

4

The Impact of Globalization on Women Peasants and Traders in Nigeria's Delta Region (1986 – 2002)

Iwebunor Okwechime

Introduction

This study is an attempt to demonstrate how the dynamics of globalization have heightened the contradictions generated by the oil industry over the last 47 years in the oil-rich Niger Delta, and the impact of these on female peasants and traders between 1986 and 2002. In the Niger Delta women are the backbone of the communities and they also constitute over 50 per cent of the population. Although most of them have limited education, they are generally enterprising. Not surprisingly, the women folk play a significant role in the communities in the Niger Delta through farming, fishing and trading in agricultural and other goods. However, each of these is becoming increasingly difficult, given the effects of globalization on the oil industry, to which the Niger Delta communities have played host over the last four-odd decades.

Globalization places an especially heavy burden on female peasants and traders in the Niger Delta. The globalization of the oil industry has led to, among other things, the intensification of oil exploration and the further integration of the region into the market-driven global capitalist system. The consequence of this is well reflected in the increased environmental and social degradation, as well as wide-spread economic disempowerment among the female peasants and traders of the Niger Delta oil communities. Due to increased oil exploitation activities by the oil companies, huge tracts of arable land were annexed for oil industry-related activities, such as pipelines, flow stations, access roads and campsites for oil workers, among others. Furthermore, increased oil exploitation and production activities heightened the environmental devastation of land, water and air which

were polluted by spills, blow outs, seepages and gas flares. All this resulted in diminished productivity, thereby threatening the viability of the local economy in which women play a vital role. "Since farms are failing, palm trees are not bearing fruit, and fish are depleted", said Grace Ekanem, a women's group leader, "women are not only unable to feed their families, but cannot earn money to send their children to school or to afford medical treatment" (cited in Esparza and Wilson, 1999:10).

It was against this background that the women mobilized themselves against the forces of globalization – the oil companies and the Nigerian state – demanding, among other things, community development and the provision of economic empowerment programmes, as well as employment for their children and an end to environmental degradation. Through their demonstrations, protests and sit-outs, the women have drawn the attention of the Nigerian state and human rights organizations to their plight. They have also largely succeeded in making the oil companies sign a series of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with them. At this point several questions are pertinent. How did poor, mostly illiterate, peasant women and traders unite and mobilize themselves against the forces of global capitalism? How did they overcome or transcend the constraints imposed by the patriarchal nature of their society? And what are the factors responsible for the relative success of these women-led protests over those of their male counterparts? These and other questions will be investigated in this study.

The context of the issues that provide the background for our investigation or our framework of analysis is based on a political ecology perspective. It recognizes, at a contextual and an analytical level, how state policies, interstate relations and global capitalism impinge on issues such as access to, ownership of and control over nature (natural resources such as crude oil, forests and water). In the specific case of the Niger Delta, this approach brings into clear relief the destructive impact of corporate globalization on the economic livelihoods of unwaged rural women. Also, within this framework, we are able to understand how the rural people of the oil belt, especially the women folk, bear the brunt of external policy constraints that originate from an institutional domain that they have no control over and little knowledge of (Redclift and Sage 1994).

The year 1986 is remarkable, not only for the purposes of our analysis, but for the Nigerian state as well. It was the very year the military government of Nigeria under the former dictator, General Ibrahim Babangida, officially adopted the Bretton Woods Institutions' imposed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), despite the overwhelming groundswell of public opinion against the adoption of the programme. 1986 is also a landmark year in the sense that it flagged off, at least officially, the process of deregulation and trade liberalization, essential components of the adjustment programme. In addition to all this, the year 1986

has a milestone significance in the contemporary political history of women's struggle in Nigeria, especially that of women in the Niger Delta.

In August 1986, a crowd of about 10,000 women from Ekpan in Uvwie Local Government near the oil city of Warri mobilized themselves and laid siege on the premises and production facilities of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Chanting and dancing in their accustomed manner, the women called on the NNPC and the oil companies operating in their community to provide social amenities for them, as well as jobs for their qualified sons and daughters. Prior to the Ekpan women's uprising, the Ogharefe women had in 1984 successfully organized a mass resistance protest against a subsidiary of the American oil multinational corporation, Pan Ocean. Following the example of the Ogharefe women, the Ughelli women (also in the Western Niger Delta) organized a fierce anti-tax protest against the government. The anti-tax revolt came in the wake of the government's policy to levy taxes on women (see Turner and Oshare 1993). The taxation was necessitated by the parlous state of the national economy following the oil boom of the early 1980s and the consequent imposition by General Babangida's government of IMF loan 'conditions'. In the eyes of these women and their counterparts across the nation, the IMF and its adjustment policies were largely to blame for the hardship they were now going through. To be sure, higher taxes, as Turner and Oshare (1993) have noted, constituted a key element in IMF adjustment packages. Thus, it was these anti-tax protests that supplied 'the immediate atmosphere of popular, woman-centred mobilization within which the Ekpan women were moved to act' (Turner and Oshare 1993).

It is good to note that the protests against the imposition of structural adjustment conditions were not restricted to the oil-producing areas alone. True, similar protests and revolts were recorded in other parts of the country. However, those that occurred in the oil belt were unique in several respects. For example, in other parts of the country, mobilizations against the adjustment programme were characterized by 'instances of urban protest actions and anti-IMF riots' (Egwu 2001:49). In the Niger Delta, such protests not only originated from the countryside, but more importantly women (mostly peasants and traders) took the initiative. Explaining the reason for this is not difficult.

Women play a vital role in the local economy, as they constitute the bulk of the farmers, fisher folks and traders. However, the adjustment programme threw up new contradictions whilst deepening old ones in the oil-producing communities. For example, the process of land alienation pursued by the state in the late 1970s under the rubric of the Land Use Act was reinforced by the SAP. According to Egwu (1998), in the wake of the economic crisis and SAP, land alienation and land grabbing became pronounced in the countryside. By accelerating this process, he argued, structural adjustment impacted heavily on the 'agrarian and land' question.

Nowhere was this 'agrarian and land question' more fiercely contested than in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta (see Turner and Oshare 1993, Turner *et al.* 2001; Obi 2000 and 2001; Human Rights Watch 1999). In the process of opening up the economy to private foreign investments, as dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions, huge tracts of cultivable land were parcelled out to oil companies for oil exploration and production activities. Additionally, the attendant oil industry pollution devastated the available arable land and water, the main sources of income for these rural women, the majority of whom were breadwinners for their families. Land hunger which consequently became endemic in the region often resulted in inter-communal clashes. Reflecting on the impact of this development on women, Grace Ekanem, a women's group leader in Akwa Ibom State, noted that women were not only unable to feed their families, but could not earn enough to send their children to school, or to afford medical treatment. 'Women are now redundant,' she concluded (cited in Esparza and Wilson 1999:10). In other words, the women of Nigeria's oil belt have been economically disempowered, marginalized and excluded.

Apart from land hunger which the alienation of land by the Nigerian state engendered through the instrumentality of the Land Use Act, oil company operations have further exacerbated the crisis of land shortage in the oil-producing areas. Oil pollution resulting from gas flares and oil spills have rendered the soil virtually infertile. In the words of a young female farmer (cited in Ekine 2001:28):

Since 1982 the soil has changed and crops do not grow well. It is not because of overuse because we know how to use our lands and our crops are rotated. It is because of the flares. The soil is now too hard - before a small child can turn the soil but now it's too hard. The yield of crops is very poor and there is lack of fish in this area. We have no help from Shell.

They have brought pollution and no development.

The foregoing serves as the general context out of which the argument pursued in this study flows. In the next section, an attempt is made at a conceptualization of economic globalization, and highlighting the centrality of the multinational corporations as well as the role of the IMF/World Bank-initiated adjustment policies in the process. The aim, it should be stated, is to underscore the critical interface between globalization, multinational corporations and structural adjustment.

Economic Globalization: A Conceptual Overview

Globalization has become the latest fad in the extant literature on the political economy of capitalist development. As a phenomenon promoted and sustained by neo-liberal economic perspectives, globalization generates differential impacts

on states. These differential pressures can be ascribed to the role and position of these various states within the global capitalist system. In the words of one observer, globalization 'does not generate a single, uniform set of pressures on all states but affects them in different ways' (Jessop 2003:32).

As a concept globalization is a complex and contested notion (Aina 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Scholte 1997; Obi 2000; Embong 2000; Rugumamu 2001). This, as Bob Jessop (2003:32) makes us understand, is because 'globalization is not a single causal mechanism with a universal, unitary logic but is a multi-centric, multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-form and multi-causal' process. Accordingly, he suggests that globalization is better seen as a hyper-complex, continuously-evolving product of many processes. Similarly, James Mittelman (2000:4) sees globalization not as a single unified process, but a syndrome of processes and activities consisting mainly of a set of ideas and a policy around the global division of labour and power.

What is worth noting is that globalization is not a new phenomenon. As such, it has been described as imperialism, a dynamic phenomenon, which changes in accordance with the law of capitalist expansion. Viewed from this perspective, globalization becomes the latest stage in the dynamic process of capitalist development which began with the slave trade, then with the 'legitimate trade', followed by colonialism and neo-colonialism (Nnoli 2000). Like Nnoli, Obi (2001) has argued that globalization is the historical outcome of a global capitalist project of an integrated world market. Yash Tandon (2000) corroborates the above assertions by noting that globalization is the final conquest of capitalism over the rest of the world. Bade Onimode (2000) has traced this 'conquest of capital over the rest of the world' to around 1870. Historicizing the phenomenon further, Aina notes that:

The important point in terms of dating globalization is that we are looking at a post-Second World War phenomenon whose intensity and definite shape has clearly emerged from around the 1970s (Aina 1997:24).

This period, according to Amin, is largely characterized by an economic crisis which was precipitated by the long phase of structural transformation that resulted in the deepening of the globalization process (Amin 1992, cited in Aina 1997). It is important, however, to emphasize the salient contrasts between the current phase of globalization and the earlier one. When compared with the current phase, for example, the earlier phase of globalization occurred to a smaller extent - in terms of breadth and scope - and at a far slower pace. As Ibrahim (2002), citing Arjun Appadurai (2001) pointed out, globalization in the contemporary world is characterized by objects in motion, including ideas and ideologies, people and goods, images and messages, technologies and techniques. It is a process anchored on flows, structures and organization.

Furthermore, the dominant actors or players in the earlier phase of globalization were imperial nation-states that were engaged in international economic competition. Conversely, in the contemporary phase, the critical players are the multinational corporations, transnational banks and multilateral institutions, notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the powerful G7 countries. As in the earlier phases, international trade, international investment and international finance still constitute the major aspects of globalization.

It should however be emphasized that, in the current era of globalization, the sheer scope and volume of trade, investment and finance by far exceed those of the earlier phases. This, as Ohiorhenuan (1998) has observed, is because globalization in the contemporary era is located firmly in the context of a new market fetishism. What this demonstrates, in other words, is the centrality of the market in the globalization process. Market in this context refers to the market for finance and capital in cahoots with the multinational corporations – the major agent and conduit for the globalization of production. As Ohiorhenuan (1998:9) has said:

The growth of FDI underscores the enormous role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in economic activity world-wide. The value of goods and services produced by foreign affiliates was estimated at \$17,000 billion in 1995. Not surprisingly, production by TNCs is becoming the dominant mode of servicing foreign markets. With the dramatic fall in transport and communication costs over the last 40 years, firms are finding it efficient to locate different stages of production in different parts of the world. Foreign trade is becoming more and more intra-industry and intra-firm, especially for advanced economies. The TNC has also become the quintessential vehicle for knowledge and technology transfer. Significantly, the global assets of TNCs were estimated at over \$8,000 billion in 1994, compared to global gross domestic investment of \$5,681 billion.

Central to the process of globalization are the breath-taking improvements in communication and transportation. The technological breakthroughs in these areas have obliterated economic barriers of distance and, in consequence, facilitated the globalization process. The liberalization in the 1980s of African economies should be contextualized within the globalization process. A major consequence of this liberalization was that the predominantly raw material-based economies of African states were left at the mercy of the international markets. The Nigerian case is instructive. Liberalization led to the relaxation or even non-enforcement of existing rules and regulations guiding oil company operations in the Niger Delta and the making of policies that tended, in the main, to attract more foreign investment in the industry by introducing a new set of incentives to private foreign

investors. Meanwhile, the environment from which the Niger Delta communities derive their sustenance was not protected. Consequently, the ecologically-fragile environment came under severe pressure as oil companies intensified their exploration and exploitation activities. This development generated firm opposition from the indigenes, especially the women who dominated the peasant and trading class. It could thus be said, as Kwanashie (1999:20) has argued, that globalization has 'created capacities for new and efficient responses to age-old problems'. The critical question is: are these capacities delivered fairly? It is in this context that globalization has been said to produce winners and losers.

For its proponents, globalization marks the dawn of universal equality, prosperity, peace and freedom (Scholte 1999). Through globalization, it is argued, efficient production processes are now possible as are cheaper products and a wider variety of services. Among the numerous claims of the proponents of globalization is the assertion that it engenders financial discipline in the economy and tackles the problems of unemployment, welfare, poverty, environment and crime, all within a global framework (Aina 1997; Onimode 2000; Rugumamu 2001).

The critics, for their part, regard the argument of the proponents of globalization as essentially Eurocentric (Aina 1997; Hoogvelt 1997; Korten 1996). Further, exploitation and marginalization, they argue, are the likely benefits that Nigerian-type countries stand to gain from globalization. 'To him that hath shall be given, from him that hath not shall be taken away', is how one critic described the distributive justice embedded in the globalization process (see Rugumamu 2001:15).

In the African context, this Biblical verse from St Matthew's Gospel certainly has the ring of truth. Since the 1980s, socio-economic conditions in Africa have considerably deteriorated, as the political economy of states become increasingly characterized by armed conflicts, debt crisis, dictatorships, famine, drought and dependency. It was under these inauspicious circumstances that African states were advised to liberalize their economies and adopt adjustment conditions to revamp their ailing economies. In this regard, critics have pointed out that not only do SAP and globalization derive from the same sources, but they are also interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Commenting on the relationship of SAP with globalization, Dembele (1999:74) has observed that 'globalization is the ultimate triumph of the neo-classical resurgence and in Africa it is the new face of adjustment'.

Furthermore, critics have exercised concerns over the failure of the proponents of globalization to highlight issues such as polarization, poverty, inequality, domination, social injustice, exploitation, coercion and conflict in their analyses. In the words of one analyst:

Instead, what we have are sugary notions of interdependence, global flows, exchanges.... Even when capitalism and capitalist restructuring are mentioned, one reads only of a benign, creative process producing new technologies and expanding opportunities. But there is little or nothing about monopolies, disruptions and dislocations of the labour and other markets, the emergence of a regulatory chaos and possible anomie and how these are being exploited for gains. Neither do we read of the pains of adjustment in the less industrialized nations, the spreading immiseration, social exclusion and alienation of an increasing number of people (Aina 1997:11-12)

This 'end of history' which was euphorically and triumphantly proclaimed by Francis Fukuyama (1992) is ill-advised because it cannot bring about a more egalitarian world. Rather, the neo-liberal doctrine which globalization represents will simply widen the existing gulf between the rich nations of the North and poor countries of the South. As Smith and Baylis have noted:

... Globalization allows the efficient exploitation of less well-off nations, and all in the name of openness. The technologies accompanying globalization are technologies that automatically benefit the richest countries in the world, and allow their interests to override local ones. So not only is globalization imperialist, it is also exploitative. The foregoing brings into sharp focus the dynamics of globalization, the place of the oil multinationals and the role of SAP in the process (Smith and Baylis 1998:10).

The last two issues will be discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

The Place of Multinational Corporations

Multinational corporations, according to Miller (1995), are dominant actors in the world division of labour. Consequently, they play a central economic and political role in the countries in which they operate. They are pivotal to the drive towards global economic integration. In other words, the multinational corporations, it is argued, are the main conduits through which globalization takes place. As purveyors of capital and technology, multinationals wield considerable influence and power in the world economy, especially within Nigerian-type economies. A cursory look at the sheer volume of global capital flows, along with global investment flows and sales, shows that multinational corporations are a critical factor in the globalization process.

Indeed, it is on record that about 500 multinational corporations control 70 per cent of world trade, 80 per cent of foreign investment and 30 per cent of world GDP (Miller 1995). In the highly complex and competitive world of business, oil companies are arguably among the world's most profitable and powerful business enterprises. The incomes of individual oil companies far exceed

that of many Nigerian-type countries. For example, in 1990, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group posted a gross income of \$132 billion. This was estimated to be 'more than the combined GNPs of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Zaire, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Pakistan – countries that represent almost one-tenth of the world's population' (Miller 1995:35).

Furthermore, the United Nation's 1997 World Investment Report (The Economist 1997) shows that the multinationals raked in some \$7 trillion in sales through their foreign affiliates. According to the Report, this amount is greater than the world's total export. With reference to global investment, the Report observed that at the end of 1996, the total stock of foreign direct investment, namely plant, equipment and property owned by businesses outside their home countries, stood at over \$3 trillion. The key role which multinationals play in disseminating technology around the globe is amply reflected in the Report. As the Report indicates, 70 per cent of all international royalties on technology involve payments between parent firms and foreign affiliates.

From the above, it can be gleaned that the MNCs, including the oil companies, are the main forces behind global flows of capital, goods and services. It is not surprising, therefore, that their critics portray them as bullies, using their heft to exploit workers and natural resources with no regard for the economic well-being of any country or community. Conversely, advocates of multinationals view them as the ultimate triumph for global capitalism, offering advanced technology to underdeveloped countries and low-cost product to the developed ones.

As was stated before, there are, besides the MNCs, other important active forces behind globalization. Beyond these MNCs and the various multilateral channels, however, it must be emphasised that 'policies too have a major role to play by fostering and maintaining open trade and payments arrangements' (Kwanashie 1999:24). From this assertion, it can be inferentially deduced that states are also to a reasonable extent, agents of globalization. Through policies that seek to guarantee stability and protection to global capital, (African) states help to facilitate the rapid advance of globalisation.

As Nyamnjoh (2003:6) has rightly noted, 'what neo-liberalism wants of African governments are national and regional policies in tune with the profitability expectations of global capital, policies that minimize countervailing traditions, customs, world views and expectations of continuity'. The main concern of the MNCs with regard to the role of the African states in facilitating the globalization process is for these states to ensure that local labour and national interests are kept subservient to the interests and powers of big business.

The Role of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), in its form and content, falls within the rubric of economic globalization. It has its roots in neo-liberal thinking and belief in the (efficient) role of the market forces. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) came against the backdrop of the debt crisis in the early 1980s (Kiely 1998). The early 1970s witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, following the devaluation of the US dollar against the price of gold. Consequently, a new system was to emerge which allowed for the operation of a system of floating exchange rates in the global economy. This period, 1973-74, was characterized, incidentally, by the dramatic rise in the price of crude oil. The exponential rise in the price of oil translated into huge revenues for the oil-producing countries, most of whom deposited these 'windfall profits' (Kiely 1998:3) in Western banks. The banks, in turn, loaned this money to some developing countries, notably those from Latin America, at relatively low rates of interest.

In the early 1980s, the international financial system came under severe pressure, as many Western Banks had lent far too much capital to some loan-seeking countries of the Third World. Saddled with increasing interest payments on their debts, these countries became unable to meet their debt obligations. In 1982, Mexico became the first in the long list of countries that were to declare a moratorium on their debt obligations.

A major outcome of the debt crisis was that the IMF and the World Bank, backed by governments committed to neo-liberal reforms, began to advocate policies that more or less reflected the neo-liberal paradigm (Kiely 1998). Beyond advocating policies, Hoogvelt (1997) argues that they were also commissioned and dispatched to the frontiers of the global economy to exact payments from and supervise the credits to the Third World. According to her, the IMF and the World Bank have been able in this capacity 'to profoundly affect the organization of production and trade in the periphery to the benefit of the core of the world capitalist system' (Hoogvelt 1997:166). This was largely achieved through the instrumentality of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). As Hoogvelt again notes:

Structural adjustment is the generic term used to describe a package of measures which the IMF, the World Bank and individual western aid donors have persuaded many developing countries to adopt during 1980s, in return for a new wave of loans (Hoogvelt 1997:167).

SAP was the neo-liberal solution to what was largely perceived as the inefficient 'orthodox' state-led development, including the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) programme. It was the belief of the neo-liberal reformers that a sustainable strategy for Nigerian-type countries is the promotion of the private sector and the liberalization of their economies. The aim of SAP, as Leftwich has noted, 'was to shatter the dominant post-war, state-led development paradigm and overcome the problems of developmental stagnation by promoting open and free competitive market economies, supervised by minimal states' (Leftwich 1993:607). According to Hoogvelt (Hoogvelt 1997:168), the main conditions of IMF/World Bank proposals include 'currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and wages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and state bureaucracies, removal of food and other subsidies on basic necessities, trade liberalization, privatization of parastatal enterprises, and expansion of the export sector'.

In Nigeria, the adoption of SAP by the Babangida regime in June 1986 was largely occasioned by the national economic crisis. The crisis in question was, for a large part, a function of the oil price shocks that occurred in 1982, and again in 1986, when crude oil prices fell below \$15 per barrel (Doyle 2002:163). Summarizing the general economic situation surrounding the adoption of SAP by the Nigerian ruling class, Ake notes that:

Between 1973 and 1978, during Nigeria's first oil boom, oil revenue grew quickly, to more than 90 per cent of Nigeria's export revenue. This increase was matched by increased public expenditure, which quadrupled between 1973 and 1975. By 1976, expenditure already exceeded revenue. During the second oil boom between 1973 and 1985, the surge in oil revenue elicited such profligacy that real income began to decline rapidly, as much as 60 per cent between 1980 and 1983 when Nigeria recorded a negative growth rate of 6.7 per cent and a budget deficit rising to 13 per cent of GDP. Austerity measures instituted in 1982 and 1984 failed and the crisis deepened, especially with the sharp fall in oil prices in 1986, the worsening of the terms of trade, debt service obligations and a sharp fall in imports and exports (Ake 2001:83).

The implementation of SAP was meant to place further pressure on the oil industry and, in consequence, the Niger Delta, the main site of oil exploration and production. For instance, it was expected that oil revenues would underwrite the whole adjustment programme as well as the political transition programme that was being supervised by the military government. In accordance with IMF conditionality rules and the reality of dwindling oil prices, state policy became a matter of direct disengagement from the oil industry, and the encouragement of private foreign and local investments in the industry.

In a bid to increase oil revenues under the SAP project, a Memorandum Of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the government and the oil companies. Given the additional incentives that were included in the new MoU, the oil multinationals intensified oil exploration and production operation in the Niger Delta. Consequently, the fragile Niger Delta environment came under severe environmental degradation leading to further impoverishment of the people, as they became increasingly unable to engage in their traditional occupations of fishing, farming and trading. These were the general conditions under which the women of the oil-producing communities took up arms in defence of their environment. The state's response smacked of a classic rent collector: heavily armed troops were deployed to the restive communities, where women and young girls were beaten, abducted and raped (Manby 1999; Okonta and Douglas 2001).

The preceding amply demonstrates the role of SAP in the globalization of the Niger Delta environment. It also illustrates how adjustment, under the rubric of globalization, has detrimentally affected the peasants, especially the women of the Niger Delta oil communities. This is more so because 'structural adjustment has helped to tie the physical economic resources of the African region more tightly into serving the global system, while at the same time oiling the financial machinery by which wealth can be transported out of Africa and into the global system' (Hoogvelt 1997:171).

Globalization in the Context of the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is the main site where oil exploration and production activities are carried out in Nigeria. Commercial production and export of oil began in 1956 following Shell-BP's discovery at Oloibiri, in present-day Bayelsa State. Given Shell's success, other oil multinationals such as Mobil (now Exxon-Mobil), Gulf (now Chevron-Texaco), Elf (now Total-Fina-Elf) and Agip came to Nigeria and acquired licences which also enabled them to start oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria. The major attractions for Nigeria's oil both then as now, among other things, are its low sulphur content, the generous incentives which the government placed before the oil companies, the country's relatively lenient oil mining regulations, as well as the proximity, safety and security of the Niger Delta environment relative to the volatile Middle East region.

The late 1960s witnessed the emergence of crude oil as a significant revenue earner for the Government. This development, however, coincided with the decline in the earnings from cash crops, which were hitherto the Government's main revenue earners. From the early 1970s, oil became the most important source of earnings for the Nigerian economy, growing from an insignificant 0.1 per cent in 1959 to 87 per cent in 1976 (Owabukeruyele 2000).

Today, 'oil revenues currently provides for 80 per cent of government revenues, 95 per cent of export receipts, and 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings' (Douglas *et al.* 2003). Indeed, according to Dr Rilwanu Lukman, the former Presidential Adviser on Petroleum and Energy Matters, Nigerian government's earnings of \$300 billion between 1970 and 1990 derived from the oil and gas industry (Faloseyi 2003). These huge revenues have been earned at an enormous cost to the people of the Niger Delta and their environment. Over four decades of crude oil exploration and production have laid the Niger Delta environment to waste. As the Sierra Club has noted:

The oil industry has had devastating effects. Our report in 1993 found 'badly maintained and leaking pipe lines, polluted water, fountains of emulsified oil pouring into villages' fields, blow outs, and air pollution'. Farms and fishes are spoiled, and the mangrove swamps, which provide people with building and other materials and are a vital part of the eco-system, are disappearing. At the same time the people get little benefit from the immense wealth being generated. While the Federal government gets 80 per cent of the royalties and mining rents, 20 per cent goes to each State government; but the local people see little even of that (Sierra Club, no date).

The Sierra Club has been cited here to demonstrate the basic fact that the oil industry, as it is currently configured and controlled by the forces of globalization (the oil companies and the G7, IMF and World Bank), has impacted negatively on the livelihoods and well-being of the citizens of the region, especially the female peasants. Indeed, the enormous wealth that the Nigerian state has derived from the Niger Delta has benefited only the local and national elites, along with their transnational counterparts, while the vast majority of the people have continued to wallow in abject poverty. As Natufe (2001:7) has argued, the Niger Delta is 'representative of the exploitative nature of domestic and foreign capital'. So long as the presence of oil deepens the exploitation of the Niger Delta environment by the oil companies, the lot of female peasants in the region will remain unenviable. In other words, the paradox of poverty amid plenty will continue to remain an inescapable fact in the lives of the inhabitants, the female inhabitants in particular. Indeed, it is against this background of environmental devastation, exploitation, neglect, poverty and repression that we can begin to appreciate the heroic struggles of the women of the Niger Delta against the forces of globalization, namely 'the Nigerian state and the oil corporations (who) have a joint interest in maintaining silence about their activities' (Turner *et al.*, 2002:34).

Globalization in the context of the Niger Delta is a western agenda that economically incapacitates and disempowers the rural poor, especially women, by targeting and appropriating their natural resources (petroleum, land, water and forestry), thereby denying them access to and control over the management

of their environment. As Shiva (2001) has noted, the tendency of globalization to plunder resources and displace people from productive employment and livelihoods is facilitated by the alliance of undemocratic regimes with powerful forces of globalization, which centralize control over decision-making and resources as well. The impact of globalization in the Niger Delta can be seen in the dynamics of the contradictions it has thrown up across the entire oil-producing communities.

As already stated, petroleum has been the backbone of the Nigerian economy since the 1970s. However, the early 1980s saw the onset of the crisis in the global oil industry, which drastically reduced the amount of revenue accruable to the Nigerian state for the maintenance of its vast social infrastructure, unwieldy bureaucratic structures and mounting debt burden, among other critical constraints. In the face of the worsening economic crisis, the Government came under severe pressure to adopt the IMF-instigated economic adjustment programme. Among the conditions was that the oil industry should be deregulated and opened up to a free flow of oil multinational investment. The apparent objective of this economic policy was to intensify oil exploration by oil companies, to enable the State to meet its social and economic responsibilities, as well as service its huge foreign debts.

By intensifying petroleum exploration and exploitation in the Delta, the oil companies brought further pressure on the available scarce resources such as land and water, which were either alienated for oil industry facilities or polluted by oil company activities. This created serious contradictions in terms of 'worsening inequities in relation to access to and power over resources' (Obi 2000:51), thereby generating mutual animosity and, sometimes, leading to open clashes between two or more communities. Commenting on the linkages between corporate globalization and environmental security, Cyril Obi has remarked that:

Globalization is one of the greatest threats to global environmental security. This is largely due to the ways it produces resource-scarcities, degradation, and sharpens social contradictions (Obi 2000:51).

Such contradictions as are engendered by economic globalization lie in what James Mittelman (2000:923) has referred to as 'a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion'.

The preceding discussion has provided useful contextual insights into the consequences of the interface between globalization and the Niger Delta ecosystem. As has been shown, the implications bode ill for the long-term viability of local economies and survival of the people of the oil belt, especially the women, who constitute the most vulnerable group of the rural poor in the region. As will be made clear later, the dialectical character of globalization, which Mittelman referred to in his analysis, is well illustrated by the women's demand

for social and environmental justice through effective grassroots women's movements across the oil-producing communities (see Turner and Oshare 1993; Turner *et al.* 2001).

Disempowerment, Marginalization and Exclusion Through Globalization: The Travails of the Niger Delta Women

The environmental degradation of the Ogoni environment affects we women more than men. This is because we women do most of the peasant farming, that is the main work of the Ogoni people... (Deborah Robinson's Ogoni: *The Struggle Continues*, p.65).

This assertion mirrors the experiences of rural women in the oil-producing communities. It also explains why women are usually found at the forefront of the struggle against environmental injustice and social neglect perpetrated by the transnational oil corporations, the most powerful proponents of the globalization forces. The heavy burden which women now have to bear was underscored in a comprehensive report by a group of nine US activists, academics and journalists after a ten-day fact-finding visit to the Niger Delta communities in September 1999. Commenting on the impact of loss of land and resources by the communities to oil company activities, the Report notes that, 'The diminished productivity and viability of local economies due to the environmental and social degradation caused by oil exploitation has affected the lives of women in unique ways' (Esparza and Wilson 1999:10). Since the great majority of the women folk have been marginalized and disempowered and, as a consequence, unable to perform their traditional roles within their families, they have inevitably been forced to adopt alternative coping strategies. The harsh situation has forced many of them into prostitution as a means of survival (Esparza and Wilson 1999). To be sure, this trend has generated its own contradictions within the households as well as within the larger society of the oil-producing communities. In many cases, for example, younger wives have reportedly abandoned their matrimonial homes and eloped with other men working for the oil multinationals. And for a society that is predominantly patriarchal, social mores have been severely undermined.

It should be noted, however, that the marginalization, disempowerment and exclusion of women in the Niger Delta did not begin with the introduction of economic adjustment. However, insofar as it became a strong point for 'indigenous feminists' (Turner and Oshare 1993:330) to latch on to in their fight against environmental injustice in the 1990s, the mindless exploitation of nature (land, water and oil) by the forces of globalization alone can be held responsible. A 1993 World Bank Report on the impact of globalization on women lends credence to the experience of women in the Niger Delta (see Ake 2001:64) As a result of globalization, the report noted, the lot of women has steadily deteriorated: they

must struggle, sometimes dangerously, to eke out an existence out of dwindling resources. Elaborating the reasons why Ogoni women have championed the struggle against increasing marginalization, disempowerment and repression in the Niger Delta oil communities, Diana Wiwa notes that:

The constant acquisition of new territory for oil exploitation, and resultant pollution from the industry, has left the Ogoni women with no means to feed or support their families. Women have to go further away from home to find unpolluted water for their domestic chores. Their children have not received employment in the oil industry (a mere fifty Ogoni were employed until 1993, mainly as cleaners and drivers), making young men and women a continuing responsibility for their mothers long after they have been independent. These changes have brought a resultant rise of tension in the home. Testimonies of older women confirm that in the past there was less tension (Wiwa 1997:13).

What is underscored in this citation is that the women (and also children) are the most affected groups. They suffer most because, unlike the men, they cannot easily migrate to the urban centres, to start life afresh. It underlines too the reason why the women have championed the fight back from below against capital-driven globalization. It also highlights the emergence within the predominantly patriarchal culture of the Niger Delta, the reconfiguration of existing gender relations or what has been described as 'gendered class alliance'. This occurs 'when women organized autonomously against the exploitation of oil corporations and local male dealers' (Turner *et al.* 2001:21). Often, the alliance is reinforced when men forsake the male deal and join the ranks of the autonomously organized women to challenge capital and male dealers within their communities.

Following the example cited elsewhere of the Ogharefe and Ekpan women in 1984 and 1986, respectively, women from other parts of the region have confronted the oil companies when their farms and fish ponds have been polluted. The Ogoni, the Egi and Eket women have at different times in the 1990s confronted the oil companies and voiced the demands of their communities to the companies (see Saro-Wiwa 1995; Wiwa 1997). At times, the demonstrations and protests turned bloody, as happened in April 1993 when a crowd of Ogoni women demonstrated peacefully against Wilbros, an American pipeline contractor firm working for Shell in the village of Biara. As Ken Saro-Wiwa (1995:156) reports:

The women held twigs as they had been advised to do to indicate that they were protesting peacefully. The soldiers emptied their live ammunition on them. Eleven people were wounded, among them Mrs Karalole Korgbara, a mother of five children who was shot in the left arm - it was subsequently amputated.

Furthermore, during the long-drawn-out (1993-1999) military occupation of Ogoni in Rivers State and the one year-long militarization (1998-1999) of Ijawland in Bayelsa State, women were the worst victims of state-sponsored repression (*Tempo*, August 3, 1995; Robinson 1996; Banjo 1998; Ekine 2001). For them, it was a double struggle in which they were raped and beaten; their husbands and sons were killed or jailed, and their daughters either raped or taken away. Also, during this period, the women were constantly harassed by soldiers who extorted money from them and even prevented them from going to the farm or market. In most cases, trading activities became impossible, since market squares were constant targets, where goods were looted and/or set ablaze, and valuable personal effects as well as money carted away from homes (Wiwa 1997:13).

Like their Ogoni, Umududja and Ijaw counterparts, the Egi women have had their own fair share of confrontation and repression at the hands of companies. In September 1998, the women took to the streets to protest against the activities of Elf, the giant French oil company. Their demands centred around the provision of basic social amenities such as water and electricity. During the protest, the women were quick to emphasize the stark contrast between their own residential areas and those of Elf workers, which were well supplied with basic amenities. The women also complained about the destruction of their farms and fish ponds by Elf and the consequent loss of their sources of income and food.

Two months later, in November 1998, the Egi women were out on the streets once again. Despite the formidable presence of over a hundred armed Mobile Policemen, the women marched intrepidly towards the Elf gas installation plant and occupied it. They re-stated their earlier demands for water, electricity and compensation for loss of livelihood. Beyond this, the women also demanded the immediate release of Egi youths who had been detained. As a result of their pressure, 'the youths were released, only to be charged in court' (Turner 2001:29). Barely one year later in August 1999, about five thousand women from the Egi women's movement again laid siege on Elf's facility, shutting it for one day. This time, they demanded, non-violently, for clean air and water, as well as Elf's investment in community development projects. According to Esparza and Wilson (1999), Elf's reaction was to deploy about forty local youths to whom it allegedly paid \$2,000 each to aggressively break up the non-violent protest. Furthermore, Elf Oil Company is on record as having 'paid the youths another \$75,000 to sign an agreement with the company, claiming that their youth group represented the entire Egi community' (Esparza and Wilson 1999:16). Elf's behaviour is indicative of oil companies' insensitivity towards host communities' plight and just demands, as well as attempts to divide and rule, rather than investing in genuine and productive community development projects within their host communities.

Today, the situation is much the same. The women of the Niger Delta remain as marginalized and economically disempowered as ever, waiting for the dividends of globalization! Apparently impatient to wait any longer for promises from companies that treat them as cows to be milked, the women are again up in arms against those oil companies.

In July 2002, a two-week long sit-out protest was organized by hundreds of Itsekiri women from Ugborodo and Ogidigben when they occupied the Chevron-Texaco's Escravos Tank Farm, demanding, like their counterparts in other oil communities, the provision of basic social amenities such as water and electricity. They complained about the loss of their traditional occupations as a result of Chevron-Texaco's activities, which have devastated their farmlands and polluted their fish ponds. The women also asked Chevron-Texaco to employ their children, so 'that we the mothers will survive' (Awowede 2002:44).

A few days later, following the resolution of the Escravos Tank Farm occupation, hundreds of aggrieved peasant women from the Ijaw communities of Gbaramatu and Egbema laid siege to four oil flow stations belonging, again, to the Chevron-Texaco oil corporation. For almost two weeks, the women occupied the flow stations of Abiteye, Maraba/Otunana, Dibi and Olero creek. Like their counterparts from Ugborodo and Ogidigben, they charged Chevron-Texaco with neglect and environmental degradation. The Ijaw women, however, went one step than their Itsekiri counterparts. They demanded, among other things, that each protester be paid the sum of two million naira as recompense for the two-week long occupation, which they argued, had cost each of them her trading and/or farming. A twenty million naira micro-credit scheme was also demanded by the women for each of the ten-odd communities that made up Gbaramatu and Egbema (Awowede 2002). The Ijaw women later called off their siege, as did the women from the Itsekiri communities of Ugborodo and Ogidigben, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between them and Chevron-Texaco.

Of great importance in the women's anti-globalization struggle in Nigeria's Delta region is the direct, resolute and non-compromising attitude that these grassroots women have adopted in their demands for environmental remediation and recompense. Given that the Niger Delta oil communities are predominantly patriarchal in nature, it becomes easier to appreciate the daring courage exhibited by these women. Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that these female peasants and traders decided to pick up the gauntlet in frustration as well as in defiance of their men folk who habitually engaged in 'male deals' with the oil companies at the expense of the communities (Turner and Oshare 1993). It is also fair to observe that the struggles of the Niger Delta women against the onslaught of economic globalization on their subsistence is a testament to the fact that even in

patriarchal African societies such as those of the Nigeria's Delta region, there exist channels through which women can fight for their rights.

In the light of the above, it is clear that from the embattled Itsekiri communities of Ugborodo and Ogidigben, to the Ijaw communities of Gbaramatu and the Urhobo women of Ekpan, all in Delta State, to the Ilaje community in Ondo State, the women of the Niger Delta are waging renewed battles against 'anti-corporate, anti-war movement for globalization from below' (Turner and Brownhill 2001:805). The following statements by Queen Uwawa and Christiana Mene, respectively, are instructive:

For 38 years Chevron has been taking oil from Escravos (with) nothing to show for it, no development. We used to catch fish and crayfish for food, but that is not possible. The fishes and crayfish have gone away. They left because Chevron has polluted rivers and creeks (Awowede 2002:44).

We want Chevron to employ our children. If Chevron does that we, the mothers, will survive, we will see food to eat. Our farms are all gone due to Chevrons pollution of our water. We used to farm cassava, okro, pepper and others. Now all the places we have farmed are sinking. That is why we told Chevron that Escravos women and Chevron are at war (ibid).

The foregoing analysis has shown how globalization has blighted local subsistence production by destroying the physical environment of the people of Niger Delta. The analysis has also demonstrated that women, especially the farmers and traders, have been badly hit in the process. As a consequence, they have been in the vanguard of demonstrations and protests against the devastation of the environment on which they depend for their livelihoods and survival. This struggle has, of course, led to some transformations in gender relations within the communities of the oil-producing region. The emergence of gendered class alliances amid long-established patriarchal structures has enormously strengthened the gathering of the wind of globalization from below.

Implications

In the light of the above, what, we may ask, are the likely implications of all this for the women of Nigeria's Delta region? The implications are several and range from economic, socio-cultural to political. One of the significant economic implications is that the women are no longer able to perform their traditional roles as farmers, traders or even as mothers. Given the vital role women play in the local economy, to destroy their main sources of income is tantamount to destroying the entire communities. Nowhere is the reality of economic redundancy more keenly felt than among the fisherwomen and the fish merchants, as decade of pollution have virtually decimated the fish population in the creeks and rivers

that crisscross the Delta region. Indeed, it was gathered that one of the victims of this economic displacement from Ughelli, Delta State, now spends much of her time in alternating visits among her children who live in different parts of the country.

As already pointed out, prostitution has become more rampant in the last ten to fifteen years. In this regard, Esparza and Wilson's (1999:10) report has commented that the number of fatherless children has increased during this period. Expatriate oil workers and their well paid Nigerian counterparts in the oil and oil servicing companies (who the locals preoperatively refer to as 'Abuja men' because their financial recklessness can only be compared to that of the politicians in Abuja, Nigeria's capital city) are said to be the major culprits. One unfortunate outcome of this trend, according to the people, is that many homes have been broken as a result. Joy Yowika (1999), an Ogoni woman activist, has described this as a violation of women's rights and has consequently embarked on a project of ensuring that the expatriate fathers are made to take responsibility of such children. According to her, the oil companies have been co-operative in this respect.

Globalization has also impacted the people's culture. Culturally, certain practices were preserved for women. For example, the 'fattening room' is a popular traditional practice among Ogoni women. A woman usually undergoes the 'fattening room' process after the birth of her first child and this usually lasts for one year. During the period, she receives instructions on local medicines and how to care for her child and look after the home. As a rule, she is attended to by elderly women as well as women from her own family. She is to rest and remain within the confines of the compound for the duration of the event. It is reported that given the pressures the young women have to contend with, the practice, when it takes place at all, rarely exceeds two months. Commenting on this fast-dying cultural heritage, Diana Wiwa has remarked that:

loss of the fattening room and other traditions led the Ogoni women to make a conscious decision to organize against the oil industry on their land - a force they saw as being clearly responsible for cultural degradation in Ogoni (Wiwa 1997:13).

It would be misleading if our analysis thus far suggested that globalization is devoid of any positive aspects. To be sure, the realities of deepening marginalization, disempowerment and exclusion experienced by women in the Niger Delta over the past fifteen years stem largely from the processes of globalization. As it devastates their environment and displaces women from productive enterprises and livelihoods, globalization paradoxically creates the objective conditions which politically empower the women, in terms of uniting them against their common enemy - the powerful oil transnationals. This unity of purpose can be observed across the oil-producing communities, where some of the most effective and dynamic grassroots women's movements in Africa have

emerged. Notable among these are the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA) and the Egi Women's Movement. These have been at the forefront of the movement for globalization from below, through their gendered class alliances and their international networking for co-ordinated action (Turner *et al* 2001; Turner and Brownhill, 2001). Through these mediums, the rural women of the Niger Delta have been able to participate in the global fight back against economic globalization.

Conclusion

An attempt has been made in this study to analyse the impact of globalization on unwaged women, namely peasant farmers and traders in Nigeria's Delta region. The pressures engendered by globalization in the oil-producing communities, it is argued, have given rise to new contradictions, whilst heightening old ones. This is evident in the ease with which globalization has undermined the active role the women used to play at home and in the local economy. Consequently, many rural women have become economically disempowered or even redundant, leading to a situation where many have either reconciled themselves to their fate or been forced to seek alternative coping strategies. However at the same time, globalization, as we have seen, has been instrumental in the modest successes these women have thus far been able to achieve in terms of grassroots mobilization, in terms of their effective actions against corrupt and collaborating male dealers in their communities and in terms of international networking, through the female elite in their society, against corporate globalization. This is not to suggest that there was nothing like local mobilization by women in the Niger Delta before the era of globalization. On the contrary, documented evidence exists of local women's mobilization in that region (see for instance Turner and Oshare 1993; Turner *et al.* 2001), before the onset of globalization in the 1980s.

However, the nature, scale and sophistication of the contemporary social movements have reduced the earlier ones to mere child's play. A lot of variables, to be sure, are at work here. And these include, among others, the contradictions thrown up by globalization itself. The milestone changes that have attended the global environment over the past decade and the crop of environmentally-conscious leadership that has emerged from among the women folk themselves are highly instructive. Indeed, the character of leadership provided by the likes of Diana Wiwa, Grace Ekanem, Joi Yowika, Annie Brisibe and Sokari Ekine, to name just a few, has accounted in no small measure for the cohesion, vision and resolve that have been exhibited by the women in their environmental rights campaigns. Beyond this, the leadership should intensify their grassroots mobilization by sensitizing the rural women on issues that have an impact on globalization, environmental justice and human rights. Also, the existing social movements should work and coordinate their activities with other international non-governmental

organizations and anti-globalization movements around the world, as this will keep the local social movements abreast of how similar struggles are being waged by exploited and repressed rural people in the other parts of the world. This is the only way the women in Niger Delta can win the battle against global capital and their local collaborators.

Bibliography

- Aina, T.A., 1997, *Globalization and Social Policy in Africa: Issues and Research Directions*, Working Paper series 6196, Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA.
- Ake, C., 2001, *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Amin, S., 1992, *The Empire of Chaos*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Appadurai, A., 2001, 'Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination' in Arjun Appadurai (ed.) *Globalization*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Awowede, O., 2002, 'The Case against Chevron', *Insider Weekly*, August 19.
- Banjo, W.S., 1998, *The Politics of United Nations Fact-Finding Mission in Nigeria*, African Research Bureau Monograph Series Vol. 1. No 3.
- CRP (Constitutional Rights Project), 1999, *Land, Oil and Human Nigeria's Delta Region*, Lagos: CRP.
- Dembele, D.M., 1999, 'The Political Economy of Debt, Adjustment and Globalization in Africa', in Yassine Fall (ed.) *Africa: Gender, Globalization and Resistance*, A WORD Book series.
- Douglas, O. et al., 2003, 'Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: An Alternative View', www.fpif.org/papers/nigeria2003_body.html
- Doyle, J., 2002, *Riding the Dragon: Royal Dutch Shell and the Fossil Fire*, Boston: Environmental Health Fund.
- Egwu, S., 1998, *Structural Adjustment, Agrarian Change and Rural Ethnicity in Nigeria*, Uppsala: Nordiska Africa Institute.
- Egwu, S.G., 2001, *Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria*, Abuja: AFRIGOV, p49.
- Ekine, S., 2001, *Blood and Oil*, London: Centre for Democracy and Development.
- Embong, A.R., 2000, 'Globalization and Transnational Class Relations: Some Problems of Conceptualisation', *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 21 Number 6.
- Esparza, E. and M. Wilson, 1999, *Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta*, USA: In works press.
- Eteng, I., 1998, 'The Nigerian State, Oil Exploration and Community Interests: Issues and Perspectives', in Funmi Adewunmi (ed.) *Oil Exploration and Exploitation, the State and Crisis in Nigeria's Oil-Bearing Enclave*, Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
- Faloseyi, M., 2003, 'Oil, Gas Fetch Nigeria \$300bn in 20 years', *Punch*, Lagos, August 5.
- Fregene, P., 1998, 'Oil Exploration and Production Activities: The Socio-Economic and Environmental Problems in Warri Division – Itsekiri Homeland' in Funmi Adewunmi (ed.) *Oil Exploration and Exploitation, the State and Crisis in Nigeria's Oil-Bearing Enclave*, Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
- Fukuyama, F., 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press.
- Gbadegehin, A., 1997, 'The Impact of Oil Exploration Production Activities on the Environment: Implications For Peasant Agriculture', Seminar Paper on Oil and The Environment organised by Friedrich Ebert Foundation's in Port Harcourt.

- Hoogvelt, A., 1997, *Globalization and the Post-colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development*, London: Macmillan Press Limited.
- Ibrahim, J., 2002, 'Notes on Globalization and the Marginalization of Africa', Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA *Bulletin*, Numbers 3 and 4.
- Jessop, B., 2003, 'The Future of the State in an Era of Globalization', *International Politics and Society* 3.
- Kiely, R., 1998, 'The Crisis of Global Development' in Ray Kiely *et al.* (eds.) *Globalization and the Third World*, London: Routledge.
- Korten, D.C., 1996, *When Corporations Rule the World*, London: Earth-Scan Publications.
- Kwanashie, M., 1999, 'Concepts and Dimensions of Globalization' in *Globalization and Nigeria's Economic Development*, Ibadan: The Nigerian Economic Society.
- Leftwich, A., 1993, 'Governance, democracy and Development in the Third', *Third World Quarterly*, 14 (3).
- Manby, B., 1999, *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities*, USA: Human Watch.
- Miller, A.L., 1995, *The Third World in Global Environmental Politics*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc.
- Mittelman, J.H., 2000, 'Globalization: Captors and Captive', *Third World Quarterly*, 14 (3).
- Mohan, G., 2000, 'The Environmental Aspects of Adjustment', in Giles Mohan *et al.* (eds.) *Structural Adjustment: Theory, Practice and Impacts*, London, New York: Routledge.
- Natufe, I., 2001, 'Resistance Politics: An Essay on the Future of Nigeria', <http://waado.org/NigerDelta/Essays/PoliticsPage.html>
- Nnoli, O. 2000, 'Globalization and Democracy in Africa', in Dani W. Nabudere (ed.) *Globalization and the Post-Colonial African State*, Harare: African Association of Political Science.
- Nyamnjoh, F.B., 2003, 'Globalization, Boundaries and Livelihoods: Perspectives on Africa' *Philosophia Africana*, Vol. 6. No 2, August.
- Obasek, P.J., 1999, 'Policies and Strategies for Dealing with the Problems of Globalization', in *Globalization and Nigeria's Economic Development*, Ibadan: The Nigerian Economic Society.
- Obi, C.I., 2000, 'Globalised Images of Environmental Security in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 83:47-62.
- Obi, C.I., 2001, *The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in Nigeria under Economic Adjustment: The Case of the Minority Oil Moment*, Uppsala: Nordiska African Institute.
- Ohiorhenuan, J.F.E., 1998, 'The South in an Era of Globalization', *Cooperation South*, Number Two.
- Okonta, I. and O. Douglas, 2001, *Where Vultures Feast: 40 Years of Shell in the Niger Delta*, Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited.
- Onimode, B., 2000, *Africa in the World of 21st Century*, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Onosode, G.O., 2003, *Environmental Issues and Challenges of the Niger Delta; Perspectives from the Niger Delta Environmental Survey*, Lagos; Lilybank Property and Trust Limited.
- Oviririe, B.G.O, 1998, 'Oil and the Environment: Our Blessings and Woes' in Funmi Adewumi (ed.) *Oil Exploration and Exploitation, the State and Crisis in Nigeria's Oil-Bearing Enclave*.
- Awabukeruyele, W., 2000, 'Hydrocarbon exploitation, Environmental degradation and Poverty in the Delta Region of Nigeria', <http://www.waado.org/Environment/PetrolPollution/Env.Economics.html>

- Redclift, M. and C. Sage, 1994, 'Introduction', in M. Redclift and C. Sage (eds.) *Strategies for Sustainable Development: Local Agendas for the Southern Hemisphere*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
- Robinson, D., 1996, *Ogoni: The Struggle Continues*, Switzerland: World Council of Churches.
- Rugumanu, S. M., 2001, *Globalization and Africa's Future: Towards Structural Stability, Integration and Sustainable Development*: AAPS Occasional Paper Series Volume 5, Number 2 Books.
- Saro-Wiwa, K., 1995, *A Month and Day: A Detention Diary*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Scholte, J.A., 1999, 'Global Capitalism and the State', *International Affairs*, Volume 73. 3, 427-452.
- Scholte, J.A., 1997, 'The Globalization of World Politics' in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: and Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiva, V., 2001, 'Globalization and Talibanization', *Outlook*, India October 30.
- Sierra Club: Environmental Update, Human Rights and the Environmental, International Campaigns: Nigeria. Website: www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/nigeria/background/survival.asp
- Smith, S. and J. Baylis, 1998, Introduction, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tandon, Y., 2000, 'Globalization and Africa's Options', in D.M. Nabudere (ed.) *Op. cit. Tempo*, August 3, 1995.
- The Economist*, December 4, 1997.
- Turner, T. and M. Oshare, 1993, 'Women's Uprising against the Nigerian Oil Industry', *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. XIV, No.3.
- Turner, T. *et al.*, 'Fightback from the Commons: General Class Alliances and Petroleum Struggles in Nigeria's Oil belt: 1980-2002' *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Winter 2001/2, Vol. XIV, No. 3.
- Turner, T. and Leigh S. Brownhill, 2001, 'Gender, Feminism and the Civil Commons: Women and the Anti-Corporate, Anti-War Movement for Globalization from Below', *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. XXII.
- Wiwa, D., 1997, 'The Role of Women in the Struggle for Environmental Justice in Ogoni', *Delta*, 3 October.
- Yowika, Y. J., 1999, 'In Niger Delta, Women Suffer Most', *Survival*, No 001, August.