The Roles of Higher Education in the Democratization of Politics in Africa: Survey Reports from HERANA

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Abstract

Against the theory on the nexus of higher education and citizenship, this article brings together the main findings and conclusions of three related studies with African mass publics, parliamentarians from African legislatures, and students from three African flagship universities, conducted by the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA). The article shows that higher education provides advantages in various measures of democratic citizenship and leadership. It plays important roles with regard to access to political information, information gathering skills, and levels of political knowledge; the ability to offer opinions and critical perspectives on politics and the economy; and levels of democratic values and democratic action. Moreover, university-educated MPs seem to make much better sense of the unique complexities of legislatures and their multiple competing functions than their less educated peers. This might reflect the knowledge and analytic skills acquired through higher education, the fact that universities are themselves highly complex institutions that they needed to negotiate as students, and the finding that students acquire extensive organisational leadership experience while at university. In light of this, the article suggests that higher education can play a crucial role in the democratisation of politics in Africa by developing “institution-builders” for state and civil society.

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Résumé

S'appuyant sur la théorie de la relation entre l’enseignement supérieur et la citoyenneté, cet article rassemble les conclusions principales de trois études liées effectuées par le Réseau de Recherche et de Plaidoyer sur l’Enseignement supérieur en Afrique (Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa – HERANA). Ces études avaient pour sujets le public de masse africain, des membres de parlements nationaux africains, et finalement, les étudiants de trois universités africaines de premier ordre. L’article démontre qu’une éducation supérieure offre des avantages de nature variée à la citoyenneté et au leadership démocratiques. En effet, elle joue un rôle important en matière d’accès aux informations politiques, les compétences dans la collecte d’informations et le niveau de connaissance politique, la capacité d’offrir une opinion et des points de vue critiques sur la politique et l’économie, et différents niveaux de valeurs et d’actions démocratiques. De plus, les parlementaires qui ont un diplôme d’université semblent se débrouiller beaucoup mieux dans les méandres uniques des assemblées législatives et leurs multiples fonctions opposées que leurs collègues moins éduqués. Il est possible que cela soit du aux connaissances et aux talents d’analyse acquis dans l’éducation supérieure, ou bien au fait que les universités sont elles-mêmes des institutions très complexes, qu’il faut maîtriser lors de ses études, en plus de l’acquisition de grands talents d’organisation nécessaires aux étudiants pendant qu’ils sont à l’université. Par conséquent, l’article suggère que l’enseignement supérieur peut jouer un rôle crucial dans la démocratisation de la politique en Afrique en encourageant l’émergence d’individus qui vont renforcer les institutions d’État et de la société civile.

Introduction

Because democracy requires democrats, it is said to require a critical mass of educated people who believe in and support democracy, and who have the cognitive skills that enable them to act as critical citizens: sceptical of government, tolerant and trusting of other citizens, and engaged in the democratic process. These arguments date at least back to Thomas Jefferson, but have since been forcefully articulated by other thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey. Indeed, this understanding was part and parcel of the movement toward mass public schooling in the United States and subsequently in Europe. More recently, scholars of democracy, public opinion and political behaviour have continued to echo this basic argument and specified it more explicitly. At minimum, education has been argued to increase society-wide literacy levels, enabling larger proportions of the electorate to follow politics by reading newspapers. Education is also believed to stimulate greater political interest and discussion,
possession of basic facts about government and the internalization of democratic norms, as well as to enable people to acquire and interpret new information in a more critical manner. Finally, education is hypothesized to translate into improved communication and organizational skills that enable people to persuade and mobilize others (for an overview see Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996). All of this is believed to translate into higher levels of political efficacy, which in turn leads to specific actions such as joining civil society organizations, contacting elected representatives and other government officials, working with other citizens and participating in community action groups, tolerating political opponents, refraining from violent protest, and ultimately supporting democracy and defending it if it comes under threat.

Most of these arguments have been corroborated repeatedly by empirical social science. While some scholars may have concluded that relatively educated democratic polities may not always have possessed sufficient amounts of the postulated ‘correct’ information or made the ‘correct’ connections between various beliefs and attitudes (Berelson, Lazafeld and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Converse and Dupeux 1972), or correctly applied abstract democratic principles to specific cases (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McCloskey and Brill 1983; and see Sullivan and Transue, 1999, for an excellent summary), empirical social scientists have repeatedly confirmed this basic thesis at the micro-level. Moreover, education has repeatedly been shown to be an important predictor of voting in the United States (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos 2004; Dee 2004) as well as in many other Western countries (Lipset 1960; Norris 2002; Dalton 2008a), though there are exceptions, often in countries with strong socialist parties that mobilize less educated working class voters (Powell 1986; Norris 2002; Milligan et al 2004). Education has also been confirmed as a strong predictor of other citizen qualities such as interest in politics, newspaper readership, political knowledge, interpersonal trust, tolerance of political opponents, and a wide range of forms of political participation, such as contacting elected leaders, joining community associations, attending community meetings, political internet activism, and protest both in the United States (Hyman, Wright and Reed 1978; Hyman and Wright 1979; Bobo and Licari 1989; Verba et al 1995; Putnam 1995; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1996; Nie et al 1996; and Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Dee 2004; Dalton 2008a and 2008b) and other democracies in Europe and Latin America (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Milner 2002; Milligan, Moretti
and Oreopoulos 2004; Belucci, Maraffi and Segatti 2006; Magalhaes 2008; Dalton 2008). In a 1996 summary, Nie et al. concluded:

The notion that formal educational attainment is the primary mechanism behind citizenship characteristics is basically uncontested .... Formal education is almost without exception the strongest factor in explaining what citizens do in politics and how they think about politics. (Nie et al 1996:2)

Education’s impact is so regularly found that political scientist Philip Converse (1972) once called it the ‘universal solvent’ of political participation (cited in Dee 2004:1700).

Scholarly arguments about the education-citizenship nexus in the ‘old’ democracies of advanced industrialized societies are really about the link between education and the quality of democracy. In contrast, in new democracies in developing countries – such as in much of sub-Saharan Africa – scholarly arguments about the education-citizenship nexus are less about the link between education and the quality of democracy; rather, arguments in our context pertain much more directly to questions about the onset and very survivability of democracy, along with its quality. The existing literature again bears out the importance of education. Education has been shown to increase voter turnout and civic engagement in several different developing world contexts (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Anderson and Dodd 2005; Belucci, Maraffi and Segatti 2006; Magalhaes 2008; Lam and Kuan 2008). More importantly, education has proved to be a very strong predictor of popular support for democracy in places like Korea, Chile, Eastern Europe, Russia and in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Markowski 2005; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Rose, Mishler and Munro 2006; Mattes and Bratton 2007).

A less frequently appreciated parallel to the linkage between education and democratic citizenship is the connection between education and democratic leadership. That is, democracy also requires a smaller, but nonetheless critical mass of educated elites who not only believe in democracy but also have the cognitive skills that enable them to run the complex institutions of modern democracy, primarily elected legislatures and executive departments, as well as regulatory agencies, courts and police, and political parties and civil society organizations. Institutional leaders and senior staff are required to master complex documents and must often play multiple and competing roles. Effective democratic institutions have to establish internal structures and procedures to enable them to perform core functions and manage their often inherent tensions and contradictions, thus bringing a semblance of predictability and certainty to the government process. Thus, while it may
not require it, effective institutionalization is certainly assisted by the types of cognitive skills acquired through formal education, especially higher education.

Because developed societies rarely lack a sufficiently large critical mass of educated elites, scholars in these contexts often fail to address this issue. Or, if they do, they do so for very different purposes. For example, there has been a large amount of descriptive research on the social background of democratic legislators under the rubric of ‘legislative recruitment’, but few studies have focused specifically on the impact of formal education per se (for reviews of this literature see Mathews 1985; Norris 1997a). To the extent that scholars ever use education as an explanatory variable, they have focused on whether it helps potential candidates get into the legislature in the first place, not on what they do once they get there (see Norris 1997b).

In a developing society, however, it is an important question whether the education system is producing a sufficient mass of people able to run and staff the range of institutions critical to the functioning of modern democracy. To our knowledge, there have been few empirical studies in this area since the 1960s (e.g. Coleman 1965), though Barkan (2009) and his colleagues have recently collected some initial descriptive data on the educational background of African legislators. Nevertheless, the applicability of the ‘education for democracy’ argument in the developing world in general and across different African polities in particular has received support from a series of macro-level studies that have demonstrated both cross-national linkages (countries with higher aggregate levels of education have higher levels of democracy) and more importantly, over-time linkages (developing non-democracies with increasing levels of education were much more likely to become democracies than those within stagnant or declining levels of education), effects that are independent of other factors such as levels of national wealth (Lipset 1959; Barro 1999; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer 2004). While some analysts argued that the correlation was a spurious reflection of larger historic economic and political development paths that simultaneously increased both education and democracy (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 2005), further analysis re-affirmed this link by examining longer-term lags of education on democratization and through better statistical controls for the mutual correlations amongst previous levels of education and democracy and their over-time persistence (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Schleifer 2007; Bobba and Coviello 2007; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Castello-Climent 2008).
Micro-level studies conducted in old democracies almost always reflect attitudinal differences between university graduates and high school drop-outs (after statistically controlling for other relevant factors) and therefore do not explicitly examine the specific impact of higher education. A few studies that have been done so have found that the impact of education on certain measures of citizenship is not linear but increases once one enters university. There is ample evidence that the university experience has a range of unique social and developmental impacts (see Pascarella and Terenzini 1995). Putnam (1995:667), for example, found that the relationship between education and civic engagement was curvilinear with advancing returns as education increased. In particular:

The last two years of college make twice as much difference to trust and group membership as the first two years of high school. The four years of education between 14 and 18 total years have ten times more impact on trust and membership than the first four years of formal education. (Putnam 1995:667 emphasis in the original)

Dee (2004) also finds similar effects of college entrance on voter registration, voting and volunteering. And Dalton (2008) has shown that university education, when combined with high levels of political interest, makes an important and unique contribution to the way in which voters relate to political parties and election campaigns.

Looking at related studies on this nexus in new democracies, it is not at all clear whether the measured impacts of education reflects the importance of higher education, or more simply, the difference between secondary versus primary, or no schooling. On one hand, one of the best empirical studies of democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s demonstrates that it was internal protest (rather than pressure from external forces, like the international financial institutions), often driven by university students, that was the key factor which brought down autocratic leaders across the continent (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). And Barkan and his colleagues (2009) found that university-trained MPs formed the core of the cross-party coalitions that have initiated key reforms in some African legislatures. Read together, the two studies could well be seen as evidence of important role of highly educated Africans in the democratic transitions and consolidation of democracy on the continent. On the other hand, while Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi’s study of public opinion in 12 sub-Saharan African countries (2005) found a strong impact of education, it did not specifically examine the impacts of different levels of education.
Evans and Rose (2007) attempted to assess the differing impacts of various levels of education in Malawi by creating a series of ‘dummy’ variables (i.e. variables that take either the value of 0 or 1) for different levels of schooling (primary, secondary, post-secondary). They found that each level of education made a statistically significant contribution to popular support for democracy in that country. While this is encouraging, the finding is less than conclusive since standard dummy variable analysis is designed to compare a series of wholly discrete nominal categories with no overlapping or cumulative content to a referent group (in this case, those with no schooling). But education is different. While each category certainly contains a discrete set of respondents, the concept is not discrete. The effect of being in secondary school, when compared to having no schooling, also includes the effect of having been in primary school; and the effect of post-secondary and higher education when compared to those with no schooling also includes the impacts of both primary and secondary schooling. Indeed, as Evans and Rose’s (2007b) models become more fully specified, the unique contribution of higher education to support for democracy diminishes rapidly.

The Higher Education and Democracy Studies of HERANA

It is in this theoretical context of strong and positive findings about the impact of education in general, and higher education in particular, on democracy in developed societies, but inconsistent and uncertain findings in the developing world, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA) conducted a series of three studies to examine differing aspects of the role of higher education in the democratisation of politics in Africa.²

The first study by Mattes and Mughogho (2009) used Afrobarometer survey data collected in 2005-2006 in 18 different countries of Central, East, Southern, and West Africa, to assess whether university educated citizens of varying ages were any more engaged with and supportive of the democratic process than less educated citizens.³ The study started by unpacking the set of factors that Bratton et al (2005) called ‘cognitive awareness’ and attempted to isolate the discrete contribution of formal education in general, and higher education in particular, to each of these other factors. Second, it examined the impact of education on a much wider range of facets of democratic citizenship than previous studies using Afrobarometer data by looking at: (1) rates of political participation, (2) the ability to formulate political
opinions, (3) basic democratic values, and (4) the willingness to offer critical performance evaluations.

The general applicability of the Afrobarometer findings about higher education might be limited if the political attitudes and behaviours of current university students differ in any systematic way from their older compatriots. Thus, the second HERANA study led by Luescher-Mamashele and involving teams of researchers and analysts in Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania, focused on current students at three premier African universities: the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) in Tanzania, the University of Nairobi (UON) in Kenya, and the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa (Luescher-Mamashele, Kiiru, Mattes, Mwollo-ntallima, Ng’ethe and Romo 2011). Surveys were conducted among third-year undergraduate students and student leaders in all three universities in 2009, producing a sample of 400 weighted responses representative by gender and faculty for each university. In addition, data from the latest round of Afrobarometer surveys (Round 4, 2008) from Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania was used to compare the students’ responses with those of the general public and the relevant age cohorts of youth without higher education in each country. Thus, this project explored the current role of universities in the formation of political attitudes and democratic citizenship among students and student leaders. Because it used identical (yet indigenised) survey instruments across all three universities, with many questions based on Afrobarometer items, it was possible to do statistical comparisons across universities as well as between each set of students, young citizens of the same age but without higher education, and the mass publics of each country in general (of any age and educational level). The student surveys focused on students’ attitudes towards democracy, their political behaviour, and their perceptions and conceptions of politics and governance on campus as well as with respect to national government; in addition, they investigated the relationship between students’ political engagement and their attitudes towards democracy. The study came to explore, in a wider sense, whether the three universities respectively provided a condition of a ‘political hothouse’ or of a ‘training ground’ for democratic citizenship and leadership, and thus serving as ‘sites of citizenship’.

In the third HERANA study, known as the African Legislatures Project (ALP), Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) examined the extent to which African parliaments are composed of university educated members of parliaments (MPs), and whether university educated legislators approached their job differently to other legislators. This project therefore explored the ability of
national systems of higher education to supply the human capital to run the national legislatures in selected African countries. The study used a combination of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with MPs. In their report, Mattes and Mozaffar attempted to subject these broad propositions to more systematic test, using a unique and original set of data from surveys of randomly chosen, representative samples national legislators in eleven countries carried out by ALP between 2008 and 2010. The researchers asked three broad sets of questions for this data. The first was a simple descriptive question: What is the overall level of educational attainment (particularly higher education) amongst African MPs, and how does this vary across countries? They then move on to two larger explanatory questions. They investigate, briefly, what national level characteristics might account for these cross-national variations? They then move on to examine, at greater depth, the actual political consequences of education amongst African legislators. Do more educated MPs possess different social and political characteristics than less educated ones? And are highly educated MPs, in fact, more likely to adopt the types of attitudes and behaviours that might expand the role of representative assemblies in their national political systems, and thus contribute to the process of democratization (Fish 2006)? Specifically, they ask whether highly educated MPs are more likely to bring with them more professional skills and government experience, adopt an ‘institutionalist’ role orientation, devote greater proportions of their time to activities that build legislative institutions, show greater independence from party bosses, and support legislative reform measures.

Higher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa

The very first thing one needs to take into account when considering the roles of higher education in the development and consolidation of democracy in Africa is the relative scarcity of highly educated people on the continent. This is reflected in the Afrobarometer data. Thus, in response to the question, ‘What is the highest level of education you have completed?’ the Afrobarometer data reveal that less than one in ten (9%) of the 21,600 adults interviewed across 18 countries in 2005-2006 had advanced beyond high school, either obtaining post-secondary non-university qualifications or attending a university. Just 2 per cent said they had actually completed an undergraduate degree. At the same time, it is also important to consider that levels of post-secondary education vary widely across countries, ranging from around one-in-five Nigerians (23%), Zambians (19%), and South Africans (17%) to less than one in every twenty adults in Lesotho, Madagascar.
and Benin (4% each), Mali and Mozambique (3%) and Malawi and Tanzania (1%). Possession of actual university degrees ranged from 4 per cent in Nigeria to less than 1 per cent in many countries according to the survey data. Given the rapid expansion of education systems across the continent in less than fifty years, the possession of a formal education – as of 2005-2006 – decreases sharply with age, as well as amongst rural people and amongst women. (Mattes and Mughogho 2010)

The ALP surveys also looked at highest education attainment but registered extremely different results. Across 11 of the same countries included in the Afrobarometer study, voters elected substantially larger proportions of educated and highly educated legislators: the majority of the randomly selected samples of MPs (59%) had at least completed an undergraduate university degree; 19 per cent had completed an undergraduate degree, and 15 per cent had either a post-graduate diploma or honours degree. One-in-five had a Masters degree (20%) and 3 per cent had doctorates. As illustrated in Figure 1, these levels of higher education attainment amongst MPs are anywhere from 15 to 80 times higher than amongst ordinary citizens in their respective countries (for details see Mattes and Mozaffar 2011). This finding in itself tells us something about the ability of political parties to re-

Figure 1: Educational Attainment amongst African MPs and Citizens
candidate out of the highest social strata in these countries. Furthermore, that so many voters are prepared to vote for candidates with far higher levels of education than themselves tells us something about the political culture in these countries and the huge responsibility this political culture bestows on higher education and its role in the democratisation of politics in Africa.

Cross-nationally, the highest levels of education were found in Ghana (where 65% had some sort of post-undergraduate diploma or degree and almost half had a Masters degree or higher), followed by South Africa (55%), Nigeria (51%), Uganda (50%), and Kenya (49%). On the other side of the spectrum, less than one-in-five MPs had postgraduate experience in Malawi (19%), Mozambique (12%) and Lesotho (7%). Unfortunately, we have no data with which to assess whether these levels of educational attainment constitute an advance over time. However, we do know that since 1990 – the beginning of Africa’s recent wave of democratisation – the proportion of higher education enrolments has increased in most African countries for which data is available. It is reasonable to assume that the ALP results also reflect an upward curve.

Perhaps surprisingly, given the various advantages enjoyed by incumbent political parties in Africa, governing parties were no more likely to have more highly educated MPs than were opposition parties. Moreover, compared to the gender differences in educational attainment amongst the mass public, we find no statistically significant differences in the level of education attained by male and female MPs, neither is there any evidence that younger or urban-based MPs are any more likely to be highly educated. There is fairly strong evidence, however, that highly educated MPs are more likely to come from a professional background, and that they are less likely to represent geographically far-flung constituencies distant from the national legislature. Highly educated MPs are also more likely to have held a previous position at some level of national government before they were elected to parliament, usually by working in a ministry, agency or parastatal. However, they do not differ with respect to experience in local government. Finally, highly educated MPs are much less likely to have held any type of leadership position within their political party than less educated ones. This begins to set up an interesting paradox. Beyond the cognitive skills developed through the educational process, highly educated MPs bring with them greater familiarity with the types of organizational and business skills that come with higher education and a professional background, as well as greater familiarity with various facets of national government. However, they have
no significant advantage in terms of knowledge of, or familiarity with local level politics, and are at a significant disadvantage when it comes to party politics. Given the powerful role of political parties in structuring and organizing legislative activities, the very advantages brought by highly educated MPs in terms of policy relevant expertise might be negated by their comparative lack of rootedness in the political parties to which they belong (see Mattes and Mozaffar 2011).

Higher Education, Information and Information Gathering

To recall, the main arguments about the contribution of education to democracy revolve in the first instance around citizens’ and leaders’ grasp of crucial information, cognitive engagement with the democratic process, and the ability to gather and process new information, through for example, the news media. At the mass level, the Afrobarometer study revealed that citizens with higher levels of formal education did indeed possess far higher levels of political information (which is defined as the extent to which respondents were able to correctly answer three questions about the identity of political leaders, and three questions about their constitutional and governmental system). They were also more likely to use news media, thus constantly acquiring new factual information. These impacts remained even after Mattes and Mughogho (2010) controlled for a range of demographic covariates of education (such as age, rural-urban status, gender, and levels of household poverty). However, when these covariates were taken into consideration, they found that formal education offered no real advantage in terms of increasing citizens’ levels of cognitive engagement (measured as the combination of political discussion and political interest) or in terms of political efficacy (i.e. the extent to which people felt they could influence other citizens).

Thus, the most direct impact of formal education in Africa on citizenship is through the stimulation of news media use and by giving citizens the skills to accumulate basic facts about the political system through the news media. This means that formal education may also have an indirect impact on other elements of democratic citizenship flowing through greater news media use and higher level of factual knowledge about politics. Consequently, Mattes and Mughogho (2010) examined all subsequent ‘downstream’ effects of education by looking at its combined direct and indirect effects, calculating a block adjusted R² estimate for only formal education, news media use, and political information (which strips out the overall explanatory contributions of non-cognitive elements of age, gender, urban residence, or
poverty). They initially found that average rates of news media consumption increased sharply and steadily across all increments of education, including higher education. However, they saw the first hints of a limited impact of higher education, with regard to the possession of political information which also increased sharply with education but levelled off amongst university attendees.

And as discussed above, Mattes and Mughogho attempted to isolate the specific impact of higher education by analyzing only those respondents with at least a high school education, and then comparing those who never went beyond high school with those who possessed some form of post secondary qualification and with those who actually went to university (holding constant for other covariates of higher education). Once this was done, they found very minimal effects: those who went on to university education were only slightly more likely to use news media or know basic facts about the political system than ordinary school-leavers. And because these weak relationships meant that higher education was likely to have little indirect impact on democratic citizenship through increased news media use or political information (or for that matter, through increased cognitive engagement or efficacy), all subsequent analyses focused only on the direct impacts of higher education (holding constant news media use, political information, cognitive engagement and efficacy, as well as age, rural/urban location, gender and poverty).

The Afrobarometer study also examined whether education facilitated increased citizen ‘articulateness’ (defined simply as the ability to provide answers to survey questions). Mattes and Mughogho (2010) found, after controlling for associated variables, that formal education indeed substantially increased respondents’ ability to offer opinions to field researchers on a range of issues of political and economic performance. Taken together, higher levels of education, news media use, and political information enhanced citizens’ ability to offer (positive or negative) opinions about the performance of the political system, preferences about democracy versus alternative regimes, and a range of social and political values, as well as provide some meaning to the word ‘democracy’. However, the authors again observed a curvilinear trend: that is, respondents’ ability to provide field researchers with evaluations of political and economic performance rose sharply across increasing levels of education until one graduated from high school, or obtained some form of non-university post-secondary qualification, but levelled off after that. Indeed, multivariate analysis demonstrated that higher
education made no significant contribution to respondents’ ability to offer opinions on these matters (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Formal Education, Cognitive Awareness and Articulateness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At Least Some University (0-1)</th>
<th>Total Adjusted R²</th>
<th>Block R²</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Able to Offer Opinions on Government Performance</td>
<td>-.284*</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to Offer Meaning of Democracy</td>
<td>-.016 NS</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to Offer Preferences on Democracy</td>
<td>.002 NS</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to Offer Value Preferences</td>
<td>-.066 NS</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controlling for age, rural/urban location, gender and lived poverty, as well as cognitive engagement and efficacy.

NS p=>.05, * p=<.05, ** p=<.01 *** p=<.001  **Source**: Mattes and Mughogho (2010:17).

In contrast to the Afrobarometer study which examined respondents of varying ages who might have attended university several years ago, the surveys by Luescher-Mamashela et al (2011) focused on current students, many of whom have grown up in a context of democratic governance, a modern educational system and with the advantages of access to new information and communication technologies. On the one hand, Luescher-Mamashela and his colleagues found that the students at the universities of Cape Town, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were not necessarily more interested in politics than their fellow citizens (as measured by Afrobarometer Round 4 results); on the other hand, the three student surveys clearly indicate that the students in all three universities discussed politics far more frequently than either their fellow citizens in general, or youth of the same age cohort but without higher education of their respective country. Students also use a great diversity of news media (radio, television, newspapers and internet) at a level at least equal to or above that of their respective mass publics (Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).

While UCT students read newspapers at about the same rate as South Africans in general, or their cohort of 20-23 year olds with no higher education, newspaper readership at Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi universities far outpaces that of their respective national publics or less educated age cohorts. Moreover, despite the mushrooming of internet cafes across the countries, internet use as news media remains almost entirely a student privilege: eight-in-ten students at all the three universities say they have access to and use the internet daily or several times a week, compared to just one-in-ten ordinary citizens in their respective country. Even among the
relevant age cohort without higher education, internet use is not much higher than among the three mass publics in general. Thus, on all the three campuses, access to and acquisition of information about public affairs and politics is considerably better and more frequent than among the relevant publics in general and the less educated same age peer groups in their respective countries.

In terms of actual knowledge about politics, UON students are highly knowledgeable about the identity of political incumbents at national level (i.e. the President of the country is correctly identified by 98% of the students, the Minister of Finance by 96%, and their local MP by 87%) and to a lesser extent of student representatives and campus officials (e.g. the Vice-Chancellor, 83% correct responses, the President of the student body 82%, and the Dean of Students, 52%) followed in rank order by UDSM and UCT students. Looking closely at responses to the question about the minister of finance in comparative perspective, it shows that the UON and UDSM students are much more knowledgeable about this specific political incumbent than their compatriots. Compared to only 12 per cent of Tanzanians, 60 per cent of UDSM students correctly name their Minister of Finance; in Kenya only 44 per cent of Afrobarometer respondents get the Minister’s name right as against 96 per cent of the UON students. In South Africa in contrast, 76 per cent of South Africans identified the longstanding and popular minister of finance correctly in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, but only 55 per cent of the UCT students correctly named the former minister or his successor. A similar pattern emerges with regard to students’ knowledge about key political institutions at national level (such as term limits for presidents) and knowledge about university governing bodies. The number of years the president can constitutionally hold office is known by 63 per cent of students at UCT, 72 per cent at UDSM and 84 per cent at UON. The role of the courts in determining the constitutionality of a law is known to half of the students at UCT, but to less than a third of UDSM and UON students.

Initial analyses of Afrobarometer data (e.g. Bratton et al 2005) placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of respondents’ own understandings of democracy. The HERANA student surveys found that more than nine-in-ten students could provide a valid definition of democracy in their own words, and that almost all definitions carried a positive connotation. In much the same patterns as the overall population, close to half of the students (47%) defined democracy in terms of political rights and freedoms; and one-third (34%) as popular participation and deliberation in politics. Conversely, less
than one-in-ten provided definitions mentioning ‘equality’, ‘fairness’, ‘justice’, ‘rule of law’ or ‘good governance’. Moreover, conceptions of democracy as ‘socio-economic development’ or ‘access to basic services’ were almost completely absent from students’ definitions (1%). In other words, while the stability and very survivability of multi-party democracy in many African countries is often under question (and local variations are usually assessed in the literature in terms of ‘deficiencies’ of political culture), African mass publics and the students at the elite universities surveyed by HERANA can be trusted to know very well what democracy is, and is not (see Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).

Cognitive engagement through access to information and news media use were among the starting points of both Mattes and Mughogho’s Afrobarometer and Luescher-Mamashela et al’s student studies. Conversely, the starting point for the ALP legislators study was to assess MPs’ ‘role orientations’ or how elected representatives in African legislatures understand and define their job. Combining answers to several open and close-ended relevant questions, the researchers created valid and reliable composite indices that measure three distinct role orientations: ‘institutionalists’, ‘constituency servants’ and ‘partisans’ (Mattes and Mozaffar 2011). They found that the highly educated MPs of African parliaments were more likely to see themselves as having an institutionalist role than MPs who had not completed high school. However, they were no different from other MPs in terms of the extent to which they saw themselves as constituent servants. Reflecting the fact that they were less likely to have had any experience in party organizations prior to entering the legislature, it turned out that highly educated MPs were far less likely to see themselves as strong partisans doing the bidding of the political party. These initial bivariate associations remained even after the application of controls for a range of other potentially important variables such as party membership, age, gender, constituency characteristics, background experiences, and experience within the legislature. In fact, after controlling for these variables, formal education constituted the single strongest explanation of why MPs adopt a more institutionalist or less partisan orientation.

While the ALP study did not include any test of political information or news media use, it did measure the extent to which MPs used various mechanisms to gather information necessary to their job. What Mattes and Mozaffar found was that highly educated MPs were indeed more likely to use the internet on a frequent basis, use various resources internal to the legislature such as the parliamentary library, research staff, committee staff or legal...
counsel, and would more likely turn to information resources external to the legislature, such as civil society organizations or universities, than their less educated peers. Highly educated MPs were also more likely to have travelled outside of Africa on fact-finding trips. With one exception (using internal resources), these correlations remained even after the application of the relevant statistical controls for demographic and experiential factors and role orientations. The authors also noted that education had an additional indirect effect via role orientations: that is, education promoted an institutionalist role definition, which in turn also separately and independently promoted the use of the internet and other internal parliamentary resources; and education reduced partisan role orientations, which in turn promote internet use but substantially detract from the use of internal resources. Therefore,

**Figure 2:** Committed Democrats

![Committed Democrats](image)

**Source:** Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011:57)

the study showed that, as with students, better educated MPs not only start out with increased factual knowledge, but are also more motivated and better able to gather additional information than their less educated peers.

**Higher Education and Democratic Values**

Replicating findings based on earlier rounds of the Afrobarometer, Mattes and Mughogho (2010) confirmed that education had a positive and sizable impact on commitment to democracy (measured as consistent preference for democracy and rejection of presidential dictatorship, military rule and one-party rule), both directly and indirectly, through news media use and
political information, each of which also had a positive impact. They also examined the link between education and a range of other democratic values, measured as support for various democratic qualities such as critical citizenship, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political equality, gender equality, bureaucratic and electoral accountability, as well as opposition to corruption. Again, they found that education had a notable impact on people’s stated willingness to demand accountability from intransient bureaucrats. Yet, across the rest of these values, the total impact of education (as well as of news media use and political information) was negligible to nonexistent in statistical terms. While formal education generally increased the extent to which citizens supported these democratic principles, the overall size of the impact was almost always very small. Indeed, more educated respondents were less likely to favour a universal, equal franchise, or to support the rule of law.

In general, cognitive factors seem to have very little to do with the question whether or not Africans held democratic values or predispositions. Compared to school leavers, those who had attended university were very slightly more likely to support freedom of expression. But they were less likely to believe that everyone should have an equal vote, or to say that elected leaders should be governed by public opinion (rather than their own beliefs). Overall, it turned out that there was virtually no difference between high school graduates and those who had attended African universities across a broad range of democratic values.

Consistent with the Afrobarometer findings, the student surveys found that only a minority of students at UDSM (36%) and Nairobi (45%) could be described as fully committed democrats (e.g. who always prefer democracy and reject each non-democratic alternative), and in the national comparison the students from these two universities also emerged as less committed to democracy than their respective national age cohorts of youth with no higher education, as well as their mass publics in general (see Figure 2). Only at UCT and in South Africa was the picture somewhat different. 54 per cent of UCT students qualified as committed democrats who consistently demand democracy; this figure is considerably higher than the South African mass public (where only 35% were fully committed to democracy) or their age peers without HE (32%). Notwithstanding this, demand for key freedoms such as free speech, press freedom, and freedom of association, is high among students of all campuses (and highest at UCT), albeit not as unfettered freedoms: on the one hand, the majority of students reject or
even strongly reject all statements that suggest government should be able to curtail free speech, freedom of association or press freedom; on the other hand, the corresponding positive statements that suggest unfettered freedoms receive varied levels of support. Provided that the students more strongly disagree with statements that limit political freedoms than they agree with unfettered rights to free speech, free association and press freedom, their responses suggest a rather nuanced demand for these freedoms compatible with students’ conceptions of democracy (as noted above), whereby democracy is not simply conceived as a political system of rights and freedoms but one which also involves citizen participation in decision-making (and perhaps other kinds of citizen responsibilities and citizenship duties) (Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011).9

Higher Education and Critical Citizenship

If highly educated African citizens are not especially likely to hold more pro-democratic dispositions, does higher education at least contribute to the likelihood of citizens giving critical evaluations of the political and economic performance of their country? The analysis of Afrobarometer data conducted by Mattes and Mughogho examined the impact of formal education, along with news media use and political information, on a wide range of political and economic performance evaluations. Three important findings emerged. First, taken together, formal education, media use and political information had sizeable impacts on how those people with opinions evaluated their personal economic conditions, the status of political rights in the country, and the degree of trust they placed in government institutions and state media. Education had an especially strong direct effect relative to that of information and news media. Indeed, with one exception, formal education consistently had a statistically significant and negative impact on all performance evaluations. Thus, increased schooling not only enables Africans to offer more opinions, it also allows them to offer more critical opinions. At the same time, the contributions that formal schooling made toward enabling a more critical citizenship could potentially be mitigated by the confounding effects of higher levels of political information and, sometimes, the effects of news media use. That is, while education (holding constant media use and information) made people more critical of performance, formal education simultaneously led people to acquire greater amounts of political information, which in turn (holding constant education and news media use)
made people consistently less critical, and thus more forgiving of govern-
ment performance. Moreover, while higher levels of news media consump-
tion sometime induced greater criticalness, it more often had the opposite
effect of making people less critical (possibly either because high media
users were consuming news produced largely by state-owned media or be-
cause increased levels of information decreased mistrust). The most con-
sistent impacts of higher education (over and above the effect of going to
high school) were to be seen in this area. Controlling the other elements of
cognitive awareness and demographic factors, Mattes and Mughogho found
(with one exception) that university attendees were consistently more criti-
cal of the performance of their economies, governments and political re-
gimes. At the same time, the size of the impact was quite limited, however.

Consistent with these findings, the student surveys found that the major-
ity of third year students at all three institutions felt that their countries were
either ‘not a democracy’ or a ‘democracy with major problems’ (UON,
86%; UDSM, 66%; and UCT, 52%); results indicating that far more stu-
dents were critical of regime performance than their age peers without HE
or the respective mass publics. The majority of students at the two East
African universities were also dissatisfied with the way democracy worked
in their country (UON 87%; UDSM 70%). As against this, 58 per cent of
Kenyans in general and 57 per cent of the Kenyan age cohort without HE
were not satisfied with regime performance (i.e. the way democracy worked
in their country), and only 29 per cent of Tanzanians and 30 per cent of the
respective age cohort without HE in Tanzania. At UCT, a majority of stu-
dents was ‘fairly’ or ‘very satisfied’ (57%), a figure that was slightly more
positive than South Africans in general (49%) and their South African peers
without HE (44%). Furthermore, Luescher-Mamashela and colleagues make
a useful contribution by developing the concept of the potentially
‘transformative democratic citizen’: that is, someone who prefers democ-

cracy, but is critical or highly critical of the current extent of democracy and
impatient to see regime change. As may be expected from the political de-
velopments in Kenya at the time of the survey, a majority of third-year
students at UON (61%) emerge as potentially transformative democrats,
compared to just under half at UDSM (47%) and four-in-ten at UCT (40%).
In each case, the students were significantly more likely to be critical and
impatient transformative democrats than their respective fellow citizens or
their age peers without HE (see Figure 3).
In quite concrete terms, the ALP study adds to the finding that highly educated MPs tend to be more critical of the performance of the legislature, that they are also more likely to demand various kinds of reforms. The survey asked MPs whether they would support or oppose a wide range of potential reform bills, ranging from enabling the legislature to initiate legislation, amend executive bills, raise and lower taxes, pass bills over the objection of the executive, and increase the amount of executive oversight. While higher education made no direct impact, Mattes and Mozaffar detected a strong indirect impact because MPs with institutional orientations, as well as those MPs who actively use parliamentary resources to gather information, were much more supportive of reforms to strengthen the legislative arm of government over that of the executive.

**Higher Education and Democratic Action**

In response to more participatory conceptions of democracy and various conceptualisations of ‘active citizenship’, each study examined in some way the degree to which higher education translated into relevant forms of democratic action. The Afrobarometer study demonstrated that formal education made positive, statistically significant but small contributions to membership...
in civic groups, as well as contacting formal and informal leaders by citizens. Moreover, any positive contribution that education made to democratic participation appeared to level off after high school. Furthermore, when it comes to partisan identification, higher education had negative effects: African citizens with a university degree were less likely than high school graduates to identify with a political party. And while they were more likely to take part in protest and contact formal officials, the absolute size of the difference was relatively small. Lastly, higher education played no role in encouraging people to join civil society organizations, become involved in community affairs, or vote.

Active organisational membership, formal and informal political action and voting were also investigated for those being in higher education in the HERANA student surveys. In terms of voting, the students at Nairobi (79%) and UCT (62%) both reported having voted in the most recent national election at rates about equal to their less educated age cohort, while UDSM students reported voting at lower rates. However, active organisational membership in an off-campus, non-religious association was much higher among students at UCT (43%) and UDSM (53%) and at least slightly higher among UON students (48%) than amongst their respective national age cohorts (11% in South Africa; 29% in Tanzania; 43% Kenya). Moreover, students were more likely to be leaders of off-campus voluntary secular organisations than their respective age cohort without HE (29% of UON students as against 12%; 15% of UDSM students versus 1% only; and 13% of UCT students compared to 4% of the South African age cohort). In addition to that, students are of course extensively involved in campus-based student organisations whereby 63 per cent of students at UON, 71 per cent at UDSM and 57 per cent at UCT reported active membership or leadership of an officially recognised student organisation on campus. And except for UCT students, who participated in national demonstrations (17%) about as frequently as South Africans in general, students from the East African universities were around twice as likely to take part in an off-campus protest as their respective compatriots (Nairobi: 28%; UDSM: 36%).

On the basis of these and related findings, Luescher-Mamashela and colleagues concluded their investigation by developing the concept of the ‘active democratic citizen’ for the purpose of the student surveys: that is, someone who always prefers democracy and either participates in protests or demonstrations on or off campus or acts in a formal capacity as an official leader/leader of an association on or off campus. By this definition, the active citizens represent just over one-third of the final year student body at...
UDSM (35%), one-quarter at Nairobi (27%) and one-fifth at UCT (22%). The surveys showed that, compared to their respective national age cohorts of youth without HE, students were considerably more likely to be active citizens at an early age (Tanzanian cohort: 16%; Kenyan cohort: 14%; South African cohort: 8%). Therefore, while students do not necessarily prefer democracy more than the mass publics or their less educated age peers, the big difference that emerges from the surveys is that those students who do so are much more likely to protest and take leadership positions in organisations on or off campus.

The relevant forms of participation and pro-democratic action for MPs are different than ordinary citizens, of course. Thus, the ALP study asked MPs rather about a range of relevant legislative behaviours. First of all, they examined how much time MPs allocated amongst the activities that underpin competing key legislative functions: committee work (oversight), constituency work (constituency service and representation), plenary work (lawmaking) and party work (see Table 3). They found few linkages between higher education and time allocation with regard to committee work, constituency work, or plenary work. However, controlling for role orientations and other demographic and experiential factors, highly educated MPs – reflecting their reduced party backgrounds and partisan role orientations – were far less likely to devote time to party work. But they also found an important indirect impact of formal education through institutionalist and partisan role orientations. MPs who see themselves as institutionalists were more likely to devote time to committee and plenary work, and less likely to devote time to party work. In contrast, those who see themselves foremost as representatives of their party were less likely to devote time to constituency work and far more likely to devote time to party work. Lastly, because of their central importance to democratic politics and to neo-patrimonialism in African politics, the ALP survey devoted another set of questions to MP activities in their constituency. Focusing only on the frequency with which MPs travelled to the constituency when the legislature was in session, and how long they stayed, they found that highly educated MPs (controlling for other factors) travelled home substantially less often, and stayed fewer days when they did travel home.
Conclusions

Taken together, the findings of the three HERANA studies suggest that Africa’s schools and universities have paid democratic dividends. Based on attitudes and values measured across 18 countries in 2005-2006, the analysis of Afrobarometer data demonstrates several important effects of formal education on citizens. Its findings are in parts confirmed, in parts nuanced and put into perspective by the student surveys conducted at three premier African universities and the ALP studies with MPs of eleven national legislatures in Africa that completed the set of HERNANA democracy studies. Mattes and Mughogho’s study (2010) has shown that formal education both enables and stimulates Africans to make greater use of the media to get news about politics. It facilitates citizens’ acquisition of the basic information that allows them to make sense of the larger political system. Citizens in Africa with higher levels of schooling are generally also more likely to develop preferences and adopt more readily critical stances toward regime and government performance. Finally, higher levels of schooling also lead Africans to demand democracy. However, beyond a preference for democracy over other regimes, educated Africans are not any more likely to hold other democratic orientations. Education also makes only a limited contribu-
tion to political participation – except in the case of students who are currently in higher education, as the student surveys show.

The Afrobarometer study also shows that most of these impacts are largely a reflection of the great differences between those with little or no formal education and those who have finished high school. African citizens who go on to university show few advances in various measures of democratic citizenship beyond that displayed by high school graduates. They display few statistically significant, and even fewer substantively important differences with high school graduates in terms of political information, news media consumption, political participation, articulateness or pro-democratic values. It is only in the area of evaluations of the performance of the economy, the government and the larger democratic regime that African citizens with higher education are significantly more critical, though the size of the differences are small in the mass public survey (but substantial in the comparison between students and non-students of the same age cohorts).

Having started the HERANA investigations into the nexus of higher education and democracy with the Afrobarometer study, Mattes and Mughogho concluded in 2010 with an observation and a question. The observation is that even with the enormous challenges faced by Africa’s schools, students who move up the educational ladder and complete high school manage to acquire more political knowledge, develop firmer opinions, and adopt more critical perspectives. The question that emerged, however, was why do we see so little further democratic dividends amongst those who have managed to get a higher education? The results of the student surveys gain some purchase toward addressing these questions. While current students at the universities of Cape Town, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi are no more interested in politics than their fellow citizens, nor more demanding of democracy, they do exhibit a range of other important democratic advantages. They display far higher levels of political discussion and news media use (with huge advantages in terms of internet use). They display high levels of political knowledge. The students also tended to have higher rates of active membership in off-campus secular organization (over and above associational involvement on campus), as well as far higher self-reported rates of organizational leadership. Lastly, students are also far more critical of the performance of democracy in their respective country. Indeed, Luescher-Mamashela et al (2011) show that students at these universities are far more likely to be dissatisfied democrats eager to see pro-democratic regime change (or what the authors call ‘potentially transformative democrats’), as
well as active democrats, who combine support for democracy with formal and/or informal political participation.

These effects are not only visible through a comparison of the students with their respective national publics, but also by a comparison of students with fellow nationals of the same age cohorts but who have not been exposed to higher education. This second comparison is important because it shows that it is not youthfulness that accounts for the more critical and activist orientation of students in politics, and suggests that it is rather what they bring to these universities, or what occurs at these universities, that accounts for these differences. Hence the authors concluded by posing two alternative interpretations of the data, neither of which can be fully corroborated with the existing data. On one hand, the increased availability of news media, especially internet, increased frequency of political discussion and ample opportunity for participation and leadership in campus organizations may mean that these universities effectively function as political ‘hothouses’ whereby the high levels of intense involvement in university and public affairs may wither and disappear once students leave the peculiar environment offered by the university. On the other hand, the findings also indicate the potential of universities acting as effective ‘training grounds’ for democratic leadership with potential ‘spill-over’ effects into off-campus political activity and a more critical outlook on politics.

The broader interpretation of these findings, that current students at these three African elite universities display a number of democratic advantages over fellow nationals in general and those of the same age cohort but without higher education, confronts a range of questions. That is, should we emphasize the ‘recency’ aspect of these findings and conclude that the role of higher education in citizenship development is improving in Africa (e.g. in terms of students’ exposure to key democratic values, skills, and practices; increased access to information through the internet and other new technologies)? Or should we focus on the ‘elite’ angle and conclude that these effects are peculiar to either the unique characteristics of the students recruited into these universities and/or the type of teaching that these institutions have always offered? The available evidence does not permit us to make a conclusive decision at this point but it opens up exciting new leads for further enquiry. For instance, the HERANA findings suggest further investigations into the practical ways in which African universities already realise their potential as ‘training grounds for democracy’ using a broad range of methodologies.
Mattes and Mozaffar (2011) of the ALP surveys uncover perhaps the strongest impacts of higher education of the three studies. Across members drawn from eleven legislatures in sub-Saharan Africa, they demonstrate that highly educated MPs bring with them important social and political characteristics and experiences that enhance their performance as effective legislators (though their lack of partisan background may reduce their effectiveness by isolating them politically). University educated MPs are more likely to see themselves as representatives of the interests of their legislative institutions, rather than their constituents or political party. In turn, both formal education and its consequent role orientations combine to lead highly educated MPs to devote more time to activities that advance the interest of the institution, to some degree in plenary session but much more importantly in the committee, and less time toward their party and constituency. They are also more likely to use the resources of the institution to gather additional information about bills and budgets, and use that information to depart from under the yolk of their party leaders on occasion. Finally, these two forces also combine to make highly educated MPs the prime constituency of legislative reform and legislative strengthening.

The university experience seems to enable these MPs to make sense of the unique complexities of the legislature, which require MPs to balance multiple competing legislative functions. This might reflect the knowledge and analytic skills acquired through a university degree, and especially a postgraduate degree. Or, it may reflect the fact that universities are themselves highly complex organizations and that negotiating undergraduate and postgraduate degrees provides graduates with key advantages in handling life in the institutions where they work, including legislatures. Or it may be, in effect, of the extensive organisational membership and leadership experience that students acquire on and off campus reported in the student surveys. Again, current evidence cannot answer these questions conclusively; we can just assume that it is most likely a combination of all the above.

The HERANA surveys have therefore provided important evidence on the roles of higher education in the deepening of democracy in Africa. On the one hand, highly educated citizens in Africa are significantly more critical of the performance of their economy, government and larger democratic regime, and they are better informed and obtain their information about politics from a greater variety of news media than less educated citizens. The same democratic advantages are already evident among students at university level. On the other hand, higher education has seemingly no positive impact on support for democracy per se and higher levels of political partici-
participation observed among students disappear once the graduates leave the university. In our view, if political participation can be sustained and democratic values are more successfully inculcated at university level, African graduates may come to play the crucial role we observe already among university educated parliamentarians in African legislatures: namely, that through their commitment to democracy and knowledge of politics, the analytic skills acquired through a university degree and insight gained into the operation of complex institutions, African graduates may come to act as effective democratic ‘institution builders’ in state and civil society and thus play a crucial role in the democratisation of politics in Africa.

Notes

1. We would like to acknowledge the support of the US Partnership for Higher Education in Africa - in particular the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Kresge Foundation – which contributed funding and expertise for the HERANA studies. We are also grateful to the Afrobarometer for availing data and certain research instruments to the researchers of the studies on which this article is based. Merci to Ms Magalie Bertrand for the translation of the abstract. Professor Mattes was a Fellow of the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies (STIAS) when the article was written.

2. The surveyed countries (Afrobarometer Round 3) were: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (for more information about the Afrobarometer, see www.afrobarometer.org).

3. The sample for each university survey was stratified by faculty, whereby proportionate to the size of third-year student enrolment in each faculty, a number of third year courses was randomly selected. Questionnaires were administered in class by the researchers. In addition, a subsample of student leaders was constructed and independently surveyed. A total of 1, 411 students completed the questionnaires; statistically re-weighted to 400 responses per university (Total N=1200). By the time Luescher-Mamashela et al. (2011) completed their report, a related study at the University of Botswana was still underway (see Kgosithe forthcoming).

4. The relevant age cohorts were for Kenyans the ages 22-25 years, South Africans 20-23 years, and Tanzanians 22-26 years (Luescher-Mamashela et al. 2011: 19).

5. The countries included in the ALP study were Ghana (2010), Kenya (2008-2009), Lesotho (2010), Malawi (2008), Mozambique (2008), Namibia (2009), Nigeria (2009), South Africa (2009), Tanzania (2009), Uganda (2009) and Zambia (2007). The intended sample size in each country was n=50. The realized sample sizes differed in Kenya (n=47), Malawi (n=49), Namibia (n=37), Nigeria (n=57), and Zambia (n=51). By the time Mattes and Mozaffar completed their analysis, surveys were still ongoing.
in Lesotho and South Africa; their study reported the result from 27 and 32 interviews respectively.

6. While the survey was conducted at UCT, a new cabinet was under formation and thus some students named the longstanding outgoing minister while others named the new incoming minister as incumbent; moreover, many answered ‘know but can’t remember’.

7. ‘Constituency servants’ is measured on a four-point scale: They see constituency service or representation as most important part of job; as the most rewarding part of job; as the most important influence on position taking; and say MPs should follow wishes of constituency over those of party. ‘Partisans’, as measured on a 0 to 4 scale, see their party as most the important influence on position taking; say MPs should follow wishes of party over those of their constituency; say MPs should follow wishes of party over national interest; and follow wishes of party over personal conviction. ‘Institutionalists’, measured on a scale from 0 to 5, see law-making, debating or oversight as the most important part of job; and as the most rewarding part of job; they see the national interest or own knowledge as most important influence on their positions; say MPs should follow the national interest rather than their party; and say MPs should follow their personal conviction rather than the party (compare Mattes and Mozaffar 2011:10).

8. The ALP study did not ask MPs for their attitudes towards democracy per se, assuming (perhaps without good reason) that elected representatives would uniformly provide pro-democratic answers.

References


