit with the wider interests of world capital? Naturally, Professor Ouda was in favour of negotiated settlements in view of the present balance of forces.

Abdel Malek Ouda thus remains a model of nationalist Egyptian thought in contrast with pan-Arab or ideological thought. Yet, his methodical detailed study of the African situation as exemplified in his ever present articles in the press is the means for Arab public opinion to follow such affairs with a clear understanding of the facts away from the aberrations caused by the actions of the regimes in power.

4

Mehdi Ben Barka: From Bandung to Havana*

I

In 2005, Cairo and other African and Asian capitals celebrated the 50th anniversary of the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Bandung, in April 1955. In January 2006 the 40th anniversary of the first Tri-Continental Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America Conference was also celebrated in Havana. Between these two celebrations falls the 40th anniversary of the assassination of the martyr Mehdi Ben Barka on 20 October 1965. On such occasion, the people of Maghreb remember a national hero who championed the struggle of his country for independence, and against despotism. Similarly, the peoples of all three continents stood strongly against the tragic death of a fighter within the ranks of Afro-Asian solidarity, and a champion of the construction of global solidarity of the peoples of the South in all three continents, against imperialism and its exploitative tendency worldwide.

First of all, we note that the action of Mehdi Ben Barka was a direct expression of the concept of the movement of national liberation as the mature challenger of world imperialism whose leadership was openly assumed by the USA from the 1960s. It did not take Ben Barka and the peoples of the Third World long to hear the discourse of globalisation and the world empire under Washington's leadership. The international struggles undertaken by many peoples may have raised hopes of containing the domination of the world under the rising banner of capitalism, or building an alternative system within which the newly independent states would stand as a rampart against the expansionist designs of world imperialism. Such hopes were expressed in

* This paper was read at the 40th Anniversary of Ben Barka's assassination.

the slogans raised throughout the peoples' conferences in Casablanca, Cairo and Arusha between 1961 and 1963. However, the imperialist beast had thrust its claws deep into the bodies of Vietnam, South Africa, Palestine, the Portuguese colonies and in Latin America. This situation was an eye opener to a perspicacious leader such as Ben Barka and his counterparts Che Guevara, Cabral, Dos Santos and Oliver Tambo, to whom the peoples of the Third World looked up as the new generation that would stand up, besides the leaders of Bandung: Nehru, Nasser and Sokarno.

The new concept here was to proceed from the creation of the new independent national states, to broaden the basis of the struggle from Vietnam to Latin America, through counter violence, and the creation of 'more Vietnams', and even to go beyond the traditional struggle for liberation from the old colonialist states, to confronting the spearhead of imperialism, the USA. Thus, the contribution of Ben Barka was historical, not only for its raising the intensity of the struggle, but also for pushing the peoples' struggle to wider horizons. He deemed this, together with others, to be feasible, even if more demanding, such as the focal point of armed struggle that persisted for decades in Asia, and erupted in Africa not long after the assassination of Ben Barka, in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and then Palestine. The shortcomings of these actions that some circles regret were mainly the outcome of certain developments that took place within the structures of the national states themselves, and that are not foreign to the machinations of the imperialist powers.

Mehdi Ben Barka challenged many spheres of struggle at the local, regional and international levels, exhibiting a degree of steadfastness little known among national liberation movements. His exploits included the national/social duality, by spearheading the class struggle in his native Maghreb, which led to the creation of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. He even participated in the transformation of the forces of the armed struggle for liberation in Algeria into the state structure. He also played a major role in the conflicts among the independent states in the Arab East, where the ideological struggle raged around whether the Arabs constituted one nation or several national states. He then moved on to share with the leaderships in Egypt and the rest of Africa, as well as with fighters in East and South Asia, their extended struggle against the forces of imperialism and colonialism.

The outcome of all these efforts, which may have been embodied in the solidarity movement of the Afro-Asian peoples, was that he moved on from Cairo, Paris, Geneva, Beijing and Moscow, to carry on its merger with similar movements in Latin America. Few leaders on the Arab, African or Asian levels

really possessed such historical dynamism that would have enabled them not to abandon Havana as a stronghold vulnerable to the threats of the huge imperialist war machine. Rather, Ben Barka helped create more strongholds to the south that would engage that war machine for quite some time. Thus, he transcended the limited level of the charismatic national leadership to the wider mechanisms of popular movements which was created after his assassination – and despite that assassination – many variations on the theme of struggle, which culminated in the liberation of Vietnam and Southern Africa, the backing of the Cuban Revolution, and the dominance of a spirit of unyielding resistance in Latin America. All these developments induce a certain optimistic hope in the future, despite the many setbacks in the last few decades, which mark but a moment on the long march of history and the peoples' road to freedom.

II

How can the spirit of Bandung and the tri-continental movement be rejuvenated? The saying goes that 'capitalism rejuvenates itself', which is true, but why is it that the liberation movement does not rejuvenate itself, when it is imperative that it should do so? Both phenomena are not new, as both started as interacting opposites since the expansion of capitalism worldwide and, in particular, into the South. Both phenomena showed different variations, throughout history, inasmuch as the variations in the recent mechanisms used by capitalism had to be met by changing forms of resistance.

Almost half a century ago, General Eisenhower expressed his misgivings about the dangers of the industrial military complex in the USA, on western democracy on one hand, and of the threat implied in its destructive policies of expansion, on the other hand. The foresight of the General is all apparent today, as the peoples of the capitalist centre as well as those of the South face the same dangers from the new manifestations of capitalism today. Such dangers are manifest in the distorted concepts of 'democracy', and the arrogant concepts of hegemony and expansionism. I need not go into details of such practices as demonstrated in neoliberal globalisation, which are even leading to cleavages within the advanced capitalist centre itself and are inducing the disintegration of national entities all over the South. All this is being orchestrated under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, which are undermining the legitimacy of the UN and its various agencies. The ultimate aim is to subject the world economy, culture, media and education to the neoliberal policies, and impose those rules by brute military force, at work all the time, and not in sporadic

cases here or there as the occasion arose, as was the old practice. The examples of economic aggression in Asia, military and political aggression in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and blockades in Latin America proliferate, and we must ask: where are the corresponding variations in the responses of the South? And how can we recall the initiatives of Ben Barka in this respect?

The ever-increasing intensity of polarisation under the hegemony of capital is almost obliterating the past exploits of the charismatic leaders of the South. However, Mehdi Ben Barka tried in his day to assemble the trump cards denouncing the horrid practices of colonialism and imperialism. But it is out of the question now to call back the old model of Bandung in 1955, as that governmental model is not much used under the changing conditions of today, irrespective of the practical achievements, for a certain period, as exemplified by the movement of non-aligned countries. The past experience shows that this model of dealing with the peoples' movements, as governmental harmed their representation on the political and democratic levels. Suffice it to cite the cessation of all peoples' conferences after the creation of the (governmental) Organization of African Unity, and the feebleness of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement once the distinction between the state and popular representatives of its socialist member states was obliterated.

In this respect, the initiatives of Ben Barka should be very edifying. His historically significant formulation of the objects of the peoples' solidarity movement and its scope caused concern in imperialist circles, as was shown in certain reports of the US Congress at the time. Such a role also explains the ready participation of certain imperialist intelligence organisations in his assassination.

We may accept the postulate that the limited resistance of certain regimes to the economic and political pressure directed against them through the policies imposed by the WTO, or the excessive debt burden, may indicate the implicit existence of a will to resist in such countries of the South. Thus, the resistance of such countries to the concepts of open borders, limited sovereignty, or interference on the grounds of the defence of human rights, may indicate the existence of certain positive possibilities in certain actions and movements in those countries. Some manifestations of such actions are the stand taken by the Group of 77 countries, and the 'group of four' (India, Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela), and other similar kinds of modest groupings in defence of the interests of the peoples of the South. However, we must note that such groupings tend to put more stress on the economic nature of their action rather than the political, out of baseless fears of the ideologisation of their stand, as was

usual to label the old movements of the Third World. Indeed, the neoliberal policies as they are applied today are nothing but mere ideology, since the Third World is not the beneficiary of any of its economic advantages. The real reason for shunning this politicising of such groupings of the South is the fear that it may have some positive social dimensions for the benefit of their peoples.

The above fears may explain the concern shown at some of the results of the meetings and groupings among the countries of the South trying to consolidate independence within the framework of globalisation. The regional groupings in South-east Asia, the African Union, and the NEPAD show such signs of feebleness, and this was reflected in the Jakarta Declaration (at the 50th anniversary of Bandoeng), aiming at creating the new Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation. The only remaining hope is to hear enough voices upholding the new appeal for liberation and independence within the structures of globalisation imposed on the peoples of the South, and that such movements of certain 'states of the South' make part of such resistance. If we go back to the discussions during the Afro-Asian Peoples' Conference in Ghana in May 1965, which called for convening the tri-continental conference, we may note the concern of many participants then. If such action is to bear fruit, it has to embrace enough of the democratic spirit in order to make its mechanisms operate effectively without the need for the charismatic leaders of the past. Such mechanisms may be discerned in the anti-globalisation rallies that culminated in Porto Alegre. I need not point to the solid capitalist convention in Davos, but to the need to go back to the calls of Mehdi Ben Barka and his teachings, to guide the huge rallies in Porto Alegre, and their ramifications in the popular actions of the peoples of the South, not forgetting the critical assessment of such actions, both in their scope and perspectives.

First of all, we note – while remembering Ben Barka – the great positive value of the World Social Forum in its first popular rally on the Latin American continent. Also, we should not forget that this impressive rally was a culmination of numerous rallies, demonstrations and popular unrest, within the framework of the anti-globalisation movement in many capitals in First and Third World countries. This movement did not emanate from the old popular organisations of the middle of the century, which were being eroded starting from the mid-1960s.

This renovation of the anti-imperialist movements, which responds to the renewed forms of globalised neoliberalism, recalls the discourse of Ben Barka about the movement of the peoples of the South and its allies, which was limited by the realities of the time. We are now witnessing popular solidarity

on a worldwide scale, which may provide a measure of democracy not available for Ben Barka and his colleagues, who fell victim to the manoeuvres of the progressive and nationalist governments in the same way all over the three continents. We may wonder here about the impact of the popular movement in Porto Alegre removing itself from the relative support of the official nationalism at the time of Ben Barka, or, shall we say that such support still exists since a progressive government in Brazil is the host of the present rally? What will the outcome be, when this popular rally spreads itself all over the countries of the three continents, where some regimes openly oppose the movement?

A serious debate may take place about the forces represented in the movement today, and Ben Barka may have given an adequate answer when he stigmatised the movement as being that of national liberation against world imperialism. However, the new movement has a much wider scope. as it has to confront new aspects of globalisation unknown in the 1960s.

When Mehdi Ben Barka issued the invitation to the tri-continental conference, he was not isolated from the social movements and popular organizations labelled today as the old movements. Indeed, some 600 delegates from 83 organisations from the three continents took part in the meeting, which shows the close relationship with the concept of popular masses favoured by the governments of the national states at the time. His action was also related to the growing movements, in the West, against the machinations of world capitalism, and its colonial and social aggressive policies. Those were the times of widespread protests against the war on Vietnam and the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as the budding youth protests, the movements for human rights, and feminist movements in the countries of the North. In those times, many intellectuals took the lead on a world level, in parallel with the charismatic leaderships of the Third World. This glorious alliance that we hope will be resuscitated supported more than 25 liberation movements in all three continents, with the support of a European movement of solidarity – both open and covert. These solidarity movements were not, at the time, just donor bodies whose main purpose was to finance organisations of questionable social weight, such as the NGOs of today.

While the rallies of the World Social Forum are just beginning to consider the role of the political besides the social in their action and they are debating the representation of political parties and even semi-governmental bodies, we note that Ben Barka and his tri-continent movement were forerunners in that respect. Some may gloss over the significance of the name of the party that

Ben Barka led in Morocco: The Socialist Union of Popular Forces, which Mohammad Yazgui described as the fruit of Ben Barka's efforts. This name bears a real significance as it describes an effective alliance of popular forces and not a hierarchical structure that obstructs the élan of the masses in their struggle for their aims. This is what prompted Ben Barka to transcend the differences between the socialist powers, and to group them together with national liberation forces. He even declared, in a party meeting in Rabat in May 1962, that the movement was part of the worldwide struggle, extending from Beijing to Havana.

We cannot visualise a powerful surge of the anti-globalisation movement against predatory capitalism without a return to many of the concepts that were familiar at the time of assembling the popular masses of the South in Havana in 1966, nor to the clear consciousness exhibited by Ben Barka and his comrades, and the supporting movements that rallied the popular masses, the national democratic fronts, and specific trade unions. The rallying slogan may be 'the world of the peoples of the South', an alternative world, one that is comprehensive, human and possible. Such a slogan is not unrealistic on the occasion of commemorating Ben Barka, the fighter for the liberation of the peoples of the three continents, and the real champion of internationalism. If he were still with us today, he would surely be at the heart of the main battles against imperialism in Palestine and Iraq.

I conclude by quoting Mehdi Manjara who once said: 'Remembering is, in the case of Ben Barka, an act of the future rather than of the past – the future of freedom, and of post-colonialism, and even, of 'post-Barkism'!

5

Israel: A Sub-imperialist Power in the Third World*

The concept of 'imperialism' was used in connection with various terms in the field of political economics, ranging from traditional colonialism, settler colonialism and neocolonialism to sub-imperialism and minor imperialism, as well as a 'relationship' between the centre and the periphery. All these interpretations take place within the framework of the debate on the nature of conflicts and contradictions at the global and regional levels, and with regards to the primary and secondary roles in these conflicts.

The question here does not pertain to mere differences in terminology, but to the various repercussions of these concepts for certain regions of the Third World and the varying patterns of political behaviour in solving the conflicts at the regional level, such as in the Middle East and southern Africa. Particularly in these regions, the difference in understanding the nature of conflict leads to different stands. The evaluation of the nature of the nation-state, the developing social formations and the aims of liberation movements also differ.

Dealing with the example of Israel – and similarly with South Africa – varies according to every given term and leads to extremely serious results, despite the need to take into account certain credible historic features of these terms. For example, the term 'colonialism', in its traditional concept, may not be appropriate if Israel is considered as a Middle East country that 'sometimes' perpetrates aggression against its neighbours or usurps some of the rights of the inhabitants of the region. It will not be considered as a coloniser, according

* Paper presented to AAPS Conference in Addis Ababa, April 1985.

to the logic of the 1947 International Partition Resolution which occupied the territories of others for about 40 years according to the traditional criteria of 'colonialism'.

The term 'settler colonialism', if applied on its own, presupposes the possibility of changing its nature by changing the internal structure of the state through internal political and social struggle without having recourse to changing or destroying the nature of the state apparatus, or according to the participation of the majority in power within a multinational state.

The racist or apartheid concept, for the Zionist project, leads some social forces in the region to face it on religious or national ethnic grounds, or, with the civilisational Arab project, to compete or besiege it. The alternative in this case is to reserve the racist project of the region as part of a Middle East or 'African' state.

The regional agent concept of imperialism or neo-colonialism makes it tempting for other regimes in the region to imagine that it is possible to weaken the regional agent through taking over its very role and depriving the enemy of the privileges of that role, to contain its hostility and its capacity as 'policeman' for the imperialist powers. This means that the organic relations that strengthen the continuity of such a role have been ignored. Even the concept of 'extended imperialism', applied sometimes to Israel has, in its absolute form, led to a kind of literature on the 'marginal difference', the lack of identification, and the possibility of 'neutralising the 'supreme master', by influencing its interests in the surrounding regions.

Contrary to these reservations, there is one common reservation that most of these concepts, when applied, do not explain. This is the growing external role played by Israel or South Africa in the Third World, in conjunction with international imperialism as this chapter will show the specific character that the nature of the economic military component of the Zionist regime may afford.

Thus, applying the concept of sub- or minor imperialism to the prevailing situation in Israel is the most credible, for it responds to the shortcomings of the previous terminological aspects concerning the nature of the Zionist state in Palestine. It explains the nature of the international Zionist movement, in its highest stages, as well as its structural relationship embodied in Israel with the international imperialist system. The concept also accounts for the difference that may at times appear with the centre, and its effects on the regional role played by Israel in the Third World, and particularly in Africa. Finally, it raises questions about the nature of stands within the regional system in the Middle East vis-à-vis the international imperialist system itself and not just the national and regional elements of the situation.

Within the context of this concept, it is possible to understand the nature and role of the Arab and Palestinian liberation movement in confronting the imperialist and sub-imperialist system in the region.

The Concept of Sub-imperialism in Relation to Israel

This chapter cannot be exhaustive enough to cover all the details of the debate on the central imperialist system and the sub-imperialist or minor systems. Several criteria have been set up in this respect, some of which have, due to formalism or the lack of the ideological dimension, classified the USSR – side by side with South Africa – as examples of sub-imperialism, such as Brazil, Iran (under the Shah's rule), India and South Korea. Only a few have been concerned with the addition of Israel to this list after that categorisation.

However, we also benefit in this respect from the elaboration of the structural theory of imperialism, social imperialism and sub-imperialism, despite its formalism. Authentic Arab contributions concerning Israel as a minor imperialist state, as well as other Arab application to Saudi Arabia, are also useful. Most of these writings base their argument on the Leninist theory on imperialism and the criterion of capital export and raw material import, or their direct substitutes (e.g. the export of advanced technology in exchange for primary goods). Therefore, the growth of world capital and the aspect of monopolism and centralisation did not hinder the appearance of subsidiary capitalist pivots specialized in export or playing special roles in the regional system. Although these pivots may sometimes seem to be competing with the central system, as is the case of Japan, they move most of the time within the framework of the integrated imperialist system in an era of internationalisation of the economic order, and even play the role of an intermediary between the centre and the periphery.

In an elaboration of his theory on sub-imperialism, J. Galtung makes interesting statements that may be useful, particularly about Israel (Galtung 1976). He speaks about the creation of a type of centre in the peripheral structure, which serves as a bridgehead for the imperialist centre, and presents the latter as a model in order to extend the sphere of its hegemony. The bridgehead ensures the internal order of the periphery while siding totally with the adopted imperialist policy with a view to preserving the prevailing status quo and the capitalist pattern in the periphery. Galtung cites the examples of South Africa in southern Africa as well as Iran (under the Shah's rule) and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, as regional imperialist powers. He also refers to the USSR in eastern Europe while pointing out that these examples are not as important as the criteria that may lead the central imperialist power to change its options.

It appears from Galtung's work, and from others too, that the external and internal structure in the sub-imperialist system is important; hence, the social structural character of the model and the role of supporting, military and security ideology. The example of Israel relies on all of these criteria put together.

In his book, *The Political Economy of Israel* (Mursi 1983), Dr Fouad Mursi points to an imperialist and minor imperialist power with regard to the Zionist state in Palestine, thus correcting several erroneous concepts that have prevailed in the Arab region. He then proceeds to the analysis of the situation of Israel as a Zionist project injected, by international capitalism, with capital that accumulates and generates the imperialist role of that state. Mursi also unveils the contribution of oil monopolies in enhancing that role, supporting the war economy and engaging in a hegemonistic policy at the level of the Arab region and the Third World.

Arab studies are not limited to the Israeli model, but apply similar concepts to the Saudi role, thanks to accumulated oil capital within the framework of the imperialist strategy for the Arab wealth and the Saudi hegemony in the regional Middle East system for the benefit of the stability of imperialist interests (Salama 1980; Mujahid 1985). This means that the management of petro dollars, the imperialist centre, sets up more than one sub-imperialist power in the Arab region without expected national clashes. Moreover, the management of the peace process in its current form serves the same goals.

It is necessary to note in this respect that these concepts about Israel were primarily formulated by Afro-Arab groupings in the wake of independence within their discussions around resolutions concerning neo-colonialism. Israel was thus classified as an essential neo-colonialist power 'threatening independence and liberation movement through plotting, oppression, military and police measures, and even assassinations. Resolution of the All African Peoples Conference, Cairo, March 1961; cited in Barongo 1980. Earlier on, the group of Casablanca states adopted a similar resolution on 'Israel as a bridgehead of colonialism' (January 1961). The Israeli literature even speaks of the 'Bandung shock', as it explains the isolation of Israel from the conference held in 1955, and the inclusion of the question of the Palestinian people within the resolutions pertaining to colonialism (Curtis and Gitelson 1976).

A Distorted Development Strengthened by the Imperialist Powers

The implementation of the 'project of the state of Israel' by the Zionist movement has never been innocent in any stage of its organic ties with the colonialist projects, particularly if one knows that the abuse of the prophecy

about the 'reconstruction of the temple' did not gain Jewish religious support itself when Hertzl set forth the 'project of state'. Therefore, we have no referential frame to explain the 'project' since its beginning, outside that of the European, starting from Napoleon's call for the Jews to settle in the region during his hegemonistic wars south and east of the Mediterranean, from the middle of the 19th century up to the Balfour Declaration of 1919; the continuous British support of the idea early in the twentieth century until its materialisation in 1948; then the British, French and Israeli joint aggression against Egypt in 1956; the West German support through financial subsidy and provision of arms in the early 1960s, as an overt substitute for the USA and, finally, the Israeli-American alliance.

We are, therefore, facing an early 'colonialist Zionist project', and not a 'Jewish identity' in search of assertion within the defined nationalist project for the establishment of its state. It is not a mere coincidence that the shifts of loyalty of a given state from one obvious colonialist interest to another have been so consecutive, while various nationalist projects in the Third World have, to varying degrees, experienced forms of contradiction with these interests, whatever their bourgeois or capitalist structure may be. This is mentioned here because it accounts for the relations that Israel continues to establish with fascist regimes in the Third World due to constant bonds with the imperialist system above. Otherwise, the alternative for the Jewish majority would be the socialist revolution, which did not take place, given the fact that the upper class always held control over the project.

We do not intend, in this chapter, to consider the details of Israel's political economy and its effects on its external behaviour and the organic relationships with the imperialist super powers, but would just like to point to those aspects of the Israeli structure that concretise the nature of these relations and impose on it the symptoms of 'explosion' abroad, in conformity with the criteria for the sub-imperialist model.

We shall begin with the special relationship between the Israeli state and the Zionist movement. Thus, we can see how Israel, which started with the argument of putting the Jewish people (from a diaspora) together as a state, has now reached anew the argument of the 'Jewish nation in the world' in order to ensure the preservation of the role of the Zionist movement as an international capitalist organisation and one of the major capital owners in the world linked with 'international monopolism'. It therefore selects its immigrants among dominating elements, cheap labour force (the Flasha), or technical cadres, etc., unlike the early trends that led to the immigration of one

million people over a period of twenty months following the proclamation of the state in 1948, that is, twice as many Jews as there used to be in Palestine at that time. The Zionist movement abroad had then to finance the operation of settling 1.5 million Jews after the proclamation of the state at expenses that reached US\$4.5 billion. Regular international conferences of Jewish millionaires in Israel have been held for the same reasons ever since 1967. In 1968, for instance, they decided to vote one billion dollars for the reclamation of the Arab land that was occupied in 1967, and carried out many other projects (Mursi 1983). Israel's reliance on this logic right from the beginning is what made it develop socially in the direction of elitism and military security, and emphasise economic liberalism since the 1970s, no matter how it liquidates the state sector or the old Histadrut economic role, as it stressed the prevalence of the hegemonistic religious Likud orientation since 1977, with its proclamation of the new 'economic revolution'.

The development of Israel as a military security project of international imperialism has made it adopt selection in the project of gathering the Jews of the diaspora, after selective immigration has given better results in the new capitalist compounds which is capable of achieving its goals more rapidly. Employment represents 32 per cent of the total population, which is (according to the 1970 statistics) the highest rate in the world; with 10 per cent of the employed working in the army and other units of the military industry. The only country that competes with Israel in this field is the USA (14%).

This situation urged Moshe Sharit, before he died, to put forward the project of Israel's willingness to let one hundred thousand Palestinian refugees return to their land (Mursi 1983). As the economic and political objectives of such a project became clear, he wanted to say that the Palestinian question was no longer the main concern of the Zionist project.

Other aspects of the Israeli economy show the nature of the distorted development provided for by the Zionist project. For instance, the Israeli economy does not rely on the usual base of the formation of its national capital, as international capitalist institutions do that in its stead. Rates of accumulation of capital are constantly increasing despite decreases in local savings. Foreign capital flow is ensured despite the constant deficit in the Israeli balance of payment. Furthermore, this economy is based on the full absorption of the national product by the national consumption, that is, the disappearance of the phenomenon of national savings; yet, investment reaches about half of the national product and capital formation attains the highest rates in the world. The Israeli economy also relies on an annual increase of

imports in comparison to exports, which means that there is a constant deficit in the trade balance, with rising prices, and increased foreign debts and rates of inflation. However, the Israeli economy is intent on constantly raising the settler's standard of living to encourage immigration. This takes place as the national product increases sometimes to 14 per cent, but goes down at times to as low as 1.1 per cent (Mursi 1983).

Various sources note that the growth of the gross national product is going up, and this was the case during the 1956 and 1967 wars. Thus, an impasse in the economy is a direct sign of the outbreak of a war with the Arabs, no matter what the reasons are. The fact that the Israeli economy is based on foreign credit lets one understand the role of world capitalist institutions in feeding this economy after each war. It is natural that we do not interpret that as a periodical charity, but rather as the state construction of the Zionist entity in a certain shape, responding to its allotted function. Hence, war plays the role of capital attraction rather than repelling it as is the case with any country in the world.

Stemmed from this formation, a constant and permanent mobilisation of financial resources from abroad is on the part of the Zionist movement. Israel has obtained from European sources alone more than what has been achieved through the Marshall Plan for building up the whole European economy after the Second World War. The contribution of the USA in that connection is the best manifestation. It suffices to say that the American aid in 1981 was assessed to amount to fifty per cent of Israel's national income and that Israel's bonds in the USA come next to the American Treasury bonds of financing. According to the report of the American general auditor published in 1984, the aggregate American aid to Israel since its establishment was about US\$25 billion – US\$16.5 billion in the form of loans and grants for military purposes, and US\$8.5 billion for economic assistance and grants as part of the programme of security. According to the report, the annual US aid is not just that officially recorded as US\$8.5 billion, but in fact it surpasses US\$10 billion, from various sources. According to a comment from a Jewish councillor to a former American president on this subject, 'Israel is the single largest recipient of US economic and military assistance in the world and no such commitment is as firm except the one to its (US) Nato allies' (Eizenstat 1984). This concurs with Fouad Mursi's remark that foreign finances supplied to Israel capital formation in the last few years amount to 34 per cent and that US credits alone constitute more than 80 per cent of foreign supplies.

Israel as a sub-imperialist project does not leave itself at the mercy of financing circumstances nor to the problems of Zionist lobbying in the USA

but proceeds in its internal build-up benefiting from the capitalist patterns of development bound to assistance:

- a) Israel imports crude diamonds from South Africa, central Africa and Belgium to convert them into an important export product that constitutes 35 per cent of its industrial exports.
- b) Exports of industrial products have soared from 13.4 per cent in 1967 to 31 per cent in the last few years, with increased dependence on heavy industry requiring intensive skills. Industrial establishments inclined towards large-scale projects. Since 1967, the number of 9,765 establishments has become 6,400 dominated by 458 and controlled by a group, setting their hegemony. The role of agricultural production in export was thus allotted 7 per cent (1979) compared to 14 per cent in 1965.
- c) The development of the military industrial complex in Israel is linked to its counterpart in the USA and to its results in feeding military tensions at the international level (as regards the USA) and at Third World level (as regards Israel), given the fact that Israel military expenditure is assessed at more than 15 per cent of its national income in the seventies, compared to 10 per cent in the USA. The Israeli newspapers recently published reports by the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and the International Centre for Peace in the Middle East (1984), providing these important facts (Tidhistur 1984; Eizenstat 1984) b)
- d) Israel is led by a large and strong military industrial community belonging to pressure groups oriented without an effective popular control or supervision. Some of these groups from the Air Force are starting the production of certain military industries that would serve their interests.
- e) These military industries absorb 25 per cent of the industrial manpower in Israel at present and the share of military exports is 27 per cent of the total industrial exports, a situation which affects the economic orientation as well as the social set-up itself.
- f) The Israeli Army was the first consumer of the arms produced until the early 1980s. Now, it consumes only 35 per cent of the aviation industry; and 38 per cent of military industries and the rest, which amounts to US\$1 billion yearly, is for export. The report does not exclude the possibility of a drop in military sales because the state's income could not depend on more than 25 per cent of that kind of production.
- g) Israel has spent, for example, US\$2 billion on air industries for the release of some of its Lavy aircraft whereas it will spend US\$11-12 billion for

10-15 years in pursuance of this industry, owing to the pressure exercised by these air industry groups.

Needless to say, there is a relationship between the development of the military and heavy industries and the development in the production of nuclear arms in Israel – from reactors to missiles with nuclear heads, to the possession of the nuclear bomb itself, and its joint experimentation with South Africa. Israel ranks twelfth among the arms-exporting countries in the world. However, J. Pieterse in his study on Israel's role in the Third World, refers to the CIA sources which classifies Israel as fifth in the field of arms export, meaning that it comes first after the big powers (Pieterse 1985).

It is because of Israel's peculiar economic structure that it cannot continue its life with the strangling economic crises prevailing in the Third World, unless it becomes more and more organically bound to the imperialist capitalist economy and its policies. Under the present social stratification accompanying the development of the industrial military groups, the dominant aggressive Ashkenasim will remain at the top of power, no matter how much broader the role of the Sephardim becomes in the administration and services. Therefore, the class formation in Israel will remain at the service of international class formation and grow within its framework. This is the situation which will continue to associate Israel with its sub-imperialist function and, hence, the international monopolies, which constantly provide it with services, despite the international crises, and facilitate Israel's penetration into the Third World.

In 1975, Israel signed an agreement with the EEC on a free trade zone to open the two markets to the largest number of industrial and agricultural commodities, to such a degree that they could exchange all commodities by 1989. This would enable Israel to move fully and gradually into the African markets and others of the Lome group. This was followed by an agreement, similar to the one with the EEC, with the USA in 1976 within the framework of the GSP system which is available to certain developing countries and allowed Israel exemption of US customs duties on 3,000 commodities.

This did not suffice for Israel. So, it put in pressure to sign a more comprehensive agreement by declaring itself a free trade zone with the USA. And it managed to obtain, in September 1984, the approval of the Senate for exemption from custom duties on the commodities of the two countries. This was a cover good enough for the transfer of American capital and investments to Israel which directly expands its markets in the Third World. This is what is being interpreted by certain Israeli sources as being 'in return for certain services rendered by Israel to the USA in the Middle East, Central America and

Africa'. A member of the Knesset declared 'America is bargaining on the issue of the free trade zone and wishes reciprocal dealing. Is it not enough that the USA benefits from our military forces?' Other Israeli sources declared that this creates an atmosphere of cooperation between industries and industrialists in USA and Israel, which encourages European industrial investments in Israel, aspiring to proceed to America after that (Simdar 1984).

Thus, Israel could be the link between multiple parties. In spite of all this assistance, Israel is suffering economic problems resulting from this distorted growth, and it is trying to overcome them through further integration with the flourishing American economy. In October 1983, it pushed the project of the Israel Minister of Finance to make the US dollar the base of evaluation – as gold – in the Israel market. The procedure was known in Israel as a 'programme of dollarisation' (Lumbrose 1984).

Israel's Foreign Relations Follow an Imperialist Pattern

Ever since the inception of the Zionist movement in the 19th century on the basis of setting up a state for the Jewish people, the movement has been playing a colonialist role which eventually gave Israel a minor or sub-imperialist pattern. These early colonial statements on the fundamental concept of the movement's pioneers included 'the civilising mission of Israel amidst the barbarian east' and the 'protection of western interests near the Suez Canal and on the commercial road leading to eastern India'. This early awareness was manifested through the linkage established between the Zionist project and the western imperialist projects and their endeavour to have the Zionist pioneers in early contact with the European settler colonialism in southern Africa, as disclosed by communications between Hertzl and Rhodes, and Weizman and Smuts at the setting-up of its state in 1948. Israel had not declared official boundaries to itself; therefore, its regional aspirations knew no limits, in the same pattern as the colonialist regime in South Africa, for a long period of its existence. For instance, since the adoption of the international resolution on the partition of Palestine in November 1947, the Jewish population doubled in less than two years. Israel did not confine itself to the limited objective of settler colonialism through migration to a 'no man's land' but subjugated a 'people/state' to the Zionist movement which is basically imperialist in structure. It naturally took some time to establish the new state's institutions by investing the Jewish vanguard spirit led by the pioneers of the movement. The nature of the first settlers, as petit bourgeoisie lured by a vanguard spirit, contributed towards that end and establishing the first Moushav on the Promised Land. It was

just natural that these young pioneers adopted the policy of internal security while seeking legitimacy externally. The first few months after the creation of Israel witnessed a tripartite agreement signed in 1950 by Great Britain, France and the USA to secure Israel's boundaries, in other words, 'declaring an international solidarity with it'. The development of class formation and the control of an advanced European stratum, Ashkenasim, helped in the formation of a ruling elite and thus dominance of their directives in the light of the prophecy to the Jewish people. While the Sephardim and the religious pioneers were building the Moushav and Kibutz and the social establishment, the upper strata were dominating the state apparatus; and even the Hestidrut, with its socialist pretences, launched itself on the policy of capitalist development which reached its climax in the late seventies.

This settler-colonialist formation did not find satisfaction in simply setting up a strong and ideal state among 'backward peoples' according to the arguments of South Africa, but launched itself rapidly into participation with the traditional colonialist imperialist power outside their frontiers. The first provocation against the July Revolution of Egypt (1952) started when the revolution leadership asserted the continuation of its rule in 1955. Soon after that, was the aggression against it through Israel's collusion with Britain and France, with a view to occupying the Suez Canal in 1956, using the imperialist powers. Those who closely followed the development of the Israeli activities in Africa carefully remarked on Israel's early circling around the Nile Basin, and Israel's security as well as economic existence whenever limited by necessity, found room in Ethiopia (Haile Selassie), Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Central Africa and Chad (Ouda 1966; Rahman 1974). In our judgment, this was but an attempt on the part of the imperialist powers to contain the Nasserist Arab liberation movement from vast repercussions in the area.

The contradiction between liberation and imperialism, which defined Israel's role at this early stage of its existence with its limited economic potential, was then obvious. Israel's volume of trade with Africa did not surpass US\$70 million throughout the 1960s despite the fact that it had established 32 diplomatic missions towards the end of that decade. This young state, ruled by the petit bourgeoisie in Israel, intellectually bound to the pragmatic social democratic concepts and their parties in particular, started spreading Israel's own claims of developing the country as a socialist model and modernised experiment. It is not a mere coincidence that its first basic relations are more deeply entrenched with the leader of the African socialism and Negritude, etc. with the aim of establishing themselves first. Then came the objective

of containing the Arab and African liberation movements. Hence, we can understand how Egypt (Nasser) failed to win a unified African position to its side or for the Arabs during the 1967 Israeli aggression when Israel's friends refused to adopt the resolution of the OAU, between 1967 and 1971, calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt, the African land! We need not go further, looking for the Israeli active movement in search of legitimacy and security, but we want to disclose the seeds of the world sub-imperialist role exemplified in Israel since its activities started to break through its settler colonialist or regional framework, directed to Africa in particular.

Israel's Development in the Seventies

Opinions differed in interpreting the great African diversion from Israel (collective severing of diplomatic relations) in the early seventies and what seemed to be a continent turn-down on Israel. Diverse reasons were given by different researchers, such as: 'the changing of Israel image in Africa', 'Israel was looked upon as a seeker of interest rather than a donor', 'because of its relations with South Africa', 'developing relationship between the Africans and the Palestinian liberation movements' or by exaggerating opinions on Africans and Arabs 'forming, in the seventies, a single international sub-system', according to Professor Ali Mazrui. In addition, there were other factors such as 'exercising pressure by the Afro-Americans' or 'the changing concepts of some African leaders' or the 'growth in certain aspects of collective Afro Arab cooperation' (Beshir 1982).

However, most of these opinions failed to completely consider the element pertaining to the nature of Israel's economic development, on the one hand, and its repercussions on Israel's dealing in Africa and outside it, on the other. These researchers overlooked the movement of international capital and the attitude of American imperialism towards the Third World, and the position of Israel and South Africa in that imperialist strategy.

Reviews of the world economic situation in the early seventies, the crises of the American dollar and the economies of Europe and Japan, all point to the American role in raising the oil price in the way it happened. This was due to the control by American companies of their production in the Middle East without directly subjugating their markets to this price, a situation which saved the position of the dollar. At the same time, the crises generated by this economic situation in the Third World urged the recycling of the capital accumulated from the rise in oil prices in investment or assistance by the USA and Europe in Africa and the Third World; after the dwindling of this

assistance in a remarkable manner, given the fact that the petro dollars doubled in the hands of some Arabs, it was possible to recycle these funds to Third World countries to save them from falling under the 'radical or communist domination'. It was then imperative to stage a diplomatic show to satisfy the Arabs by apparently discarding Israel in a smooth flow of Arab and western capital to the continent (Sharawy 1984). We recall in that connection the sum of US\$19 billion from OPEC countries to the Third World in 1973-1977, that is 4 per cent of the national income of oil countries at a time when direct western assistance could not reach 1 per cent of their GNP. The same style was previously experimented with, to keep the People's Republic of China away from the African continent, when western capital was in need of China's markets; and for entente with China that it entered the UN in the early seventies.

Israel understood the message and accepted this procedure of formality, despite some of its nervous reactions, given the fact that this attitude was accompanied by a large industrial capital development in Israel which asked to reconsider, on its part, the concepts of foreign market relations in coordination with world capital. This was according to the qualitative and quantitative expansion in its economic relations with Africa, particularly with South Africa and Taiwan, and reformulating its new role within the framework of its strategic relations with the USA to comprise Africa, Latin America and other regions in the world. We can mention here a brief review of the new situation:

- a) Reconsideration of Israel's position vis-à-vis the new changes brought about a new conceptual revision of foreign relations in the framework of the Zionist ideology and its commitments. We have previously referred to the concept of the 'Jewish people' vis-à-vis the Jewish state, which means they had to seek the help of the Jewish communities in South Africa and Latin America, and assert the importance of a Jewish lobby in USA as regards to the services requested from certain leaderships in the Third World. According to certain Israeli sources, the question was raised as to whether Israel would be a simple Middle Eastern state in the Third World or a westernized state (Curtis Michael 1981). If the development in the '70s led to Israel's diplomatic exodus from Africa, the capitalist development in Israel engendered its economic intensification in Africa due to the following facts:
 - (i) Israel's foreign trade with Africa increased from US\$71 million in 1970 to US\$326 million in 1980, and the diamond trade alone with South Africa, Zaire and Central Africa is considered one of the strategic secrets (Sharawy 1984);

- (ii) The transactions of large companies in Africa amounted to US\$3 billion, the main ones of which are Solil Boneh and Kor which alone work on 100 projects. According to some sources, the Israeli companies set up a tripartite system of operation with European countries and the USA that achieved revenue for Israel's treasury up till 1981, amounting to US\$4 billion (Hazzan 1984);
- (iii) Israel shifted from small operations, mostly of service development projects in a large number of the African states, under the guise of the Israeli socialist development model, to large capitalist projects, and concentrated on countries that needed this type of service, such as Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zaire, Gabon and Togo. Foreign economic relations of this size must depend, like its internal economy, on foreign financing and not on its national savings, as shown by evidence;
 - a) Israel's close relations with South Africa after the diplomatic embarrassment was a rewarding alternative for Israel, particularly as it is building up a structural relation between both of them and Taiwan in an axis whose results extended from the production of nuclear arms, developing and testing neutron bombs and producing cruise missiles to cooperation and assistance of the fascist regimes in Latin America (Bolivia and Guatemala) and the Caribbean. Many international sources provide information and facts on this relation; however, our attention should be drawn towards the basic dimensions of these realities (Adams 1984):
 - (i) The organic complementarity of these sub-imperialist powers with the main centre is confronting the national liberation movements. The then Israel's Minister of Finance formulated this relation himself by saying that Israel will be a suitable pivot for South Africa's production: import it, then re-export it to the USA and the EEC, thus averting taxes and the embargo set by the two parties. An Israeli professor comments on that statement that the two countries will be the bastion for the free world outside their direct regions and their regions of strategic interest (the Middle East and Southern Africa) to become a part of an international network led by the USA and this will become even stronger under the new administration (Reagan's administration; (Hallahmi 1983).

- (ii) Israel's Relations with South Africa: Israel and South Africa have become one of the largest sources of arms export, and the list of importers of Israeli arms comprises 9 countries in Latin America and 10 in Africa and Asia, for more than US \$1 billion annually. They also exchange experiences in confronting movements of liberation in the neighbouring countries and at Third World level and in drawing together its theoretical framework. They jointly exercised the declared American policy of 'strategic consensus' and collective security, as well as their own on 'going to the source' that is to deal a blow to the source of external instability through the implementation of the theory of 'the land not the people' and the ideal villages, 'Bantustans' or 'associations'. Destabilisation was the adopted policy in the neighbouring countries for 'combating communism and the Soviets' rather than 'regional stability'. This is exactly what happened in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Lebanon. South African sources speak now of this destabilisation policy and 'Lebanese experience' in Mozambique and Angola (Pieterse and Jenkins 1984). Israel and South Africa exchanged their experience in detail with countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and some sources even speak of their transference to Ireland and Sri Lanka.
- b) Despite the strategic line to expand the Israeli arena of work, quantitatively and geopolitically, it did not fail to concentrate on its basic old elements in the Nile Basin and the Red Sea to secure the region first, but in accordance with the new concepts. It is no coincidence that Israel rapidly penetrated Zaire when the situation of the government deteriorated in Shaba, and built up its armed forces to confront internal instability in addition to its assistance in intervening in Angola and playing its role in Chad. Furthermore, Israel promised Zaire to provide financial assistance through the Zionist lobby in the USA and, accordingly, a comprehensive military agreement was concluded in early 1982. Other arms sales were declared to Kenya with further influence there (the Ngongo affairs). More than one source, whether Israeli or others, disseminated news concerning Israel's sale of arms to Ethiopia, being situated on one of the main sources of the Nile water and one of the states of the Red Sea. It is this same consideration that incited Sharon to pass through Sudan on his tour of Africa in November 1981, to benefit from the support of Numeiri for the Camp David Accord and this

visit was concluded with the contribution of Numeiri's regime in transporting new immigrants from the Flashas to Israel as cheap manpower.

- d) Within the framework of Israel's concentration on capitalist patterns of development in Africa and the large economic opportunities that are provided with the world capitalist assistance, the type of growing relations with the Ivory Coast and Nigeria is not limited to the higher figures of trade exchange and the economic projects as well as the hundreds of experts but it has extended since the late 1970s to the direct and effective areas of politics. The attempts to re-establish diplomatic relations with African states is closely linked to the meetings held in Geneva with President Houphouet Boigne in February 1977. Israel also stood by the side of the Nigerian Chief Awolowo in his election campaign in 1982, to be followed by his call to Shagari's government, to resume diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Israel. It expects, as a result, to invest Ivory Coast as a member of the Francophone group as well as the fact that Nigeria has an impact on the OAU.
- e) Legalised Relations with the Imperialist Centre: The growing development in the role of Israel entitled it to request from its allies in the centre that its relations with them should be unequivocally legalised through official agreements and treaties. We can see how this was fulfilled on the economic level in the light of the agreements with the EEC and the free trade zone with the USA which went as far as to study the project of 'dollarisation' of the Israeli currency markets. We have seen, practically, the military complementarity in the policy of intervention and arms sales. The late 1970s and the early 1980s have seen developments in the legalisation of these relations as follows:
- (i) The content of 'The African Document' of the French socialist party in the name of 'the party and Africa South Sahara in the 1980s' (Le Parti Socialiste et l'Afrique Sud Saharienne Paris) pointed out 'the communist' in Africa, particularly the Soviets, and Cuba as an example, stating the necessity of non-intervention policy in the continent. This is the theory that gave support to the South Africa-Israel pattern of intervention on behalf of the big powers, and this also led to the reconsideration of resuming diplomatic relations between Israel and the Francophone states more than once at the periodic Francophone conferences. Israel

is looking forward to the re-establishment of relations with Africa through France in the same manner as the collective severing of relations with Africa which happened in 1972-1973.

- (ii) The Camp David Accord of 1979 was an important outlet for collective conviction in Africa, to put an end to the boycott of Israel according to the stand of one of the biggest African states, i.e. Egypt. As this took place at the American negotiation table, it was a situation which gave greater security to Israel in its dealing with the African continent. The extent of Israel's power in the region and its capacity to impose peace, proliferate its pretence of 'development' instead of 'war' and put an end to political and moral resistance and international boycotting was evident to all. It gave Israel a new framework to contain radicalism and communism in the region as well as the Palestinian liberation movement. These are the same gains studied by the racist regime in South Africa in a bid to attain similar agreements with countries in southern Africa.
- (iii) After the formulation of the French and American stand, the military statements issued by American and Israeli officials respectively concurred, thus paving the way for the agreement that came to be known as the Memo on the Strategic Entente Between the USA and Israel, on November 30 1982. Alexander Haig and Shron issued statements in between September and December 1981 on common security commitments to confront the communist danger as well as the Cubans and the Libyans, and on extending the frontier of security from Pakistan to the north and the south of Africa. This rendered the strategic entente memo fully expressing Israeli-US integration policy (Sharawy 1984). It also stipulated the cooperation in the field of security trade and the US financing of Israel's defensive arms and services. Eizenstat, former President Carter's councillor, commenting on this memo said that it was the first time that the US refers to 'mutual security' between the two states and agrees on cooperation to put an end to threats to the peace and security caused by the Soviets or the powers under their subjugation. The memo admits, in his opinion, that the US considers Israel a part of her comprehensive strategy to stop any Soviet influence (Eizenstat 1984 a) Stephen 1984). The study written by Simha Dinitz, the former Israeli ambassador

to the USA (1973-78), on 'Israel as a Strategic Wealth to USA' is one of the most important in this respect (Dinitz 1984). It reflects the nature of the Israeli-American relations in that context as it exposes the extent to which the two countries' ideologies and strategies coincide and reveals the difference between the Democrats and the Republicans' perspectives of the international conflict, to reach the conclusion that:

'... tension between the East and the West and the conflict with the Soviets, according to Reagan, are functional elements in the Middle East conflict and that a state is not evaluated by the nature of its system but by its strategic importance and its standing as a barrier against Soviet expansion...' (Dinitz 1984).

Hence, he concludes that ...

rapprochement between Israel and the USA constitutes an element of deterrence to enemies big or small, and that strategic cooperation is translated into a tactical cooperation in coordination with the two air forces and for the establishment of contingent stores for arms and equipment and for joint manoeuvres at sea and air (Dinitz 1984).

Despite the concurrence between the Israeli and American decision-makers, this did not prevent an Israeli economist from launching a call on the US to define reciprocal interests. Jacob Merider, Israel's Minister of Finance, declared on 25 August 1981 that:

We call on the USA not to enter into the competition with us or Taiwan or South Africa, in the Caribbean or anywhere else you could sell arms, but allow us to do that. You could sell arms and ammunitions through a middleman, and Israel is that middleman (Merider 1981b).

Conclusion

I wonder whether the points submitted here are sufficient to prove certain concepts that appeared in the introduction of this chapter, on the character of the sub-imperialist power as a 'subsidiary' centre among the periphery that grows organically in the 'arms' of the mother centre, and according to diverse or specific considerations; or whether the Israeli type and its conduct on the African and Third World arena in general needs more studies so that we could reach exact future assumptions. In the two cases, I have to admit that this subject needs further studies of the regional environment where such a sub-imperialist system moves, be it Israel, South Africa or others. No doubt, they do not move in a vacuum or in regions free from contradictions with the movement of the new centre periphery.

The question raises itself as regards the social formations within the sub-imperialist power and its role in consolidating the organic relation with the centre. We have clarified, to a certain degree, the nature of capitalist development and industrial military complex growth, basically in addition to the nature of Israel's relation to the Zionist movement and lobby as international financing centre, and its role which could be an answer to this point. It is the particular nature that made V.G Kiernan describe Israel as 'being the heel of Achilles' that burst with movement and 'the USA self-imposed' obligations towards this ally whereas the interest of the USA, in his opinion, is with the Arabs (Keirnan 1978).

The question remains on the nature of the social systems surrounding Israel or South Africa, on the one hand, and the stands of the Arab national movements with the Palestinian as its vanguard, on the other hand. It is not new to say that the Arab bourgeoisie did not develop to become 'that' national bourgeoisie aspiring to compete with the world capitalist ambitions and, consequently, the sub-imperialist powers. No articulated relations with world capitalism were created to push the latter to consider the map of the regional interests or revise the imperialist commitments toward Israel. It was theoretically impossible to expect the possibility of 'neutralising' the centre power towards the Israeli-Arab conflict as some Arab writers sometimes thought. The path of development of the Arab bourgeoisie on a comprador and parasitical base missed the possibility of playing the main regional role.

The petit bourgeoisie project of the Arab nationalistic state did not succeed either. Being isolated from the masses, it stumbled and was contained in turn in the oil well! It could not succeed in establishing articulated relations with other parties in the world national liberation movement or with a strategic ally such as the socialist bloc. According to Sadat, we could have 'normalised' the Israeli system through the establishment of 'normal' relations with it to reduce the tension around it. Israel's conduct since the signing of the Camp David Accord with the Palestinians and that of South Africa with Namibia and Angola proves that Sadat's concept was totally wrong. Containing the national liberation movement in Palestine or South Africa within the framework of the so-called 'peaceful settlement', which are not settled down yet, despite what happened in Camp David or Komati, jeopardised the Afro-Arab national liberation movement in confronting the imperialist machinations.

While admitting the priority of the local national liberation movement in resisting these machinations, the imperialist system and its subsidiaries cannot be confronted except through a world liberation movement. In the

case of Israel, we can see how it could surpass the question of Palestinian self-determination as well as the pan-Arab national movement surrounding it. The Israeli role, old and new, to serve as a bridgehead to international imperialism presupposes the incapacity of the Palestinian liberation movement alone to solve the problem without a comprehensive Arab and African formula, even with different levels of confrontation.

The continuation of the oil decade may have created difficult conditions confronting the 'socialist' alternative as well as the embarrassment of the nationalistic or religious factors of the conflict confronting the 'civilisational' alternative. At the same time, the settler colonialist project extends to the peak of its regional and international horizons, leaving us to think over the kind of crisis that could lead to its end.