Consequences of Referendum in Southern Sudan for Sudan, Horn of Africa and Neighbouring Regions

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Introduction

Voting in the referendum has resulted in an overwhelming choice of secession for Southern Sudan, a fact that was recognized by the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the international community on 7 February 2011. This historical event has paved the way for the declaration of the 54th State in Africa in the nearest future. This situation calls for internal and external adjustments and adaptations of relationships in the Sudan and in the geo-political regions.

Political, social and economic gains or losses for the north or the south are subject to further negotiations to avert renewed violence in the region. Sharing of oil revenues, water resources and other issues such as citizenship and nationality remain tricky in the post-referendum period. Further, fears of beneficiaries from losing peace dividends of the CPA could become problematic in the run up to the declaration of a new sovereign state in Southern Sudan. All these factors are a challenge to partners and friends of the peace agreement. Issues related to population movements (IDPs and nomads) and the common border between the north and the south are yet to be settled.
In the Sudan, armed conflict alone had been the main cause of the dislocation of the population. Attitudes of policy makers and ordinary people in the north and the south split after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005, especially during the period leading towards the end of the interim period. The Government of National Unity (GoNU) and political forces in the north were alarmed by trends of events in the south that were in favour of voting for secession. The CPA stipulates that people in Southern Sudan will vote in a referendum to determine the political future of the Sudan. This benchmark in the implementation of the CPA is enshrined the Interim National Constitution (INC) (GoNU 2005:134). The two documents contain details of transitional arrangements leading to the end of the interim period in 2011. However, the parties to the agreement, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) have to come to terms with the secession of Southern Sudan and subsequent declaration of independence in July 2011.

Events in the Sudan have not only changed the political landscape of the country, but have serious repercussions in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and Central Africa. Secession of the south from the Sudan is the second after that of Eritrea from Ethiopia since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. This new development in the Sudan is more dramatic to Africa compared to the case of Eritrea. The number of countries and sub-regions that have complex relationships with the south is cause of concern. Recognition of the referendum results at national, regional and international levels is one thing, but supporting the successor states to enhance harmony in the region is another challenge.

The question is how will the successor states cope with the challenges of peaceful coexistence? To what extent are the neighbours and African Union (AU) member States prepared to contribute to the stability of the Sudan, which is the key to Africa development? And how would African countries and organisations curtail secession tendencies in other African countries in similar situations like the Sudan? The purpose of this paper is to put ideas on the table for expanded discussions of secession in the continent of Africa.

**Physical Linkages and Prospects for Political Stability**

The ideal situation for peace in Sudan depends on a mutually agreed secession, which took place on 7 February 2011. The first phase of averting renewed war was attained in the Sudan. The referendum resulted in secession. There are, nevertheless, many important issues remaining to be dealt with to forge
interdependence between the south and the north and within Southern Sudan as well. It is incumbent on CPA partners to identify determinants that would strengthen mutual dependence at the end of the interim period on 9 July 2011 and even far beyond. The post-referendum political environment is associated with vulnerabilities, which could easily drag the north and the south into lose-win confrontations.

Interdependence between the south and the north is a crucial factor in maintaining peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and other regions. Scholars describe the concept of interdependence as situations in which actors and events in different parts of a system affect each other (Nye Jr. 2000:179-184). There must be determinants to stimulate mutual dependence to offset the negative sensitivities accumulated during the period of armed conflict in the Sudan. The north-south surface transportation connections are weak because of prolonged neglect of Southern Sudan in national plans. There were no all-weather roads linking the north and the south since independence. The railway line that linked the south and the north became dysfunctional in 1980s and remains so in the interim period of the CPA.

Roads linking northern and southern parts of the Sudan are in terrible shape. Road and railway bridges were blown out as war strategy. River transportation was partially functional, but always paralysed by the civil war. Only air transport connected some principal towns. This was expensive for movement of goods and services. The present condition of roads hampers return processes, resettlement of people, rehabilitation of essential services and future economic development. The CPA provided many opportunities to construct major road networks between the north and the south and to repair the Babanusa-Wau rail link. However, sections of roads of Kosti-Renk-Melut and Kharasana-Pariang-Bentiu were built to connect the north to oil producing areas in Southern Sudan. Transport facilitates internal trade, domestic interactions, business interests and knowledge of the other. All states lying south of the Sudd swamps are weakly connected with the north. Consequently, many communities in Southern Sudan are encapsulated into their homelands in the ten states without wider contact with one another.

Communications networks play a similar role like the roads networks. Many mobile phone operators have, nevertheless, invested in the south. All major urban centres and cities in the ten states of Southern Sudan are connected by northern-based mobile operators. The presence of these operators has contributed to improved transactions of public and private businesses. This is an exemplary service which, if reinforced by surface transport networks, would
consolidate interdependence between the south and the north. The emerging states from the old political system are expected to promote transportation and communications in order to boost internal and external businesses and to lay sound foundations for future cooperation. In short, opportunities for nurturing interdependence constitute a challenge in future relationships between the north and the south when secession of Southern Sudan materialises.

Remaining Conflicts and Emerging Identities in the North

The most pressing issue concerns the status of Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains), Blue Nile and Abyei. According to the CPA, the populations in the first two areas have the right to exercise ‘popular consultation’ on whether or not they are satisfied with the implementation of the CPA. Positive outcome of the consultation will result in the confirmation of the present arrangement after the expiry date of the interim arrangement. The issue at stake is whether these regions are not going to constitute a ‘new south’ of the northern Sudan as far as emerging political conflicts are concerned. These regions were involved in Sudan’s civil war that ended in 2005. The hangover of the liberation mentality may continue to cloud relationships between these regions and the centre. The successor state in southern Sudan, in concert with the government in the north, will need cooperation in order to de-escalate whatever new conflict may arise in the future.

Of like concern as the problem relating the two regions above is the uncertainty surrounding the political environment in Abyei in the post-referendum period. Partners of the CPA have the tradition of disagreement over the territory. Disagreements between the CPA partners over Abyei could ignite another cycle of violence. This area saw the worst violence in May 2008, which led to the destruction of Abyei Town, displacement of the population including returnees and the temporary evacuation of UNMIS and NGOs (Wassara 2009:13). The Abyei area was left without authority for some time. Although the CPA partners sought a judicial solution, the ruling of the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague of 2009 remains a blueprint. No border demarcation has taken place since the verdict of the Court was announced. The Abyei case is volatile in the relationships between the north and the south. While the referendum operations ran smoothly in southern Sudan, Abyei witnessed prolonged violent confrontations between armed groups in which lives were lost, people injured and properties destroyed.

Further, the Darfur conflict remains uncertain because the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), which promised a referendum on Darfur by the middle of
2010, is no longer functioning (Art. 56 of the DPA). The civil war continued despite the participation of some Darfur factions in the Government. However, if armed conflict intensified in Darfur it would likely spill-over the north-south border. Darfur rebels might seek sanctuary in forests of Western Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan, a scenario that might draw the latter into the conflict between the Khartoum regime and the Darfur insurgency. A similar situation developed when the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) started bombardment of frontier villages of Western Bahr el Ghazal before the referendum under the pretext of pursuing Darfur rebels into southern Sudan (CIGI 2011:7). Therefore, continued civil war in Darfur is a threat to stable relationships between the state in the north and the emerging sovereign state in the south.

Finally, Eastern Sudan is a conflict region where the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and SPLM/A were present before the CPA was signed in 2005. Conflict actors in the region were given a separate treatment in the search for peace in the Sudan. The GoS and rebel groups in Eastern Sudan entered into a separate agreement under the name of Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) on 14 October 2006. Under the terms of the agreement, a regional government was established that included three states: Gedarif, Kassala and Red Sea. The ESPA endorsed the June 2000 Tripoli Agreement between the GoS and the Free Lions, which gave political rights to the Rashaida people believed to be latecomers to the region from the Arabian Peninsula. Ethnic groups of the region, namely the Beja, Ben Amer and Rashaida have constructed a new political identity, which is problematic to the authorities in Khartoum (Abdel Ghaaffar and Manger 2009:101-103).

Hence, regional identities are emerging in increasing numbers in northern Sudan. There are four distinct regions (Blue Nile, Darfur, Eastern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains) where identity politics could cause problems for the post-referendum government in the north (Ottmann and Wolff 2007:19-27). The secession of Southern Sudan could influence political activists in the northern part of Sudan to claim greater autonomy, a situation that could further weaken the central government in Khartoum. In case the north does not adjust to the new situation, it is feared that some of these regions may even consider secession as a solution to disputes between them and the centre. The greatest concern is that political forces in these regions were partners of SPLM/A during the years of armed struggle against the regime in Khartoum. They may be tempted to involve Southern Sudan to support their political causes. Should the new State support such a cause, that act will be detrimental to consolidation of peace in both north and south, and in neighbouring countries.
Human Security in the South: Problems of Arms and Violence

Many factors contributed to the resurgence of violence and insecurity in Southern Sudan in the post-CPA period. The most obvious factor is the breakdown of law and order that destroyed traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution at the community level. The rise of civilian defence forces supplanted the power and authority of tribal chiefs, community leaders and faith-based institutions. The GoSS as well as the State and County administrations were unable to control local warlords. Post-CPA security institutions were unable to protect citizens and their property from armed groups within or outside communities. The incidence of cattle rustling rose dramatically in pastoralist communities. Unemployed youth who have lost traditional coping mechanisms organised into militia-like criminal groups that engaged in banditry. Hence, the interim period of the CPA witnessed violent clashes between tribal communities in a number of states of Southern Sudan. Some causes of such clashes were political; but most of them were attributed to cattle rustling and other forms of banditry.

The availability of small arms among the civilian population might not be the cause of insecurity in Southern Sudan, but it has certainly exacerbated the violence. In the light of the poor security situation, and as result of the inefficiency of law enforcement institutions, people feel the need to turn to small arms and light weapons (SALW) to defend themselves and their property. In the past, pastoralist communities in Southern Sudan used traditional weapons to defend their livestock from predators and rival groups, causing minimal causalities compared to the present day.

Young has compiled an exhaustive list of 60 different militia groups allied with the SAF or SPLA (Young 2006:42–48). Many war-time militias splintered due to disagreements over their integration into the SPLA or SAF. The huge number of militia groups complicated the implementation of the CPA in Southern Sudan because the unabsorbed groups used to create insecurity and continuously switched sides between the SAF and the SPLA. Many militia groups and demobilised SPLA soldiers that were dissatisfied with the post-CPA security arrangements have melted into their communities with their weapons. The failure to handle the integration of militia groups into the SPLA is a source of outbreaks of armed violence in Upper Nile and Unity states. These groups engage in other forms of inter-communal violence such as banditry and cattle rustling.

The proximity of Southern Sudan to conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region has adversely influenced its social, political and
security environment. Most of the conflicts have their roots in economic underdevelopment, environmental hazards, repressive political systems, and competition over natural resources. Patterns and trends of conflict differ in nature across the region. The Horn has experienced both inter- and intra-state conflicts. The end of the superpower rivalry left a power vacuum that regional powers sought to fill. Such political interference and competition for influence created a fertile ground for dissident movements with cross-border connections.

Stockpiles of weapons are in abundance in the conflict-affected countries neighbouring Southern Sudan. Studies (Lewis 2009:47-49) show that there is an abundance of SALW in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chad that find their way into Southern Sudan. Many communities take advantage of the wide availability of small arms to establish community military formations with the aim of forcefully acquiring property from neighbouring communities. The result is a cycle of communal violence and militarisation.

Cross-border ethnic relationships play an important role in the flow of weapons in the region. Present state boundaries cut across several ethnic groups. The control of trans-border peripheries has been a nightmare for the GoS, but is becoming even more problematic for the GoSS after its establishment in 2005. Many ethnic groups straddle the borders between Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda; for example, the Acholi, Anuak, Nuer and Toposa. Regional conflicts involving states in the Horn of Africa have led political systems to the exploit such communities for their political and strategic interests in the region (De Waal 2007:9-15).

Civilian disarmament in Southern Sudan is a complex undertaking that requires a sharp understanding of inter-communal relationships and cross-border dynamics. Southern Sudan is a segmented tribal society where traditional authority was terribly eroded during the civil war. The civil war contributed to community ownership of an excessive number of small arms and light weapons. There was a definite pattern of community militarisation and livestock-related violence in Southern Sudan. The movement of cattle from Dinka and Nuer villages to the lowlands along the White Nile and its main tributaries results in recurring dry-season violence between communities over grazing land and fishing rights; and other pastoralists such as the Murle, Toposa and Boya engage in cattle rustling. These communities have acquired modern assault weapons that have increased fatalities in communal violence.
Challenges for New States in Old Sudan

The major challenge, which governments of the north and the south have to overcome include things like: citizenship, disarmament of civilians, professionalisation of security sector institutions, making of laws, and diversification of economic activities. The government in the south will have to negotiate access to sea ports, a necessity for landlocked states.

Citizenship and Identity

Citizenship and identity are ambiguous concepts with reference to the Sudanese society. In the Sudan, the law emphasises the concept of nationality. The Nationality Law of 1957 (amended in 1974) is based on ancestry and descent, although naturalisation is a lesser important basis for qualifying to be identified as Sudanese. Ancestry or descent is not a necessary and sufficient condition for being a citizen of the Sudan. The basic requirement is belonging to a community in the Sudan. However, the law discriminates against some ethnic groups in northern Sudan as well as in southern Sudan (Assal 2011:4-7). Border peoples of the country undergo stringent procedures to obtain nationality certificates in order to identify themselves as Sudanese citizens. Besides biological parents, the law requires witnesses and elders of the communities to justify that an applicant is born to parents who live or lived in the Sudan. These are the complications that the new state in southern Sudan has to deal with immediately before the declaration of independence is made.

The referendum vote for secession is homework for policymakers in north Sudan and south Sudan. According to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to which Sudan is not a signatory and the 1999 International Law Commission (ILC) clauses on Nationality of Natural Persons in succession of States, the Predecessor State should ensure that the situation of statelessness is prevented in the Successor State. Inhabitants of the latter, including aliens, have the right to choose a nationality in either of the two states (Brownlie 1990:661-665). Several proposals were advanced about citizenship and nationality in the run up to the 2001 referendum vote in the Sudan and afterwards. Dual nationality/citizenship was considered as an option for the Sudanese born in the two States before 2005. This option was rejected outright by the NCP.

CPA partners hold different positions on this issue. According to a recent study (Assal 2011:10), the NCP leaders maintain that Southerners living in the north will have to return to their new home and those who choose to
remain behind will be treated as foreigners. The SPLM position on the issue of nationality is that there should be no discrimination in the Predecessor State and the Successor State. Southerners who choose to stay in the north should be granted citizenship and Northerners in the south likewise. As the Government of Sudan has accepted the results of secession, it is logical for the NCP to abide by the international rule and practice that the Predecessor State cannot withdraw nationality from an inhabitant unless that person has acquired a domicile and nationality of the Successor State.

The issue of nationality and citizenship is yet to be resolved within the remaining interim period. There is already a precedent set during the independence of the country. The Sudan was a Condominium under the British and the Egyptian rule. At Sudan’s independence, residents of foreign origins (Egyptians, Syrians, Cypriots, Greeks, Turks, Armenians, etc) were given the opportunity to acquire Sudanese citizenship or remain citizens of their countries of origin, but fulfil conditions of residence as defined by Sudanese laws. Therefore, this section is concluding by borrowing the idea of Brownlie that ‘sovereignty denotes responsibility for people’ and it will be a crime to treat the Southern Sudanese population in the north as stateless after secession.

Water Resources and Waterways

South Sudan is emerging as a new riparian state in the Nile basin after the result of the January 2011 referendum is secession. The new State may become the 11th member of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) if it adheres to the 2002 Constitutive Act of the water organisation. This political development has serious implications for the existing arrangements and problems related to the sharing of water resources between the lower riparian states, Egypt and the Sudan, and the other upper riparian states. The history of the Nile water sharing agreements was much influenced by theory of absolute territorial integrity (Godana 1985:38). The theory states that the upper riparian states should not undertake projects to harness sections of a river system on their territories if such works affect adversely water interests of other basin states. This theory favours downstream states such as Egypt and the Sudan. Experts maintain that there is a form of hydro-hegemony enjoyed by Egypt and the Sudan by virtue of previous agreements. The signatories of the 1959 Nile Water Agreement control water resources and coerce the upper riparian States into accepting an unjust allocation of water quantities (Mirumachi and Allan 2007:2-5).
Most of the existing Nile water agreements excluded the upper riparian states. The agreements of 1929 and 1959 included only Egypt and the Sudan. These two countries allocated for themselves nearly all water quantities of the Nile River system. The demographic explosion and corresponding food, power and water shortages coupled with water sharing in the two agreements have been sources of tension in the Nile basin. Egypt took advantage of endemic conflicts in upstream countries to benefit from the share of water when the upper riparian states were engulfed by armed conflicts since the signature of the 1959 Nile Water Agreement (Okoth 2007:85-88).

Causes of water scarcity in the lower riparian states (Egypt and Sudan) are attributed to climatic conditions such as evaporation in the great swamp (the Sudd) in Southern Sudan. It is estimated that 14 billion cubic metres of water are lost in evaporation in the Sudd swamp alone (Wassara 1994:112). The 1959 Agreement contains clauses defining construction works for water drainage in the White Nile River system located in Southern Sudan. The remaining major planned water projects were in Southern Sudan but stalled due to the civil wars in the region. The 400-kilometre Jonglei Canal project was planned to drain 4.7 billion cubic metres of water from the Sudd swamp in Southern Sudan. The project, started in 1978, was halted six years later by the civil war. Northern Sudanese and Egyptian interests in controlling access to Nile water and its resources still persist and the independence of Southern Sudan is a matter of concern for its northern neighbours.

Opportunities for the development of hydro-economy in Egypt and North Sudan lie in Southern Sudan. It is where all the rivers descending from the Nile-Congo water divide converge to create the largest wetland in the Nile basin known as the Sudd. The Sobat River, which descends from the Ethiopian highlands, also meets the White Nile at the northern end of the Sudd near Malakal. At the same time, another wetland, the Machar Marshes in eastern Upper Nile, retains considerable quantities of water descending from the Ethiopian highland. Both the Sudd and the Machar wetlands are targets of water drainage projects conceived in the early twentieth century, refined in subsequent plans by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium administration and reformulated by Egypt and the Sudan to be the core of the 1959 Agreement on full utilisation of the Nile waters.

Southern Sudan is emerging as a sovereign state in a water-related contested area of regional interests; but is not a signatory to any existing treaty. This political development is a threat to Egypt’s hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin. If South Sudan refuses to recognise the 1959 Nile Water
Agreement, the Egyptian government will be compelled to renegotiate the water agreement and the other upper riparian States may take advantage of this situation to mount pressure on Egypt and the Sudan to endorse the new agreement framework developed by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) member States (Kagwanja 2007: 325-329). As the emergence of a new State in Southern Sudan is imminent, the sharing of the Nile water is likely to be an intriguing factor in its foreign policy. The question to consider is to what extent could South Sudan exploit the situation to its advantage?

The positive side of the Nile is that the river has served Southern Sudan for more than a century as an access to the outside world. Southern Sudan is a landlocked region, which is thousands of kilometres away from seaports. The Nile waterways made it possible for different types of trade to flourish in the south. Given the poor state of surface transport infrastructure in Southern Sudan, the Nile River is an important transportation outlet for the south. Although journeys on the Nile River waterways are painfully slow, there are very few competitively cheap, alternative transport systems at work now. The waterway facilitated domestic trade and enabled the supply of commodities to local markets, delivery of humanitarian and relief goods during the war and, currently, the massive return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the north to Southern Sudan. The strategic importance of the Nile is not only for sharing water resources, but as a permanent link between peoples of the south and the north.

**Oil as a Binding or Breaking Factor**

Sudan is the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, the country pumps about 490,000 barrels per day. Most of the oil produced in the Sudan is found in the south (Krumova 2011). Oil production in Southern Sudan adds to its strategic importance. Multinational companies such as the American Chevron and the French Total were initially involved in the exploitation of Sudanese oil; however, sanctions of the Western World against the Sudan redirected oil investments towards Asia (China, India and Malaysia).

The oil producing region is linked to Port Sudan by a pipeline running over 1,000 kilometres through which oil is transported and then exported to China and other world oil markets. The multinational companies that have maintained a presence in Southern Sudan since prior to the signing of the CPA are the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Malaysian Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) and the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). These companies signed their contracts with the
Khartoum regime to which they pay allegiance. More than one-third (35 per cent) of oil revenues go to the drilling companies, while the rest is shared between the north, the south and the oil producing states according to an agreed formula of revenue sharing in the CPA.

Oil could be a factor of cooperation and collaboration between governments in the north and the south after secession. Krumova, the optimist, wrote under a bold headline that ‘Oil Ties North and South Sudan despite Expected Separation’. The analyst argues that separation of Southern Sudan will alter the CPA revenue-sharing formula to the advantage of the south.

The north holds, nevertheless, the key to oil production that would enable it to raise its stakes during negotiations with the south on revisions of the CPA formula for sharing oil revenues. It controls the oil infrastructure such as the pipeline, storage and export reservoirs on the Red Sea coast. In addition, it has the technical expertise to extract the oil. The south does not possess this advantage. It will take the south many years to find an alternative for oil production and exportation. Both governments rely much on oil revenues. Accordingly, 98 per cent of the GoSS budget relied on oil revenues; 50 per cent of the domestic revenue of the north came from oil and 93 per cent of exports came from oil in 2009 (Krumova 2011). This situation is likely to enhance cooperation and collaboration if economies of the north and the south are to avert crises.

In a situation where this optimistic outlook is affected by vulnerability factors, foundations of the economic performance will be profoundly shaken in the post-independent South Sudan. The question is what factors would provoke non-cooperation or non-collaboration of the sovereign states that will emerge at the end of the interim period? The most important factor will be the southern demand for transparency as far as documents of contracts and transactions between the GoS and the Asian oil multinationals are concerned. Another factor will be the request for majority revenue sharing reverting to Southern Sudan. The referendum took place and the GoS accepted the result that tilted in favour of secession. Disputes remain, nevertheless, over which oil fields are subject to wealth sharing, how new oil sharing structures work and who determines the status of the existing contracts. These questions are yet to be addressed adequately before the end of the interim period.

Both the north and the south will be losers if resource-related conflicts escalate to provoke a renewed war. As the economies of the north and the south are profoundly influenced by oil revenues as mentioned above, the oil production will be adversely affected. One adverse effect of a war is that there
would be no sufficient finances for the belligerents to uphold war economies. Further, the war situation would be much more complex than the one experienced before the signature of the CPA. The SPLA has entrenched itself in the southern states where they were absent, especially in the oil fields. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) would have the daunting task of driving out the SPLA from oilfields, a situation that would interrupt oil production for a considerable period of time. The end result would be serious deterioration or near-collapse of economic performances in both the north and the south.

**The North-south Border and Pastoralist Communities**

A seceding Southern Sudan will have a common border with the north, which will be the longest border in Africa (about 2000 Km). The issue of the border is sensitive because of natural resources such as water; pasture and oil are located in borderlands. This could be settled between the north and the south through negotiations. Most of the boundaries between African countries have not been marked on the ground despite the fact that these countries attained independence about half a century ago. Grassroots communities rarely recognize political boundaries. Pastoralists in both north and south have vague notions about international and local borders. Their borders end where there is water and rich grazing areas. The movement of armed nomadic tribes of the north across the north-south border into Southern Sudan does invite predatory activities. The reason why the north-south border is sensitive at the communal level is because of the availability of natural resources such as water sources and grazing land.

Although ethnic clashes were frequent between border communities in the north and the south, they had developed mechanisms for resolving emerging conflicts over grazing lands and water sources. The politicisation and militarisation of communities, which was a civil war strategy, affected adversely the good relationships that existed between communities on both sides of the common border. So long as communities are militarised and communal relations are politicised, it is certain that inter-communal violence could invite military confrontations in border regions between the north and the south after secession. In this respect, the states that will emerge in the north and the south need to re-consider the concept of soft border, which allows seasonal movements of nomads across common borders. These movements could be made safe by replicating war-time peace markets that enhanced border trade. The idea peace markets in borderlands were already embraced by border communities during the civil war, especially in Northern Bahr el Ghazal.
Regional Dimensions and Prospects for Integration

The secession of Southern Sudan will impact on neighbouring states in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and regional organisations. The independence of Southern Sudan may alter inter-state diplomacy and relations not only in the immediate neighbourhood, but in the whole of Africa. Secession will affect power configuration, security and economic environment in the regions mentioned above. States bordering Southern Sudan and proximate regional organisations are likely to position themselves to interact with what some policy experts (Hemmer 2010) refer as ‘the new kid on the block’. The rise of Southern Sudan as an independent country has repercussions of various degrees at different levels in its geopolitical regions.

In the Horn and Neighbouring States

Southern Sudan, emerging soon as a sovereign state, is a landlocked political entity. It is located more than 1,000 kilometres away from the main ports of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast and Mombasa on the Kenyan coast of the Indian Ocean. The new state will be an important political player in the region. Southern Sudan shares common borders with Ethiopia in the east, Kenya, Uganda, in the south and south-east; Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR) in the south and south-west. Sudan’s conflict was easily felt in the countries of the region.

Cross-border entanglements and regional rivalries with almost all immediate neighbours paralleled the internal conflicts, shifting according to regional dynamics and opportunistic political interests. For example, Southern Sudanese refugees, mainly the Nuer and the Dinka, shifted the population balance in favour of the Nuer reducing the influence of the Annuaks in Gambela state. The involvement of Mengistu regime in supporting the SPLA militarily had its backlash when the Derg regime was overthrown in 1991. The Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERDF) regime in Ethiopia left an opening for its backer, the Sudan government, to deal a fatal blow to the SPLA (Sima 2010:197-203). Local conflicts between the Nuers and the Annuaks in Ethiopia spill over into Southern Sudan and vice versa. So, many examples could illustrate similar situation along common borders with the other neighbours of Southern Sudan. This situation led an African scholar (Mesfin 2009) to consider the Horn of Africa as a security complex.

Neighbours of Southern Sudan had influence on events during the war without getting directly embroiled in military actions. In the process of peace
each neighbour pursued its political and economic interests in Southern Sudan. Hemmel (2010:2-4) outlined relations between Southern Sudan and its neighbours in the advent of its independence. Most of the issues related to north-south relations are already explored in the sections above. Sudan and its neighbours, which have history of fuelling each other’s conflicts, have mended their relations.

The CPA made it possible for Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to make serious inroads into Southern Sudan through diplomatic relations and businesses including air connections and road links. All these countries have established Consulates in Juba, the Capital of Southern Sudan. The other neighbours are French-speaking countries, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). Although these countries share common borders; have same people on both sides of the border and experience similar conflicts, their engagements with Southern Sudan remain relatively weak. They share two main problems: the atrocities of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and flow of illicit weapons across common borders (Marks 2007: 25-30; Lewis 2009: 47-49). These problems should have strengthened mutual resolves to deal with regionalisation of rebel movements. Instead, Uganda deals with these countries with its military presence on their territories and in Southern Sudan. In short relations between Southern Sudan and French-speaking neighbours are anchored in the security sector.

**In Regional Organisations**

Shared utilization of water resources could serve as a basis of regional integration for Southern Sudan. It is worth mentioning that a water-related organisation known as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was launched in 1999 and is in progress. Southern Sudan is likely to be a member when the country declares independence because the country was technically part of the Sudan which participated as a member of the organisation. The country has a large river basin through which flows the Nile River from Uganda; the Bahr el Ghazal and its tributaries descend from the Nile-Congo water divide plateau in the west; and the Sobat and its tributaries descend from the Ethiopian highlands. These river systems create the world’s largest wetland known as the Sudd. Major water projects were planned in Southern Sudan but never developed due to the civil wars in the region. The 400-kilometre Jonglei canal project was planned to drain 4.7 billion cubic metres of water from the Sudd swamp in Southern Sudan for use in Northern Sudan and Egypt. The project, started in 1978, was halted six years later by the civil war. Northern Sudanese and Egyptian interest
in controlling access to Nile waters persists and the possible independence of Southern Sudan concerns its northern neighbours. Water security issues are currently negotiated by the Nile Basin countries within a temporary framework dubbed the Nile Basin Initiative and are likely to grow in importance. The emergence of Southern Sudan as a sovereign state implies readjustment of functional relations with the Sudan and with the other riparian states to ensure uncontested participation.

IGAD brokered the CPA and shares the responsibility of monitoring developments in Sudan. This sub-regional organisation is not simply empowered to negotiate conflicts among member states, but is a developmental authority covering the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Mediation of conflicts in the region is just one function for which a secretariat was established in Kenya. There are a host of developmental relations that IGAD has to manage from its headquarters in Djibouti. As secession is the outcome of the vote in the referendum 2011, this organisation will have to deal with old and new challenges when Southern Sudan declares independence in July 2011. Its role as a developmental organisation was challenged by natural and man-made factors. For instance, environmental degradation attributed mainly to droughts is one of the natural factors. It affects hydrology and vegetation of the region which affect human and pastoral security. These are the issues Southern Sudan will be sharing with member states of the organisation. Concerning post-conflict problems in the Sudan, IGAD is represented in the Sudan by a Special Envoy in the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), a CPA monitoring structure.

The African Union (AU) is the continental organisation in which IGAD is one of the sub-regional organisations. The organisation has a conflict mediation function, which is vested in its Peace and Security Council proposed at the Lusaka Summit in 2001. It has fifteen members responsible for monitoring and intervening in conflicts, with an African force at its disposal. African Union military intervention is limited to Darfur in northern Sudan where it has deployed peacekeepers from African countries. The AU will be an active participant in events leading to the independence of Southern Sudan because it mandated IGAD to negotiate the conflict in Sudan and Somalia. It also mandated Thabo Mbeki in 2009 to follow up CPA implementation and democratic transformation in Sudan. This is seen by specialists in conflict management as a duplication of efforts that requires proper coordination with IGAD responsibilities.

Southern Sudan is expected to join the African Union and the relevant regional organisations. These are the IGAD and East African Community
(EAC). The AU, the IGAD and the East African Community are expected to assist the new state in Southern Sudan to pursue positive diplomacy with all neighbours including the Sudan. African and world representatives witnessed the declaration of results of the referendum as the last benchmark of the CPA on 7 February in Khartoum. Despite this ceremonial declaration, however, violent crisis scenarios are still haunting the north and the south. It is the moral and political responsibility of African regional and continental organisations to build confidence between the north and the south and between the south and its neighbours. This goal could only be achieved through dialogue. The AU and IGAD have the daunting task of dealing with intriguing factors that may complicate and sour inter-state relations between the Sudan and Southern Sudan that may have implications for the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

People fear the flare up of violent conflict between the north and the south after the declaration of independence in Southern Sudan. If violence breaks out between the north and the south under any circumstance, it could spread out rapidly, aggravate the conflict in the Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Abyei and Darfur and may draw some neighbouring countries into its circuit. The government in Khartoum is already sending warning signals to GoSS requesting the expulsion of Darfuri and other opposition figures from Juba. These signals could be seen as a warning about future relations between the two parts of the Sudan in the process of separation.

There are, nevertheless, a set of priorities that actors in the two independent republics emerging from the old Sudan should consider in different areas of governance. They include the pillars such as international and regional relations, governance, security and justice systems, the economy and the social interactions. For example, the maintenance of political stability in northern and southern Sudan is essential for healthy trends of interstate relations in the Horn of Africa, East Africa and in Central Africa. This will depend on positive diplomatic actions of countries of the regions to promote sustainable peace through continuous dialogue among neighbours.

Another important observation is that Southern Sudan and its neighbours are countries where civil wars have contributed to the proliferation of small arms. The DRC, as a neighbour, is still struggling to establish law and order in the country. In Southern Sudan, the transformation of the SPLA, professionalisation of police and other organised forces and demilitarising the state and communities are the way forward towards consolidating political
stability. This action would be strengthened by promulgation of laws and the professionalisation of the justice system in Southern Sudan. The two political entities emerging from the Sudan need more cooperation and involvement of their neighbours in dealing with regionalisation of rebellions and laying foundations for internal political stability and enforcing law and order.

The economy of Southern Sudan is another pillar, which looks fragile because of dependence on oil to a larger extent. The percentage of oil dependence in the two parts of the Sudan becoming separate states has already been shown in the preceding sections of this paper. The GoSS, in collaboration with actors in the private sector and communities, should enhance the diversification of the economy. This will depend on economic policies and strategies of the government. Efforts are yet to be seen in expanding tax bases for raising non-oil revenues for public expenditure. Southern Sudan is depending heavily (98%) on oil revenues for running its economy. The improvement of the economy depends on the strength of research in development processes in Southern Sudan. Commissioning research will be badly needed to rationalise the formulation of policy framework of the government in the new state.

Finally, the different groups in society must be seen as active participants in all policy priority areas in Southern Sudan. The politicians and policy makers have to encourage open dialogue between sectors of the population and the government. This includes the active participation of civil society organisations and independent media. These actors are important in the conception of policies, strategies and actions in the framework of common vision of the new state. However, there is tendency in Southern Sudan to seek military solutions to local differences. The multiplication of armed violence after elections and the referendum, especially in Upper Nile, tend to paint a gloomy picture of the anticipated Republic of South Sudan.

References


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