Archie Mafeje Debates in the CODESRIA Bulletin

Culture and Development in Africa: The Missing Link*

The Problematique in its Historical Setting

The problem of culture and development is at least as old as the social sciences, which are largely the product of the West. Within the West two principal traditions which date back to the nineteenth century can be identified. These are idealism and materialism, which in contemporary society feature as liberalism and Marxism, respectively. Of the two, the former is hegemonic and fully elaborated in the social sciences. In contrast, Marxism has not been part of academic social science until the onset of the current world economic crisis, which saw the resurrection of political economy and the ascendancy of neo-Marxist studies, especially in development theory. This has meant a renewed confrontation between these two major European traditions. In the Third World this has coincided with the questioning of Eurocentric social science which, in turn, is a reflection of the intensification of anti-imperialist struggles which are its antecedents.

Here, we do not propose to go into a detailed history of these different traditions. However, in order to set the stage for a possible African debate and research on the question of culture and development, it might be expedient to identify the relevant western schools of thought:

(a) The best known school “modernization theorists”. Amongst them would be included writers such as W. E. Moore, N. J. Smelser, F. B. Boselitz, E. E. Hagen, S. N. Eisenstadt, E. M. Rogers, M. C. E. I. Land, etc. Although these writers are a mixture of sociologists and what could be called “institutional economists”, basically, their work derives from Talcott Parsons’ theory of “pattern variables”, as expounded in The Social System (1948). In his book Talcott Parsons set up a paradigm which consisted of two polar ends or binary opposites, modernity and traditionalism. These could be identified by means of certain indices, which he called “pattern variables”. Simply put, these were: traditionalism is to modernity as parochialism is to universalism, ascription to achievement, affective to effective, and diffuseness to specificity. These attributes depended on the type of social values each society has. Significant shifts from the traditional end of the spectrum towards the other marked social change. Parsonian have always argued that theirs is not a dichotomous schema, counter-posing the traditional against the modern, but rather a continuum capable of several combinations of variables. If granted, this implies a significant departure from Weber’s sociology, of which Talcott Parsons is supposed to be the American heir-apparent. Max Weber is renowned among sociologists for his ideal-type analysis and cultural relativity. In the hands of Parsons the former became real-types, capable of measurement along a progressive scale of modernity. Secondly, modern capitalist society such as that of the United States became a terminus of all development. This dispensed with cultural relativity and replaced it with an absolute ethnocentric standard, the western bourgeoisie society. It also implied a unilinear model of development.

(b) Over-time the Parsonian paradigm infected cultural anthropologists as well in America, especially what came to be known as the Chicago School. Prominent among these were Robert Redfield (The Primitive World and Its Transformation, 1953) and Oscar Lewis (The Children of Sanchez, 1961). In their case traditional/primitive society was explicitly associated with “low culture”/”Little tradition”, as against the “high culture”/”great tradition” of modern industrial society. Regrettably as it was from the point of view of liberal romanticism, the primitive or traditional societies were destined to be swept away by modern civilization. This was supposed to be reflected in the way traditional villages were being penetrated by metropolitan mores even in the most remote parts of countries such as Mexico. This found expression in the so-called “rural-urban” continuum which is associated with the Chicago School. The basic thesis was that with the spread of European Industrial culture, rustic or traditional values were being gradually displaced by modern, “universal” values. Unlike the “modernization” theorists, cultural anthropologists did not think of this as either desirable or necessary but inevitable. From this point of view their position was more akin to that of Weber than to Talcott Parsons.

(c) The third and less well-known school which dealt with the problem of development and social values is that of the technological evolutionists. They are often referred to as the Columbia School of technological evolutionists. Marvin Harris and George Foster are the best known representatives among anthropologists. But there are others, mainly economists, who derived their ideas from C. E. Ayres instrumentalist philosophy. Amongst them, K. Baldwin, R. Manners, F. Service and Louis J.uker are the best advocates. Their basic thesis is that social values can be divided into two main categories, ceremonial and instrumental. Traditional societies are characterized by the predominance of “ceremonial” values which militate against experimentation, whereas modern societies are characterized by instrumental values which encourage experimentation and reward technological innovation. This is reminiscent of Talcott Parsons’ “effective” versus “affective”, and “achievement” versus...
“prescriptive” values. Both ascribe social progress to individual initiative and achievement. The only difference is that in Parsonian sociology technological progress is endemic in modern societies and this is how “the social system” regulates itself in such a way that it maintains its equilibrium indefinitely. In contrast, the technological evolutionists saw technology not only as a prime mover but also as liberating force from retrograde “ceremonial” values.

(d) The fourth and opposed school within the western tradition is M arxism, as has already been remarked. If it were not for its epistemology, the M arxist paradigm comes closest to that of the technological evolutionists. Whilst in M arxist theory a distinction is made between the superstructure, which represents philosophical and legal rationalizations, social ideologies and cultural forms and beliefs, and the infrastructure, which represents material and productive forces, it is the latter two (accumulated and live labour) which are accorded a determinant role. The superstructure is treated as a derivative category i.e. it is a reflection of what goes on in the infrastructure. For this reasons, in M arxist theory the concept of “culture” is hardly elaborated (see Worsley, 1981), except in the general sense of “civilization” or the development of the arts. The only occasion in which “culture received a positive treatment in M arxist theory is in relation to the question of the right of nations to self-determination or definition of nation, as such. Even then, it remains a subjective category. This is notwithstanding the fact that M arxists have had some difficulties with language notwithstanding the fact that Marxists have had some difficulties with language. Structural relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries was the underlying problem. In other words, while not ascribing an active role to culture in the process of development, the Latin-A mericans were satisfied that whatever cultures existed in their region were not a barrier to development. It is conceivable that Latin-A mericans whose modern culture is a derivative of European culture (including language) could afford this minimalist position. Therefore, if culture could be treated as a common variable between them and M editerranean Europe, then their underdevelopment could not be explained by recourse to the same variable. The logical conclusion which could be drawn from this is that the nationalism of the “dependencia” theorists was structural rather than cultural. This deduction might not appeal to some chauvinistic Latin-A mericans. But from the point of view of the sociologist of knowledge, it is not without significance that the most effective critique of theories which attributed lack of development to cultural differences came from Latin- America. In order to test the critical role of any variable, it is always convenient to be able to hold certain variables constant. For the reasons already given, Latin-A merica is the only region in the Third World which could do that * culturally. The 1970s saw “modernization” theorists on the retreat (see Gouldner, 1971 and Bottomore et al., 1982), yielding ground to the dependistas. The “dependencia” theorists anticipated anti-imperialist or nationalist struggles. What they did not anticipate was cultural revivalism in the Third World, which received its most dramatic expression in the Iranian revolution and Islamic fundamentalism in general. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the political results thus far, it is clear that revolts against western domination have issued an increasing and general emphasis on local culture and traditions. This is the fountain from which nationalist movements draw their sustenance. However, such a quest for authenticity and an independent identity has not necessarily been linked directly to what in the current jargon is called “development”. Third World nationalists often appeal to local culture, without saying clearly what kind of new society they wish to build, as is exemplified by Iran or Afghanistan. In Africa the nationalists have shown a great inclination towards western capitalism. Then, the interesting question is: if a genuine case were to be made, where would the A frican intellectuals begin?

It is obvious that evolutionist theories would oblige them to accept industrial capitalism and bourgeois culture as the apogee of development so far. The anthropological view of writers such as K roeber or Redfield and Weber’s cultural relativism would seem attractive, but this would be succumbing to liberal idealism which has very little to do with the nasty praxis of development. It is true that W eber in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1921) did tackle head on the question of values and development. Nevertheless, Weber, along with classical anthropologists, has been criticized for ignoring structural and material forces in his theory of development and change. Most of this criticism came, though not exclusively, from Marxists, starting with Lukacs’ tour de force, History and Class Consciousness: Studies
in Marxist Dialectics (1926). But as has been warned, Marxists have never used “culture” as a critical concept in their theorization of society. Therefore, a radical call for the re-instatement of culture in development studies, justified as it is in the context of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, it is a deviation from classical Marxist theory, which is anti-imperialist in so far as it is anti-capitalist. Consequently, any explorations in this field represent a terra nova which should be approached with some reverence.

The Necessity of Culture

As is well-known, culture distinguishes man from brutes. It characterizes the human species and simultaneously divides it over time and space. The history of human civilizations testifies to this. Modern western civilization is the first civilization to try and homogenize culture. This is not only impoverishing, culturally-speaking, but is also inimical to development in so far as it denies so many other unexpected possibilities. Nonetheless, the invitation to the study of these possibilities should not be seen as affirmation, without negations. All cultures are subject to mutations and transformations. Since Tylor’s celebrated definition in 1871, it is generally known what culture encompasses in its complexity. What is not known in advance is what elements are possessed with a potential for farther development. This is a sensitive and intricate problem which cannot be deciphered through received theory or contrived universalism. It requires intimate knowledge of the dynamics of African culture in a contemporary setting. This has to be so because there is no way in which modern Africans can re-live their pre-colonial past. This does not detract from any calls for authenticity. Indeed, there have been calls from Third World intellectuals for the indigenization of the social sciences. This presupposes a rejection of received theory and an awareness and knowledge of indigenous modes of thought and doing. Africa is the worst victim of intellectual tools for unraveling it. This cannot be a solitary but a collective enterprise, involving a series of workshops and seminars in which well-considered papers, grounded on regional or local reality, are presented.

FESPA in December, 1988 in Dakar could offer a useful and convenient platform for introducing the topic, raising the relevant questions and for setting up the machinery for further discussions and research.

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African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes: An African Recovery in Thought*

Preamble
Since the beginning of the present economic crisis in Africa, the continent has been inundated with “approved” programmes of economic recovery. These mainly came from credited international agencies, whose job it is to contrive such programmes for underdeveloped regions, especially. In Africa the most predominant since 1980 has been the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These have been implemented in more than thirty African countries to date. In addition, there has been the FAO programmes, African Agriculture: the Next 25 Years (1986), and the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UN-PA AERD).

During the same period (1985) the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic recovery 1986-1990 (APPER). From the point of view of re-direction of the African economies and the analytical grounds for it, there was nothing distinctive about APPER. Consequently, it had virtually no impact on its African audience. This is to be expected because the majority of African countries had already adopted the SAPs and had accepted the loans offered for the purpose – the so-called Structural Adjustment loans (SALs). Under the circumstances APPER was politically hollow, intellectually platitudinous, and financially uncompetitive.

In contrast, the programme sponsored by international agencies had everything going for them. Invariably they had the blessings of the developed countries, always bolstered up by great intellectual/technical pretensions and seductive financial benefits. Therefore, to varying degrees their sponsors tend to take for granted their intellectual and ideological presuppositions in dealing with Africa, especially. This is not to suggest that their postures are identical or static but that the intellectual reasons for any shift of positions have been for a very long time internal to them as far as Africa is concerned. Thus, the scope for scientific licence, political paternalism, and ideological mystification was unlimited.

In practice this has led to a situation where in changes in policy are highly arbitrary and dependent governments such as the African ones are tossed form pillar to post, without any clear scientific explanation. For instance, while in the 1960s and 1970s FAO was advocating individual land tenure and capitalist agriculture as a matter of policy and a “scientific” basis for development, since the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) in 1979 it has emphasized the role of the poor in agricultural development and the need to alleviate rural poverty. In that context in 1981 it published a policy document entitled, The Peasants’ Charter. These were significant policy changes and FAO perceived them as such. Confronted with them in the 1980s the present author could not help remembering being rebuked, as a young consultant in 1974, for advocating the same thing and being described as “too ideological” by one of the FAO chiefs.

In 1986 when I read African Agriculture: the next 25 years, I knew FAO had come full circle. In a written response (Mafeje, 1987), I wanted to know the scientific/theoretical reasons for it. I knew that there were none for, if there were, they would have appeared in the document itself. Africans would have had the pleasure of learning a new scientific theory about agrarian transformation, new methods for allocation of production factors, especially distribution of land or improved land tenure regimes for future development. The only deduction that could be made from this lack of intellectual consistency is that while FAO might be sensitive enough not to push too hard its earlier neoclassical orthodoxy, in the case of Africa this has left it with neither a coherent theory of agrarian transformation nor clear recommendations on land policy. Instead, it is guided by normative values which are noble in themselves but do not advance our scientific understanding of the development problems of the continent. Existing theories must be upheld or discarded according to their explanatory power, and not be merely suspended for anybody’s convenience.

This demand is perfectly consistent with the canons of scientific positivism. Indeed, what on the surface gave the World Bank its intellectual dominance among the international development agencies over the last ten years is that it prides itself on applying these proven principles, without compromise. Despite Robert McNamara’s flirtation with the idea of “small producers” in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the World Bank technocrats were theoretically less concerned about this and were itching to get back to undiluted neoclassical economic theory. With the change of guard in that vaunted power-house later in the 1970s, they got their chance. McNamara’s policies in Africa had failed and the African economies were in shambles because of certain economic irrationalities and a certain international soft-mindedness or sentimentality. The new marching orders were foreshadowed in the now famous or infamous (depending on how one looks at it) Berg report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, World Bank, Washington D.C., 1981. As is well-known, the report had a great impact but largely negative. African governments, which had just the year before adopted their own blue-print, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), were jolted. Publicly, they refused to endorse the Berg Report on the grounds that it contradicted their own policy priorities, as set out in the Lagos Plan of Action.

In spite of the fulfilment of the Lagos Plan of Action, the issues were clear. The World Bank was insisting on the reinstatement of neoclassical orthodoxy. Among other things, this entailed concentration on capitalist farmers and export agriculture, elimination of price controls, removal...
of agricultural and food subsidies, liquidation of parastatals in favour of the private sector, and curtailment of public spending. On the other hand, the African governments, while not equipped with any particular orthodoxy, knew from political experience that there was a range of things they could not afford. Foremost among these was the question of food subsidies for populations which generally suffered from sub-minimal levels of income and the plight of small producers whose economic situation was getting so desperate that, without government financial support, the alternative was chronic food shortages among the rural and urban poor with predictable consequences.

In the posture adopted by most African governments on this issue there might have been a huge dose of cynicism. But this does not matter so much. Whatever most is their sense of reality or of the objective situation. If at first they were afraid that they may endanger their survival by endorsing publicly the Berg Report, since their individual capitulation to the SAPs subsequently provoked nothing dramatic, most might have got encouraged to forget about the Lagos Plan of Action. This is particularly so that they were promised continued blood transfusion in the form of SALs and that, if they played the game according to the rules, recovery was inevitable. Whether or not recovery has come to the SAPs adopters, as time ticks away there is bound to be increasing anxiety, if not apprehension, among both the adopters and the authors of the programmes. This is especially so that all along there had been a certain amount of muted scepticism among some African intellectuals and policy-analysts. This received its first collective expression in The Khartoum Declaration on the Human Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (1988). This as it may, the Khartoum declaration amounted to nothing more than a complaint. It was soft and constituted no real scientific challenge to the SALs. Nonetheless, the emotive impulses behind it were strong and widespread enough to set the stage for the next round, which proved to be the greatest challenge that has come out of Africa since independence. We are here referring to the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP).

AAF-SAP: Its Intellectual and Theoretical Significance

In reviewing AAF-SAP the intention is not only to pay tribute to its architects, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) under the leadership of its Executive Secretary, Professor Adebayo Adedéji, but also to bring it to the attention of African intellectuals and scholars. Through OAU representatives and African Ministers of Economic Planning and Development, and of Finance, African politicians and policy-makers are fully aware of the document. As the document represents basically a framework, it will certainly require further elaboration and research. In the given division of labour, this falls largely on the shoulders of African scholars. Here, one is reminded of the role of the Latin-American scholars in the 1960s and early 1970s under the stimulus of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). As is well-known, this gave rise to a pervasive paradigm which was distinctly Latin-American and yet inspired scholars everywhere in the Third World by proving the fallibility of northern conventional wisdom. For a paradigm to achieve such a transformational effect, it does not have to be “right” on every specification within its field of discourse. So it was with the Dependencia paradigm. It is sufficient to show through systematic analysis and methodological rigour that there could be an alternative, if the various omissions of existing theories were taken into account. In other words, the selection of indices for measurement is as important as the measurement itself. In our view, this is precisely what gave birth to the AAF-SAP.

Indictment Against the Bank

In its review of the World Bank’s report Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s (1989), the ECA accused the Bank of the following:

- manipulation of statistical data to confirm pre-conceived ideas;
- a simplified approach which failed to take into account external factors, the social costs of adjustment, and long-term negative effects of the recommended adjustment policies;
- ignoring the role of aid flows which favoured adjusting countries and thus penalized non-adjusting countries;
- arbitrary classification of sub-Saharan African countries into “strong” adjusting, “weak” adjusting, and non-adjusting;
- indiscriminate price decontrol;
- anti-social curtailment of public spending.

On (a) the evidence presented in a document entitled Statistics and Policies (1989) was devastating. Using weighted averages and 1980 as the baseline, instead of the unweighted averages used by the Bank and 1985 (an exceptionally good year) as its baseline, ECA was able to show that: “...during 1980-1987 the performance of Sub-Saharan African countries with strong SAPs was the worst of any group; a negative annual average growth rate of -0.53 percent contrasted with a positive 2.00 percent for countries with weak structural adjustment programmes and a relatively strong positive rate of 3.5 percent for non-adjusting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Although the World Bank tried to find formal excuses for its omissions, substantively, it was not able to prove in this reply that its findings were not spurious. The rest of the points by ECA concerned approach to development itself. While at first the Bank was inclined to argue that its programmes are basically a stop-gap and do not aim at long-term development, later it produced a report, Poverty Adjustment, and Growth in Africa (1989), which purported to deal with all the social issues and problems of equity raised by agencies such as ECA and UNICEF. Therefore, the challenge form the ECA’s African Alternative Framework should help to clarify the matter.

The Challenge

Although the ECA at times made it appear that its critical comments on the orthodoxy of the structural adjustment programmes were nothing more than a call for a modification of policy instruments and measures, in fact they were tantamount to an explicit rejection of the approach of the World Bank and the IMF. Likewise, the attempt by the World Bank to give the impression that it could embrace a “human-centred” development strategy, without abandoning its basic philosophy of development, was misleading. If, as the ECA did, the following were declared unacceptable:

- drastic budgetary reductions, especially with respect to expenditures and
subsides on social services and essential goods;
• Indiscriminate promotion of traditional exports through price incentives offered only to “tradeables”;
• A cross-the-board credit squeeze;
• Generalized devaluation through open foreign exchange markets, currency auctions and large and frequent currently depreciations;
• Unsustainable high real interest rates;
• Total import liberalization;
• Over-dependence on market forces for getting the “prices right” in structurally distorted and imperfect market situation and
• Doctrinaire privatization.

What would the World Bank be left with as building blocks for its programme? For all intents and purposes, the World Bank is committed to laissez-faire policies and by implication to old-fashioned “trickle-down” suppositions. In contrast, the ECA upholds the principle of government intervention in the allocation of resources and income distribution. These represent two different approaches to the problem of development and transformation in Africa.

In the light of this, one of the questions that has been raised is whether the rejection of the World Bank orthodoxy amounted to a serious questioning of neoclassical assumptions and a new contribution to African development theory. This might not be part of the ECA’s brief but that of the African academic community in general. However, the supposition could be made that there is a relationship between ECA’s intellectual/scientific endeavours and those of the African academic institutions. If this turns out not to be the case, as one suspects, then the implications are very serious indeed. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to check to what extent are the ECA’s prescriptions under AAF-SAP informed by the discourse that has taken place beforehand in African academic institutions.

Broadly speaking, the AAF-SAP advocates a mixed economy approach. This idea had been on the agenda since the Indian second five-year plan in the fifties and had been adopted in Africa since independence as a matter of necessity for the same reasons as advanced by the ECA. Secondly, the problem of growth with equity had been debated fiercely in academic circles since the Rusha Declaration by the Tanzanian government. Actually, the debate spreads from the University of Dar-es-Salaam to other university campuses in Zambia, Nigeria, and Kenya towards the end of the 1970s. For that matter, it might not be an accident that the SALs have had an extremely mixed reception in countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Nigeria. Thirdly, the concept of “self-reliant” development, nationally and regionally, had also received a great deal of attention from African scholars between 1968 and 1975 under the influence of the Latin-American dependency theory. Fourthly, though to a limited extent, the question of the relationship between external and domestic demand had already been raised in the context of export crops versus food crops. Fifthly, although not an area of concentration by any means, since the end of the 1970s the limitations of import-substitution industrialization strategy with regards to production of essential goods for mass consumption had been made apparent.

It is, therefore, surprising to discover that after a brilliant critique of the World Bank SAPs the ECA technical staff have not been able to take advantage of prior insights by African scholars and go beyond what is given. For instance, in the AAF-SAP under Strengthening and Diversifying Production Capacity in table 5.2 reference is made to “land reforms” and “increased inter-linkages between agriculture and industry”. “Land reform” is a term which frequently features in policy recommendations in Latin America and Asia. In Africa nobody knows precisely what it refers to, outside the settler economies of Southern Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa it used to be associated with the introduction of individual land tenure and modern technology. But both these indices have been under serious review up to as late as the Third Government Consultation on Follow-up to WCARRD in Africa in Addis Ababa, October, 1989. As a result of sustained research on land tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa by no more than five African scholars, FAO can no longer vaguely refer to something called “land reform” in Africa. How much more with ECA?

Secondly, while there can be no question about the desirability of food self-sufficiency in Africa, it is not quite clear what would be the role of agriculture in the changed circumstances. This is bearing in mind that conventionally and historically agriculture has been looked upon as an earner of foreign exchange and a source of primitive accumulation. Under the twin concepts of “sustainable growth” and “preservation of the environment”, would African agriculture be able to meet all these requirements? This is particularly pertinent because contrary to the assumptions of the AAF-SAP, African agriculture has not suffered necessarily because of technological level but its performance continues to approximate to the low technological level. In the mean time, there are reports everywhere in Africa about the degradation of the soil. In the circumstance is intensification of technological factors a self-evident policy instrument, as the ECA is inclined to suggest.

This brings us to the third issue, “increased inter-linkages” between agriculture and industry. It might well be that what is at stake here is not the magnitude of inter-linkages between the two but the type of inter-linkages. It has been complained that import-substitution industrialization led to a discrepancy between resource use and domestic demand and that agriculture was used, without any transformational benefits. Likewise, one of the charges against the SAPs is that they are anti-industrialization in their effects. The question then is: at the stage of primitive accumulation what is going to be the relationship between agriculture and industry and what is going to be the dynamic link between the two, especially under the rigours of “self-reliance” and scarcity of foreign exchanges? The ECA’s interesting idea of diversifying export crops by diversifying their products can be subsumed under “agro-industries”, which need not be outward-oriented. These are some of the questions on which policy makers need guidance which goes beyond the usual economic clichés.

Consistent with its idea of “human-centred” development, the AAF-SAP is very strong on Pattern of Expenditure for the Satisfaction of Needs. By placing a priority on the satisfaction of critical social needs, investment in human capital and raising the living standards of the majority of the population, the AAF-SAP succeeded in putting upside-down the paradigm of the World Bank. But it would seem
that the emphasis on increased consumption is not matched by equally stout policy instruments and measures for increased production. In recommendations under *Improving the Level of Income and the Pattern of its Distribution* the main concern is how to augment government revenues. Although frequent reference is made to "productive investment" of revenues so gained, this remains unspecified and no clear long-term pattern of investment emerges under the section. It is true that under the previous section, *Strengthening and Diversifying Production Capacity*, agriculture is given priority mainly from the point of view of food self-sufficiency and employment opportunities. This still leaves us with a largely consumption-oriented development strategy. The same comments could be made in regard to the separation of social services from production and treating them as a purely bureaucratic responsibility. It would seem that whatever happens in Africa in the next few years, "diversifying production capacity" must go beyond the usual preoccupation with crop diversification within agriculture and confront the problem of diversification of production within the economy as a whole. For instance, agriculture going to be maintained in the intermediate future as the leading sector, despite the low added-value in its products and high market inelasticities? This question could be answered in relation to the role of mineral wealth in the future development of the continent. Very little attention has been paid to this factor and no reference is made to it in the AAF-SAP. Yet, the strategic value of minerals in a rapidly industrializing world and their potential for regional industrialization cannot be minimized. It must be remembered that it is this kind of wealth which made countries such as South Africa. A mong African countries Botswana is making effective use of it and it is hoped that Namibia will follow suit. But what about the rest of mineral-rich African countries? One cannot help feeling that the AAF-SAP could have been more forthcoming on prospects and strategies for industrialization in Africa. It would be an alternative to mere import-substitution.

Finally, we come to the section on *Institutional Support for Adjustment with Transformation*. Here, the concern is agrarian development and transformation. The frame of reference used is fairly conventional — credit facilities, extension services, mobilization of small producers (especially women), popular participant, NGOs, self-help, and promotion of cottage industries. All these activities are subsumed under the concept of "integrated rural development", which has gained currency in recent years. But the question is: what is "transformational" about it? Be it noted that historically, this referred to a transformation from one set of institutions to another or from one level of technological development to another. In Sub-Saharan Africa the rural institutions are kinship- or communally-based. Modernization advocates, including the World Bank, conceived of transformations as a movement away from such institutions to more individualized and privatized forms of ownership and production. Technologically, they equated this with the adoption of western machinery and production techniques. Both assumptions have become a source of controversy in contemporary Africa.

Therefore, it would have been useful if the AAF-SAP had spelled out the kind of transformation its authors had in mind. Allusions to accelerated "process of achieving a green revolution in Africa" will not allay the worst fears among some African analysts, given the Asian experience and that of African countries such as Nigeria. If what is envisaged is "industrialization of agriculture", then this cannot be realized, without basic industrialization of the African economies themselves. Therefore, what is needed most is advice on the intermediate steps. There are enough ideas and research findings to make this feasible. In fact, some of the evidence would have come from ECA itself. When they discovered that it was the "weak adjusting" and non-adjusting African countries that did best during the crisis of the 1980s, they should have been able to derive clues from that experience for formulating practicable policies for the future. What adjustments did these countries make on their own to survive the crisis?

**Conclusion**

From the point of view of the psychology of knowledge-making, it is of historic importance that the ECA was able to issue the challenge it did. Even more significant, psychologically, is the fact that what its technical staff wrote is something which they had already known or was known but for one thing: the implicit belief in the infallibility of external agencies such as the World Bank. The simple discovery that the statistical claims of the World Bank were spurious gave them the confidence to give vent to suppressed, authentic, intellectual knowledge. Prior to this, the same external intellectual domination might have led to the devaluation of internal intellectual capital. Otherwise, how else do we explain the fact that the recommendations of the AAF-SAP start from a lower scientific base than would be justified by the state of the arts within Africa?

Nonetheless, it is worth reiterating that the AAF-SAP is an effective critique of the SAPs and thus has created a new policy environment in Africa. It falls short of providing a recognizable alternative, as against a modification of the World Bank’s flawed framework, this should be welcome as an invitation to African researchers to make good any deficiencies therein. It is very rare for a holistic framework to be evenly developed in a single shot. A bove all the temptation towards reformism is ever so present, especially when social indices are included as an integral part of development models, which are by convention "economic". This political economy approach favoured in the AAF-SAP has been in disuse for sometime or associated with "leftists". Now that there are no leftists to worry about any more, it might be the time has come to experiment with new models, without appealing to the usual prejudices of the west.
On ‘Icons’ and African Perspectives on Democracy: A Commentary on Jibrin Ibrahim’s Views

In the context of Jibrin Ibrahim’s polemic against ‘Icons’, it could easily be reasserted that the opposite of ‘Icon’ is ‘neophyte’ (from the Greek word, neo-phyes, meaning ‘newly planted’). Whether we think of it as ‘newly initiated’ or ‘novice’ the emotive connotations would not be soothing to anybody’s ego. Therefore, why appeal to those terrible things, human passions – green, yellow, and red? Why not keep to essence – black and white – so that we can tell with clarity whether it is a funeral or a wedding; a requiem for the ‘icons’ or an overture for ‘neophytes’.

Jibrin Ibrahim’s strictures against what he calls ‘icons’ can neither be clarified nor validated because they violate all the rules of intellectual discourse. First, nowhere in his diatribe does he define his terms. Second, he uses abstracted single sentences as substitute for studied texts. Third, he shows great disregard for historical and empirical facts. Fourth and most disconcertingly, he has no argument but merely a series of subjective complaints. Fifth and sadly, he seems to be oblivious of the dangers of ‘finger-pointing’ or of ad hominem accusations. Failure to become “unabashed celebrants of liberalism” does not in any honesty render any of Ibrahim’s chosen ‘icons’ liable to accusations of having spent “too little time learning or practising (in this case fighting) for democracy”. To be a breaker of images (eikonoklastes in Greek), one does not have to be a jaundiced biographer, a theoretical nihilist, or an epistemological anarchist. This defeats the whole purpose of intellectual discourse and militates against the development of an intellectual community. Therefore, without minimising the importance of Ibrahim’s legitimate concern and disillusionsment with senior African scholars, it behoves everybody to play the game according to the rules.

On Liberalism and Liberal Democracy

Jibrin Ibrahim simply fails to define either of these two terms. The nearest he comes to define “liberal democracy” is to make a vague reference to people’s attachment to their civil and political rights as individuals”. Be it noted that the shift in his formulation from collective nouns and pronouns to individuals is mystifying. Sociologically understood, at what point does collective political action become the social property of individuals and defendable by them as such?

Contrary to liberal ideology, what became known as individual freedom, rights, or civil rights, is not attributable to individual achievements but rather to social struggles. In the case of feudal Europe it was a question of liberating whole classes from either bondage or political subordination. It is obvious that to liberate people from generalised servitude or oppression, recognition of the individual has great intrinsic as well as strategic value. However, this does not detract from the fact that social liberation of any kind is a collective responsibility.

This is an issue which plagued European bourgeois social thought and philosophy until the first quarter of this century. For both its realisation and protection bourgeois individualism relied on collective action. This irony of history did not escape the attention of such well-known ‘laissez-faire’ individualists as Auguste Comte (1789-1857) and Hébert Spencer (1820-1903). Their problem was how to reconcile individual freedom with the necessity for social organisation. Accepting the latter as a necessary evil, they resolved the issue by drawing a sharp distinction between the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’. In this context the state was seen as generally inclined to impose its will on individuals and it was thought that individuals could save themselves from the imposition by insisting on an independent existence outside the state. Thus ‘civil society’ came to symbolise a community of private citizens who by virtue of their collective existence and political vigilance guaranteed individual freedom. Part of this was, of course, illusory for two major reasons.

First, as is known, civil society derived its strength from organisation. Secondly, insofar as civil society is organised into different social groups with different interests, it is open to social competition for power. Thus, the necessity for social organisation and the self-imposing imperative to protect common interests in practice make nonsense of the abstracted ‘individual’ of the ‘laissez-faire’ theorists. Without collective commitment, individuals cannot be defended. The significance of this assertion becomes apparent only if we are able to decide in our own minds whether individuals are subjects or objects of freedom. Bourgeois thinkers became self-contradictory on this matter because while they insisted on individualism and treated the state with great suspicion, they at the same maintained that not only was it the right of the state to guarantee civil liberties but also its duty to protect them. But the state could not guarantee all this, without reserving the right to overrule individuals or even groups if justified according to the same constitution which theoretically binds it to its citizens.

The second major point is that the counterposition between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ is part of bourgeois mystification because it fails to identify the state according to its origins and social character. There is no such a thing as an undifferentiated civil society. Part of civil society accounts for the origins and the social character of the state and this part is organised to guarantee the social reproduction of the state and benefits by it. For instance, what is popularly called ‘petit bourgeois’/neo-colonial’ governments in Africa is not autogenous appariations but rather a reflection of the social interests of the emergent African elites. Sociologically, these are identifiable as the educated elite, politicians, senior bureaucrats, estate/commercial farmers, and businessmen – mainly parasitic merchants.
Despite the denial of civil liberties and frequent violation of human rights in Africa, these elements sway by bourgeois democracy and in most cases it is written into their national constitutions. They are sufficiently indoctrinated in bourgeois ideology and in their own inferiority that they are consumed by a great desire for bourgeois respectability. When this cannot suffice, they opportunistically appeal to ‘traditional’ African values such as the justification for the one-party state and life presidencies in Africa. They know that, objectively, they cannot afford bourgeois democracy and the most they can do is to pretend. The result is that there are neither guiding principles nor authenticity in the running of national affairs. In the circumstances the road is open to arbitrary and personalized use of power by the rulers and what would have been the objective functions of the state, even a reactionary one, become secondary. Contrary to Ibrahim’s fervent belief, the cure of this socio-political aberration is not reversion to liberal democracy anywhere in the world. This is, indeed a foreclosure which befits an ‘icon’. However, in mitigation it can be stated that it is not born of dogmatism but of a more than casual reading of the development of bourgeois democracy.

Philosophically speaking, World War I marked the end of ‘liberal democracy’ as a leading bourgeois ideology. Different issues had emerged. First was the question of whether ‘bourgeois democracy’ was realisable at all in ex-colonial countries dominated by imperialism. This was raised by socialist idealists in the wake of the Russian revolution. Their concern was not repudiation of civil liberties as had been attained under liberal democracy but rather socialist democracy which was seen as a negation of class rule and exploitation. Although this got associated with the ‘proletariat’ revolution and international ‘socialism’ among Marxists or members of the Third International, the critique of liberal democracy itself was not limited to them. It had become general in capitalist countries in a way which is hardly acknowledged by their historians. The risk of labour parties or social democratic parties in different parts of Western Europe and the failure of the liberal parties to win popular support in the inter-war period and after the Second World War were strong pointers to the inadequacies of liberal democracy. These did not centre on civil liberties but on actual distribution of power and wealth. This remains the issue whether raised inside or outside capitalist societies.

In this connection it is well to remember that social indictment is not about the good that is given but about the good that is seen but denied. Therefore, it is rather inane to suppose that a critique of liberal democracy is necessarily a denial of the value of the rights which liberal democracy ushered in its heyday. Consequently, the cutting edge of any contemporary demands for democracy should be the perceived good which is denied by existing social systems. If, for instance, liberal democracy is offered as a sop to the African ‘masses’, is it not the duty of African intellectuals to show in what ways this is historically fraudulent? It might come as a surprise to Ibrahim to discover that his African ‘icons’ did not have to ‘demolish’ liberal democracy because that had already been done by the societies which invented it.

First, it was European voters who passed a negative verdict against liberal parties in the aftermath of World War I. It was not an ideological revulsion but a well-founded perception of the good that was not being delivered. This did not become crystal clear until the onset of the ‘Deep Depression’ of 1929-1933. Liberal individualism could not give any solace to multitudes of unemployed and starving individuals nor could ‘laissez-faire’ theories of the 19th century suffice. The liberal model with its trickle-down suppositions had collapsed. This cleared the way for the Keynesian revolution in economics. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ was jettisoned in favour of the visible hand of the state in the management of national economies. For political expediency, the state interference in the allocation of labour and resources, and in the redistribution of value in the form of free social services was beguilingly referred to as ‘indicative planning’. In fact, this signalled the rise of the welfare state which had different ideological underpinnings from those of liberal individualism or ‘laissez-faire’. The governments of the day were called upon to intervene to stimulate economic growth, to create employment, and to guarantee the livelihood of the unemployed/employable. This is precisely what the social democrats had been agitating for since the end of the 19th century.

In the circumstances the only crime the African ‘icons’ might have committed is to take all this for granted and for good historical reasons to ask for more. It is the ‘more’ which is, theoretically and politically, interesting because it is not self-evident. It leads to divergent views which are worth considering in their own right, especially with regard to the question of whether or not African and other Third World countries can hope to reproduce the socio-historical experience of the West. Failure to confront this fundamental question can only lead to such drip-ping-wet arguments as ‘half a loaf is better than no bread’. These are no arguments but jaded apologetics which sounded the death knell of liberalism – the inclination to be charitable where else fails. Although Ibrahim confuses “liberalism” with “liberal democracy”, the two terms have come to denote two entirely different things. “Liberalism” has become an expression of contempt in intellectual and political debates precisely because it does not offer any solutions but apologies. Witness the contempt in which democratic Americans hold ‘liberals’ since the doomed attempt by President Truman to set the clock back after World War II. Yet, the Americans nationally are willing to destroy half of humanity in defence of ‘liberal democracy’. Social democracy having been publicly denounced on their continent, the Europeans are also willing to beat the drums of war but are not brash enough to do it themselves. In the circumstances, why would any self-respecting African ‘icon’ be expected to condone such cynicism and to engage in a feckless parody of ‘liberal democracy’?

On “Liberal” and “Socialist Democracy

On this particular issue Jibrin Ibrahim can be accused of muddled thinking and a woeful lack of sense of historiography. Metaphorically, albeit inelegantly, it could be said that: “liberal democracies evolved social democracy”. But, historically and analytically, this obscures the fact that it was those who objected to the omissions of liberal democracy, namely, the workers and their socialist/Marxist allies, who were instrumental in the evolution of social democracy within bourgeois Society. Secondly, if ‘liberal democracies’ is used as a metaphor for bourgeois society, then it must be granted that, historically, bourgeois society produced a number of other things such as fascism, dictatorships, socialists, Marxists, colonialists, racists, and imperialists. To avoid depicting...
Ibrahim as a starry-eyed neophyte, it could be granted that he knows about all these things but that his ideological interest is to affirm the virtues of liberal democracy and to decry the iniquities of "socialism" or Marxist doctrines. The moment for this type of exercise could not be any more felicitous. However, history does not begin or end with the rise and fall of the so-called socialist societies in Eastern Europe.

It is very demeaning to suggest that American 'icons' should celebrate 'liberal democracy' simply because "socialist" regimes did nothing else but degenerate into dictatorships. In the event what would be an African about them? Or is their alleged "universalist Marxism" the rub? Naturally the collapse of Eastern European societies has theoretical implications for socialists/Marxists but it does not dispose of social problems that inhere in capitalist society. The issue concerning "liberal democracy" versus "social democracy" was about distribution of the social product and political power between classes in capitalist societies. Whether this issue is referred to as "socialism" or "social democracy" is immaterial. What is of critical importance is that liberal democracy does not address it and consequently it got superseded by programmes which do. Everywhere the battle lines are drawn very clearly between the Right, which firmly believes in concentration of wealth and power and to that extent is prepared to dismantle the welfare state and to dispense with distributive justice, and the Left, which fervently believes in the redistribution of wealth and power in favour of underprivileged classes. The Left having suffered defeat and loss of credibility since the reversals in Eastern Europe, is finding it difficult to formulate a new programme and to devise strategies for its implementation. At the same time, it is obvious that retreat into liberalism under conditions in which it has been over-taken by historical events is of no avail, despite Ibrahim's illusions. New and critical thinking is what is required.

Pronouncements by African scholars, like any other, can fruitfully be reviewed against the background of changing historical perspectives. For instance, in rejecting liberalism and the limitations of liberal democracy as were experienced in Europe, the African 'icons' are sailing in well-chartered waters. In advocating socio-democracy as well as democratic pluralism, they are on firm ground since this has in fact become a universal issue precisely because of the collapse of the so-called socialist societies in Eastern Europe. They helped to re-introduce the question of social democracy in 'united' Europe which, predictably, issued in the rise of fascism in Western Europe, the centre of wealth and privilege. Mahmood Mamdani's point about the rights of citizens and non-citizens would apply here but would not necessarily be attributable to 'liberal democracy' but rather to the anachronistic conception of the 'nation-state' at the moment of its historical suppression. In the Third World the collapse had the effect of intensifying popular rebellion against external control and comprador regimes in the wake of an aggressive drive by the Western powers to consolidate their global stranglehold in the name of a 'new world order', as is boisterously declared by "ugly American". It is this popular energy which the Americans and their allies are trying to channel into 'liberal' solutions which they themselves have long forsaken. They patronise Third World countries by setting lower standards for them than for themselves and by telling them that 'half a loaf is better than no bread'. Where is the full loaf? Is it the privilege of the Western bourgeoisie?

Universal struggles, despite the supposed collapse of "socialism", would indicate that nowhere is this accepted unquestioningly. In Europe the struggle for social democracy is such that the triumphant right-wing is not able to consolidate the power of the bourgeoisie, without making social democratic concessions, as is shown by the vicissitudes of the Maastricht Treaty or the frustrated GATT talks for more than six years. The pressures are felt most acutely at the national level. The gullible Eastern European reformist regimes have discovered, in the shortest possible time, the folly of offering liberal democracy at this historical juncture, without social democracy. Some have even imagined that they could escape their plight by selling their countries piecemeal to the West for a morsel of bread. Empty promises and the shutting of the floodgates has been the response from the West partly because of the fear of internal repercussions but basically because it still harbours imperialist motives towards Eastern Europe. Therefore, the struggle for social democracy in Europe will continue unabated. What needs to be reviewed is the relationship between such struggles and what was perhaps erroneously called 'socialism' in Eastern Europe. In this regard, Samir Amin is correct in maintaining that the collapse in Eastern Europe does not foreclose any discussion on socialism. However, it would seem that the burden for elucidating the logical implications of social democratic struggles by extra-population as happened in the past, falls squarely on the shoulders of the left.

There are pragmatic grounds for posing the question this way. In Third World countries the struggle for social democracy entails a number of other freedoms which might have already been attained in the North e.g. civil rights and national self-determination. Anti-imperialist struggles are still reality in their case and, nationally, denial of civil liberties by regimes which lack legitimacy but enjoy enough external support to hold onto power indefinitely is common-place. These jointly put the national question firmly on the agenda. Therefore Amin, Shivji and myself are hardly mistaken in emphasizing the right to self-determination and the right of the people to chose for themselves. It is also known that the people do not only want to be free to organise themselves and to express their views but also to have adequate access to means of livelihood or a fair share of the national product. This could mean any of a number of things. Therefore, in dismissing liberal democracy as inadequate it is incumbent upon the African 'icons' to say what their conception of the new dispensations would look like almost in the same way that progressive Northerners would be required to say what is the possible articulation between social democratic struggles in advanced capitalist countries and the transition to full social equity, whatever it is called.

In approaching the national question, say, in Africa it is an acceptable orthodoxy among African 'icons' to think in terms of a "democratic national alliance", certain classes having been left out after independence. It is also a Marxist or socialist orthodoxy to think in terms of "classes". But are members of a class always organised as such everywhere? For instance, what happened in Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia or Liberia? Was it a purely class phenomenon? It would seem that in evolving a social-construct for our social democratic revolution it would be necessary to take into consideration forms of social organisation other than "classes". Claude Ake,
whom Ibrahim describes as a "Universalist Marxist", is at the same time credited with having made un-Marxist references to some "societal characteristics" in Africa which would be incompatible with liberal democracy. What would be relevant here is to press Ake not only to identify such but also to evaluate them accordingly, for Wamba-Dia-Wamba is chastised by Ibrahim for proposing to base African social democracy on traditional mechanisms such as the "village palaver and mbbongi (lineage assembly)".

Is all this romantic nonsense, as Ibrahim so strongly contends?

It is quite conceivable that here Ibrahim’s liberal individualism is getting the better of him. But, suffice it to say, a close study of village palavers (which apparently are peculiar to Africa according to the Oxford English Dictionary) and mbbongi has led one to yet another unMarxist conclusion, namely, that there is no necessary relationship between forms of social organization and the purpose for which they are used at different times in history. For instance, African lineage can be used for presidential elections, capitalist accumulation, collectivisation, or planning at the community level. This area and its implications for social democracy and equity in Africa is largely terranova, especially to the African Marxist "icons". Nonetheless, one dares to say that it is sheer perservity for Ibrahim to invite the few African "icons" who are on the march to abandon any search for alternative solutions and instead to lose themselves into a veritable jamboree in celebration of European "liberal democracy", no matter how misconceived it might be.

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‘Benign’ Recolonization and Malignant Minds in the Service of Imperialism*

**Alarm Bells Ringing**

Some time in October last year I received some frenzied telephone calls from some Egyptian intellectuals and scholars, enquiring indignantly: ‘Why has a famous African scholar been invited to join the Advisory Board of the World Bank? There are many lesser honours which Ali Mazrui would reel out without any prompting for there is one thing he did not learn from the British, namely, that self-praise is no recommendation. His pride lay elsewhere. As he declared in an Afro-Arab conference in Sharja in 1977, this was part of what he described as ‘counter-penetration’ of the colonizers by the colonized. Nobody was convinced. In fact, one of the African scholars from the USA walked out of the conference room, protesting that ‘This fellow is obscene’. It was not to Ali Mazrui’s Freudian metaphor that he was objecting so much but rather to his grotesque intellectual rationalisations. But even so, what Ali Mazrui had going for him was enough to excite the envy of many a professor in Africa and, indeed, elsewhere.

For these accomplishments Ali Mazrui is often described in the Western media as a ‘leading African scholar’ . Even in the article under review, the editors did not forget to project him as a ‘Kenyan author’. Why not Albert Schweitzer Professor of African Studies in New York? The fact of the matter is that Ali Mazrui is serviceable to the Americans or the British as an African. The latter is more relevant than anything else for there are other outstanding African scholars but who might not be so serviceable. Samir Amin is first and foremost among them. Not only has he made a lasting contribution to the devel-
opment of social science in Africa but also his scientific integrity and scholarship is of a different order altogether compared to A I Mazrui’s. Owing to the fact that his is not serviceable to imperialism; instead of honouring him, they dishonoured him in the UN system, despite the fact that IDEP was flourishing under his intellectual leadership. (A I Mazrui might not even remember this, given his preference for airy-fairy-ellipsis.) Needless to say, all this was done with the complicity of the same putrid African governments whose countries A I Mazrui is recommending for ‘recolonisation’.

Another interesting and illustrative example right next door to A I Mazrui is Edward Said, the illustrious Palestinian Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism at Columbia University. His scholarship and erudition would put A I Mazrui to abso-
lute shame. Yet, in the same way as in Samir Amin’s case, his unserviceability to imperialism (see his book, Culture and Imperialism, 1993) has brought him nothing else but Levitical abominations. This makes one wonder whether what we are talking about is scholarship or something else.

There is no doubt that A I Mazrui has a brilliant mind that by all counts he is a prolific writer. He has written more than 20 books and numerous articles. He is a gifted writer, a master at coining catchy phrases and at conjuring up images of the grotesque and the ridiculous. For the same reason his oratory is unsurpassed and attracts big audiences. Yet, with all this in his favour A I Mazrui has hardly any followers among African Scholars. He has produced no body of knowledge which they could use for building sus-
tainable systems of thought about African societies. Like newspaper articles or commentaries, his books are read albeit with pleasure and forgotten. Even worse, in immediate encounters he tends to draw a negative intellectual and ideological re-
sponse from African scholars - young and old. This is something one has ob-
served since our days at Makerere College in the mid-1960s. He has been called names in his face by angry or outraged African scholars.

The same thing happened 25 years later at a CODESRIA symposium in Kampala in 1991. Some of the people involved were fairly senior e.g. President Museveni, Tarsis Kabwegyere and, of course, Mahmood Mamdani. I also tried to have a quieter dialogue with A I Mazrui. A I

seemed to be of no avail. This was most embarrassing because during that sym-
posium there was a deliberate effort to rehabilitate A I Mazrui at a time when the Zionist lobby in the USA was doing every-
thting possible to undermine him, in-
cluding some unworthy personal attacks in Newsweek. This aside, once in a re-
view of some Mazrui’s work Christopher Fyfe, who has long been asso-
ciated with African Studies, asked rhet-
orically, ‘Need our author be such a gad-
fly?’ This raises question about the role

in which he is cast by this western admir-
ers. If A I Mazrui is a leading African scholar; whom is he leading and where to?

A part from ideological divergences, A I Mazrui’s African Scholarship is in doubt. Since he escaped in 1971 from the clutches of Idi Amin whom at first he had given support against M Iton Obote’s ‘violent constitutionalism’ and ‘The Move to the Left’, A I Mazrui has been visiting Africa like an intellectual tourist. Not that this matters much as he has never been a believer in solid scientific work. In 1966 when we were gathered in Makerere to discuss field work and its importance, A I Mazrui’s only question was whether in our considerations we had left room for literary work. Everybody laughed knowingly. A is revealed by the references in his books, his data is culled largely from newspaper cuttings, radio newscasts, and conversations with lead-
ing politicians when the opportunity of-
sers itself. Using his known mental agility and great sense of imagination, from these he produces bright but ephemeral ideas like white phosphorus in a bowl of water.

In 1966 in Makerere he dramatically as-
serted that, if it had not been for the En-

lish language, there would have been no African nationalism. This assertion dis-
couraged African nationalists but de-
lighted British ex-colonial officers who had turned academics after independence. In 1970 in Dar-es-Salaam University he castigated the leftists for their intolerance and declared that everybody was entitled to his ideas, including racist Verwoerd in South Africa (he could have included Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany). Their implicit contradiction here is that while ideas are perceived as primary, their practical impli-
cations are eschewed unless they come from the left.

In 1991 in Kampala A I Mazrui had come full circle. Along with others, he declared that a nation which does not produce knowledge in its own language cannot develop. But according to his 1966 testi-
mony, English had developed African nationalism. And why not an African na-
ton?’ Fully aware of the fact that the total eclipse of Eastern European communism was a foregone conclusion, he for the first time put socialism on a part with capital-
ism. He ostentatiously observed that so-
cialism is best at redistribution and poor at production while capitalism is best at production and poor at redistribution. With great aplomb, he suggested that in the event what would be ideal is to com-
bine the socialist redistributive system with capitalist production - a perfect recipe for African countries which took into account neither the practical implica-
tions of the actual existing crisis of accumu-
lation in these countries nor the his-
tory of social democrats in Scandinavia and other countries such as Holland and the problems they are facing now under the drive for greater concentration of capi-
tal in Europe. Barely three years later, in 1994 A I Mazrui has yet another ideal so-
lution for Africa: ‘recolonisation’.

‘Benign Colonization’: Intellectual Bankruptcy or Self-prostitution?

A I Mazrui’s discourse on ‘benign colo-
nisation’ is intellectually bankrupt, analytically superficial, sensational, and downright dishonest. First, as is typical of him, he uses what would be social sci-
ence concepts as mere words or slogans e.g. social ‘decay’, ‘decomposition’, ‘de-
pendent modernisation’, ‘national freedom’ etc. Historically, the concept of ‘social decay’ or ‘social decomposition’ is used with reference to old societies that were once cohesive and viable but were getting outmoded under changed socio-eco-


nomic conditions. Post-independence states in Africa are only one generation old nor could it be proved that during this short period they had become cohesive and self-sustaining. In fact, the opposite is generally true of most of them. Power struggles ensued within them almost im-
mediately after independence. These took the form of competition between political elites with different regional or ethnic backgrounds and later between different fractions of the bureaucracy e.g. the civili-
ian vs. the military establishment. This was a reflection of the artificial nature of the colonial state. A African leaders were fully aware of it, as is shown by their per-
petual concern about ‘nation-building’. This presupposed the attainment of a unitary nation state. But the conception
itself was ill-founded and inevitably degenerated into one-party state dictatorships. This in turn exacerbated centrifugal tendencies within the African ex-colonial state and destroyed the necessary conditions for economic production and social reproduction. In this sense Africa is definitely undergoing a process of political and economic disintegration.

However, it cannot be assumed that this necessarily means social decay. The successive collapse of African states in the 1990s that Ali M. Mazrui finds so alarming has been accompanied by new democratic social movements which have brought to power new regimes or at least held at bay the old dictatorships. True enough, there is hunger and civil strife in Africa. But there is also social virability and militancy we have not seen since the independence movement. Popular civil wars like in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Togo, Somalia, Western Sahara and so on might be the social price that has to be paid in order to deconstruct dominating and coercive structures. The collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe was celebrated in the West, as would be expected. What is of interest to us is that the same processes of political and economic disintegration that are found in Africa are taking place in the various Eastern European countries. In several of them is increased poverty among the mass of the people and there are civil wars which are epitomised by the war in Bosnia, which the UN and NATO have not been able to stop, despite Ali M. Mazrui’s illusions about an “African Peace-keeping Force”. By failing to recognise these obvious historical parallels Ali M. Mazrui can be accused of being an unconscious agent of Western racism.

Concerning civil wars in Africa more could be said. Ali M. Mazrui, like a breast-beating liberal, flauts to the world the bitter message that has emerged from the horrifying events in Rwanda. A fricans know better than that. We do not know yet with certainty what happened in Rwanda and for that reason CODESRIA is planning a special workshop on the Great Lakes social formations. What happened in Rwanda is not new in Africa and contrary to Mazrui’s facile assumption, it might have nothing to do with ethnic imbalance between B’a-Tutsi and B’a-Hutu. The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique cost millions of lives. The same imperialist countries that are now crying, “wolf”, contributed to the tragedy in no mean way. The US Strategy of ‘low-intensity warfare’ adopted since the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars means that when it is necessary warring Africans will be helped to engage in mutual extermination or genocide. For southern Africa this has been fully documented by Horace Campbell, among others. Therefore, conflicts in Africa need not to be associated with ethnicity. Since independence Lesotho, a single-ethnic country, has had a series of coups and countercoups. Lately, another single-ethnic country, Somalia has been plunged into the worst kind of civil war in Africa.

The proposition that Africa be recon- solidated is not only preposterous but is also mischievous in that it is not meant for African consumption. It is again Ali M. Mazrui playing up to his Western gallery. He is acutely aware of the racist and imperialist connotation of the term and for this reason he tries to dispense with the ‘whiteman’s burden’ (a crude cliché). He does this by inviting Azians and Afircians to be custodians of the envisaged ‘benign colonisation’ – a contradiction in terms, as ‘colonisation’ implies political imposition by whosoever does it. In trying to deal with this hare-brained scheme Ali M. Mazrui makes suggestions which verge on lunacy. For instance, he proposes a ‘Trusteeship’ system – like that of the United Nations over the Congo in 1960 –. He seems to be oblivious of the fact that it was under the same imperialist trusteeship that Patrice Lumumba was eliminated. Likewise, as an East Africam, he should have known that the relationship between Azians and Afircians still suffers from an unresolved imperialist legacy. Ali M. Mazrui definitely goes overboard and loses all sense of reality when he imagines that Egypt could be called upon to ‘re-establish its “big brother” relationship with Sudan’, or that Ethiopia, despite the challenge from former oppressed nationalities, could resume not only its imperial role but also ‘run Somalia on behalf of his supposed “United Nations”, or that South Africa and Nigeria could be invited to play the role of benign sub-imperialist powers in their regions. How absurd!

This is most amazing because every political scientist in Africa knows that these are huge incompatibilities and that Ali Mazrui’s prescription is in fact contrary to popular sentiments on the continent. ‘The rejection of the monolithic one-party state, the demand for “democratic pluralism” and regional autonomy or “decentralisation” are a sufficient indication of current trends on the continent. Hegemonic powers are resented or at best treated with suspicion. This is true of South Africa in the SADC region and of Nigeria in ECOWAS. It is also true of Egypt vis-à-vis the Sudan. The Ethiopian empire has already been dismantled and will not be resurrected. All these facts cast serious doubt on Mazrui’s sense of reality and renders his claim that there is a “colonisation impulse that is resurfacing” in Africa spurious. A brave all, he is basically confused because he cannot advocate “re-colonisation” of Africa and at the same time proclaim that regional integration is the order of the day and that:

If Africa does not follow this path, the lack of stability and economic growth will push the entire continent further into the desperate margins of global society.

Johan Galtung, a brilliant but hard-headed European professor, addressing the European Parliament, warned that in the coming division of the globe into regional blocs, Africa will be cut adrift. In the same vein he advised that Africa should see this as a blessing in disguise because for the first time they will be left alone and in the event they will be forced to find their own solutions to their problems. There is a certain wisdom in this which is lost to our African professor.

Instead of fantasizing about “re-colonisation” and the reproduction of the UN system (which is itself under review) in Africa, Ali M. Mazrui could have contemplated the question of why our own UN, the OAU, has not been able to fulfil all the functions he ascribes to his “colonisation”; second, why the ECOWAS Peace-keeping Force in Liberia has not been able to fulfil its mission; third, why the real UN failed in its intervention in Somalia; and four, why it proved impossible for the OAU to intervene in the Rwanda crisis, even though it had been invited to do so by the UN Secretary-General – something which France did unilaterally? It would seem that, far from needing recolonisation, we need decolonisation in Africa not only of the body polity but also of the mind.

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Self-Colonization and the Search for Pax African: A Rejoinder

Perhaps in my naïveté, I had as sumed that Professor Archie Mafeje was a professional friend since he had been very gracious to me on a number of occasions in the past. But, as the saying goes, with friends like Mafeje, who needs professional enemies? He trivializes and denounces a lifetime's work of a colleague without showing any evidence that he has read any of the twenty books written by his victim. He uses as evidence anecdotes and hazy memories of what I might have said twenty or more years ago – and then accuses his victim of slippshod scholarship!!

If Dr. Archie Mafeje had read no other book of mine than Towards a Pax African: A Study of Ideology and Ambition he would have realized that I have been concerned about the issue of Africa’s self-pacification for about thirty years.

...perhaps the most crucial aspect of the ethic of self-government in Africa lies in the African’s ambition to be his own policeman. The following question has often been asked in the last few years: Now that the Imperial order is coming to an end, who is going to keep the peace in Africa? It is considerations such as these which make Africa’s freedom itself sometimes depend on an African capacity for self-pacification. This is what the concept of Pax Aficana is all about... just as the notion of self-government is central to African political thought, the concept of Pax Aficana is in turn central to the ambition of self-government in the continent (Mazrui 1967).

It is true that while in the 1990s I sometimes use the vocabulary of Africa’s ‘self-pacification’, in the 1960s I had used the vocabulary of Africa’s ‘self-pacification’. But my central concern has remained constant – how can Africa develop a capacity for effective inter-African control, inter-African pacification, and collective self-discipline?

Both in the 1960s and in the 1990s I have allowed a role for the United Nations. But contrary to one more unfounded assumption by Archie Mafeje, I am not blind to the limitations and even injustices of the United Nations as presently constructed.

My following statement, (Mazrui 1967: 204-216), still holds up:

As between the old idea of imperial pacification and the new ambition of Pax Africana the United Nations temporarily provided a third alternative. And yet it was soon clear that the United Nations as an alternative could never be as self-sufficient as imperial pacification had been and as Afican self-policing aspired to be... Towards the end of 1964 the United Nations therefore withdrew from the Congo. And yet pacification of the Congo by Africans themselves from internal continental resources was as yet not a practical proposition... In the meantime conflict between (African) leaders themselves, or between them and the military, or between one soldier and another, remains an aspect of the African political scene. So does the risk of foreign intrusion. The quest therefore continues for an African tranquility capable of being protected and maintained by Africa herself.

I am advocating self-colonization by Africa. I am against the return of European colonialism and the equivalent of Pax Britannica. But I fear that if Africans do not take control of their destiny themselves, including the use of benevolent force for self-pacification, they will once again be victims of malevolent colonial force used by others. I was discussing the dream of Pax Africana decade before we experienced failed post-colonial states and before Africa paid the post-colonial price of four million lives. Does Mafeje feel that we have to lose a few more million lives before we help each other?

The United Nations help is needed but it has to be subject to the consent of Africans themselves. The UN has been a help to Mozambique, and may continue to be needed by Angola. The UN mishandled Somalia, and was grossly, almost criminally, neglect over Rwanda. But Africa will continue to need the United Nations for the foreseeable future. I am not sure if Archie Mafeje would like to join Republican extremists in the United States who would want to end the peacekeeping role of the UN, and perhaps even destroy the world body.

It is not the big countries which, in the final analysis, need the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It is the small countries, and the vulnerable people. That includes most of Africa. Archie Mafeje thinks I am being used by Westerners. Is Mafeje being used by Newt Gingrich?

Mafeje accuses me of being an ‘intellectual tourist’ in Africa. He assumes that I had a choice about being based either inside or outside Africa. When was the last time Mafeje offered me a permanent job in Africa and heard me turn it down? And has he forgotten his own long years as an ‘intellectual tourist’? Has his own exile ended? Such chaotic thinking is enough to make one recommend inter-African intellectual colonization and re-education.

Professor Mafeje seems to regard inter-African colonization as a kind of fairy tale. In reality that is what happened in 1964 when Tanganyika annexed Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Nobody consulted the people of Zanzibar in a referendum or by a prior general election whether or not they wanted to give up their sovereignty and independence. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika signed an agreement with Zanzibar dictator A. K. A. K. Amuwo – the same way British empire-builders used to get African chiefs to affirm the equivalent of the 1900 Uganda Agreement for so-called British protection.

Zanzibar was in disarray following the revolution of January 1964. The union with Tanganyika provided Zanzibar with a form of pacification. Although the terms of the union were very generous to Zanzibar, it was nevertheless a case of inter-African colonization.

Dr. Mafeje also cites a case where inter-African intervention has so far resulted in a stalemate – i.e., the case of ECOMOG.
in Liberia in the 1990s. Mafeje conveniently forgets the case of the intervention of the Tanzanian army in Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1979. The Tanzanian soldiers marched all the way to Kampala and successfully ousted the brutal dictator. ‘Mission impossible’ turned out to be ‘mission accomplished’ after all. The ill-trained army of a poor African neighbour was still strong enough to end Amin’s tyranny.

Dr. Mafeje has convoluting speculations as to why my article on ‘Recolonization’ was datelined Pretoria. It never occurred to Archie Mafeje that the most obvious explanation was the correct one - that I was myself in Pretoria, South Africa, on August 4, 1994, when the article was published in the International Herald Tribune (and simultaneously in such African newspapers as The Daily Nation of Kenya). If I had been in Kampala, Dakar, Nairobi or Asia, the dateline of the article would have been changed accordingly. Instead, I was invited to South Africa to listen to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to extend my personal felicitations to him with less venom and less abuse, I have not even tried to find out where else I had discussed the issue of ‘recolonization’ and for what kind of audiences.

Mafeje refers to a remark I made in Kampala in 1991 that socialism was best at redistribution and poor at production while capitalism was best at production and poor at redistribution. (Mazrui’s epigram is ‘The genius of capitalism is production’ and ‘The genius of socialism is distribution’). Which par of the epigram does Mafeje want to contradict? He mentions some ‘crisis of accumulation’ in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Mafeje carefully side-steps the examples of China and Vietnam which have been moving towards market M aixm. Fidel Castro has declared similar intentions for Cuba. Had my epigram anticipated the momentous economic changes in China and, increasingly, in Vietnam? The Chinese have certainly demonstrated the truth of the proposition that ‘the genius of capitalism is production’. So have their neighbours in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and elsewhere. But the Chinese also want to rescue the second part of the epigram - ‘The genius of socialism is distribution’. Mafeje may prefer weary and all-inclusive phrases like ‘crisis of accumulation’ to explain global changes. That is Mafeje’s privilege.

Archie Mafeje refers to my BBC Reith Lectures (Mazrui 1980) and my BBC/PBS television series (The Africans: A Triple Heritage, 1986). Mafeje suggests that I am given these opportunities so that I can sing political songs which the West likes. If that is what Mafeje thinks, once again he has the books which emerged out of my B.B.C. Lectures and television series. He would know that I infuriated Western listeners by nuclearising my concept of Pax Africana:

It is not enough that Africa should have a capacity to police itself. It is also vital that Africa should contribute effectively towards policing the rest of the world. It is not enough that Africa should find the will to be peaceful with itself; it is also vital that Africa should play a part in pacifying the world (Mazrui 1980:113).

In pursuit of this wider global goal, I recommended a temporary nuclear proliferation of the Third World (including Black-rulled South Africa and Nigeria) in order to shock the big powers towards universal nuclear disarmament. That was not a message which the West wanted to hear.

My TV series The Africans was regarded as ‘anti-Western’ and ‘anti-American’ by powerful forces in the United States. The Africans caused a national debate about the TV series; and the National Endowment of the Humanities (which had contributed to its funding) condemned The Africans as ‘anti-Western diatribe’ and withdrew its name from it.

Western media may give me a platform from time to time to express my views. The media may also give a high visibility platform to Edward Said, our Palestinian colleague at Columbia University. Neither Edward Said, nor I play to the Western gallery. We interpret the world as we see it. If Archie Mafeje did more research, he would have found out these simple facts. The facts are well documented and most are in the public domain.

Should I have treated Professor Archie Mafeje with greater politeness than he has shown towards me? In fact, I have treated him with less venom and less abuse, I have not used words like ‘bankrupt’, ‘egotistical’, ‘self-prostitution’, ‘downright dishonorable’, ‘malignant mind’, ‘servant of imperialism’, or ‘obscene’ - which are freely scattered in his attack on me. There are depths of unprofessionalism to which I refuse to descend even under provocation.

References

'Recolonisation' or 'Self-colonisation' in Pursuit of 'Pax Africana': Another Response to a Reactionary Thesis*

I wish to thank Ali A. Mazrui, Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies and Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, State University of New York at Binghamton; Albert Luthuli Professor-at-large, University of Jos, Nigeria, and Senior Scholar and Andrew D. White Professor-at-large Emeritus, Cornell University, Ithaca, for having refused to descend to certain depths of unprofessionalism even under provocation. If that had been my crime in the initial response, I wish to assure him that his magnanimity and professional propriety will not go unappreciated. Secondly, I would like him to note that, if I had treated him graciously before, it was not because I ever shared his views. It was because we are who we are and this will not cease. However, if we live in a divided house, it is in the best interests of the community that this be known. It is in this context that I am prepared to cross swords with Ali M. Mazrui. If in the process real blood is drawn, it might be undue sacrifice to the African gods or an invitation to young African warriors.

Indeed, this is a very good time for clarifying intellectual and political standpoints among African scholars for it is not only a period of deconstruction of old models and structures but also of increasing popular pressures of reconstruction and independent styles of thinking. Therefore, 'leading' African scholars may ill-afford to fudge issues that arise from their own intellectual praxis. I believe that Ali M. Mazrui did not answer the questions which pertained to his article in the *Herald Tribune*. These may be summarised as follows:

a) Although in this rejoinder he repeatedly refers to 'self-colonisation', in the text in question he suggested a 'once unthinkable solution: recolonisation'. This was not a slip of the tongue or lapse of memory because in the same text he unambiguously recommended 'external recolonisation under the banner of humanitarianism'. To be sure, he advocated an international trustees system whose members could be drawn from Africa or Asia, as well as from the rest of the United Nations membership. He surmised that this way the 'white man's burden would, in a sense become humanity's shared burden'. This cannot be construed as 'self-colonisation', as he is at pains to prove in this rejoinder. In the event he has clear choice to withdraw the statement or to accept its connotations. If he chooses the latter, then he has an obligation to say on whose behalf he is speaking. This is particularly so that he was one of the participants at the Seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala in April, 1994, where the guiding slogan as is reflected in the final declaration was: 'Resist Recolonisation: Organise Don't 'Agonise'. Secondly, if Ali Mazrui's ideas about recolonisation are so well-known to African audiences, why did his article send such shock waves in many quarters in Africa?

b) The second issue which followed immediately after the first was whether a UN-like trusteeship system for Africa would be able to do what the OAU and regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC (contrary to Mazrui's false charge, I was not concerned with the UN proper) could not do. If the latter were the case, then it had to be explained before any presuppositions could be made about the necessity or efficacy of 'recolonisation' of Africa. At issue was the political and ideological implications of such a suggestion at this juncture in African history. Personally, I could not credit such a reactionary stance form any African scholar whether 'at-large' or in-house. Closely related to this was the question of whether colonisation of any sort could be benign, given the element of imposition at a time when African peoples are rebelling precisely against this. One is mindful of the fact that in the text Ali M. Mazrui used 'recolonisation' and 'self-colonisation' interchangeably. In this I found a certain sloppiness and flippancy which I do not associate with serious scholarship. 'Self-colonisation' is a contradiction in terms and is contrary to 'self-liberation' which is what the current struggles for democracy on the continent would signify.

c) The third question was whether there was a political raison d'être for sub-imperialist powers in Africa to presume that they could take charge of the affairs of their weaker or 'chaotic' neighbours. In our view this would be a condonation of that which we seek to terminate, namely, domination and coercion by bigger powers. It would also militate against democratic regional integration. Leadership is not imposed but attained. Hence, the question posed to Ali M. Mazrui was how does he reconcile the notion of 'colonisation' with the principle of regional integration? If it were not the question of 'might is right', what would be the moral,ideo-political grounds for casting in a leadership role countries such as Nigeria, Zaire, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt (Mazrui's pivotal states)? What is it that they offer as a solution in the current crisis in Africa, seeing that they themselves have not resolved the national question under their own sovereignty? Is it not the case that Ali M. Mazrui is in fact reproducing the ideology of the Great Powers? If this is the product of

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Ali Mazrui's life-long work, call it 'recolonisation' or 'self-colonisation', then there might be no value in reading all his books. Secondly, if it is a measure of his African scholarship, then it remains my conviction that we could do better than this and that probably we have already done so, especially under the sponsorship of CODESRIA.

d) The final point raised had to do with the idea of African nationalism in the 1960s and 1990s, as is seen by a scholar like Ali Mazrui. According to him, much of Africa is in a state of 'decay and decomposition'. This is so much so that 'even the degree of dependent modernisation achieved under colonial rule is being reversed'. (If Mazrui did not know, this is precisely what he said: 'crisis of accumulation', refers to in the circumstances it cannot help being 'weary'). He observes that: 'The successive collapse of the state in one African country after another during the 1990s suggests a once unthinkable solution: recolonisation.' The movement of the 1950s and 1960s in Africa was described as 'anti-colonial' or 'African nationalism'. If all this seems to have evaporated in the 1990s, what are we left with? What was the significance of the 7th Pan-Africanist Congress in Kampala in 1991, which Ali Mazrui apparently attended. According to the conference papers sent to me the spirit and the mood in Kampala was decidedly at variance with Ali Mazrui's projections. Disillusionment with the post-independence states in Africa has not led to a feeling of helplessness but rather has generated a new spirit of Pan-Africanism and cultural nationalism reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s. The issue, therefore, is whether these political impulses are compatible with the notion of 'recolonisation'.

The Role of African Intellectuals

I have never been comfortable with this expression because it assumes too much. The reason is that it is not so much the role which is expected of African intellectuals but rather the role which African intellectuals choose for themselves that makes the difference. Here, the interaction between ideology and scientific endeavour; and between intellectual praxis and personal vicissitudes makes it very difficult to prescribe any single ethical system for intellectual behaviour. This has been hotly debated in the CODESRIA and AAPS symposia, without any clear resolution. Nevertheless, the effect it has had is to set minimal ideological psychological, and political standards for African intellectual. This has created a climate in which intellectual representations by African scholars can be judged as authentic or unauthentic. This is the issue between me and Ali Mazrui and it was the same in Kampala in 1991.

In my response to Ali Mazrui's article in the Herald Tribune I charged that his intellectual representations, as an African, were neither leading nor authentic. They were, I contended, addressed to the 'other'. In his rejoinder, Mazrui denied this absolutely. His rebuttal took various forms, which I will take in their order of importance. First, he argued that if I had read all his books (which I did not for good reasons), I would have known that for him 'recolonisation' is synonymous with self-colonisation which is the essence of his life-long trajectory on Pax Africa. This is an inadmissible conflation and is certainly not a mark of great scholarship and scientific rigour. Historically understood, the independence movement in Africa was an explicit rejection of colonialism. In the wake of disillusionment with post-independence governments in Africa, popular representations make no reference to colonisation but rather to deconstruction of hegemonic structures and realisation of democratic pluralism.

In an attempt to refute my assertion that his intellectual representations are unauthentic, Mazrui refers me to many African fora in which he had the occasion to present his 'self-colonisation' alternative. According to him, the 'geographical sequence of [his] representations' took him from Kampala in April, 1994 to Cairo in May 1994, and to Addis Ababa (no date mentioned). What is interesting is that most of this is at the invitation of the same leaders who, according to his confession, are responsible for the African collapse. In South Africa, where he got the dateline for the article at issue, he had been invited to listen to Bishop Tutu, to extend his-personal felicitations to President Mandela and ultimately to attend a conference on 'Islam and Civil Society in South Africa'. It is not clear who invited him but the accent is unmistakably on powers that be. This is in contrast to what happened at the Seventh Pan-Africanist Congress in Kampala where he refers merely to the fact that his paper was distributed. Did they or did they not put him on a pedestal in Kampala? Did the Western media, as represented by The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, and the International Herald Tribune, take as much interest in the Pan-Africanist declarations in Kampala as they did in his 'geographical representations'? If not, why not?

The platforms on which one speaks are not unimportant. In Ali Mazrui's case this is best illustrated by the Western reaction to his Reith Lectures and the BBC series on The Africans. My comment regarding these was more on the platform rather than their content. It is not that Mazrui missed the point that he was too anxious to prove that his representations are not in the service of imperialism. In the event he confirmed what he sought to disprove. Not unnaturally, his sponsors expected him to make affirmations on behalf of imperial history and interests. When he failed to come up to their expectations, they denounced his representations both in England and in the United States. Given that kind of invitation or platform, why should the imperial reaction be so surprising. Like Dr. Faustus, Mazrui had sold his soul to the devil for immediate glory. For that matter, it is mischievous and misleading for Ali Mazrui to compare his intellectual praxis to that of Edward Said. Edward Said's intellectual representations are consistently anti-colonial and anti-imperialism. This has over the years determined the platforms to which he is invited in the West and in Palestine. Secondly, while he is prepared to talk to Mazrui, he has made it known that he profoundly disagrees with his epistemology of colonialism. There is a name for the attempt by anybody to have the best of both worlds. Ali Mazrui's theory of 'counter-penetration' gives him an excuse for betting on the strong at all times whether it be in the West or in Africa. It is hard to imagine how anyone could hobnob with the oppressors for the benefit of the oppressed. It is the same regimes or neo-colonial organisations that are objects of popular resistance in Africa which invite Ali Mazrui to indulge in his usual mystification to their great delight. He is happy to refer to the dictator Idi Amin but will not answer the specific question as to whether or not he lent support to Idi Amin before he decided to flee the country. It is also curi-
ous that he proffers the role played by Tanzanian forces in Uganda as a vindication of his advocacy of ‘self-colonisation’. Little does he know that the Executive Committee of TANU had consistently opposed such a policy. It was only after Amin’s forces had crossed the Tanzanian border and attacked some villages that an attack on Uganda could be justified. It is true that President Nyerere saw A min as a dangerous usurper and wanted his ally, Milton Obote, reinstated. Whether this was a felicitous thing or not, it became a source of great controversy among East Africans. Nonetheless, from Mazrui’s perspective Tanzania gets a plus.

Yet, when we gave intellectual and political support to Tanzania after the Arusha Declaration, Ali M Mazrui saw us as suffering from a terrible disease he called ‘Tanzaphilia’. Or is this again a contrast between oral history and scholarly amnesia? The fact of the matter is that he was ideologically opposed to the Arusha Declaration and the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The latter is clearly refl ecting in his denunciatory statement that: ‘Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika signed an agreement with Zanzibari dictator Abeid Karume – the same way British empire-builders used to get African Chiefs to affirm the equivalent of the 1900 U ganda Agreement for so-called British protection’. The analogy is outrageous and the characterization of the agreement a good illustration of Mazrui’s superfi ciality and journalistic predisposition. The union was an agreement between the revolutionary party in Zanzibar (including such prominent fi gures as Babu) and progressive nationalist in TANU for mutual benefi t. Mazrui partially grants this for he states that: ‘Zanzibar was in disarray following the revolution of January 1964. The union with Tanganyika provided Zanzibar with a form of pacifi cation’. But then he makes a volte-face and declares that: ‘Although the terms of the union were generous to Zanzibar, it was nevertheless a case of inter-African coloni zation’. This makes nonsense of the term ‘colonisation’ and contradicts Ali M Mazrui’s self-declared aspiration for the continent.

Concerning the actually existing crisis of accumulation in Africa, all I wanted to say, ‘Mazrui’s epigram’ notwithstanding, is that the supposition that the capitalist mode of accumulation could be combined with a socialist mode of social redistribution might be diffi cult to sustain. Not only is it a contradiction in terms but also, as is shown by the experience of modern welfare states such as the Scandinavian countries and Holland, this presupposes that there would be a continued surplus to guarantee social distribution. Yet, under conditions of an actual or threatened crisis of accumulation capital seeks to guarantee the conditions for its own reproduction by putting a stop on ‘waste of money’ on social services and even on foreign aid. This is what underlies the policies of the Christian Democrats in Europe, the Conservatives in Britain, and the Republicans in the U.S. Therefore, Ali Mazrui’s ‘epigram’ is of no avail. But the debate centring on it goes back to the days of the Second International and the emergence of socialist reformism in the hands of Bernstein and Kautsky within SPD in Germany.

However, this has nothing to do with what is happening in countries such as China, Vietnam, and Cuba. A part from the intensifi ed pressure on remaining socialist economies since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is not true that commodity relations did not exist within these economies and between them and capitalist economies. In the case of Cuba she did not choose not to engage in trade with her neighbours. Rather she was and still is a victim of trade embargo on her by the United States. The dichotomy between ‘planned economies’ and ‘market economies’, which Ali M Mazrui seems to take at face value, was not a creation of the socialist countries. As far as they were concerned, the issue was how to reconcile between ‘blind’ market forces and the need to rationally plan the economy so as to guarantee social equity.

This problem is not peculiar to socialist economies. The various interventions in the economy by African states, which the World Bank so strongly opposes, were meant to contend with the same basic problem. Whether or not the result was positive in all cases is not the issue. What is at issue is how to maximise economic efficiency and equity at the same time. The same issue is implicit in Keynesian economics in the aftermath of the Great Depression in the West. These are major issues which cannot be comprehended by resorting to nonconcepts such as ‘market-M axiom’ (whatever that may be), instead of ‘crisis of accumulation’ and the ‘problem of equity’ under the present international economic order. If indeed Ali M Mazrui admires Samir Amin, then familiarity with his work on this particular subject might prove a useful antidote to his supra-structural illusions.

Finally, the reference to intellectual tourism might have nothing to do with exile but with the extent to which one’s intellectual representations are rooted in African reality and not on impressions gained from ethereal visits. A somebody who is preoccupied with the question of the indigenisation of the social sciences in Africa, I can afford to make this remark. Also, I should like Ali Mazrui to know that my intellectual exile ceased since I went to Tanzania in 1969 and that within Africa there is no exile for me. This has been the case since 1976. At times it has been hard and painful. Yet, it has been the source of my intellectual emancipation. I judge the authenticity of my representations not by what any organisation or commentator abroad might think or say but by communion with similarly placed African scholars. I feel accountable and, therefore, I cannot with impunity speak on behalf of the ‘other’. I might be consumed by envy but certainly I am not in competition with Ali M Mazrui simply because we are not looking for the same thing. But then he should not make excuses for himself by referring to such things as job opportunities. He did not have to be Albert Luthuli Professor at-large at J o S University. He could have become Professor in-residence, if he so wished. Anybody can guess why that would not be so attractive for him. Is it not high time that Ali M Mazrui stopped prevaricating and came to terms with himself? His intellectual representations betray his African claims, I still maintain and I am not the only one.
Pax Africana: Between the State and the Intellectuals*

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am not sure why I am continuing to debate somebody who takes pride in not having read any of my books and yet thinks he is qualified to judge my entire career. I am not sure why I am agreeing to debate a scholar who cannot distinguish between intellectual argument and personal abuse. I am not sure why I let myself cross-swords with somebody who judges my whole career on the basis of a single newspaper article – and yet thinks such reductionism is scholarly. Perhaps I am continuing the debate more out of respect for readers of CODESRIA Bulletin than out of conviction that this debate is much above a gutter brawl.

If Archie Mafje insists on making this kind of brawl which mixes abuse with argument, I can meet him halfway. I can even come half-way towards the gutter – but not all the way! But I have no idea how long I can keep up this unseemly exchange. In Mafje I am clearly dealing with a more brash and less subtle antag-

nist than Wole Soyinka, with whom I had debated earlier this decade (1991-92) in Transition. In combating Soyinka I was inspired towards a higher level of discourse. In combating Archie Mafje I find myself on the downward spiral of cheap invective.

Self-Colonisation: Benevolent, Benign and Malignant

Dr. Mafje seems a little confused about how I use the two terms ‘recolonization’ and ‘self-colonization’. Actually, it is quite simple. Recolonization can be by non-African countries, or by the United Nations, or by other African states. I reserve the term ‘self-colonization’ for inter-African colonization only especially when its purposes are substantially benevolent. In such a context inter-African colonization could become part of Pax Africana.

Africa’s capacity to control its destiny requires a capacity to stabilize and pacify itself. African countries which are larger and potentially more influential have a special responsibility in a world organized on the basis of nation-states. There may be occasions when a larger country has to be its brother’s keeper, or even its brother’s guardian. Inter-African pacifi-
cation can become a form of benevolent self-colonization – a Pax Africana.

Inter-African colonization can be benevolent, benign, or malignant. It is benevolent when the intervening power stands more to lose than to gain from the intervention; and when the short-run advantages of the country which is occupied are considerably greater than the country’s intervention into the country that is occupied seemed to be, in the final analysis, benevolent – for it ended eight of the most brutal years in Uganda’s twentieth century history. Archie Mafje rightly points out that the Tanzanian government’s intentions were not necessarily benevolent. Their motives were defensive against Idi Amin’s territorial claims. But the consequences of Tanzania’s intervention included the ending of eight years of Idi Amin’s tyranny. Tanzania’s temporary military occupation of Uganda was benevolent. Nyerere erred in trying too hard to restore Milton Obote to power – whose second administration turned out to be almost as disastrous as Idi Amin’s. Pax Africana received a setback.

At the other extreme is malignant intervention or colonization which is very damaging to the weaker country, and usually perpetrated entirely in the interest of the powerful country.

Benign intervention is a situation where the moral case for and against intervention is about equally compelling. In such a situation the moral issues hang in the balance.

Was Tanzania’s annexation of Zanzibar in 1964 benevolent, benign, or malignant? It would have been benign but for the attempt to make the annexation permanent. The wedding between Zanzibar and Tanganyika was a forced marriage, but the bride wealth from Tanganyika to Zanzibar was exceptionally generous. Zanzibar was over-represented on union institutions.

The moral issues were hanging in the balance. But since the bride never gave her consent, the unions could not be made permanent without ascertaining the wishes of the bride sooner or later. Zanzibar needs to give its consent to the union. Only then will this form of inter-African colonization be saved from becoming malignant, and become ethical under Pax Africana.

In the final analysis inter-African colonization should never be permanent. It should happen only in times of desperation. It should then either end or be legitimized by a vote of the colonized people. The vote can either be a referendum or full participation in a truly democratic order.

In did not think that I would have to teach Mafje the laws of logic. European colonialism meant colonization by category A countries (European). Self-colonization in my sense meant being colonized by category B countries (fellow African). Zanzibar was previously colonized by category A (the British). Zanzibar was subsequently colonized by category B (i.e. Tanganyika).

Therefore Zanzibar was recolonized. Obviously there is no contradiction between ‘self-colonization’ and ‘recolonization’. Just as self-conquest is a meaningful concept, ‘self-colonization’ is equally operational. But self-colonization can only be saved from being malignant if it is not permanent or if it is legitimized by a vote of the colonized people.

But between the self and the other is there something called the United Nations? Is that an intermediate political and moral actor? I thought it was self-evident in both my original Herald Tribune article and in my first response to Mafje that I believed that Africa needed the United Nations and its specialized agencies. How much guidance does Mafje need in interpreting my sentences? There are two forms of reconcolonization which I regard as potentially defensible under certain circumstances – by fellow Africans and by a multi-racial United Nations. I do happen to believe in both Africa and the United Nations, but both are for the time being dominated by the West. Just as I am unwilling to reject Africa simply be-
cause it is Western-dominated, I am unwilling to reject the United Nations either. If Mafeje read more of my work (instead of just the Herald Tribune) he would know my real position.

Mafeje thinks I am an Afro- pessimist because I have identified areas of decay and vulnerability. On the contrary, I am an Afro-optimist because I come up with ideas about how Africa can transcend those problems. Mafeje’s paradigm focuses more on ECOWAS and SADC as failures. My more optimistic paradigm views these as organizations which simply need more experience, better leadership, and a will to act more creatively. We also need more effective continent-wide organizations. Endless verbiage about some ‘crisis of accumulation’ will get us nowhere.

Nor must we be limited to what will work in the next few years. It is time we planned the future of our continent with longer term horizons in mind. That means we need to institutionalize Pax Africana.

On Exile and Domesticity

Dr. Mafeje taunts me for being in exile. As a neo-Marxist Mafeje should know that exile is for some people a more creative condition than being at home. Does Mafeje remember for how long Karl Marx was in exile from his native Germany? Over thirty years! All those years he spent at the British Museum were much more fruitful for the intellectual history of the world than if Marx had remained at home in Germany to be silenced or imprisoned. V.I. Lenin also had a spell in exile before the 1917 Russian revolution.

What about Marx’s friend and benefactor, Friedrich Engels? What was he doing making money from capitalist ventures in Manchester, England, while the German people suffered from tyranny? Engels also found exile much more productive than political domesticity.

History is littered with radicals, liberals and intellectuals who were forced into exile by the intolerance of power at home.

Just as exile is not necessarily barren, residence at home is not necessarily fruitful either. Indeed, as a South African, Mafeje should know that being located in Africa is no guarantee that one is rooted in African reality. The whites of South Africa were located in Africa for generations, but to all intents and purposes they were racial exiles. The question which arises is whether the archie Mafeje of Africa are ideological exiles in spite of being physically located in Africa. I suspect that if he and I were to address the same audience in South Africa, and I discussed ethnicity and race, and he addressed the ‘crisis of accumulation’, I would be closer to the real nerve of South African reality than he, would, given his ‘exile vocabulary’.

Would he like to test this out in practice before a live audience in a debate with me in South Africa or Kenya?

What about my own physical exile? How voluntary is my own exile in the United States? What about Mafeje’s location – is he in Africa by default?

Mafeje says I did not have to be a professor-at-large at the University of Jos when I could have become a professor-in-residence. It is obvious that Archie Mafeje does not have a clue that I had been a professor-in-residence at the University of Jos for years. Since he knows so little about my life, why does he presume to judge it?

He does not know that I have offered myself more than once to my old university, Makerere, in Kampala, Uganda, and not been taken up. He does not know that I have not been invited to give a public lecture on any of the campuses in Kenya since Kenyatta died in 1978.

How much freedom to say what I want would I have in Kenya? One test was the fate of my television series. Mafeje does not seem to know that my television series, The Africans: A Triple Heritage, which has been shown in dozens of countries, in several languages, has not been shown in my own country. Mafeje thinks I am hob-nobbing with the powerful in Africa. He does not have a clue about my life and its relationship with the powerful in Kenya.

Since he knows so little about me personally why is he giving me personal advice? I do not know much about his life either. But I hear rumours that Mafeje recently applied for a job in the United States. He was even short-listed. If he did not succeed in his application, it is not hard to understand why he is making a Pan-African virtue out of his failure to get the job. Is he in Africa by default?

On Power and the Intellectuals

Mafeje is right to raise the issue of power in relation to the role of intellectuals. But Mafeje has a few contradictions to sort out. I have been to South Africa every year since Nelson Mandela was released. My credentials have been intellectual and academic. Dr. Mafeje would like to know who has been playing host. A ctually it has varied. The range of hosts has included universities, religious groups, a Black Chamber of Commerce, a major national newspaper, students’ groups, and a non-profit organization for international peace. Admittedly, I have never been invited by the poorest South African, partly because they have never heard of me. But I suspect they have never heard of Archie Mafeje either.

Mafeje assumes that I interact only with the powerful in Africa, and he regards this as evidence that I am against the people! And yet suddenly Mafeje is on the side of dictator A beid Karume’s decision to end the independence of Zanzibar without consulting the people in a referendum. Suddenly Mafeje is on the side of the power-structure controlled by Karume and Julius Nyerere. What happened to Mafeje’s support for the people?

Nor does Mafeje seem to realize that part of the reason for Nyerere’s decision to embark on a union with Zanzibar was the pressure from the President of the United States Lyndon Johnson, and the pressure from the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. These two Western powers wanted Nyerere to prevent the emergence of an East African Marx, and Cuba, President Nyerere colonized Zanzibar partly to appease President Lyndon Johnson of the United States. I thought Mafeje was on the side of the people. Has Mafeje’s democratic instinct run out of steam over the issue of Zanzibar?

It is possible to argue that the power structure in Africa consists of politicians, soldiers and intellectuals, each category broadly defined. Politicians rely on skills of verbal manipulation and electoral horse-trading. Soldiers rely on the use or threat of military force to achieve desired goals. Intellectuals invoke the skills of wider expertise and the analytical power of the mind. Sometimes intellectuals like Julius Nyerere and Leopold Senghor become politicians. Sometimes the three categories enter into alliances with each other. How will the three units respond to the imperative of inter-African colonization?

Did I serve as an intellectual advisor to President Idi Amin Dada? Amin did want me to play ‘Henry Kissinger’ to his ‘Richard Nixon’, but I successfully wormed out of such a role. I had mixed feelings about Idi Amin.
Mafeje would liked me to tell him more about my attitude to Idi Amin, either when he took over power or afterwards. I have written a whole book about such matters entitled Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy. If Mafeje is too lethargic to read my books, he can continue his blind speculations about my relationship with Idi Amin. I invented the term lumpenmilitariet after Idi Amin captured power, and when I still lived in Uganda. The term was later adopted by a West-Indian colleague at the University of Dar es Salaam. I may write another book about the Amin phenomenon one day.

Behind Tanzania’s invasion of Idi Amin’s Uganda were there politicians, intellectuals and soldiers in alliance? Mafeje points out certain fundamental disagreements in Tanzania about the wisdom of invading Uganda. But the differences of opinion did not coincide with the divides between politicians, soldiers and intellectuals.

Dr. Mafeje keeps on trying to hold me to some intellectual standard ostensibly set by the Seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala in April 1994 at which I was a participant. But the organizers of that Congress deliberately decided to marginalize intellectuals and scholars – including Makerere academics. I was amazed at how few Makerere colleagues were in the programme, or even in attendance at all. I and other scholars (academic intellectuals) were relegated to relatively obscure workshops. High visibility roles were given to either those politicians already in power (a head of state or a foreign minister) or those military leaders struggling to share power (like John Garang of Sudan and Mohammed Farrah A ideed of Somalia). Is Mafeje’s support for the people as against the power-structure. Mafeje changes like a chameleon according to which power-structure he approves of.

I turned up at the Kampala Congress with 30 copies of my own paper concerning the spectre of recolonization. Copies of my paper disappeared without a trace – but with no impact at all on the final communiqué, since nobody in the drafting committee had read it! I gave copies of my paper to the Uganda Press, who were also slow. Strangely enough, Uganda did not pay attention until the same material was published in the K enya Press.

Mafeje as a long-established intellectual should know by now that where an article is published can make all the difference in its impact. My views on recolonization were known in Africa before they were published in The International Herald Tribune – but once they were published in The Herald Tribune and in a syndicated column of the Los Angeles Times, even Mafeje sat up and noticed. African intellectuals themselves react differently to articles published in major Western media than to articles published in African newspapers and magazines. That is one of the facts of life of international power-relations and intellectual know-how.

Mafeje is right to compare African intellectuals with other intellectuals abroad. But how much does Archie Mafeje really know about Edward W. Said and his ideas? Mafeje keeps trying to cast me against Edward Said, the Palestinian scholar and man-of-letters. I assume Mafeje trusts Edward Said’s judgment. In his book Culture and Imperialism (1993) Edward Said described me as ‘a distinguished scholar... whose competence and credibility as a first-rank academic authority were questioned’ (page 38). Professor Said went on to defend me against the furious attacks against me by the New York Times ‘television critic’, John Corry. This is how Edward Said (1993:38-39) put it:

| Here at last was an African on prime-time television, in the West, daring to accuse the West of what it had done, thus reopening a file considered closed. That M azruil spoke well of Islam, that he showed a command of Western historical method and political rhetoric, that, in fine, he appeared a convincing model of a human being – all these ran contrary to the reconstituted imperial ideology for which Corry was perhaps inadvertently, speaking. |

Elsewhere in the book Edward Said includes me among a handful of intellectuals whose ‘scholarship [has been] a catalyst for other scholars’. (p.261). Earlier Said had made the following observation in another context (1993:239):

| ...it is no longer possible to ignore the work of Cheikh A. Diop, Paulin Hountondji, V.Y. Mudimbe, Ali M azrui in even the most cursory survey of African history, politics and philosophy. Why is Archie Mafeje trying to deceive readers of the CODESRIA Bulletin that Edward Said and I are ideologically and epistemologically at war with each other? I have myself always admired Said’s work. And I have quoted Edward Said’s own words of his scholarly solidarity with me. Does Mafeje have any evidence from Said’s writings to the contrary? Or is Mafeje as ignorant of Said’s writings as he is of mine? While it is a good idea to discuss African intellectuals in relation to intellectuals from other cultures and societies, we need to begin from a higher level of discourse than Professor Mafeje has afforded us so far. |

Conclusion

In spite of it all, I am grateful to Professor Archie Mafeje for creating a situation in which I had to explain my concepts of self-colonization and Pax Africana to readers of CODESRIA Bulletin. I am prepared to believe that Mafeje genuinely misunderstood my original article in the International Herald Tribune. Perhaps so did William Pfaff when he quotes me in his own article ‘A New Colonialism’, published in the influential American journal Foreign Affairs (1995:26).

On the other hand, Leenco Liat, an African normally living in Canada, fully understood my idea of inter-African colonization, but rejected it as both immoral and impractical Sunday Nation (Nairobi).

In the same newspaper in Kenya, Stephen Harrison’s rejection of inter-African colonization was based on a more unique argument. He argued that since post-colonial African governments had been so incompetent in governing their own countries, why should they be any more efficient in governing their neighbours? To Stephen Harrison (1995), the European colonizers were much more efficient.

The solution, I think, would be to invite them back to run the continent until the local population has been given proper time and training to take over again. This should be a commercial arrangement, in the same way that companies in trouble have to bring in temporary management expertise, or when receivers are appointed to run the affairs of near-bankrupt companies.

This is different from William Pfaff’s call in Foreign Affairs. Pfaff called upon European powers to return to Africa and complete their unfinished moral responsibility of trusteeship as colonizer. Harrison, on the other hand, was proposing a new business contractual relationship between the colonizers and the colonized.

I prefer my original position of inter-African colonization for benevolent reasons, preferably under a system which includes
Conflict Settlement in Post-Colonial Africa: Recolonization or Decolonization? A Reflection on the Mafeje/Mazrui Debate*

The Debate

Ever since the beginning of the decade, at the same time that the democratization process was launched, Africa has been plagued by serious problems which recall those it experienced on the eve and immediately after the era of independence. Not only is Africa confronted with unprecedented economic doldrums never experienced during the colonial regime, from the East to the West, North to the South, it is also rife with conflicts of all kinds, and exceptionally violent, which constitutes a matter of great concern to the intellectual elite.

As observed by Fares (1993:19), Africa is in ‘troubled waters’ and has become the subject of major concern. Already in 1964 when Tanganyika annexed Zanzibar. But we should be on guard against malignant recolonization – as when the Emperor Haile Selassie I unilaterally ended the autonomous status of Eritrea, or when Morocco attempted to deny Western Sahara self-determination. Outside Africa, India’s annexation of Goa from Portugal in 1962 was clearly either benevolent or benign, whereas India’s annexation of Kashmir in the teeth of militant opposition of Kashmiris themselves continues to be tragically a malignant annexation. Also malignant was Indonesia’s unilateral annexation of East Timor in 1975.

I can understand why my old colleague, Professor Archie Mafeje is sometimes confused. The ethics of inter-African or inter-Asian colonization are often complex. But in the quest for comprehension what we need is more light and less heat, more argument and less abuse. Perhaps one day Professor Mafeje and I will succeed in conquering our feelings in order to liberate our intellects? If such self-conquest is achieved, can self-colonization be averted?

References


As could be expected in Africa where such debates are well-sustained since the establishment of CODESRIA, M Mazrui’s proposals were met with angry protests from Mafeje who saw in this ‘benign recolonization’ attempts by the ‘malignant minds’ serving the cause of imperialism. He in turn proposed a ‘decolonization of the body politic and esprit de corps’ (Mafeje 1995:20-24) instead of a ‘recolonization’. Most naturally, Mazrui riposted (Mazrui 1995:24-26).

In its Bulletin (2, 1995), CODESRIA published items from both parties and sought the points of view of its members. We have just received this entry after it had probably been circulated in the capital cities and libraries around the world. However, it would be a wrong step on the part of CODESRIA to hurriedly end the debate which is of great interest to the African Social Science Community. If it has already done so, this reflection on the topic will constitute, for that matter, a request to reopen debates on the issue.

Parties to the Debate

Mafeje and Mazrui should be commended for initiating the debate on how to settle conflicts in Africa, and fortunately, without making an in-depth analysis of the
subject, thereby making it possible for the African social science community to further examine the issue while leaving the door open for other analyses.

I have not yet had the privilege of meeting directly with any of them although it has been my ardent desire for nearly a decade. It was when I attended CODESRIA’s Summer Institute on ‘Constitutions, Institutions and Democratic Governance in Africa’ in 1994 that I took interest in acquainting myself with some of the articles written by Mafeje and Mazrui.

The little I knew of Mafeje was that he was one of the leading intellectuals of the continent. The several telephone calls I had received from Egyptian intellectuals and those from other African countries, in reaction to M Mazrui’s article, testify to his position in the African social science community. I knew M Mazrui as one of the celebrated social scientists of the continent. He is one of the best social science professors in USA and in Africa where the sense of solidarity makes it obligatory on us to express satisfaction at the beautiful hut built by one’s neighbour. I hold him in high esteem! Consequently, Mafeje and Mazrui are leading personalities in the social science field. Consequently, a young researcher should bow before such monuments with the greatest respect and admiration, even if he does not fully share the ideas expressed by any of his elders.

I did not know that Mafeje and Mazrui were both lecturers in American universities, one in Cairo and the other in New York.

I was however convinced that, as leading social scientists from East Africa, they must surely have known each other very well. Mafeje found it necessary to sum up the ‘itinerary of Ali Mazrui’ in a few words and even if the latter did not deem it necessary to do the same for the former, there is no doubt that they both knew each other very well. For more than a quarter of a century, they have established suspicious friendly relations characterized by cordial and fraternal contempt. On this point, I have not been disappointed. The critical stand taken by Mafeje against his colleague M Mazrui and the strong rejoinder of the latter constitute a sufficient proof.

Mafeje’s Critical Outlook

Personally, I did not understand why, in response to the proposals made by M Mazrui on the settlement of conflicts in Africa, Mafeje made such a strong attack on the former, referring to his professional life and his works. The impression created is that Mafeje went ‘too far’.

In his criticism of Mazrui, Mafeje described the famous professor as a ‘malignant mind serving the cause of imperialism’. Fortunately, the term does not imply ‘evil spirit’ in Islam as it is in Christianity. Otherwise, Mazrui and his abundant ‘diabolic works’ would be subjected to the sentence passed on Salman Rushdie and his Satanic Verses. In fact, that is exactly what Mafeje is praying for.

Before criticizing his ideas, Mafeje attacked the colleague’s personality in the following terms: ‘M Mazrui’s self-centeredness is well known to African intellectuals residing in the continent and abroad’. He then made ironical statements about him: ‘It is said that M Mazrui is the leading African professor. He is reportedly one of the three “megaprofessors” presently in the social science field in the United States of America’.

A according to Mafeje, the celebrated Mazrui owed his fame to the certificates lavished on him, the publicity made around him by ‘his western show case’ for which he ‘operates’ and whose interests he serves. For Mafeje, Mazrui is simply useless as a social scientist:

M Mazrui [...] has become a master in the art of forging attractive expressions which recall ludicrous and ridiculous images. He has never believed in carrying out a real empirical work [...] the only issue he once raised was whether work done in a library was worth anything. Indeed, judging by the bibliography of his works, he obviously culled most of his data from newspaper clippings, news items from radio broadcasts and his conversations [...] He conceives brilliant but short-lived ideas comparable to phosphorus in a bowl of water. Is it lack of sufficient intellectual ability or self-prostitution?

Mafeje’s answer to this question on Mazrui is certainly affirmative:

the discourse of Mazrui leaves much to be desired intellectually... it is superficial, sensational and dishonest... Mazrui makes suggestions bordering on mental alienation. He is easily excited by an idea and loses any sense of reality [...] A bove all, he has a confused mind.

Instead of talking about himself, Mafeje showed his preference for Edward Said ‘the illustrious Palestinian professor’ at Columbia University whose works and scholarship ‘would totally astound M Mazrui’ and Galtung ‘a brilliant and practical European professor’ who made to Africans a recommendation ‘with some wisdom which our African professor did not have’. Complex (which?) or refusal to recognize the merits of a renowned colleague? Such were the sentiments shared by African intellectuals. In any case, more than twenty books and about a hundred articles published as well as chairs in leading universities prove that our brother M Mazrui is an eminent intellectual.

Cheikh Anta Diop, our scholar and our celebrated Samir Amin are not prominent because they are not in the good books of the western world. However, they are eminent by virtue of their intrinsic qualities. The western world did not offer them red carpets. Never mind if it offers Professor Mazrui red carpets. Would one refuse to recognize him if a Nobel Prize were awarded to him, simply because one does not share his ideas or that the prize would have been awarded to him by the western world? As confessed by Mafeje, ‘in spite of all that, Mazrui had a lot of qualities to make professors in Africa and elsewhere envious of him’. He still has them.

Mafeje asserts that ‘praising oneself does not constitute, in any way, a recommendation’. However, it is difficult to believe that the lack of courtesy towards a colleague or an unrestrained insult of an opponent whose ideas are not shared can constitute lessons learnt from the British!

The nihilism shown by Mafeje in his direct quotation of theses defended by Mazrui amply reflects the scope of the gap created between the two men over the years and which they now seem determined to bridge through heated debates.

Settling Scientific and/or Ideological Scores?

Mafeje and Mazrui have had stormy exchanges for nearly thirty years. Mafeje often felt frustrated. On several occasions, he was offended by the haughty, proud and contemptuous attitude of Mazrui, this very self-conceited liberal, towards his African papers:

His direct meetings with his African colleagues, the young and old alike, generally led to negative intellectual and ideological reactions of the latter [...]

CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos 3 & 4, 2008 Page 81
This remark dates back to our university days at Makerere College, in the mid-1960s [...] 

The situation remained the same 25 years later, as revealed at a colloquium organized by CODESRIA in 1991 in Kampala [...] I also tried, on my part, to engage M azrui in a more peaceful debate but all my efforts were in vain. 

During an Afro-Arab conference held at Sharja in 1977 [...] one of the intellectuals from the United States left the Conference hall in protest against this man’s obscenity. 

Ali A. Mazrui
Binghamton University, USA
M afje therefore had several scores to settle with Mazrui personally and on behalf of other African intellectuals who, at one time or other, felt scandalized by the remarks of the latter.

Furthermore, when the article written by M azrui was published in October 1994, M afje received telephone calls from African intellectuals and scientists who were ‘outraged’ and in January 1995 in Europe, a copy of the original text was sent to him by African colleagues. These reactions confirmed my fears: M afje is a great man; nonetheless, why the ‘alert’ and calls solely to M afje? Why did the Egyptian correspondents ask him such questions ‘with indignation’? What kind of African intellectual is this M azrui? Why were the African colleagues so preoccupied with sending him the original article written by M azrui? The response to these questions seems clear. His correspondents knew fully well that M afje was one of the rare African academics who was quite familiar with the itinerary of M azrui, his personality and his ideas. He was one of the few personalities who could confront him. They were also aware that no one else had ever been so outraged by M azrui as M afje and that the Cairo American University Professor was the only African intellectual better armed to lead the battle with all the force required to break the myth built around the famous East African Professor of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton, University of New York. An ‘alert’ by way of telephone calls was enough. M afje did not have cause to solicit such entreaties. One could count on his immense talent at this crucial moment. One could take him into full confidence as to his ability to institute, as expected, a brainstorming debate on M azrui, and he really deserved it. He was not disappointing, for he discharged his duty with enthusiasm. 

Since M azrui is presented by his opponent as a ‘malicious spirit in the service of imperialism’, a self-conceited liberal acting for his western audience, an unrealistic intellectual hostile to ‘leftist’ ideas, a conscientious agent of capitalism who is unconscious of racism, as well as the peripheral adviser of centralism and the neo-colonial order guaranteed by the United Nations, the brainstorming debate launched against him by M afje should also be directed against ‘imperialism’, ‘liberalism’, the western world, ‘rightist parties’, capitalism, racism, centralism, colonialism, neo-colonialism or ‘re-colonization’ and, to a certain extent, against the United Nations system. 

In any case, was it a prophecy or provocation? – M azrui had warned that his comments were ‘frightening ideas for a proud people who had spilled so much blood and deployed all the necessary political will to liberate themselves from the hegemony of European powers’. He should therefore have expected to be confronted by M afje, one of the most dignified adversaries of ‘imperialism’ in Africa and one of the most ardent defenders of African nationalism, resolutely committed to the Left out of conviction and necessity. M afje denounced the demons of ‘imperialism’ (the term is used abominably three times along with ‘imperialist’, ‘four times’), of capitalism (two times as a noun and two times as a qualifying adjective) and racism (three times) who accompany the ‘devil of colonialism or recolonization’ of which the professor acts as a prophet. 

As a self-styled radical nationalist, M afje has not forgotten that, in 1966 at Makerere, M azrui had made a disturbing statement affirming that, without the English language, there would never have been any such thing as ‘African Nationalism’. However, in 1993, M azrui returned to his point of departure: like other intellectuals, he declared that a nation which does not produce knowledge in its own language cannot develop. M azrui never reacted. Nevertheless, since it is never too late to return to one’s good opinion or idea, should we reproach him for this? Unless we wish to preach some fixed ideas in social sciences or demonstrate scientific fetishism, both of which do not fit M afje at all. The important thing now is to, among other things, find out whether since 1991, those excellent ideas have begun to materialize or whether these African intellectuals who take pleasure in abstract phraseology, have finally moved on from slogans to concrete actions so that African nations produce knowledge in their own languages. Unfortunately, several of them, alienated to the marrow, continue to act as sycophants of Anglophone or the puppets of Franco-phonie. The conclusions we drew from the colloquium on Educational Innovation in Post-Colonial Africa, held in Cape Town in December 1994, remain a dead letter for lack of support from governments which are on the payroll of western ‘cultural imperialism’. Swahili, for example, which can serve as a tool for the production of scientific works in East Africa, continues to be regarded as ‘degrading’ and I have observed with much admiration that M afje and M azrui continue to produce knowledge in a style of Shakespearean English which they communicate to their students in American universities with great skill, with one demonstrating his talent in Africa, and the other in America itself. The sad reality is that we do not only continue to produce works in foreign languages; we also seem to impart knowledge not to our people primarily but to people in the western world. 

In M afje, one observes the expression of a ‘leftist’ who has not forgotten and who is not likely to forgive or make concessions to the too liberal M azrui who has built a solid reputation for himself by waging war against the African ‘leftists’. 

In 1970, he denounced the leftists of Dar-es-Salaam University for their intolerance and declared that everyone had the right to express his opinion. 

Is intolerance the ‘strong point’ of the ‘left’? M afje also had a grudge against this generally ‘unrealistic’ man who perceived the fundamental ideas but refused to draw practical lessons from them unless they emanated from the ‘left’. 

Finally, it is the colonial monster itself that M afje is fighting, there is no such thing as a recolonization’ or ‘benign colonization’. From this point, the professor suddenly shifts from scientific thinking to concrete action, threatening and warning: ‘Africans will not allow themselves to be deceived’. 
Decolonization and Conflict Settlement in Africa

Mafeje begins by affirming that contrary to the ‘disintegration’ issue raised by Mazrui, Africa was rather ‘decaying’. However, beyond the divergences about concepts and discourse on the sex of angles which African intellectuals are so fond of, there are basically no concrete differences and this is reflected in the fact that, notwithstanding the beautiful expressions used and the scholarly theories propounded, Africa’s situation is worsening each day as if the continent is infected by the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a result of colonization.

Mafeje sees conflict settlement in post-colonial Africa as being contingent upon ‘the decolonization of the body politic and esprit de corps’.

Mafeje has most probably presented his idea of ‘decolonization’ in one of his numerous publications which, unfortunately, he does not mention.

The fundamental issue which events brought to bear on Mazrui consisted in knowing how to settle conflicts in Africa and put an end to the ‘disintegration’ of the continent. Mazrui tried to respond to it and could not escape criticisms. For his part, Mafeje seems to be in the clouds. In the end, who is more realistic than the other? In criticizing Mazrui’s ‘unrealistic’ proposals one unfortunately gives the impression of coming up with vague suggestions. Galtung may have to be called in to impart wisdom to another African professor. However, it should be recognized that his so-called wisdom never escaped Mazrui who, like him, had suggested regional integration and who contradicts himself while insisting on self-colonization and on the need for Africans themselves to address the problems facing the continent.

Harsh Rejoinder from Mazrui

In a short rejoinder to Mafeje, Mazrui reaffirmed his proposals as already published in the International Herald Tribune. He first defended himself against the accusation that he was serving the cause of imperialism and bent on destroying Africans. Thus, he produced supporting documents to prove that the issue of ‘self-pacification’ and the search for ‘Pax Africana’ had preoccupied him for several years. The international scholar reaffirmed his support for the United States and immediately after, like an answer from the shepherd to the shepherdess, like a seriously wounded animal it seems that is called to self-defence in the trial of a scientific case the lawyer returned blow for blow, insult for insult and discourtesey for discourtesey. He loaded his anger in one of those magic words known to him alone and hurled his bomb spitefully at Mafeje whom he accused of expressing ‘confused reasoning’ and for whom he recommended ‘colonialization and inter-African intellectual re-education’. Even though Mazrui confessed that he had been ‘less spiteful and less insulting’, he is not justified for that matter. He is in a better position to know that to reply spitefulness with spite and trade insults, even if moderately applied, is not an excellent source in the social sciences.

I hope Mafeje and Mazrui, are still practising Muslims I have the greatest respect for Islam, even if I disapprove of certain Islamic principles and practices. Perhaps it might be necessary to recall this verse of the Spittle of Jude (1,9) which teaches Christians that even when involved in an argument with the Devil – the true one – about the corpse of Moses, Michael the archangel dared not utter insults against the Devil. A lais, the brainstorming debate between the two men appeared to be violent. It marked by the regrettable lack of courtesy and was rife with insults, whereas the two professors were expected to put up a better behaviour. Mafeje distinguished himself by his lightning attack, characterized from beginning to end by the type of annoyance said to be rare among Anglogphones, even when they disagree. Provoked, Mazrui unfortunately also ended up not observing professional ethics and the rules of propriety. A start, the two fighting eagles were swept off by the devil’s tide toward murky waters of the debate.

Recolonization and Conflict Settlement in the Continent

Issues such as ‘self-pacification’, ‘self-colonization’ and ‘Pax Africana’ are fundamental and date back to the early works of Mazrui. In ‘Toward a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition’ (1967), his major work in this domain, Mazrui had already expressed concern about the future of peace in Africa after the collapse of the colonial order. His proposal makes recolonization the mechanism for conflict settlement in Africa and the very basis for peace on the continent.

Peace as Conceived by Mazrui; Mazrui’s Peace Proposal

Mazrui is absolutely a man of peace! He very well merits an Afric Peace Prize and even a Nobel Peace Prize. He is obsessed by peace and really believes in it. If he spontaneously accepted the invitation to go to South Africa to listen to a Archbishop Desmond Tutu, personally congratulate President Mandela, both winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, it was partly because he was convinced that he was following their footsteps. Was it not because they had also seen in him a potential Nobel Prize Winner that they invited him? It will therefore not be surprising if Africa is again honoured with another Nobel Peace Prize through Mazrui, after being totally ignored in the past whereas it had offered shelter to the Son of God when his life was threatened in Israel.

However, Mazrui’s conception of peace is not the same as that of Tutu or Mandela. The latter conceive peace without servitude, peace without colonization or apartheid which negates it. Mazrui, on the other hand, conceives peace under slavery, under colonization, under apartheid or its new form, ‘recolonization’. Since the peace professed by the professor is practically opposed to that of the South African leaders and that the latter very well knew the professor they had invited, one may wonder whether Archbishop Tutu and President Mandela had not invited Mazrui to South Africa to subject him to what Mazrui himself called ‘interafrican intellectual re-education’! Was it not to have him change his ideas on peace that they considered it worthwhile to see him directly listen not to the Te Deum but rather the requiem in aeterna of colonization and apartheid which he always claimed to be a better guarantee for peace? The invitation was too enticing to be refused and the aim too far-fetched to be understood. Did this smack of foolhardiness or misunderstanding? The professor seized the opportunity to publish right in the heart of South Africa, which was just throwing off its cloak of racism, his famous article on ‘recolonization’, while making sure he had reserved a place for South Africa on his ‘African Security Council’. This attempt to seduce had no impact in the South African political circles and on the intellectual elite, for they did not react. However, in Soweto and the townships, the people who had paid the highest price to see the end of apartheid
wished to lead a debate on a social science subject. I am tempted to believe that Mazrui simply tried to lead a debate on a social science subject and I think he succeeded in that respect and therefore merits our gratitude. For one thing, science makes progress through the exchange of ideas and debates. Did M azrui really want to conduct debates in the African media? It is difficult to say so because he confesses through his rejoinder that his opinion on the subject has not changed over thirty good years. M azrui seems to have the nostalgia of the colonial order. Terms such as: ‘colonial’, ‘recolonization’, ‘self-colonization’ etc., have been accorded special attention in his works. In 1977, ten years after his brilliant defence of the colonial order which was on the verge of ‘disintegration’, he placed the Afro-Arab Conference in Sharja within the framework of ‘the counter-penetration of the colonizers by the colonized’. In 1994, he came up preaching ‘recolonization’ or self-colonization’. In 1995, in spite of the ‘criticism’ levelled against him by M afje, in the second edition of CODESRIA Bulletin, he persisted in his arrogance, a style which threw his enemies into panic. The Western world might have found in M azrui its best African adviser during the colonial era and since this ‘humanitarian mission’ is still not over, M azrui is one of the celebrated heads who should be exempted from presented a job application or curriculum vitae.

The peace conceived by M azrui is peace in hell, sustained by inequalities, oppression, exploitation and servitude. As far as we are concerned and, as observed by Patrice Lumumba, ‘there is neither honour nor peace in servitude’. It is not this chimeric and empty peace that the African people want. Besides, if the ‘colonial peace’, administered through flogging and exploitation had really been the right peace, nobody would have felt the need to fight or sacrifice himself for independence, unless the prominent professor ascertain that independence was an error! Besides, when he refers to ‘recolonization’ it is because at a given time, colonization has ceased and the colonial order considered better than the previous one needed to be restored. However, he who spends most of his time meeting with the colonial masters in their home countries, does he, Professor M azrui, think that the colonization of Africa ended, and hence his proposal of ‘recolonization’? The independence attained has remained nominal and the Western world is still pursuing its colonization activities in new forms through its peripheral agents and international institutions. This fact cannot be denied, unless one should continue to consider Africans as eternally under-aged or the fake independence as a genuine achievement. I cannot believe that M azrui, who knows so well the secrets of the colonial deities, can make the mistake of taking the superficial for the essence, lightning for light, startfire for day and the wrong side as the right one. In his first statement, M azrui envisaged a ‘recolonization from outside, inspired by humanitarianism […]’ and administered by powers from Africa, Asia or member countries of the United Nations Organization.

Is ‘recolonization’ by Africans conceivable for countries of Eastern or Western Europe, America or Asia which are facing problems similar or comparable to those of the African countries where the term ‘colonization’ has already been thrown into the dumping ground of history and ‘recolonization’ is viewed as a dangerous ghost to be fired at sight by nationalists? For instance, when will Bosnia, Ireland, some former Republics of USSR, certain provinces of Spain or Corsica be ‘recolonized’ by Africans? Perhaps the Professor proposes a one-way ‘recolonization’ of Africa by foreign powers with preference to the former colonizers, this would constitute a kind of repetition of the history of colonization, this time, upon request!

It is obvious that the West does not need to make any request before carrying on with an enterprise it had never really stopped. It has become the self-proclaimed guardian of the democratization process and distribution of patents for ‘good governance’, the moral authority to decide on the fairness of elections – manipulated by it at any rate – and to announce the corresponding results. It has already intervened in Zaire under cover of the Troika (the coalition comprising USA, Belgium and France) which actually constitutes the country’s supervisory authority. However, democracy under supervision is a mere facade.

In recommending a ‘recolonization based on humanitarianism’, is M azrui forgetting so soon that humanitarianism has always served as a Trojan horse for colonial invasion? Has he forgotten that at the Berlin Conference of 1885 the objective put forward for the colonization of Africa was equally humanitarian in character - to be ‘civilization’ to barbaric peoples and put an end to the slave trade […] - or that without sharing the views of the Baghd-
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Colonization establishes the colonial sys-
in Africa, it this monster is already dead
finders as well as those initiatives taken by
the latter to settle on their fatherland.
whether it came from Africa itself or from
Africans themselves or from foreigners outside Africa, coloni-
ization remains a bad experience for the
colonized peoples. The black devil is not
preferable to the white one. Moreover, a
good devil or a good colonist cannot be
found anywhere. It is therefore of no use
to bring the colonial monster back to life
in Africa, it this monster is already dead
or about to die. Who can control it?
Colonization establishes the colonial sys-
tem which crystallizes into a permanent
system of exploitation. The lightning in-
tervention of the Tanzanian army in
Uganda in 1979 to rescue the people of
that country from the bloody claws of
monstrous Idi Amin from whom M azrui
escaped and for which Africa is grateful to
God – and the intervention of
ECONOMO troops in Liberia cannot be
interpreted, in my opinion, as cases of 'Afric-
anian colonization' or 'recolonization'.
In advocating 'self-colonization' or
'recolonization' M azrui seems to forget
that 'Pax Africana' has already been im-
posed or is still being imposed in certain
States by authoritarian regimes. In such
cases, the central authoritarian state had
certain regions or provinces of the coun-
try 'recolonized' by the national dictator.
Soon after the passage of the festivities
marking the nominal independence, new
African leaders took over the seats and
armory of the white colonizers and thus
put on their helmets and held their whips.
The neo-colonial state colonizes some of
its provinces and a segment of its popu-
lation. However, like the peace preferred by
any authoritarian system, colonial
peace is an antithesis of genuine peace.
' 'Recolonization' would only generate
new liberation struggles. M azrui could
also have advocated the procedure for
settling conflicts created by the
'recolonization' process.
M azrui commends the United Nations
Organization for its peacekeeping efforts
in the world. He admits and deplores the
failure of some UN missions, but he does
not go farther. He was also expected to
have pointed to the lacunas inherent in a
system in which certain entities have a
complete say in the affairs of the Security
Council while others do not have much
or anything to say and only applaud or
laugh during General Assembly sessions
which offer several African Heads of State
and their M insisters an opportunity to
tour New York and its suburbs. I also expected
M azrui to express, in passing, the fact that
he supports Africa's membership of the
Security Council. However, this issue does
not seem to interest him, as attested in
his proposals. M aybe he has discussed it
in one of this twenty works which,
Unfortunately, are more available in the
Western world than in the African continent.
Africa will always need the United Na-
tions services but that does not mean it
will swell the ranks of those extremists
who bear a grudge against Africa for their
own reasons. It seems to me that the UN
system suffers from serving as a tool for
'recolonization' managed, moreover, in an
underdemocratic manner.
Does M azrui give the United Nations Or-
organization more than its due on account of
its peacekeeping vocation or because it
is an instrument of 'recolonization' ma-
ipulated by the countries forming the
UN Security Council, particularly the five
permanent M embers?
The two aspects go hand in hand, accord-
ing to M azrui's philosophy. First, it is
by virtue of its status as an instrument of
'recolonization' vital to world peace that
the United Nations Organization has won
the favours of the celebrated professor.
Indeed, the UN system makes it possible
for the give 'great' powers to 'recolonize'
the world, using all procedures including
even those that are contrary to the provi-
sions of international law which is itself
in an indisputable state of imperfection.
The UN peace is first the peace proclaimed
by America, Britain, France, Russia or
even China as well. This type of peace
imposed as a new form of colonial peace
is too fragile not to carry M azrui away.
It is difficult to support M azrui’s point of
view that 'the great countries' are not
those that need the services of UN and
its specialized agencies but rather 'the
small countries' of which the majority are
in Africa. Thus, taking into account the
fact that UN is a charitable enterprise for
the 'small countries', which should be
grateful to the 'great' countries, only one
step is quickly taken. Even though he does
not contradict Mafeje – who considers
that the westerners have been using him
but only asks to know whether it's
Newt Gingrich who has been using him – it
would be surprising to argue that M azrui
does not serve western interests.'
The truth is that USA, France or Great
Britain, to cite only three countries,
actually need the UN and its specialized
agencies. It is not because of the beautiful
eyes of the citizens of the 'small' countries
that USA for instance refuses to quit the
United Nations in spite of the strong criti-
cisms from a segment of its public opin-
ion. It is not for humanitarian reasons ei-
ther that the five 'great' powers refuse to
extend the membership of the Security
Council to incluate Africa, Asia or South Am erica. Their charity in this regard ac-
tually goes to Germany!
The Western states, i.e. the 'great coun-
tries' actually need the UNO to 'recolonize'
the rest of the world, to exploit it and main-
tain their leadership in the world. Such an
interest is of great significance; it is also
essential and strategic in character. G en-
eral de Gaulle even qualified UNO as a
machin (‘thing’) but neither the General
nor his successors withdrew from that
thing. I was the same General de Gaulle
who said that 'States have no friends,
they have only interests'. Ever since the
proclamation of this notion, France has
made that philosophy part and parcel of
her spiritual heritage. French interests in
the United Nations and its specialized
agencies are such that the 'Liberator of
France' dared not change course and his
successors did not do so either to dis-
credit the grandeur of France.
However, the greatness of France, like that
of the other counterparts, lies in their 'im-
perialism'. France remains within the
United Nations to strengthen its position
as a ‘super power’, to reconquer or enlarge its colonial empire.

Eventually, and as an instrument of ‘recolonization’, the United Nations Organization serves the ‘great countries’ more than it serves the ‘small’ ones, unless one considers that the apartheid system benefited the blacks more than the whites in South Africa, that the slave trade was more advantageous to the slaves than to those who sold them, that colonization was a ‘bad enterprise’ for the colonizers and very lucrative for the colonized people or that the exploitation of Africa is more profitable to Africa than to the Western world. I cannot imagine Mzuru supporting such an argument that would then call for Mafeje’s death threats.

Even ‘recolonization’ by Africa herself within the framework of an African Security Council will still benefit the Western world. Mzuru’s five ‘key States’ that will set up the said council are within the framework and under the control of the Western world. Consequently, they would only constitute western proconsulates in Africa entrusted with the administration of African territories under the authority of the West which would supply them with arms, money and experts in addition to teaching them the expedient techniques that enabled it to exploit the rest of the world for several centuries.

In his Security Council for ‘recolonization’, Mzuru seems to have forgotten two other key states which however have sound experience in the field: Morocco and Libya, which respectively inherited from Spain and France the colonies of Western Sahara and Northern Chad.

The Pan-African Emergency Force advocated by the distinguished professor also poses problems. How can Africa set up such a force, ensure its efficiency and sustain it if the continent already lacks the means of maintaining ECOMOG troops in Liberia? To intervene in Chad for example, Zaire would have to draw on the wrath and violence that mark the tombs of the martyrs. Mzuru’s five key states would therefore be tantamount to desecrating the tombs of the martyrs.

Coming back to Mzuru’s five key states, one notices that almost all of them are plagued with problems of ‘disintegration’, Egypt is shaken by internal tensions. Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zaire are breaking up and the newly born South Africa is very fragile. That being the case, from where will these prominent states mobilize the strength they need to ‘recolonize’ the others? From where will they derive the resources required to enable them to fight simultaneously on both fronts – on the one hand, by arresting their internal ‘disintegration’ and, on the other hand, by arresting the disintegration of the other countries and foster Pax Africana?

The ‘disintegration’ of a ‘key state’ is yet another relatively imminent problem. Who will ‘recolonize’ such a state, supervise it and act as its ‘big brother’. Indeed, several lessons can be drawn from the aforementioned supervision of Zaire by the ‘Troika’. The guardian will definitely come from the West.

What therefore prompted our great Mzuru to declare support for colonization or ‘recolonization’ and thus abandon ‘self-pacification’, the term he was using in the 1960s? Is it he who teaches us that, at any rate, ‘self-colonization’ and ‘recolonization’ mean the same thing to him. However, is it not possible to ‘pacify oneself without being ‘recolonized’? The answer is yes and it therefore seems to me that Mafeje and Mzuru starved away from that course which is identified with democratization.

It is strange to notice that, in the 1990s, Mzuru prefers ‘self-colonization’ or ‘recolonization’ as opposed to his preference in the 1960s when he advocated ‘self-pacification’! Is this because he has now found a better opportunity than he did find in 1960 to make people accept a proposal he would never have attempted to formulate for Africans who had just buried the martyrs of their independence? Fortunately or unfortunately, he can still find along his course nationalists such as Mafeje who, in spite of his scientific approach to the argument, does not hesitate to draw on the wrath and violence that marked the liberation movements, thereby complying with courtesy and ethics.

Democratization and the Settlement of Conflicts in Africa

More pragmatic than Mafeje, Mzuru takes the merit especially since he expressed his anguish, raised the problem of conflict settlement in Africa, proposed ‘recolonization’ as a means of fostering peace in Africa and suggested at the same time the framework for such an enterprise. Mzuru makes observations and formulates a proposal and therefore does not limit himself to merely making observations and passively accepting the status quo with resignation. He could not be expected to do anything less than that in his capacity as a scientist. Solicited on many occasions and also pestered with severe criticisms, he had the duty to reflect on this issue and he did fulfill that obligation.

In social science, certain solutions are often inappropriate because the corresponding problems are not properly defined, because efforts are not made to master the terms of the equations generally comprising several unknown quantities or that the time dimension is not adequately taken into consideration.

The fundamental question one should ask oneself before proposing solutions – ‘Decolonization’ or ‘Recolonization’ – appears as to be follows: what is or are the cause(s) of the conflicts underlying the ‘disintegration’ of Africa? This question seems to have eluded Mafeje and Mzuru.

CODESRIA organized a seminar on ‘ethnic conflicts in Africa’ from 16th to 18th November 1992 in Nairobi. Several papers were read on that occasion and these made it possible to establish the fact that almost all the countries are affected and that most of the conflicts plaguing the entire continent are closely linked to the phenomenon of ethnicity or tribalism.

Conflicts arise whenever certain groups of people are exploited by others, whenever certain provinces or regions are marginalized by the central government or consider their situation as the outcome of the authoritarian attitude of governments toward the citizens. Others are either orchestrated or entertained by forces outside Africa. Some of the conflicts appear as true liberation struggles.

The effects of external and internal imperialism cannot be permanently and effectively overcome by imposing a new form of imperialism or those forms identified
with colonialism through ‘recolonization’, however light it may be.

The root causes of the conflicts have to be overcome in order to ensure lasting peace. The said root causes are many and appear in the form of ethnocentrism, tribalism, regionalism, marginalization, oppression, inequitable development, etc.

A peace still constitutes the ultimate goal of Pax Africana and, since M. Mazrui admits that the United Nations Organization has an important role to play in this regard, it seems to me that the question he attempted to answer - which interests both M. Mafeje and myself - can be summed up as follows: ‘what is the best procedure for restoring peace in Africa?’.

Perhaps, in this regard, and as Africans, a ‘peace-loving’ people, we should rather humbly solicit the opinion of another African in the person of Boutros-Boutros Ghali of Egypt, also a professor, who is currently reputed to know better the United Nations and peace-related problems in the world, and who, by coincidence, is the incumbent Secretary General of the United Nations Organization at a time when we are fighting scientifically and shaking fists at opponents in an effort to find solutions to the conflicts plaguing Africa.

More than one year before the publication of M. Mazrui’s article and two years before the debate between M. Mafeje and M. Mazrui, Boutros-Boutros Ghali had already arrived at the conclusion that could have been taken into account to spare us heated and less courteous debates. According to him, ‘Democracy is a guarantee for peace and that sound development is impossible in the absence of democracy’ (Ghali 1993:15). Ghali also warned those who might be tempted to consider positive economic performance as a solution to conflicts: ‘if the States do not initiate democratic reforms after obtaining the first economic results, they will eventually end up with declining growth which is the source of the increasing levels of inequalities and the attendant social disorders’. Ghali ended his argument on an authoritative note: ‘I repeat, it is democracy alone that gives development a meaningful dimension’ (Ghali 1993:16).

The synchronous relationships between democracy, development and peace were also highlighted by Tafsir M. allick Ndiaye (1992:26).

After all, the general concern of everybody - M. Mafeje and M. Mazrui, members of the CODESRIA Community and all Africans - consists in settling conflicts in Africa and beyond, ensuring the survival of a continent in ‘decadence’ or being ‘disintegrated’. One of our colleagues, Ake, had earlier on observed that, for Africans in the present situation, just as for the citizens of all the States of the world, ‘Democracy is the basic prerequisite for survival’ (Ake 1991:4). One can hardly live or survive without peace. Be it at the institutional or economic level, the absence of democracy, in the broadest sense of the concept, mainly accounts for the wave of conflicts raging throughout the continent and plunging it into a state of hypertension.

Africans and all peace-loving people in the world should first of all and right now support the on-going democratization process if they wish to see lasting peace restored in each African country.

The Pax Africana worth its appellation will depend on national peace in each African State guaranteed by democracy.

There is no doubt that, as long as the human race lives, there will always be conflicts. Democracy is the ideal framework for settling conflicts. It does not suppress them but it helps to limit them and the most serious conflicts are peacefully settled through the implementation of rules established by law and through dialogue.

Peace and servitude cannot be matched, and neither can democracy and (re)colonization nor paradise and hell, for that matter. Without a real independence or full sovereignty democracy and peace are inconceivable.

Once we succeed in achieving ‘self-paciﬁcation’ for each African country, through democratization, we will then be able to tackle with greater force and success the political, economic, social and cultural integration of the continent. To this end, it will be necessary to redeﬁne the mandate of the OAU. The positive economic results obtained through a transparent and democratic management by people who set themselves back to work after winning the democratization struggle will make it possible to ﬁnance and sustain continental institutions such as the ‘Pan-African Peacekeeping Force’ to restore peace and not ‘recolonization’. Consolidated democracy, peace and development will considerably reduce the number of political and economic refugees or even ensure that there are no more refugees at all, since the factors that make people become refugees would have disappeared completely.

However, we should not jump the stages and we should not sleep on our oars. The major challenge Africa has to meet at the end of this 20th century and at the dawn of the third millennium consists in ensuring the success of the democratization process and its consolidation.

The struggle for democracy and total decolonization in Africa is already better and will be worse. However, it is an existentialist requirement binding on all citizens and peoples of Africa. Africans should therefore be prepared to confront ‘imperialism’ and all of its demons.

The Western world continues to successfully implement the ‘divide-and-rule’ principle in order to maintain African countries under its control. It plays the role of prompter or even director in several plays involving conﬂicts in Africa. It pulls the strings! Indeed, but for its intervention, many conﬂicts would not have erupted or would have easily and quickly been settled.

The action taken by the Western countries and particularly France during this ‘Transnational’ period shows that the Western world is not ready to leave Africa to assume its independence or to see it implement democracy in its own way with the men and the regimes it wishes to have but rather to follow plans with experts and men chosen and prepared by the West. Togo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Zaire and many other more examples can be mentioned. The recent coup d'état orchestrated in the Comoro Islands by the famous French mercenary Bob Denard, against a democratically elected African president, is heavily loaded with implications. For one thing, Bob is very popular in eastern Zaire and that was not the first coup d'état he had ever engineered; he had always wished to reign in Africa over Africans and France, his country, had always been more lenient with him than with ‘terrorists’. There is therefore cause to wonder if he did not operate under cover of the authorities of his country!

Furthermore, a democratic and independent Africa will be detrimental to his interests of the Western world and all those who live by exploiting Africa. After supporting the most bloodthirsty dictators in the service of its interests, the Western world continues to support the totalitarian regimes.
To prove its goodwill and to support the pacification of Africa, the Western world should cease intervening in the internal affairs of the States; they should stop imposing regimes and people of their choice on the States and rather rid the continent of the numerous mercenaries, wild dogs who are the cause of terror and many conflicts in Africa.

It is first and foremost the duty of Africans themselves to accelerate the decolonization and democratization of the continent as well as fight to cut the umbilical cord binding Africa to the Western world just as it links a baby to its mother. In this struggle against the ‘disintegration’ or ‘decay’ of the continent and for the settlement of conflicts, scientific reflection should play a predominant role and debates constitute an important framework. Yes to actions in favour of democratization and decolonization. No to ‘recolonization’, which one would however have considered understandable, in view of the status quo in Africa. Neither Mafefe nor Mazrui should be excommunicated. We should hold discussions without fighting one another. The temptation to give into A fro-pessimism is quite great but we should also consider the time-frame. Fortunately, the CODESRIA court has this characteristic quality as it receives direct summons, presides over hearing sessions and produces evidence. Moreover, it can deliberate over issues while making provision for an appeal without necessarily passing sentences or pronouncing judgements.

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*CODESRIA Bulletin, Number 1, 1996, (p. 21-30)

Preamble
First, it is important to note that this paper is not a book review but rather a review article which aims at discussing the major ideas and perspectives which emerge from Sally Moore’s book. Although no special effort will be made to follow the exact format of the book, every attempt will be made to follow through the ideas presented in a systematic way. Second, such an undertaking might serve as an advertisement of Sally M oore’s ideas about Africa and anthropology which, I daresay, are not familiar to most African scholars. In fact, it came as a surprise, at least to me, that of all the anthropologists who have worked in Africa she was the one who elected to make the final pronouncement on anthropology and Africa. Perhaps, this should be taken as a sign of her courage and deep commitment to her craft.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that in certain situations a fine distinction between courage and foolhardiness could not be made. This is meant in both the professional and the political sense.

The history of anthropology in Africa is one thing; its ideological import and practice in modern Africa is another. Besides, the question of which anthropology and which Africa is still far from being resolved. Probably, the younger generation of anthropologists and what Sally Moore contemptuously refers to as the ‘colonial mentality’ advocates are less sanguine about the future of their craft than her. The African anthropologists who do not feature at all in her book are still in a political and intellectual quandary. In South Africa and its environs volkkekunde anthropology is part of the bitter past and at present is being rejected by Africans as colonialist and racist. It transpires, therefore, that ‘anthropology’ and ‘Africa’ are abstractions which could refer to any number of things at the concrete level. In this context it is interesting to note that Euro-Americanists can easily talk and write about ‘African studies’ but not ‘African anthropology’. The difference in conception is not in the phraseology itself, which is perfectly symmetrical, but in the noun agency. In African studies, Africa is unambiguously the object whereas ‘African Anthropology’ could, among other things, refer to a specific claim by Africans. Although not recognised by the proprietors of anthropology, this impulse exists and is probably strongest in southern Africa. According to this reckoning, the alternative is the abolition of anthropology which, as is well-known, is exactly what African nationalists did elsewhere in Africa.

It is apparent, therefore, that in the present epoch scholars, whoever they are, have to contend with the antimony between intellectual imperialism and the desire by Africans for self-liberation. This is not merely a matter of ‘framework of thought’, as Sally M oore might suppose, but actual politics of knowledge-making under conditions of global imposition and its antitheses. In this respect a certain sense of sociology of knowledge even among anthropological stalwarts might be of value. Who are the makers of anthropology in the 1990s and for whom? Who are the objects of anthropology and why? Why ‘Anthropology and Africa’ and not ‘African Anthropology and Europe’? A number of answers to these questions are implicit in Sally Moore’s text? It is the

A Commentary on Anthropology and Africa*1

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intention in this review article to make them explicit?

The orientation

Anthropology and Africa is obviously not meant for an African audience. Nonetheless, it is the author’s particular hope that it will be read in Africa (Moore 1994:vii). By whom and what for, it is not clear. Nor could have the book been intended to be a guide to anthropology for the creators of anthropology in Africa – the British. Therefore, one can only surmise that it was written largely for the benefit of the American anthropologists, old and young, who are late-comers to Africa and might not be so well-versed with the inside story of British anthropology in Africa. Even so, looked at from a perspective of an African who was nurtured in the best Oxbridge anthropological traditions, the whole book could be described as a lie intelligently told. This does not reside so much in what the book says but in not saying what it means, which is the opposite of tendentious. Moore says but in not saying what it means, this is how to fight in the dark.

The Colonial Legacy

Anthropology and the colonial era constitutes half of Sally M oore’s short survey and rightly so. Before anything else it should be granted that there is no drama, without characters. There is no question about it, the colonial anthropologists were great characters and personable persons. I got to know personally the succeeding generations of British Anthropologists since Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Evans-Pritchard. I do not remember disliking any of them, except Henry Forsbrooke, the last colonial Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and a former District Commissioner in Tanganyika – a half-baked colonial anthropologist by all counts. The anthropologists I knew in Britain and in Africa such as Audrey Richards, Fortes, Leach, Goody, Firth, Schapera, Gluckman, Mitchell, Beattie, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Lucy Ma ir, Phyllis K aberny, Monica Wilson, Philip Mayer, Southall, Gulliver, Maquet, Jappie van Velsen, Gutkind, Anthropo, Blacking and a few other well-known figures were, indeed, liberals. But once in a light conversation Mary Douglas reminded me that, that was a swear word and that it was ‘kosher’ to believe.

Whether this was a friendly dig at me or not, the fact of the matter is that I used to have bitter arguments with some of them on the colonial question and white racism. In one occasion the exchange became so intense that one of my mentors, A udrey Richards, had to remind me that during the Second World War they sweet blood in the colonies, presumably for the colonised. Yet in another meeting in Lusaka M ax Gluckman, the Zulu warrior, feeling betrayed shook his fist at me warning me that my strictures against them would not do because only yesterday they were being accused by colonial whites of being traitors and now independent Africans are accusing them of being colonialists. Richards and Fortes eventually disowned me whereas Monica Wilson prayed for my soul and told the others that if they wanted to know what the other side thought I was one of the people to listen to. In contrast, Sally M oore (p.20) makes it appear tranquil and blissful:

Despite the fact that the anthropologists came from the dominant society, they were preoccupied with the dominated population, its affairs, and its well-being. Anthropologists mixed freely with the Africans among whom they worked, often living among them, acknowledging no colour bar and respecting none of the many social boundaries between rulers and ruled that were conventional among white administrators and settlers.

Sally M oore’s claim is as unanthropological as it is false. Everywhere they went, the anthropologists were Bwana Mkubwa or Mama by virtue of their skin colour in a colonial setting. They commanded the attention and the services of the natives at will. The fact that some of them were more gentle than others and did not use N adel’s ‘bullying method’ whereby he ordered his informants to his tent and hotly interrogated them is irrelevant. What remains is relations of superordination and subordination or social and political exploitation. At the formal level there is yet another distinction that should be made. By virtue of their class background, the first generation of British anthropologists in Africa enjoyed as much power as the colonial administrators with whom they collaborated in developing what became known as applied anthropology. There are well-known examples such as the Seligmans, N adel, and Evans-Pritchard in the Sudan, J.G. Jones in Nigeria. A udrey Richards in Uganda, Mitchell in Rhodesia, L estrade, van Warmelo, Odendaal, and Hammond-
Tooke in South Africa. Likewise, Darryll Forde did his best from the Royal Anthropological Institute in London. Sally M ore (pp.19-20) is our witness:

In London, the profession tried intermittently to persuade the government that anthropology could indeed help in the affairs of colonial rule. By the mid-1920s the nature of the interface between scholarly and administrative interests in Africa had become clearer (pp.19-20), (note the choice of words). This did not apply to the next generation of British anthropologists who went to Africa in the period leading up to independence e.g. Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, John Beattie and a number of their contemporaries from the Manchester School. Not only were they not empire-builders but not also they took no particular interest in the colonial government. All the same they still enjoyed some prestige and respectability. Things were to change rapidly with the advent of independence. The first generation of British anthropologists who came out to Africa shortly after independence e.g. Caroline Hutton, A n Sharman, Suzette Halld, Joan Vicent, Rachel Yeld, Sandy Robertson and a few others enjoyed neither prestige nor respectability. They were on their own. The political and ideological environment was hostile. They were under pressure to account for themselves. They responded by being generally anti-colonial, anti-colonial anthropology, and denounced structural-functionalism. They avoided tribal studies like plague and opted for thematic topics which focussed on processes of transformation. Most of them were good researchers but it was never clear whether or not what they did was reproduction of anthropology under changed conditions. One thing certain is that they never enjoyed the same eminence as their predecessors. In fact, by the time I left Cambridge in 1968 none of my students wanted to go to Africa for fieldwork. One of them chose to go to Mongolia, another to the Amazon, and yet another to the A taa Mountains. So, when Sally M ore refers to a flourishing anthropological enterprise in Africa I truly do not know what she is referring to. In her book she has great problems proving her case. But for the time being, my contention is that the trends I have sketched above marked not only the decline of colonial anthropology in Africa but also the ensuing atrophy of anthropology itself in Africa.

It is obvious that in the context of the foregoing discussion, personalities and individual attributes were not the issue. Colonialism was the issue. Anthropology got identified with colonialism because of its objects and epistemology of alterity. It was introduced by people whose professional interests were the same as those of the colonial administrators. The fact that the two shared the same structural position and often collaborated to perfect the desired system of political control made it possible for the Africans to distinguish between them, politically and ideologically. The argument that the anthropologists cared for their objects of study and defended them when necessary misses the point and is too subjective to be useful. A part from the implicit paternalism, protecting individual groups did not amount to anti-colonialism on a broad front, which is what African nationalism signalled.

M any liberal anthropologist hated black ’agitations’ and trouble-makers and did not want them to come anywhere near their ‘people’ almost in the same way that Sally M ore hates the ‘colonial mentalities’ critiques within anthropology. The only two anthropologists I know of who joined the nationalist movement in the countries where they were doing research caused a stir not only among colonial administrators but also among their fellow-anthropologists who felt that it was ‘not necessary’. Likewise, when an anthropologist from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute fell in love with a young woman from the tribe he was studying and wanted to marry her, he was forced to resign and was advised to disappear from Northern Rhodesia. A similar situation occurred in M akere when a British woman shortly after independence had a child by a M asai elder but this time could insist on keeping it and remain in independent Uganda. Colonialism went hand in hand with racism even among anthropologists. This is to be expected because they were part of the colonial community. If any changes were taking place, they were not due to change of a ‘framework of thought’ among the anthropologists, as Sally M ore is so well aware, but to the dynamics of decolonisation.

Deconstruction or Reconstruction of Anthropology?

Undoubtedly, Sally M ore does not believe in the deconstruction of anthropology as an historical-determined process and is obviously contemptuous of those who so believe. In her book she remarks (p. 22):

These connections between, anthropology and the colonial enterprise became the subject of considerable invective in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the ‘colonial connection’ became a political issue among ‘radical’ internal critics of anthropology just at the point at which such connection no longer had any practical relevance, i.e. in a post-colonial reaction. Other attacks came from African academics who wanted to repossess control of scholarship concerned with their own societies. This invective went on for decades. In a book which purports to be a historical guide to anthropology one would have expected that even these bastard children of anthropology would be mentioned as authors in their own right. But none of them features in the text, except James Clifford and Paul Rabinow. Their omission is definitely tendentious. Whatever one thinks of the deconstructionist literature of the late 1960s and the 1970s in anthropology, it is historically and sociologically important. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (A sad 1973), Reinventing Anthropology (Hymes 1974) and ‘The Responsibility of the Social Scientist Symposium’ in Current Anthropology, 9, 1968 probably marked a turning-point in anthropology. Any arguments by people such as Sally M ore that the authors of these texts were merely reiterating what anthropologist had already been doing are misguided and superficial. The intensity of that debate which lasted for ‘decades’ indicates that there was more than meets the eye.

First, they signalled a growing paradigmatic crisis within anthropology which was brought about by social and economic transformations of anthropological units of analysis. Second, they were a response to the anti-colonial revolution in regions such as Africa. The former colonial subjects were refusing to be treated as objects of curiosity and hence the political intervention by newly independent African governments. Third, there was a political and intellectual ferment in Europe and America in the form of the student movements of the 1960s which questioned traditional forms of knowledge and their organisation, something which threatened an epistemological break, especially in the social sciences. There was also the rise of Black Power which pro-
duced the Montreal hurricane in 1969, and the anti-Vietnam War protest in America. Here, we witness a conjuncture of historical forces which made the so-called invective protracted. One is not sure if the battle is yet over, despite Sally Moore’s complacency. For the time being and contrary to what she claims, one notes that there is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterises anthropology as a discipline nor are there emerging paradigms at least in Africa which distinguish what passes as anthropology from other social science disciplines. What seems to be the case is that if one declares oneself an anthropologist in advance, then, as if by fiat, one’s work becomes ‘anthropological’. Also, most interesting from the point of view of Sally M o o r e’s testimony and epistemology of subjects and objects, the anthropological enterprise in Africa is flourishing, without Africans. As if to rub in the point, she does not refer to any African authors, except Mudimbe for negative reasons which will be commented upon later. Suffice it to say, from what one knows about the current situation in African studies, the veracity of her claim is in doubt.2

In rejecting the deconstructionist critique as spurious, Sally Moore (pp. 22-23) has this to say:

A part from the vituperation of the 1960s and 1970s, which often became as drearily conventionalized as the vulgarized conceptual straw men it attacked, there was in addition considerable serious questioning of the models on which so much of anthropological theory had been founded. The ahistoricity and selective constructions of the structural-functional paradigm became strikingly clear. The ‘colonial period mentality’ critiques represented one dimension of the more general proposal that a new set of problematic be addressed.

This is a grand statement like Sarastro quelling the hysteria of the Queen of Night in the Magic Flute – completely unillustrated but commanding. At what point did the ahistoricity of structural-functionalism become strikingly clear and what brought about this new revelation, apart from the ‘vituperation’ of the 1960s especially? While it is true that structural-functionalism did not mean the same thing to all British anthropologists and that individuals such as Leach, Firth, and Audrey Richards could hardly be described as structural-functionalists, it is also true that they were not responsible for the demise of the structural-functional paradigm. It was the younger generation who mounted a sustained attack on structural-functionalism first as graduate students in the mid-1960s and later as Sally Moore’s ‘radical’ upstarts from within. Among these may be mentioned Adam Kuper, Maurice Bloch, Ralph Grillo, Jim Faris, Jack Stauder (whom they sacked from Harvard for his ‘colonial mentality’ obsession), and Marilyn Strathern, to mention only those I knew in Cambridge. There were others at University College in London. The Protest of this younger generation had an impact not on the senior generation of anthropologists but on the intermediate generation notably Jack Goody and Mary Douglas. In Oxford to achieve the same effect, it seems that one had to undergo a certain kind of spiritual transformation as in the case of Rodney Needham. But certainly, in seminars and in informal discussions people like Jack Goody and Mary Douglas used to listen with interest to these ‘noises’ and began to address them indirectly lest (?) they were accused of encouraging rebellion by the old guard. Insofar as this is true, unlike Sally Moore’s sages who knew it all from the beginning, they were liberated by the younger generation. In Jack Goody’s case one could draw a graph which portrays these changes accurately and which would amuse Enid Schildkrout and Keith Hart who became members of his extended family.

As far as the ‘ahistoricity’ of structural-functionalism is concerned, it is obvious that one had to stand outside this particular paradigm to be able to accuse its adherents of ahistoricism. The founders of British structural-functionalism were ahistorical by choice and conviction: anthropology was meant to be a science which established causal connections from direct observation, whereas history belonged to the humanities and established causal connections indirectly and through extrapolation. So, history was not and could not be an integral part of anthropology. This has nothing to do with awareness of the ‘time dimension’ in Sally Moore’s simple sense. Of course, every anthropologist was aware of time and change but for structural-functionalism the problem was how to incorporate it into its theoretical-construct, without becoming ‘historical’, probably, in the sense of social history. This had deconstructionist implications which could not be faced, without radically transforming the discipline itself. To wit every good British anthropologist concluded his/her monograph with an appendix on current changes in the community under study. Some even went further and revisited their ‘tribes’ after some years so as to get two static pictures separated by time in order to compare them in what was called the diachronic method.

There were also monographs devoted to social change, of which the best known is Analysis of Social Change by G. and M. Wilson (1945). A s Sally M o o r e correctly points out, the book was a comparison of two static models or stereotypes of ‘primitive’ vs ‘modern’ society. Implicit in this were a number of colonial and Eurocentric presuppositions which were critically reviewed by Ben M agubane in his article, A Critical Look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Africa (1971). His critique included some of the works by the members of the Manchester School to which Sally M o o r e is unmistakably partial. The amazing thing, perhaps not so amazing, is, that she does not even mention M agubane’s work, despite the impact it had on the younger generation of anthropologists both in Britain and in America.

Sally Moore believes that ‘situational analysis’ and ‘extended-case method’ introduced by the members of the Manchester School helped anthropology to move away from the ‘closed system’ version of functionalism. However, she does not say whether or not they remained functionalist or became historical. No doubt, ‘situational analysis’ was dynamic and exciting like all drama. But where did it lead to? It led to confirmation of functional equilibrium through ordered or ritualised conflict. As Sally Moore acknowledges, most of this was inspired by Gluckman’s work and ideas as are found, for instance, in Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa (1952). Custom and Conflict in Africa (1955), and Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa (1963). Victor Turner’s Schism and Continuity in an African Society (1957) was in the same mould. Even in his later work which was on symbolic systems, e.g., The Forest of Symbols (1967), and The Drums of Affliction (1968) he never abandoned the idea of structural reconciliation or respite by affirming community solidarity through ritual. In this sense he was more Durkheimian than Levi-Straussian. A nother
interesting example from the Manchester School is *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy* by William Watson (1958). He sought to show that Mambwe in then Northern Rhodesia participated in a money economy without losing their tribal cohesion i.e. they managed to maintain dynamic equilibrium under changing economic conditions. As would be noticed, the referent in all these studies is the ‘tribe’. This means that, far from transcending the tribal framework, situational analysis succeeded only in recognising rhapsodic explosions with the same melodic lines as in medieval motets.

Sally Moore credits Gluckman for having planted the seed, referring in particular to the analysis of a situation on the bridge in Zululand and his assertion that an African miner is a *miner*, meaning that once they sell their labour in the urban areas Africans cease to be tribesmen but become urban proletarians as everyone else. But in the context of discussions about ‘detribalisation’ in Africa, Gluckman was not able to sustain his position in the historic symposium on social change in modern Africa in Kampala in 1959 because he granted that once an African worker returns to his village he is ‘retribalised’ (Southall, 1961). It was Watson who gave a clearer answer to this apparent paradox by arguing that the African migrant worker did not have to choose between these two worlds; he belonged to both Gluckman could not have liked this much because his subjective position (stated to me in several occasions) was that either the Africans were left alone to enjoy their traditional splendour or, if that could not be sustained, that there was a complete revolution. To this extent he sympathised with the South African Communist Party. Even so, he remained a colonial rebel, something he could never understand or accept. Neither would Sally Moore because of an inability or unwillingness to see history as so many interpretations of reality and also because of a deep-seated belief in the absolute objectivity of their own perceptions.

**Social Change as Unrecognized History**

In her book Sally Moore sees some significance in the fact that Gluckman was brought up in South Africa, where the confrontation between black and white is more direct and self-imposing? Where for this reason or another, under the topic ‘detribalisation’ she introduces a sustained comparison between the Wilsons and the Mayers. The works in question are *Analysis of Social Change* (1945) by the former and *Townsman or Tribesman: Conservatism and the Process of Urbanisation in a South African City* (1961) by the latter. The issue is whether ‘culture loss’ or ‘detribalisation’ on the part of the African signifies that great transformation from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilised’; or conversely whether retention of ‘tribal’ traditions is a mark of conservatism or unwillingness to be ‘civilized’. These are basic and topical issues in Africa. But I would say, the choice of texts by Sally Moore is less than perfect. It is hard to imagine how she could compare a 1945 text with a 1961 text. The counterpart of the Mayers’ book is *Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township* (1963) by M. Wilson and A. M. Afeje and *The Growth of Peasant Communities* by Monica Wilson in M. Wilson and L. Thompson eds, *The Oxford History of South Africa* Vol. II (1971).

In *Townsman and Tribesmen* the Mayers identified a category of people they call the ‘red people’ i.e. those who paint themselves with red ochre or dip their traditional shawls and skirts in red ochre (amagaba in Xhosa). According to the Mayers, these people are conservative because they refuse to give up their traditional values and habits and to assimilate to the urban environment. The Mayers admired them for their insistence to be themselves but at the same time admit that in the urban environment they are disadvantaged because preference is given to ‘school people’. The latter are Christian converts, otherwise called ‘amagoboka’ in Xhosa. At the beginning they were forced to learn the three Rs in missionary schools and hence they were referred to as ‘school people’ (abantu basesikolweni in Xhosa). These represented modernity according to the Eurocentric model and were favoured. However, as time went on and segregation or apartheid took over not all Christian converts had access to education and not all pagans rejected modern education. Consequently, the distinction between the two was getting blurred, especially in the urban areas where everybody wears European clothes. Therefore, the Mayers could only have arrived at their classification by asking projective questions to which they would get answers according to the convenience of the respondents. So, we actually do not know whether the people they interviewed were in fact ‘red people’ or “school people”. All we know is that they were conservative rural migrants.

In undertaking the Langa study we avoided what we thought was a procedural error on the part of the Mayers. Instead of thinking in terms of ‘school’ and ‘red people’, we thought of urban-oriented people. In Langa this was not difficult to determine because the migrant workers were quartered in the barracks whereas the permanently urbanised African population was housed in individual municipality bungalows. The first category was referred to by the people themselves as ‘amagoduka’ (those who return home) and the second category as ‘abantu baselokishini’ (location people or townpeople). Secondly, mindful of the fact that labour migration to cities like Cape Town favours those who have some education, we tried to see whether urban-orientedness among the migrants was at all correlated with more than average rates of education among what was called ‘amagoduka’. It turned out that the least educated or the uneducated migrants tended to be more conservative and rural-oriented than those who had received better education and found it easy to interact with the location people whose codes they had acquired through modern education. This had nothing to do with ‘detribalisation’. It had something to do with social differentiation or class-formation among urban Africans in Cape Town. For that matter, even the conservative migrants could not be thought of as ‘red’ or ‘school’ people nor as ‘tribesmen’. They were merely peasant migrants who recognised common regions or districts or origin. For this reason, instead of referring to them as ‘tribesmen’, we adopted the commonly used urban terminology, ‘homeboys’.

Clyde Mitchell contended with some of these problems in what was then the Rhodesians. Sally Moore refers to his *Kalela Dance* (1956) but not so much to his *Tribalism and the Plural Society* (1960). There were often questions as to whether Mitchell’s work was anthropological or sociological. In his urban studies Mitchell frequently used ‘tribalism’ as a term of reference but maintained that substantively it referred to more than one thing. For instance, he believed that in the Kalela dance the Bisa were not asserting their tribal identity but rather their ethnic identity in a multi-ethnic environment in the Copperbelt. He contended
that ethnic identity in everyday interaction in the Copperbelt was more important than anything else. Even this claim he qualified by pointing out that his observation applied only to inter-African relations and not to black and white relations. In the latter case ethnic differences were of no consequence. He elaborated on this theme in his *Tribalism and the Plural Society*. This was effectively about the interaction between race, ethnicity, and class in a colonial society. In the context of this late analysis M. Itchell had the opportunity to decide whether his term of reference was going to be ‘tribalism’ or ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’, buthedidnot. His kalela dancers in the Copperbelt could have been looked upon as rural-oriented peasant migrants as against the urban-oriented, educated, and non-ethnic trade union leaders who were destined to be among future nationalistic leaders who led the anti-colonial movement. In Southern Rhodesia and South Africa once again it is the urban-oriented, educated class which spear-headed the struggle against racial domination and oppression under white minority regimes. So, the Wilsons could not have been altogether wrong in supposing that the modernizing African elites were antiethnical to pre-colonial social formations. Their major crime was Euro-centricism. They supposed that these elements would be European-like and not just be modern Africanics with their own social peculiarities. In a surprising outburst in a seminar in Leiden some years ago A. damn Kuper accused the Christian anthropologists in Africa of proselytizing in that they used conversion to Christianity as an index of modernity or civilization. Although he did not say as much, this indirectly explained why Jewish anthropologists, at least in South Africa, identified more with the conservatives than ‘school people’. To an African, this was not immediately comprehensive because most Africanics do not know who is a Jew or a Christian. They simply know of Africans and foreigners use the term does not necessarily mean ‘tribe’ and for many issues did not represent the most meaningful unit of study.

This is in contrast to an honest declaration by Gulliver (p. 92) whom she quotes. In his words: “The natural ‘unit’ of study for the anthropologist in Africa has been the tribe – not the ‘tribe’ under colonial rule but the ‘tribe’ tout simple.” Despite Sally Moore’s Euro-centric pretensions, they did not deconstruct the concept of ‘tribe’ in anthropological discourse. The African did in my person in 1971 when I published my article on ‘The Ideology of Tribalism’. It is interesting that my starting point was not Gulliver’s (1965) article quoted above but the 1969 treatises entitled *Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era*, of which he was the editor. In his introduction Gulliver explained that:

> We do not continue to use it (the term ‘tribe’) in any spirit of defiance, let alone of derogation and disapproval. We use it simply because it continues to be widely used in East Africa when English is spoken... among the citizens there (p. 2).

In 1994 Sally Moore offers the same justification. How often must it be pointed out that in African languages there is no equivalent of the term ‘tribe’ and that the concept of ‘tribe’ is a European imposition in Africa? What is ethnographically known is that Africanics like everybody else are conscious of the linguistic and ethnic group to which they belong. The theoretical question then is how do we know that this predicates ‘tribal consciousness’ or that the collectivity to which they claim affinity is necessarily a ‘tribe’? The fact that English-speaking Africanics and foreigners use the term does not prove anything anthropologically and in fact conceptually it might be a confirmation of my contention. The second theoretical question which follows is; in the absence of conceptual ‘tribes’ or real tribes what semantic categories are there for the anthropologist to use to designate her/his unit of analysis?

Sally Moore has no answer to the above question. Instead, she takes refuge into thematic issues such as gender, food systems, land reform, legal history, some social history, guerrilla warfare, and development studies. But then she admits that the discipline has broken up into subspecialisations which have proliferated to the point where they often have more in common with paralel topics in other disciplines than with other sectors within anthropology (p. 122). This contradicts her claim that anthropology as such is flourishing more than ever before in Africa. Out of approximately 500 references cited in her book, there are only about 40 studies on Africa by anthropologists since 1968. This paucity had already been foreshadowed in her discussion of anthropology after ‘African Independence’ in which she warns her readers that: ‘...there will be a certain amount of taking back and forth form earlier to later monographs...’ (p. 87). In the event she invoked the names of the anthropological ancestors in vain for there was not much to go ‘forth’ on. When the chips were down and she had to demonstrate the current presence of anthropology, she cited only five works to illustrate the exuberance of the anthropological enterprise in Africa. Realizing that even these did not cohere in the disciplinary sense, she indulged in special pleading:

> Their authors have three things in common - a knowledge of the earlier anthropological literature in Africa a familiarity with the general theoretical problems addressed in the discipline and a commitment to the fieldwork method (p. 122).

In the context of deconstruction of colonial anthropology and anthropology at all, this is methodologically and epistemologically naïve because background to anthropological literature and the fieldwork method is now given to Africanist social scientists of all kinds and the theoretical issues which are supposed to be addressed by anthropologists are now common property, as her own testimony shows. There, therefore, is no place to hide!

Finally, on the question of ‘Africanity’, Sally Moore is in all probability right in describing Mundimbe’s text in *The Invention of Africa* (1985) and in general as ‘complex, indigestible, and highly opinionated’. But Mundimbe’s hostility to colonial anthropology is shared by many African scholars. To harbour such feelings an African scholar does not have to be a trained anthropologist. Familiarity with classical anthropological texts is sufficient. What is important is the images of Africa they conjure up and their association with...
the colonial past. Sally M oore mistakenly thinks that this does not matter any longer in the post-colonial era and pours scorn on the ‘colonial period mentality’ critique. These issues are still very much alive among African intellectuals, to whom she seems to pay no attention as is reflected in her references in which African are conspicuously only by their absence. This might confirm existing beliefs among Africans about whiteracism and Eurocentrism. The insistence by writers such as her that anthropology is, not in so many words, a study of the uncivilized by the civilized is likely to aggravate such feelings. Independent Africans are in a position to decide what kind of relations in knowledge-making will be tolerated and which will not. M udimbe’s apparent obsession with the problem of alterity is not socially uninformed, despite the fact that he is resident in the United States. What interests me in his book is not his grasp of anthropology or otherwise but his command of the etymology of the africans alphabet as perceived by Europeans over ages. The classical texts (which I have no problem in decoding having wasted my youth learning classics in a missionary boarding school) have one advantage, namely, that their authors had no inhibition about expressing their prejudices concerning Africa. It was simply a continent of savages (read ‘tribes’) and venemous beasts. I do not mind such candour; I got used to it in Southern Africa. As a matter of fact, I like black mambas lethal as they are and wish Africans could learn from them. Perhaps, in the circumstances their continent would cease to be a playground for knowers of absolute knowledge and they in turn would lose their absolute alterity.

Notes
1. Sally Falk Moore, 1994, University Press at Virginia, Charlottes-Ville

*CODESRIA Bulletin, Number 2, 1996, (p. 6-13).

A Contribution to the Debate on the Recolonisation of Africa*

If it is not indecent for an ’outlander’ whose only justification for speaking out is the dubious honour of being an ‘Old Man’, a title given to me by an African friend. I would like to enter into the inter-African debate launched by an article by Professor M azrui (International Herald Tribune, August 8, 1994) and continued in the columns of the CODESRIA Bulletin (issues 2 and 4 of 1995). Firstly, it is imperative I comment on a matter of form. It saddened me to note that among the comments made on Ali Mazrui’s article, there were several ad hominem attacks directed against a colleague and compatriot who, in his own way, has helped spread a current of African thought. The urgent need for this has already been pointed out by M. Kamto. Characterizations such as ‘completely dishonest discourse’ and ’retrograde ideas’ are not acceptable. No one expects that kind of treatment in the academic milieu. Differences of opinion are no excuse for reflections which are at the very least discourteous and which do nothing to further intellectual debate.

The right and, indeed, the duty to criticize are part of the intellectual’s mission. However, as Konrad Lorenz and Karl Popper pointed out, ‘it is important for politeness’ sake and it is extremely important for democracy’ sake… that criticism be as objective as possible instead of succumbing to the urge to cut down who dared think the unthinkable and cast out the demon, the unpure’.

Now my readers must also pardon me for pointing out that most African states are undergoing a profound crisis, whatever the cause (the causes of the crisis have been analyzed among others, by Samir Amin (1995)). Professor M azrui is legitimately worried about the failure of policies implemented since the 1960s and one cannot blame him for being naïve enough to suggest a solution which could only be reproved by any African wanting to preserve an independence which was won at great cost. How could one imagine a single instant that a state such as South Africa, which has been on ‘a long walk to freedom’ (title of Mandela’s autobiography, 1995) since the beginning of this century, might agree, as suggested by Mazrui, to collude in placing its sister under a protectorate? Moreover, at the end of his original article in the Herald Tribune, M azrui clearly indicated that his idea would provoke opposition from ‘proud peoples who have shed so much blood and used all the political will necessary to liberate themselves from the yoke of European powers’. It would only be fair to give Ali Mazrui the benefit of this statement. It would also be fair to admit that the author sees his idea as a ‘last resort’. Apter all, he suggested in this conclusion that ‘it would be even better if African conquered themselves’.

Therein lies the real problem. Professor M azrui can be reproached with resuscitating an old idea whose origins are themselves suspect. In 1990, an American journalist, N. Pfaff, broached the subject in a Herald Tribune article (April 24), when he spoke of the need for an ‘international recolonization of Africa’. A year later, B. Lugon, in a paper on ‘The Results of Decolonization’, concluded with the question: Should A frica be recolonized? Quite rightly, he felt that recolonization would be of no help for Africans and suggested they instead practice the old saying: ‘The Lord helps those who help themselves’. An African would probably equate that with the saying from Burkina Faso: if you go to the pond and someone scrubs your back, the least you can do is scrub your own belly!

In this contribution, Bangura (1994) addresses the real problem: remaking the state. One may dream about a United States of Africa and integration on a regional and sub-regional scale. That is probably the future of Africa. But one must admit that the road to integration has been long and hard. I have already pointed out the obstacles in the path of...
politically - and/or economically integrated assemblies (Gonidec, 1987).

For the moment, reality lies in the irrefutable state, which is sovereign although it is not a nation-state.

How can the state be remade? Bangura (1994) proposes a radical reform of the nation state is urgent for political stability and economic development, two objectives which, according to M azrui, have not been reached due to Africans’ inability to band together. A radical reform of the nation state, or rather, a plan for a nation-state, since there is as yet no nation, would be the solution to the crisis. I think the real solution is even more daring. It is essential to break away from the imposed ideology of the nation state.

Like all states, African states are the product of a long history, dating back to pre-colonial and colonial times, as well as a more recent post-colonial history. Realistically, if Africa is to progress, the present must be made, or remade, using the materials at hand. At the present stage, not all the materials necessary to create a nation corresponding with the state are available. Thus, nation-making can only be carried out under conditions similar to those in Europe, that is, under the auspices of a dominant ethnic group bent on imposing unification. This is hardly an acceptable solution, since it goes against the grain of democracy. Indeed, spokespeople for ethnic minorities cut off from power have just that reproach to make against the current trend is to seek democratic solutions, but the problem is what form of democracy? Whatever form is chosen. It seems necessary, according to the logic of a pluralistic society, that democracy itself be pluralistic, whether it is seen as a means, or tool; or as an end in itself, or philosophical value. From this standpoint, democracy cannot be arbitrarily reduced to its judicial-political aspects alone, since these are too easily borrowed from foreign systems. Economic, social and cultural democracy remains to be invented, and will require deep reflection in order to define the respective roles of the state apparatus and the various organizations representing civil society which have recently mushroomed in Africa and which have been the object of countless studies (see especially the Dakar conference, March 15-17, 1993).

Debates on the concept of civil society have occasionally blurred the distinction between state and civil society. But that means ignoring the idea of a totality which implies, as Gramsci demonstrated that a society which has reached the level of a state necessarily includes both a state (in the sense of a state apparatus), and a civil society, which is the social sector voluntarily and spontaneously organized, to a great degree independently from the state. Naturally, the state and civil society cannot be dissociated and must work together for the greater good of society as a whole, civil society, which was absorbed by the state (apparatus) during the times of monocratic and autocratic government, is reawakening and bringing social contradictions to the fore, including pluralism in African societies.

This reawakening of civil society, manifested by a sort of ritual slaying of the state by society in sovereign national conferences, which are dreaded by some.
It is a very diverse field encompassing the entity Mafeje seems to have in mind. One way it is done? Anthropologists by "declaring oneself an anthropologist" become an anthropologist. Mafeje says "she does not refer to any African authors except Mudimbe". A little more care and he would have noticed references to Busia, Danquah, Deng, Dike, Diop, Hountondji, Mabogunje, Obbo, Oppong and Kenyatta. Could it be that he means that I do not refer to him? Mafeje also says of the qualifications of anthropologies that one becomes an anthropologist by "declaring oneself an anthropologist" (page 9). And where, I wonder, is that the way it is done?

Anthropology today does not resemble the entity Mafeje seems to have in mind. It is a very diverse field encompassing many sub-specializations, geographical, topical, and theoretical. Mafeje's arguments attack an outdated vision of the discipline. He needs to prop up that vision to legitimize his hostility. The preoccupations of the colonial period are not representative of current thinking. In Anthropology and Africa I say that, 'The sub-specializations of anthropology have proliferated to the point where they often have more in common with parallel topics in other disciplines than with other sectors within anthropology' (M oore, p. 122). Mafeje echoes my statement but treats it as an assertion of his own which like most of his commentary turns into a complaint. He says, 'There is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterizes anthropology as a discipline nor are there emerging paradigms at least in Africa which distinguish what passes as anthropology from other social science disciplines' (Mafeje, p. 9). And how much does that add to what I said?

The common ground within social anthropology is the basic commitment to fieldwork as a major form of knowledge production. Such research is not only informed by a background knowledge of earlier and comparative work, it is infused which the habit of problematizing cultural and theoretical concepts and categories. The topics and sites of recent anthropological fieldwork in Africa are very diverse, as diverse as the African scene itself. Recent ethnographic studies look at everything from local systems of land tenure to refugee camps, from ritual practice to legal ideas, from the economy of rural households to the nature of the tourist art market, from population issues to gender ideology. Many of these studies are of very high quality. The topical diversity with regard to work in Africa reflects a more general state of affairs in the discipline. A look at the themes addressed in the Annual Review of Anthropology over the past ten years shows that this breadth of topical and theoretical interest is manifest whether the anthropologists are working in Europe, the Middle East, in Malaysia, China, Peru, Mexico, Africa or Texas. This is not a question of my 'taking refuge in thematic questions' nor is the intersection with many disciplines something I must 'admit' because 'there is no place to hide' (Mafeje, 12). This is a description of the multiple preoccupations of the discipline today.

Like all other Africanist anthropologists I hope that there will soon be many more Africans in the profession (M oore, p. 133). Their absence in recent decades is not due to exclusion by 'Europeans', but to the fact that for political reasons formal training in anthropology has not been available in many African universities for a long while. There is no longer any political reason to treat anthropology as a form of knowledge to be avoided by African intellectuals. Books that give an overview of a discipline, its history and current debates should help to open up the arena of discourse to many more entrants. The history of the division of intellectual labour in the academy is of intellectual interest in itself. A critical understanding of the past of a discipline exposes present academic practice to similar critical inspec-
tion. A central point in *Anthropology and Africa* is that there are many critical debates current in anthropology today. These debates centre around at least five critiques. I describe them this way:

The first critique is the attack on colonialism, no longer, of course, in its old political form because that is in fact long since over, but in the form of neo-colonial relationships and ideas or metaphoric frameworks of ‘recolonization’. The second is the global economy critique, which has many different versions and subversions, including classical economic dependency oriented, Marxian, world system, and other. The third is the gender critique, which prescribes a re-understanding of the literature, a recasting of ethnographic observation, and a redesign of the ethnographic imagination to repair the distortions of the past and prevent their repetition? The fourth argues that all reading and discussion should be rethought in light of the Foucaultian discourse of power. The fifth is the post-modern, literary-critical understanding of the problematic of meaning, which for the anthropologist is associated with all the many dilemmas of dialogue, translation, representation, and textual reading ...

Maféje not only has nothing to add to this, he wants to reduce the debate to one theme, the colonial mentality argument. He says that ‘pour scorn on this critique (Maféje p 12). I do nothing of the sort. I say:

The colonial mentality argument was one of the earliest themes in a series of major post-1960s attacks on anthropology from within. These attacks found much the same audience as did the contention that independence had not delivered what it had seemed to promise, that post-colonial African economies were neo-colonial i.e. instances of continued economic domination without formal administrative control. Thus, as one looks at subsequent critiques it becomes clear that the colonial mentality attack had implications that went far beyond its initial focus. It gave relative weight to the power of frameworks of thought over the appearance of facts. It was a statement about the nonautonomy of intellect. Some of the elaboration of Antonio Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony and about domination through cultural supremacy also percolated into anthropology. The unwilling and unwitting captivity of consciousness has also recently engaged Africanists interested in the historical products of the European-African ‘dialogue’ for example, John and Jean Comaroff (1991), (*Anthropology and Africa* p.79).

Maféje asks on page 7 why ‘Anthropology and Africa’ and not ‘Anthropology and Europe or America’? In fact, there is a great deal of anthropological fieldwork being done currently in Europe and in America and indeed, all over the world. A long with this world-wide ethnographic work, there also has been a great deal of interest in the distinctive histories of anthropological work in different regions (Fardon, R *Localizing Strategies*, 1990). Surely Africa should not be left out of this kind of review.

But back to Maféje’s essay and its invidious comments. He opens by saying on page 6 ‘it came as a surprise, at least to me, that of all the anthropologists who have worked in Africa she was the one who elected to make the final pronouncement on anthropology and Africa. The book is not offered as a final pronouncement. As I say very clearly in the preface ‘Other authors might have written different versions of the story, and no doubt they will’ (vii). Maféje is as much at liberty to write his own version as any one else. His comment that for me to write this book was foolhardy both professionally and politically (Maféje, p 7) moves me to tell your readers how this book happened to be written.

Some time in 1990 or early 1991 I was asked by V.Y. Mudimbe, Robert Bates and Jean O’Barr to contribute a chapter a book they were going to edit to be called *Africando the Disciplines: The Contributions of Research in Africa to the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993). I was asked to write the chapter on anthropology. The idea behind the book was that such a volume might persuade colleges and universities in the United States to maintain the study of Africa on their campuses. There has been some anxiety about the future of such studies in American universities. Downsizing of faculties and spiralling costs have obliged administrators to choose in which disciplines and in which areas instruction and training will be offered and which to drop. The editors of Africa and the disciplines wanted the intellectual importance of Africa to many disciplines brought home to those who would be making such choices.

A nyone interested in the current institutional state of affairs in the US should have a look at anel Gayer’s *African Studies in the United States: A Perspective* (African Studies Association Press 1966). African Studies encompasses all the disciplines that offer instruction relevant to Africa from agriculture to urban planning. Anthropology is one only of them. The preface to Gayer’s report says that ‘the African continent risks becoming increasingly marginalized in (American) academic life’ (1966: vii), were the contributors to and the editors of *Africa and the Disciplines* wrong in wanting this not to happen?

When I had nearly finished the chapter Mudimbe and his colleagues had requested, I happened to be asked what I was working on by a publisher visiting Harvard. This is a common experience of faculty members in many American universities, since publishers are always soliciting manuscripts. I explained what I had been writing. They asked to see it. Since no bibliographical book of this kind existed, they thought the anthropology material might be of interest outside the multidisciplinary volume, standing by itself in a slightly enlarged version. I asked the editors of the interdisciplinatory volume to publish a spin-off book and I was granted it.

Now, to turn to the more substantive issues of anthropological history discussed in the CODESRIA essay. One of the histories traced in *Anthropology and Africa* is the story of how, by the 1960s, many anthropologists had moved away from using the ‘tribe’ either as a descriptor or as an analytic concept. Not only what was the ‘tribe’ understood as a construct of colonial administration, but the ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology that was preoccupied with ‘custom’ was gradually replaced by an anthropology preoccupied with change and social transformation. In the discipline as a whole (i.e. not just in African studies) the structural-functional paradigm went under.

*Anthropology and Africa* shows that one of the early shifts away from the ‘tribes-and-traditions’ model was the result of the challenge of urban fieldwork, the study of African labour migrants in towns and cities. This urban fieldwork began well before 1950, began to alter the question anthropology was asking and the methods
it used to try to find answers. Some ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology continued alongside of this advance, and there were some curious theoretical contradictions and mixtures. But ‘tribes-and-traditions’ anthropology was on the way out. By the early 1960s the achievement of African independence radically shifted the intellectual ground. Political and economic change in Africa altered the basic terms of academic analysis.

Mafeje pretends that I offer justification for the continued use of the idea of the ‘tribe’ (Mafeje, p. 12). That is not so. He imputes to me the opinions of persons whose views I describe. He goes so far as to misplace a quotation mark to make me appear to be agreeing with Gulliver in a sentence in which I was in fact criticizing him for not emphasizing the colonial context of tribe (Mafeje, p. 12 citing page 92 of Anthropology and Africa). Mafeje also alleges that I do not take note of the historical conjuncture that led to the intellectual transformations associated with decolonization (Mafeje, p. 9). Mafeje may have reasons of personal vanity for making these allegations. He states without modesty that he was responsible for the alteration of anthropological thinking, for the backing off from the idea of tribes and tribalism. He says, alluding to the social anthropologists, ‘Despite Sally Moore’s Euro-centric pretensions, they did not deconstruct the concept of “tribe” in anthropological discourse. The Africans did in my person in 1971 when I published my article on the ideology of Tribalism’ (Mafeje, p. 12).

This claim Mafeje makes about his influence is exaggerated, to say the least. The critique of the idea of tribalism had been on the table for at least a decade before Mafeje wrote his article. This was true inside and outside of academic circles, inside and outside of Africa. I call Mafeje’s attention to Joan Vincent’s remarks in her historical account of the discipline. This is not something that happened then (and only then) and only in anthropology. It was (and is) true of all the social sciences, and of many other disciplines. It was something that surfaced in many countries, not just in Africa, but in France the United States, and elsewhere. A great wave of self-consciousness about paradigmatic change was under way. It was surely not an accident that Thomas Kuhn’s the Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published in 1961. Today, in 1996, must there be only one orthodoxy, one acceptable social science paradigm? What kind of conception of open academic discourse is that?

By creatively misrepresenting Anthropology and Africa Mafeje manufactures an opportunity to credential himself. He lists for us the names of many of the anthropologists he has known and not only refers to his collaboration with Monica Wilson on a 1963 book on Langa township in South Africa, but alleges that he changed her mind, too (about what I wonder). The Preface to Monica Wilson’s book acknowledges the fieldwork Archie Mafeje did but says, ‘The formulation of the problems, the direction of the field work, and the writing of the book was done by professor Monica Wilson’ (p. viii). As far as I can tell (from their titles and catalogue notes in the library) since the Langa study, Mafeje’s books have concerned political theory and development, and have not involved any ethnographic fieldwork of his own. His most recent book, The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formation (London, CODESRIA, 1991), is a rereading and reinterpretation of classical, colonial period, anthropological texts on the interlacustrine kingdoms. The issues he raises in that book are very interesting. He obviously thinks the history of anthropology is important and that reanalysing the old classics can be turned to present purposes. I agree. His book could be an advertisement for Anthropology and Africa had he read mine without so much animus.

Mafeje chides me for omitting various articles and books I did not cite. I can only reply that I had to make choices. Several hundred entries are not enough to be all-inclusive I focussed on books rather than on the periodical literature, and on ethnographies and fieldwork monographs rather than on commentary. No doubt I left out many interesting pieces of work as I included. A short book cannot include everything.

I should add that I am saddened by the fact that Mafeje’s tone is so insulting. I realise that there are audiences for which one has only to shout ‘colonialist, racist, Eurocentrist’ as he does referring to me, and it is like shouting fire in a crowded theatre. There are some people who respond instantly to this kind of name-calling and many namecallers who legitimate themselves by doing the labelling. I believe that the social science community represented by CODESRIA is more sober in its judgments than that. Surely this undignified display does not pass for scholarly disagreement. There is so much work to be done, there are so many research themes to be explored, so much current history to be recorded, so many serious questions about methods and models to be debated, so many difficulties in the way of open communication, it is a pity to have to waste time on crude invective.
Several issues from the Mafeje-Moore debate in *CODESRIA Bulletin* nos. 2 and 3 (1996). One relates to the place of African scholars in African studies as conceived in the West. Second, concerns the unending emphasis by African scholars on colonial period anthropology in Africa. Last is the general question of historical process in anthropology studies on Africa.

The Mafeje-Moore debate must be seen in the light of the discussion on the role and relevance of Africanists in African studies today. The central thrust of Mafeje’s argument (1996) is that Western scholarship has always neglected or discriminated against contributions by African scholars to African studies. He illustrates this discrimination by putting his experience at the centre of the critique of Sally Moore’s book on Anthropology in Africa. He opines that this omission leaves her book lacking important perspectives of anthropology and Africa which totters her analysis.

Moore on the other hand finds Mafeje’s personalizing of the critique a mere wish to relive the glory of their youth when they protested the anthropology of the colonial era in the Oxbridge seminar of the late 1960s (1996:22). Her response scats from the pertinent issue of the place of the African scholar vis-à-vis Africanist scholars in the production of anthropological knowledge on Africa. She does not respond to the important issue of the role African scholars play in transforming the study of anthropology in Africa and the discipline at large. Instead she points out a few Africanists like Kenyatta, Dike, Busia etc. to illustrate that she did not neglect them. Moore has no worry parading Kenyatta and Dike as anthropologists. She does not inform readers that she referred to them only in relation to Africanist i.e. Dike is quoted on what he says about Herskovits while Kenyatta appears only as a student of Malinowski (see Moore 1993). Furthermore they appear only in the footnotes, yet these names were meant to show that Mafeje’s critique was ill-conceived and in bad taste.

Sally Moore’s book on Anthropology and Africa emerged from a chapter that appeared in Bates, et al. (1993). The stated aim of this book, says Zeleza (1994:181): ‘Is to provide a defence for the study of Africa, not on its own terms, but to promote the marketability of Africanists...’. To achieve this objective, Africans are treated as mere objects of study while Africanist scholarship remains business as usual. Thus, these Africanists contribute to the fact of making choices is not contestable, but which choices, why and for who?

What is evident is that the Western perception of Africa influenced Moore’s disproportionate emphasis on Western texts which were suitable for cementing her argument. By dismissing the colonial anthropological theme, Moore achieves the aim of not saying what she intends to mean. Colonial anthropology has a lot of relevance for anthropology and Africa even today. This is where many African scholars deserve a fair hearing. Do the likes of P. Bitek (1970), Mafeje (1971) and M agubane (1971) deserve any place in this? Or are the words ‘inventive vituperations’ fair and adequate summaries of their long-term labour of debunking Eurocentric and racist notions of Africa by Anthropologists? It makes one wonder what happened to Sally Moore’s sense of sober judgment and uninsulting commitment to scholarship (p. 23).

It is true as M amdani (1995:609) puts it that: ‘I have always taken it for granted that, should I want to study North American society, I would approach it through its own intelligentsia, through their writing, their self-reflection’. This is not so for African scholars who seem to believe that African scholars have no ability of self-reflection and identification. They hold that studies by Africanists suffer certain defects. This has become a very critical issue in the attempts by African scholars to publish their views on Africa. Recently Hyden (1996:5) bluntly put it that:

Africans wishing to publish with European and North American companies often run into difficulties because their manuscripts have usually not gone through the same rigorous peer scrutiny and advising as the case is with those submitted by scholars based in these countries.

This of course is an untenable and discriminatory excuse that cannot effectively stand fair judgment. What is true is that often, African scholars have been forced to include Africanists in their bibliographies (Yankah 1995) while on occasions they have been denied journal space on the pretext that their sources are old and outdated. On other occasions, editorial double-standards have worked to effectively shut out most Africanists, from publishing. Such was the case with the *Journal of African History* until Nigerian scholars decided to boycott it en masse (Johnson 1995). The consequence of all these is that most African scholars are unable to publish thereby giving Africanists disproportionate say on things African. Does this say something about Moore’s choices?

There is therefore no justifiable and fair reason why Sally Moore could state that her choices are representative of anthropological scholarship in Africa. African scholars are the main doors to understanding anthropology in and on Africa. They are significant to the transformations in anthropology as a discipline. Thus it was important that their reflections and personal experience be put at the centre of any discussion on Africa. Many of these early African scholars like Mafeje had an intriguing experience in Westen academies of learning which provide extensive corpus of testimony for upcoming scholars.
in Africa and African studies in general. We therefore draw a lot of inspiration from their experiences which help shape future scholarship in Africa. Sally Moore may not be in position to benefit from their exposition.

Western scholars, perhaps with the exception of those who have gone beyond the short-lived participant anthropologists’ tenure in Africa, perform Western studies of Africa for Euro-American audiences. New evidence suggests that most of them have a general dislike for fieldwork in Africa (Hyden 1996:4). For instance, forty per cent of British African historians had not visited Africa since 1983 (McCracken 1993:243). Instead they depend on official documents which give official and distorted versions of African realities. Such presentations must necessarily be counter-checked by African realities and African scholars are in the best position to provide this data. That is one reason why no effective study of Africa can avoid African scholars and Africans in Africa.

Secondly, Sally Moore mentions five critical debates current in anthropology today (1996:21). She uses them to demonstrate that anthropology as a discipline is up and alive in Africa. It was Mafeje’s contention that ‘there is no observable theoretical framework at the moment which characterizes anthropology as a discipline...’ (1996:9). Moore found Mafeje’s emphasis on ‘colonial mentality argument’ reductionist and wrong. She includes the five themes i.e. colonial, global economy, gender, Foucaultian and post-modern critiques to illustrate Mafeje’s reductionism. But the question remains as to whether there exists any conceivable way of extricating these critiques from colonialism and its legacy in Africa’s historical experience.

In retrospect, Mafeje had emphatically argued that Moore’s book was ‘a lie intelligently told’. This not so much in what the book says but in not saying what it meant. The argument that Mafeje reduces all these themes to one colonial mentality argument indeed illustrates that Moore runs away from saying what she meant. Let us demonstrate this by showing how colonial the above five themes are and why Moore prefers to emphasize other themes and not the colonial one.

The fact that neo-colonialism exists in the developing countries today imply that colonialism never died. The themes which Moore highlights as current in anthropological discourse today bear witness to the persuasiveness of situation imperialism in Africa’s intellectual and social fabric. In the first place, all the five themes she mentions are of Western origin. African struggles to intellectually command their discourse has always been thwarted by Western economic, political and intellectual conspiracies. Unfair economic arrangements and discriminatory political decisions make sure that the West defines areas of social inquiry. It is because of this that the Western vision of the global is defended and assured of dominating world scholarship (Saltier 1995).

Given the centrality of power in the production of knowledge, discourses are hegemonically defined in Western terms. The postmodernist critique, for instance, is the latest neo-colonial mirage designed to put the least important as priority on African development agenda. Also, gender studies as defined by Africanists are cast in modernist terms, using African women as examples to validate Western theoretical approaches (Amadu 1987:2-4). They reduce African women into examples, confuse in their lives irrelevant analytical tools which never permeate into the social fabric of African societies. Such analytical tools have no superior ability of combating the many exploitative programmes which African women face from external imperialist agencies and internal cultural trappings.

Postmodernism is therefore a leap forward in modernisation theory where themes like gender studies are being presented in new and sophisticated terms but they retain their initial modernist objective. What is defeating is that it does not answer the question of whether Africans have attained modernism or is it a case of premodern postmodernism (Aseka 1996:22). Such postmodernist themes like the Foucaultian critique have a hegemonic agenda in Africa and must therefore be interrogated. Foucault was a French poststructuralist who was greatly fascinated with Bentham’s elaborate architectural and administrative plan for constructing a model prison called the panopticon (Aseka 1997). He envisioned the building of a disciplined society to characterise the leap from the enlightenment to modern between the ‘power to’ and the ‘power over’ in Foucault which has been assertively expressed in the history of progress and modernity through western incursions of non-western societies. Power over other societies has been codified and legitimated under signs of manifest destiny and civilising mission. This further reduces the Foucaultian critique to colonialism.

In our view, some of these postmodernist critiques are misplaced in Africa. In their premodern variant, recolonization is the objective while in their postmodernist perspective, anthropology is being historised while history is being anthropologised. The two objectives are however inextricable and are going hand in hand. This is distorting the historical method and seeking to replace it with anthropology. Indeed in Moore’s book, anthropology is finding new assertive ground. Some scholars are wondering why history has been a target of postmodernist onslaught especially as fronted by the donor community and world financial institutions. It is because the systematic collective memory of a people finds expression in history, yet it is the intention of these donors to capitalise on the alleged African short memory of hate.

Consequently, Africa is being invented through language games, fracturing and fragmentation of discourse. There is an Afro-pessimist emphasis to justify recolonization. Through postmodernist eclecticism, facts are selectively being used to explain poverty, war and anarchy in Africa. Colonialism is sacrosanctly left unexplained as an explanation. Thus, Africa’s alleged mentality for war and genocide is used to validate the colonial era as good benevolent and to vouch for a recolonisation prophylactic. ‘Even the degree of dependent modernization achieved under colonial rule’, we are told, ‘is being reversed’ (Mazrui 1995:36). The core of Africa’s current problems emanating from colonialism is overlooked. That is why Sally Moore would rather we emphasize other themes and leave out the colonial one. But some of the critiques that Moore offers are mirages, defined in Western academies of learning and couched in Western ideologies. They are a product of Western hegemonic intentions in Africa, designed to perpetuate neo-colonialism. By overlooking colonial anthropology, Moore participates in overshadowing opening historical experiences for Africans. By neglecting African anthropologists Moore hoped to set aside an inspiring and memorable historiographical past whose significance exists to date and
offers redeeming inspirations to Africans and Europeans of real good will. Just how successful she does it is illustrated by Mafeje’s critique.

Thirdly, methodology demands that Moore explains which anthropology for which Africa. History has the method to unravel this question. As a discipline, anthropology was intended to study the primitive other. The ‘other’ as distinct from the European was an object of intellectual curiosity and fascination. The African other was studied to illustrate the past conditions of life which have existed in our own country and in Southern and Western Europe... At least that is the message we so clearly get from Harry Johnson. But anthropology first came to Africa for the benefit of colonialism. British anthropologists were mainly trained at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) for the benefit of advising colonial administration. It also had to elaborate the myth of the primitive African for whom colonialism was meant to civilise and modernise (P’ Bitek, 1970). Colonial structures and institutions became indices of measuring change. It would be too much to expect Moore to quote P’ Bitek (1970) and M’agubane (1971) given that they don’t share her anti-colonial mentality cup of tea. But this is the cup of tea that Africans will never forget.

M’agubane’s article (1971) revolutionised the perception of change and process in anthropology. The diachronic structural functionalist approach innovative as it may have been merely took static snapshots of events. Social change was studied against the background of culture contact where they committed the ‘fallacy of the ethno-graphic present’ (Smith, n.d.:82). African values and institutions were seen as unchanging traditional given which further reinforced the view of the ahistorical Africa awaiting the modernism of colonial rule. These were very feeble attempts at historicising anthropology which failed to achieve much. It is because of these failures that M’wanzi (1972:1) suggested that anthropology must either become history or nothing at all because whenever anthropology is associated which history, there has been nothing but recognizable error.

First, colonial rule was premised on the view that Africa had no history. It was given impetus by the alleged ‘ahistoricity’, ‘stasis’ and uncivilised nature of Africans. Colonial rule was further justified on the basis of the binary logic of civilised/barbaric, traditional/modern, static/dynamic etc. The contribution of anthropology in colonial times was to study the small self-contained units called ‘tribes’ and explain how colonialism detribalised them. However, African anthropologists contested the phraseology of colonial discourse. The early and most extensive challenges to this phraseology were M’agubane’s and Mafeje’s 1971 articles. Other scholars may have talked about these distortions, but not with the experiential thoroughness evident in the above two articles. In their view anthropology was misplaced in Africa given its lack of appreciation of change in Africa. Anthropology, they argued was the curse of African studies. Moore can explain if anthropology has shed off these hideous scales since then.

In a nutshell, the experience of anthropology in Africa may be long and enriching to Western scholarship but racist and imperialist to Africa. Everyday discourse in any human society is shaped by the historical experience of that society. Africans may not have been the most brutalised people in history but they are probably the most humiliated in their dehumanising experiences of enslavement, colonialism and neo-colonialism (Aseka 1995:1). It is definitely too much for Sally Moore to expect us to forget about the relationship between anthropology and colonialism. In terms of scholarship, decision-making and social justice, neo-colonialism is still rampant. We cannot therefore fail to interpret Africa’s challenges from a colonial angle, yet we experience neo-colonialism from our houses to the streets, from the offices to eating places, from lecture halls to publishing houses and even from the kitchen to sleeping places. Our determination as Africans is that nobody including Sally Moore takes advantage of our motto of forgiving but not forgetting.

References


Self-colonization and Pax Africana have begun in Africa. If my critics have not recognized the trend in the role of Uganda and Rwanda in the overthrow of the Mobutu Regime in Zaire (now Congo), my critics have been less than fully alert.

When I started the debate about inter-African colonization earlier, in this decade, few people took me seriously. By the time Archie Mafeje discovered my thesis about self-colonization, Archie went vitriolic and abusive! Other critics in your columns have argued that my thesis was either evil or unreal. Yet by mid-1997 it was evident that history was indeed turning in my direction.

Africans were beginning to assert control over their unruly neighbours. The most dramatic of these events was Uganda’s role in helping the Tutsi to reassert control over Rwanda in 1994. This was a kind of ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation, African style. The original ‘Bay of Pigs’ project launched by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 consisted of Cuban exiles trained by the United States to invade Cuba in the hope of overthrowing Fidel Castro. They were intended to land in the Bay of Pigs in Cuba and start an anti-Castro revolution. The whole operation was a total fiasco.

More than thirty years later exiled Rwandans trained in Uganda invaded Rwanda in order to overthrow the Hutu regime there and end the genocide against the Hutu. The aim of the Rwandan Patriotic Front from Uganda was not counter-genocide but conquest and control. This particular ‘Bay of Pigs’ operation – African style – was completely successful in 1994.

In the face of the anti-Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, Westerners have sometimes asked: ‘Why don’t Africans themselves stop this kind of thing?’ The answer in 1994 was: ‘The Africans did stop it. The genocide was ended not by French troops, but by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, aided by Uganda’. It was an impressive case of Pax Africana.

Then came the problems of 1996 and early 1997 in what was then Zaire. The Mobutu regime over-reached itself when it tried to empower remnants of the Hutu (Interahamwe) in refugee camps in Zaire, and strip indigenous Zairian Tutsi of their Zairian citizenship.

The Zairian Tutsi – helped by Rwanda – decided to resist the intimidation of the Zairian armed forces. To the astonishment of everybody, the Zairian armed forces were a paper monkey, even less than a paper tiger. They were easily defeated by the Tutsi resisters.

Before long the Tutsi rebellion became multi-ethnic. Enter Laurent Kabila with his rendez-vous with history. The rebellion also became multinational, aided by Rwanda, Uganda and also Angola. The anti-Mobutu movement was both Pan-African and trans-ethnic. It finally culminated in the overthrow of a dictatorship which had lasted from 1965 to 1996. A least in ousting Mobutu Sese Seko, this was a triumph for Pax Africana, though we still do not know how much of an improvement over Mobutu, Laurent Kabila will become.

The optimists see him as another Youweri Museveni. Museveni too had created a private army to challenge the official army of the state, Museveni’s army like that of Kabila had defeated the army of the state. And then Museveni in power embarked on three strategies of change: first, stabilization of the country; second, restoring the economic health of the country; and third, initiating cautious democratization.

Museveni has had remarkable success in the first two goals, the quest for stability and the restoration of the economic health of Uganda. His progress in both has been faster than most observers (and most Ugandans) ever expected. His third goal of cautious democratization is still in its early stages but so far, so good.

Will Laurent Kabila be another Youweri Museveni? The answer is only if Kabila is lucky. What is clear is that Kabila’s initial triumph would probably not have occurred without the help of Museveni, both directly, and through Rwanda. For the time being this is a success story for Pax Africana, though its long-term future is unclear.

A different kind of successful Pax Africana is the story of Liberia and the role of ECOMOG in ending its civil war leading Liberia towards a relatively and peaceful general election in July 1997. Once again this was a case of neighbouring African countries accepting responsibility for a malfunctioning brotherly state, and going into the weaker state to try and do something about it.

ECOMOG’s lack of experience, along with disarray in Lagos, initially resulted in a lot of disastrous false starts in peace-keeping in Liberia. But in the end the mission was relatively successful, and Liberians had their say at the ballot box. While the overwhelming choice of Liberians for Charles Taylor (the architect of the civil war) puzzled most observers, it was at least a free democratic choice. Behind that choice was the fumbling but historic role of ECOMOG in pioneering Pax Africana.

How do we discourage African armies from staging military coups against democratically elected governments? The di-

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lemma arose with the first Black African military coup against Sylvanus Olympio in Togo, which was also post-colonial Africa’s first presidential assassination. This was in 1963.

The initial Pan-African response was in boycotting the successor regime in Togo. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, there was one vacant seat. It was Togo’s originally intended for the assassinated Sylvanus Olympio? At that time no one was.

Sylvanus Olympio? At that time no one was. The initial Pan-African response was in boycotting the successor regime in Togo. At the inaugural meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, there was one vacant seat. It was Togo’s originally intended for the assassinated Sylvanus Olympio. At that time no one was. The Charter of the newly formed OAU explicitly included a clause ‘condemning political assassination in all its forms’.

But was anybody prepared to use force to oust the regime which had assassinated Sylvanus Olympio? At that time no one was. Pax Africana was alive but under-developed.

Almost exactly ten years later (to the month) a coup took place in Uganda. Idi Amin Dada overthrew the government of Milton Obote. A gain one of those most deeply shattered by the event was President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania. He roundly condemned the coup, and personally refused to have any dealings with Idi Amin Dada. But was anybody prepared to use force to try and reverse the coup? At that time not even Nyerere was! Pax Africana was indeed sensitive, but not yet forceful.

Eight years later Julius Nyerere was indeed prepared to use force against Idi Amin’s persistent national and regional destabilization. In 1979 Nyerere was at least ready to order Tanzania’s army to march all the way to Kampala to overthrow Idi Amin. Nyerere was successful in ousting the Ugandan dictator and in establishing a temporary Tanzanian protectorate in Uganda before multiparty elections could be held. Nyerere made two mistakes in his protectorate over Uganda. He made his Pax Africana too brief, and he tried too hard to ensure the return of Milton Obote to power. Both decisions were catastrophic for Uganda. The interlude of Pax Africana was good but not well focussed.

And the second Obote administration in Uganda turned out to be a tragedy, only to be ended by Yoweri Museveni’s triumph in 1986.

Then came the military coup on Sierra Leone in 1997, which overthrew the elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. In this case Pax Africana took a wholly unexpected turn. A military government in Nigeria decided to defend, and attempt to reinstate, a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone.

This was certainly an improvement on the older story of Western democracies propelling up military regimes like that of Mobutu Sese Seko which was twice saved militarily by the West in the face of a domestic challenge from its own Shaba province.

I personally would rather see a military regime like that of Nigeria defending democracy in Sierra Leone, than see a democracy like that of France or the United States propping up military dictatorships in less developed countries. Yet for the time being the story of Sierra Leone seems to be a stalemate. Pax Africana has not yet fully triumphed, though the whole of Africa has condemned the June 1997 coup in Freetown.

The idea I have recommended of a Pan-African emergency force is also gathering momentum in the 1990s. The Blue Eagle Project in Southern Africa has involved training the troops of at least eight African countries to be in readiness for special responsibilities in situations of political crisis. Much of the training so far has occurred in Zimbabwe. The Blue Eagle could develop into the ECOMOG of Southern Africa, but with more appropriate training for a peace-keeping role. Here again is a potential arm of Pax Africana.

The Clinton administration in the United States has been championing a rapid deployment African force. It has also been involved in training troops from countries like Senegal and Uganda for peace-keeping roles. My own disagreement with the Clinton paradigm concerns the accountability of the African rapid deployment force. The Clinton administration would like to trace accountability ultimately to the Security Council of the United Nations, which is itself controlled by Western powers. I believe that the Pan-African emergency force should be accountable to Africa itself, through such revised institutions of the OAU as a force may be able to devise. Alternatively, accountability should be towards relevant sub-regional organizations in Africa to ECOMOG in West Africa, to SADEC in Southern Africa, and to a newly evolving Eastern Africa Economic Community. Only such an Afrocentric accountability would save Pax Africana from becoming a mere extension of Pax Americana.

Also relevant to the unfolding saga of self-colonization in Africa is the hesitant hegemonic role of the Republic of South Africa. Within the wider picture of Pan-Africanism is an emerging sub-theme of Pax Pretoriana, the muscle of Pretoria in sorting out political crises in neighbouring countries. Sorting out Lesotho’s problems with its military is one case in point.

In fact the Republic of South Africa is under pressure to be more active in other African crises from helping reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo to pressuring UNITA to stop fighting and join the democratic process in Angola, Pax Pretoriana at its best can be a branch of Pax Africana.

Democratic trends in Africa are real, but still very fragile. The remaining military regimes are under pressure to democratize; single party systems have been giving way to multiparty systems; authoritarian systems like that in Kenya are facing angry demands for constitutional reform. Africa is taking hesitant steps towards democracy.

But democratization within individual African countries is only part of the process of resuming control over Africa’s destiny. Pax Africana is the continental face of this self-determination provided the motives, goals and means are in tune with Africa’s ultimate well-being.

The Beast and the Icon: No End to Ali Mazrui’s Pax Africana Muddles*

Prelude

‘Vitriolic and abusive’ as I might have been in my last exchange with Ali Mazrui, by pretending that he did otherwise he only succeeds in confirming one of my charges against him. Not only did he respond in kind but also went so far as to enlist the services of some Kenyan journalists to spread scurrilous propaganda against me. This was acknowledged by such scholars as Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Andre Mangou who are not necessarily hostile to him, if not in agreement. So, instead of entertaining any hypocritical remarks in a world where virtue is the gift of a few, I propose simply to get on with the fables of Pax Africana as propounded by him. Even ‘vitriolic’ debates seem to have their uses for it transpires from Mazrui’s latest pronouncements that his sense of African nationalism has got enhanced ever since. It is also possible that they revived his faith in ‘pan-Africanism’ which he found difficult to ‘credit’ after his experience in the 7th Pan-African congress in Kampala in 1994, as was shown by his disparaging remarks about my attacking any significance to such events (see CODESRIA Bulletin, no. 3, 1995).

‘Self-Colonisation’ Revisited

In our last encounter Ali Mazrui accused me of ‘changing like chameleon when it suits me’ and of being ‘a little confused’ about his use of the terms, ‘recolonisation’ and ‘self-colonisation’. Without justifying myself or attempting to address the question of whether or not he himself was chameleon-like and rather confusing (not confused), it is noticeable that there is a significant shift in his presentation between now and then. In spite of the fact that in previous polemics he made a special pleading concerning his use of the term ‘recolonisation’ to include ‘self-colonisation’, this time the accent is on ‘self-colonisation to the exclusion of participation by non-Africans whether they be invited trustees or the United Nations. Whether this is an unintended volte-face on Ali Mazrui’s part or not, this time he assures us that only ‘an Afrocentric accountability would save Pax Africana from being a mere extension’ of external agents. A though in this context Mazrui had argued that ‘self-colonisation’ could become part of Pax Africana. It would appear then that here we are witnessing a chameleon-like change in shades of meaning from ‘recolonisation’ through ‘self-colonisation’ to ‘Pax Africana’. What remains incomprehensible though to lesser minds like me, is Mazrui has insinuated, is the persistent association of Pax Africana with ‘colonisation’ of any sort. Why is the prospect of regional sub-imperialism any more justifiable morally and politically than imperialism from elsewhere? Is the former part of Ali Mazrui’s Pan-Africanist sensibilities? In conformity with the dubious distinction he seeks to make and with a certain amount of nationalistic fervour he declares:

I personally would rather see a military regime like that of Nigeria defending democracy in Sierra Leone, than see a democracy like that of France or the United States propelling up military dictatorships in less developed countries (p. 15).

What a Choice! Or is it Ideological Schizophrenia?

After aborting democratic elections in its own country, trampling on the democratic and human rights of its own citizens, and murdering its opponents with impunity, what moral/political justification has the Nigerian military dictatorship to defend in Sierra Leone what it ruthlessly denies at home? Secondly, is it entitled to usurp the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) at will? It is a question of might is right, and then what would be the logical grounds for denying France or the USA the right to invoke the same immoral principle? It is apparent that Ali Mazrui’s perverse African nationalism could only lead to a moral and political abyss. The disturbing thing is that it is consistent with his macabre idea of five ‘pivotal states’ in Africa which he shares with the State Department, without going into its political ethics and the question of democratic rights of small states within ever-increasing processes of regional and global integration. There is a big difference between Mandela’s and Abacha’s intervention in African politics. The question of on what basis and how any intervention is implemented is of cardinal importance.

Pax Africana Misconceived

As is shown by his opening remarks in the article under review, Ali Mazrui suffers from grand illusions. Not only does he believe that ‘Pax Africana’ exists because he authored it but also imagines like Apollo in the Oracle of Delphi that history can turn at his beckoning. Secondly, most of the time he labours under very serious methodological misconceptions such as treating analogies and metaphors as a valid method of scientific or historical analysis. For instance, the historical analogy he uses between the Bay of Pigs and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) campaign against the regime in Kigali is not sustainable structurally and substantively. It is merely a flamboyant way of talking and, as I have alleged before, gives Mazrui’s writings an air of superficiality. It would be absurd for Ali Mazrui to postulate that the RPF was a counter-revolutionary force in the service of an imperialist master by name of Yoweri Museveni. It would also make nonsense (which probably it is anyway, as will be shown) of his claim that the RPF campaign, aided by Uganda, was an impressive case of Pax Africana.”

Likewise, while very appealing, the ‘paper monkey’ metaphor does not explain anything. The fact of the matter is that the Zairian army had been there for a very long time a national army only on paper. Not only was it demoralised because of very poor service conditions (including unpaid salaries for months) but also was experiencing high rates of disaffection from Mobutu’s regime like the rest of the oppressed masses in the country. Consequently, as an army, it had no cause to fight for but to back various favoured

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political leaders. On the other hand, while the Banyamulenge1 who were being used as scapegoats by the tottering Mobutu’s regime had a genuine cause, their military campaign fitted too well in what was being orchestrated by Museveni and Kagame for them to be portrayed as ‘little tigers’. The movement against Mobutu was not only national but was also regional and trans-ethnic, as Mazrui acknowledged. In the event Kabila’s so-called ‘rendez-vous with history’ could only have been with him as a hyena, a scavenger trailing an army of unknown identity. All this has unsavoury implications for Mazrui’s vaunted Pax Africana.

So far, neither Museveni’s domino game nor the RPF’s enlightened militarism has brought about peace in the affected areas. Regarding Rwanda, Ali Mazrui boldly states that: ‘The aim of the Rwandan Patriotic Front from Uganda was not counter-genocide but conquest and control’. Even so, it is fair to acknowledge that expediency dictated that they stop the large-scale massacres by the Interahamwe (government-sponsored militias). What casts doubt on their Pax Rwandaise is that hardly had they pacified the country before their own enlightened militarism degenerated into mass murders in the refugee camps and roiling death squads. By the time they had joined the war against Mobutu’s regime they had become indistinguishable from ordinary mercenaries and got embroiled in mercenary-like atrocities in eastern Zaire where mass graves were one of the results and later came to hang like an albatross around self-declared President Laurent Kabila’s neck and who as a consequence had to play hide and seek with the proposed UN Commission of Enquiry. Could it be that our hero came to power with his hands dripping with blood? Is it conceivable thatAli Mazrui’s Pax Africana heroes, Museveni and Kagame were actually angels of death who brought neither peace nor democracy in the region? This question cannot be answered by reference to the overthrow of Mobutu with their covert help because that was predetermined by long-standing and intensifying political and social struggles in former Zaire. Mobutu was on his last leg in every sense of the word. It is a matter of logic pace Ali Mazrui that there cannot be Pax Africana, without peace. ‘Good’ intentions, without good deeds are a dead loss.

Democracy: Key to Genuine Pax Africana

Ali Mazrui’s concept of Pax Africana is necessarily undemocratic and reactionary. It refers neither to democracy as a sine qua non for peace nor to equality as a necessary condition for political cooperation among nations. Instead of being people-centred, it is premised on state-power (the bigger, the better) and verges on militarism. It grants the criminal military regime in Nigeria the right to impose its dictatorial will on weaker Sierra Leone. It celebrates militaristic ‘little tigers’ such as the Rwanda Patriotic Front for dispatching to hell ‘paper monkeys’ such as the Zairian army while trumpeting citizens’ democratic and human rights both in the camps and in former Zaire. Museveni, the ‘fox’, whose regime undemocratically expelled Ugandan citizens of Rwandese origin2 (notwithstanding the fact that some of them were his erstwhile comrades-in-arms) and thus callously obliging them to join the forced march to Rwanda, also emerges as a shining symbol of Pax Africana. Yet, as the saying goes, charity begins at home. It is indeed extremely unrealistic to suppose that there can be peace in Africa, without democracy. By ‘democracy’ is not meant merely formal individual rights but, above all, collective social responsibility.

It transpires, therefore, that Pax Africana cannot be a matter of individuals governments or conspiring presidents deciding unilaterally what is good for their neighbours. It must be a collective responsibility including citizens and based on a well-defined code of conduct. Regional organisations such as ECOMOG and the planned Blue Eagle in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region should not be seen as a potential arm of Pax Africana à la Mazrui but as prototypes for peace-keeping in Africa. It is worth noting that, besides lack of an established code of conduct and advance training in peace-keeping, ECOMOG faulted in Liberia partly because of authoritarianism of the Nigerian contingent. Militarisation of national politics in Africa predispose peace-keeping forces towards making war instead of peace in troubled countries. This is one of the reasons why demilitarisation in Africa should be looked upon as an essential part of the democratisation process. African armies are not known to fight external enemies but their own civilian populations, which is an absolute negation of democracy and ultimate violation of citizenship rights. For this destructive role, African armies are generally accorded budget allocations which exceed those of the ministries of education and health combined in their respective countries. Insofar as African armies have never been tested in battle fighting a real enemy in defence of their citizens (except Egypt and perhaps Tanzania), they are probably all ‘paper monkeys’ (to borrow Mazrui’s metaphor) but in reality are a great political, social and financial liability. Africa must be demilitarised for peace, stability, and collective social development.

Under normal circumstances the responsibility for the coordination of the requisite interventions would devolve upon the OAU for which Ali Mazrui has high but vain aspirations. In the meantime, the OAU has yet to find a way of making itself relevant to genuine Pax Africana and social development in Africa. This might be on its agenda but is definitely not on the cards. In the event what might prove interesting and exciting in the foreseeable future is Pan-Africanist initiatives and deliberate integration at the regional level. This might even create greater scope for participatory democracy than is possible through the ossified structures of the OAU.

Notes

1. It is ironical that Ali Mazrui, like the Mobutu’s regime, refers to Banyamulenge (inhabitants of the Mulege hills) as ‘Tutsi’ after 200 years of settlement and intermarriage in a gold mining area (Kivu). Like Western journalists, he thinks of his African subjects in primordial tribal terms. In contrast to other contemporary African political scientists and Africamist historians who are grappling with the connotations and social implications of supposed tribal identities, he still employs them exactly the same way he did in the 1960s. This makes me wonder what tribe he thinks he belongs to at this stage.

2. Tanzania at the worst time is doing the same to people who settled and were settled in its territory nearly 40 years ago precisely because there is no collective responsibility and established code of conduct among African states. What makes Tanzanian citizens for two generations ‘Tutsi’ and not the Bahinda/Bahima in Buhaya, Buha, and Buzinza?

Africanity: A Combative Ontology*

Prelude
This article is inspired by Out of One, Many Africas (1999), an incredible intellectual insurrection instigated by William Martin and Michael West. For their courage, persistence, and intellectual integrity, they deserve all the recognition. The best way of appreciating their contribution would have been to review their book in full but for me there was the danger of biting more than I could chew. Therefore, I chose to respond to some of the leading ideas in the book. These include the pending demise of Africanity, and the necessity of Afrocentrism. As would be readily agreed, these issues are as big as they are controversial but intensely that even ‘distinguished elders’ are willing to jump in with both feet, perhaps, to the chagrin of ‘Brave New World’ advocates. Even so, the risk is not too great since they have the advantage of hindsight, unlike neophytes who are often too easily infatuated with fashions. Since fashions are very changeable, it stands to reason that ahistoricity is a greater risk than historicity. To evolve lasting meanings, we must be ‘rooted’ in something.

The fashionable ‘free-floating signifier’ is an illusion in a double sense. First, nobody can think and act outside historically determined circumstances and still hope to be a social signifier of any kind. In other words, while we are free to choose the role in which we cast ourselves as active agents of history, we do not put on the agenda the social issues to which we respond. These are imposed on us by history. For example, we would not talk of freedom, if there was no prior condition in which this was denied; we would not be anti-racism if we had not been its victims; we would not proclaim Africanity, if it had not been denied or degraded; and we would not insist on Afrocentrism, if it had not been for Eurocentric negations. Secondly, unlike, the illusory ‘free-floating signifier’, it is the historical juncture which defines us socially and intellectually. At this point in time there are certain critical issues which African scholars have to clarify so as to indicate what might be the underpinnings of the eagerly awaited African renaissance.

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Of necessity, under the determinate global conditions an African renaissance must entail a rebellion - a conscious rejection of past transgressions, a determined negation of negations. Initially, such representations will not be credited by those who uphold the status quo. If they be robust and persistent, they will sooner or later elicit a plea from men and women of reason and goodwill for a dialogue. Not surprisingly, this is already happening. Before they have rediscovered themselves and have exercised all the evil spirits that have harboured on the continent for so long, African scholars are being invited to an extraver ted contemplation about ‘our common future’. The ostensible reason is that such self-affirming constructs as ‘Afrocentrism’ are too confining and will succeed only in ‘ghettoising’ African intellectuals. These entreaties should be resolutely spurned because the classical liberal idea of a universal (wo)man is like a mirage in the face of self-perpetuation hierarchies in Bush’s ‘and Clinton’s ‘New World Order’. For the Africans who are at bottom of the pile, authentic representations need not connote anything more than that ‘charity begins at home (a very fitting Anglo-Saxon adage) which is a conscious refusal to be turned into ‘free-floating signifiers’. Thus, Africanity, if properly understood, has profound political, ideological, cosmological, and intellectual implications.

Afrocentrism versus Afrocentrism
Although in current debates the two terms are often used as interchangeable or, at least, as having a common referent, this need not be the case. Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish clearly between the two. Contrary to the suppositions of the Temple University school represented by Tsehoane Kete (now back in South Africa) in Out of One, Many Africas which made a fetish of it, Afrocentrism can be regarded as methodological requirement for decolonising knowledge in Africa or as an antidote to Eurocentrism through which all knowledge about Africa has been filtered. Although this has been justified by appealing to dubious ‘universal standards’, the fact of the matter is that Africa is the only region which has suffered such total paradigmatic domination. In a simple and unpolemical manner K wesi Prah (1997) in an unpublished but pointed communication makes the same observation:

Rather strikingly, in comparative terms it is remarkable that when Chinese study Chinese culture and society in their own terms and for their own purposes, western scholarship does not protest. This is because the sovereignty of Chinese scholarship on China is accepted. India and the Arab world have almost reached that point. Russians do not look west for understanding their society... Neither do the Japanese.

Interpreted this way, Afrocentrism is nothing more than a legitimate demand that African scholars study their society from inside and cease to be purveyors of alienated intellectual discourse. The underlying belief that this will issue in authentic representations. Indeed, it is only logical to suppose that when Africans speak for themselves, the word will have the authentic voice, and will be forced to come to terms with it in the long-run. This might prove to be a long march, especially under the unfavourable educational conditions in Africa and the prevailing dearth of requisite scholarship. But the principle is a noble one and is worth nurturing. Once again, K wesi Prah (op. cit) has argued that if we are adequately Afrocentric the international implications will not be lost on the others. In this context he recalls M ao Tse Tung’s words of wisdom regarding internationalism: ‘If what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance is guaranteed’. As a general rule a living example of this. However, mutual awareness or recognition does not breed universalism, as the dominant West has been preaching since its ascendancy. Contrary to current western...
suppositions about ‘globalisation’, different conceptions of humanity and different ways of ordering human life might well lead to polycentrism rather than homogeneity/homogenisation.

Insofar as this is true, ‘universal knowledge’ can only exist in contradiction. It is perhaps recognition of this historical experience that led to the questioning of classical European epistemological suppositions, especially by the post-modernists who proffered a dialogue between cultures as the only way forward. It seems that, theoretically, even this can only suffice if by ‘culture’ is meant civilisations in which the intellectual and scientific function is primary. By some curious coincidence, Afrocentrism might be an appropriate response. It is this probability which African scholars have to investigate with all seriousness. What forms of accumulated knowledge do African scholars have? Are they serviceable under modern conditions? Modern Africans justifiably reserve the right to address this question themselves. Why not? They fought colonialism successfully and have delivered Southern Africa from white settler tyranny. They are making steady progress in the arts and, as the record of the African academies of Sciences show, they might yet prove themselves in the field of science, given enough resources and opportunities which are non-existent at the moment. As can be seen, there is absolutely no reason why Afrocentrism as an epistemological/meth- odological issue should be ideologised or demonised. Secondly, it is a mistake to presume that it can be grown on foreign soil or be universalised before its birth. Probably, Kweisi Prah speaks for a significant number of indigenous African scholars when he declares: ‘We must be national before we become international’. This would seem to contradict the supposition that Afrocentrism is or could be trans-Atlantic, short of ideologising it for other reasons – a problem to which we will return.

Africanity versus vindicationism

Unlike Afrocentrism, which we argued was basically referential, Africanity has an emotive force. Its connotations are ontological and, therefore, exclusivist. This is to be expected because its ontology is determined by prior existing exclusivist ontologies such as white racist categorisations and supremacist European self-identities in particular. These insinuated that blacks were inherently inferior. Hence, the blacks in the New World, especially, felt the need to prove themselves and thus produced what Martin and West call the ‘vindicational’ intellectual tradition. On this side of the Atlantic this found its greatest ovation in Senghor’s famous concept of ‘Negritude’ and to some extent in Nkrumah’s idea of ‘African personality’. The idea of a distinct inner quality being, a ‘black soul’, if you like, was not an appeal to race but a claim to greater human qualities. For people who had been degraded and accorded a sub-human status, it would not take much effort to fathom this reflex. Probably, even this would not suffice for ordinary Africanists who are not vindicationists but firmly believe that they, as a people, are endowed with greater human qualities than the whites. In Bantu languages the collective abstract noun for describing this is ubuntu, which is not translatable into English (carelessly translated, it comes out as ‘humanity’ which is a generic term with no social-cultural connotations). Highest among these qualities are human sympathy, willingness to share, and forgiveness. It is interesting that during his African tour His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, acknowledged the same revelation (probably with South Africa in mind) for which he specifically commended and blessed the Africans.

This could not have been of any special significance to his listeners because these are taken for granted. Rather, it is their absence which draws attention and comment. It is a reflexive dialogue which makes it easy for ordinary Africans to make a distinction between themselves and others, without feeling the need to develop it into a discourse. In the hands of modern black intellectuals Africanity has been developed into something much bigger than simply a state of social and spiritual being. It has become a pervasive ontology that straddles space and time. Instead of being limited to continental Africans, it extends to all black of African descent in the Diaspora, especially African-Americans.

Inevitably, it has acquired racial overtones precisely because it is a counter to white racism and domination, especially in America. However, its intellectual project is much wider than this. Among other things, it aims to gain respectability and recognition for the Africans by establishing the true identity of the historical and cultural African. This has necessitated an excursion into the past, going as far as the beginnings of the Egyptian civilisation in the Nile Valley, and the deciphering of African cosmologies and myths of origin. This is undoubtedly a continuation of the ‘vindicational’ tradition in which the first generation of African-Americans played a leading role. But in the present juncture, African-American scholars have been joined by a younger generation of African scholars and this has presaged a possible rupture in what Martin and West, perhaps unwittingly, refer to as a ‘seamless treatment’ of all people of African descent. Certain discontinuities are beginning to manifest themselves.

From what one can discern, the idea of Africanity as perceived by African scholars such as Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Kweisi Prah, Paulin Hountondji, and Valentin Mudimbe refer to what is considered to be the essence of Africa, as opposed to distorted images that have been imposed on the continent by others (meaning Europeans and American). The point of reference is the history and cultural underpinnings of contemporary African societies. It is hoped that a genuine understanding of this heritage will enable African scholars to develop theories and paradigms that will help the Africans to combat foreign domination and to forge an independent Pan-African identity. In other words, the emphasis on Africanity struggles for a second independence in Africa or an African renaissance. It has more to do with African meta-nationalism than race or colour. Therefore, those who feel compelled to declare that ‘Africana is not black’ or that ‘Africanity is regressive’ are barking up the wrong tree. In Africa only Southern African white settlers, who are the prime authors of racism, are preoccupied with colour and are unable to deal with their Africanity for they have persistently played ‘European’ to the extent that they unconsciously granted that they were aliens whereas blacks were ‘natives’. Thinking individuals amongst them are acutely aware of this anomaly.

Africanity is an assertion of an identity that has been denied; it is a Pan-Africanist revulsion against external imposition or refusal to be dictated to by others. In this sense it is a political and ideological reflex which is meant to inaugurate an African renaissance. In our view, this should not be confused with black solidarity in the original Pan-Africanist sense, which included blacks of African descent in the
Diaspora. This is still valid and desirable. But, socially and conceptually, it is odds with reality. Culturally, socially, and historically the African-Americans and the West Indians have long ceased to be Africans unless we are talking biology, which itself is highly hybridised. Black Americans are first Americans and second anything else they choose, like all Americans. This also applies to the West Indians or Caribbeans. The historical and cultural heritage and contribution of the Black Americans to the making of America is largely denied and grossly understood by American standards. Like Africanity for the Africans, this is a provocation of Black Studies, correctly conceived. Irrespective of what they do, Black Americans cannot hope to re-appropriate Africa. Any attempt to do so can only lead to intellectual confusion and conceptual distortions. There is already evidence of this.

Earlier, reference was made to a threatened rupture between black American notions of ‘Africa and those of indigenous Africans. Henry Louis Gates Jr. made a name for himself when he published *The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism* (1988), which made extensive use of Yoruba symbolism, and subsequently established a big Afrocentric empire for himself in Harvard. But in the meantime, the authenticity of his representations had been questioned by Olufemi Taiwo in an article entitled, significantly enough, ‘A propping Africa: An Essay on New Afrocentric Schools’ (1995). Using very fine tools indeed and relying on greater command of Yoruba semiotics, he demonstrated that Gates had done less than full justice to his chosen texts. There is no doubt that what gave Taiwo enough courage to tackle a black American celebrity such as Gates is the fact he was standing on home ground, the ultimate firma terra. Nonetheless, it is not Taiwo who goes on a space odyssey riding trains from Kampala to Mombassa or Timbuktu in glorification of Africa on TV. Has ‘Skip’ Gates Jr. become an intellectual tourist in the name of Afrocentrism? Anthony K. Wame Appiah, the author of the celebrated *In My Father’s House* (1992), who is Ghanaian by origin but ended up in Harvard as a member of Gates’ ‘Dream Team’, suffered a similar interrogation in the hands of a fellow-Ghanaian, Kweisi Prah. Surprisingly enough, Prah questioned the authenticity of Appiah’s conception of the African and eventually accused him of holding the stick from the wrong end by ‘accusing the victims’ for what had been imposed on them by colonialism. Here, the only possible conclusion to draw is that Appiah’s discourse is extraplated precisely because it is not Afrocentric in Prah’s sense of the term. In the meantime, African students in the United States have complained that Appiah is not accessible to them because he has priced himself out of their reach and that he is unwilling to stoop to conquer – another instance of ‘accusing the victims’. Certainly, there is something afoot but as yet has not been problematised.

Towards the end the Civil Rights Movement, black Americans came to Africa in droves. They found it very different and by their confession preferred home, despite their initial romantic desire to rediscover their roots in Africa. On their part, the Africans complained that the black Americans thought and behaved like whites, including the tendency by some to raid the continent for exotic artefacts to go and sell in America. In Tanzania they were referred to outrightly as *bazungu* (whites), their colour notwithstanding. In the States black Americans find the Africans a bit strange and say as much. This is not simply a problem of false consciousness, as some idealist Pan-Africanists would like us to believe. Once the two cousins have grown apart and in reality their common African identity cannot be assumed. We have the experience of Liberia and Sierra Leone where the arbitrary return of ex-slaves by Britain and the United States led to the establishment of a dual society, wherein the ‘westernised’ ex-slaves reserved the right to lord it over the natives. The rest is well-known to the Africans but they are too embarrassed to talk about it openly. But one thing certain, judging by the turn of events in both countries, The creation of Liberia and Sierra Leone by foreign powers was not a felicitous event by any means. This marks the limits of transcontinental Africanism.

For the time being, it can be stated with a fair amount of certainty that, whereas at the political level there is a great deal that co-joins Africans and the blacks in the Diaspora, namely, what Skinner identifies as white racism and ‘paradigmatic hegemony’ of the West, historically, culturally, and sociologically a significant, and sociologically a significant disjunction exists between the two. Skinner, who is an unflinching defender of Africanity in the vindicationist tradition, is equally convinced that ontological claims to a universal African culture are unsustainable and that African-Americans distort certain aspects of African culture to suit their needs. To K wanzza which, according to the *Economist* as quoted by him (Martin and West, op. cit, p. 80), the founder ‘concocted his festival by borrowing from a number of cultural sources…His idea was to create a ritual for America’s blacks to express pride in their African roots’. Of course, Skinner does not say anything about continental Africans who trade in African ‘culture’ in America for their own opportunistic purposes. All this makes nonsense of ontological claims to authenticity and African cultural identity which transcends all boundaries. If not fraudulent, these claims are nothing more than an adulteration of the truth.

In the totality of things, Afrocentrism made in America is a contradiction in terms. Black Americans, no matter how well-intentioned they are, cannot make indigenous knowledge for Africans in America: that for any length of time in America. While individual African-Americans can become ‘experts’ on Africa, they cannot in the name of Africanity speak for the Africans. Africanity, as is perceived by the African scholars mentioned earlier, is an insistence that the Africans think, speak, and do things for themselves in the first place. This does not imply unwillingness to learn from others but a refusal to be hegemonised by others, irrespective of colour or race.

In one of his many political pamphlets, Kwesi Prah once remarked regretfully that in the past African presidents have always had foreign advisers. In the case of Nkrumah, to one’s surprise, he included George Padmore, one of the founders of Pan-Africanism. This is a strong indication that in the new Africanity the primacy is on African self-autonomy. In spite of any possible temptation, this cannot be described as chauvinistic or parochial because it is the right of all peoples of the world. The only difference is that under the present international and racial dispensation some have more and some have much less. That is the rub, and the only rub. By insisting on Africanity the Africans are staking their claim. For this reason, it would be incongruous, if the instruments for establishing Africanity were
forged elsewhere. In the same way that Afrocentrism cannot be imported from America, Africanity cannot be nurtured outside Africa. As an ontology, it is in-separable from the projected Africana renaissance. It is a necessary condition for the mooted African renaissance, the sec-
cond independence of African meta-nationalists.

One is aware of the fact that in making the various distinctions and sociological ob-
servations in the preceding section, one is treading on hallowed ground and that one might incur the wrath of black essen-
tialists and black intellectual careerists alike. But that is no reason why black in-
tellectuals with any integrity at all should forsoever deceive themselves or bury their heads in the sand in an ostrich-like fashion. The truth is staring them in their faces, despite any grand illusions about a universal African culture immune to space and time. Whites in Southern Africa have every chance of becoming Africans themselves, instead of reserving the right to tell Africans, how to be ‘modern’ Africans, meaning how to behave like themselves, a presumption which is anti-African in a profound historical, social, and culture sense. Africanity is an antithesis of this and, like all social revolutions, its terms of reference are exclusive of its negations. It is an attempt to put an end to domination and self-alienation and the collective level but anchored in this de-nied, hot piece of land, full of strange ven-
omous creatures.

**Africanity and the end of African Studies**

The rise Africanaity, as is defined in the foregoing discourse, spells doom for Af-
rican Studies for the simple reason that African Studies is an American institution run by Americans for their purposes, good or bad. African Studies are an anomaly in African found only in South Africa, the vortex of white racism. To study themselves, Africans do not need African Studies as a separate intellectual or political endeavour. In instituting African Studies both the American and the white South Africans were politically and ideologically motivated. Now that those considerations have fallen by the wayside since the end of the Cold War and of Apartheid in South Africa, both Americans and white South Africans are going to find it nigh impossible to sustain or to redefine African Studies. The fundamental reason is that, as an intellectual enter-
prise, African Studies were founded on alterity. If those responsible deny this absolutely, then they will be bereft of Africanity in the contemporary setting. Jane Guyer in defending what is clearly her vested interests states:

Research on Africa by African scholars as well as ourselves, is not just a geographical stake in an ‘area studies’ world; it is a contribution to the understanding of global phenomena and common human experience that has made African culture and societies ‘special cases’ (as quoted by M artin and West, op. cit; p 11).

This is a convenient afterthought and evades the issue altogether. Africana culture and societies became ‘special cases’ to whom and why? That is the question. There is nothing Martin and West know about the history of African Studies in America that Jane Guyer does not know. She knows as well as anybody else that what she proclaims has never been the case and that why African Studies is in a big crisis at this historical juncture. African scholars predicted this not because of their own growing intellectual maturity. The article written by Mahmood Mamdani, ‘A Glimpse at African Studies, Made in USA’, which appeared in CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 2, 1990, was a clear signal and spoke for a sizeable constituen-
cy of African scholars. The turning point was the meeting of thirty Africanist scholars at the Carter Centre in Atlanta in February, 1989. The designs of the American Africanists were thoroughly exposed. Instead of looking at themselves, they treated the whole indictment as an individual aberration (see Goran Hyden’s rejoinder; ‘Mamdani’s One-eyed Glimpse’, CODESRIA Bulletin, 4, 1990).

Nevertheless, the rebellion continued and reached a climax in a meeting organised by Martin and West at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 1994. The African participants rejected in no uncertain terms the idea of African Studies ‘made in the USA’. Most outspoken amongst them was Micere Mugo from Kenya. The Africanist antithesis, as can be seen in the introduction to Out of One, Many Africas, vindicated the position of those American scholars such as Martin and West who had been arguing for developing a new concept of African Studies. Although there are some Africanists such as Jane Guyer who sincerely believes that African Studies ‘made in the USA’ can still be redeemed, it is apparent that the rise of Africana and Afrocentrism is its ultimate negation.

This in itself does not mark an end to the study of Africa by white American scholars. It marks the end of their taken-for-granted intellectual hegemony and institutionalised domination in African Studies. One suspects that there will be a forced retreat into traditional disciplines from which only (not lonely) American scholars will pursue their research interests in Africa. It is conceivable that the institutional void created by the disappearance of African Studies ‘made in the USA’ will be filled by such African organisations as CODESRIA, OSSREA, AAPS, SAPE/SARPIS, CASAS, CAAS, etc. These are potentially democratic institutions because they are run by African scholars themselves and not beholden to any government. If they prove viable, it might be appropriate for foreign scholars to work through them, while waiting for the revival of the collapsed African universities. In other words, they hold prospects for intellectual and scientific cooperation which could be of great mutual benefit, as against the historical imperialistic appropriation of Africa by others.

The irony of all these developments is that there might never be any African Studies anywhere in the future. Christopher Fyfe and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch in Out of One, Many Africas both report the decline of African Studies in Britain and France, respectively, as a sequel to the end of empire and growing self-assertion by Africans. Americans as the last-empire-builders might suffer the same fate. Coquery-Vidrovitch thinks that the col-
lapse of empires, whether political or in-
tellectual, is an auspicious event since it creates opportunities for new initiatives, especially by those who had been denied. In the Francophonie she sees a new universalism spear-headed by the youth from the former French colonies. While one shares Coquery-Vidrovitch’s revolu-
tionary optimism, one is inclined to think that she underestimates nationalism in the developing world as a reaction to one-dimensional globalisation from the West, which transcends any supposed division between Francophone and Anglophone. Theoretically, it is arguable that the national democratic revolution had been aborted in Africa. Responses are symptomatic of this. As was suggested earlier, this has nothing to do with colour or race but with domination and the resultant
politics of independence. It is predictable that in this millennium everybody will pay lip-service to universalism but it is equally evident that all comers are going to pursue their parochial interests. Naturally, this will happen under different guises.

As was hinted above, African Studies will certainly be one of the casualties of the new millennium. It has reached its atrophy in Europe and America and it cannot be resurrected in Africa. There has never been any ‘African Studies’ in African universities, except in the damned Southern African settler societies. There, they had replicated the colonial paradigm, wherein white subjects studied black objects. In the ensuing process of subordination and subordination black were not allowed to study themselves, except as aids. After independence in the sub-region it was supposed that African Studies could be rehabilitated by upgrading the African handy boys and girls. Those who so thought were courting trouble for they had not clearly discerned the rising tide of Africanity in the aftermath of the fall of the old order. They thought that they could stage-manage the whole thing. How mistaken they were, as is shown by the Makgoba affair at the University of Witwatersrand and the Mamdani fiasco and the ensuing debacle of the envisaged African Studies at the University of Cape Town which blew in their faces.

Owing to either their insularity or isolation, the South African white academic community behaved as if they lived in a cuckoo-land of their own. They could have learnt from the experience of the British and French colonialists and fellow-American upstarts in Africa. This is apart from the fact that they were caught between the devil and the deep sea and could not define themselves as they were neither European nor African. In the newly conceived but doomed ‘African Studies’ who is going to study whom? Africanity predicates that there shall be neither white subjects nor black objects. Therefore, a plague upon both their houses and everlasting blazes upon Gomorrah and Sodom.

References

* CODESRIA Bulletin, Number 1 & 4, 2000, (p. 66-71).
Africanity: A Commentary by Way of Conclusion*

Socio-Historical Context
The publication of a special issue of the CODESRIA Bulletin on Africanity could not have come at a better time for a number of reasons. Repeated publication of solely editorial pronouncements had already generated great concern among African scholars, as shown by Zeleza’s unpublished letter to the former Executive Secretary of CODESRIA and its ramifications on the Internet. Privileged editorial declarations had truly become an intellectual hindrance and threatened to degenerate into a self-satisfied monologue. Therefore, according space to a variety of representations on the question of Africanity was a felicitous and facilitative event. It gave those concerned an opportunity to find out if there were still any real issues to be addressed, apart from personal fantasies or unnecessary mystification. Judging by the tenor of the general discussion in the Bulletin, it is apparent that Africanity is not a controversial issue in the philosophical sense but simply a historically determined political and social construct. It is an assertion of an independent identity under the present determinate conditions.

A cursory glance would show that its resurgence among radical African scholars is traceable to three important events in contemporary African history. These are (a) the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank (b) the intellectual negation of African studies and (c) the demise of apartheid in South Africa. These events are not related to one another but their impact on the consciousness of African scholars, particularly in the social sciences, was the same. Whereas in the 1980s the World Bank Programmes in Africa and African Studies – made in USA – came to be seen as imposition from outside, continued white domination in post-Apartheid South Africa in the 1990s is perceived as a denial of Africanity. The latter is particularly true of those African academics who came from outside and had no first-hand experience of white-settler societies and mistook majority-rule for ‘independence’, as is known elsewhere in Africa. Mahmood Mamdani’s vicissitudes at the University of Cape Town and elsewhere at the University of Cape Town and in Africa. Mahmood Mamdani’s vicissitudes at the University of Cape Town and elsewhere have been the starting representations of ECA in 1989 in a document entitled ‘African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation’. This created a great stir within the Bretton Woods institutions, as nobody had ever imagined, that representatives of African client-states could be so defiant in their rejection of what they saw as the excesses of the West.

The second example of an Africanist challenge to the economic presumptions of the World Bank came from a research group of about 20 African economists whose primary intention was to stake their intellectual claim against the World Bank and its mischief in Africanity. This is clearly reflected in the title of their final product: Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, edited by Thandika Mkandwire and Charles Soludo (1999). As far as African Studies is concerned, reference has already been made in my contribution in the Bulletin to Mahmadi’s authentic representation, A Glimpse at African Studies Made in USA (1990) and to the final requiem for a gringo edited by William M. Artin and Martin West, entitled Out of One, Many Africans (1999).

Authenticity and Historical Conjunction
The representations cited above are not random impulses. They are a culmination of political forces which have been at work over the last 20 years. In other words, Africanity is an expression of a common will. It is a historically-determined rebellion against domination by others. There is nothing new about it, except the historical conjuncture. Since the era of white colonialism, Africans have always referred to themselves as Africans in contradistinction to their foreign oppressors and exploiters. At no stage did this imply a desire to oppress others: the underlying sentiment has always been self-liberation. At the present historical juncture, what has made Africanity appear otherwise is the political insecurity of Southern African whites who for so long had treated the Africans as the ‘other’ now that the chickens have come to roost, they want the Africans to think of themselves as something other than what they think they are. This is a thoroughly perverse reaction. Properly understood, the problem is not Africanity but rather the ‘otherness’ on which the whites thrived and still do, as a socio-economic category. Whereas Southern African whites and their kith and kin overseas might genuinely believe that events such as land occupation in Zimbabwe are a transposition of ‘otherness’ by Africans, in fact, they are a mark of their failure to adjust under changed conditions wherein pre-existing relations of social domination are being challenged. If Southern African whites, like Bradley S. Leeuwen, are impelled to grab everything and, in pursuit of their avarice, are predisposed to treat the other with absolute callousness, then they can only succeed in confirming their historically-determined ‘otherness’. This is exemplified by the white interviewee from Johannesburg who, after nearly two years of majority-rule in ‘South Africa’, insisted that to her, South Africa is a South Africa of swimming pools and picnics. This made Mandela’s frequent declaration, ‘There shall not be any trains of gravy any longer’, sound like a voice crying in the wilderness.

This is not a philosophical or technical question, as some apologists have to make us believe. It is a straightforward political and social issue determined by the march of times. It has nothing to do with race either, it is a social-construct. Fabien Boulaga presents the matter in its true perspective when he states: ‘History shows that race is not a logical or scientific problem, but a political problem in
search of an absolute, metaphysical justification. Who should command and who should obey? In the name of what? (CODESRIA Bulletin, 1, 2000). But then our philosopher detaches from this insight by giving the impression that both the subjects and the objects of racism are guilty of the same crime. Rejecting racial subordination or being treated as the other cannot be construed as the reverse side of the same coin. Rather, it is a negation of a prevailing socio-construct and an affirmation of what is denied. This can be achieved only by proffering new self-identities. A fricanty and the proclaimed ‘African Renaissance’ feature very strongly in this search for a ‘second independence’. In the African context there is no evidence that these are aimed at debasing others expropriating them, yes, if that is the only way social equity and justice can be guaranteed. It is, therefore, false to suppose that those who had been victimised necessarily use this as a moral justification to debase or to dehumanise others. For that matter, Mmbembe committed a gross sociological transgression by giving even the vaguest impression that there is a similarity between ‘Jewish Messiahism’ (if by that he means Zionism) and A fricanty. In contemporary history, it is only the Israelis who used their victimisation as a moral justification for visiting on the Palestinians and the Arabs in general the same sins as had been visited upon them during the holocaust. This does not seem to have earned them as much disapprobation from the Americans, the British and the South African whites as A fricanty is threatening to in the case of the Pan-Africans. The moral duplicity implicit in this is not lost to the Africans.

**Race as a Form of Mystification**

It is interesting to note that, while social scientists and philosophers have still to contend with the problem of the concept of ‘race’. Once again, Boulaga assures us that ‘there is only one human species or race’ and marshals a great deal of up-to-date scientific evidence to prove his case. But even I as a biology student in the late 1950s at the University of Cape Town had been taught the same by my white professors, who nonetheless regarded or treated me as the ‘other’. Even anthropologists suffered from the same intellectual schizophrenia, despite the persuasive writings by Ruth Benedict and Ralph Linton in the 1930s. This is proof of the fact that the theory of difference is not based on scientific knowledge. It is socially-founded. For instance, to justify their claim to superiority, racists seize upon morphological differences or phenotypes, as Boulaga points out. The most pervasive of these is colour, which manifests itself as an essential difference between black and white. Yet, in reality, colour is the most indefinite human feature. This is made worse by the fact that human beings do not breed true. It is for this reason that, contrary to Boulaga’s suggestion, they cannot be divided into subspecies or ‘sub-races’. At best, we can talk of human varieties that run into one another, i.e., they constitute a continuum. For instance, the people who are called ‘black’ in Africa and America (not in South India or Sri Lanka) are mostly not black. They vary from dark brown to very light brown. This is particularly true of Southern Africans and African-Americans. The phenomenon is mostly attributed to continuous miscegenation among human varieties. In South Africa, it is significant that an uncompromising Africanist such as Winnie Mandela would lay claim to the so-called Coloured, as ‘our cousins, children of our mothers raped by whites’. In insisting on A fricanty the advocates are not blinded by sheer colour.

It is therefore surprising that, all of a sudden, a long-standing member of CODESRIA, Mmammoud Romdhane, finds it necessary to make apologies for being a ‘non-black African’. Is he afflicted by social amnesia or has he been infected by a new virus in CODESRIA? If so, it is well to remind him not only did he become a bona fide member of CODESRIA but that the issues he is raising had long been resolved before his time. If he did not know, CODESRIA was founded by North African blacks led by Samir Amin as a Pan-Africanist organisation. The Sub-Saharan Africans took the latter at face-value and embraced CODESRIA with both hands and became its backbone. Although latter-day reactionaries tried to introduce ‘race’ in the organisation by making references to strange notions such as ‘Arabophobes’, in CODESRIA circles North African blacks were referred to as such. This was consistent with the division of Africa into four sub-regions. West, North, East, and Southern African for purposes of representation. Not only this, if Romdhane’s memory is failing him, it is well to remember that the North Africans played a very prominent role in the formation of OAU. Figures such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ahmed Ben Bella became shining symbols of the Pan-Africanist movement and, to this day, nobody in his/her right sense could question their Africanty. In passing, it is also worth noting that, during the Congo crisis in 1960, which led to Lumumba’s assassination, the victim’s sons were immediately given permanent custody by an Egyptian family, ‘black’ as they might have been. Hence, pathetic and tendentious responses from old colleagues such as Romdhane, who should know better, are to be regretted. In contrast, novices such as A chille Mmbembe, who believe that ‘Pan-Africanism defines the native and the citizen by identifying them with black people’, are to be forgiven, for they know not.

As it has been reiterated, the object of Africanty is white racism as a pernicious social-construct, not non-black peoples. While in the ensuing political discourses the terms of reference are ‘black’ and ‘white’, especially in South Africa and America (if by that he means Zionism) and Africanty, it is important to note that both terms are used metaphorically. As was indicated earlier, ‘black’ is a social category and ‘African’ is a social identity used in opposition to ‘white’ (whether this be European settlers in Southern Africa or the imperialist West). However, in reality, ‘whites’ are not white. They vary from pink to tan and olive-brown. What distinguishes them is that they have been hegemonic over the last five hundred years and still insist on it; as shown by the new generalissimo dubbed ‘globalisation’. As would be expected, this has produced its own antithesis. It is the latter which should be the focus of discussion and not the illusion of colour or race. The whites in Southern Africa have not been denied citizenship by black governments. But inexorably they are being denied the right to dominate the blacks, however defined. Nevertheless, as the new developments in Zimbabwe demonstrate, this does not automatically confer upon ascendancy blacks the right to dominate others. This has been made abundantly clear to President Robert Mugabe, despite his un-flinching stand on white racism, as is socially defined. This contradicts Mmbembe’s metaphysical insinuation that: ‘The victim (meaning the A frican), full of virtue, is supposed to be incapable of violence, terror, and corruption’. Supposed by whom and where? As shown by the intense struggles for democratisation subsequent to the disillusionment with independence, for the last 20 years, A africans
have been fighting their own dictators and African scholars have spent an inordinate amount of time writing about dictatorship and corruption in Africa. This is so much so that they have been blamed for being long on criticisms and short on positive suggestions.

The Way Forward

In their concept paper, ‘Race and Identity in Africa’, Wambui Mwangi and André Zaaiman contrived to make race and African identity a problem for research. Scientifically, it is agreed that ‘race’ is a meaningless concept. Therefore, it cannot be a subject for research. Secondly, the African identity is a self-imposing concept. In the same way as Europeans, Asians or Latin-Americans take their identity for granted, Africans know and have always known that they are Africans at least since the colonial imposition. Otherwise, the independence movement would have been inconceivable. The problem of identity concerns those who live in Africa but do not know whether they are Africans or not. Even this is not a problem for research but rather for introspection. Once this problem has been resolved, there would be no need to talk about ‘minority groups’. Indeed, this might not be for protection of the human rights of minorities but an excuse for preservation of privilege. It is common knowledge that, in Africa, there is a number of the so-called minority groups that came to dominate the indigenous people. As pointed out earlier, this was often achieved through racism in one form or another. Thus, the issue is not ‘minority’ or ‘majority’ but social equality and equity. These latter two know no colour.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that African intellectuals who insist on Africaniy do not think of it only as a necessary condition for resisting external domination but also as a necessary condition for instituting social democracy in Africa. In support of this supposition, reference could be made to the works of African scholars such as Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Claude Ake, Kweisi Prah, Ernest Wamba-Dia-Wamba, Jacques Depelchin and many less obvious examples. Theirs is a call for a new Pan-Africanism that breaks neither external dependence nor internal authoritarianism and social deprivation. Currently, this is metaphorically referred to as ‘second independence’ or ‘African renaissance’. These are glimpses of utopia that need to be translated into actionable programmes.

When the movement for democracy swept throughout the continent towards the end of 1980s and in the early 1990s, it seemed that this movement was going to usher a new era in Africa. Alas! This did not happen. The movement only succeeded in authoritarianism, namely ‘democratic authoritarianism’ since the two main criteria for instituting it were multi-partyism and regular elections. Both turned out to be fraudulent and the African citizens were back to square one. As far as African scholars have not been able to explain why this was the case.

Unconvincing references have been made to the frailty of civil society in Africa. The intriguing question though is, if the same civil society had been strong enough to sweep away the older generation of African dictators, why has it not been able to contend with the new petty dictators? Furthermore, not all African societies can be said to have weak civil societies. For instance, South Africa (and Zimbabwe for that matter) can hardly be accused of having a weak civil society. Yet, while formal liberal democracy prevails in the country, it cannot be claimed that its civil society has been able to guarantee social democracy. When President-elect, Thabo Mbeki, in his movement of glory proclaimed that the South African revolution ‘has not been completed’ and, accordingly, declared his great aspiration for an ‘African renaissance’, what was he actually alluding to? Whatever it was and still is, it is apparent that he cannot realise his dream, without significant intellectual labours or inputs.

Therefore, it would appear that, instead of wasting their time debating sterile issues such as race and how black or not so black Africans are, African intellectuals could devote their energies to more relevant conceptual problems. For instance, the question of social democracy vis-à-vis social development has to all intents and purposes not been clarified. Furthermore, it could be asked: in the name of Africaniy, how do Africans combat racism, without being drawn into unrewarding discourses such as being proposed by some self-appointed universalists? Secondly, in the name of Pan-Africanism, how do Africans reconcile statehood and regional integration? The existence of sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC notwithstanding, it is obvious that African metanalystes have no clear formula for resolving the manifest tension between parochialism and universalism in their own context, let alone in the global context. These are some of the issues that could give Africanaity a substantive referent. Also, it is conceivable that their resolution could inaugurate the projected African renaissance. In other words, Africa needs not simply a metaphorical but a real renaissance. For the last three decades or so, Africa has been in the doldrums. As would be readily agreed, it is impossible to combine pride with depravity; or to reject racism, without proving oneself (including the actually despised Third World within ‘united’ Europe). For the time being, it is appropriate to recognise the fact that the way ahead is paved with stones and that some of the wounds suffered are self-inflicted.

Mafeje receiving the CODESRIA Lifetime Membership Award from Samir Amin at the 30th Anniversary Conference, Dakar, 2003

Tandeka Mkiwane and Archie Mafeje

Archie Mafeje and Thandika Mkandawire at the Conference on the Social Effects of the Economic Crisis and Reactions in Africa (Dakar, July 21-23, 1986)

Archie Mafeje Ebrima Sall

Jimmy Adesina, John Foye and Archie Mafeje