#CODESRIA14

Creating African Futures in an Era of Global Transformations:

Challenges and Prospects

Créer l’Afrique de demain dans un contexte de transformations mondialisées :

enjeux et perspectives

Criar Futuros Africanos numa Era de Transformações Globais:

Desafios e Perspetivas

بعث أفريقيا الغد في سياق التحولات المعولمة :

رهانات و أفاق

Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place

Pedzisayi Leslie Mangezvo

08 - 12 June / Juin 2015

Dakar, Senegal
**Introduction**

Neoliberal globalisation was once touted as the catalyst for the dissolution of borders and free movement of goods, services, ideas and people, yet in many respects, it has deepened and extended contestations over resources that are constructed as finite (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009). It is somewhat paradoxical that the same process of globalisation that has led to unprecedented levels of the geographical dispersion of economic activity (Harvey, 1989) has also incubated numerous forms of popular mobilisations, including xenophobia, against clusters of human groups perceived as outsiders. Prominent in this group are migrants, ethnic/racial/religious minorities and so on. Claims to autochthony and indigeneity have challenged the ideal of globalism and international citizenship (Geschiere, 2009).

In May 2008, the world watched in disbelief as television images were broadcast of mobs of out of work South African nationals turned on black African migrants, ostensibly to rid South Africa of “illegal aliens” that threatened the country’s development aspirations. In a fortnight of extraordinary violence that required the deployment of the South African National Army in the streets for the first time in the post-apartheid era, 62 people lost their lives, dozens were raped and close to 100,000 people, mostly non-nationals, were displaced (Landau, 2011; Worby et al., 2008; Robins, 2009). The attacks shocked many for their callousness and their racialised nature as the bodies and property of black, African migrants became the primary targets of the attacks by sections of the South African population who made it clear that foreign nationals, pejoratively referred to as *amakwerekwere*, had no claim to South African urban space (Landau, 2011; Worby et al., 2008).

Unknown to casual observers of South African socio-economic dynamics was the fact that the May 2008 anti-immigrant violence was not the first time that post-apartheid South Africa was confronted with the spectre of varying degrees of mass mobilizations against non-nationals. A few examples spring to mind. Soon after the country’s first democratic election, Alexandra Township north of Johannesburg organised a campaign called ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (Operation Go Back Home) aimed at eliminating all non-nationals in the township. The operation seemed to have tacit approval from municipal officials (Handmaker et al., 2008). In September 1998, for example, a crowd returning by train from a demonstration in Pretoria threw three non-nationals to their deaths, ostensibly for stealing scarce jobs (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2002). Three months later, reports emerged of a band of hoodlums in Johannesburg who seemed bent on the systematic elimination of non-nationals (Comaroff & Comaroff, ibid). In 2002, Du Noon Township outside Cape Town passed a resolution expelling all non-nationals from the township.

The pervasively negative sentiment towards immigration in general and black, African immigrants in particular raises broader questions relating not only to South Africa, but to the governance of African countries’ development agendas. It requires us to question where contemporary governance systems in Africa locate migrants, whose presence in host countries
is supposed to be a celebration of globalisation. Using the experience of Zimbabwean male migrants living and working Stellenbosch (Western Cape), this paper explores the configurations and re-orderings of power, population and place in contemporary urban South Africa. The proposed paper draws on findings from an ethnographic study of xenophobic exclusion and migrant integration in Stellenbosch and interrogates the construction of foreignness, conviviality and space in urban South Africa.

Engaging Landau and Freemantle’s theorisation of tactical cosmopolitanism, the paper evaluates the challenges and prospects globalisation poses in so far as migrants negotiate and/or assert issues of space, rights and entitlements in an environment they consider to be hostile. The paper explores how a seemingly innocuous endeavour such as playing football is laden with the politics of availing space, rights, benefits and resources to certain groups of people (migrants) in contemporary South Africa. The paper concludes that South Africa presents one of the greatest ironies of globalisation: it has one of the most celebrated liberal constitutions in the world yet remains very much an exclusionary society to black African migrants. South Africa remains an economic powerhouse in the continent but is still some way off consolidating the democratic ideals of inclusivity.

Global transformation, transmigration and the paradox of exclusion

The scholarship on the discrimination, exclusion or maltreatment of non-nationals in modern African countries has produced fascinating insights into the relationship between xenophobia, citizenship and resources. Gray (1998) and Nyamnjoh (2002) trace the cultivation of citizenship through xenophobia in Gabon and Botswana respectively. In both countries, non-nationals are marginalized on the basis of xenophobia. In both cases, the notion of national citizenship inevitably require the production of the category of the Other of the nation, those who are foreign, alien and do not belong. An interesting paradox in both countries is that citizens often draw on the presence of non-nationals to trumpet how hospitable and generous their countries are (Gray, 1998; Nyamnjoh, 2002). The official rhetoric in most African countries is that the discrimination of non-nationals or xenophobia is distasteful and regressive, yet evidence from Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Ivory Coast and South Africa show that hidden behind the rhetoric are contestations over belonging (Geschiere, 2009). The contestations pitting nationals against non-nationals result in fractures that manifest themselves in the competition for jobs, housing, and social services. Nationals use citizenship as a resource by which they assert their claims to what are perceived to be finite resources (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Landau, 2011).

For Geschiere (2009) and Nyamnjoh (2006), the paradox of neoliberal globalization is evident in the rhetoric of free flows and dissolving borders that stand in opposition to increasing calls for the intensification of border controls. The processes of globalization have been celebrated for their contribution to the impressive advances in information and communication technologies, human mobility, social diversity, geographical dispersion of economic activity and opportunities for cultural exchange (Harvey, 1989; Bhalla, 1998; Castells, 1996, 1997,
1998; Giddens, 2002). Yet, globalization has also animated calls for the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, insiders and outsiders (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

There are anthropological explanations for these apparent contradictions. Meyer and Geschiere (1999) assert that globalization and identity operate in dialectic between “flow” and “closure”. As goods, information and humans circulate (flow), attitudes towards the perceived threat (migrants) harden and calls for border controls increase. Zenker (2011:64) writes about the “contradictory expansions of modernity”, which produce “accelerated desires for interconnecting individuals, groups and ‘their’ territories,” at the same time as heightening people’s claims to indigeneity and autochthony. Comaroff and Comaroff (2002:780) write about a global order in which immigrants “have become pariah citizens”. The Comaroffs’ (2002) article, *Alien Nation: zombies, immigrants, and millennial capitalism*, uses rural North West Province of South Africa to assess the ambiguity at the centre of neoliberal capitalism in its global manifestation. It appears to entrench material benefits to those who control technologies, yet threatening the livelihoods of those who do not. The contestation over paid work in particular has seen increased conflict between young South African men, women and immigrants, which has also fed accusations of witchcraft, zombie making and the demonization of immigrants from elsewhere on the continent (Jean Comaroff & Comaroff, 2002)

“Closure” reflects the less desirable side of globalization where identities are formed for the purposes of accessing resources or to deny certain social groups access to those resources (Meyer & Geschiere, 1999). Globalization has therefore fashioned a rebirth of local identities and vernacular forms of autochthonous exclusions (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006; Zenker, 2011). The renaissance of identity politics has often been celebrated as the political recognition of cultural variance, but it also has the potential of producing exclusion, discrimination, mistreatment or violence against those considered to be outsiders (Zenker, 2011). Nyamnjoh (2006) characterizes the contemporary global society as straddled by “insiders and outsiders” and access to resources is mediated by the extent of one’s belonging. Citizenship and belonging have become the tools by which insiders justify their claims to resources and the mechanism by which outsiders are excluded (Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Landau, 2011).

Landau (2011) asserts that the presence of non-nationals in the South African urban space has repeatedly generated violent and non-violent strategies of exclusion. The non-violent responses are very important in the analysis of exclusion because they reveal the manner in which xenophobia in the country is institutionalized and embedded in most aspects of social life (Sachikonye, 1998, 2011; Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Crush, 2008; Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; Hopstock & de Jager, 2011). This explains why popular and state discourses of belonging are not only widespread, but have produced deeply felt negative sentiments against non-nationals. According to Landau, identities based on indigeneity and autochthony in South Africa have meant that non-nationals are perceived as a group that cannot “justify claims to a patch of urban space” (Landau, 2011:1). This is in keeping with
Nyamnjoh’s (2006) observation that since the collapse of colonial and postcolonial authoritarian orders in Africa, there has been a growing effort to question the efficacy of availing certain rights, benefits and resources to certain groups of people, particularly those perceived as ‘outsiders’. The irony of it is that the South African Constitution refers to the rights of all persons who live in the country, and not only citizens of South Africa. The only exclusion for non-nationals is that they cannot vote in elections. But as Comaroff and Comaroff (2002:779-780) immigrants have always been thought of as “those wanderers in pursuit of work, whose proper place is always elsewhere” and that way it becomes easy to disenfranchise them.

The association that I am making between globalization, xenophobia and exclusion should not be interpreted to mean that there is a causal relationship where xenophobic sentiment is set off by the apprehension created by globalization. I am suggesting that xenophobic sentiments build on or exploit such fears. Not all people and countries have responded to neoliberal globalization-induced uncertainties similarly. The responses have been variable, but certain discernible patterns speak to the challenges immigration has produced in migrant-receiving countries.

**Zimbabwean male migrants in Stellenbosch: a methodological note**

The paper is based on a broader study of xenophobic exclusion and masculinities among Zimbabwean male migrants in Cape Town and Stellenbosch. The study deployed ethnographic methods to produce thick descriptions of the interface between xenophobia, migrant experiences and the production of specific masculine identities and identifications. The study had, as its primary question, the manner in which Zimbabwean male migrants’ masculine identities are constructed, expressed and reworked in the face of the threat of xenophobic exclusion. Ethnographic methods were relevant because of their “emphasis on understanding the perceptions, organisations and cultures of the people under investigation” (Troman & Walford, 2005:vii).

Geertz's (1974) theorisation that anthropologists should describe the world from the native’s point of view was a key guiding principle in the analysis of the primary and secondary data. In keeping with this notion, the entire anthropological enterprise in the study was predicated upon “sorting out the structures of signification” (Geertz, 1973:9) whereupon as a researcher, I was involved in a process of “explication” (Geertz, ibid). I set out to explain and interpret Zimbabwean male migrants’ experiences of xenophobia, migration and the specific masculine identities to emerging out of that. Zimbabwean male migrants in Stellenbosch define xenophobic exclusion in numerous ways. Some of them have directly experienced xenophobic attacks (or attacks they constructed as motivated by xenophobia) and others have not. There are also different experiences for documented and undocumented migrants. Most of the study participants are employed as waitrons in hotels and restaurants and others are engineers, media practitioners and managers in the industrial and service sectors of South Africa. There are thus different experiences along occupational and professional lines. What it
shows is that Zimbabwean male migrants in Stellenbosch are far from being a homogeneous cluster. Instead, they are highly differentiated in terms of their migration experiences and personal circumstances. This explains the attractiveness of Geertz’s (ibid) approach because he asserts that ethnographers deal with “a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular and inexplicit and which he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then render” (Geertz, 1973:10).

The adoption of an interpretivist approach means that my analysis of xenophobic exclusion, migrant experiences and masculinities among male Zimbabwean migrants in Stellenbosch takes cognisance of broader contextual issues relating to questions of masculinities in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. This particularly finds expression in the recreational spaces migrants inhabit. Football in Stellenbosch embodies enclaved social spaces in which Zimbabwean male migrants seek to reconfigure power relations in an environment they construct as conflictual. It is interesting that they seek to express aspirational masculinities through a favourite Zimbabwean pastime: money games (winner-takes-all challenge matches). In keeping with its qualitative nature, the study also examines issues in relation to the wider context of Stellenbosch as well as the specific research sites of Kayamandi and central Stellenbosch.

Stellenbosch was selected as the research site because of the diversity and contrast it presents and its proximity to Stellenbosch University. An analysis of Stellenbosch in terms of the ordering of urban space and the configuration of power relations is a central feature of the paper. Compared with a large metro such as Cape Town, Stellenbosch is much smaller in size and provides opportunities of employment in hotels, restaurants, bars and service stations. It is a research site with fascinating insights into the socio-spatial separations between the nationals and non-nationals, and the dividing practices instituted in the town’s spatial, temporal and social compartmentalisations. The town’s historical experience of modernity, coloniality and apartheid continues to cast a shadow over the physical and social spaces migrants inhabit and the power relations within these spaces. Whilst central Stellenbosch has no record of violent xenophobic attacks, its spatial organisation belie the latent xenophobic sentiments that lurk underneath the surface.

**Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place**

On 11 May 2008, residents of Alexandra Township turned on their neighbours. From this densely populated settlement located just beyond the shadows of Sandton, sub-Saharan Africa’s financial centre, violence spread quickly: first across Gauteng province then to informal settlements and townships around the country (Landau, 2011:1).

The text quoted above is from Loren Landau’s book, *Exorcising the Demons*. In many ways, the text and the title of the book capture many of the issues that have dominated the empirical debate on post-apartheid South Africa. Many of the demons from colonialism and apartheid...
Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place

are yet to be exorcised in a way that speaks to an inclusive, democratic country. The May 2008 attacks captured the world’s imagination in their callousness as violence directed at the bodies and belongings of non-nationals and South Africans speaking minority languages spread across the country. The image of a Mozambican man, Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave, being burned alive whilst some bystanders laughed (Hassim, Kupe, & Worby, 2008) has come to define the ferocity of the attacks. Close followers of South Africa’s experience with xenophobia may have been shocked by the magnitude of anger, but the violence itself came as little surprise as this was “hardly the first expression of post-apartheid violence targeting ‘foreigners’” (Hassim et al., 2008:3).

Results from national opinion surveys by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 1997 (see Mattes et al., 1999), 2006 (see Crush, 2008) and Futurefact in 2007 (see Erasmus, 2008) show significant levels of anti-migrant sentiment across all sections of the South African population. The 2006 survey by SAMP also showed strong levels of support for citizen-led actions to rid the nation of non-nationals (Crush, 2008). The explanation for such negative attitudes towards immigrants remains largely elusive. Most of the systematic attempts at understanding xenophobia in South Africa reflect diverse scholarly legacies and have complementary merits. However, there remain unanswered questions regarding the broader questions on the manifestation of xenophobia in the country. As Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2011) point out, two issues that have come up in the xenophobia debate remain unclear. The first is whether there is an objective connection between areas affected by violence and a specific socio-economic profile. Most of the attacks against non-nationals have taken place in informal settlements, but not all informal settlements have had a history of xenophobic attacks. The second concerns the question of why some sections of the population mobilise and resort to violence against non-nationals and others do not even though socio-economic indicators and levels of anti-migrant sentiment are comparable.

Xenophobia, social exclusion and anthropology

How similar or different are Zimbabwean male migrants’ experiences from religious or ethnic chauvinism, right wing nationalism, or Islamophobia in other parts of the world? Are there other kinds of anthropological studies of this phenomenon that would help to understand the issues at stake in this paper? Studies on the discrimination, exclusion and abuse of the other (ethnic/religious/racial minorities, foreigners, migrants and so on) demonstrate the reality of xenophobia in the world today and how it is fashioned by many sources (Gray, 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Shryock, 2010). The changes science and technology have brought about mean that societies are in a constant state of flux (Anderson, 2002). The world is witness to processes of freely circulating local and international influences with the inevitable pressures to accommodate these changes. Frustrated expectations of socio-economic development and imagined threats to predominant values often produce xenophobic sentiments towards groups of people perceived to be threatening to the development aspirations of a given society (Gray, 1998; Geschiere, 2009). Migrants are one of the clusters of people who comprise easy targets for scapegoating and
Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place

exclusion where competition for resources produces the politics of belonging (Geschiere, 2009; Landau, 2011).

Where xenophobia is fanned by perceived threats to cultural values, it is rationalized on the basis that minorities or foreign influences are harbingers of social instability (John Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Geschiere, 2009). The outcry against foreigners or minorities is carefully designed to create a moral panic (Ungar, 2001). The threat non-nationals or ethnic minorities pose is nothing more than hyperbole and a simplification of complex issues done to unify people behind an anti-foreigner sentiment. Migrants are usually seen as invasive outsiders and are scapegoated for such social ills as crime, child or human trafficking, unemployment, housing shortage, and so on (Gray, 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001). We see it in Kenya where Somali refugees are blamed for compromising Kenya’s security (Wamela, 2009), in Morocco where a rapid increase in the number of sub-Saharan migrants transiting or intending to transit to Spain has generated widespread disquiet among Moroccan nationals (Natter, 2013) or in Israel where Arabs, foreign workers and Ethiopian Jews are confronted with hostility from the predominantly Jewish majority (Pedahzur & Yael, 1999).

Gray (1998) and Ungar (2001) rightly point out that the scapegoating of non-nationals is often a strategic move on the part of various interests to focus attention away from complex, substantial issues of resource distribution or the equalization of opportunities. Claims to authenticity, autochthony or indigeneity are mobilised or deployed to foster spontaneous, permanent or fleeting nationalisms that arrogate to the autochthons the right to determine the parameters of belonging (Zenker, 2011). More often than not, the parameters set for group belonging are not available to being contested. The latter sections of this chapter will show the manner in which some Zimbabwean men are infantilised by their Xhosa counterparts on the basis of their circumcision status. I interpret these to be clear attempts by sections of Xhosa men to set the parameters of group belonging as a way of excluding perceived outsiders. It can also be seen as part of the informal surveillance mechanisms that non-nationals face on a day-to-day basis. Literature shows that there is a common practice everywhere by nationals to informally police migrants on the grounds that left to their own devices, they abuse the host country’s hospitality by practices that threaten long held beliefs or customs (Gray, 1998; Jearey-Graham & Böhmke, 2013).

In Europe, the Bosnia genocide and Kosovo war in the 1990s involved the mass killing of innocent Muslims. The wars have been linked to Islamophobia (Winter, 2010). In the US, Muslims became targets of attacks in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995. Many residents of Middle Eastern descent and African-American Muslims became victims of the initial anger that was targeted at the perceived enemy: “Muslim terrorists”. It later turned out that the chief culprits behind the attack were hardly Muslims and the initial anger was misdirected at the wrong “enemy”. The 9.11 bombings only served to intensify Islamophobic sentiment in the US. The 2002 Dutch national election campaign brought to prominence the controversial politician Wilhelms Simon Petrus Fortuijn, known as Pim
Fortuyn. He was an outspoken critic of immigration and Islam, which he consistently described as a “backward civilization”.

In August 2001, Fortuyn was quoted in the *Rotterdams Dagblad* newspaper saying “I am also in favour of a cold war with Islam. I see Islam as an extraordinary threat, as a hostile religion”. He was assassinated just over a week before the 2002 election but his views on Islam and immigration found resonance with the Dutch voters. The reason was simple. Voters had issues with immigrants from Morocco and Turkey. Among other things, the immigrants were seen as bad employees, *verloederings* (debasing, corrupting), having no respect for private and public property, committed crimes, molested and harassed women and their children did not ride their bicycles only in designated lanes (Ali, 2011:98). Fortuyn raised a number of issues about which any democratic country should freely debate. However, his message was couched in exclusionism and ethnocentrism. Most of what he perceived to be wrong with the Dutch society at the time was blamed on immigrants. Fortuyn cleverly manipulated the general disquiet the Dutch voters had to scapegoat perceived outsiders as threats to the future security of Dutch cities.

**Discourses of foreignness in contemporary South Africa**

In South Africa, nationals have often scapegoated non-nationals for local problems. Foreign nationals have been scapegoated for deficiencies in service delivery (Gqola, 2008; Hassim *et al.*, 2008; Robins, 2009; Langa & Kiguwa, 2013), rising unemployment (Crush & Ramachandran, 2009; Crush, 2008), upsurge in crime (Landau, 2011) and other challenges confronting South Africa today. Gqola (2008) locates the scapegoating in negrophobia, understood as the contempt or fear of black people and their culture, including any behaviour founded on such an outlook. This is a theme Matsinhe (2011) builds on in his engagement with the notion of *makwerekwere*. Matsinhe (ibid) concludes that the idea of *makwerekwere* derives from an irrational fear of the black African other who is constructed by black South Africans as uncultured, a bearer of diseases, and someone who speaks an unintelligible language (Matsinhe, 2011).

By most accounts, xenophobic sentiments in South Africa are fairly generalised across all races and social classes. With just over a week before the 2014 general elections in South Africa, the *Sunday Times* newspaper¹ carried results of a survey it had commissioned. Conducted by Ipsos, the survey assessed registered voters’ views on a range of issues pertaining to the election, including voters’ attitude towards the presence of non-nationals in South Africa.

The people surveyed were presented with the following statement:

---

¹ Published on the 27th of April 2014 under the headline “Pulse of the Nation”. The survey had a representative sample of 2 219 registered voters.
Some people say there are not enough jobs and opportunities because there are too many foreigners in South Africa. Others say foreigners help and play an important part in growing the economy by starting businesses and working in South Africa.

In response to the statement, 67% said there are “too many foreigners that take jobs and opportunities away from South Africans”; 19% said foreigners “play an important role”; and 14% did not know. The results were barely affected by political party affiliation. 67% of ANC voters, 62% of Democratic Alliance voters and 63% of Economic Freedom Fighters voters said there are too many foreigners and that they are taking jobs from South Africans (van Onselen, 2014). Whilst the results by race alter slightly, the majority for each group has an adverse outlook towards the presence of foreign nationals in South Africa. On the question of whether there were too many foreigners in the country, 67% of black voters, 57% of white voters, 68% of Indian voters and 73% of coloured voters responded in the affirmative. Interestingly, the survey results are in keeping with the findings of similar surveys carried out by SAMP more than 5 years ago. More expansive than the *Sunday Times* one in that they cover cross-sections of the population beyond registered voters, the SAMP surveys also find a high prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment among South African nationals (Crush, 2008).

Neocosmos (2006) links xenophobia in South Africa with statecraft. In particular, how state actions, through policy and public pronouncements, have consistently portrayed immigrants as a threat to the socio-economic development of the country. Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s 10 year (1994-2004) tenure as the Minister of Home Affairs is frequently referenced by many xenophobia scholars as one of the most regressive in terms of the official engagement with the subject of immigration. The comments that are attributed to the then Minister, such as his claim that South Africa’s developmental aspirations were under threat because of a deluge of foreign nationals, show a man who had a very insular view of immigration and a lack of a nuanced appreciation of development. It comes as no surprise therefore that Buthelezi’s tenure was marked by a sustained attempt to make South Africa a fortress that was impenetrable to the unwanted alien. Prior to the 2004 elections, Buthelezi took his attempt to overhaul immigration laws to a whole new level as, for the first time in South African history, a Cabinet Minister (Buthelezi) took the President (Thabo Mbeki) to court for refusing to sign into law his attempt to secure stricter immigration regulations.

I should point out that I am not reducing immigration policy in South Africa to a single individual, that is, Buthelezi. I accept that the country’s history of coloniality, apartheid and modernity has influenced how such policies come into being. Buthelezi was simply projecting the social milieu that has always been exclusionary from the time of the Quota Act of 1930 that denied Eastern European Jews entrance to South Africa, the Anti-Aliens Act of 1937 that barred Western European Jewish immigration to the Aliens Control Act of 1991 that promoted and furthered a racist and anti-Semitic immigration discourse (Hicks, 1999). The stringent visa requirements triggered by the Aliens Control Act (1991) resulted in the construction of black, African migrants as illegal and a threat to the development aspirations of the country. Various pieces of legislations over the years and the fact that government
Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place

Officials habitually blame immigrants for the country’s social problems, such as the spread of crime, unemployment and diseases gives credence to Neocosmos’ (ibid) thesis that statecraft is at the centre of xenophobic sentiment in the country.

Landau (2011) concurs with Neocosmos and argues that an analysis of the May 2008 xenophobic attacks reveals salient elite political manipulation and precedents that shaped and, in places, animated the violence. Misago (2011) alludes to the role played by micro-politics in fuelling xenophobic violence, whereas other scholars locate the sources of xenophobia in the media and popular narratives on autochthony and entitlement (Crush, 2008; Landau, 2008a; Hopstock & de Jager, 2011; Langa & Kiguwa, 2013). Foreign men are accused of taking local women, setting in motion a clash between two clusters of men. South African men, have a sense of entitlement to South African women (Gqola, 2008). Xenophobic exclusion is therefore an expression of masculinist violence resourced by patriarchal institutions and relations that objectify women to the point where they are perceived as commodities to be appropriated by rightful claimants to place.

**Migrancy, vulnerability and precarity**

Irrespective of one’s level of education or occupational status, there is a vulnerability Zimbabwean male migrants experience for their quality as outsiders. This is the demarcation between insiders and outsiders that Nyamnjoh (2006) writes about. Some of my study participants speak of regularly being asked what they are doing in South Africa, why they do not want to be in Zimbabwe, or when they plan to go back to Zimbabwe. They mention having an overwhelming sense that at each and every point of their lives, they are being asked to account for themselves, that is, to declare their value to South Africa. This vulnerability is magnified by the fact that South Africa has a fairly recent history of violent popular mobilisations against nonnationals and male migrants bear the brunt of the attacks (Crush & Tevera, 2010; Landau, 2011; Langa & Kiguwa, 2013; Breckenridge, 2014; Hickel, 2014). Anthropologists have over the years produced studies on the notion of vulnerability as it relates to the marginalised. I draw on the work of Veena Das to illustrate how violence, which finds expression in hyper masculinities, forms the basis for the exclusion of Zimbabwean male migrants.

**Vulnerability, violence and exclusion**

I find Das’ (2007) empirical work on resettlement colonies in India useful in the analysis of the link between disempowerment and violence. Das’ depiction of the colonies in India has broad theoretical implications for our anthropological understanding of vulnerability or living precarious lives. In *Precarious Japan*, Anne Allison explores the confluence of political economy, affective experience, gendered, sexualised and irregular labour in texturing precarity in modern day Japan. In the book, Allison uses the word “precarious” to refer to

---

2 So named because their occupants are former slum dwellers.
“disconnected” clusters of people or “people who experience themselves as being out of place, out of sorts, disconnected… a precariousness no-one cares to share” (Allison, 2013:14-15). I like the way Allison develops an expansive understanding of precarity to include groups of people who are disconnected from legible social ties of family and community and thus in many ways socially and politically invisible (Goldfarb, 2014). Some undocumented and unemployed Zimbabwean male migrants can easily fit into the category of invisible subjects. Most migrants are also politically invisible so it sounds reasonable to draw from Allison’s notion of precarity.

Das’ (ibid) study describes how residents of the colonies recurrently experience the state of exception through communal unrest in which the police openly side with the majority religious community. Religion is a key determinant or marker of insiderness and outsidersness. While Das’ study in India is not about migrants, there are parallels between the struggles people living in the colonies and Zimbabwe male migrants both have to navigate. Das (ibid) sketches how people construct a semblance of normality in the context of vulnerability. In the colonies, people live with neighbours who they know are the murderers of their family and friends.

In Stellenbosch, there are migrants who are living with people they know actively beat up or robbed their compatriots during the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. They are also neighbours to people who have openly expressed their objection to their presence. They live in the same neighbourhood as men or women who have openly threatened to “fix” them for having romantic or sexual relations with local women. Physical violence is used by young South African men to assert their claims to physical space, women and even the material possessions that the male migrants have. The male migrants’ agency as males is thus compromised because of a social milieu that generally sides with the nationals. Reporting cases of intimidation is considered as a complete waste of time as the male migrants feel that no action will be taken by the police, especially in cases involving a South African wronging a non-South African. There is an overwhelming sense of powerlessness and frustration when the male migrants have to subordinate their masculinities to that of South African men as a way of avoiding confrontation. This is where I make the connection between the situation in the colonies Das describes work and the condition Zimbabwean male migrants describe as their everyday reality. Das depicts the resettlement colony as assuming the nature of a camp where the state of exception is the norm. Most Zimbabwean male migrants describe their neighbourhoods as arenas of informal surveillance where their liaisons with women or recreational activities are monitored by the local population.

**Hyper masculinities as violence**

Giorgio Agamben draws on the killings of the Jews, homosexuals and Roma and Sinti (Gypsies) in Nazi Germany to theorise about the association between state-sanctioned exclusion and violence. Agamben asserts that the killings were preceded by a process where these groups of people were legally excluded and disenfranchised from the German state
Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place

(Agamben, 2005). From this perspective, exclusion is preceded by violence. I do not suggest that the killing of millions of Jews by the Nazis compares with the killing and displacement of thousands of migrants (Landau, 2011), but I see in Agamben’s logic a way of analysing how migrants in South Africa experience violence and exclusion. I posit that in both the Germany and South African cases, hyper-masculinities—premised on crude notions of power and hegemony—prescribed the parameters of belonging. In Nazi Germany, Jews, gypsies and homosexuals fell foul of the Nazis’ fascist agenda. Hitler played on and mobilise imagined injustices, which he cleverly manipulated to invoke a sense of grievance that the Nazis used against the Jews. The tactic was to marginalise the Jews through the promotion of Hitler’s Pan-Germanism and anti-Semitism, which were all aimed at the elimination of Jews from Germany.

In South Africa, the state has employed the triple strategy of containment, arrest and deportation to deal with immigration (Neocosmos, 2006). Immigration legislation has consistently sought to contain the immigration of foreign nationals who are perceived as obstacles to the attainment of socio-economic development in the country (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Sharp, 2008; Hopstock & de Jager, 2011). The amakwerekwere are constructed as threats to South African masculinities in that they take away jobs and women (Gqola, 2008). There is evidence that black African male and female migrants experience prejudice differently. There is a greater chance of male migrants being asked for IDs than there is for their female counterparts (Dodson, 2010). There is a gap in literature on romantic relationships between female migrants and South African men. There is evidence that some South African women married to migrant men were attacked during the May 2008 xenophobic violence (Landau, 2011). It is not clear if South African men married to migrant women were also attacked but the fact that most of the reported tension has been around migrant men taking local women suggest that xenophobic exclusion is also gendered. I argue that this is an expression of hyper-masculinities built on perceived injustices or unwarranted privileges. South African men perceive Zimbabwean male migrants as enjoying privileges (employment and women) that should not be accruing to them. Xenophobic violence and exclusion becomes a technique of asserting belonging. It is ironic that the violent, hyper-masculinities close off opportunities for equitable masculinities because of their exclusionary nature.

Power, exclusion and tactical cosmopolitanism

I draw on Landau and Freemantle’s concept of tactical cosmopolitanism to illustrate the mechanics by which Zimbabwean male migrants end up in enclaved spaces, from which they produce compensatory masculinities. The notion of tactical cosmopolitanism relates to the problematic of migrant insertion into conflictual environments. It has echoes of self-government whereby migrants tactically insert and remove themselves into and out of their host communities. Landau and Freemantle (2010:375) use the term “tactical cosmopolitanism” to refer to migrants’ “partial inclusion in South Africa’s ever evolving society without being bounded by it”. They identify a plurality of strategies migrants in Johannesburg employ to navigate space, place and exclusion.
One would imagine that male migrants in particular find this strategy useful given that some performances of masculinities play out in the public domain. Tactical cosmopolitanism entails that recreational activities such as sports, drinking and clubbing have to be carefully planned to avoid areas of potential conflict. Zimbabwean male migrants in Stellenbosch self-regulate by avoiding specific nightclubs or practices such as having parties in Kayamandi as a response to a social milieu they construct as hostile to their presence. Whilst they stay in Kayamandi, they make it a point to avoid specific areas and activities to maintain some level of anonymity. This is a theme I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter that deals with sites of encounters, get-togethers and football in Cape Town and Stellenbosch. I assert that tactical cosmopolitanism leads to a process of self-enclaving whereby Zimbabwean male migrants inhabit enclaved social spaces. This is evident in the maps the male migrants draw through their movements, which are aimed at avoiding potential trouble spots. The tactic of partial inclusion by the Zimbabwe male migrants is textured by the challenges they confront in asserting or integrating themselves in the South African urban space.

**Anti-xenophobia mobilisations: pockets of hope?**

It would be unfair and inaccurate to paint every South African as xenophobic. There have been responses to attacks on non-nationals that makes some hopeful that South Africa may as yet become a the “Rainbow” nation Archbishop Emeritus Tutu spoke about many years ago. Landau (2011) writes that some community leaders in the informal settlements neighbouring Alexandra in Gauteng, where the May 2008 xenophobic attacks started, refused to be drawn into the popular mobilisations against non-nationals. Significant numbers of South Africans in areas most affected by the May 2008 xenophobic violence reported that non-nationals were helping to make life easier during the time of economic downturns through their cheaper range of goods (Misago, 2011). In Masiphumelele, Cape Town, community leaders were pressured by their own communities to facilitate the return of displaced Somali traders as local traders were failing to offer competitive prices the Somali offered (Misago, ibid). the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) was also at the forefront of social movements’ response to the May 2008 attacks in Cape Town (Robins, 2009). Maybe there is a glimmer of hope that pockets of the citizenry willing, for their own various interests, to open up South African urban space to nationals. It remains to be seen the terms under which such clusters of people would be willing to do this.

**Conclusion**

Xenophobia in contemporary South Africa is expressed in many forms. It is difficult to identify a single cause of it. The phenomenon of exclusion is particularly salient in urban South Africa where competition for resources has magnified the contestations over belonging, rights and entitlements. In the last five years, there has not been any popular mobilisation against non-nationals at the scale witnessed in May 2008, but there have been sporadic attacks against Somalis and Asians in different cities in the country. This suggests that the use of violence as a tool of marginalisation resonates with some sections of the population. Non-nationals still find themselves faced with a strong anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.
Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place
Bibliography


Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place


Xenophobia and the re-orderings of power, population and place


