



Politics of Natural Resource Management and Accountable Systems in the Delivery of Water Services in Uganda

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Abstract

The political behaviour of public institutions exhibited in the management of critical natural resources influences the nature of service delivery. In particular, the character of such public organizations as regulators of natural resources, like water, impacts not only on what such management bodies do and their functionality, but also on the way they respond to public accountable systems. The latter systems refer to those formal and informal public frameworks that emphasize the need to ensure that water services are delivered effectively, efficiently, satisfactorily and in a sustainable manner. It is mostly the shortfalls in such accountable systems, as is the case in most developing countries' cities, that prompts analysis of the role of politics in the relevant public organizations. Thus, this article is intended to explore pertinent issues particularly relevant to the interests, rational choices and calculations in the regulation of natural resource management and the modes in which they impact on accountable systems in Uganda. Using a descriptive and correlational research design, data were collected using questionnaires administered to 1,086 respondents from key stakeholders in Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). The findings indicate that political considerations by water managers mostly led to utility maximization of self-interest rather than serving public interest in terms of decisions which were characterized by minimal participation of lower-level employees and water consumers. The level of adherence to accountable systems was low, suggesting that managers in water provision services were working hard to satisfy their political masters rather than the clients they served. The political considerations that underlined the practices in water resource management significantly watered down the promotion of accountable systems, but also affected the efficiency of the National Water and Sewage Corporation (NWSC). The article concludes that politics in organizations promotes skewed management practices that ultimately undermine accountable systems in the provision of critical resources such as water at the expense of consumers and citizens. Public reforms that

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enhance the independence of public institutions charged with the provision of vital development resources, which also enhance accountable systems in the public interest, are the most appropriate policy response to this challenge.

Key Words: Politics, natural resource management, accountable systems, water delivery services, Uganda.

Résumé

Le comportement politique manifesté par les institutions publiques dans la gestion des ressources naturelles essentielles a un impact sur la nature de la prestation des services. En particulier, le caractère de ces organismes publics, en tant que régulateurs des ressources naturelles, comme l'eau, a un impact non seulement sur les activités et la fonctionnalité des organes de gestion, mais aussi sur la façon dont ils répondent aux systèmes publics de reddition de comptes. Ces systèmes se réfèrent aux cadres publics formels et informels qui mettent l'accent sur la nécessité de veiller à ce que les services d'approvisionnement en eau soient fournis de manière efficace, efficiente, satisfaisante et durable. Ce sont surtout les insuffisances de ces systèmes de reddition de comptes, comme c'est le cas dans la plupart des villes des pays en voie de développement, qui incitent à analyser le rôle de la politique dans les organisations publiques concernées. Le présent article vise donc à étudier les questions pertinentes particulièrement liées aux intérêts, aux choix rationnels et aux calculs dans la réglementation de la gestion des ressources naturelles et le degré auquel ils influent sur les systèmes de reddition de comptes en Ouganda. Sur la base d'un plan de recherche descriptif et corrélationnel, les données ont été recueillies à l'aide de questionnaires administrés à 1 086 répondants parmi les principales parties prenantes de la « Kampala Capital City Authority » (KCCA, Autorité de la ville capitale de Kampala). Les résultats indiquent que les considérations politiques des responsables de la gestion de l'eau ont surtout conduit à la priorisation de l'intérêt personnel au détriment de l'intérêt public dans la prise de décisions caractérisée par une représentation minimale des employés de niveau inférieur et des consommateurs d'eau. Le niveau d'adhésion aux systèmes de reddition de comptes était faible, ce qui laisse supposer que les responsables des services d'approvisionnement en eau travaillaient essentiellement pour satisfaire leurs maîtres politiques plutôt que les clients qu'ils desservaient. Les considérations politiques qui sous-tendent les pratiques en matière de gestion des ressources en eau ont considérablement atténué la promotion de systèmes de reddition de comptes, mais ont également affecté l'efficacité de la « National Water and Sewage Corporation » (NWSC, Société nationale d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement). En conclusion, nous soutenons que la politique dans les organisations favorise des pratiques de gestion biaisées qui, en fin de compte, entament les systèmes de reddition de comptes dans la fourniture de ressources essentielles telles que l'eau, aux dépens des consommateurs et des citoyens. Des réformes publiques visant à renforcer l'indépendance des institutions publiques chargées de fournir des ressources vitales pour le développement, ainsi que les systèmes d'obligation redditionnelle dans l'intérêt public, constituent la réponse politique la plus appropriée à ce défi.

Mots clés : Politique, gestion des ressources naturelles, systèmes d'obligation redditionnelle, services d'approvisionnement en eau, Ouganda.

Introduction

Water resource management, which covers underground, aerial (vapour and rain) and surface (spring, well, pond, river, lake, sea and ocean water) regulation, constitutes one of the forms of natural resource control and delivery without which all forms of life on planet earth are threatened. It is on these resources that most of the human activities conducted in the world depend (UNDESA 2005). Water supports all forms of human, terrestrial and aquatic life by playing a critical role not only in the production of food and energy on which life depends but also in providing the environment in which some forms of life are entirely managed and sustained (– United Nations – Water 2012a). According to the Water Resources Management Framing Paper (2013), even all the forms of livelihoods are directly linked to water resources. For example, clean and safe water for drinking and cooking, water for sanitation and hygiene, water for energy production, fishing, agriculture, transport and navigation, industry, recreation and livestock, aquaculture and maintenance of the integrity of the ecosystems, are managed in diverse but closely linked environments. Water resources are also at the core of almost all activities that propel the development of societies all around the world (United Nations – Water 2012b; Schilling & Chiang 2011; Batey *et al.* 2008; Salvati & Marco 2008).

The management of water resources is therefore at the core of ensuring the wellbeing and development of societies in a sustainable manner. Management in this context is defined as the development and implementation of policies, strategies, standards and priorities on which basis water is extracted, treated, protected, allocated and distributed. The significance of this management process lies in making water and other resources affordably accessible and optimally utilized by all citizens and species in the ecosystem in a sustainable manner (Matyama 2013; Grafton & Hussey 2011; Chartres & Varma 2010; Walmsly & Pearce 2010). According to UNDESA (2005), the various human and ecological demands that come to bear upon water resources imply that the management of these resources has to be conducted using an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). This is an approach that has been internationally accepted as the way forward for an efficient, equitable, satisfactory and sustainable water supply (McMullen 2012; United Nations 2012c). Since the demands of the IWRM approach are that water resources must be satisfactory, the approach also implies that the management of these resources has to involve many actors, who can be categorized as government, private water service providers and water consumers (Ballet *et al.* 2010; UNDESA 2005). In Uganda, the involvement of government as an actor is constitutional as per Parts XIII and XXVII (i) of the national objectives and directive principles of state policy and Article

189 (7) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. In practice, the involvement of different actors makes water resource management a truly public process (Samra & McLean 2007), and this introduces the need to mediate interests between and among diverse stakeholders in the management of this resource. Indeed, Henrik-Serup (2014) observed that politics permeates everything that happens in the management of public affairs.

Politics carries diverse meanings to different people. Firstly, as both a concept and practice, politics has been differently defined by various scholars since the time of the great philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle whose main concern was the role of the state in securing the citizens' welfare in the commonwealth (Henrik-Serup 2014). Secondly, there are other scholars who take politics to mean allocation of development resources, mediation of competing interests, management of meagre resources, conflict resolution and other representations of politics involving reconciliation of societal values (Ryan 2012; Schmidt *et al.* 2011; Thompson 2009; Knapp & Wright 2006; Hay 2004; Flinders 2001). Thirdly, the various conceptions of politics have compelled Hanley (2010) to consider it in a larger context, not only limited to any one particular set of activities but also with wider application to any class of purposeful human endeavours and behaviours involving more than one individual.

It is consequently imperative to develop an operational definition of politics before this concept is further analysed. Drawing upon the relevant aspects of its various definitions, particularly the definition given by Harold Lasswell cited in Hanley (2010), politics is in this paper conceived of as all actions undertaken in water resource management to promote either self-interest or public interest by authoritatively influencing who gets what, when and how in the public realm. Politics is defined this way because it occurs in the form of such actions which influence the management of water resources and what management can do as far as provision of water services is concerned. Essentially, the concept of politics underlines the fact that where there are scarce resources, there is a need for procedures, rules and regulations not only to legally determine who gets access to these societal resources, but also to ensure the orderly allotment of development resources. This argument is further articulated by many public service management theories, including the public interest theory, self-interest theory, public choice theory, and the public value theory, amongst others. All perspectives underscore the need to follow rules and regulations in the management of public interests enforced in the context of a specific political superstructure (Rhys & Van de Walle 2012; Tegeret-Kiplangat 2012; Hertog 2010; Coats 2006).

As political interests are mediated in the management of water resources, the effects of such negotiations are seen at the level of service delivery

where the intensity of water extraction, treatment, protection, allocation, and distributed are analysed most particularly in terms of expected accountable systems. It is again at this point where significant questions of affordable access and optimal utilization by diverse stakeholders in the ecosystem are raised (Baietti *et al.* 2006). This essentially implies that the nature of interests and values in the water management structure affects the level of observation of accountable water supply systems, since these are the systems that ensure that water services are provided to a level planned to maintain the integrity of a country's ecosystem and to ensure that citizens can access and utilize clean and safe water in a satisfactory and sustainable manner (Borgerhoff-Mulder & Coppolillo 2005). Moreover, the fact that the politics involved in water resource management affects the level at which accountable systems are observed implies that it can be questioned when the systems do not behave as expected. This is the very situation that characterizes most water delivery services in many developing countries (Ghana Integrity Initiative 2011; Baietti *et al.* 2006). The systems in place for the provision of water services are not accountable to the extent that they even compelled the 192-member United Nations General Assembly to declare access to clean and safe water as a human right (United Nations 2010). This was after the Assembly realized that globally, close to 900 million people did not have access to clean and safe water and that about 1.5 million children under the age of five years were dying annually because of water-related diseases (United Nations 2010).

Uganda recognized access to safe and clean water as a fundamental right much earlier as per parts XIV and XXI of the national objectives and directive principles of state policy prescribed in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Providing satisfactory access to safe and clean water is therefore a constitutional requirement in Uganda. The political will to realize this right was reiterated when Uganda committed itself to attaining the seventh pillar of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which requires halving the proportion of the world's population without access to clean and safe water by 2015. Uganda further reaffirmed its stand by committing itself to ensuring that 77 per cent of its rural population and 100 per cent of its urban population would have access to clean and safe water by 2015 (Uganda's National Development Plan 2010-2015). These targets are higher than the 75 per cent that Uganda needed to attain by 2015 (MWE 2010). Following the Poverty Eradication Action Programme (PEAP) framework that guides its development agenda, Uganda pursues the realization of this right through not only the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) to manage all water resources and the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NW&SC) to manage piped water, but also local governments to

manage the extraction of underground water and protection of wells and spring water resources, while private water service providers are regulated by the Uganda Bureau of Standards (MWE 2013).

Despite the operations of all water service providers in the country, the available statistics for 2015, the magical year by which desirable achievements in the water sub-sector should have been achieved in line with the MDGs, indicate that Uganda is still far from attaining its planned water supply targets. According to the MWE (2013), 64 per cent of Ugandans have access to clean and safe water in rural areas and 69 per cent in urban areas. These proportions appear impressive as they suggest that most Ugandans have access to clean and safe water. They, however, also show that 36 per cent of Ugandans in rural areas and 31 per cent of citizens in urban areas do not have access to clean and safe water.

These proportions suggest that over a third of Uganda's estimated 37 million people have their fundamental right to safe and clean water sacrificed by politics in water management. The statistics further imply that the efforts to rationally deliver water services by water managers and their political supervisors were still responding to immense pressure from diverse competing demands for water. In this respect, uncontrolled politics in water management have become a threat to good health and can cause ultimately death (United Nations 2010). This scenario is causing concern, leading to questioning the level at which water is used in Uganda and how this level is explained by the politics played in water resource management in Uganda. Taking KCCA as a case in point, the purpose of this paper is to answer the following research questions: (a) what is the nature of politics that characterize management water resources in KCCA, (b) to what extent do managers in water resource organizations respond to accountable systems relevant to the provision of water services and (c) what is the effect of politics in the management of water resources as far as water services provision in the KCCA is concerned. The indicators used to meet these objectives were identified from the literature reviewed below.

Literature Review

The literature reviewed in this section is about theories and indicators of management and accountable systems as they apply to the delivery of public services, particularly water services.

Theoretical Review

The theoretical perspective applied in this paper is developed by combining the rationales of the public interest theory, self-interest theory, public choice theory and the public value theory. The public interest theory was developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou based on Platos' premise that the ideal political

community is that in which property is owned in common and serves a common interest (Hertog 2010; Munyaradzi 2005). Based on the premise that service provision is inherently inefficient and inequitable when left to operate on its own, this theory postulates that inefficiency or inequity needs to be corrected through regulation so that it responds to public demand in a satisfactory manner (Glaeser & Shleifer 2003). Regulation is needed in terms of formulating and enforcing policies, standards, guidelines and plans that ensure that instead of serving selfish interests of particular individuals or groups of people in society, services are provided to benefit society as a whole (Armstrong & Sappington 2007; Carlton & Picker 2005; Crew & Kleindorfer 2002). The rationale of this theory was applied in this paper to analyse the nature of regulation that takes place in the management of water resources and how it affects the application of accountable systems in the water resource sector. It is imperative to point out that the rationale of the public interest theory works only when the regulating body does not serve the private interests of the regulators, but the interest of the entire society in which it operates (Abdel-Nour 2003). The theory ascribes the regulating responsibility to government assuming that government is a neutral body. Yet, despite its public responsibility, government is a political player with real partisan interests. Moreover, while government officials are expected to work in the interest of the public, putting into practice the policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, this does not always happen value-free as the pre-occupation is to balance diverse interests, values, risks and political considerations. This is well explained by the self-interest theory and the public choice theory.

The self-interest theory is premised on water the utility maximizing rationality based on the capitalistic principle regarding the rational human being. The theory advances a view that humankind is selfish and all their behaviour is motivated by the desire to maximize their own utility. This theory views self-interest as one's personal profit, benefit, advantage to the exclusion of regard for others. Self-interest expresses itself in one's devotion, concern for and pursuit of own welfare without regard for others (Munyaradzi 2005). The self-interest theory's rationale is well summarized by Robert (2005) who contends that the average human being is about 95 per cent selfish. Perhaps no one captures the political rationale perspective of the self-interest theory better than Machiavelli who, as cited by Munyaradzi (2005), argued that a prudent ruler (or service provider) cannot, and must not, honour anything that places him or herself at a disadvantage.

Karl Marx cited in Munyaradzi (2005:88) warned, however, that pure pursuit of self-interest can be dehumanizing because it tends to be individualistic, treats others mechanistically and has no regard for humaneness.

Aristotle (cited in the same source) had recognized this tendency earlier and argued that the average person is a lover of self. Aristotle observed that human beings should profit themselves by doing noble acts that benefit others. This perspective is also held by Adam Smith (cited in Haseler (2000:66) who argues that the natural effort of all individuals was to better their own condition, but in so doing, they tend to also better the condition of society. The rationale of the self-interest theory is also shared by the public choice theory, although with a slightly different focus.

Essentially, the public choice theory dispels the notion that people in the public sector seek to maximize net benefits to society as a whole. It posits that the behaviour of everyone that participates in the provision of public services is such that they all act in a way that seeks to satisfy self-interest as opposed to and at the expense of public interest (Mueller 2003). Politicians, bureaucrats, private service providers and consumers, all seek to maximize the satisfaction of their own utility. Consumers want government and private companies to provide services that meet their welfare needs satisfactorily (Waterson 2003). Similarly, politicians want to satisfy their political agendas, thereby focusing much attention on power consolidation, wealth accumulation, patronage, and public reputation (Tegetet-Kiplangat 2012). At the same time, as bureaucrats act as utility-maximizers of their selfish interests, thereby working to increase their reward and incentive budgets, private service providers want to maximize their profits (Le Grand 2007). In the end, no one serves in the public interest. Therefore, government policy is driven by individual interests of politicians, powerful forces (rent seekers) and the bureaucrats (Rhys & Van de Walle 2012). The rationale of this theory was adopted in this paper to explore the nature of interests displayed in the management of water resources and how they affect the use of accountable systems in the water resource sector. The rationale of the public choice theory suggests that no one can serve in the interest of the public. The public value theory has, however, been developed as a new paradigm for public management intended to reconcile these opposing interests.

The public value theory was developed by Mark Moore to improve the New Public Management approach and its Reinventing Government variant (Andrews 2010). Mark Moore developed the public value theory based on the premise that the realm of public services, including services delivery, was different from the realm of services provided based on markets, competition and choice. He argued that effectiveness is realized in public service management when the efforts of public sector managers are evaluated not in the economic marketplace of individual consumers but in the political marketplace of citizens and the collective decisions of representative democratic institutions (Clarke *et al.* 2007).

Following this argument, the public value theory advances a notion that citizens are more than consumers and ought to be able to influence the design and delivery of services. Service providers have to develop a continuous dialogue with their authorizing environment (citizens) so as to serve it in a manner that satisfies its real needs in an effective and efficient manner (Cowell *et al.* 2012). The involvement of citizens can allow service providers to develop targets that relate to outcomes genuinely valued by the public. It also helps service providers to develop a clear sense of how they respond to the service preferences of the citizens (Walker & Enticott 2004). The rationale of the public value theory suggests that its proper application can help service providers such as those in water service delivery to consult with citizens, thereby becoming knowledgeable about how to improve efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in water service delivery based on citizens' socioeconomic and political aspirations. This rationale was applied in this paper to explore the involvement of citizens in the management of water resources and how it affects the use of accountable water supply systems in Uganda, particularly in Kampala district.

Politics

The concept of politics has been differently defined by different scholars, but often focusing on diverse elements of public affairs. For instance, Harold Lasswell cited in Hanley (2010) defined it as the practice which determines who gets what, when and how. David Easton cited from the same source defined it as the authoritative allocation of values for a society. Values in Easton's definition are understood to mean development resources, supportive regulations distributing public resources and authoritative directives in this regard. Politics has also been defined as an art or science exercised by one or more people with an intention of influencing others in one way or another (Haseler 2000). It is further defined as intrigue or manoeuvring within a political unit or group in order to gain control or power. Politics refers to the methods or tactics involved in managing a state or government or its organs such as an organization in charge of delivering water services, education, health, poverty alleviation and other governmental organs. Ryan (2012) defined politics as the practice and theory of influencing people at an individual or civic level to the purpose of directing them toward a desired destiny. Leftwich (2004) perceives politics as actions involving making and enforcing collective decisions. He however forgets to mention that such collective decisions seldom lead to benefits in terms of service delivery for the general public, resource capacity notwithstanding. Hay (2010) considered politics as actions involving compromising, building consensus and forming coalitions for the good of the majority of citizens or well-wishers. Similarly, Hanley (2010) adds that politics includes all behaviour applied to determine who gets what, when and

how in a situation where there are two or more people. Henrik-Serup (2014) described politics as the art and power of influencing resource distribution. According to Gooby (2013), politics is the activity by which differing interests are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. In this context, politics is also described as an activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live or which govern what they do when pursuing desired welfare (Hay & Wincott 2012).

The foregoing definitions are just some of the many put forward by various scholars since the times of the great political philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. First, the analyses suggest that politics carries different meanings to different people, depending on what public affairs issues a scholar wants to emphasize. Secondly, the diverse meanings of the concept as put forward by scholars allude to the need to analyse the nature and character of politics contextually. The nature and character of the interests, risks and controversies in the public arena are therefore explored in this paper by drawing upon the relevant aspects of the various perspectives of politics, particularly the one used by Harold Lasswell. It is conceptualized as all actions carried out in the management of water resources with intent to influence who gets what, when and how. This understanding of politics is considered to be comprehensive enough to cover the analysis of all relevant forms of political situations that take place in the management of public resources vis-à-vis the level at which these public organizations comply with the relevant accountable systems.

Indeed, actions pertaining to the 'what' dimension of the concept allude to taking decisions regarding 'the kind of public resources such as water' to supply in terms of type, quantity and quality. The specific actions involve deciding, for example, how much and what quality of water to supply (levels of treatment, labelling, size of pipes, unprotected or protected spring, well, pond, valley dam, pumped, channelled river, extended lake or rainwater or other types). The actions conducted to influence 'when' to supply the determined type of water may involve deciding the delivery timelines while actions that involve determining 'who' pertain to deciding the specific population groups to whom water should be delivered (should they be in urban or rural areas, the poor or the rich, and which regions and communities to supply). Finally, actions regarding the 'how' dimension involve deciding the methods to use to supply water. The methods used to deliver services, including water services, tend to include the public supply system, the open market or public private partnership arrangements (Hanley 2010). These methods apply whether the services are provided by government or the private sector. It should be noted that although all these forms of politics are

usually at play in the management of water resources, those that characterize this management in Uganda, particularly in KCCA are yet to be clarified; hence the need for this paper.

The public method may involve the use of unquestionable directive commands, orders or decrees to determine how water services must be provided (Maseti & Gumede 2011; Hanley 2010). It may be dictatorial involving the use of guidelines and instructions, not in an expressly flawed manner but in systems that may be inefficient. Under any of these public methods, the politics engaged may require consulting, compromising, building consensus, or enlisting support from other different stakeholders. The methods demand nothing less or more than obedience to rules and regulations that may be issued by politicians from time to time (Fisk nd). Public methods tend to be loathed by those managers dictated upon, but they can be effective and efficient and can translate into efficient delivery of satisfactory services, especially when the decisions are made in the public interest (Lindblad 2010).

This is because they involve bureaucrats evaluating possibilities, making and enforcing decisions through other people without their direct input (Fisk nd). This makes decision-making and implementation fast and unimpeded (Fisk undated; Maseti & Gumede 2011). They can also be inefficient, ineffective and inequitable in the sense that they can result in the delivery of very unsatisfactory services when their intent is to promote the self-interest of the politicians (Puni *et al.* 2014). While public interest in the public sector may involve the desire to serve for the common good, self-interest takes many different self-seeking forms, including the desire to patronize others, to serve a favoured few, to entrench oneself in power, building power bases, and other forms (Hill *et al.* 2004). In the private sector, public interest expresses itself in the form of concern for and demonstration of social responsibility (Hertog 2010). Self-interest is expressed in the form of profit-maximization through exploitation of others (Abdel-Nour 2003).

The open market method was first introduced into the scholarly world by Aristotle having observed how oligarchies work, observing that it involves a privileged few, usually the top echelon of chief executives who pocket all the profits but bear all the risks as well (proprietors, private companies or members of the economic elite and private-planning groups), determining how to deliver a service under consideration. This method is usually manifested in the analysis of service delivery policies, plans, strategies, standards and regulations formulated by diverse decision-makers in private companies (Dye 2000). This method involves planning for and delivering services to the public or targeted communities (in the case of private service providers), but it does not require consulting with them. The method therefore tends to rely on limited knowledge or information about

the actual needs of those for whom the formulated service delivery policies, plans, strategies, standards and regulations are to serve (José Izquierdo 2013). However, according to the elite theory as discussed by Gonzalez (2001), the initiators of the policies, plans, strategies, standards, and regulations, usually the heads of business organizations concerning the services under consideration, have to enlist the support of other members of the decision-making groups so as to build consensus regarding the intent, expected benefits and proposed implementation methods, requirements and the human, material and financial resources needed to realize the intent and expected benefits (Bottomore 1993). This consensus is particularly needed when the intent is to regulate the self-interest of service providers for the purpose of promotion of public interest (Foldvary 2009).

The public private partnership method connotes the use of participation and involvement of public and private stakeholders in the management of service delivery (Billgrena & Holme 2008; Choi 2007). Its use implies that service delivery management is conducted by making consultations and partnering with relevant stakeholders to seek their views, listening to and acting in line with the views, and building consensus with the stakeholders (Thakadu 2005). This implies that the management is based on knowledge of the needs of citizens as well as the need to improve relevant capacity to deliver service (Measham 2007). Bartley *et al.* (2008) observed that the public sector realizes this form of participation through decentralization where most of the services are contracted out to private business entities (Shackleton *et al.* 2002).

Management of Water Resources

Available literature indicates that the management of water resources should be conducted following Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (Kuenzer *et al.* 2012; Rahaman *et al.* 2004; Falkenmark & Folke 2000; Global Water Partnership GWP 2000, 2004a, 2004b). IWRM is defined as a management approach that promotes the coordinated development and management of water in relation to other natural resources and in a way that maximizes citizens' water-related welfare in an equitable manner and without compromising the sustainability of the ecosystems (GWP 2000). This approach is particularly recommended because it promotes the realization of what is referred to as the Dublin principles passed at the International Conference on Water and the Environment in 1992 (Rahaman & Varis 2005). According to Biswas *et al.* (2005), these three principles include:

- (a) The principle of social equity, which focuses on making policies that ensure that all water users, particularly those in marginalized and poor communities, have equal access to a sufficient quantity and quality of water necessary to sustain human well-being.

- (b) The principle of economic efficiency, which emphasizes making strategies that yield the greatest benefit to the greatest number of water users possible using the available financial and water resources.
- (c) The principle of ecological sustainability. This principle requires that aquatic ecosystems are acknowledged as users and that adequate allocation is made to sustain their natural functioning.

According to Lovell *et al.* (2002), the realization of the above principles necessitates those in charge of water management working closely with and for all water users. This alludes to the use of a comprehensive, participatory planning and implementation approach involving both central and local governments (Holling & Meffe 2002). This is the only way water can be supplied in a manner that enables it to serve its different uses in agriculture, maintenance of eco and human health and life, and as a source of household income and government revenue (Kuenzer *et al.* 2012). This approach is cross-sectoral and flexible because it attempts to bring together all the groups that matter in ensuring that forms of life that need water have adequate access to its supply. IWRM seeks to create a water supply environment that enables realization of human access to water as a right as well as sustainable development and use of all water-dependent individual, household, company and government assets (Rahaman *et al.* 2004). The approach achieves these ends based on rational, just and informed choices, priorities, policies, standards, strategies and practices. Its effectiveness depends on supportive political will and commitment, capacity development, adequate and equitable financial allocation and disbursement, and effective monitoring and evaluation (Falkenmark & Folke 2000).

Accountable Systems

Accountable systems are regarded as mechanisms by which services are sustainably delivered to their consumers not only as planned (effectiveness) but also in an efficient and satisfactory manner (Chukmaitov *et al.* 2014; Marsha 2010). The extent to which these systems are conformed to ensures that the quantity and quality of service outputs and outcomes are achieved at a cost as minimum as possible (Robinson & Dolan 2010). They ensure that the planned level of services is satisfactorily delivered to consumers in terms of both quantity and quality (Terrell *et al.* 2011). These accountable systems further help to ensure that reasonable services are provided in the most efficient and effective manner partly, due to the participation of citizens in making service delivery decisions. Citizens do this by electing their leaders at both national and local levels where among other issues they make the elected and appointed leaders not only answerable for the decisions they make while

in office but also responsible for ensuring that the decisions are implemented as they agreed (Devers & Berenson 2009). Accountable systems operate in such a way that they stop participants from wavering from the expected course of action, but make them work as highly performing teams (Fisher *et al.* 2006). Moreover, these systems also promote observance of what may be referred to as a networked sense of responsibility in the delivery of services since they ensure that all people participating in this delivery are not only motivators but also watchdogs of each other (Chukmaitov *et al.* 2014).

Accountable systems in the delivery of services trace their origin to and have been widely applied in the health sector. Literature indicates that healthcare services began to be delivered in a satisfactory way when the responsibility to provide these services was extended from individual health workers to the entire system applied to deliver the services (Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Wilen & Stone 1998). Not only did the extension cause health workers to start working collaboratively but it also led workers to keep watch over each other so as to ensure credible fulfilment of each other's healthcare responsibilities and collective accountability for the quality and equity of the provided care. The system of care applied also revealed that all public services could be delivered in a planned and satisfactory manner if accountable delivery systems were adopted in all sectors of central and local governments (Maccarthaigh & Boyle 2014; Su Wild 2006).

According to Dubnick (2005), the rationale for adopting accountable public service delivery systems across the board is based on the observation that holding public officials individually accountable does not yield the desired results. Many of those who tend to be held liable as individuals are usually not the ones or the only ones responsible for accountability processes and accomplishment of results. They are just victims or a part of a group of government officials who might not necessarily be held answerable without holding the entire system accountable (Dubnick 2005). The justification for the shift to accountable systems is that whatever the management of services related to welfare needs, the services are effectively satisfied as planned not only when the responsible public officials are held accountable individually but also when the whole system applied in the management operates in an accountable manner (Gregory 2012). That is, in an approach that translates into optimal delivery and realization of the planned quality of public services (Kellert *et al.* 2000) based on the doctrine of collective accountability (Petersson 2008; Gilbert 2006; Mellena 2006).

The foregoing observations indicate that the use of accountable systems ensures that all actors in the management of service delivery work with a shared sense of responsibility which translates into providing services efficiently, effectively and in a satisfactory and sustainable manner. The sys-

tems are therefore needed to ensure that water supply is maintained at a level that not only guarantees citizens satisfactory access to clean and safe water but also facilitates the ecosystem to remain healthy (Mercer & Christensen 2011; Baietti *et al.* 2006; Borgerhoff-Mulder & Coppolillo 2005). However, the level at which these systems are complied with to facilitate the provision of water services in Uganda, particularly within the KCCA, is still questionable owing to the failure to supply water as planned and in a satisfactory manner. This is why this paper analyzes the relevant issues to clarify on the levels of water service delivery.

Methodology

The study from which this paper is developed was designed as a descriptive and correlational study. This design was used because it was suitable to apply in order to meet the objectives of the study. Indeed, as Neville (2007) observed, the descriptive part of the design was appropriate to facilitate explanation of the nature of politics which occurs in the management of water resources and the level at which accountable systems are complied with. As Al-Mahmood (2011) notes, the correlational aspects of the design are significant as they help establish the effect of politics on the management of water resources and the level to which the accountable systems are complied with in the water service sector.

The population of the study consisted of regulators, public and private providers (bureaucrats) and consumers of water services in KCCA. Regulators were represented by MWE political leaders and bureaucrats. Public water service providers were represented by bureaucrats in NW&SC (representing central government) and KCCA (representing the local government in the capital city). Private water service providers were represented by water sellers and those using privately supplied water in KCCA. Water service consumers were represented by heads of all the households in this district. All households were considered because KCCA is an urban conurbation whose water supply target was set at 100 per cent as per Uganda's National Development Plan (2010-2015). This implies that all households were expected to have access to and consume clean and safe water services. This fact justified the need for information regarding household heads. Water service delivery regulators and providers were considered because they obviously had relevant information to provide about the study variables. Efforts to establish the private water sellers and providers in KCCA were futile due to lack of records about them. Therefore, their population size was considered infinite. Consequently, the size of their sample was determined using a formula for estimating a statistically representative sample from an infinite population. As discussed by Kothari (2005), this formula is as stated follows:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 p (1-p)}{d^2}$$

Where d is the margin of error permitted in the selection of the sample. The 95 per cent confidence level was used to select the sample, which implies that d was 5 per cent. Z is the z-value corresponding to the 95 per cent confidence level, implying that $z = 1.96$. p is the proportion of the population with the desired attributes. Kathori (2005) noted that for infinite populations, p is assumed to be equal to half of the population. So, $p = 50$ per cent. Therefore $(1-p)$, which is the proportion of the population without the desired attributes, is given as $(1 - 50 \text{ per cent}) = 50 \text{ per cent}$. Hence, filling in the formula above,

$$n = [(1.96)^2 \times 50 \text{ per cent} \times 50 \text{ per cent}] \div (5 \text{ per cent})^2 = (3.8416 \times 0.25) \div 0.0025 = 0.92198 \div 0.0025 = 384.16 \text{ H" } 384$$

The review of the reports of Ministry of Water and Environment (2011), Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2007), National Water & Sewerage Corporation (NW&SC) (2013), and Mwanje and Ssenkabirwa (2013) revealed the population sizes of other categories of respondents as summarized in Table 1. It should be noted that the table also shows the selected number of respondents per category as given by Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) Sample Determination Table cited in Amin (2005:454).

Table 1: Sample distribution by category, number and applied sampling technique

Category of respondents	Population size (Kampala)	Expected sample	Determination criteria	Actual sample
MWE	492	217	Krejcie & Morgan	170
NW&SC	580	234	Krejcie & Morgan	197
KCCA	308	169	Krejcie & Morgan	137
Private water service providers	Infinite	384	Kothari's formula	198
Water consumers (household heads)	306,178	384	Krejcie & Morgan	384
Total		1,388		1,086

The sample was selected using simple random sampling so as to give each respondent an equal chance of participating in the study. This was based on the view of the definition of politics adopted in this study. This was because for each category, every respondent had something to say not only about the politics played in the management of water resources at their respective levels but also about how accountable systems are used in the delivery of water services. Data was collected using questionnaires designed according to the variables of the study. The questionnaires were tested for validity using the content validity test and for reliability using the Cronbach Alpha method of internal consistency. The computed content validity indices were 0.779 for the regulators' questionnaire, 0.766 for the bureaucrats' questionnaire, 0.809 for the private providers' questionnaire and 0.897 for the consumers' questionnaire. The Alpha coefficients computed for these questionnaires were 0.749, 0.777, 0.783 and 0.799, respectively. These indices were all greater than 0.7 which, according to Booth *et al.* (2008) and Field (2005), is the minimum acceptable threshold. The questionnaires thus contained highly valid and reliable items. Data was collected after getting permission from the authorities of the selected agencies and Local Council I Chairpersons of the villages from where the heads of households were selected. Efforts were also made to explain to the respondents the purpose of the study and to seek their willingness to participate in the study. Ethical issues were addressed. Confidentiality was promised by telling respondents that their names were not required and that all their responses were to be handled confidentially.

The data was analysed using the SPSS programme, particularly its descriptive, ANOVA, factor analysis and multivariate regression analysis methods. The descriptive method was used to establish the nature of played politics and level of using accountable systems in the supply of water services. Respondents' perception of the variables was measured using a 5-point Likert scale of responses running from strongly disagree (1) to disagree (2), not sure (3), agree (4) and strongly agree (5). As far as politics was concerned, respondents who on average scored 4.5"5.0 implied that it was played in a manner that highly promoted self-interest on the self-interest scale or public interest on the public interest scale. Regarding the accountable systems' scale, these respondents meant the use of these systems was high. Respondents who scored 3.5"4.49 on the politics scale meant that the interests were promoted at a low level. They also meant that the level of using the systems was low. Respondents who scored 2.5"3.49 on average implied that they were uncertain not only of the nature of the played politics but also of the level of using the systems. Respondents who scored 1"2.49 implied that the played politics did not promote any of the interests mentioned and also that the systems were not used. ANOVA was applied to establish differences in the perception of variables. Factor analysis was used to identify the signifi-

cant measures of the variables. Multivariate regression was used to establish the effect of politics in the management of water resources on the level of using accountable systems in the supply of water services.

Findings

The findings are presented according to the objectives of the paper.

Politics, Management and Patterns of Accountable Systems

This objective focused on establishing the nature of politics played in the management of water resources in Kampala district. The nature was established by administering a number of indicators of politics and asking respondents to show their opinions on each indicator using a strongly disagree-strongly agree response scale. A descriptive analysis of the responses led to the findings summarized in Table 2.

An analysis of the mean distribution in Table 2, particularly that corresponding to the total rows, reveals that on average respondents agreed (mean = 4.41) with the various indicators of politics played to promote self-interest. This suggests that the politics played in the management of water resources promoted self-interest but at a low level. The corresponding F-value (F = 20.53) was significant at the .01 level of significance (Sig. = .000). This implies that the perception of politics played in this management differed significantly across the different categories of respondents. Indeed, while private providers (mean = 4.53) and water consumers (mean = 4.96) felt strongly that the played politics promoted self-interest at a high level, MWE (mean = 4.02), NW&SC (mean = 4.09) and KCCA (mean = 4.33) officials showed it promoted this interest at a low level. These differences were also reflected in the specific indicators. For instance, apart from private providers, respondents strongly agreed that all decisions made to supply water were in line with the President's agenda. This implies that the President's interests were highly prioritized in the management of water resources. The played politics also promoted the self-interest of political heads in central government and of bureaucrats in MWE, NW&SC, KCCA and top management in private providers, especially with regard to designing water service delivery policies (mean = 4.75), making decisions about the type of water to provide (mean = 4.65), and developing water delivery budgets (mean = 4.68). Other findings are similarly interpreted. It suffices to note that the mean responses corresponding to measures of public interest indicate that it was not promoted. The only exceptions where the played politics promoted public interest, moreover at a low level, included making provision of water decisions in the best interest of targeted consumers (mean = 3.98) and government provision of water services according to the promises made to citizens by the President (mean = 3.53).

Table 2: Responses on Politics Played in the Management of Water Resources in KCCA

Indicators of played politics		Mean response on nature of applied politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig.
		MWE (n = 170)	NW&SC (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 198)	Consumers (n = 384)			
Type	Specific indicators								
	No decision can be made to supply water when it is not line with the President's agenda	4.76	4.66	4.63	2.35	N/A	4.06	24.66	.000
	Water service delivery policies are designed without prior gathering of information about the needs of water service consumers	4.63	4.70	4.77	4.76	4.96	4.75	15.07	.000
	Decisions on type of water services to provide are made following the agenda of the political head	4.81	4.39	1.35	N/A	N/A	3.53	32.66	.000
Self interest	Decisions on the quality of water to provide are made based on the personal agenda of top bureaucrats	2.02	2.22	1.39	4.76	N/A	2.46	29.07	.000
	Decisions on the type of water to provide are made based on the personal agenda of the bureaucrats	2.05	2.33	1.35	4.56	N/A	2.46	33.30	.000
	Decisions about the type of water to provide are made by members of the top management only	4.55	4.75	4.71	4.86	N/A	4.65	1.07	.607
	When preparing budgets for water service delivery, efforts are made to ensure that that staff remuneration is well catered for	4.73	4.69	4.57	4.70	N/A	4.68	1.93	.460
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by the Minister only	2.32	1.72	1.89	N/A	N/A	1.88	1.19	.498
	Decisions on to provide water are ductated by most senior bureaucrat only	2.02	2.32	1.32	4.53	N/A	2.42	36.33	.000
	Decisions followed to provide water are dictated by top management members only	4.93	4.70	4.53	4.73	N/A	4.64	1.34	.467
	Unquestionable instructions are given to employees to carry out tasks that meet what bosses want	4.51	4.75	4.65	4.83	N/A	4.67	2.32	.363
	Water supply tasks are allocated to employees democratically	1.31	1.71	1.81	N/A	N/A	1.38	1.49	.463
	Employees freely negotiate their rewards with management	1.30	1.70	1.60	N/A	N/A	1.33	1.69	.461
	Decisions on which type and quality of water services to deliver are reached through consensus	2.07	2.38	1.37	1.51	N/A	1.46	3.13	.303
	Employee meetings are held as forums for generating ideas needed to make decisions about how best to deliver water services	2.37	2.33	1.37	1.34	N/A	1.68	1.73	.461
	Total	4.02	4.09	4.33	4.53	4.96	4.41	20.53	.000

Indicators of played politics		Mean response on nature of applied politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig.
Type	Specific indicators	MWE (n = 170)	NW&SC (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 196)	Consumers (n = 384)			
	Disagreements in making of water supply decisions are solved through consensus with stakeholders	2.32	1.33	1.45	1.35	N/A	1.43	1.83	.460
	Data is gathered from the public to guide decisions on quality of water needed to meet public water needs	2.43	2.24	1.95	1.47	1.88	1.56	.990	.699
	Data is regularly gathered from the public to guide decisions about the type of water required to meet public water needs	1.63	1.55	1.61	1.41	1.03	1.51	1.97	.390
Public interest	Policies used to deliver water services are formulated based on information gathered about water service needs of consumers	1.58	2.33	1.11	1.19	1.09	1.30	1.99	.388
	Decisions to provide water services are democratically made in line with the promises made to citizens as per the President's manifesto	3.67	3.55	4.05	3.53	N/A	3.98	1.05	.490
	Decisions about the provision of water are autocratically made in the best interest of all targeted water consumers	4.53	4.66	4.55	4.86	N/A	4.53	1.94	.390
	Water consumers are allowed to lobby for the quality of water services to deliver to them	1.53	1.56	1.77	1.98	1.03	1.56	1.57	.466
	When preparing water supply budgets more emphasis is given to the requirements needed to provide services than on staff rewards	2.44	2.47	1.45	1.47	N/A	1.76	1.98	.391
	Decisions on provision of water are dictated only by the political head but in a manner that ensures that all water consumers are catered for	2.33	2.49	1.49	1.37	N/A	1.88	2.08	.331
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by only the most senior bureaucrat officer but in a manner the benefits all water consumers	2.30	2.40	1.46	1.66	N/A	1.77	2.02	.333
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by members of top management only but in a manner beneficial to all water consumers	3.55	3.50	3.51	3.70	N/A	3.58	1.69	.464
	Total	2.37	2.33	2.39	2.03	2.34	2.32	2.18	.330

Note: N/A means that the item was not applicable to the respondent category.

Compliance with Accountable Systems by Bureaucrats and Provision of Water Services

This objective was aimed at ascertaining the level of using at which accountable systems were used in the provision of water services in Kampala district. It was approached using the same method applied to meet the first objective of the paper. Findings are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Level of Accountable Systems in the Provision of Water Services in KCCA

Type	Indicators of played politics Specific indicators	Mean response on nature of applied politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	- ² _{obs}	Sig.
		MWE (n = 170)	NW&SC (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 198)	Consumers (n = 384)			
	Employees work collaboratively for the purpose of ensuring that responsibilities assigned to each of them are accomplished as planned	2.36	2.46	3.66	4.06	N/A	2.96	34.69	.000
	Employees watch over each other to ensure that allocated resources are used authentically	2.01	2.19	3.95	4.56	N/A	3.35	24.28	.000
	All employees are held collectively responsible for implementing water service provision decisions	2.22	2.02	2.09	2.07	N/A	2.03	2.00	.303
	Employees encourage each other to stay focused on carrying out assigned responsibilities without wavering	1.64	1.99	2.01	3.72	N/A	2.43	29.02	.000
	Cost incurred to prepare water is low when compared to all the water provided to consumers	2.03	2.22	2.32	3.69	N/A	3.30	13.07	.000
	The cost incurred to distribute prepared water to final consumers is low when compared to the number of supplied consumers	2.33	2.23	2.02	3.76	N/A	3.36	17.03	.000
	Water supply is consistent every day	1.67	1.33	1.73	3.98	1.04	2.37	40.09	.000
	Supplied water is enough to meet the water needs of all household consumers in KCCA	3.60	3.55	3.75	3.79	1.09	2.48	30.07	.000
	Supplied water is not contaminated in any way	2.34	2.44	2.42	3.68	1.45	2.46	24.20	.000
	Irrespective of where they live, all members of households in KCCA can access the supplied water without any obstacle	1.07	1.30	1.63	2.38	1.64	1.37	1.19	.500
	Total	2.33	2.42	3.56	1.41	2.36	12.02	.000	

The findings in Table 3 indicate that on average, while MWE (mean = 2.34), NW&SC (mean = 2.33), KCCA (mean = 2.42) and consumers (mean = 1.41) disagreed, private providers agreed (mean = 3.56) according to the various indicators of using accountable water supply systems in the delivery of water services. There was therefore a significant difference in the perception of using these systems across the respondent categories ($F = 12.02$, $\text{Sig.} = .000 < .01$). This difference implies that while the systems were used by the private water service providers and at a generally low level, they were not used in MWE, NW&SC and KCCA. It is important to note that although public and private service providers indicated that they used the systems in cases like ensuring that supplied water was enough to meet consumers' water needs, the consumers felt otherwise.

Effect of Politics on Policy Management Structures and Accountable Systems

This objective was intended to analyse the effect of politics played in the management of water resources on the level at which accountable systems were used to provide water services in Kampala district. The effect was established using the multivariate regression method of the SPSS after applying factor analysis not only to establish the significant measures of the played politics and of the level of using accountable systems, but also to build this level as a global component. The findings are summarized in Table 4.

From Table 4, the Adjusted R-Square values, their corresponding F-values and levels of significance indicate that politics played in the management of water resources to promote self-interest affected the level of using accountable systems in KCCA in a significant manner. When politics was played autocratically, the effect was 20 per cent (Adjusted R-Square = .200, $F = 5.083$, $\text{Sig.} = .001 < .01$). In cases when it was played aristocratically, the effect was 34.9 per cent (Adjusted R-Square = .349, $F = 9.555$, $\text{Sig.} = .000 < .01$) and when it was played democratically, the effect was 10.9 per cent (Adjusted R-Square = .109, $F = 2.085$, $\text{Sig.} = .002 < .01$). Therefore, politics caused the most significant effect when it was played aristocratically. The corresponding Beta coefficients indicate that all the politics that was played in this management to promote self-interest had negative effects on the use of accountable systems. The effects were more negative when politics was played aristocratically and the use of the systems was most affected in terms of its efficiency (Beta = $-.309$) and equity (Beta = $-.280$).

In contrast, politics affected the level of using accountable systems significantly when it was played to promote public interest autocratically (Adjusted R-Square = .300, $F = 9.087$, $\text{Sig.} = .000 < .01$) and democratically (Adjusted R-Square = .103, $F = 2.089$, $\text{Sig.} = .021 < .05$). The effect was

not significant in cases when politics was played to promote public interest aristocratically (Adjusted R-Square = .093, $F = 0.165$, Sig. = .306 > .05). The Beta coefficients indicate that all the politics that was played to promote public interest had positive effects on the use of accountable systems. The most significant and positive effects were caused by autocratically played politics and the use of the systems was mostly affected in terms of efficiency (Beta = .427) and effectiveness (Beta = .375). It should be noted that although democratically played politics did not translate into a significant effect on the overall use of accountable systems, it had the biggest positive effect on the quality (Beta = .275) that these systems could deliver in the public interest.

Discussion of Findings

The findings in Table 4 indicate that the nature of politics played in the management of water resources affected the level at which accountable systems were used to deliver water services in Kampala district. The findings therefore confirm the observations made by Henrik-Serup (2014) that politics affects everything that happens in the management of public affairs. The findings are particularly consistent with Samra and McLean's (2007) argument that politics permeates even the management of water resources and everything that this management does. Findings in Table 4 indicate that as far as the management of water resources in KCCA was concerned, the effect that played politics had on the use of accountable systems was twofold.

In the first instance, politics that was played to promote self-interest affected the level of using accountable systems negatively, irrespective of whether it was played autocratically, aristocratically or democratically. This effect implies that as long as politics was played to promote self-interest, it significantly constrained the use of accountable systems in the delivery of water services. Constraining the level of using these systems in a significant manner implies that self-interest politics considerably lowers the possibility of delivering water services at a desired level of quality and in an effective, equitable and efficient manner. The findings suggest therefore that when politics is played to promote self-interest, it discourages the use of accountable systems and hence, the realization of quality, effectiveness, equitability and efficiency in the provision of water services. Since accountable systems are adopted in the management of public services with intent to promote public interest, the fact that their use is constrained by politics that promotes self-interest is not surprising. It is in fact expected based on the rationale of the self-interest theory and that of the public choice as discussed by Robert (2005), Munyaradzi (2005), Haseler (2000) and Tegeret-Kiplangat (2012), amongst other scholars. As the rationale of these theories

Table 4: Effect of Politics on the Management of Water services in KCCA Indicators of politics played in water resource management Statistics predicted on the use of accountable systems and its indicators

Indicators of politics played in water resource management		Statistics predicted on the use of accountable systems and its indicators										
		Effectiveness		Quality		Equity		Efficiency		Adjusted R-Square	F	Sig.
		Beta		Beta		Beta		Beta				
	Constant											
Self interest	Public	1.301	-.117	-.107	-.101	-.201	.201	.200	5.083	.001		
	Private	7.661	-.130	-.132	-.280	-.309	.350	.349	9.555	.000		
	Public											
Public interest	Private	4.053	-.108	-.102	-.208	-.137	.106	.109	2.085	.002		
	Public	8.807	.375	.012	.252	.427	.331	.300	9.087	.000		
	Private	1.109	.073	.013	.032	.024	.096	.093	0.165	.306		
	Public											
	Private	1.010	.101	.275	.021	.031	.025	.103	2.089	.021		

maintains, when the purpose is to promote self-interest, all effort is devoted to self-utility maximization at the exclusion of others. As politicians and bureaucrats seek to satisfy their selfish interests, they do not pay attention to ensuring that services are delivered to the public in an effective, equitable, efficient and satisfactory manner. They do not mind whether the services satisfy public needs or not. All they do is maximize self-interest based on the capitalistic principle as explained by the rational man model.

Findings in Table 4 indicate that politics that constrained the use of accountable systems in the most significant manner was that which was played aristocratically. The same findings further show that this type of politics constrained mostly the equity and efficiency that would be realized through the use of these systems. Since aristocratic politics was defined in this paper as the type of politics played by those in top management positions, these findings imply that it was mostly these individuals who played politics that greatly constrained the efficiency and equity that would have been realized through the use of the systems. Findings in Table 2 indicate that these individuals constrained the systems' efficiency by prioritizing their own interests when budgeting for water supply. They did not even gather information about the water supply needs of the public, implying that they did not pay attention to knowing these needs. In fact, delivering water services without adequate prior knowledge of the water needs explains why the delivered water services did not satisfy water consumers as shown in Table 3. The fact that top bureaucrats and managers in the private sector did not pay much attention to delivering water services in the public interest explains why even the following of decisions that the top management aristocratically made to benefit all water consumers did not translate into a significant effect on the use of accountable systems, its positive nature notwithstanding (Table 4).

Since access to clean and safe water is a fundamental human right in Uganda, including KCCA, politics exercised to promote self-interest in the delivery of such water needs to be averted. Findings suggest that using regulation through the formulation of policies, standards and strategies as discussed by Armstrong and Sappington (2007), Carlton and Picker (2005) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) may not help avert this type of politics. As Abdel-Nour (2003) observed, regulation of this type works only when the regulating body does not serve the private interests of the regulators, but the interest of the entire society in which it operates.

This was however not the case. As shown in Table 2, the formulation of policies, standards and strategies was not in the public interest and it did not promote the use of accountable systems (Table 3). Fortunately, the findings indicate that politics that promotes self-interest can be reduced by applying

politics that promotes the rationale of the public interest theory and public value theory using other means. This type of politics is suggested by the findings in Table 4 as revealed by the second form of effect discussed below.

The second form of effect that politics played in the management of water resources had on the use of accountable systems was positive and significant. The findings in Table 4 indicate that the type of politics that caused this form of effect was that played autocratically and democratically in order to promote public interest. The fact that autocratic politics that promoted public interest encouraged the use of accountable systems supports Lindblad's (2010) observation that even though autocratically exercised politics tends to be loathed by subordinates, it can be effective and efficient and can translate into delivery of satisfactory services, especially when the dictatorial decisions are made in the public interest. The findings in Table 2 indicate that this was exactly the case. Respondents strongly agreed, thereby showing that there were decisions made autocratically to provide water in the best interest of targeted water consumers. These were in fact the decisions that contributed much to the positive effect of autocratic politics on the use of accountable systems.

Apart from autocratic politics, the effect of politics that was democratically exercised in the public interest was also positive and significant (Table 4). This effect indicates that if politics is played democratically in the public interest, it encourages significant use of accountable systems in the delivery of water services. From the findings in Table 4, this effect is mainly felt in terms of delivering the desired quality of water. The same findings show however, that the effect of democratically exercised politics was weaker than that of autocratically played politics. This was because democratic politics was applied at a low level and mainly in the form of making decisions to provide water services in line with the promises made to citizens as per the president's manifesto (Table 2). Other forms of democratic politics were not applied. For instance, information about water consumer needs was not regularly collected from the public, water consumers were not lobbying for desired water quality, and policies used to deliver water services were not formulated based on information gathered from consumers (Table 2). These findings suggest that there was no public participation or involvement in the management of water resources. This confirms the earlier observation that the delivery of water services was not based on knowledge of consumers' needs. It is therefore not surprising that the delivered water services were not satisfactory, equitable or effective (Table 3). A positive effect suggests however that improving the use of democratic politics in the management of water resources will lead to improved use of accountable systems in the delivery of water services.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite the advances in the water service delivery patterns and a range of other services in Uganda's urban areas since the 1990s, results of the study highlighted a rather sluggish pace in improving the scope of services as well as their quality which does not in many respects match the expectations of a significant number of citizens. The evidence for the levels of discontentment have their origins in the country's politics, where results suggest a corrosive effect on the service management structures and patterns of accountable systems that are portrayed as skewed in favour of self-interest and the political system, largely ignoring their mandate to serve the public. Indeed, the levels of compliance to established accountable systems by managers in the provision of water services were found to be too low, suggesting a need for sustained reforms in the sector for strengthening the service management structures while weakening the ministerial control of the service delivery systems.

From a policy perspective, it is clear that a responsive and more publicly accountable system needs to be established and consolidated through sustained reforms that address the legal provisions which politicians exploit to chip away at the capacities of public bureaucracies. In this way, it can be argued that the effect of politics on the management of service structures and accountability systems for efficient delivery of services will be greatly improved. In addition, the aims of democratising public service delivery and bringing about growing inclusive and accountable systems will be realised through a responsive, reliable and efficient system that attempts to insulate policy implementation organs from politics.

Furthermore, the relationship between political considerations in public service delivery systems as well as the current incongruities in the wider natural resource management structures imply that the obstacles in service delivery mechanisms are indeed a result of the adverse effects of politics on policy management structures. For example, the current problems in the management of water services which include pathetic governance and accountability, weak financial management, high numbers of vacancies in critical senior water management positions, high infrastructure backlog for extension of water service coverage, and in some instances, the inability to deliver even a core of basic water services efficiently and effectively, can be understood in this framework.

Quite clearly, the attempts by government and MWE, the political institution responsible for overseeing the performance of NW&SC and potential address of these problems, have yielded only limited success. Part of the challenge has been an attempt by bureaucrats to operate with the political establishment considerations rather than executing their mandate of deliver-

ing responsible, accountable, effective and efficient services to the public. As such there is a need for a coherent policy framework that responds to the varied social, economic, technical and administrative context of established accountable systems so that planning, financing and support in the service structures is tailored to the unique perspective within the requirements of the current public service delivery structures.

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