We Are the Sons of Mau Mau!
Re-Assessing the Historiography of Resistance in Kenya, 1924-2008

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Abstract
Mungiki is a politico-religious group and a banned criminal organization in Kenya. The organisation, which apparently originated in the late 1980s, is secretive and bears some similarity to mystery religions. Specifics of their origin and doctrines are unclear. What is clear is that they favour a return to indigenous African traditions and reject Westernisation and all trappings of colonialism. These include; rejection of Christianity, and the practice by the Mungiki of forced female genital cutting. The ideology of the group is characterised by revolutionary rhetoric, Kikuyu traditions, and a disdain for modernization, which is seen as immoral corruption. Their participation in recent ethnic wars in Kenya has evoked serious academic concerns on the group. What is interesting is that the followers of the so-called Mungiki youth sect, whose 500,000 members see themselves as ‘the true sons of the Mau Mau’. By using interdisciplinary approaches, I intend to show the myriad ways in which youth construct their own identity and how they derive power and inspirations from the past (Mau Mau). I not only introduce problems surrounding conceptions of Mungiki and the generation, but also show how conflicts between the young (Mungiki) and older (Mau Mau) generations reconfigure power in society.

Résumé
Le Mungiki est un groupe politico-religieux et une organisation criminelle clandestine. Cette organisation secrète qui a vu le jour à la fin des années 1980 ressemble dans une certaine mesure à une religion mystérieuse. Les détails de son origine et ses doctrines sont vagues. Ce qui est évident, c’est que Mungiki appelle au retour aux traditions indigènes africaines et rejette l’occidentalisation et tout autre piège du colonialisme. Ceci inclut la rejection du Christianisme et la pratique forcée de l’excision. L’idéologie du groupe est marquée par la rhétorique révolutionnaire, les traditions kikuyu et le mépris envers la modernisation du Kenya qu’il considère comme une corruption immorale. Sa participation aux
guerres ethniques récentes au Kenya a été à la base de préoccupations académiques sérieuses sur le groupe. Une chose intéressante est que les 500 000 jeunes membres du soit-disant secte Mungiki se considèrent comme ‘les vrais fils des Mau Mau’. A travers une approche interdisciplinaire, cet article compte montrer les voies complexes pour la reconstruction de leur propre identité et comment ces jeunes puissent leur pouvoir et inspirations du passé (Mau Mau). Pour reconfigurer le pouvoir dans la société, les problèmes de perception du Mungiki et de sa génération sont évoqués, de même que les conflits entre les jeunes (Mungiki) et les vieilles générations (Mau Mau).

Introduction
Recent events across the African continent, including, dramatically and tragically, the eruption of violent conflict and massacres, have once again brought the question of citizenship and identity to the fore. The combination of factors which have posed the issues of citizenship and identity anew ranges from the economic and the social to the political and demographic. Matters have not been helped by the crisis of state legitimacy as well as the project of state retrenchment that has taken a severe toll on governance capacity in most parts of the continent. As can be expected, a broad range of contestations has been organised around the multidimensional citizenship and identity issues.

These contestations have both been generated by and have helped bring to the fore the disjuncture between the formal rules of citizenship and the daily practice as experienced by most people. For example, the shifting spatial (re)distribution of population within and between states challenges the unchanging rules by which rights and entitlement are defined and allocated. The high ideals of the social contract between state and society are negated by the non-justiceability of most citizen rights. The patriarchal foundations of the construction of citizen rights confront the need to accommodate women’s rights. The promise of nation-building founded on multiculturalism (as projected by the slogan of unity in diversity) contrasts with the increasing parochial politics of settlers or residents versus natives or indigenes (Kanyinga 1994).

Considering the (sometimes violent) emotions which it has aroused and the toll which it has already taken, one can suggest that the citizenship and identity question has become the most important political issue in Africa today. It is a question that carries serious implications for policy-making and the continuing stability, even viability, of many a polity. With many countries across the continent facing serious intra-state challenges from disaffected groups that define themselves as the victims of long-term exclusion, the time is right for a painstaking comparative research on citizenship and identity in Africa. Such a study is made all the more necessary as some of the intra-
state challenges have already resulted in genocidal violence and the fragmentation and collapse of central governmental authority. Moreover, there is a distinct danger that state legitimacy and viability are likely to continue to be eroded if a balanced framework for the exercise of citizenship and the projection of identity is not established. It is imperative to understand the contemporary dynamics of citizenship and identity in the continent, in ways that can provide a basis for possible pro-active policy and advocacy work at the local, national, sub-regional and continental levels (Kanyinga 1994 and Olukoshi 1997).

**Historical and Contextual Background**

The nationalist anti-colonial coalition that inherited state power at independence faced many challenges, not least among them the need to define an adequate framework for managing ethno-regional diversity, of preserving the territorial integrity of the countries, and expanding the framework for the provisioning of the broad social welfare needs of the populace.1

Most of the first generation independence governments went about the broad-ranging socioeconomic and political issues they confronted through a heavy investment in nation-building and a project of state-led development. The task of welding multi-ethnic, multi-religious countries into a nation against the backdrop of the colonial legacy of divide and rule was met by the approach of governments which without exception consisted of the adoption of national unity projects that were, to say the least, distrustful of autonomous ethnic identities. Even in cases where the notion of ‘unity in diversity’ was embraced as official policy, practice was more attuned to the idea of unity and distrustful of diversity. This, in many cases, included the suppression of the rights and aspirations of ethnic and religious minorities (Olukoshi 1997).

In time, the dominant policy frame translated into the erosion of political pluralism, the institutionalisation of single party, military rule or civilian-military diarchies, and the rise of the cult of the personal ruler. The monopoly on power which these regimes claimed was tragic enough for the abridgement of civil liberties, minority interests and human rights that went with it but worse still, it was itself, in many cases, founded on narrow ethnic pillars. Resistance to this version of nation-building and the disaffection associated with its failure truly to advance the boundaries of national unity elicited high handed responses from the authorities which fed into the political authoritarianism that became a feature of post-independence governance.2

The zeal with which the national unity project was pursued and the monopoly on power that was part of it were justified partially on the grounds that all national energies needed to be mobilised and focused on the task of national development. There were many aspects to the agenda of national
development which the nationalists pursued but perhaps the most crucial
centred on the realisation of the goals that constituted the key pillars of the
post-colonial social contract whose articulation during the anti-colonial struggle
was critical to the mobilisation of popular support for independence. Where
the colonial authorities denied Africans access to the amenities that were
deemed necessary for the modernisation and full citizenship for which many
yearned, and while the state had a narrow social agenda which privileged the
colonial officials themselves, the nationalist politicians who led the
independence campaign promised an all-round better life. The construction
of a national identity was, therefore, as important a priority of post-
independence policy-making as the promotion of a project of social citizenship
that served as the frame within which expectations about the services which
the state could be expected to offer were defined. In practice, given the
magnitude of the needs at hand, the state was not able to meet all the demands
and expectations that built up. The exercise of policy discretion in the
designation of priorities became a central part of the politics of resource
allocation in post-independence Africa. The contestations that built up around
resource allocation were refracted into the broader dialectic of state-society
relations, given the dominant role of the state in the economy. These
contestations also fed into the politics of inclusion and exclusion that became
a prominent part of post-independence politics of citizenship and identity.
The dialectics of inclusion and exclusion intensified with the growth of
scarcity and austerity in the political economy; it underpinned the bitterness
with which the citizenship and identity question was posed and fought out in
the 1980s and 1990s. It also partly explains the intensity of the competition
for access to and control of the state (Kanyinga 1994 and Olukoshi 1997).

Groups which felt themselves excluded in the emerging post-colonial
political economy served generally as the support base for the organisation
of oppositional politics. Their disaffection also coalesced into silent and open
challenges to the entire post-colonial nation-building project. The absence of
effective mechanisms for responding to the challenges and the authoritarian
manner in which they were handled meant that layers of grievances cumulated
within the polity. Disaffection and the challenges which they generated often
took ethno-regional and religious forms; however, importantly, there were
also generational and gender challenges as represented by growing agitation
among the youth and women for a bigger voice in governance. There were
also rural-based protests which were linked to the concerns of the rural
working poor and pressures mounted by the urban working class as
represented by the trade union movement. Furthermore, a variety of social
movements and civic associations emerged to canvass different concerns,
acting sometimes underground or in exile, and in some cases openly in the
domestic context.  

In the context of the economic crises which was later to grip most African
countries at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the various
disaffected groups were to take a prominent role in the struggle for the
opening up the local political space as the post-colonial state-led model of
development collapsed. The subsequent political reform agenda that was
launched in many countries during the 1990s is part of the recent history of
the continent that is still well known and need not be discussed here. Suffice
it to note that it encompassed a broad-ranging process of soul-searching that
culminated in the abandonment of single party/military rule, and the embrace
of multiparty politics and elections.

**Mau Mau and the Colonial State**

There exists a great deal of literature on the Mau Mau. In this article thus I
try to look at those elements of Mau Mau that were carried on throughout
Kenyan history, and are today manifested in Mungiki, an intrastate challenge
to the nation-state project in Kenya.

According to Rosberg and Nortingham, historians still find it difficult
to understand the nature of the Mau Mau insurrection, with the obscurity of
its origins and the apparently indiscriminate direction of its violence.
Anthropologists, seeing that the violence was a product of present grievances
rather than of any atavistic past, interpreted Mau Mau as ‘not a reversion to
ancient rituals but a regression deriving power from the breach of universal
taboo’. Some Africans hailed it as a national struggle for land and freedom;
but since participation was largely confined to Kikuyu (with the neighbouring
Embū and Meru), and since nearly 2,000 African civilians were killed, as
against thirty-two Europeans and twenty-six Asians, such a view raises
problems about the nature of the modern Kenyan nation. Later commentators
gave more weight to the socio-political context; by 1960 even a hostile official
could discern ‘violent manifestation of a limited nationalistic revolutionary
movement’ (Rosberg and Nortingham 1966:23).

This inability to place Mau Mau in the political developments in Kenya
allows for general conclusions that it was to a large extent a tribal revolt
contesting the political space – or a peasant revolt developing on the fringe
of nationalist politics. Some historians, such as Bethwell Ogot, have dismissed
Mau Mau as a narrow tribal affair. But it must be admitted that with Mau
Mau a truly radical nationalist movement emerged. Because of its sudden
break with middle-class nationalism, Mau Mau failed to develop a distinct
political programme and an ideology. Even nationalism as a principle remained
diffuse and ill-defined. The aim of most activists was winning access to

According to Anderson (2005), the Mau Mau movement was itself part of the process of the construction of a Kikuyu identity premised on a shared culture and a shared structural predicament. The hymn texts which were an integral part of the movement were carried forward to the Mwakenya and Mungiki sects. These hymns strongly emphasized land (i.e. Kikuyuland) and the Kikuyu traditional regime. One line reads: God will send a sword from Kiringaga (Mt. Kenya). The hymns constantly echo the necessity of recovering land, for example:

Mumbi’s household …has been disturbed
They will be asked by the Kikuyu...
Why did you sell our land?
We shall get our land which was sold for chieftainship.4

The application of these symbols from Kikuyu legends had an integrating function in binding many Kikuyu to the Mungiki movement. The movement was essentially an ad hoc response to changing conditions. It was born of a common experience of economic insecurity, land hunger, a feeling of frustration born of racial oppression, and resentment of the Kikuyu establishment. These sentiments developed spontaneously; nobody had to teach a Kikuyu squatter or a shantytown dweller to hate the colonial police or the Kikuyu authorities. The main catalysts behind the explosion were the unmediated tensions that prevailed in Nairobi and the European settled areas in the Rift Valley and in the Kikuyu reserves. In these regions, tensions were always liable to boil over into conflict (Guy 1978:14).

Guy argues that Mau Mau was not merely directed against the colonial authorities but also against the Kenyatta regime. This was illustrated by the fact that after independence it took nearly four years before the Kenyatta government was able to establish stability on the land. During this period, the conflict between the ex-squatters and the state took on a class character, as those without land tried to fight the new group of African capitalist farmers. The emergence of the protests in the late 1920s which matured into a mass movement in the 1940s and armed struggle in the early 1950s was finally destroyed by the Kenyan African ruling class in the late 1960s (Guy 1978:14).

Civil disobedience became the norm as landless Africans organized to defend their interests. Thousands of landless peasants were determined to acquire land, and they were joined by migrants who poured into the Rift Valley in search of land. Indeed, the neutralization and repression of the KPU can be compared to the containment of Mau Mau. In different ways and under different conditions Mau Mau and the KPU sought to give organizational expression to the grievances of the urban and landless proletariat. Both Mau
Mau and the KPU faced state repression, the difference being that for Mau Mau it was by the British and for the KPU it was the Kenyatta regime. In reality, according to Ogot (1967), Kenyatta and his class hated Mau Mau.

We are determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow hooligans to rule Kenya. We must have no hatred towards one another. Mau Mau was a disease which had been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.

Mau Mau activities did not stop at independence. The same ex-Mau Mau soldiers – landless people whom Kenyatta never rewarded – continued to struggle for basic resources.

However, the peasants and workers who fought and died did so not only for the sake of culture but also to cement a unity of purpose – putting a Kikuyu leader into power. Anderson argues that the greatest strength of the Mau Mau movement was its organizational independence. The split with moderate nationalists allowed radical activists to promote the aspirations of the masses and thus challenge the very foundations of the colonial order. The problem was that this challenge remained diffuse. The failure to evolve a coherent class-based social programme meant that Mau Mau was simply the militant wing of a nationalist movement. The fundamental conflict of interest between those who supported militant nationalism and those who advocated moderation was never clarified (Anderson 2005).

Mau Mau brought the question of social change out into the open. This issue was later quickly to be picked by the Mungiki organization. Once Mau Mau was defeated, an all-class nationalist party could be created, one that precisely because it was undifferentiated would be responsive only to the interests of the new African bourgeoisie. Writing in 1977, a Kenyan historian Ben Kipkorir noted that the Mau Mau emergency was ‘certainly responsible for the precise timing of the conclusion of British rule in Kenya’, but he implies that Mau Mau was in fact responsible for delaying the decolonization process.

**Resistance, Ethnicity, Identity and the End of Cold War**

With the advent of multi-party politics in Kenya many fundamental changes occurred. They were both positive and negative. Positive in the sense that the changes brought to fruition a wider space of political expression. But, negatively, it ushered in a wave of political violence that was fuelled by tribal and sectarian interests. This spate of violence in the Rift Valley province is what came to be called ‘land clashes’ prior to and after the first two multi-party general elections in the 1991-92 and 1997-98 periods.

The two protagonist parties the Rift Valley perceived the land clashes differently. The Kalenjins and Kikuyus, who had co-existed well for long
time, were profoundly polarized long political lines with the inception of multi-partyism, and expressed divergent interests. Kikuyus joined the Democratic Party and FORD, while the Kalenjins remained supportive of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In the national arena the ‘Young Turks’ who came to represent the ‘second liberation’ resorted to demonstrations to dislodge the ruling party from power. Those on the side of the government, the so-called ‘KANU Hawks’, who represented the status quo, resorted to ethnic chauvinism and threats to hold on to power. The result was violence that was camouflaged in the name of land clashes, although having little to do such phenomena.

Those supporting the single party predicted that the country would disintegrate along tribal lines. Government MPs from KANU and its party cadres openly called for the removal of other ethnic groups from the province, as they were viewed as opposition adherents. In addition they called for a majimbo (federal) system of governance so as to protect their regional interests. This clash saw the revival of tribal organisations such as KAMATUSA, an acronym for Kalenjin Maasai, Turkana and Samburu, as a tool of advancing tribal politics. It is in this regard that Nnoli observes that the selfish ambition of the ruling elite and the petty bourgeois are often presented as general ethnic interests.

These developments underlay Kenya’s transition from a single party to a multi-party state. They brought with them as a spate of mass meetings, demonstrations and rallies to advance the cause of constitutional and electoral reform and violent attempts to ethnically cleanse population in the Rift Valley province and elsewhere.

All this prompted the international community to call on the Kenyan government to act swiftly and save lives of innocent Kenyans. The opposition groups, which had taken shape in the name of political parties, joined hands with the international community to call for political tolerance. This was based on the assumption that land clashes were state-sponsored violence. The Kenyan government reluctantly agreed to political and constitutional amendments to level the ground for free and fair elections. Among these was the ‘twenty-five percent, five-province rule’, which stipulated that a presidential candidate could only be declared elected by garnering twenty-five percent of total votes cast in five out of Kenya’s eight provinces.

This rule is widely thought to have intensified the ‘Majimboism’ debate led by the hawkish government ministers. The hotbed of this debate shifted to the Rift Valley province, which occupies 40 percent of Kenya’s landmass. The Rift Valley is occupied largely by the Kalenjin communities who were pro-government, as opposed to pockets of Diaspora communities like the Kikuyu, Luo, Gusii and Luhya who were perceived to be anti-government.
The ‘majimbo’ debate was used to instil the fear those who did not support the government of the day would be expelled to their home provinces. One minister was quoted as saying: ‘let them lie low like envelopes’, meaning that the Diaspora community should be seen and not heard. These and other sentiments found expression in the unleashing of terror by organized. The torching of houses and wider property destruction finally led to a civil war. This spate of violence came to be dubiously called the ‘land clashes’. Between 1991 and 2001 this violence led to the deaths of over 4,000 people and almost 600,000 were displaced.12

The issue of land clashes needs to be understood in part as a function of a transition from the single party to the multi-party state. This is why it only broke out on the eve of the first of two multi-party general elections. Some politicians and peace advocacy groups who have called for a truth and reconciliation commission akin to that of South Africa thus tend to miss the point. The horrors of the ‘land clashes’ were systematically hidden and trivialized by the state powers that sometimes instigated them (Kanyinga 1998).

**Violent Resistance and Being a Kenyan Citizen: Gikuyu and Mungiki Ethnic Identity**

Public concern that the police had failed to take adequate steps to prevent the initial violence was deepened by reports of heavy-handedness, insensitivity and general incompetence in rounding-up supposed ‘suspects’ when they finally arrived in Kariobangi some hours after the attack. What protection then would the police offer the teeming populations of the estates and shanties of Nairobi’s Eastlands and Southlands against further attacks of a similar nature? Underlying these fears was the suspicion that the slaughter had been politically motivated.13 There was widespread speculation, reported in all the Kenyan newspapers, that Mungiki members were in fact protected by senior politicians, that the violence had been orchestrated for political ends, and that Mungiki even had recruits within the ranks of the police. Many analysts saw the Kariobangi attack as symptomatic of Kenya’s growing culture of political violence, making connections with other incidents of vigilantism elsewhere in the country and with previous cases of politically mobilised inter-ethnic violence surrounding the election campaigns of 1992 and 1997.14

Grace Wamue has described the nature of Mungiki ‘in relation to the traditional religion and cultural practice of the Gikuyu people’. She traces its origins to an evangelical sect known as the ‘Tent of the Living God’, founded in Laikipia district in 1987, under the leadership of the charismatic 58-year old Gikuyu preacher Ngonya wa Gakonya.15 The movement initially drew upon Gikuyu traditional values in establishing an indigenous alternative to the materialism of the many evangelical Pentecostal churches that had flourished in central Kenya from the 1980s. Mungiki appears to have emerged as a
s splitter movement within the Tent of the Living God before 1990. It came to prominence when its members sought registration as a political party in order to contest seats in the 1992 general elections – an aim in which they were not successful.

The supporters of Mungiki were predominantly young (under 30), many having left the established Christian churches to join the movement. As it grew, it attracted a high proportion of Kikuyu displaced from the Rift Valley districts by ethnic clashes of 1992 and 1997, and it has become firmly embedded among the urban poor of Nairobi’s slum estates. Mungiki philosophy espouses a kind of Kikuyu traditionalism, harking back to a mythologized pre-colonial image of egalitarianism and social order, with biblical references drawn from Old Testament texts. All of this was turned toward a moralistic critique of the failings of the modern state in Kenya. 16

Mungiki speaks for the poor and dispossessed, but with a distinctively Gikuyu voice. The influence of the preacher Gakonya would appear now to be minimal and it is Ibrahim Ndura Waruinge, who first joined the movement in 1987 when only 15 years of age, who is identified as Mungiki’s leader. This shift from Gakonya, the charismatic hermit preacher of Gikuyu traditionalism, to Waruinge, the 27 year-old radical Gikuyu political activist, is more significant than Wamue’s analysis of the movement has allowed for. Though Waruinge strongly promotes the Gikuyu heritage and the foundation of what he terms ‘the Kirinyaga kingdom’ in rhetoric and deed, Mungiki has become increasingly politicised. As Wamue herself acknowledges, Mungiki adherents can barely manage five minutes of conversation ‘without spontaneously deviating into the politics of contemporary Kenya ... They ... criticize the widespread political oppression, poverty and violence experienced by Kenyans at the hands of government agents in the same breath as they condemn cultural and religious imperialism’. 17 Wamue’s conclusion that the ‘core values’ of Mungiki remain essentially rooted in an apolitical and passive rural support base is difficult to reconcile with the strident, violent, criminal and increasingly intimidatory tactics employed by the movement in Nairobi’s slums over the past two years.

Whatever Mungiki may once have been on the distant farms of Laikipia, it has transformed itself into a radically different movement in the estates, shanties and slums of the city. In contrast with Wamue’s portrayal, Terisa Turner and Leigh Brownhill have emphasized Mungiki’s radicalism, placing the movement in the Kenyan vanguard of the international campaign ‘for globalization from below to rebuild the civil commons alternative to corporate rule’. 18

This interpretation links Mungiki with Nairobi-based Muungano wa Wanavijiji (‘The Organisation of the Villagers’), established among the slum-
dwellers of the city to fight evictions and protect tenants. Taken together, the two movements are seen to represent a ‘rebirth’ of the Mau Mau struggle of the 1950s for ‘land and freedom’. Turner and Brownhill thus emphasize Mungiki support for Rift Valley farmers displaced in the ethnic clashes of 1992 and 1997, and its growing role in urban protests against oppressive landlords and corrupt urban ‘land-grabbers’. The involvement of women in these protests is also noted by Turner and Brownhill, as is support for the struggles of the poor, the dispossessed, and the landless. While these accounts indicate that Mungiki is clearly a more complex and multi-faceted organisation than Wamue suggests, the materialist, instrumentalist and ethnocentric character of local Kenyan politics and of the Mungiki movement is glossed over. Nor is there any sense that the Mungiki movement may have undergone significant changes since its founding. These aspects of Mungiki require closer scrutiny.

Under the national leadership of Waruinge, Mungiki has become stridently ethnocentric. He has declared that Mungiki will fulfil the prophecies of Mugo wa Kibiro, the Gikuyu diviner and seer of the late nineteenth century. Reading Mugo wa Kibiro through the writings of Jomo Kenyatta, but also with a heavy influence from Ngugi wa Thiongo’s presentation of the prophet’s words in the novel *Weep Not Child*, Waruinge places responsibility for the ‘decay’ of Gikuyu traditions squarely on the shoulders of European colonialism. The present Gikuyu generation should now throw off the shackles of colonialism, neo-colonialism and Christianity, which presented the greatest challenge to Gikuyu cultural values, and seek redemption, as Mugo wa Kibiro had predicted they must: ‘We have come together and purified ourselves to avoid God’s curse’. The revival of Gikuyu values in the ‘Kingdom of Kirinyaga’ also implied a political restoration of Gikuyu power through the removal of the oppressive ‘Nyayo regime’ of President Moi.

Even among the Gikuyu communities, many view Mungiki as ‘backward-looking’ and dangerously subversive. Mungiki’s threatening character is accentuated by its unpredictability. This was perhaps most vividly to be seen when several prominent Mungiki leaders declared their intention to become Muslims in June 2000. This announcement evoked considerable publicity, but to the embarrassment of Muslim leaders it soon became apparent that Mungiki members did not see that embracing Islam in any way implied a challenge to their beliefs in Gikuyu traditional religion and cultural practice. And when Moi was replaced by a Kikuyu, Mungiki still inveighed against the government. A new trajectory of the sect occurred given the role of the Mungiki in the post-election violence experienced in Kenya in December 2007 through February 2008. Clearly much more research on the phenomenon of Mungiki is required.
Notes


5. Kenya is divided to eight administrative provinces, namely Rift Valley, Eastern, Coast, Nyanza, Western, North Eastern, Central and Nairobi. With exception of Nairobi the others are largely defined along ethnic lines.


7. President Moi was a popular advocate of this prophecy.


11. The considerable diaspora communities of Rift Valley were largely settled there through government settlement schemes and other African land buying companies immediately after independence when the so-called white highlands were vacated by the whites. The Kalenjins have always believed that they were short-changed by the Kenyatta Government.


15. See reports of the arrest of Gakonya at a meeting of The Tent of the LivingGod, for example, Kurgat Marindany, ‘Chaos as sect leader is nabbed’, *East African Standard*, 1 Ma, 2002.


Macharia: We Are the Sons of Mau Mau!


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