Rethinking Ethical Security in the Light of European Institutional Security and Integration Strategies: The Quest for Methodological Convergence

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Introduction

This study examines the ethical dimension of the national security problem by using the European paradigm as a framework or model for defining the core principles of national survival and social integration. This work can be defined in terms of the primary challenges of a new global ethical principle. The reality of the security problem in the contemporary era suggests that there is a need for cooperation and integrated efforts to meet the security challenges, especially the transnational and international aspects. As Dower (1998: 109) rightly maintains, ‘there are certain global responsibilities in respect of values i.e. there has been an increasing recognition that individuals have responsibilities towards human beings in general, not merely towards members of their own societies’. Such commitment and belief is the motivating factor for examining the linkages between European and African security situations from this ethical viewpoint.

Africa, as it is today, must reckon with the realities taking place in other parts of the world. Indeed, the history of the continent in the last few centuries makes such a consideration inevitable. According to Okigbo (1991: 424), ‘it is essential to look at the critical transformation of Europe, its politics, economics and culture and assess how prepared Africa is to come to terms with these changes’. The truth is that Africa cannot afford to ignore the rest of the world since it still depends on Europe and others for major materials needed for the survival of
Africans. Wright (1998: 133) points out that Africa’s present condition ‘is traceable to problems derived from both internal developments within the continent and from its increasing marginalization in the global political economy’. At a major level, the link between Africa and Europe can be viewed in terms of some cultural dynamics. We may start by agreeing with Huntington (1997: 131) that the European Union is the product of a common European culture. In this sense of the definition, we are still in need of defining the idea of culture used.

This conceptual confusion notwithstanding, Rynning (2003: 481) has more to say on the cultural context of the EU. ‘In the analysis of the EU we should treat culture as a context, that if integrated and coordinated, can help actors overcome even serious obstacles to cooperation.’ However appealing this idea is, our view is that it raises fundamental questions of cross-cultural ethical relations. The more significant point must be made that the context of the EU is larger than the cultural imperative. For instance, Farrands (1996: 177) tells us that the creation of a European Union is mapped out in terms of three parallel but separate areas of activity; the European Union, the common foreign and security policy, and inter-governmental cooperation in domestic policy and intelligence related activities. This is evidence of the stratification of the European vision of their union or community. Also this is clearly a sign that ‘the Europeans are intensifying their cooperation and are doing so precisely through institutions’ (Grieco 1993: 329). Why are they using the path of institutionalisation? Why are institutions of great importance, not just to security but also to other areas of life? We shall examine these issues later.

For now, we must define the ethical basis of our work which lies in its irreducible desire and capability to repudiate existing epistemologies and schemes of comprehension and thus execute a transition from the old to the new in the quest for liberation and transformation. The reason for increased interest in the European systems of life can be understood against the background of some geopolitical events. According to Ross (1998: 166), ‘the diffusion of the American model helped reconfigure European national developmental models along with a solidification of democratic institutions, new commitments to social justice and the re-distribution of wealth’. This statement suggests that the Europeans have been at the forefront of the modernisation of the theories of social change and human welfare such as we are interested in here. The quest for the lessons of European security for Africa is valuable and particularly significant because ‘in recent years it has been widely acknowledged that a myriad of factors including the European Union have had significant impact on global security and sovereignty’ (Makinda 1998: 281). This same point is affirmed by Biscop (2003: 183) with the statement that ‘with the development of the European security and defence policy ESDP the EU is gradually emerging as a significant actor in the field of security’. Hence, in our review of the strategies for the acquisition of the proper value
orientation for human survival, what capabilities can we develop to enhance the employment of ethical knowledge for human and moral rectification? The quest for security is linked to the identification and sustenance of social ideals such as ‘fairness, justice, morality, impartiality and accountability’ (Bagilhole 1997: 30). Thus we must tackle the question of how do we establish ethical character as seen in a higher level of duty to self and community? Our concern for highly desired values such as dialogue, fraternity, peace and discipline compel a focus on institutional ethics and organisational roles in a way that accounts for diversity of expectations and interests, and offers a hope for negotiation and compromise.

Theoretical and Conceptual Foundations of Our Study:
The Nature of Morality and Institutions

In history, the major goal of any social order, whether national or international, is to promote good conduct within the ‘society’. Security and social order are impossible without such qualities. The co-existence of any group or community of people requires some level of friendly feelings shared among them. Such friendly feelings facilitate mutual cooperation, communal rapport and integrated activities. It is also impossible for people to live peacefully, safely, and comfortably together within a community if morality is absent. This point is significant given that ‘the European community, as it has developed over the years has probably performed best on the dimension of well-being’ (Bertsch, Clark and Wood 1991: 241). Therefore, the quest for a secure human community compels a discussion of morality as an instrument for providing ethical principles that safeguard the right of the individual and points to reciprocal duties and responsibilities.

Wiredu (1992) observes that any society without a modicum of morality must collapse. Thus, ‘morality is simply the observance of rules for the harmonious adjustment of the interests of the individual to those of others in society. It involves not merely the “de facto” conformity to the requirements of the harmony of interests, which is inspired by an imaginative and sympathetic identification with the interest of others even at the expense of a possible constraint to one’s own interests’ (Wiredu 1992: 191-199). Morality is an emanation of man’s overriding desire to preserve social harmony by ensuring that moral codes discourage injustice, deceit and anarchy in any system. Morality conceived as a social phenomenon is a crucial and indispensable means of social control, regulation and the prevention of harm among men in society. Morality achieves this social regulation and control not only by ensuring the clarification of rules and laws differentiating good from bad, right from wrong in society, but also by ensuring that specific traits of character or dispositions are instilled in people.

The essence of morality, according to Perry (1974: 373), Bayles and Henley (1989: 10), and Foot (1985: 208), is man’s endeavour to harmonise conflicting interests, to play the role of an arbiter, and to secure that greatest possible general
good. According to Kupperman (1983: 4-10), the core of morality must be injunctions against harming others. Morality tries to prevent harm to both the individual and the society. This is what Cox (1981: 185-187) refers to as defensive social behaviour adopted against a hazard. Kupperman argues that morality arises out of a need for protection. But this protection is not usually absolute because there are still immoral persons who try to breach moral rules and expectations. However, by ensuring that many people keep within the boundaries limited by morality as much as possible, human personal and social life become more bearable and productive. Frankena (1973: 63-65) holds that morality throughout its history has been concerned with the cultivation of certain traits such as character. By defining the roles and responsibilities of men, morality reveals the character of man as a responsible, free and dignified being capable of self-respect, self-determination and accountability in the things he does.

The question of the need for morality continues to dominate the age-long controversy between the egoists and altruists. Egoism holds that morality should serve the interest of the self and that the goal of a person’s action should be his own self-interest. In effect, egoism holds that man should not only seek his own interest in everything he does, but that he should act morally only if he has some benefit to derive from such an arrangement (Hospers 1973: 600; Omoregbe 1993: 79). However, some important questions arise from the attempt to justify morality based on egoism. Can self-interest be a genuine basis for enduring morality? How can the presence of altruism be explained in social life? It seems that a strictly egoistic moral life will not be conducive to personal and social morality. It may in fact be antithetical to the demands conducive to personal and social morality because the promotion of self-interest as the moral rule will ensure that the goal of harmonising conflicting interests is largely defeated. Only confusion can attend any society founded strictly on egoistic principles of morality.

According to Bayles and Henley (1989: 1-10), if moral concepts are used to categorise actions, persons and institutions, and moral judgements concern themselves with the social and interpersonal, then the viewpoint of morality seems to rule out normative egoism. Wiredu (1992: 191) asserts that a certain minimum of altruism is absolutely essential to moral motivation. Altruism is consideration for the interests of others, and only when we consider others can the talk about harmonisation of conflicting interests become meaningful. According to Cox (1981: 185-190), altruism acknowledges correctly that the form of moral behaviour appears generally to be other-regarding. However, altruism fails to acknowledge the individual, social and practical ends served by moral systems. On the other hand, egoism achieves a correct recognition of the function of morality as supportive of human self-realisation but it ignores the social role in self-actualisation. Cox argues that ‘both theories express a portion of the truth but neither by itself is sufficient’. Sharing a similar view with Cox, another writer, McMahon
Adebayo, Ujomu, Adelugba & Adadevoh: Rethinking Ethical Security (1991: 250), holds that some connection exists between acting, as morality requires and promoting the interest of others. However, he is quick to point out that affirming a link between morality and altruism does not mean that both cannot diverge. Matters become more serious when we seek the connection between morality and institutions.

The institutions created by man are intended to provide some form of stability, well-being and security for the individual and society. They simply aim at its efficient practice and continuation. The society aims at its own notion of the common good through the provision of greater opportunities for participation and responsibility among citizens. Underlying this feeling of mutual responsibility is, presumably, the attitude of trust or faith in a unique pattern of political administration and social conduct that seeks the inclusion of as many as possible in the management of affairs. This inclusion is premised on certain structural, normative and practical considerations. Parsons (1960: 36) points out that ‘the integral problem within an organization most directly concerns the human agents. The central problem concerns the institutionalized norms which can effectively bind the actions of individuals in their commitment to organizations’. The question is then how we can establish and sustain rules and values that can propel human actions for positive ends. This issue is the more significant in the context of pattern maintenance organisations that centre on cultural, educational and expressive functions.

However, it is very possible for us to have a set of institutions that embody key social principles and ideals, but in fact the institutions will not be effective or functional everywhere. Hence, it is clear that the institutions themselves are, at best, a means rather than the end of the human quest. Moreover, the externalised character of these institutions makes them prone to violations. Thus, Hermet (1991: 256-257) rightly observes that the process of institutionalisation does not in any way indicate that the affected institutions have taken root. The reason is that sometimes these institutions serve as a mere facade or smokescreen and actual or far-reaching dealings take place outside of them. Hence, ‘there could be aberrations, such that institutions designed to promote accountability could also be used to make it void’ (Apter 1991: 470). The excessive emphasis on institutionalisation leads to the loss of the personal dimension that is equally important in successful social life. This is because when there are problems with practice the individuals can act surreptitiously and conceal themselves under the canopy of institutions.

Prevailing Models of European Security: The Classical and the Modern

What is the basis of European security and integration? Why should some of the European values serve as a basis for African security reformations or transformations? These are very important issues especially when we begin to review the values underlying the European models of integration and security. According to
Ross (1998: 177), ‘renewed European integration was a complex construction which flowed from multiple motives in response to a variety of pressing problems’. This suggests that the Europeans have had more than their fair share of problems and are now in a position to serve as an inspiration to others on the world scene. In a brief historical account, Baylis, (1992: 385) reminds us that ‘the European state system which prevailed from the late 1940s until 1989 emerged following the collapse of the classical European order which had been in place from the end of the Middle Ages’.

This historical challenge facing Europe was the more significant given the security problems in that theatre. According to Mann (1998: 188-189), ‘over the previous four centuries most military power had become gradually monopolized by states and this proved the greatest subversion of Europe. Conflicts between European nation states had escalated into hi-tech mass mobilization warfare, using terrible weapons of destruction. In 1945, Europe lay devastated by internecine strife’. The aftermath of that destructive engagement in the European space paved the way for the demise of Europe as a world power and the emergence of the world ruled by two superpowers. Ross (1998: 165) argues that ‘in essence the security environment within which European integration began had become a global one dominated by super power rivalry in general, and from the point of view of future EU members, specifically by American power’. This historical situation and the European reading of it eventually led to widespread reforms of the regional geopolitics of Europe with special reference to security matters which have plagued Europe over the centuries. Therefore, Moller (2003: 316) makes it clear that ‘a component part of the region building process in Europe’s north is the discourse on the prospects for a regional security community’. The quest for a European community can thus be taken as an imperative of history. There are reasons for this. According to Ross (1998: 169), ‘European nations returned to integration because changes in their international surroundings oblige them to. The return of energetic European integration was part of a new strategy to de-emphasize the role of national states in economic life and create a regional economic bloc structured around a liberated single European market’.

Under the prevailing state-centric view of security, Ayoob (1984: 41) holds that ‘the term security has traditionally been defined to mean immunity (to varying degrees) of a state or nation to threats emanating from outside its boundaries. A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values. By security we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity’. This constituted the classical approach of the European states before the recent efforts at integrating. Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 158) have offered the clearest possible reason why we must move away from the realist view of security. They observe that ‘state security is essential but does not necessarily ensure the
safety of individuals and communities’. Simply put, we have to look elsewhere for further inspiration and clarification of the security problematic. This crisis in the state-centric vision of security led to the international security approach or system-oriented perspective to security. According to Ayoob (1984: 41) again, ‘this is a broader view or collective interest idea of security that depends on the recognition of the state or better still states as the objects of security. Thus if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained. The security of the parts of the system is inextricably intertwined with that of the whole’.

The international approach to security especially in its more recent contexts created its own problems and led scholars such as Mann (1998: 198-199) to say that ‘Europe is obviously not a singular military power. This suggests that our concept of security issues should also become rather softer, more societal, than statist’. Many options arose from the dissatisfaction with the classical models of security. One of these was the human security approach. According to Bellamy and McDonald (2002: 373), ‘human security marks a much needed departure from the statist and militarist approach to security that dominated the field of international relations. The approach should prioritize the security of the individual and that security is achieved only when basic material needs are met and meaningful participation in the life of the community and human dignity are realized’. For Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 157), ‘human security embodies a positive image of security’. This idea was placed side by side with the idea of societal security. The idea of societal security is placed in contradistinction to the notion of state security. Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 162) insist that ‘societal security is about identity, the self conception of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community. Societal security is recognized as a security sector independent of state security but important to the dynamic of state legitimacy’.

But these ideas of security do not retain the capacity to cover the entire gamut of the European vision for their security. Hence, this explains the emergence of other positions below. The comprehensive approach to security is one of such. Comprehensive security, defined by Biscop (2003: 184-185), as ‘a broad and integrated approach that will address all dimensions of security: not just military, but also political, socio-economic, demographic, cultural, ecological, etc. Security is the sum of several interrelated factors and therefore requires an approach that encompasses more than just traditional “hard” security’. There was also the idea of cooperative security. The notion of cooperative security is different from the crude state-centric view in other significant ways. According to Knudsen (2001: 357), the concept of cooperative security ‘essentially represents the policy, demonstrated in practice, of dealing peacefully with conflicts, not merely by abstention from violence or threats, but by active engagement in negotiation and a
search for practical solutions, and by a commitment to preventive measures’. Again there were specific dispositions of particular schools of thought on the security problematic of Europe and other parts of the world. This led to the Copenhagen school and the idea of securitisation. The Copenhagen school uses the idea of securitisation to represent a wider range of visions in relation to security analysis. Central to its concern is what Knudsen (2001: 357) refers to as the stress on the broad security concept. Specifically, ‘the concept of securitization was in part a move along the path of the wideners. But its innovative value was to shift attention away from a mere widening of the security concept to spotlighting of the way in which issues do or do not end up on the political agenda. Securitization gave a name to the process of raising security issues above politics and making them something one would never question’.

However, going beyond this theoretical and historical account of European security, there is a need to look at the more recent evolution of the discourse. Castells (1998: 311) has argued that ‘European institutions are trying to cope with trends by using new forms and new processes, thereby attempting the construction of a new institutional system’. There seem to be some advantages gained by adopting new approaches to doing things. According to Todd and Bloch (2003: 101), ‘intelligence is one area in which the EU may hope to realize its drive for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The avalanche of EU wide security measures brought in after 9/11 has given a new lifeline to agencies’.

It must be observed that some people have a less optimistic view of the European Union. For instance, Mann (1998: 205) says that ‘though all societies are composed of multiple overlapping, intersecting networks of interaction, Europe seems especially to lack overall internal cohesion and external closure’. Also Rynning (2003: 480) offers a pessimistic view of the EU’s strategic culture. In this sense, ‘it would appear that there is neither strategy nor policy because the common security and defence policy is all about internal state building and domestic European affairs rather than external defence’. On the international scene, the EU seems to have some disadvantages. Parker (1996: 172) observes that there are crucial matters regarding the public interest. Are European institutions strong enough to ensure that the public interest in telecommunications embraces the concerns of smaller firms? From the above analysis, we need to find out what African societies can learn from the European systems especially in the areas of values and principles for proper human living. Diggs (1973: 289) has rightly noted that ‘if persons are to live together, they must live under common principles and rules’. The question then is, what are the principles and rules that African can borrow or apply in order to ensure national and human security in this modern age?

With specific reference to the European conceptions of security, the following factors have become prominent. The security architecture of Europe is ir-
revocably predicated on the quest for ‘prosperity, security and peace’ (Lodge 1993: xiii). To achieve this aim, the principles and policies of the European security architecture are based on the idea of intense or deeper integration that is woven into the character, ‘composition, organization and capacity of the institutions themselves’ (Lodge 1993: xiv). These institutions are founded on the ideological template of liberal democracy, which eventually is designed to usher in a new conception of the union. This union of Europe is defined by ‘processes engaging member governments in a positive form of cooperation designed to maximize their collective interests’ (Lodge 1993: xv) in what can be described as a security community. This European security architecture is based on participation and integration, which ‘involves a pooling of endeavour, through whatever supranational institutional arrangements are appropriate’ (Lodge 1993: xvi). The architecture of European security is also predicated on mutual assistance and the creation of a balance of advantages that will result from cooperation for peace and security.

The whole concern has been on the mitigation of threats to peace, though the machinery for securing that peace remains to be established. Salmon (1993: 256) cautions that ‘in some circumstances military measures would not be the most appropriate security action’. Security must be taken more widely as ‘relating to the maintenance of values, lifestyles and way of life’ (Salmon 1993: 256). In a way, this suggests an expanded conception of security as a basis for articulating the European view of security. Such a conception must include ‘concern with fundamental freedoms, human rights, democracy, economic and social stability’ (Salmon 1993: 260). The broader concept of security cherished in Europe is founded on the struggle to guarantee ideal of the ‘Four Freedoms of Movement (of goods, services, persons and capital)’ (Lodge 1993: 315). This means that there is a conscious effort to tie together the economic and political aspects of security. To achieve this wider goal of security some of the European architectural arrangements have focussed on the ‘availability and efficient deployment of financial, human, technical and technological resources both within and between states’ (Lodge 1993: 323) in respect of police and security, movement of people, transport and movement of goods. More than that, the struggle to calibrate an alternate conception of security must entail the recognition that the differential context of Cold War and post-Cold War security challenges cannot be neglected without dire consequences. The most significant effect of this is that ‘security problems can no longer be compartmentalized into national, regional and international categories since national borders have proved to be increasingly inadequate in containing security problems’ (Shea 1993: 360). This European view of security with its emphasis on integration, community, institutional and human centred principles can be harnessed to impact on the African situation. What
principles and values can best facilitate the crucial sense of belonging and capacity that can enhance security in most African societies?

The Ethical Challenge of Security for Modern Africa: The Need for Civil Security and National Development

By extrapolation, and in the context of modern Africa, the goal of security is nothing less than the cultivation of citizens and rulers with expert knowledge, having the ability to formulate reasoned positions as guides to action. This would imply that the person would be capable of living out internalised roles and be able to meet the expectations of others through his or her occupational roles. The total behaviour of individuals can be meaningfully examined as a pattern of social roles. Social roles represent the particular ways in which persons interact with other actors in terms of their various statuses or positions within social systems. The idea of civil security has been conceived variously. Its earlier conceptual types have ranged from the endorsement of some advanced form of community policing, to larger vigilante structures, and then to civilian volunteer inputs to security as supervised by the regular military (Ujomu 2002: 43-45). Such ideas presuppose some kind of aggregation of capabilities or division of labour. Their foundations can be attributed to the notion of solidarity, which underlies the conditions for cooperation for security within the society. Another established view identifies a link between trust and security and it suggests that the communal method of security is only applicable within the ambit of a small community of men.

Civil security (Lucas 2000: 38) which refers to the systematic and conscious participation of non-military or civilian segments of a society in the provision of national and human security, is distinctive due to its emphasis on the increased role of the citizen in maintaining security. Specifically, it affords citizens, through a national policy, the chance to participate in providing emergency services and certain defence functions, such as providing information about criminals, participating in vigilante activities, as well as other forms of community service. The importance of the civil populace in the provision of security cannot be underestimated. According to Odekunle (1993: 39), the most reliable defence and security that any nation can have is the mobilisation of the citizenry through their involvement. Civil security possesses great potential for enhancing the participatory quality of democratic life. It creates and fosters an atmosphere of trust between the government and other segments of the society. It encourages individuals to be more directly and consciously involved in the construction of a safe and prosperous society.
Two Values Required for Security in a Human Social Context: The Value of Human Life and the Principles of Justice

The need for security requires an interrogation of the core idea of the value of life as it operates on other central principles and practices. We place a value on human life when we define a set of operative principles that determine our estimation of the human being as constitutive of certain features that earn him a particular treatment or consideration. The value of life is also related to our axiological premises for considering the human person to be deserving of certain goods (benefits or burdens). Security is aimed at affirming and upholding the value of life. To this effect, security focuses on survival, as well as the realisation of peace and progress for individuals and groups. Everyone is in need of security whether consciously or unconsciously. In the absence of security not much can be done. Above all, the idea of security presupposes the establishment of a nation of people oriented to the common good on the premises of fraternity, equality and liberty. This implies a quest for a conceptual and practical platform for reinventing the human political community.

Security; construed as the quest for survival, peace and progress, depends significantly upon the establishment of a social order that effectively defines the political, economic and social roles, rights and duties of people in a society. Social order aims at achieving certain important ends, mainly, security, protection and preservation of the lives and properties of people. To ensure individual and collective security, the social order attempts to make sure that every person or group has some stake or interest in, and commitment to, the society. Security can be most effectively established and sustained through an idea of society which upholds the values of increased human participation, responsibility and wider input to social well-being. This view of society promotes security by recognising that values such as cooperation, consolidation and continuity are themselves usually uppermost in the minds of people when they form, or participate in, a commonwealth. The participation of as many citizens as are responsible, committed, or willing to make their input to local or national governance and interpersonal or social affairs ought to be based on shared feelings of mutual responsibility.

Thus security can be assured if certain core principles are in place. The first principle is that of the common good which affirms the state’s duty to ensure common justice and fairness in the relationship between individuals. The common good may be understood primarily as the perfection of the members through the existence of the society. What are the means for the improvement of the human security situation? Security can also be assured by an emphasis on justice. The idea of justice under survey is not the warped but currently prevailing idea of ‘might is right, ‘sovereignty by conquest’, hegemony or a dominant metropolitan culture which though it appears appealing to the person gaining the upper
hand, in the long run is not sustainable for all parties involved. Indeed the history of failed ideologies, failed politico-economic projects, failed societies and failed dictators all around the world are sufficient evidence of the non-sustainability of any perverse idea of justice.

There is a strong link between rights, justice, security and survival. A genuinely secure society is a just society. A genuinely just society is also a secure society. A just social order cannot allow a society of slaves or marginalised peoples neglected and exploited just because of contexts and facts external to them. Justice is a constant and perpetual will to give every man his due, through rules such as merit, just deserts, entitlement, equality, need, productivity or effort. A just society needs to define and recognise individual rights and to embed these rights in the constitutional structure so that the opportunity for abuse is diminished. Therefore, justice emerges here as a set of minimal constraints necessary for achieving social coexistence, co-operation and well-being. Both conceptions of life agree on the need for justice understood among others as the basis of productive human cooperation. The upholding of the legal system and the rule of law are critical factors in the sustenance of a just order. Viewed in this light, security becomes something that is expedient for all men to aspire to, attain and preserve because it is in the interest of all to work for individual and collective security.

Conclusion
This study has attempted to facilitate a better insight into national security by appropriating the creative inputs of ethical and aesthetic analysis. In the quest for a new or alternate theoretical basis for the understanding of the national security problematic, the researchers have shown their capacity to translate the concrete conceptual reconstructive processes into relevant empirical and practical solutions to the multi-faceted problems of security. The combination of aesthetic and ethical imagination in fostering positive human values and social reconciliation can be of great importance for national development. The new conceptual and methodological trajectories in national security suggest the imperative of ethical citizenship and the attainment of a just and harmonious society which will restore public confidence in the capacity of the government and society to attain national survival, peace and progress. The commitment has been to intensify the modes of the appreciation of the value of human life, the role of greater public trust in governance, and the necessity of a collective adherence to the rule of law and codes of civility.

Our aim has been to search for those core values that can make human life more secure, stable, harmonious and amenable to the challenges of modern change. We are obviously in need of a more vigorous and imaginative application of the principles of security to the fundamental areas of human life. We must return to our visions and values which guide situations and actions. Many of
the attitudes of the individual reflect his values or his conception of what is important or desirable. As members of a human community, we must preserve the values essential to the security of life that elevate the levels of human dignity and human prosperity. The point about the connections between values and security cannot be overstated. Some of the values of self-help, self-responsibility, solidarity, and social responsibility are now imperatives of security in Africa. Human beings can survive only because there are shared or public values and interests which ultimately foster the good of all. We are in need of specific behaviour for security; joint action for the common good. Behaviour is modified as a result of experiences. Attitude change depends on reviewing the scope of social adjustment, the means of control, the attractiveness of the project, the courage, the reward system and credibility that goes with the new vision.

In situating the problem in the context of a post-colonial setting, the desire has been to obtain the best out of the social realities before us. The aesthetic disposition requires a close and complete concentration on the subject of investigation. This has called for a traditional and historical analysis of the African and inter-cultural perspectives of security. The ethical factor is defined by the need to create a vision of a society in which the various groups have roles to play, despite their differences. The interrogation of culture provides all sorts of nuances to foster the communication and communal solidarity necessary for national security.

The guarantee of enduring security connotes the creation of the tools of opportunity - education, health care, employment, legal rights and political freedoms, so that dignity, security, respect and justice will prevail. The whole issue of security is that of establishing the machinery for sustaining those conditions in which men can live their own lives, pursue happiness and fulfill their destiny. In seeking a way forward, there must be a de-emphasis of those approaches that have created ambiguities of sex roles in terms of the quest for freedom and competence. Therefore, with special reference to marginal groups, we must for instance aim to deconstruct the closure of women, and to prevent the oppression of the perceived less competitive persons (challenged, dependent, vulnerable) from the guarantee of social security.

Finally, this study has examined the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of the security idea as compelled by the hitherto restrictive analysis of the nature of national security and the unexplored character of the critical conceptual and empirical interface between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions as key contributors to human national survival and integration. It insisted on a re-conceptualisation of the visions and values of ethical security and political community in the light of the critical failure of existing approaches to national security. It situated the problematic within the real context of the pervasive insecurity that has continually plagued the different forms of human organisation at various levels, especially
the state. It has emphasised the need for a new vision of security theorising and praxis. This study has also examined the ethical dimension of the national security problem by using the European paradigm as a framework for defining the core principles of national survival and social integration. Such a belief in the gains of a cross-cultural view of things is the motivating factor for examining the linkages between the European and African security situation from this ethical viewpoint.

References


