## Contents

### Editorial
Africa at 50: Looking to the Future .......................................................... 1

### Debates & Think Pieces
Beyond his Place, Beyond his Time: Nkrumah’s Heritage in the New Millennium ................................. 3  
   Kofi Anyidoho
Return to a Wider Vision of Social Development: Social Policy in Reframing a New Agenda .................. 10  
   Jimi O. Adésinà
Academic Freedom: A Realistic Appraisal .................................................. 13  
   Philip G. Altbach
Challenges to Africa’s Economic Development and Barack Obama’s Policies toward the Continent thus Far 15  
   Abdul Karim Bangura
Discourse on Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Sustainable Socio-economic Development and the Challenge of the Academy in Africa ................................................................. 24  
   Teboho J. Lebakeng
International Symposium on African Revival .............................................. 30  
   Iba Der Thiam
The Impossible Task of Managing the Euro .............................................. 34  
   Samir Amin
The Political Imagination of State Reform: Reflections on the Making of Political Community after Apartheid in South Africa ............................................................ 35  
   Suren Pillay

### Reports
Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa .................. 39  
   Ibrahim Oanda Ogachi
The January 2011 South Sudan Self-determination Referendum and Possible Consequences for Sudan and the Region ................................................................. 40  
   Sam Moyo, Mahmood Mamdani & Ebrima Sall
The Political Process in Sudan and the 2011 Referendum ............................................................ 42  
   Reim Atabani
Second Nyerere Intellectual Festival: Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-African Studies .... 46  
   Bernard Mumpasi Lututala
2010 Distinguished Africanist Awards: Professor N’Dri Assie-Lumumba and Professor Tukumbi  
   Lumumba-Kasongo .................................................................................. 47
   CODESRIA Publications
Mahmood Mamdani bags Honorary Doctorate at Addis Ababa University .............................................. 48
   CODESRIA Publications

### CODESRIA Activities
Research ........................................................................................................ 50
Training, Grants and Fellowships .................................................................. 52
South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development (SEPHIS) ............... 53
New Publications ......................................................................................... 54
CODICE ....................................................................................................... 55
Editorial

Africa at 50: Looking to the Future

As many West and Central African countries are celebrating fifty years of independence this year, CODESRIA and the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies of the University of Ghana, Legon, organised an international symposium to reflect on dreams and realities of African independence. Highlights of the symposium will be published in the next issue of CODESRIA Bulletin. In this issue, we publish sweet memories of one of Africa’s most illustrious sons – Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana – through the inaugural lecture of Prof. Kofi Anyidoho, a member of CODESRIA Executive Committee, which he gave at his installation as the first occupant of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon, in March this year. On behalf of the entire African research and academic community, CODESRIA congratulates Prof. Anyidoho on this well-deserved appointment and wishes him a very successful tenure in the advancement of scholarship in Africa and beyond.

The Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies was established at the University of Ghana, Legon, two years after the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Chair in Pan African Studies was established at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with Professor Issa Shivji as the first occupant. Hopefully, we will soon witness the birth of other chairs in pan-African studies named after great women and men of Africa and the African Diaspora such as Ruth First, Cheikh Anta Diop, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Amilcar Cabral, Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Marcus Garvey. Such Chairs can help both in making the works of great pan-Africanists known to the younger generations of Africans, and to also initiate critical reflections on the challenges facing our continent and its peoples in the 21st century.

Professor Anyidoho’s interesting lecture takes us through the academic, philosophical, political and physical influences that clearly mark Nkrumah out as a pan-Africanist of distinction. Nkrumah’s erudity, clarity of vision, courage, revolutionary spirit, and some of his successes and many other issues, are chronicled in the lecture. Kwame Nkrumah’s story is that of an extraordinary symbiosis between visionary leadership and the will of the people as well as that of an individual and a nation inextricably woven together. The lecture, spiced with dramatic excerpts and anecdotes, posits that Nkrumah ended up being a controversial figure because ‘he was too far ahead of his time’, which made it difficult for his contemporaries to fully understand him. There is therefore a need to re-visit Nkrumah’s legacy, as we re-conceptualise and work towards the free, united, respectable and respected, economically developed and democratic Africa that he envisioned.

The current debates on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that most countries of Africa are said to be far from achieving, are a reminder that the journey towards genuine freedom, peace and development has hardly begun in our continent. The setting of the MDGs was already, in itself, a kind of testimony that the goals of independence have not been achieved.

The Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development held in 1995 constituted a first attempt by the international community to make global and national development processes more inclusive. Fifteen years after the 1995 Copenhagen Summit, a cursory glance at social developments in Africa would lead one to conclude that important as it was, the summit’s decisions have not led to inclusive social development for most African countries. According to Jimi Adesina, social development in this period has been hampered by various social and economic crises and the resultant ‘adjustments’ and reforms have further complicated the problems. His article, in this issue of the Bulletin, calls for a wider vision and a longer gaze on society and a move towards gender equality and social solidarity, and to make the reforms more relevant to quick recovery and faster social progress.

Indigenous African epistemologies and languages are inestimable treasures, and the fact that they were not integrated into colonial knowledge systems is not an excuse to relegate them to the periphery of the modern knowledge system and replace them by the so-called ‘universal’ systems which are, essentially, products of Western scientific traditions. These systems, established by the colonial administrations, have also succeeded in disconnecting the African academy from the various social institutions that could have enhanced endogenous knowledge production. One important consequence of all this is the partial alienation of some of the intellectuals of this continent, who are wallowing in a pool of ‘borrowed’ cultures. Indeed, the African knowledge system is a bifurcated one, and in the African intellectual community the ‘non-europhone’ intellectuals (Ousmane Kane) constitute a large marginalised group. Teboho Lebakeng’s article calls for a shift from Eurocentricism which has severed African intellectualism and polity, and painted African knowledge systems negatively and as the root cause of the continent’s contemporary problems of underdevelopment. Indigenous knowledge, she argues, is the key to sustainable social and economic development; it is through these that we can reverse what she calls the current situation of “epistemicide” and “linguicide” that Africa is currently suffering from. The major problems facing the African academy in this context are surmountable if only we would make conscious efforts to know ourselves and how much we have and are contributing to world civilisation.

This issue also contains an article calling for an appraisal of ‘academic freedom’. The author, Philip G. Altbach, reveals that this universally practised right, which has become a core value for good quality higher education, has been much confused
with other issues of academic and institutional welfarism, politicking and accountability in contemporary times. It is time to re-think and re-define the term, especially in the context of internationalisation and other kinds of profound transformations going on in the higher education sector. However, it is not certain whether Altbach’s call for a return to some kind of orthodox approach to academic freedom will get many supporters in Africa. The Kampala Declaration, whose 20th anniversary was celebrated in a major CODESRIA conference held in Oran, Algeria, in March this year, was informed by a broader view of intellectual and academic freedom (see brief report in this issue).

The present crises of legitimacy and management facing the Euro have attracted the attention of one of Africa’s eminent intellectuals, Prof. Samir Amin. Underscoring the inseparability of a state and its currency for the proper functioning of capital, he submits that creating the Euro in the absence of a European state is an aberration, a decision deliberately taken to keep the oligopolies in power and forestall any challenge. This article suggests an alternative in what he calls a ‘European monetary snake’ by which each European state would remain monetarily sovereign, managing its own economy and currency, but still operating within the limits of free trade.

The international economy is gradually shifting base, presently from Europe to Asia, and it is envisaged that it would reach Africa, making it the continent of the 21st century. This will surely require some deconstruction and reconstruction, unprecedented changes and new discoveries. Africa must prepare adequately to face the challenges, so there is a need for a revival. This is why Thiam talks of an ‘International Symposium on African Renaissance’ in his article. He however warns against a Renaissance that takes after the European Renaissance of the 15th century which focused only on culture. Instead, the African revival must permeate the entire African community in all its ramifications. Recalling the black race revival of the 19th and 20th centuries and the pioneering efforts of Cheikh Anta Diop, Franz Fanon and Aimé Cessaire, he outlines necessary steps to be taken to fulfil the dreams of Africa, past and present.

Ebrima Sall
Executive Secretary

Alex Bangirana
Head, Publications
Introduction

The problems of a nation, even a small one, cannot all be solved in the life span of any one man, or even in any one generation. The problems of Africa belong to many generations of men. The mountains that loom so formidably today will be distant hillocks behind the generations of tomorrow. But overweening ambition to erect what they think will be their own immortal monuments drives some men in tempestuous haste to telescope all history into a lifetime, and they seek to destroy in the process all who will not submit to their imperious will. ...It is not given to man to make himself immortal. It will take more than a lifetime to build a united nation out of the states of Africa. The vision was seen years ago, in the darkest days of slavery. It has come nearer to reality since then; but it is not the Hitlers who build the things that endure (Busia 1962).

In his own place, in his own time, Osagyefo Dr Kwame Nkrumah woke up one dawn in a far away land, and discovered that he could not return home. For six years and more, he lived in exile, waiting, hoping that the people of Ghana would change their mind, that they would reclaim the vision of freedom and self-determination he had tried to inspire them to, and they would surely welcome him back. Somehow, we never did. His thoughts gathered into a lump in his throat and stayed there for so long that the lump became malignant and was later diagnosed as cancer of the throat. And he died, only for his body to be brought home to widespread mourning and a state burial still remembered as the most heavily attended in our history.

On the day of the great betrayal, the day Ghana repudiated her most precious gift of the twentieth century, not too long after the guns fell silent around Flag Staff House, the people poured out into the streets with wild jubilation, led by students and some faculty members of the University of Ghana, Legon, many of them wearing academic gowns and screaming obscenities into the tropical heat. The demonstrations gave way to several weeks devoted to a series of brilliant lectures given at the Arts Centre in Accra under the title ‘What Went Wrong’? It was at one of those lectures that a leaflet with the opening passage quoted above was given the widest possible circulation.

To some, it may seem odd to begin a lecture dedicated to Dr Kwame Nkrumah’s heritage by citing at length words of apparent wisdom from Professor K.A. Busia, the man who led the last major opposition in parliament against Nkrumah and was eventually obliged to seek refuge in exile. It is however appropriate that we choose Busia’s words as a relevant entry point into a reassessment of the significance of Nkrumah’s heritage. The Busia passage comes from the concluding pages of The Challenge of Africa. This is a brief but significant work in which the one time professor of sociology draws on fundamental human values inherent in aspects of his native Akan culture as a basis for his critique of the intellectual foundations of the independence movement along lines advocated by Nkrumah.

Busia is very careful not to mention Nkrumah, but his words of caution may very well be answering to Nkrumah’s challenge. As indicated above, Busia’s The Challenge of Africa, brief as it is, may be considered a classic study in human values, a study directly based on insights provided by a close study of aspects of ancient Akan traditions, such as funeral rites and the belief in tranquility. His and Busia’s studies had given them a deep knowledge of African history and cultural institutions. As a scholar, Danquah is still widely recognised for his classic work Akan Doctrines of God, among others. And it is generally acknowledged that it was from his research into ancient African history that he proposed the name Ghana for the Gold Coast as an independent state. As indicated above, Busia’s The Challenge of Africa, brief as it is, may be considered a classic study in human values, a study directly based on insights provided by a close study of aspects of ancient Akan traditions, such as funeral rites and the belief systems on which the rites are based.

Beyond his Place, Beyond his Time: Nkrumah’s Heritage in the New Millennium*

Kofi Anyidoho
University of Ghana
Legon

The claim has often been made that intellectually, Nkrumah was no match for the political figures who led the opposition against his ideas and his political agenda for Ghana and for Africa, in particular, Dr. J. B. Danquah and Dr. K. A. Busia. There is no doubt that these two major figures were among the best-educated and most articulate Ghanaian intellectuals of their time. Indeed, as demonstrated in their various writings, their studies had given them a deep knowledge of African history and cultural institutions. As a scholar, Danquah is still widely recognised for his classic work Akan Doctrines of God, among others. And it is generally acknowledged that it was from his research into ancient African history that he proposed the name Ghana for the Gold Coast as an independent state. As indicated above, Busia’s The Challenge of Africa, brief as it is, may be considered a classic study in human values, a study directly based on insights provided by a close study of aspects of ancient Akan traditions, such as funeral rites and the belief systems on which the rites are based.

It goes without saying that Danquah, Busia and many others of their circle were beneficiaries of the finest Western-type of education available to a select group among the African elite, the kind of education generally associated with the Oxford-Cambridge tradition. It is not only privileged education, but also education for privileges. The Oxbridge model of edu-
cation is one that is best suited to the
world view and aspirations of young men
and women who have been brought up
under conditions of social reality which
teach them to believe that they are among
the very best, and that they naturally de-
serve the best of what life has to offer. In
short, they are entitled to reserved, perhaps
ancestral seats, in the House of Lords, a
safe distance from the House of Commons.

It is significant that even in the colonial
dispensation, in spite of racial stereotyp-
ing, in spite of serious doubts about the
intellectual capacity of people of ‘the
darker races’, especially the African, it was
not uncommon for Oxford and Cambridge
to open their doors to carefully chosen
young men of promise, who were expected
to be groomed into potential candidates
for eventual OBE’s, cynically termed by
some as ‘Obedient Boys of the Empire’.
Admittedly, the Oxbridge tradition has
often turned out brilliant and ‘rebellious’
products, much to the annoyance of their
mentors. On the whole, however, it was
expected that the future of the empire
would be safe in the hands of these
young, even if somewhat inexperienced,
potential OBEs.

It is important to note as well, that many
members of this elite group did not owe
their privileged status only to the ben-
efits of their Oxbridge type of education.
Many of them came from royal lineage or
belonged to families that had established
themselves as members of the profes-
sional elite or the merchant class within
the colonial system. Often, it was this kind
of background that provided the re-
sources for an Oxbridge type of educa-
tion. Both Dr Danquah and Dr Busia are
of direct royal descent.

The British might not have been too wor-
ried about the prospects of handing the
Gold Coast over to their carefully prepared
surrogates, under a new and disguised
kind of indirect rule. After all, hardly any
of them would ever have dreamed of cut-
ting off their imperial umbilical cord in
haste and without proper consultations
and necessary preconditions. Besides,
they were always properly dressed in
three piece suits for formal occasions, and
the best among them spoke English with
a flawless Oxbridge accent that must have
put Daniel Jones to shame. The future of
the empire would and should be safe in
their hands, even under a so-called in-
dependent Gold Coast, call it Ghana or
whatever.

In the meantime, J. B. Danquah, ‘the
doyen of Gold Coast politics’, and his
colleagues - among them William Ofori
Atta, Edward Akuffo Addo, J. W. De Grafh
Johnson and V.B. Annan - continued to
press for ‘substantial changes to the con-
stitution introduced in 1946’, changes that
would pave the way for them to assume
the leadership mantle. ‘They confidently
expected that their education, their social
standing, their background and their leader-
ship qualities would make them natural
heirs when the colonial government
handed over power’ (Rooney 2007:48). As
noted by Kwame Arhin, ‘Dr Danquah and
his friends thought of the UGCC as a
group for uniting and embracing all the
chiefs and peoples of the Gold Coast for
the purpose of asking for the permission
to rule themselves ‘within the shortest
possible time’... They would negotiate
with those authorities a slow but system-
atic grant of authority...’ (Arhin 2000: 10).
Arhin’s observation coincides with that
of June Milne who also notes that the
other leaders of the United Gold Coast
Convention (UGCC) who were arrested
and imprisoned with Nkrumah, following
the 1948 riots ‘made it clear that they re-
gretted inviting him to become the gen-
eral secretary of the UGCC, even blaming
Ako Adjei for recommending him. They
wanted to conduct the liberation strugg-
le in an orderly manner, step by step,
under conditions prescribed by the colo-
nial government’ (Milne 2000:42).

Unfortunately, this guy just showed up
and proceeded to spoil everything. Leg-
end has it that when he stepped off the
boat in Takoradi ‘his total possessions
had been a couple of suits and a change
of shirts, shoes, and underwear which he
carried in a small suit-case’ (Rooney 2007:
21). To the above list of possessions, we
probably should add a few books and
manuscripts, as well as his almost com-
pleted but long abandoned PhD thesis.
He apparently had no particular residen-
tial address of his own in the metropolis
to go to, and, after some two weeks of
reunion with his mother in Tarkwa, was
obliged to spend the next few years in
accommodation provided by benefactors.

Kwame Nkrumah had left the Gold Coast
eleven years earlier, in 1935, with the dream
of pursuing higher education. Having
failed the entrance examination for Uni-
versity of London, he went, instead and
upon advice from Nnamdi Azikiwe of Ni-
geria, to the United States. He eventually
graduated from Lincoln University in 1939
with a BA in Economics and Sociology;
top of his class from the Lincoln Theo-
logical Seminary in 1942 with a Bachelor
of Theology; from the University of Penn-
sylvania, also in 1942, with an M.Sc in
Education, and again from U-Penn with
an M.A. in Philosophy in 1943. Back at
Lincoln, in between increasing responsi-
bilities and involvement in student politi-
cal organisation, he signed up for the PhD
in Philosophy. His doctoral thesis, titled
‘Mind and Thought in Pre-literacy Soci-
ety: A Study in Ethno-philosophy with
Special Reference to the Akan people of
the Gold Coast’, was eventually aban-
donated to enable him devote full attention
to his new responsibilities as a key mem-
er of the fast-growing Pan-African move-
ment. His relocation from the United
States to the United Kingdom, to work as
Joint Secretary to the all-important 1945
Pan-African Congress at Manchester, ef-
effectively brought to an end his quest for
a doctoral degree. However, a copy of the
uncompleted thesis available at the Kwame
Nkrumah Mausoleum in Accra suggests
that the work was all but finished.

It is important for us to note that in order
to secure funding for his travel to America,
he had to rely on support from members of
his extended family. He even had to
travel to Lagos as a stow-away in order
to get help from one such family member.
Even more significant, most of his educa-
tion in the US was gained while he worked
at various menial jobs to support himself:
from library assistant to such ‘sordid and
degrading jobs’ as ‘selling fish in Harlem’
and ‘handling of rotting animal entrails’.
‘Often, during these difficult days, he
slept in railway stations until the police
moved him on, he slept in parks until
heavy rain forced him to move and he even
slept on the subway between Harlem and
Brooklyn’ (Rooney 2007:29). A reading of
‘Hard Times’, Chapter Four of Nkrumah’s
autobiography (1957:35-47), offers ample
testimony not only of the hardship he had
to endure but also his determination to
survive this long period of agony. Even
more significant, was his determination
to turn this period of adversity into an
opportunity to learn new ways of survival,
a chance to make new friends, take on
new, even if difficult challenges. In the
process, he gained a wide range of friends
and experiences, all of which were to play
a crucial role in his early maturity as an
unstoppable fighter for freedom and so-
cial justice.

\[---\]
It was under these conditions that Kwame Nkrumah was to become a candidate for activist politics in the cause of the emancipation of Black people. The rising tide of Black nationalism, especially as championed by Marcus Mosiah Garvey, was clearly a natural destination for his political tutelage. In an important essay titled ‘Kwame Nkrumah – the Pan-African Revolutionary’, Kofi Awoonor makes a strong case for a direct link between Nkrumah’s eventual political philosophy and agenda and the kind of drudgery he had to endure in the United States, especially as a Black person in those years of active political struggle against slavery, racism, and capitalism (Awoonor 1994:1-34).

The case being made here for the impact of Nkrumah’s background of growing up in modest and sometimes humiliating circumstances as a working class ‘black’ person, must also take in one very important aspect of his place of origin. He was born into the small rural community of Nkoful in 1909. It was barely eight years after the European colonisers had set the boundary that split the ancestral territory of his Nzema people into two, one part to the British on the Gold Coast, the other half over to the French in the Ivory Coast. As a child, he must have grown up watching his people as they tried to adjust themselves to this sudden complication introduced into their lives by alien colonial powers. It is my view that the need for the removal of such colonial boundaries must have come to Nkrumah quite early in life. This view is expressed even more emphatically by Kwame Arhin: ‘...it is just possible that Nkrumah’s intense Pan-Africanism is related to his early experiences connected with the practical results of the arbitrary division of the Anyi-Baule peoples between the British and French colonial powers along the Gold Coast and Ivory Coast boundaries’ (Arhin 2000:3).

The leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention must have meant well when they accepted Ako Adjei’s suggestion that Nkrumah should be invited to return to the Gold Coast as the first full time paid secretary of the party. As one historian puts it, ‘They did not realise what a deep gulf separated their views and their aims from those of the revolutionary leader they were about to invite to join them’ (Roooney 2007:48).

The story of Nkrumah’s dissatisfaction with the basic ideas and programme of the UGCC, his eventual split and the launching of his own Convention People’s Party, is one story that has been told so often we need not go into it here. Instead, I would like to propose that the greatest mistake made by Danquah and his colleagues was not the invitation to Nkrumah. Their most fatal error was to have underestimated the force of the intellectual and revolutionary foundations of Nkrumah’s political convictions and strategies. If they had, for instance, had a chance to read his completed but unpublished manuscript Towards Colonial Freedom, they might not necessarily have agreed with him on various points and conclusions. But they probably would at least have taken him a bit more seriously as a potentially dangerous opponent who deserved to be treated with respect, rather than with disdain. Their greatest error was to have seen him at first and perhaps for a long time as a mere rabble-rouser and troublemaker, a man with no real pedigree as an intellectual.

Nkrumah may have abandoned his doctoral studies. But he was no half-baked intellectual. He had read widely, gaining intellectual breadth and depth not only from Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini, but also from some of the best minds working in the service of the Pan-African struggle in the earlier decades of the twentieth century. They included Du Bois, Kwegyir Aggrey, Nnamdi Azikiwe, CLR James, George Padmore, Casely Hayford, among others, and indeed Blyden and Horton of the 1860s to 1880s. Each one of these, in his own way, was an activist intellectual, a public intellectual totally devoted to the struggle for the emancipation of African people. The cumulative impact of these minds on Nkrumah seemed to have brought him to a clear conviction that it was not enough to be a brilliant intellectual. The ultimate goal of intellectual enterprise must be the ability to use insights provided by intellectual analysis as building blocks of strategies for the African liberation struggle. As noted by George Padmore:

During his twelve years’ stay abroad, he had made an intensive study of the history of political and national liberation movements and had helped in formulating the tactics and strategy of the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in October 1945, under the direction of Dr W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, the foremost Afro-American scholar and champion of Negro liberation, and one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples (Padmore 1953:61).

Among these various influences, however, Nkrumah himself admits that his greatest debt was to the intellectual and revolutionary ideas and tactics of Marcus Garvey: ‘...of all the literature I studied, the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey published in 1923’ (Nkrumah 1957:44-45). Commenting on the Garvey influence on Nkrumah, Awoonor observes that ‘It was also Garvey who led him to his Pan-Africanist idealism and practice, defining for him the existence of a global African family, including the concept of the diaspora — which later became the cornerstone of his internationalism’ (Awoonor op. cit:xixii). Nkrumah’s eventual adoption of the Black Star, Black Star Line, and the national colours of red, gold and green bear ample testimony to the impact of Garveyism and the Garvey movement on his project for a self-defining African revolution. Lessons learned from the Garvey movement must have helped Nkrumah’s remarkable success in leading the expansion of the base of the UGCC from one central committee and office to hundreds of branches and offices across the country in a relatively short time. Following his break with the UGCC and its leadership, the newly established Convention People’s Party became the immediate beneficiary of the Garvey-inspired techniques and tactics of mass political mobilisation, complete with remarkable success in getting ordinary, even poor, citizens to provide much of the financial and other resources needed to sustain the movement and its campaigns.

As part of a recent graduate seminar on Post-colonial Literature, I had my students read Towards Colonial Freedom as a good example of what has been described as a discourse of decolonisation. From the long discussions that followed, it was clear to me that the students were amazed at the force and clarity with which Nkrumah’s analysis exposes the ultimate goals of imperialism and various strategies designed for the achievement of those goals. They were also impressed by the carefully thought-through programme of action Nkrumah proposed for the struggle against imperialism and its offshoots, colonial and neo-colonial domination. Above all, however, some of the students expressed anxiety over his fu-
No exclusive setback, but its general import must not be dismissed so lightly:

It tasted good. To the surging crowds at the Lagos racetrack, to the thousands who packed the polo grounds in Accra, to the multitudes that lined the streets of Nairobi, Kampala, Abidjan, Freetown, or Dar es Salaam, it tasted good indeed.

‘It is the hour of truth’, proclaimed President Senghor in Dakar.

‘At long last, the battle has ended!’ Kwame Nkrumah exulted, watching the red, green, and gold colors of Ghana fluttering in the night breeze, ‘Ghana...is free forever...’

Independence, however, carried more profound implications – more than an individual, or even a national triumph. Nkrumah’s exultation was tempered by the knowledge that Ghana was an example for all the people of Africa. ‘If we...succeeded’, he informed his countrymen, ‘we shall aid...other territories...the sooner to reach conditions under which they [too] may become independent’. Similarly, in Tanganyika, the great day was marked by the lighting of a beacon on the summit of Mount Kilimanjaro, a flame to shine symbolically for all who sought freedom. Julius Nyerere had some years earlier given the explanation: ‘We, the people of Tanganyika, would like to light a candle and put it on top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond our borders, giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity where before there was only humiliation. In Tanganyika, as elsewhere in Africa, independence meant more than freedom from colonial rule. It meant the freedom to build a new life, a better world’ (July 1987:1-4).

What we may call the African independence imperceptive constitutes one of the most rapid and most hopeful, even if short-lived, moments in world history. Thirty African countries gained their political independence from reluctant but somewhat helpless European powers within five years from Ghana’s historic moment on 6 March 1957. A large part of the credit must go to such visionary leaders as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Azikiwe, Kenyatta, even Banda, despite how each of them later turned out. But we cannot overlook the role played by the ordinary citizenry of the various countries. Without their support, without the sacrifices they were prepared to make, in some cases sacrifice that took the form of armed struggle against some of the best equipped armies in Europe, often aided by deadly collaborators and traitors in their midst, the lofty ideals of even the most revolutionary, most visionary leader would be bound to amount to nothing but a dream. In the particular case of Nkrumah, his official biographer makes the following observation: ‘There was fertile ground on which to work for mass participation in the anti-colonial struggle. A high degree of political awareness already existed among the people in towns and countryside. This was being expressed in a growing resentment of colonial rule’ (Milne 2000:36).

Perhaps this was the one thing that each of these leaders eventually seemed to have lost sight of – that the spirit of freedom resides in the collective will and struggle of a people, not in the lofty ideals of one leader, however gifted, however self-sacrificing. Any disconnect between the vision of a leader and the will and spirit of the people can only lead to one thing – collapse of the independence dream itself and tragedy for the leaders and the people alike.

For a few magical years, Nkrumah seemed to have carried the will and the spirit of the people with him. And during those few years, amazing progress was recorded, in spite of active and negative opposition and sometimes blatant sabotage and repeated attempts on his life.

The Convention People’s Party (CPP) government led by Kwame Nkrumah, made massive investments in agriculture and manufacturing to lay a foundation for the emergence of our country as a modern industrialised nation. These socio-economic investments exceeded what had been achieved by Malaysia, India, South Korea, and Indonesia, that were the newly independent countries in the era. Nkrumah justified the primacy of the state in economic investment and development on the observation that colonialism precluded the emergence of a viable capital-inclass and private sector in the colonial economy. He concluded therefore that it was the responsibility of the state to assume the role of prime mover in the economic development of the newly independent country (Duncan 2009:27).

Many there are who have questioned this line of thinking and the action programme it engendered, but the offered no workable alternative that was not likely to return the fate of the newly independent
states into the suffocating embrace of the erstwhile colonial empire. On the contrary, the political and economic histories of Ghana’s independence age-mates such as Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea seem to suggest that the Nkrumah option was indeed a difficult but ultimately worthwhile way to go, provided there was prudent management and internal political will and consensus, strong enough to stand up to inevitable hostility from the erstwhile colonial and imperial order.

The new nation of Ghana did itself proud by embarking on the most massive programme of development ever recorded in the space of a few years – and which covered every sphere of national life: for education, a national network of brand new secondary schools distributed evenly across the country, a number of technical institutes and teacher training colleges, and two new universities, one devoted to science and technology, the other to the production of graduate teachers; in health, the introduction of a free health care system and the building of new clinics and polyclinics for various communities; in transport, the launch of a national airline, which took off on its maiden voyage with an all Ghanaian crew (Captains Agyare, Ampomah and Dorkenoo); in trade and industry, the establishment of as many state owned enterprises as possible, at one point 60 new ones within twelve months, the expansion of the one old harbour and the building of a new one from scratch, complete with the new municipality of Tema, and a national shipping line, Black Star Line (after Marcus Garvey’s historical model); in science and technology, the establishment of the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission; in research and high level intellectual work for industrialisation, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research as well as the Ghana Academy of Science and Letters; in arts and culture, the Institute of Arts and Culture, Institute of African Studies - with a national dance company, Bureau of Ghana Languages, School of Translators, Ghana Television, and Ghana Film Industry Corporation; in agriculture, massive subsidies to individual farmers, especially cocoa and also tobacco farmers, and a country-wide network of state farms, several of them run by the state-sponsored Workers Brigade, a network of silos for eventual storage of surplus food during bumper seasons – all of them criminally abandoned after Nkrumah’s overthrow; and on and on.

Clearly, the expansion of national assets on such a massive scale in such a short time must have posed major management and maintenance challenges. Perhaps this was where the trouble began. Many have wondered what happened to the over 200 million pounds Nkrumah’s government is said to have inherited as foreign reserves. He certainly did not divert it into secret personal Swiss and other bank accounts. We can or should see where most of it went – into a phenomenal expansion of national assets. But for how much profit for the nation at large and for how long? We may never be able to answer this question with absolute certainty, given the abrupt end to the Nkrumah dream and programme of action. But of one thing we are quite sure – nothing else that we have tried since then has worked sufficiently as to put the lie to the Nkrumah dream and programme.

Among the many slogans that Nkrumah’s followers often recited, to the annoyance of those who had reason to hate him, was the claim that ‘Nkrumah Never Dies’. Maybe this was indeed too much of a presumption. But among some of our people, there is the saying that a person may die and be buried, but his or her tongue never rots. By the tongue, they mean words, but more than words, they mean the person’s ideas, especially as enshrined in various memorable sayings (or writings) and as translated into action. No matter how we assess Nkrumah’s life, no matter what final judgment we come to on the person’s ideas, especially as expressed in memorable sayings (or writings) and as translated into action. No matter how we assess Nkrumah’s life, no matter what final judgment we come to on the person’s ideas, especially as expressed in memorable sayings (or writings) and as translated into action.

But above all, he was a man of ideas, a visionary intellectual whose ideas shine brighter, like a star in a dark sky, the farther we move away from his own place, his own time. Few things stand stronger and last longer than ideas that have the force and the purity of fundamental truths, especially truths that relate to the ultimate desires of all human beings, desires such as freedom. With a remarkable gift for words, Nkrumah was able, often, to state his great ideas in unforgettable images:

There is only one way to Africa’s survival: a union of African States ... I have visions of great cities in Ghana with large factories and cultural institutions, inhabited by people who are happy, cheerful and resilient, venturing into the realms of knowledge, science, industry and technology. On our political horizon, I can see Ghana within the framework of a united Africa, making her voice and strength felt in the councils of the world. If ever there was time for unity, concord, concerted action and relentless personal sacrifice at home, this is it (Nkrumah 1960). That vision of a self-defining Ghana prospering in the global arena ‘within the framework of a united Africa’ was indeed a compelling dream for which Nkrumah will always be remembered. Those who doubted the wisdom of that vision have since discovered that African people have tried every other option, but to no avail. And as if to spite Africa, Europe, her erstwhile imperial majesty, has recently seized upon that same dream, and is now busy running ahead with it, albeit with certain technical difficulties.

During what must have been his last visit to Ghana, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere paid a private visit to the W.E.B. Du Bois Memorial Centre for Pan African Culture. He stood for a while in front of the tomb of the man known to history as the Father of Pan-Africanism. Then he turned to the small group that had gathered around him, especially members of the management board of the centre. ‘This is good, very good indeed. But you must do a similar honour for Nkrumah. After all, it was Nkrumah who brought Du Bois back to Ghana, to Africa.’ And then, almost in a whisper, as if speaking to himself, we could hear him say: ‘I wonder how many of us understood what he was trying to tell us then?’

Often, the loftiest vision of independence is clouded by colonially conditioned responses of the professional and political elite. Nkrumah was, of course, fully aware of this challenge. His error, if indeed it was an error, was to alienate and even antagonize most of the elite, to assume that once he managed to win over the so-called masses to his side, he would in due course subdue the opposition of the elite. As it turned out, the opposition was not only stronger than he imagined, but also unforgiving, and would go to any length to neutralise his efforts, or indeed eliminate him if need be. What he was to eventually come up with as his final option, may have been his gravest miscalculation. The complexity of his dilemma was such that we must turn to Femi Osofisan, literary artist and master of words, to capture it most poignantly in the language of poetic drama:
Nkrumah: We will rebuild those castles so that, when next you go to Cape Coast, you’ll see, not a tomb crammed with the noisy wailings of the past, but a monument of progress, a glittering testimony to the genius of the black race, to the immense possibilities of human freedom! That’s the mission of our new nation, Doctor, why we name ourselves Ghana, and I want you especially to believe in us.

Du Bois: It’s a beautiful dream... a tall dream...

Nkrumah: But we’ll get there, I swear it to you! We’ve survived the last three centuries, haven’t we? Three hundred years during which our land became the whorehouse of European adventurers... They stripped us of our gold and diamonds, of our timber and cocoa. And finally the British colonised us. But it’s over now, we have won our freedom. We’ve recovered the right to shape our own destiny.

Du Bois: I want to believe that. That’s why I came here, isn’t it? But, with all I see around, tell me frankly – have the British left?

Nkrumah: I don’t understand...

Du Bois: Tell me I am wrong. Because, I’m sorry, the people I see around you offer me little assurance. For the British cannot be said to be gone, when they have left so much of themselves behind – inside all of you...

Your ardour is infectious! But still – what about the educated elite? Can you build a modern nation without the collaboration and the commitment of your educated elite?

Nkrumah: We will re-educate them. Make them learn from the masses.

Du Bois: Like rolling a river up the hill.

Nkrumah: It can happen, Doctor, yes. It’s the saying among our people, that mountains have been known to surrender, when the river is stubborn.

Du Bois: But, will you have time?

Nkrumah: We will have to create it.

Du Bois: And if they decide to fight back? If your elite resort instead... for instance, to throwing bombs?

Nkrumah: Then we’ll have no choice but to eliminate them.

such reassessment should help us see our way clearer into the future we carelessly threw away. Mr Vice-Chancellor, I intend to dedicate much of my tenure as the first occupant of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies not only to my personal research agenda, but also to one or two specific projects that may help point us in the right direction.

Given the abundance of myths, half-truths and blatant lies that have been peddled about Nkrumah and the African liberation project he led with such remarkable, even if short-lived success, it is important that we move quickly to reclaim whatever reliable information there may still be around. To this end, I propose to launch a project titled *Homage: Personal Testimonies of the Independence Era and its Aftermath*. *Homage* is a proposed video/television series that will feature personal testimonies of significant individuals who were key players and/or keen witnesses to some of the most important events leading up to and immediately following Ghana’s Independence, through Nkrumah’s overthrow and into the era of military rule. Drawing on my experience as host and executive producer of GTV’s *African Heritage Series* and of the documentation project of the CODESRIA African Humanities Institute Programme, I am currently working on a line-up of potential witnesses to probably the most significant era of Ghana’s history, an era that needs to be carefully documented for posterity.

A second, more ambitious project I wish to propose is entitled the ‘Kwame Nkrumah Pan-African Intellectual and Cultural Festival’, a bi-annual intellectual and cultural festival to be organised under the auspices of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies, in honour of Nkrumah’s dedication to a tradition of vigorous and liberating Africa-centred intellectual and cultural activity, such as was outlined in the major address he gave on the occasion of the formal opening in 1963 of the Institute of African Studies. Inspiration for such a festival comes from the example of the *Annual Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Intellectual Festival* Week of the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, under the auspices of the Julius Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-African Studies. The maiden edition of the Nyerere festival was held from April 13-17, 2009. A close study of the full line-up of events suggests that such a festival is certain to provide a critical impetus for the promotion of a major international dialogue on Pan-African thought and struggle. The University of Ghana, through the Kwame Nkrumah Chair, is in a very good position to not merely copy the good example of Dar es Salaam, but to draw on Ghana’s multiple connections with the history of Pan-Africanism to fashion a unique programme of intellectual debate and cultural events that could easily and quickly grow into one of the most significant events on the university’s calendar. The plan is for the first occupant of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair to lead a planning committee to put together a comprehensive programme for the festival, with the Institute of African Studies and the CODESRIA African Humanities Institute Programme as joint coordinating units but working in collaboration with other departments, such as the School of Performing Arts and the Departments of History and Political Science. Unlike the annual Dar es Salaam festival, the Legon festival should be held once every two years. The idea is to devote each intervening year to finalising publications and other products from each edition of the festival. This should also allow reasonable time for fund raising and careful planning. The maiden edition of the Kwame Nkrumah Pan-African Intellectual and Cultural Festival is intended to be held in September 2010, around the next anniversary of Nkrumah’s birthday. It is envisaged that core festival activities will include an international symposium as well as a cluster of cultural events, such as film shows, literary readings/performances, dramatic and musical shows, as well as a package of activities specially designed for the younger ones in schools and colleges. Every effort will be made to produce professional video documentaries on each major event for eventual wider circulation.

Mr Vice-Chancellor, colleague faculty members, students, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I must take this opportunity to appeal for support in cash and in kind for the success of the work of the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies. The two projects outlined above are important as ideas, but they must be translated into a programme of action that will bring honour to the legacy Nkrumah has left for us. It is my hope that I can count on the necessary support for our plans to translate these ideas into action.

I salute the foresight and fortitude of various directors of the Institute of African Studies, from the founding director Professor Thomas Hodgkin who led much of the foundation work, from the Venerable Emeritus Professor J.H. Kwabena Nketia, pioneering scholar in African Studies who is quietly sitting here among us today, to his successor Professor K.A. Dickson and to Professor Kwame Arhin, who first raised a proposal for the establishment of an Nkrumah Chair, to Professor George P. Hagan who kept the mission of the Institute alive through some troubled times, to my good friend K.E. Agovi who joined the ancestors a bit too soon, to Professor Irene Odotei, who brought a new spirit of intellectual activism into the work of the Institute, to Professor Takyiwaa Manuh, who lobbied successfully for an endowment for the Nkrumah Chair, to Professor Brigid Sackey who held the fort briefly and helped to settle into the Institute, to Professor Akosua Adomako Ampofo, who has moved so quickly and efficiently to make sure this installation takes place and in grand style. To my colleague, sister, and friend Dr Esi Sutherland-Addy and the entire installation planning committee, and all fellows and staff of the Institute, I offer my deepest gratitude for this gift of a ceremony worth remembering. I salute the incredibly rich and creative foundation work accomplished by founding fellows of the Institute, especially Dr Ephraim Amu, Professor Mawere Opoku, Dr Efua T. Sutherland, Professor Joe de Graft, Dr Jawa Apronti, among others, and their noteworthy successors such as Professor Kofi Asare Opoku and Professor F. Nii-Yartey. I join the director of the Institute and the Vice-Chancellor in thanking AngloGold-Ashanti for providing an endowment for the Nkrumah Chair, and the Ghana@50 Secretariat for facilitating access to the endowment. I am grateful to Professor Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, Chairman of the Council of State, for sharing with me countless hours of conversation on the historical and contemporary struggles of African peoples and in particular Nkrumah’s singular contribution to that struggle. I share the joy of this special honour and privilege with my wife, Professor Akosua Anyidoho, my daughters, Dr Nana Akua Anyidoho and Akofa Anyidoho, and other members of my family who are here in the hall, all of whom have been a constant source of strength for me in all my endeavours.

Mr Vice-Chancellor, my sincere thanks to you for presiding over this installation ceremony. But, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, may be you did not notice, as you led me in the procession towards this hall, that my
steps were a bit sluggish, my gait not so certain. I can now confess that I walked into this Great Hall with a slight feeling of unease, a vague sense of sadness and a feeling that I was about to perform a eulogy for a great man we all once repudiated, an ancestral pathfinder who is still being demonised by some among us. However, as I settled back into my seat and took a good look around me, as I read the several hundred faces that smiled back at me from every corner of this hall, as I listened carefully to your introductory remarks and to those of Professor Adomako Ampofo, as I watched my comrades and brother Professor Olufemi Taiwo perform his well-crafted oriki that made my already big head grow even bigger, as I listened to the drums and watched the dancers in their invocation of ancestral voices and presences, a sense of total calm took over my thoughts. The mood and quiet vibrations that floated through me from the shadows, reassuring us that all is not yet lost. I thank this great audience for restoring my faith in our collective future.

Note

* This paper was delivered as the Installation Lecture for the Kwame Nkrumah Chair in African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon.

References


---

**Return to a Wider Vision of Social Development: Social Policy in Reframing a New Agenda***

**Introduction**

As we mark the fifteenth anniversary of the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development and the social development commitments entered into at the historic summit, we are confronted with two contradictory realities. On the one hand, we have perhaps never been further away from realising the commitments made in Copenhagen. On the other hand, we are at a historical moment for returning to a wider vision of social development.

**Copenhagen+15: An Assessment**

We can address the lessons of the global experience on social development since Copenhagen at two levels: one existential, and the other ideational.

**Existential Challenges**

The 1995 Copenhagen summit was held under conditions of widespread entitlement failure and growing inequality, even after a decade of neoliberal orthodox economic reforms. While the Copenhagen commitments represent the triumph of hope over adversity, it nonetheless, reflected the ideational constraints of a vision of human existence that was in retreat. Such concessions are reflected in the plea for the inclusion of ‘social development goals’ in Structural Adjustment Programmes (Copenhagen Declaration # 6).

The Copenhagen +5 Copenhagen +10 reflections also painted grim pictures of the state of the social world (cf. Deacon et al. 2005, Mkandawire and Rodriguez 2000). While poverty was declining in East Asia at significant rate, in sub-Saharan Africa an additional 182 million people sank into severe poverty between 1981 and 2005, and 80 million new poor were created.

In 2010, however, we are confronted with two additional challenges. The current economic crisis, triggered by the sub-prime mortgage market failure in the US, is generating another round of social and economic crises and acute vulnerability in the world’s poorest regions. The recent estimate by the World Bank (2009) suggests that an additional 46 million people will fall into severe poverty; an additional 53 million will become poor. It is also estimated that between 200 000 and 400 000 children will die annually if the crisis continues; that is anything between 1.4 million to 2.8 million new cases of child mortality between 2009 and 2015 (World Bank 2009: 11).

The fragility of the average growth rate of six perc ent that sub-Sahara Africa experienced in 2006 and 2007 (largely due to the commodity boom) is being exposed by the decline in demand for the primary commodities on which much of the growth was based.

Even before the financial crisis, aggregate current account balance of low and middle income countries as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product was in the negative throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century. The improvement in 2002 and 2003 has been reversed, and will
worsen; which raises the question of the financing of public expenditure, broadly.

For many developing countries, the challenge is also at an institutional level, and we see these more acutely in sub-Saharan Africa. Successive cycle of neoliberal reforms have left many countries in a state of acute institutional crisis and undermined the little capacity for endogenous policy learning that many of these countries built in the period between 1960 and 1980.

For many of our societies, the consequence of obsessive anti-statism was to fundamentally damage the nation-building project. The institutions and policy instruments for building social cohesion were severely undermined in the process of ‘reform’. Often, for the poorest countries, there are no substitutes for the collective, public provisioning of these services. In the sub-Saharan African context, people did not simply fall through the cracks; they died (Adesina 2007).

Ten years of severe retrenchment of public education has produced not just a lost decade of books in libraries and chalk in classrooms, it subverted the culture of scholarship and destroyed (in several cases) the conveyor belt of intergenerational transmission of knowledge, essential to scholarship, when those able to do so emigrated. Reversing the trend is turning out to be much more complicated than simply finding new money to finance education. I will return to this diminution of vision in a moment.

More troubling is the impact of climate change and the paradox of such an impact: the most vulnerable regions and peoples are those who have contributed the least to greenhouse gas emission or the culture of conspicuous consumption that has put our planet at great risk. For most communities, the threat is existential.

Ideational Challenges: narrowing of vision, lowering of gaze

Equally important in assessing the social development landscape of the last fifteen years is the crises of ideas and imagination; a narrowing of vision and a lowering of gaze. The focus on ‘absolute poverty’ and the broad appeal to accommodate social development objectives in the design of structural adjustment programmes in the Copenhagen commitments, for instance, reflected a retreat from the wider vision of social policy and development outcomes, broadly, not just those of social development.

Even so, the Copenhagen Commitments #2 and #9 aimed for higher ideals: those of full employment and universal access to education. By contrast, the Millennium Development Goals, five years later, marked a particularly low ebb in the diminution of vision and the triumph of ‘realism’. It has been argued that the MDGs built on the Copenhagen commitments by giving specific timelines for achieving the goals (Deacon et al 2005). Perhaps. But it did so at the cost of a fundamental retreat from the higher ideals of the two commitments or even the agenda set out in the Millennium Declaration of September 2000. Not only did the idea of full employment not feature, the objective of universal access to education was reduced to universal basic education as an objective in the twenty-first century!

Detached from the wider set of policy instruments that produced major advancements in access to education, we have ended up with the goal of universal primary education being ‘financed’ by overcrowding (Adesina 2007). In most cases, policy interventions became stranded at the level of ‘helping’ the most vulnerable. It might not be as bad as the late 1970s and the 1980s when the poorest were deployed as ideological weapons against the poor and the ‘precarious non-poor’ but it is a severe diminution of vision nonetheless. As Deacon et al., (2005:4) reminded us, ‘services for the poor also tend to become poor services’. The lesson of history, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme (1998) reminded us, is this: the more we focus on the ‘poor’ the least likely we are to succeed in reducing poverty. The most successful cases of poverty reduction were concerned with enhancing social equality not poverty, per se.

Equally important is the retreat, among many scholars in the field, from the wider vision and the multi-tasking of social policy. In its place emerged the mono-cropping of Social Policy. Social policy was reduced to protecting against destitution. In an apparent attempt to delineate what separates social policy experts from the ‘neoliberal’ economists, we have retreated from addressing the production functions of social policy; much the same way that progressive economists think that to speak of ‘macroeconomic stability’ is to betray a higher ideal. A problematic distinction has been drawn between the ‘normative’ ends of social policy and its ‘instrumental’ uses, as if these are mutually exclusive objectives. The terms of the distinction ‘instrumental’ versus ‘normative’ put false labels on something that is much more complex.

In much of the international development circles, the poor have become a demographic category: largely unproductive, unable to help themselves, and in need of handouts. Yet, as we find in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of the working poor within the total employment remains quite high. While in this instance it reflects precarious labour market conditions, we are nonetheless reminded that those impoverished by socio-economic policies (by acts of commission or omission) and social relations are not without agency or productive capacity.

Whatever the shifts in the language of international policy discourse from ‘HIPC to PRSP and pro-poor policies’, the normative framework (even at an ontological level) remains wedded to the economic paradigm that defined much of our collective existence in the last three decades. In this seemingly gloomy landscape, the works of the International Labour Organisation, on ‘decent work’ reminds us of what is possible when we lift our gaze to a higher horizon.

Finally, I will argue that we have not had a more auspicious opportunity, in the last three decades, than now to fundamentally rethink the social development agenda. The recent economic crisis - not simply a ‘financial crisis’ - finally drew the line under the neoliberal profligacy of the last thirty years.

A starting point, I will argue, is the return to the wider vision of society and lifting of our collective gaze to a longer term horizon. Here, I will refer to the works done under the auspices of the UNRISD (Geneva), and the work we are doing at Rhodes University (South Africa) on Trans-formative Social Policy. We use this as the basis for rethinking and widening our vision of social development and the social policy instruments for achieving these.

Wider Vision; Raised Gaze: Social Policy and Social Development

A starting point is the recognition that: successful efforts at building socially inclusive developmental agenda have always depended on visionary agenda setting; second, that social policy has multiple functions.
Successful economic and social development efforts derive from visionary agenda setting that embraces a wide vision of society and a gaze planted on a long-term horizon. While it is true that successful cases depend on the use of ‘evidence’ (scholarly studies, impact assessment, etc.), this is often in the service of the visionary agenda, not the reverse. Indeed, for many of these cases, what the ‘evidence’ suggested was that they should not and could not do what we now hail them for doing.

In the most successful cases of social development, economic growth and the transformation of gender relations, the visionary agenda derived from the norms of equality and social solidarity. They embrace the idea, in Richard Titmus’ phrase, of a ‘Good Society’ or ‘A Better Life for All’ in the language of African anti-colonial movements and leaders. The shared vision combines the agency of those previously disadvantaged with the buy-in of other segments of society. The initial coalescing of social forces is sustained by the norms of Encompassing Social Policy (Korpi & Palme 1998), which rest on universal access, supplemented by targeted instruments to protect the vulnerable, *inter alia*. The universal coverage not only enhanced social and political commitment; it made reforming the system and recovery from crisis easier and faster (Kangas and Palme 2005).

It is useful to reiterate that social policy instruments are not about ‘public goods’, at least not in the Samuelson (1954:387) sense of the ‘collective consumption of goods’: ‘each individual’s consumption of such goods leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good’. Rather, they are social and economic commons because they involve the idea of a collective, common good (not ‘goods’). Equity, rather than ‘non-excludability’ or ‘non-rivalry’, is the determinant condition for access, and access may be structured on the basis of gravity of need rather than presentation of demand.

In all these cases, expansive social policy agenda were not things that countries did at high levels of ‘development’ but at a much earlier stage. For many of these cases, expansive social spending was fundamental to stimulating and sustaining economic development and the transformation of social relations, and social funds were sources of development financing: electrification, industrialisation, etc.

Related to this is the need to move beyond the mono-cropping of social policy. In this regard, we refer to the multiple functions of social policy (UNRISD 2006, Mkandawire 2007, Adesina 2007), which include:

- Production;
- Protection;
- Reproduction (social and demographic);
- Redistribution;
- Social cohesion and nation-building.

The links between production, protection, reproduction, and social cohesion functions undergirded the Bismarckian model as it did the Beveridgean model. The 1942 Beveridge Report (1942) sets out as the second of its three principles, the idea that ‘social insurance should be treated as one part only of a comprehensive policy of social progress’. Beveridge’s second report in 1945 was concerned with ‘full employment’. These are two sides of the same coin in vanquishing what Lord Beveridge referred to as the ‘five giants on the road to reconstruction: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squallor and Idleness’ (Beveridge 1942). The Bismarckian model was more directly driven by the imperatives of industrialisation, nation-building, and weaving the working class off revolutionary ideas. Similarly, the ‘Nationalist model’ (Adesina 2009) was driven by the assumption that independence was the initial step on the long road to post-colonial reconstruction, with the objectives of rapid economic development and defeating ‘the trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease’ (Mkandawire 2006). The Nordic model addressed similarly multiple functions.

Combining production with dignity (‘decent work’) was possible because the labour market functioning was rooted in the same normative framework that bound economic and social policies: equality and solidarity. The outcomes were low levels of inequality, low poverty rates, and better social development outcomes in health, education and international competitiveness; much better outcomes than the alternative social policy model that is rooted market transactional logic. As Mkandawire (2007) reminded us, transformative social policy enhances labour market efficiency and innovation. Transformative social policy relates not only to the transformation of an economy or protection from destitution, but to the transformation of social relations as well. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of gender relations and equality. Social policy regimes grounded in solidarity and norms of equality are much better in producing social cohesion and inclusivity.

Finally, social policy for a wider vision of social and economic development agenda setting is not simply something that ‘the state does.’ It is more useful to see it as multifaceted, with diverse delivery mechanisms - within and outside the state. State-community partnership in setting social policy agenda, delivery, monitoring, and fine-tuning is not only about fiscal sustainability in low-income countries but ensuring community buy-in and ownership. In building inclusive societies, they also facilitate what Amartya Sen (2009) refers to as ‘Public Reasoning’.

What these call for is a fundamental rethink in how we defined and shape the social development agenda. This has several implications. I end by highlighting two such implications:

First is an acknowledgment of the importance of policy space. Successful social policy regimes are grounded in local histories and available socio-cultural resources. That applies to Finland as it does Rwanda. It requires coherent national level efforts in building institutional capacity for policy learning. It requires local policymakers to take seriously the wider vision of inter-sectoral synergies that make for success in any one area. To illustrate a very simple case: you cannot have an effective and universal primary education system without good teachers and authors of textbooks, the infrastructure for book production, etc. These require viable higher education and research and development infrastructures. You cannot pursue the objective of universal basic education at the expense of the higher levels of education or a coherent national system of innovation.

Second, successful financing mechanisms are first local. They derive from an acknowledgement of the agency of local peoples. These are not simply about the state’s capacity to tax but the collective capacity for resource polling and social funds building. International development assistance works when it complements rather than supplants local efforts and initiatives (national or sub-regional).
Everyone seems to favour academic freedom. Indeed, if university leaders or ministers of education were asked, they would claim that this privilege is universally practised. Yet, problems concerning academic freedom exist almost everywhere - created by changing academic realities, political pressures, growing commercialisation and marketisation of higher education, or legal pressures. Academic freedom needs to be carefully defined so that it can be defended in the global climate of complexity. A new, and probably more delimited, understanding of academic freedom is needed in the age of the internet and the global knowledge economy.

A Bit of History

Academic freedom has a long history in higher education but has always been contested by forces outside the university. Since the time of Martin Luther and Socrates, professors have been persecuted for their views - by state or religious authorities or by powerful interest groups who do not like dissenting views or uncomfortable truths.

Modern academic freedom was perhaps first codified by Wilhelm von Humboldt when he developed the research university in Berlin in 1818. The German academic freedom idea was limited in scope. It included lehrfreiheit - the freedom of professors to teach in their classrooms and to do research in their direct areas of expertise. The Humboldtian ideal did not include freedom to express views outside the professor’s area of expertise and nineteenth century Germany often disciplined academics who expressed dissenting opinions about politics and excluded socialists or other dissenters from holding academic appointments. It should also be noted that students were guaranteed lehrfreiheit - the freedom to study what they wished.

The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) first focused on academic freedom in 1915, and its statement emphasised three main principles: ‘to promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge’; ‘to provide general instruction to the students’; and ‘to develop experts for various branches of the public service’. With the agreement of university presidents, the AAUP expanded the purview of academic freedom in 1940 to include professorial expression on topics outside the direct academic expertise of the professor. In other words, professors had a wider range of freedom of expression, although the statement emphasises professorial responsibility and recognises some restrictions.

In both the German and American cases, academic freedom included protection of academic appointments through a tenure system: professors could not be fired for their research or views on a range of topics. Professors came to be protected in roles as members of the academic community as well. They could not be disciplined because they might oppose university leadership on issues relating to academic governance or policy. This broader definition, stemming from both German and American traditions, seems to be widely accepted globally in countries that have a traditional commitment to academic freedom, although it is possible to point to many violations of the accepted norms.
Contemporary Confusion

At the same time, definitions about academic freedom are being expanded and contracted beyond generally accepted norms.

Some now define academic freedom as virtually everything that permits effective teaching and research - faculty involvement in governance, adequate budgets for academic institutions, suitable conditions for teaching and learning, such as appropriate classrooms and access to technology. This stretches academic freedom to include everything necessary for a successful university. At the other end of the spectrum, some countries or universities claim adherence to academic freedom where there are policies in place that restrict what can be taught in the classroom or themes for research and publication.

Contemporary realities have also created complexities. The internet, distance education and related technological innovations, as well as the rise of multinational media conglomerates that increasingly control the distribution of knowledge, have raised questions about the ownership of knowledge. Issues related to academic freedom are involved in these technological debates.

Is academic freedom a necessary condition for high quality ‘world-class’ universities today?

The evidence seems to show the requirement. The various international rankings of universities give those institutions with a high degree of academic freedom the top scores. Few highly ranked universities systematically violate traditional norms of academic freedom. A high degree of academic freedom is particularly important for the social sciences and humanities, but all fields benefit from freedom of inquiry and a sense that the university is committed to the free expression of ideas.

The Need for a New Consensus

Academic freedom is without question a core value for higher education. In the knowledge economy of the twenty-first century, academic freedom needs some rethinking, with all the pressures on higher education engendered by massification, commercialisation and accountability. What is needed is a return to the core concepts of academic freedom developed by von Humboldt and expanded in the AAUP’s 1940 statement.

Academic freedom, after all, is the right of professors to teach without constraint in their field of expertise, do research and publish, and express themselves in the public space (newspapers, the internet and so on). Academic freedom generally protects the employment of professors as well as provides the most ironclad guarantees possible - through a formal tenure or civil service system, or other arrangements.

A statement issued by professors at the University of Cape Town in South Africa and quoted in the famous 1957 United States Supreme Court decision states:

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. These ideals neatly summarise many of the essential ideas of academic freedom.

Academic freedom does not essentially concern how universities are managed, whether they are adequately funded or even how the faculty is compensated. Academic freedom does not ensure that professors have a role in governance but should guarantee that they can speak out on internal management issues without fear of sanction.

Academic freedom does not relate to accountability. Universities may legitimately demand appropriate productivity from faculty members. Professors’ work may be evaluated, and inadequate performance may lead to sanctions or even, in extreme cases, firing, but only after careful procedures that do not violate academic freedom. Academic freedom protects professorial freedom of teaching, research and expression - and nothing else.

Current Problems

Traditional academic freedom is under threat in many places today, creating the need for more attention to be paid to contemporary challenges. These crises range from professors being subject to severe sanctions for their teaching, research or expression - including firing, jail or even violence. Groups like Scholars at Risk provide assistance to such academics and publicise their problems.

In some countries, restrictions exist on what can be researched, taught and published. In some cases, the restrictions are explicit, but in most cases the ‘red lines’ that cannot be crossed are not clearly spelled out. Yet, academics may be sanctioned if they violate these terms.

The list of such countries and fields of inquiry is unfortunately rather long.

In the United States, which has in general effective protections for academic freedom, problems are emerging. Courts have recently ruled that academics who speak out against the policies of their own universities and are penalised for such actions are not protected by academic freedom. The growing number of part-time teachers in many countries have no effective protection of their academic freedom. The growing number of part-time teachers in many countries have no effective protection of their academic freedom, since they are often employed for just one course or for a short and often indeterminate period of time. The ownership of knowledge by multinational corporations or even by employing universities has become an issue of contention in some countries.

Is it a violation of academic freedom for an external organisation to control publication through ownership rights? Is academic freedom violated if governments impose curricular requirements of various kinds, as is the case in a significant number of countries?

In short, academic freedom is under considerable stress today, and expanding the definition of this key concept to include basically everything makes the protection of the essentials of academic freedom increasingly difficult. The complexities of the twenty-first century require careful attention to the core principles of academic freedom so that they can be protected in an increasingly difficult environment.

Note

* ‘Academic Freedom: A Realistic Appraisal’ was first published in the International Higher Education, Number 57 Fall 2009, a publication of the Center for International Higher Education. It is reproduced with permission.
Challenges to Africa’s Economic Development and Barack Obama’s Policies toward the Continent thus Far*

**Introduction**

As a member of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) based in Dakar, Senegal, I have been allowed to grapple with the realities of Africa’s economic development efforts. When I think about the continent’s economic development challenges and Barack Obama’s policies toward the continent thus far, what comes to mind are Africa and the world trading system; mobilising financing for development in Africa; citizenship, democracy and development; education, health, social services and development, and gender equity and equality in development. Thus, I segment my discussion in this paper into four major sections: (i) challenges to the space of Africa’s own thinking on development, (ii) external and internal obstacles to Africa’s economic development, (iii) Barack Obama’s policies toward Africa thus far, and (iv) a call for action. In the end, I draw some conclusions.

**Challenges to the Space of Africa’s Own Thinking on Development**

I recall the series of initiatives by Africans themselves aimed at addressing the development challenges of Africa, in particular the Lagos Plan of Action and the companion African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment. Each time, these initiatives were counteracted and ultimately undermined by policy frameworks developed from outside the continent and imposed on African countries. Over the past several decades, a false consensus has been generated around the neoliberal paradigm promoted through the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This stands to crowd out the rich tradition of Africa’s own alternative thinking on development. It is in this context that the proclaimed African initiative, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was developed in the same period as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s (UNECA) Compact for African Recovery, as well as the World Bank’s Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? are to be assessed.

The uneven progress of democratisation, and in particular of the expansion of space for citizen expression and participation are to be noted. The contribution of citizen’s struggles and activism to this expansion of the political space, and for putting critical issues of development on the public agenda, must also be acknowledged.

**External and Internal Obstacles to Africa’s Economic Development**

The challenges confronting Africa’s development come from two inter-related sources: (i) constraints imposed by the hostile international economic and political order within which African economies operate, and (ii) domestic weaknesses deriving from socioeconomic and political structures and neoliberal structural adjustment policies. The main elements of the hostile global order include, first, the fact that African economies are integrated into the global economy as exporters of primary commodities and importers of manufactured products, leading to terms of trade losses. Second, reinforcing this integration have been the policies of liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, as well as an unsound package of macroeconomic policies imposed through structural adjustment conditionality by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These have now been institutionalised within the WTO through rules, agreements, and procedures, which are biased against African countries. Finally, the external and internal policies and structures have combined to generate an unsustainable and unjustifiable debt burden which has crippled Africa’s economies and undermined the capacity of Africa’s ownership of strategies for development.

The external difficulties have exacerbated the internal structural imbalances of African economies and, together with neoliberal structural adjustment policies, inequitable socioeconomic and political structures have led to the disintegration of African economies and increased social and gender inequity. In particular, African manufacturing industries have been destroyed; agricultural production (for food and other domestic needs) is in crisis; public services have been severely weakened; and the capacity of states and governments in Africa to make and implement policies in support of balanced and equitable national development has been emasculated. The costs associated with these outcomes have fallen disproportionately on marginalised and subordinated groups of African societies, including workers, peasants, and small producers. The impact has been particularly severe on women and children.

Indeed, these developments have reversed policies and programmes and have dismantled institutions in place since independence to create and expand integrated production across and among African economies in agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, and social services. These were programmes and institutions which have, in spite of their limitations, sought to address the problems of weak internal markets and fragmented production structures as well as economic imbalances and social inequities within and among nations inherited from colonialism, and to redress the inappropriate integration of African economies in the global order. The associated social and economic gains, generated over this period, have been destroyed.

This reality should inform our reflections on the NEPAD. We must conclude that, while many of its stated goals may be well-intentioned, the development vision and economic measures that it canvases for the realisation of these goals are flawed. As a result, the NEPAD will not contribute to addressing Africa’s development problems. On the contrary, it will reinforce the hostile external environment and the
internal weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa’s development. Indeed, in certain areas like debt, the NEPAD steps back from international goals that have been won through global mobilisation and struggle.

The most fundamental flaws of the NEPAD, which reproduce the central elements of the World Bank’s Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? and the ECA’s Compact for African Recovery, include the following:

(a) the neoliberal economic policy framework at the heart of the plan repeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the preceding several decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies;

(b) the fact that in spite of its proclaimed recognition of the central role of the African people to the plan, the African people have not played any part in the conception, design, and formulation of the NEPAD;

(c) notwithstanding its stated concerns for social and gender equity, it adopts the social and economic measures that have contributed to the marginalisation of women;

(d) in spite of claims of African origins, its main targets are foreign donors, particularly in the G8;

(e) its vision of democracy is defined by the needs of creating a functional market;

(f) it underemphasises the external conditions fundamental to Africa’s development crisis and, thereby, does not promote any meaningful measure to manage and restrict the effects of this environment on Africa’s development efforts. On the contrary, the engagement that it seeks with institutions and processes like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the United States Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and the Cotonou Agreement will further lock Africa’s economies disadvantageously into this environment; and

(g) the means for mobilisation of resources will further the disintegration of African economies that we have witnessed at the hands of structural adjustment and WTO rules.

In order to address the preceding development problems and challenges, Africans on the continent and in the Diaspora must take action at the national, continental and international levels to implement the measures described in the section titled ‘Call for Action’.

Barack Obama’s Policies toward Africa thus Far

In September 2008, Whitney W. Schneidman, an adviser on Africa to the campaign to elect then Senator Barack Obama as President of the United States, stated Obama’s three objectives for the African continent as follows:

(a) to accelerate Africa’s integration into the global economy;

(b) to enhance the peace and security of African states; and

(c) to strengthen relationships with those governments, institutions and civil society organisations committed to deepening democracy, accountability and reducing poverty in Africa.

These objectives, Schneidman made very clear, are geared toward Obama’s goal ‘to strengthen our common security, invest in our common humanity and, in this way, restore American leadership in the world’ (Schneidman 2008).

On January 13, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, outlined in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Obama’s Africa policy as being ‘rooted in security, political, economic and humanitarian interests’ (Corey 2009). She added that Obama’s foreign policy objectives for Africa also include ‘combating al-Qaeda’s efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa; helping African nations to conserve their natural resources and reap fair benefits from them; stopping war in Congo; ending autocracy in Zimbabwe and human devastation in Darfur; and supporting African democracies like South Africa and Ghana’ (Corey 2009).

However, as Josh Gerstein and Zachary Abrahamson (2009) have demonstrated, Obama’s Africa policy has been more talk than action. They pointed out how some of the changes Obama has discussed for Africa amounted to ‘words about future words’. In fact, they restated some of the terms Obama has used to admonish Africans, such as ‘tribes’, which would have raised some serious objections by Africans had other United States Presidents used similar words.

As far as I can assess, just as he has done at home in lecturing African Americans on their shortcomings but has done nothing significant for them besides appointing Eric Holder to what has become a second-tier cabinet level position since the creation of Homeland Security, as a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, Obama has thus far done nothing substantive to point to in terms of Africa’s economic development, besides visiting Egypt and Ghana and lecturing Africans about their shortcomings. This situation may be the result of the economic crisis and two wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) Obama inherited from George W. Bush. Consequently, two dominant paradigms seem to undergird Obama’s foreign policy for now: (i) power and coercion and (ii) world order. The discussion in the rest of this section seeks to explain this suggestion.

Power and coercion is an area of study within the fields of International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and International Development (ID) that is rarely addressed by scholars. Despite its ability to achieve peace and development, it is seldom respected. An analysis and understanding of coercion is, however, crucial to the building of a comprehensive peace and development paradigm. It might appear rather contradictory to the ultimate goal of peace and development, given the forceful and destructive means at which power and coercion can be implemented by political actors - i.e. individuals, groups, states, regional and international organisations. But it is arguable that violence and coercion are sometimes a necessary reality to enforce rule of law.

Force does not have to be destructive in nature to be effective. The threat or potential use of force might be just as viable, interwoven with diplomacy, to control another actor. When an actor’s peace and security is threatened, force becomes an effective policy instrument. ‘Force is neither the normal nor the only means of state power, but it is the specific means through which, as a last resort, a state can enforce its sovereignty’ (Weber in Scott 2001:34). Although there are other viable avenues to achieve peace, the use of military force is the most effective when a state is under a direct threat.
Power is the capacity to coerce another actor to yield to the aggressor’s will or interest. According to Scott,

Power is a social relation between agents, who may usefully be called the ‘principal’ and the ‘subaltern’. A principal is the paramount agent in a power relationship, while a subaltern is the subordinate agent. The principal has or exercises power, while the subaltern is affected by this power (2001:2).

A state’s desire for self-preservation, survival, and protection is obvious. Since security for any state is by no means guaranteed, a state must act within its best interest to preserve its chance for survival and to ensure stability in the region. States generally form alliances or act independently to ensure stability. Countries will either form alliances or act independently to ensure stability. Since a state’s desire for self-preservation, survival, and protection is obvious. Since security for any state is by no means guaranteed, a state must act within its best interest to preserve its chance for survival and to ensure stability in the region. States generally form alliances or act independently to ensure stability. Countries will either form alliances or act independently to ensure stability.

One of the most famous diplomatic contests of the last half century between states involved the building and deployment of nuclear weapons throughout the world between the United States and the Soviet Union. One theory about this contest was that nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent against invasion, while simultaneously assuring that any country that possessed them resisted using them because of the disastrous consequences of being destroyed in turn by the opposing side. ‘Deterrence is a means of safeguarding peace to the extent that maintaining a status quo is peaceful; most of the time disruptions of the status quo lead to tension or war’ (Treverton in Thompson and Jensen 1991:18). Historically, there have been trends in the realm of deterrence that could be made available; (ii) credibility, or capability, or whether sufficient force and coercion in history are abundant. Force, properly mandated, applied and controlled, can halt unrestricted violence and possibly genocide between actors in a conflict. In African Peace Paradigms (2008), I discuss five such African cases: (i) the Epic of Sundiata Keita; (ii) Emperor Haile Selassie’s Magnanimity after Italy’s Defeat; (iii) the Soft Revolution of Madagascar; (iv) the Bushongo of Congo during the Torday, Holton-Simpson and Hardy Expedition; and (v) the Political Longevity of El Hadj Omar Bongo in Gabon.

As it concerns Obama and power and coercion, in his essay titled ‘Obama and the Empire’ (2008), Allen Ruff provides ample evidence to show that Obama has been remarkably consistent in the realm of foreign policy and his unflagging support for the United States imperial agenda. According to Ruff, while sectors of liberal opinion and antiwar activists may feel disillusioned by Obama’s later pronouncements, Obama’s record shows that those disappointed supporters have mainly engaged in self-deception for the following reasons.

To begin with, in the New York Times of July 14, 2008 and in a major Washington speech the following day, delivered just ahead of his ‘fact finding trip’ abroad that included stops in Afghanistan and Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Europe, Obama detailed the ‘five goals essential to making America safer’: (i) putting an end to the war in Iraq, (ii) pursuing the ‘War on Terror’ against al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, (iii) ending United States oil dependence, (iv) securing all nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists and ‘rogue states’, and (v) rebuilding United States’s alliances. With whatever minor refinements, those mid-July statements amounted little more than the repetition of positions mapped out some time ago and articulated from the start of Obama’s campaign, most often to elite audiences in less public venues, and entirely within the mainstream of Democratic Party politics. While it still remains unclear just how Obama would uphold and maintain United States imperial power, especially in the event of unforeseen new crises, nor how much he would continue George W. Bush’s obscene executive abuse of power under the cover of the ‘War on Terror’, Obama’s positions have long conveyed the clear message that there will be little, if any, change in the overarching strategic course and direction of the imperial state (Ruff 2008).

Obama’s election is historic in its symbolism: a black man as the chief executive of the remaining global superpower. It has nothing to do with challenging the ‘right’ of that superpower to dominate the world - ‘for the world’s own good’, of course. Obama’s global outlook is firmly situated at the centre of the long-established ruling-class consensus on the United States prerogative to intervene anywhere and at any time to make the world safe for capitalism, couched, as always, in the rhetoric of ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, and ‘stability’. Obama therefore personifies a deep strand of liberal interventionism with roots extending all the way back to the early ‘progressive’ imperialism of a Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Given
the disastrous results of the Bush regime’s ideologically driven Iraq adventure and the impasse with Iran, however, Obama’s promised course appeals to most of the elites and the general populace because it seems more ‘realistic’ and less ‘unilateral’ (Ruff 2008).

On ‘renewing American leadership’, Obama earlier on articulated his major foreign policy positions in the form of an address before the non-governmental and bipartisan Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), historically the most important foreign-policy formulating body outside the State Department. Obama laid out the framework and strategic vision for his intended audience, the elite who’s who of the foreign policy establishment. These included the upper echelons of the foreign relations and national security state bureaucracies, corps of think tank and academic policy wonks and, most importantly, the key CFR patrons from the ‘commanding heights’ of the corporate world.

While certainly promising a change in direction from the course of Bush’s failures and outright blunders, Obama systematically promised to stay the grand strategic course of global predominance pursued by every President across the twentieth Century. Obama pledged the continuation of a struggle to reclaim and guarantee United States imperial hegemony, euphemistically described as ‘leadership’ in a world that has grown increasingly hostile to American domination. This hostility is caused, according to Obama, by the arrogant unilateralist contempt for allies, failed diplomacy and mismanaged military adventurism of the Bush regime. Invoking Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John Fitzgerald Kennedy as the pantheon of a tough but enlightened Truman and John Fitzgerald Kennedy as the pantheon of a tough but enlightened Roosevelt, Obama promised a return to a pragmatic and rational revival of the United States as ‘the leader’ of a ‘free world’ (Ruff 2008).

Offering to reward friends (i.e. those in support of the United States agenda) and penalize foes (i.e. any opposition) and ready to ‘walk the walk’ with an unsurpassed military to be augmented by tens of thousands of new soldiers, Obama assured his CFR audience of his willingness ‘to place boots on the ground’ anywhere, with or (when necessary) without the support of those ‘partners’ ready to follow the American ‘lead’. Steeped in the rhetoric of an American global mission, Obama stated that ‘The American moment is not over, but it must be seized anew. To see American power in terminal decline is to ignore America’s great promise and historic purpose in the world’. He then highlighted a litany of twenty-first century threats and challenges as follows:

...They come from weapons that can kill on a mass scale and from global terrorists who respond to alienation or perceived injustice with murderous nihilism. They come from rogue states allied to terrorists and from rising powers that could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal democracy. They come from weak states that cannot control their territory or provide for their people. And they come from a warming planet that will spur new diseases, spawn more devastating natural disasters, and catalyze deadly conflicts... (Ruff 2008).

Absolutely nowhere in his list of major international threats facing America was there a hint that the United States itself has played a historic role, directly and indirectly, in shaping that dangerous world. Nor was there any mention that America’s drive to dominate the world, including its energy resources and the permanent war economy that is required for this, has anything to do with the looming catastrophe of the ‘warming planet’ (Ruff 2008).

On Iraq, Obama stated that the United States must bring its war on that country to a ‘responsible end’ in order to ‘refocus attention on the broader Middle East’. His central point is to pacify the situation in Iraq in order to get on with the larger imperial project of winning and maintaining strategic control over the region and its oil reserves. While failing to mention the invasion and occupation of Iraq as the major source of violence in the country, and focusing on the Sunni-Shiite civil war, Obama argued that Iraq’s Sunnis and Shites would most likely settle their differences without the United States presence. He then astoundingly went on to suggest that the contending sides could be pressured toward an agreement by the threat of an imminent American withdrawal, as if the overwhelming majority of Iraqis do not want the United States occupation to end (Ruff 2008).

On Afghanistan, Obama promised to move at least two combat brigades, some 10,000 soldiers, to that country. He talked about increasing the number of ‘boots on the ground’ in Afghanistan in order to ‘confront ... terrorists where their roots run deepest’. Like any tough-talking politician, he didn’t mention how many of those ‘boots’ will wind up ‘in the ground’ along with the soldiers wearing them, or the enormous casualties to be suffered by Afghan civilians. Pledging to pursue the ‘real war’, the one against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Obama openly spoke of military strikes against ‘high-value terrorist targets’ in Pakistan’s Waziristan province. Obama’s inexperience was showing, as this kind of outrageous violation of an allied nation’s sovereignty is not supposed to be explicitly acknowledged, let alone advertised in advance (Ruff 2008). Obama called for ‘more troops, more helicopters, more satellites, and more Predator drones in the Afghan border region’. Convinced that ‘success in Afghanistan is still possible’, Obama promised to ‘pursue an integrated strategy that would not only increase United States troop strength in Afghanistan’, but would ‘work to remove the limitations placed by some North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies on their forces’. He added that ‘To defeat al-Qaeda, I will build a twenty-first-century military and twenty-first-century partnerships as strong as the anticommunist alliance that won the Cold War to stay on the offense everywhere from Djibouti to Kandahar’. Neither Hillary Clinton, nor John McCain or George W. Bush himself could make a more explicit statement of unrestrained imperialist ambition (Ruff 2008).

On Iran, Obama promised no departure from the longer trajectory of United States policy toward that country. The bottom line for Obama is that Iran must concede to Washington’s demands on all fronts, halt its nuclear programme, its alleged ‘sponsorship of terrorism’ and ‘regional aggression’, or pay the price through increased sanctions and, if need be, direct intervention. While liberal pundits have noted and right-wingers have denounced Obama’s willingness to ‘sit down and talk’ with the leadership in Tehran, Damascus and elsewhere, few have noted that such negotiations would be based on sets of preconditions and the constant threat of ‘realpolitik’ penalties: i.e. the use of coercion and threat of force. Obama has called for stronger international sanctions against Iran to persuade it to halt uranium enrichment. He co-sponsored the Durbin-
Smith Senate Bill, the Iran Counter Proliferation Act, which calls for sanctions on Iran and other countries for assisting Iran in developing a nuclear programme. Obama authored and introduced, as the primary sponsor, the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act in May 2007. The bill would make it easier for state and local governments to divest their pension funds from companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector. As Ruff asks and responds, ‘Divestment and sanctions for Iran, yes. Divestment and sanctions aimed at Israel’s nuclear weapons? Out of the question’ (Ruff 2008).

Interventionism will remain a key component of Obama’s international ‘peace through strength’ strategy. As he put it:

> We must also consider using military force in circumstances beyond self-defense in order to provide for the common security that underpins global stability - to support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction, or confront mass atrocities (Ruff 2008).

On Israel, Obama stated in 2007 that ‘For more than three decades, Israelis, Palestinians, Arab leaders, and the rest of the world have looked to America to lead the effort to build the road to a lasting peace:

> ... Our starting point must always be a clear and strong commitment to the security of Israel, our strongest ally in the region and its only established democracy’.

In the Senate, Obama unflinchingly supported increased economic and military aid to Israel and came out strongly in favour of Israel’s July 2006 attack on Lebanon (Ruff 2008).

In speeches before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and elsewhere, Obama has consistently confirmed the United States-Israeli ‘special relationship’ and the ‘unwavering support’ of Israel as a cornerstone of United States Middle East policy. Feeling compelled to counter claims by critics and opponents, Obama consistently voiced the belief that Israel’s security is ‘sacrosanct’ and affirmed ‘an unshakable commitment to the security of Israel and the friendship between the United States and Israel’. In order ‘to secure a lasting settlement of the conflict with two states living side by side in peace and security’, Obama told the CRS elites that ‘we must help the Israelis identify and strengthen those partners who are truly committed to peace, while isolating those who seek conflict and instability’. Ruff points out that as Chicago area Palestinian activist Ali Abunimah has recounted from his personal contact, Obama knows perfectly well that the Israeli occupation is the real source of ‘conflict and instability’ – thus Obama’s speech to AIPAC was more than a statement of obedience to the Zionist lobby; it was part and parcel of his loyalty oath to the empire and the fundamental continuity of United States Middle East policy (Ruff 2008).

On Cuba and Latin America, during a May 23, 2008 speech before the Miami-based right-wing Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Obama promised to maintain the existing trade embargo against the island ‘as leverage for winning democratic change’. He said that he would lift restrictions on family travel and remittances to the island but would offer to start normalising relations with the country if it released all political prisoners. This is a reversion to the Clinton Administration’s position. In essence, the blockade will remain in place as will the United States insistence on ‘regime change’ and a ceaseless opposition to Cuba’s self-determination in place since the Kennedy era (Ruff 2008).

Obama has also promised a continuation of United States support for ‘regime change’ in Venezuela, neither more nor less than a reversal of the Bolivian revolution. While his CANF speech spoke of the lack of democracy in Cuba, it seemed to suggest something else in regard to Caracas. In his words, ‘... We know that freedom across our hemisphere must go beyond elections. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez is a democratically elected leader. But we also know that he does not govern democratically. He talks of the people, but his actions just serve his own power’. As Ruff notes, much the same might be said of George W. Bush, except for the detail that Bush probably was not ever democratically elected at all, but that is not the Obama agenda (Ruff 2008).

Voicing opposition not only to Hugo Chavez, but to the inroads in self-determination from Bolivia to Nicaragua, the CFR speech raised another concern:

> While the United States fails to address the changing realities in the Americas, others from Europe and Asia - notably China - have stepped up their own engagement. Iran has drawn closer to Venezuela, and Teheran and Caracas have launched a joint bank with their windfall oil profits (Ruff 2008).

In sum, according to Ruff, Obama seeks to uphold the ‘national interests’ of the United States’s imperial project. Obama’s promise of the reversion to Clinton-era policy but no actual change in the Middle East status quo, his talk of diplomacy reinforced always by the threat of military force ‘beyond self-defense’ and unilateral interventionism, his call for ‘regime change’ and counter-revolution in Latin America, none of these bode well, especially for all those still hungry for something more material than the rhetorical promise of ‘change’ (Ruff 2008).

It is therefore not surprising that just four days in his occupancy of the White House, Obama ordered his first missile strikes in Langham province along the Afghan-Pakistan border that killed at least eighteen people. Obama believes that the area is a hiding place for Taliban fighters, an area Bush struck thirty times in 2008 killing more than two hundred people (MacAskill, 2009).

On the diplomatic front, on January 21, 2009, the day after his inauguration as President of the United States, Obama rang and spoke to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Jordan’s King Abdullah, and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority. White House staff said that Obama emphasised his determination to help ensure that the current Hamas-Israeli cease-fire holds. In expressing his commitment to pursuing Arab-Israeli peace, Obama said that he would help the Palestinian Authority with a major reconstruction effort in Gaza. Analysts have said that the calls were an opportunity for Obama to make a commitment over an Arab-Israeli peace deal from the very beginning of his term (North Korea Times, January 21, 2009).

In terms of law and world order, power should be limited to universalising legal ways and means of peacefully resolving conflicts among and within groups and nations, regardless of their cultural affiliations or biases. The current world order is based on the precepts of international relations, which concern the relationships among the world’s governments: their peoples and cultures, politics, security and economics, and a host of other char-
characteristics. Strictly defined, they are the relationships among the world’s state governments and the connections of those relationships with other actors (such as the United Nations, multinational corporations, and individuals), with other social relationships (including economics, culture, and domestic politics), and with geographic and historical influences.

A variety of existing theories abound that explain international order. However, these are generally classified as conservative, liberal, and revolutionary worldviews. The conservative worldview generally values maintenance of the status quo and discounts the element of change in international relations. This perspective focuses on the laws of power politics, which are considered timeless and universal. The conservative approach tends to value order. In this perspective, war is viewed as the natural order of things. Next is the liberal worldview which values reform of the status quo through an evolutionary process of incremental change. Liberalism values freedom, especially free trade and free exchange of ideas. War is not a natural tendency but a tragic mistake to be prevented or at least minimised by international agreements and organisations. Third is the revolutionary worldview which values transformation of the status quo through revolutionary and rapid change. Focusing often on the unfair and exploitative aspects of international relationships, the revolutionist sees the need to radically change those relationships. War is viewed as a product of underlying exploitative economic relationships. For there to be international relations, policy makers of nation states must be willing to behave in a cooperative manner, thereby becoming signatories to laws applicable to all parties that have ratified the said laws. These agreed upon laws and scopes of relationships are administered and governed by actors such as international organisations and multinational corporations.

Law is an essential element in the sustenance of a stable functioning society. One source defines it as ‘All the rules of conduct that have been approved by the government and which are in force over a certain territory and which must be obeyed by all persons on that territory’ (LawInfo.com). Another source states that law is ‘The combination of those rules and principles of conduct promulgated by legislative authority, derived from court decisions and established by local custom’ (www.nacmnet.org).

The International Law Dictionary and Directory defines international law as ‘the body of legal rules and norms that regulate activities carried on outside the legal boundaries of states’ (www.August1.com). Administered by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the highest judicial authority of international law. ICJ’s Article 38 of its Statute lists the sources of international law: (i) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting states; (ii) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (iii) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; and (iv) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law (ICJ, Article 38).

For international law to work, it must be accepted and adhered to by the nation states which are signatories to it. International organisations created by international agreement or consisting of nation states such as the United Nations function as a relationship builder and enhancer of nation states. Created on June 26, 1945, the United Nations remains the most influential among international organisations. The events leading to the ongoing United States’ war on Iraq, however, unearth the more influential arm of the United States.

Owing to the sovereignty of nation states, the essence of law is subjected to a nation’s specific need resulting in differences in interpretation. As the world continues to shrink, there is a growing need for a universalised interpretation of law. In an effort to introduce better world cohesion and prevent global mayhem, the peace through law paradigm brings together commonalities and iron out disparities that are characteristic of the different interpretations of law by various actors. If one gives credence to Bishop’s ideas, there are customs that are shared by all nation states and general legal principles that are applicable to every society (Bishop 1971). The paradigm recognises the need for sustained collaboration among actors. The five African examples I discuss in African Paradigms (2008) are (i) King Moshesh/Moshweshwe/Moshesho 1 (1786-1870): Legal and Diplomatic Genius; (ii) Gender, Justice and Peace in the Dikgottla in Malepole, Botswana; (iii) Peace through Law in Traditional Akan and Ashante Societies of Ghana; (iv) the Hadza of Tanzania; and (v) the Code Pastoral of Mauritania.

In terms of Obama and world order, during one of the presidential debates with Republican nominee John McCain, Obama’s citing of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his answer to a question on foreign policy left me, and I am quite sure many other listeners and viewers, flabbergasted. Reading Kurt Nimmo’s article titled ‘Kissinger again Shills Obama and the New World Order’ (2008) gave me an inkling why Obama was citing Kissinger. It appears that Obama had been the consumer of what Nimmo calls Kissinger’s ‘ebullient editorial lauding the coming depression for the International Herald’. According to Nimmo, in that piece, Kissinger argued that the rapidly unfolding economic depression with the accompanying misery for billions of people ‘generates a unique opportunity for creative diplomacy’ to usher in ‘a world financial order’ and force sovereign nations ‘to face the reality that its dilemmas can be mastered only by common action’.

In other words, it is time for a world government and a New World Order, a phrase Kissinger repeated several times in the article. As Kissinger put it, ‘An international order will emerge if a system of compatible priorities comes into being. It will fragment disastrously if the various priorities cannot be reconciled.’ Put differently, if nations do not embrace the ‘international order’ in response to the ‘banksters’ engineered global depression, they will be left to twist in the wind. As Kissinger warned:

The nadir of the existing international financial system coincides with simultaneous political crises around the globe. Never have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication. The alternative to a new international order is chaos (Nimmo 2008).

Obama, Kissinger argued, is the answer to this opportunity, because the extraordinary impact of Obama ‘on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order’ (Nimmo 2008).

Prior to the International Herald article, Kissinger had mounted the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and told
CNBC’s ‘Squawk on the Street’ hosts Mark Haines and Erin Burnett that in essence Obama would be the man tapped to realise the one world control grid. As Kissinger put it, Obama’s ‘task will be to develop an overall strategy for America in this period when, really, a new world order can be created. It’s a great opportunity, it isn’t just a crisis’ (Nimmo 2008).

According to the Aangirfan (2009), Kissinger has revealed what Obama is going to try to do to bring about a New World Order based on the following premises:

(a) The alternative to a new international order is chaos.

(b) The extraordinary impact of the President-elect on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order.

(c) The ultimate challenge is to shape the common concern of most countries and all major ones regarding the economic crisis, together with a common fear of jihadist terrorism, into a strategy reinforced by the realisation that the new issues like proliferation, energy and climate change permit no national or regional solution.

(d) The role of China in a new world order is crucial.

As Maurizio d’Orlando (2008) continues with the same postulate, the depth of the current economic crisis is leading many people to favour a form of governance that would place economic and political life under the trusteeship of international organisations. He adds that Obama’s new cabinet, which is made up of those responsible for the crisis, will ensure the ascendancy of financial interests. Meanwhile, no one is calling for the people to have power in the monetary sphere, thereby democracy being killed by financial power.

According to d’Orlando, a new world order has been in the making for quite some time and is now becoming ‘inevitable’. Many politicians and economists are quick to say that great sacrifices need to be made and that any ‘reasonable’ person will see that suffering and hardship are ‘necessary’. The current crisis affecting us is behind this global shift. It has moved from real estate to banking and finance and has now reached industry, agriculture, and the whole economy. From the heartland of the United States, it is reverberating throughout the world. The fear of a domino effect and its potential for economic, political and social upheavals and the fear of widespread anarchy provide the necessary tools to install this new order, which for most people will appear as the only possible outcome. The act of governing will change as a world body will be in charge of the financial, economic and tax systems. Police, prisons and private relations inside and outside the family will come under its purview, so too will national sovereignty of the peoples and the right to express opinions that are different from those of the single thought of relativism, which will be seen as the only solution that is available and desirable (d’Orlando 2008).

Until a few decades ago, such a new world order would have been an anathema, a nightmare, a first step towards a worldwide dictatorship. Now world leaders are being praised when they show concern for the well-being of the Earth’s peoples and social groups at a time of difficulties. The G20 summit convened on November 15, 2009 was billed as a time when the ‘miracle’ would be found, one that would entail a world central bank that regulates a single currency of account and its relationship to local currencies. After a brief lesson and a quick diagnosis of the current problems, during which G20 participants heard that ‘it was all the fault of Bush’s brainless laissez-faire advocates’, the same people responsible for the current crisis would supply the treatment for putting things right. All we have to do is to see who funded the most expensive presidential campaign in the United States (more than a billion dollars at a time of great recession). Obama pulled it off money-wise almost twice as much as Republican candidate John McCain. In addition to traditional sectors like show business, media, academe, education, information technology and the Internet, law firms (closely linked to the world of creative financial mediation) and private equity funds bankrolled Obama’s campaign (d’Orlando 2008).

For d’Orlando, in order to change nothing, the appearance of everything has to change. And according to him, it has been business as usual as Obama’s new cabinet is made up of the same, ‘reckless people’. Larry Summers, Tim Geithner, and Robert Rubin are all extreme laissez-faire advocates who believe in an unfettered financial system, enemies of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that established the Federal Department Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United States and included banking reforms, some of which were designed to control speculation. They are the same people who swapped jobs at the IMF, the World Bank, the Clinton Administration; they played sideskicks for Alan Greenspan and Ben Shalom Bernanke, or at the headquarters of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Geithner); they are the same people who masterminded events before and after the current crisis. Obama picked Rahm Emanuel to be his chief of staff, a man whose career straddled politics and Wall Street’s great financial groups. According to d’Orlando, there is more to Emanuel’s case: not only that his father was a member of the Irgun (‘National Military Organisation in the Land of Israel’- a militant Zionist group that operated in Palestine between 1931 and 1948)- he also holds Israeli citizenship, has fought for Israel, and represents the country’s armed forces. He also endorsed Obama before the leadership of the AIPAC. In Israel, many view Emanuel as ‘our man in the White House’ (d’Orlando 2008).

Thus, d’Orlando argues, Obama’s presidency will not change how the financial crisis will be handled. Contrary to what many say or believe, the Obama Administration will strengthen the trend to protect large institutions and industries at the expense of small enterprises and the man and woman on the street who voted for Obama (d’Orlando 2008).

Call for Action

In terms of the external environment, action must be taken towards stabilisation of commodity prices; reform of the international financial system (to prevent debt, exchange rate instability and capital flow volatility) as well as of the World Bank and the IMF; an end to IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes; and fundamental changes to the existing agreements of the WTO regime, as well as a stop to the attempts to expand the scope to this regime to new areas including investment, competition, and government procurement. Most pressing of all is that all African nations’ debts must be cancelled.

At the local, national and regional levels, development policy must promote agriculture, industry, services, including health and public education, and must be protected and supported through appropriate trade, investment, and macroeconomic policy measures. A strategy for
financing must seek to mobilise and build on internal and intra-African resources through imaginative savings measures. It must reallocate expenditure away from wasteful items including excessive military expenditure, corruption and mismanagement. There must be creative use of remittances of Africans living abroad; corporate taxation; retention and re-investment of foreign profits; and the prevention of capital flight and the leakage of resources through practises of tax evasion practiced by foreign investors and local elites. Foreign investment, while necessary, must be carefully balanced and selected to suit national objectives.

These measures require the reconstitution of the developmental state. This form of state is one for which social equity, social inclusion, national unity, and respect for human rights form the basis of economic policy. It is a state which actively promotes and nurtures the productive sectors of the economy and which actively engages appropriately in the equitable and balanced allocation and distribution of resources among sectors and people. Most importantly, it is a state that is democratic and which integrates people’s control over decision-making at all levels in the management, equitable use and distribution of social resources.

Recognising that, by raising anew the question of Africa’s development as an Africa-wide concern, the NEPAD has brought to the fore the question of Africa’s autonomous initiatives for development, we must engage with the issues raised in the NEPAD as part of our efforts to contribute to the debate and discussions on African development. In support of a broader commitment to contribute to addressing Africa’s development challenges, we must work both collectively and individually, in line with our capacities, skills and institutional location, to promote a renewed continent-wide engagement on Africa’s own development initiatives. To this end, we must deploy our research, training and advocacy skills and capacities to contribute to the generation and dissemination of knowledge of the issues at stake; engage with and participate in the mobilisation of social groups around their interests and appropriate strategies of development; and engage with governments and policy institutions at local, national, regional and continental levels. We must continue our collaboration with our colleagues in the global movement. Furthermore, we must call:

(a) for the reassertion of the primacy of the question and paradigm of national and regional development on the agenda of social discourse and intellectual engagement and advocacy;
(b) on Africa’s scholars and activists within Africa and in the Diaspora to join forces with social groups whose interests and needs are central to the development of Africa;
(c) on African scholars and activists and relevant organisations to direct their research and advocacy to some of the pressing questions that confront African policy and decision making at international levels (in particular, negotiations in the WTO and under the Cotonou Agreement), and domestically and regionally; and
(d) on our colleagues in the global movement to strengthen our common struggles in solidarity.

We must ask our colleagues in the North to intervene with their governments on behalf of our struggles and our colleagues in the South to strengthen South-South cooperation.

Finally, we must pledge to carry forward the positions and conclusions of this conference. And we must encourage other like-minded individuals and organisations to explore, together with other interested parties, mechanisms and processes for follow-up to the deliberations and conclusions of this conference.

Conclusions

The economic relationship between Africa and the United States can best be characterised in terms of the type of ‘interdependent’, albeit unequal, relationships between developed and developing nations. On the one hand, United States development assistance to Africa appears more as a means to strengthen American economic and geopolitical interests in Africa; on the other hand, Africa benefits by having a peaceful relationship with the United States and employing American aid to promote government programmes. More basically, then, the issue can be raised as to whether or not the present American mode of pursuing its interests in Africa cripples the ability of the continent to control its own destiny; for, implicit in United States development assistance is an ethnocentric view that prevents it from seeing what is good in ‘underdeveloped’ Africa and to feel justified in treating Africa as standing in need of American ‘know-how’.

This ethnocentric view hampers innovation and change and results in social isolation. This explains why some African leaders often reject American solutions to their development problems, and see no need to change what they feel is already a good thing from their own perspective. At worst, it leads to stagnation; at best, it results in retarded growth and development. The fragmentation of United States development programmes in Africa is the additional negative consequence of this ethnocentric view.

Since the United States government possesses most of the needed technological and financial resources for development, or enjoys access to them, the United States understandably ‘aids’ the development efforts of Africa only to the degree that such activity enhances American objectives. And since the United States is technologically and economically more powerful, transfers of resources, information, and personnel consolidate the dominant American position and further accentuate the dependency of an economically weak Africa.

When development techniques are transferred from the United States to Africa, only a fraction of the entire process of technical change is bound to emerge within Africa when the technique is implemented. It is those parts of the process that are taking part outside the United States that dictate the basic properties of the technique. These characteristics are shaped by the social organisation and the factor endowment of the United States where the inventions and innovations are made. And for those techniques that are generated within American transnational corporations, it is obvious that they will be geared toward those corporations’ maximum profitability in their international corporations, and not necessarily adapted to the conditions in Africa. Most frequently, Africa is able to choose only among techniques generated in American transnational corporations. This limitation gives rise to a structural technical dependency by Africa in terms of American projects in the continent.

This being the case, a more coherent American foreign assistance programme for Africa calls for terminating project aid and converting it to outright security assistance. This will allow Africa to spend
its aid dollars on programmes that it perceives important to its development needs (a relationship that will parallel that between the United States and Israel), putting Africa fully in charge of its own economic destiny.

The major consequence of such a foreign aid policy, however, will hinge upon the American public’s attitude towards its government. This attitude, which must be conditioned by trust, calls for clarity and honesty with which American leaders explain the African situation and argue for actions they believe are necessary to meet the critical challenge in that part of the world.

Such a foreign aid policy cannot be expected to lead the United States to a foreign policy consensus, but it can play a role in generating domestic support for African initiatives if it is explained honestly in terms of what it is and what it will do. It should neither be explained as a humanitarian programme nor as a development programme, since security assistance programmes are not primarily designed to spark self-sustaining economic growth (Israel is a good example).

A United States foreign aid programme for Africa that is comprised of security assistance entirely would increase Africa’s maneuverability; and what it will do with this ability will depend on its priorities and capabilities. This will also allow the African governments to increase their odds of survival - no government can pursue effective development policies if its future is in doubt.

This is why the application of security assistance compels different rules. The unpredictable nature of African politics and the uncertainties inherent in intra-African relationships, in particular, suggest that such a security assistance programme for Africa will carry with it the potential for excesses. This could lead to charges of waste and inefficiency by its critics. While such outcomes are inevitable, they can nevertheless be kept in check through careful management.

In essence, United States development assistance to Africa should be used to reinforce both actors’ political, economic and moral objectives. If these purposes are sound, then United States aid will become an effective form of foreign policy for strengthening America’s interests in Africa. The continent, on the other hand, will be able to buy breathing space in maintaining stability as it works to meet its development needs.

Indeed, the modern system of communication has overcome the geographical barriers between Africans and Americans and expanded their horizons. Africans, especially, have become more acutely aware of the state of affairs in the United States than ever before. They are hauntingly reminded of America’s affluent style of living. Many in the United States have also been frequently moved to help Africans work towards eradicating poverty and causes of disease and unrest. Many in Africa grow restive to achieve a higher standard of living, to emulate the American way of living. Both Africa and the United States stand to benefit from increased prosperity in Africa and from mutual trade.

As it concerns security, the first decade of the new century is witnessing a continuation of the complex and profound changes in the international arena and the further advance of globalisation. Development and peace remain the paramount issues of our times. On the one hand, promoting development, safeguarding peace and enhancing cooperation, which are common desires of all peoples, remain imperative. On the other hand, destabilising factors and uncertainties in the global arena are increasing. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Development remains more pressing and peace more illusive.

Africa, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for global development and peace. Africa-United States relations face fresh opportunities under new circumstances. The two entities must therefore pursue objectives for vibrant and lasting relations and the measures to achieve them.

Africa, the home of humans, has a long history, abundant natural resources and huge potential for development. After many years of struggle, Africans freed themselves from slavery and colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thereby making a significant contribution to the progress of humanity. Africa still faces many challenges on its way towards development. With the persistent efforts of African states and the continuous support of the United States and the rest of the international community, Africa will surely overcome the difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in this new century.

Thus, in pursuing its security interests, the Obama Administration must rethink the United States policy within the framework of an equitable partnership with Africa. At the core, the administration must be cognisant of the fact that African states also have national interests. So, the appropriate approach would be for the administration and African states to work together within a framework of an equitable partnership and find ways in which their respective interests can be harmonised for the benefit of the people. Once this mindset is established, it will then provide the crucible in which Africa-United States relations will henceforth be conducted.

Africa must also realise that it exists in a world in which political and economic strength counts, where might is right, and not one which simply operates on morality. For Africa to be heard and make a positive impact, it must seriously consider the conditions or structures that can sustain economic and political growth. This means that it must be stable and secure. The challenge to the various governments and peoples of Africa is to build an Africa that is noticed for its strengths and not for its misery and weakness. This calls for an Africa that is economically integrated, financially stable, and politically united.

Note


References

Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), 2002, Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA
Discourse on Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Sustainable Socio-economic Development and the Challenge of the Academy in Africa

The Problematic

A major intellectual fallacy of our time is the continued fatuous assertion that knowledge systems were introduced to the African continent through colonialism. The incontrovertible fact is that colonialism introduced western knowledge systems, as a particular form of knowledge, through imposition and systematic attempt to destroy indigenous knowledge systems (Lebakeng 2004). This was underpinned by a specific philosophical-cultural package: a package that denied the humanity – as encapsulated in the past, history and civilisation – of indigenous African peoples. Denying the humanity of other peoples by the colonisers had power rather than their intrinsic merit/merit or ability/inability. Since colonisation, African cultures have been associated with primitivism and paganism and, as such, were incriminated as the root cause of socio-economic underdevelopment in Africa. In this regard, development on the continent was seen as a process of acquiring western-style systems, standards, expertise and problem-solving methods (World Bank 1998). Development was premised on a contrived status which posited western knowledge systems as universal. Flowing from western understanding and conceptualisation of indigenous African knowledges, country development policies would typically focus on the adoption of ‘western’ practices with a view to modernising the society and transforming the productive sectors. This position overlooked fundamentals about the nature of knowledge as identified by, among others, Okere, Njoku and Devisch ‘that all knowledge is first of all local knowledge systems which was assumed to be negative. This omission was not accidental but rather antithetical to technological enthusiasm to innovate and invent nor scientific curiosity to discover.

Teboho J. Lebakeng
South African Mission to the United Nations

was excluded from policy formulation in the social, economic, judicial, constitutional and educational areas.

From the point of view of Western colonialists, indigenous African knowledge systems, as ‘inferior’ forms of knowing, were to be replaced by contrived or universalised knowledge systems derived from Western scientific traditions. Essentially, these systems were suffocated because they were pejoratively and contemptuously considered to be part and parcel of a barbaric African culture by a dubious determination based on who had power rather than their intrinsic merit/demerit or ability/ inability. Since colonisation, African cultures have been associated with primitivism and paganism and, as such, were incriminated as the root cause of socioeconomic underdevelopment in Africa. In this regard, development on the continent was seen as a process of acquiring Western-style systems, standards, expertise and problem-solving methods (World Bank 1998). Development was premised on a contrived status which posited western knowledge systems as universal. Flowing from Western understanding and conceptualisation of indigenous African knowledges, country development policies would typically focus on the adoption of ‘western’ practices with a view to modernising the society and transforming the productive sectors. This position overlooked fundamentals about the nature of knowledge as identified by, among others, Okere, Njoku and Devisch ‘that all knowledge is first of all local knowledge systems which was assumed to be negative. This omission was not accidental but rather antithetical to technological enthusiasm to innovate and invent nor scientific curiosity to discover.
Notwithstanding the bleak picture painted on the relationship between western science and indigenous African knowledge, some of the indigenous African science and technology innovations have survived the deliberate onslaught by hegemonic western scientific influences. Such survival is a function of the resistance and choices made by Africans to protect their natural environment and knowledge heritage. Nonetheless, like the biblical Pharaoh, western science has been hardening its heart by refusing to recognise the status of indigenous African knowledge epistemologically, ontologically and cognitively.

It is germane to point out at this juncture that there is generally recognition of the role and impact of Islam on the African continent (Olaniyan 1982) and the fact that, like its western colonial counter-part, it wreaked havoc on the continent. In North Africa, Nubians and other indigenous African ethnic groups were physically and culturally annihilated through Arabisation and Islamisation. In fact, historically, the Arab-led slave trade of Africans predated the Atlantic Slave Trade of the West by about a millennium. The common denominator between them was that they both challenged the humanity of Africans through domination, pillage and misrepresentation. Although its impact on the social fabric and history of Africa is very significant, it has generally been underestimated and underplayed by many scholars. Among the reasons for this could be included inclusive Pan-Africanist sentimentalism. In this sense, the hybridised vulgarity Mazrui refers to as AFRABIA, implying a historical convergence of Africa with the Arab world should be properly understood as a result of conqueror-conquered relationships. It is because of such aspects of his writings that Mazrui is considered to be a ‘vacuous’ intellectual if not an intellectual salesman of Islamic values.

It is against this background that contemporary African philosophical rationalisations and political representations should be understood. Not as essentially a negation, but a profound affirmation, of indigenous African knowledge systems through reversal of both epistemicide and linguacide. Hence the need for a project that speaks to and engages African authenticity: one that is not just combative but more importantly liberatory. Admittedly, and with all its imposed obstacles, the post-colonial era provides a poignant strategic opportunity to reverse epistemicide and linguacide, and duly reclaim indigenous African knowledge systems.

Despite the current global knowledge landscape resulting from epistemicide and characterised by hegemonic discourses necessitating a significant thrust and major reconfiguration and reconstruction, Mbembe (2001; 2002) clearly rejects/resists the Africanisation and nativisation project as an antidote. Mbembe fails to historicise, theorise, conceptualise and contextualise nativism, and the broader objective of Africanisation, within its objective socio-economic and political realities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007). As documented and acknowledged, the African response to Western representations of Africa has been through the articulation of notions such as negritude, Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

The Relevance of Indigenous Knowledge in Sustainable Socio-economic Development

Historically, it is exactly two decades since the concept of sustainable development was launched into the political arena. Since then, it has become the watchword for international aid and development agencies, the key jargon of development planners, recurring theme of conferences and the slogan of developmental and environmental activists (Le’le’ 1991). The concept developed in the face of seething problems besieging the African continent and other regions of the developing world. Although there are various definitions of the concept, it is most commonly and widely used to mean ‘meeting the needs of the present [generation] without compromising the ability of future [generations] to meet their own [needs]’ (WCED 1987). The operative word is ‘sustainability’, which implies continued existence, in the long-term, of a situation or condition. Comparatively speaking, sustainable socio-economic development is a fundamental departure from the concept of development that was narrowly defined to mean economic growth engendered by a rapid and sustained expansion of production, productivity and income per head.

However, despite being the development paradigm of the 1990s, the concept of sustainable development has been subjected to telling strictures for what is perceived to be its contradictions and implications. According to Le’le’, for activists the concept is said to (i) overlook the suffering and poor around the world who suffer from environmental degradation, (ii) fail to question the ideology of economic growth and, (iii) be an ideology imposed by the wealthy industrialised countries to introduce stricter conditions and rules on aid to developing countries (Le’le’ 1991). In other words, the concept is characterised by an ‘incomplete perception of the problems of poverty and environmental degradation, and confusion about the role of economic growth’.

Since the early 1990s, a number of conferences and workshops around the world have helped to raise the awareness of the importance of indigenous knowledge in sustainable development. There has also been progress in moving indigenous knowledge from the realm of folklore into the development domain (World Bank 1998). There is currently an acknowledgement of the limitations which both epistemicide and linguacide have imposed on development in Africa. In fact, scanning the literature points to the fact that the theme of utilising existing knowledge to create appropriate solutions runs through development literature (Puffer 1995). It may not be accidental that the growing interest in the potential contribution of indigenous knowledge to sustainable development is becoming manifest at the time when current development models have proven unsuccessful. Millions of marginalised African people all over the continent are still excluded from the mainstream of development initiatives, processes and end-goals.

It would appear that what is complicating the relationship between indigenous knowledge and sustainable development is that the literature on indigenous knowledge does not provide a single definition of the concept. The problem of lack of a single definition derives from using indigenous and traditional and local interchangeably or synonymously. Indigenous knowledge is, generally speaking, the knowledge used by indigenous inhabitants of a land to make a living in a particular environment (Warren 1991). Local knowledge refers to the knowledge possessed by any group living off the land in a particular area for over a period of time but not necessarily indigenous to the land. Contrary to some prejudiced assertions about its backward and static nature, indigenous knowledge is creative, experimental and constantly incorporates in selective manner outside influences
and inside innovations to meet new conditions. Indigenous knowledge is dynamic and results from a continuous process of experimentation, innovation and adaptation. In this way, it recognises the need, on one hand, for cultural continuity and, on the other hand, for reform and change. Indigenous knowledge is cultural knowledge in its broadest sense, including all of the social, political, economic, technical, aesthetic and spiritual aspects of an indigenous community’s way of life. It is precisely this dynamic nature that has not allowed indigenous knowledge to fossilise into historical oblivion.

Indigenous knowledge, in all its ethnographic sense and particularism, is important for several reasons. First, it can help communities find the best solution to a development problem by being an appropriate appraisal for development paradigms being implemented in the continent. Second, it represents the successful ways in which people have dealt with their environment (Puffer 1995). Third, it is closely related to survival and subsistence and provides a basis for local-level decision making in various fields of activities. Fourth, it plays a major role in truly participatory approaches to sustainable development. Fifth, harnessing indigenous knowledge provides firm development underpinnings. Sixth, it is critical to conflict resolution regarding disputes arising from competing claims to land by returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Seventh, building on indigenous knowledge systems contributes to local empowerment and development, increases self-sufficiency and strengthens self-determination (Thrupp 1989). Eighth, it provides a powerful basis from which alternative ways of managing resources can be developed. Ninth, tapping into the intellectual resources associated with indigenous knowledge is not only cost effective but also relevant and indispensable for environmentally and ecologically sensitive activity. Tenth, indigenous knowledge provides the basis for problem-solving strategies for indigenous/local communities, especially the poor (World Bank 1998). Eleventh, indigenous knowledge represents an important component of global knowledge on development issues and helps to leverage other forms of knowledge so that poverty and other ills can be addressed jointly with the poor. These are some of the reasons why it is important to build on the indigenous, as argued in a collection edited by Masoga and Musyoki in 2004.

According to the 1998/1999 Development Report, knowledge, not capital, is the key to sustainable social and economic development. The challenge for the development community is to find better ways to learn about indigenous institutions and practices and where necessary adapt modern techniques (i.e., global best practices) to the local practices. Only then will global knowledge be rendered relevant to the local community needs (World Bank 1999). According to Burford, Ngila and Rafiki, the greatest threat to the economic stability, and one might add, to sustainable socio-economic development, of the African continent is the gradual erosion of indigenous knowledge and the accompanying destruction of natural wealth – plants, animals, insects, soils, clean air and water – and human cultural wealth, such as songs, proverbs, folklore and social co-operation. This robs people of their ability to respond to social and environmental change, both by removing the resource base, and by attacking the foundations of human identity (Burford, Ngila & Rafiki 2003). We thus posit that the goal of sustainable development in Africa calls for re-acknowledgement of the power and contemporary relevance of indigenous knowledge and its systematic integration into development policy formulation and education systems.

As an ideal towards which African people should strive, this imposes a number of challenges with serious implications. Among these challenges could be mentioned the need to reclaim indigenous knowledge systems of Africa. This is important because indigenous knowledge is increasingly being seen as central to sustainable socio-economic development and rational resource use. There appears to be a growing awareness in developing countries all over the world that, after years of Western science hegemony and continued and persistent ‘underdevelopment’, the reality is that indigenous knowledge is, indeed, the ‘missing link’ in sustainable socio-economic development. Such reorientation is in stark contrast to the traditional views that saw knowledge as a major obstacle to development.

Additionally, such an understanding of development would require that received wisdom about the meaning of progress, in particular the identification of ‘development’ with western industrialisation be critically revisited and debunked. As Mafje advised, we need to abandon American instrumentalism and positivist notions about development (Mafeje 2001).

Notwithstanding the rosy picture painted regarding the relevance of indigenous knowledge systems, it is critical to note that indigenous knowledge is not to be romanticised or nostalgically embraced as a panacea. Although Africa has a relatively rich body of indigenous knowledge and related technologies which are embodied in the continent’s cultural and ecological diversities, not all indigenous practices are beneficial to the sustainable development of a local community. Not all indigenous knowledge can a priori provide the right solution for a given problem. Typical, and somewhat controversial, examples are slash, burn agriculture and female circumcision.

An approach that is romanticised could lead to a lack of historical perspective and failure to appreciate that there are aspects of indigenous knowledge that need to be dispensed with. What this means is that although indigenous knowledge systems are desirable, feasible and necessary, it is important that they are subjected to serious epistemological appraisal. After all, the objective is not to replace universalism with particularism but to locate the particular as a central component of the universal. Due to the interdependency of various cultures, the concept of indigenous (which is not specific to any cultural context) is becoming flexible and its fluidity allows little room for autonomous, internally coherent and self-contained cultural wholes, particularly in the post-colonial world. Hence, indigenisation discourse in sense stricto is difficult to sustain. Given this state of affairs, Africans cannot and should not call for essentialising discourses and approaches. An exaggerated cult of cultural, original, national or religious identity can easily degenerate into essentialism, and in turn, create a jaundiced and exclu-sioniary culture of ‘we’ and ‘them’. Nonetheless, the failure of ‘modem’ approaches to development has called for a fresh and urgent search for more appropriate and effective ways. Herein lies the relevance of indigenous knowledge systems.

A critical challenge is to leverage indigenous and global systems effectively to resolve development problems (Payle & Lebakeng 2005). At this point we do not wish to indulge in the debate as to whether indigenous knowledge should be integrated into the mainstream or whether
it is a science which is separate from what is considered to be mainstream but still equal. Elsewhere, we articulate the position that the latter is the case (Lebakeng & Payle 2003). However, despite methodological approaches, that does not preclude intersection between the two as the core of both is the desire to negotiate and navigate nature for the benefit of humanity. This is so despite the legendary impact of scientific advancement on mankind.

**Challenges Facing the African Academy**

Historically, colonisation with the ‘right to conquest’ as the principal feature of the relations between conquerors and conquered, manifested itself concretely in the sphere of education as epistemicide and linguacide. Among the central questions which immediately come to mind are the following: (i) to what extent have African universities succeeded in their knowledge production, in producing relevant indigenous African knowledge? and (ii) what are the epistemological paradigms under-girding university curricula?

Given the experience and reality of the university in Africa since western colonisation and its victimisation, such as in the case of Sankore during the Moroccan invasion in the 1590s and the decision to deport several of the university’s scholars, there is a deep disconnect between higher education institutions and various fields of social practice. These universities are characterised by theoretical extraversion as a result of being steeped in western intellectual traditions and epistemology (Houtoundji 1997), and colonial languages are the mode of communication and articulation of issues. This has given rise to a telling distinction that since colonisation and the post-colonial period, there are hundreds of universities sited in Africa but no African universities.

Such universities generally ignore not only the ancient history of the continent and its important contribution to world civilisation, but also indigenous African systems of knowledge in philosophy, religion and government (Quanta 2007). Clearly, the colonial knowledge production and orientation dominate and characterise the development of universities in Africa. Pedagogy in African universities is still fraught with misrepresentations and distortions regarding African history and civilisation. From an early age, students learn the major western scientific interventions, and rightly so, but seldom do they learn about indigenous African inventions and innovations developed by institutions and communities within their respective countries. And when local contributions are indeed taught, these are referred to with terminology which may generate contempt rather than respect for indigenous African people and their innovative genius. This perpetuates and feeds the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge, with science at the top of such hierarchy, rather than an understanding that there are various pyramids of knowledge, each with its own logic (Ramose 1998). Yet, as Okere so poignantly points out, science remains only one of the many forms of knowledge and the west only one of its producers (Okere 2005).

Since independence, the role of African education has been inextricably interwoven with the quest for national development and modernisation. The relationship between education and national development in Africa continues to be a question of critical concern in many countries. Hence, following independence, African governments invested heavily in educational expansion and diversification. The inherited colonial systems were expanded and modified to serve new economic and social needs identified by African governments. However, this did not help to improve the lives of the majority African people. For the most part, educational policy decisions and implementation remained highly centralised and reflected the will of ruling elites. Results have not matched expectations and educational systems have, in most cases, caused new problems for nation-building. The reform of inherited educational systems that largely functioned to maintain the colonial order of dependency and elitism has been an essential part of this task (Woolman 2001). Their main objective has been to recouple and reconnect African intellectuality with its sociality and polity.

Despite this state of the academy in respect to the nature and production of knowledge, numerous African scholars, academics and intellectuals have noted and challenged the unpalatable derailing of the development of indigenous knowledge, neglect of traditional practices and marginalisation of local institutions in Africa. These scholars, academics and intellectuals have demonstrated that western received wisdom is not sacrosanct and needs to be reviewed by seeking indigenous truths and knowledge. They emphasised the need for the African academy to move from savaging to salvaging indigenous African knowledge. Among those who have been involved in ensuring that a strong indigenous Africanist recollective tradition affirms itself continentally could be counted Claude Ake, Paulin Houtoundji, Es’Kia Mphahlele, Archie Mafeje, Wamba dia Wamba, Dan Nabudere, Mogobe Ramose, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Sophie Oluwole, Jacob Ade Ajayi, Okere Theophilus, Wole Soyinka, Kwsesi Prah, Kwame Gyekye, Vichto Ocaya, Odera Oruka, Theophile Obenga and Kwasi Wideru. The list is illustrative but hardly exhaustive.

Given the variations in their intellectual projects and their intuitive sense of discretion in both their conceptualisations and representations, these scholars could not be said to have represented a singularity of epistemology or methodology. Their common denominator is that they were all not serviceable to western epistemological paradigms. This, in contrast to the younger generation of academics and intellectuals, is thus often perceived as muted and distant to the struggle to reverse epistemicide and linguacide.

Whether one refers to it as opportunism or careerism, the fact is that it is an existential reality: knowledge production is now being driven by the imperative of globalisation whose core values come down to profit-making. It is noteworthy that despite the accomplishments of some of this older generation, African universities lack a conducive environment to retain high-class scholars. The replacement of individuals with appropriate academic leadership by technicists and managers in the form of directors, deans and vice-chancellors has not helped the situation. Accordingly, Mazrui identifies a need for young Africans to struggle to conquer African self-contempt which arose as a psychological by-product of Eurocentrism (Mazrui 1978).

Moreover, currently the indigenisation of academic and intellectual discourse is conducted under the conditions of socioeconomic and political crisis across the continent. Education, especially higher education, became the main target for structural adjustment policies. The effects and impact of structural adjustment are seen in the fact that education is now geared towards the market. There is a strong role played by corporate or commercial interests in driving research. With regard to students, the tendency is to be
extrinsically motivated by utilitarian or bread-and-butter issues such as to pass examinations with the anticipation of securing a job or promotion. Added to this, the global economic order has continued to under-develop, impoverish and indebted the African continent. Universities have been among the first casualties for budget cuts, especially in the social sciences, arts and humanities.

As a result of the combination of the above factors, the condition of mimetic and de-contextualised character of knowledge remains unchanged in post-colonial Africa. This necessitates a new research agenda within the African academy and an emergence of a conscientious intellectual cadre to carry it through. That agenda must speak to the mainstream, and protect indigenous knowledge and its main means of transmission, the African languages as a critical link to sustainable development in Africa. Resolving theoretical and conceptual issues about the identity of indigenous African knowledge systems is in fact one of the many challenges confronting African philosophers, historians, sociologists, educationists and anthropologists.

From the above issues of epistemology, it is important that we now turn to those of language. Our point of departure is that colonial education was responsible for the promotion of European languages to the detriment of African languages and the resulting linguistic configuration that legitimised and produced the unequal division of power and resources between speakers of the former and those of the latter (Mwandemere 2007). As such, the issue of African languages in education is part of the continuing reflection on the reform of African education systems. Cultivation of oral and written fluency in African languages is important in building self-esteem, preserving culture and advancing the literary output and identity of African peoples. Busia (1964) argues that schools could only preserve and transmit African culture by maintaining African languages. The importance of African language development is further underscored by the historical reality that early nation-building in Europe was closely linked to the cultivation of vernacular languages and literature. These experiences led the contributors to Between Distinction and Extinction: Harmonisation and Standardisation of African Languages edited by Kwesi Prah to argue that without respect for what Prah calls ‘the door into peoples’ culture, without the use of indigenous languages, development cannot be realised.

However, twenty, nineteen, nine and seven of the fifty-three member states are classified as Francophone, Anglophone, Arabophone and Lusophone respectively. This state of affairs means that, four decades after political independence, the status of African languages leaves much to be desired. Several obstacles are said to hamper the use of African languages in education. The following are commonly used arguments: (i) that African languages have limited capacity to express technical concepts; (ii) that African languages do not have a vocabulary that is developed enough to be languages of scholarship and instruction at higher levels in the educational system; (iii) lack of reference books and reading and educational materials; (iv) negative attitudes towards African languages, which continue to be widespread because the languages of the former colonial countries have remained the languages of power; (v) that the diversity and multiplicity of African languages have created a sort of dangerous African Tower of Babel. Many of these so-called obstacles have been exposed as a farce. For instance, the myth of the African Tower of Babel has been challenged and a theory posited that most of what are regarded as autonomous languages are really dialects which can be put into wider clusters enjoying a significant degree of mutual intelligibility (Prah 1998).

Clearly, these clusters can only be harmonised and grow through use, and not mere aspiration. Unfortunately, market discourse and practice in higher education have resulted in many instances of the closure of departments of languages because they are not considered to be cost-effective and useful in an instrumentalist sense. Obviously, such closures and cut-backs for funding for fields such as the arts and humanities threaten exactly those fields that are central to the goal of restoring the African heritage in the form of African epistemologies and African languages.

**Concluding Remarks**

We should take our point of departure from the preamble of the World Declaration on Education for All (WCPEFA 1990) that: ‘traditional knowledge and indigenous cultural heritage have a value and validity in their own right, and a capacity to both define and promote development’. Isn’t it the time that Africans took seriously the reminder from an African wit in the person of the late distinguished South African social scientist Professor Archie Mafeje regarding the guiding principle in Socratic thought: Know thyself? Only when Africans know their own history, contributions to world civilisation they can appreciate indigenous African knowledge systems.

Clearly, Africaniisation holds that different foundations exist for the construction of pyramids of knowledge. It thus claims the view that any pyramid of knowledge is by its very nature superior to all the others (Ramose 1998). Therefore, inscribing the African experience in the construction of knowledge and the design of education in Africa is recognising the necessity for the authentic liberation of Africa in the post-colonial period (Ramose 2002). This would require that Europe, including its (post)colonial discourse should be decentred from the learning experience, research and knowledge generation (Tefo 2002).

Indigenising the academy is not going to be an easy task since the academy is implicated in the colonisation of indigenous peoples (Ka’ai 2005). Moreover, given the intellectual power relations, the task is going to be long and pregnant with intellectual resistance and casualties.

Already there are those who claim to sympathise with the broad concerns of indigenisation but doubt the existence of protagonists in the post-colonial era. According to their argument, the debate of ‘indigeneity’ only made sense in the context of colonial domination or rule. What is being overlooked in such arguments is that, clearly, the university in Africa as an extension of the epistemological paradigm of the conqueror remains fundamentally unchanged in decolonised Africa. That this theme continues to preoccupy the minds of many African scholars and intellectuals is more than an indication that the basic issues have to date not been satisfactorily resolved or even adequately addressed. This in itself speaks to the ethical and political necessity to assert the right to be an African university through the reversal of both epistemicide and linguistic.

**References**


International Symposium on African Renaissance

We have just entered a new century. Contrary to what many think, it is going to be a century of deconstruction and reconstruction. There is no doubt that the current world equilibrium as roughly outlined in the aftermath of the Great Discoveries and the Italian and European Renaissance, and later refined by the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, will undergo changes of a magnitude never before witnessed.

I do believe, indeed, that we shall soon move, in the coming decades, from a unipolar into a multipolar world with a strong resurfacing of identity expressions on the part of all civilisations, whether in Asia, America and Africa, that are likely to claim that their history has existed for several thousands of years.

The end of the cold war will be followed by an inevitable showdown between cultures, religions and civilisations; it may not necessarily be an adversarial showdown but rather something that can be turned into a symphonic dialogue, founded on mutual enrichment of ideas, concepts, symbols, values and references such that we can work out together a new humanism, recast not according to the unilateral codes, rites, customs, visions and scenarios of a single world, no matter how dominant but according, from now on, to multifarious and successive contributions in which each people, each country, each race, each civilisation no matter the size, will bring their share.

So much so that, an era once marked by an ethnocentric vision tainted with a seemingly immanent superiority, will now be succeeded by that of diverse cultural expressions, that of identity assertions on the part of all peoples who have lived long enough and have a message to deliver to the rest of the planet.

Africa has to be prepared for this cardinal change by laying the foundations of a future described by the historian, Christopher Bayle as ‘the reality of tomorrow’.

The geopolitical framing to which we have been accustomed so far is bound to break up.

One indication is that the centre of international economy is now shifting from Europe to Asia. This movement will also certainly and especially spread to Africa.

Yes, I truly believe so. Our continent is going to be the continent of the 21st Century.

Our continent is going to be the continent of the 21st Century, on the condition that we all, men, women, youth, adults and seniors dedicate ourselves to a spirit of work everywhere and at all times, to the ethics of enduring and conscious effort associated with a high sense of discipline and a true and full commitment to serving the supreme interest of our homeland and continent; on the condition that we stay united; on the condition that we nurture peace, full peace and still more peace, for peace is the sine qua non condition for development; on the condition that we elevate mutual solidarity and trust to being a vital imperative; on the condition that we are capable of formulating the lineaments of a new humanism, based on a liberation, re-motivation and mobilisation ideology at the service of a great cause, marking a complete departure from a certain past. I am talking here of African Revival.

My humble view is that, it is in similar light that the concept of African Renaissance assumes full significance, value and an emergency character.

However, I have to make it clear from the onset that we are not suggesting that Africa should make a copycat of the Western Renaissance, for the simple reason that Africa is not Europe and that the challenges of the 15th and 16th Centuries are different from those of the 21st Century.

We simply need to study well when it came into being and its operational mode on the basis of our current ambitions, future challenges and the spirit of the African people.

What some termed ‘African decline’ started only in the 15th Century, whereas Europe’s, when Renaissance came into being, had lasted a millennium, more precisely since the fall of the Roman Empire.

Neither should we repeat the History of Florence with Durer or Francisco de Hollande, the Médicis, Petrarch era, not to say the Chansons de geste of Erasmus, Henri Estienne, Guillaume Budé, Machiavelli, Clément Marot, Du Bellay, Ronsard or Montaigne, Michelangelo, Raphael or Leonardo da Vinci.

It was Fernand Braudel who wrote ‘each epoch has its modernity if this word is to mean the contrary of apathy’.

However, the lesson contained in this European experience for us is: ‘The intellectuals of the Renaissance, first in Italy then in Europe think of themselves, mankind and the world in break off and not continuity terms’.

It seems to me that our two approaches find a common ground in this key-idea.

- While European Renaissance was mostly relevant in the cultural area, that of Africa and its Diaspora should, though duly allowing for this dimension, additionally spread to the other areas of human activity, including notably economy, science, technology, good governance and even geopolitics.

It should not be an essentially elitist undertaking but instead a tidal wave that irrigates the entire society and integrates into its problematic all the components of the African community.

Renaissance historians also discussed in length whether it represents in the History of Culture, such a clear departure that its actors and witnesses felt that they were experiencing a real renewal of civilisation of such a magnitude that they believed they were pulling out of an endless night, that of the Middle Ages, filled with obscurantism, regression and cold seclusion, and entering a new world, in what may be described as a total revolution.

In a country like France, the champions of Romanticism said and repeated it so well that the power of habituation established their opinion as an almost irrefutable scientific fact.
Reacting to this judgement, V.L. Saunier observed that ‘an era in which the concept of human glory or outmoded nature of science or what have you becomes a new notion is not that which invented it; almost any idea to formulate it into such a general pattern alone which constitutes its main foundation, will be never or always’.

But, he moved quickly to add: ‘For each key idea, there is at least one era which attributes more to it than its formula viz. its prestige, glamour and freshness, making light out of a concept. It is in that era that it is new.

The African Renaissance concept came into being in the sorrowful conscience of Maroon communities persecuted, victims of violence, reduced to slavery, dragged away from their fathers’ land, packed in the wet and stinking holds of slave ships, exposed to the hazards of long and painful voyages, landed onto unknown lands, deprived of their identity, language, religions, and civilisation, separated and penned up in makeshift shelters like animals in a cattle fair, numbered just like sheer goods and subjected to inhuman code and disgraceful laws.

All they got from this ordeal was much suffering; notwithstanding this denial of freedom, the fact of being away from their homeland and the hardships of exile, it was by relying on their culture and their faith in their race that they survived and resisted against all odds the most implacable adversity, the most ferocious cruelty and the most shocking humiliations.

Those struggles and battles, whether individually or collectively, contained the seeds of African Revival, the scientific foundation of which has been laid since the 19th Century by Godfrey Higgins (1772-1833), François Lenormant (1837-1883) and John Baldwin, with the latter demonstrating the anteriority of the Cushite civilisation from time immemorial, across the whole of South East Asia; the work of Gérard Massey (1828-1917), author of the famous ‘L'Afrique est le berceau et l'Antiquité’ or Africa in Ancient Times, published in December, 1955-January 1956, an article titled: ‘Alerte sous les tropiques’ or Alert in the Tropics.

In his public appeal to the Black race prior to the 2nd Annual and International Congress of Negro Peoples of the World, which convened, in New York, on August 31, 1922, and was attended by 100,000 delegates and MPs representing the Black populations of Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia, Central America, the United States and the Caribbean, he defined the paradigms of a programme ending a past historical subjugation.

Relaying and as a committed pursuer of the struggles and resistances that these revelations have triggered mostly since the 19th Century, Marcus Garvey will encourage in all oppressed Blacks the will to claim and aspire to dignity and freedom through a slogan which represented a programme per se: ‘Africa to Africans. Black Race Revival. Wake up Ethiopia. Back to Africa’.

Since that era, he linked the Egyptian civilisation with Black Africa, Black race of which he exalted the beauty, courage and dignity.

Since that era, he aspired to the establishment of a Negro Parliament, asserted his will to establish an African empire and to resuscitate the glory of Ancient Ethiopia.

Speaking up in August 1920, in an electrically charged environment, he wrote: ‘We, Blacks claim Africa and we are prepared to shed our blood to defend her rights. We shall draft a Code for the Black Race’.

In his public appeal to the Black race prior to the 2nd Annual and International Congress of Negro Peoples of the World, which convened, in New York, on August 31, 1922, and was attended by 100,000 delegates and MPs representing the Black populations of Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia, Central America, the United States and the Caribbean, he defined the paradigms of a programme ending a past historical subjugation and proposed ‘the establishment of a climate of understanding and friendship between the members of the Black race, discussions on the formation of a Government of Black Peoples, exchange of views on the international protection of Blacks, debates on the condition and future of Blacks in various parts of the world, a reflection on the History of Black race that is yet to be written, the preparation of a Declaration of Black Race Human Rights’.

Such were the objectives and foundations of Black Race Revival about 100 years ago.

Others, to mention only a few, like Cheikh Anta Diop in 1948, Frantz Fanon in 1952, Aimé Cesaire in 1955 followed and in turn set other landmarks of African Revival.


This worthy son of Africa revealed in it that Solon, Clisthenes, Pythagoras, Euclid, Archimedes, Eudoxe and Eratosthenes had all studied Egypt, something that has, however, not been taught anywhere, provoking Chancellor Williams right when he wrote that: ‘The Africans and their descent should assume responsibility and lead in historical research. If we leave it to the Whites to do almost all the research and the basic historical writings on Blacks; then we must accept their vision without complaint’.

The following year, the same publisher published in December, 1955-January 1956, an article titled: ‘Alerte sous les tropiques’ or Alert in the Tropics.

The 1st Congress of Black Writers and Artists was held at the Sorbonne in 1956, the second one took place in Rome in 1959, and without explicitly addressing the concept, it defined the lineaments of an African Revival Project.

The publication, in 1973, of Théophile Obenga’s work titled: ‘L’Afrique dans l’Antiquité’ or Africa in Ancient Times, was part of this movement.

The 1966 Dakar World Festival of Negro Arts, held in an era of dominant Negritude, those of Algiers in 1969 and Lagos in 1977, addressed in their own way the same themes from a dominant cultural perspective.

Adding to these events were the publication of the same Cheikh Anta Diop’s: ‘Fondements Economiques et Cultures d’un Etat Fédéral d’Afrique Noire’, K. Nkrumah’s ‘Afrique Must Unite’, and Professor Abdoulaye Wade’s ‘Un Destin Pour l’Afrique’ in 1989; lastly, on entering the scene, Thabo Mbeki made of these themes the number one objective of his post-Apartheid policy. Since 1996, when the First Conference of Intellectuals and Men and Women of Culture of Africa and the Diaspora was held in Dakar, re-convened in October, 2005 and was moved thereafter to Brazil; since the Symposium held in this room on the United States of Africa, followed by a Forum on Africa and World Governance; since especially your decision, Mr. Chairman, to make African
Reval the central theme of FESMAN III, which will be held in our country in December 2010, the African Revival concept seems to have been strongly established. Each of the events that I have just mentioned constitutes, indeed, a landmark of variable significance in this long march towards African Revival. In the light of the foregoing, this Revival should first rely on the restoration of our prestigious past, in other words, our history, making current and future generations aware of the contribution of our culture, not only to science and technology, but also in every area of human activity such that no one can, henceforth, ignore that we are world civilizers and that our contribution to universal heritage is worthy of respect and consideration.

This is neither a narcissistic and backward-looking glorification undertaking nor one of misleading and exhilarating delight. Instead, it is a moral duty, an obligation of truth, that makes us and others not to continue teaching unacceptable falsehood but to inscribe, instead, on the minds proven scientific concepts that will cure mankind of racism, cultural despise, truths that will impose on all consciences the sacred paradigm of equal dignity of all peoples and cultures.

This approach will provide the opportunity to rewrite entire pages of our history, including those that are called with some pretension to rewrite entire pages of our history, being modern. It is a moral duty, an obligation of truth, that makes us and others not to continue teaching unacceptable falsehood but to inscribe, instead, on the minds proven scientific concepts that will cure mankind of racism, cultural despise, truths that will impose on all consciences the sacred paradigm of equal dignity of all peoples and cultures.

This approach will provide the opportunity to rewrite entire pages of our history, including those that are called with some exaggeration, ‘conquest’ and ‘pacification’.

The truth of the matter is that Africa has never been conquered.

No! Pacification has always been a myth. Whether in the past, today, as a tradition of futures, the African people, as always, will remain firmly standing, proud and haughty, heroic and resilient, never submitting, never accepting to resign themselves to being dominated whether under pre-colonial empires, at the time of slave trade and slavery, under colonial administration and Apartheid or after independence.

Even today, they continue to struggle through all their component parts for democracy, justice, dignity, freedom and economic and social advancement.

This concept of a permanent resistance of the African populations constitutes a powerful asset which African Revival should take advantage of, if it were to successfully meet all the challenges and stakes of the 21st Century. It is one of the essential conditions for its accomplishment.

Studying our contribution to Universal Heritage and highlighting the permanent resistance of our populations should have two main corollaries:

- first is the formulation of a strategy that will end once and for all for the isolation and weakness of our continent, cutting it off its Diaspora.
- The second corollary consists in making all aware of the key role played by the African Peoples in the advent of Human Rights and the birth of the Free World.

I would like to recall that as soon as 1500 B.C., you could, referring to an Egyptian Pharaoh, proclaim, according to the Book of the Dead, the following declaration which is an expression of an admirable moral and political philosophy: ‘He gave bread to the starving and water to the thirsty. He clothed the naked’.

I remember having written somewhere that ‘in 617, when Prophet Mohammad (PSL) decided to send from Mecca to Abyssinia an Arab community in order to move them away from ostracism and Quraysh persecutions, a perfect illustration of a desire for Islamic/Christian dialogue and an admirable example of tolerance, he based his choice on the fact that there lived a king named Nadja’ who, by his own description, was ‘a just king who harmed no one’. During the 13th Century, the Kurukan Fugha Charter, a contemporary document with Magna Carta, went much further even sketching a right falling today under the 3rd generation categories.

Set aside Arab columnists’ testimonies, justice administration in Ghana, education in the Malian empire, science and scholarship as reflected through Songhai humanism, I would like to recall the Zanj revolts, the Haitian revolution of 1526, the glorious epic of Benkos Bohio in Colombia in 1599 (before being proclaimed king, governing his community in the Matuna region up to March 16, 1621), that of Zumbi in the Palmare State between 1630 and 1667 in Brazil, the Haitian revolution, with Toussaint L’Ouverture, his role during the savannah battle where 800 Blacks under the command of Rear-Admiral Destaing saved George Washington’s troops from a debacle as they were threatened by Lieutenant-colonel Maitland, and all the scores of admirable heroes painted by Abdoulaye Wade in ‘Un Destin Pour l’Afrique’ not to mention the multiple and heartbreaking resistances opposed by Muslim Black slaves in many countries of with the United States its proposed AGOA, on the one hand, and Latin America, the Islamic-Arab and Asian world, a mutually advantageous cooperation, on the other hand, we must do it with the recognition of our Diaspora as the 6th region of our continent.

The second corollary consists in making all aware of the key role played by the African Peoples in the advent of Human Rights and the birth of the Free World.
South America and the Caribbean where they had been resettled against their will.

Set aside the role played by Haiti in the liberation of South America, the participation of African troops in the Crimean and Mexican wars, World War 1 and World War 2 or in other words, in the victory against militarism, fascism and Nazism; set aside, the heroic, worthy and admirable struggle that Afro-Americans have led since 1619, with emblematic figures like Nat Turner in 1831, to obtain their civic and political rights, a clear expression of a will to totally break away from a past history of labelling, pain and stigmatisation; it is also in Africa that the ‘rainbow society’ and ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ commission concepts were invented to settle the mass violations of Human Rights; it is again in Africa that the National Assembly of Senegal adopted two historic laws: one establishing full parity in all elective functions and the other declaring slavery trade crimes against humanity.

All these feats of arms and strong symbolic deeds have, so far, earned Black troops no equal dignity as founding fathers of a Free World as it did, for example, for Americans, Canadians, the British, New Zealanders or Australians.

Making an assessment of our contribution in the birth of civilisation, our contribution to the advancement of mankind through science and technology, our demographic weight which makes of the African world one of the strongest community globally, we have a right to a greater share in global governance or in other words, in bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organisation, etc.

Still, we are being denied this legitimate right. We can put an end to this ostracism if we are able to implement, as soon as possible, the United States of Africa which will enable us, without renouncing our States, our hymns or our flags, to speak in one voice in the name of 53 African States subject to ceding a bit of sovereignty.

We shall succeed if we create an African Central Bank operating a single common currency; if we have an integrated educational system, a common legislation allowing for the free movement of goods, persons, capital and merchandise; a coordinated and integrated African scientific and technological research policy, founded on centres of excellence; if we have exchange, coordinating and self-development spaces, where articulate, virtuous economic and monetary policies implemented with rigour and duly allowing for infrastructures and ICTs will be debated for the purpose of formulating relevant strategies for Africa to make the big jump forward that will pull it definitively out of under-development. Let me just note very quickly that we have every reason for hope.

Between 1998 and 2007, 18 African countries (seven of which outperformed China) recorded a cumulative growth of over 100 per cent. The top 20 highest growth rates around the world were found in Africa, within the same period, and these include Equatorial Guinea 963 per cent, Angola 75 per cent, Mozambique 306 per cent, Sudan 283 per cent, Nigeria 201 per cent and Chad 197 per cent.

In 1998, 17 African countries were involved in conflicts. They are today only five of them.

The African Renaissance machine, as we can see, has now been definitively launched under favourable auspices. But most especially, it is in our culture and the positive values it conveys that we should find the reasons and motives for our unity, solidarity and commitment to the service of African Revival.

Culture is, as someone said, the shortest path from a human group to another. And yet, there is some terrific revival and fantastic boom of music, fashion, cinema, painting, architecture, singing taking place in the cultural domain with a powerful development of rappers and reggae enthusiasts but also of dance, photography, handicrafts, jewellery trade which convey the continent’s new message to all regions of the world, thanks to greatly talented artists and designers who have become international icons and reliable assets.

All we need to do now is to arm ourselves with the conscience needed for African Revival, because ‘conscience, as a wise man said, is always some form of power’.

Africa: Reaffirming our Commitment
Edited by Adebayo Olukoshi,
Jean Bernard Ouédraogo & Ebrima Sall
Dakar, CODESRIA, 2010, 96 pp
Price: Africa 3500 FCFA – Outside Africa: www.africanbookscollective.com

Africa: Reaffirming our Commitment examines the economic foundations of our states and the question of the dignity of Africans as human beings. The objective of this book is not to lament or finger-point those who caused Africa’s ills, but rather to think of means and propose strategies that can be used to free ourselves from poverty and oppression, and most importantly, identify the main drivers that could accelerate Africa’s development. This publication proffers ways by which our economy and our governments can be put at the service of all Africans.
currency cannot exist in the absence of a state. Together, a state and its currency are the means by which collective capital operates, above and beyond the various competing forces of fragmented capitals. The current perception of a capitalist system controlled by the market and in the absence of the state (which in this case, is reduced to the minimal role of maintaining law and order) is not based on any serious historical understanding of capital. Neither is this perception based on any scientific theory that shows the ability of the market to maintain an optimal balance.

The Euro was created in the absence of a European state, at a time when the nation-states were themselves being stripped of the responsibility to manage capital. The notion of a currency that is ‘independent’ of the state is in itself absurd. ‘Europe’ does not exist, in the political sense. In spite of the naïve illusions of transcending national sovereignty, it is in fact the national governments that remain legitimate. The political maturity necessary to accept a Europe born out of a ‘European vote’ still does not exist in any of the individual member countries.

Economically and socially, Europe still does not really exist. The current entity composed of twen-tyfive to thirty states remains deeply unequal in terms of capitalist development. The oligopolies that control the economy of the region are groups whose ‘nationality’ is dependent on that of their leading stakeholders. These groups are predominantly British, German, French, and peripherally Dutch, Swedish, Spanish and Italian. Eastern and part of southern Europe are connected to northern and central Europe in the same way that Latin America relates to the USA.

Under the current conditions, Europe is little more than a common market, and is itself part of a global market in the hands of global financial oligopolies. From this perspective, as I have stated before, Europe is the most globalised of regions.

This situation, coupled with the impossibility of a political union, means you have differentiated wages levels, social security and taxation regimes that cannot be done away with under the current European system.

The creation of the Euro was therefore putting the cart before the horse. The founders themselves have since admitted this, claiming however, that the idea was to force Europe to create a transnational state. But this miracle did not happen. Towards the end of the 1990s, I had occasion to express my misgivings about this move. My expression on the matter (putting the cart before the horse) has since been used by one of the senior officials behind the creation of the Euro, who had at the time told me in no uncertain terms that my views were unreasonably pessimistic. At the time, I stated that such an absurd system could only possibly work effectively if the general economic climate remained favourable. What happened subsequently should therefore not have been a surprise: as soon as a crisis (which initially appeared to be financial) hit the system, it became impossible to manage the Euro, and respond effectively and coherently.

The current crisis is set to persist and even deepen. The effects thereof are varied and unequal across the different European countries. By the same token, the social and political responses across the working class and the middle class, as well as the political establishment, will vary from one country to the next. The conflicts that will arise out of this crisis will be impossible to manage in the absence of a real and legitimate European state, possessed of a suitable monetary instrument. The responses of Europe’s institutions (CBE included) to the crisis (Greek and others) are therefore absurd and futile.

The responses can be summed up in one term – austerity across the board. This is very similar to how governments responded in 1929-1930. And in the same way that those responses worsened the situation in the 1930s, we shall see the same results today from Brussels.

What should have been done in the 1990s was the establishment of a ‘European monetary snake’; each European state would remain monetarily sovereign, managing its economy and currency according to its own opportunities and needs, all within the limitations of free trade (the common market). This monetary snake would ensure interdependence through fixed (or relatively fixed) currency exchange rates that could be adjusted occasionally based on negotiated devaluations and revaluations.

Under this scenario, a longer-term view of a ‘stiffening serpent’ would be realistic – perhaps leading up to the adoption of a common currency. This process would be tempered by the slow and progressive convergence of production systems, real wages and social benefits. In other words, the serpent would have aided – not hamstrung – the process by means of a bottom-up convergence. This would have required the different countries to agree to common objectives and exercise political will to, among other things, control financial flows. This goes contrary to the absurd current system characterised by deregulated financial integration.

The current crisis provides the perfect opportunity to abandon the way on which this illusory currency is managed, and replace it with a European monetary serpent that conforms to the realistic opportunities available to the affected countries.

Greece and Spain could start the process by deciding to (i) ‘provisionally’ opt out of the Euro; (ii) devalue their currencies; (iii) set in place exchange controls, at least as far as financial flows are concerned. These countries would then be in a strong position to negotiate the rescheduling of their debts, and after audits, to call for the cancellation of debts associated with corruption and speculation (activities in which foreign oligopolies participated and enriched themselves!). I am convinced that this would set a strong precedent.

Unfortunately, the chances of such an exit from the crisis are slim. The decision to manage the Euro, independent of the states, and the sacrosanct respect of the ‘law of financial markets’ are not products of some absurd theory. They are de-
signed to keep the oligopolies in control. They are key elements in the construction of a European collective, itself designed to preclude any challenge to the economic and political power of the oligopolies.

In a widely published article entitled ‘Open letter by G. Papandreou to A. Merkel’, the Greek authors of this imaginary letter make a comparison between Germany’s past and present arrogance. On two occasions in the 20th century, the German ruling classes have taken a beligerent approach to create a single European Revi entity in conformity with their wishes, both times unsuccessfully. Their pursuit of European leadership, ruling over a ‘Mark zone’ seems to be based on a similar over-estimation of Germany’s economy, which is in reality relative and fragile.

The crisis will only be overcome when a radical left dares to take political initiative and build alternative anti-oligarchic formations. Europe will either be Left, or not at all, I have stated. The current rallying cry by Europe leftist forces so far has been ‘the current Europe is better than no Europe at all’. Breaking the current impasse requires the deconstruction of the current institutions and treaties. In its current form, the system will lead to unprecedented chaos. All scenarios are possible, including that which we pretend not to want to see – the resurgence of the far right. For the US, the survival of an emasculated Europe, or its complete collapse, will not change much. The idea of a united and strong Europe that forces the US to take note of its interests and opinions is in the current conditions no more than wishful thinking.

I have tried my best to be concise in this article, to avoid repeating views I have previously made on the European impasse in these works:

- Capitalism in the Age of Globalization, chap 6, 1997
- L’hégémonisme des Etats-Unis et l’effacement du projet européen, section II, 2000
- Obsolescent Capitalism, chap 6, 2003, original French 2002
- The Liberal Virus, chapter V, 2003, F 2002
- The World We Wish to See, chap 3, 2008, F 2006
- From Capitalism to Civilization, chapter VI, 2008, F 2008

The Political Imagination of State Reform: Reflections on the Making of Political Community after Apartheid in South Africa

On a recent visit to a government agency – as a citizen, not a researcher – I began chatting with a friendly front desk consultant. After some general conversation about state of the world, she – of Afrikaner descent – confided to me that an Afrikaner savant has predicted the end of the universe in 2012. This savant also predicts that when Nelson Mandela dies, his body will lie in state in a glass coffin for seven days. On the eighth day, she whispered almost without sound, ‘the blacks will kill all the whites’... ‘Before I could wonder aloud why she was sharing this with me, someone who considers himself black, she elaborated, ‘then all the Indians...’ Suddenly I was transformed from potential perpetrator to fellow victim, and understood why she felt obligated to convey this humanitarian insight to me.

Despite this oddly revealing anecdote, I believe that twenty years after Nelson Mandela’s release, the pervasive allure of these genocidal visions have lost their grip. Talk about a racialized civil war in some circles, brought on again by the recent murder of the white supremacist far right wing Afrikaner leader Eugene Terreblanche, was unable to find traction in the wider society. The fear that once

private moments of doubt are silenced and that the sinews of public displays of kragdagheid are stiffened, force has given way to other more pressing misgivings – about jobs and crime. Terreblanche’s death is being understood as such by most people, rather than part of a systematic erasure of whites. Gestures of reconciliation such as the disposition of Nelson Mandela and other liberation leaders, along with the nature of the political settlement and the acceptance of both African and South African political identities in post-apartheid society, played a vital role in ensuring that these kinds of fears struggle to take root on a mass scale today. Of course, the gestures of the leadership of the liberation movements also reflected a pragmatic political compromise with power: neither side, it was clear, could militarily defeat the other.

What I want to talk about today is the question of political imagination. If there was, in hindsight, an important element that made possible the transition to a post apartheid South Africa, it was the fact that the contending political forces imagined the future of what South African citizenship might look like after apartheid, and that this imagination was shaped by the historical particularity of state formation in South Africa, by both its limits and its possibilities. We must note that there was a long history of violence -colonial violence and legalized violence- that was the sharp blade that came along with the dull compulsion of apartheid’s laws.

We must note, too, that by 1988, a turning point was reached in the Cold War, as it played out in Southern Africa. This turning point meant that a space for local initiative was possible, as both the Soviet Union and the United States were reversing their hot proxy war, played out with and through the blood of Africans seeking political independence and the right of peoples to govern themselves. An approach which the Cuban leadership best appreciated and supported in its active solidarity in Angola at the time. This turning point in the Cold War in Southern Africa also meant that the South African state -up until then emboldened to go to war ‘against terrorists’ by the tacit and active support of Western powers still
holding on the Monroe doctrine, began to see the liberation movements less as a foreign Communist orchestration, and more as a genuinely home-grown African political expression of a sovereign desire for self-determination.

It was in this context that the questions of peace and of justice were framed and answered, in ways that were heatedly debated then, and remain so. But they were debates which were always decided, as they are now, by the contending political forces in the country exercising their capacity to shape the outcome through argument, persuasion and mass mobilization. Today, the means through which this is expressed tends to be juridical, fought over in a constitutional discourse. We might disagree then with Clausewitz’s dictum that war is politics by other means, and rather agree with Hannah Arendt who argues that violence marks in fact the end, the limit, the failure of politics. The South African transition out of apartheid has created a new national legal order, but that legal order was shaped by a political imagination that enjoyed and claimed its sovereignty and was shaped by that sovereignty. It was a transition that was made possible by the primacy of the political rather than the prescripts of the universal. It was also a peaceful transition made possible by prioritizing political justice over what it saw as the potential obstacle of relying on legal and specifically criminal justice. For the political leadership at the time, defining locally what political justice would look like was a right to be defended, because it allowed the possibility to imagine an inclusive future together, whilst legal criminal justice presented a future of victors and vanquished. They feared revenge.

Govan Mbeki, father to former President Mbeki, in his 1964 book gives an account of the peasant’s revolt in the 1930s in the Eastern province of South Africa. The intellectual and ANC leader, and later Robben Island prisoner, set out the challenge for the South African state at the turn of the century in these terms: The problem was plain: apartheid had to find a new way to administer Africans, because the pressure for more rights was growing too strong a challenge…The traditional system in South Africa had been one of direct rule: White government officials sat over Chiefs. Everyone knew that the Commissioner was the boss. Yet now, the White government official has become too visible and accessible a target for anti-government action. The need was clearly to devise a system under which the Africans appeared to be managing their own affairs. This, too, of course, was nothing new. Indirect rule had been carefully evolved by Lord Lugard for the British colonies in Africa; Nigeria and the former Gold Coast had been governed this way, but the Nationalists had taught their followers to regard British policy as their constant and implacable enemy, so that the British system of indirect rule cold not be directly copied… The Nationalists set to work to evolve a variation. It turned out to be a hybrid of direct and indirect rule. It was given the grand name of self-development. The ‘Native Commissioner’ was now ‘rechristened’ a Bantu Commissioner, en vogue with the term ‘Bantu’, which the Nationalists insisted should replace the more compromising word ‘Native’...

Mbeki, therefore, notes two important points. Firstly, the formulation of apartheid was not peculiar to South Africa, but had a pedigree in colonial practice elsewhere in the colonial and African world. Secondly, apartheid had a specific ideological form which had to be reformulated in relation to the specific historical conditions, taking on the historical burdens and tensions peculiar to settler colonialism in South Africa.

In an article published in the newspaper Liberation in 1959, Nelson Mandela re-heard his objection to the then draft Promotion of Bantu Self Government Bill. He argued: “It will be seen, that the African people are asked to pay a high price for this so-called ‘self-government’ in the Reserves. Urban Africans -the workers, businessmen, and professional men and women, who are the pride of our people in the stubborn and victorious march towards modernization and progress -are to be treated as outcasts, not even ‘setters’ like Dr. Verwoed”.

Mandela bannered his article with two epithets that set in stark contrast alternative visions of political community in South Africa. The first epithet was the opening resolution of the Freedom Charter, a document that had been adopted by the Congress of the People in 1955. This event organized by various nationalist, trade union and grassroots political movements that represented the diversity of South Africa. It stated that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white”. The second epithet was a quote from Dr. W. M Eiselen, an Afrikaner anthropologist, and the then Secretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Eiselen argued that “All the Bantu have their permanent homes in the Reserves and their entry into other areas and into the urban areas is merely of a temporary nature and for economic reasons. In other words, they are admitted as work-seekers, not as settlers”.

In those contrasting epithets, between Eiselen’s vision and that of the Freedom Charter, Mandela was not only pitting an increasingly powerful African nationalist political movement against one of the dominant ideologues of the Apartheid State at the time. He was also setting out the political trajectory of two starkly different visions of political community and citizenship in South Africa, and posing the question of who would ‘belong’ to the nation-state? Who had a ‘right’ to belong, and on what basis? Faced with the prospect of creeping pincers of the state’s intention to implement indirect rule across the country, this was a foreboding question to pose.

Settler colonialism’s historians argued at the time that European and Bantu settlement of the land south of the Limpopo River, the land of South Africa, occurred at the same time. Neither grouping could, based on this view, claim a right to the land based on first occupancy or indigeneity. Settler claims to having the right to the land could have the same status as native claims. And the fact that settlers now occupied land after a hundred years of wars of conquest meant that the right of might was now turned into what the Israeli state calls ‘facts on the ground’.

In his critique of the empty land thesis, Govan Mbeki, attempted to dispel this spurious and historically questionable claim by the historians of the apartheid state and by the state itself. "Historical arguments that justify the White claim to exclusive rights in 88 per cent of the country are’ he argued, ‘absurd’. The true record is that brown and black people were spread throughout the subcontinent long before the first Whites arrived. Van Riebeeck found the Nama at the Cape when he landed in Table Bay. Boers found and fought the KhoiKhoi and Batwa when they trekked to Namaqualand – an area which still bears the names of its original
inhabitants. Xhosa lived on the banks of the Buffalo River in 1686. Whites fought the Xhosas in the 1770s on the fringes of the Tisitikama forest and drove them back from the Gamtoos to the Fish River in 1778. Zulu tribes once occupied the whole of Natal. Like a lawyer moving towards his final victorious summing up, Goven Mbeki then concluded decisively, based on the recalling of the historical "facts" I have just described, that "the White man’s claim to rights of first occupancy are false". But he did something fairly remarkable at this point. Rather than claim a historical and a historiographical victory which turned historical knowledge into a triumphantist political argument for the primacy of African claims to the land, he subverted and set aside his own conclusion by ending with this crucial conclusion: "But true or false, they are plainly irrelevant. It is the existing distribution of the population that should decide South Africa’s future -and present." (1984 [1964], p17). I have found this to be an important illustration of a radical moment of the political imagination. Firstly, it seeks to set a historical injustice straight -let history get its ‘facts’ right. But then it sets aside a certain kind of political opportunity that arises from this knowledge -the right to claim the land based on first occupancy. Historical narrative was not to be left to others to do with as they please, to produce a useable past which suited them. But historical narrative for Mbeki was also not going to be the straight jacket of the future. That future would be decided by an assessment of what the conditions were, and what was going to be required to live together in a single political community in the future. And it was a future that was to be decided upon by the legitimate leaders of popular movement of the country. Mandela’s contrasting of Eiselein with the proclamation of the Freedom Charter’s declaration according to which South Africa would "Belong to all who live in it, Black and White" also reflected this argument.

The ANC eventually pursued a political programme which began with the idea that South Africa was a racially exclusive state, but the goal was not to re-racialize the state through demanding a black majoritarian future, but rather a de-racialized state with a non-racial future. That is to not replace a white minority with a black majority. This was not a view shared by all in the anti-apartheid nationalist movement. There were those who argued that South Africa belonged to the black majority and that white settlers in South Africa did not have a guaranteed future there. ‘Black power’ was their slogan. If there was a question that split the anti-apartheid movements in South Africa then, this was it: what would be the fate of the white settlers in a South Africa without apartheid? Where did they belong? If South Africa represents a peaceful transition then, it is the answer to this question, perhaps more than any other, that swayed the forces of history in one direction rather than another. It was an answer that was enabled by this radical act of political imagination to some extent. And that imagination is radical because it defied a certain political common-sense of what form justice took at the time in the world. It transcended the limitations imposed upon it by the past. It also resisted the prescriptions of universal imperatives where those imperatives ran the risk of producing enemies rather than friends. After all, those who choose to live side by side will have to be friends rather than enemies. The process in South Africa was able to satisfy the fundamental challenge to peace at the time, and was able to stay on track through some very trying times because it was as inclusive as possible. It recognized that all belonged and that the creation of a single political community was the goal. Race, ethnicity and history defined the answer in the past, but will not define it in the future.

The result was later eloquently crystallized in the speech delivered by the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki at the adoption of the new constitution of the republic of South Africa in 1996. Some 40 years after the writing of the Freedom Charter, Mbeki noted that ‘It is a firm assertion made by ourselves that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white’. ‘I am formed’ he proclaimed, ‘of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land. Whatever their actions, they remain a part of me’. He went on to say that ‘I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle’… ‘I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena and the Bahamas…I come of those who were transported from India and China whose being resided in the fact, solely, that they were to provide physical work...being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim that I am an African’… ‘we refuse to accept that our Africaness shall be defined by race, colour, gender and historical origins’. Besides the speech’s recognition of diversity as unity to be lived in a single national identity, rather than many fragmented racial and ethnic identities, there was a statement about belonging at the core of this speech. A reassuring statement. A statement that spoke with equal measure to anxieties and fears, but also to hopes and dreams. A vision that confounds the historical universal laws of wrong, right and revenge that so often has turned ‘victims into killers’. That makes perpetrators of wrongs scared to take their foot off the necks of their victims for fear that the victim will turn on them with the full vengeance of their might. It took a radical act of sovereign political imagination to grasp that so much turned on fear, and by offering and proving their commitment to overlook race, to transcend race, the political leadership of the liberation movement convinced the parties representing white South Africans that their future was safe. This is not to say that we have solved our problems in South Africa. Every solution can create new and unintended consequences. Rising insecurity and anger about the slow pace of economic and social reforms are evident as we grapple with a state which seems unable to reverse the historical inequalities of apartheid at the pace we need, at least on the scale required to lift the poor out of poverty and insecurity in the medium to short term. The lesson of South Africa, if there is one, is not simply the one contained in the remarkable gesture of reconciliation made by the majority of victims to their oppressors, which enabled the creation of a single political community. The lessons of South Africa may still be unfolding. But I would suggest that it is in this unfolding, in the contested nature of the answers and questions that remain debated everywhere in the country, from parliament to street corner, that a vital sovereign political imagination displays itself and asserts its right to exist. In these moments, we are continuing to transform the ‘victim’ of apartheid into the active democratic citizen of a post apartheid South Africa still very much in the making.
A Study of Ghana’s Electoral Commission

This report on the Independent Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana is part of a broader project on Modelling Success: Governance and Institution-building in West Africa, being implemented by the Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP), a community of institutions dedicated to collaborative policy-oriented research and capacity-building in North America, Europe and West Africa. The Consortium is coordinated by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) with initial collaboration of the Programme of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University, USA. The project focuses on the identification of concrete strategies to advance institutional performance in Africa through an in-depth analysis of institutions which are key to ensuring that governments and public officials act in the public interest.

Since the beginning of the post-1990 democratic reforms, studies that assessed governance institutions in Africa, and Ghana in particular, revealed poor performance due to weak systems and lack of credibility. In addition, the discourse on governance institutions revealed a multiplicity of non-performing and under-performing institutions, which created a deficit in knowledge about the abilities of several other national and regional institutions. The Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana is one such institution, as it was not given any staid attention in the study of governance institutions in the country. Ironically however, the EC which evolved as part of the transfer of the superstructure of British colonial rule, with limited responsibility and jurisdiction, has grown over the years to enjoy the confidence and cooperation of the Ghanaian elite. Its high level of competence, efficiency and the ability to withstand negative influences and manipulations, have won it wide acknowledgement as an independent body with the capacity to hold free, fair and credible elections.

This report demonstrates that there are governance institutions in Africa that perform creditably well. It is therefore a very important report that all individuals and institutions committed to good governance, transparency, accountability, and credible elections and electoral processes in Africa will find very useful.

A Study of the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
ISBN: 978-2-86978-316-4

This report on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria, is part of a broader project on Modelling Success: Governance and Institution-building in West Africa, being implemented by the Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP), a community of institutions dedicated to collaborative policy-oriented research and capacity-building in North America, Europe and West Africa. The Consortium is jointly coordinated by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Programme of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University, USA. The project focuses on the identification of concrete strategies to advance institutional performance in Africa through an in-depth analysis of institutions which are key to ensuring that governments and public officials act in the public interest.

The report is based on a study of the process and challenges of institution-building for democratic governance in INEC, the body constitutionally empowered to organize, undertake and supervise all elections and electoral processes Nigeria, with a mandate to ensure transparency and accountability. This study is a valuable contribution to both knowledge and policy, as it critically examines the constitution, operations, performance, successes and challenges of the electoral body, taking into cognizance its centrality and strategic importance to the evolution of good governance, social cohesion and political stability in the country.
The conference on ‘Academic Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Academics and Researchers in Africa: What are the New Challenges?’ was held in Oran, Algeria between the 9th and 11th March 2010. The conference was jointly hosted by CODESRIA, Dakar and CRASC, Algeria. The main objective of the conference was to reflect on developments in academic and research activities in Africa as well as the emerging challenges that academics and researchers continue to face, 20 years after the ‘Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and the Social Responsibility of Scholars and Academics in Africa.’ The background to the Oran conference was the recognition of the tremendous changes and transformations that have taken place in higher education institutions in Africa since the 1990 Kampala Declaration, and which transformations have occasioned new challenges to the academic community in Africa. These transformations include global-level processes that impose new requirements to which universities have to respond by diversifying the courses they offer. Higher education in Africa has thus increasingly taken an international dimension more than ever before and, in the process, has changed the contexts of knowledge production and the rights of academics and researchers. The internationalisation and revolutionisation of information and communication technologies have further complicated the issue of violations and standards, insofar as they provide opportunities of training and education services at a more global level, thus rendering the concept of institutional autonomy relative. The Oran conference therefore took cognisance of these transformations and made reflections on the road travelled in the area of academic freedom and social responsibility of academics in African universities.

The proceedings were organized into ten working sessions, spread over the three days of the conference. Besides the opening and closing sessions (which were devoted to introductory and opening, and closing remarks by Nouria Remaoun, Director of CRASC, and Ebrima Sall, Executive Secretary of CODESRIA), the other eight sessions focused on paper presentations organised around themes, followed by reflections from discussants and general discussions. The themes around which working sessions were organised are: Theoretical and Conceptual Issues, Theories and Concepts, Gender and Ethics, Academic Freedom and ICT, Global and Country Perspectives, Academic Staff Unions and Academic Freedom. Each paper presentation was preceded by a keynote address that conceptualised academic freedom and social responsibility within the context of the identified theme.

During the opening session, Nouria Remaoun and Ebrima Sall both outlined the key issues for discussion with regard to the challenges facing academic freedom and institutional autonomy in Africa, 20 years after the Kampala Declaration. The issues they raised focused on the need to reconceptualise academic freedom, from the perspective of academics, to the responsibilities they have to their students and communities. The need to refocus has been necessitated by the increasing number of private universities on the continent and the privatisation of public universities, the deepening of entrepreneurial cultures in public universities, the application of GATS to higher education provision on the continent which might end up privileging private universities over public ones, especially in the context of some GATS provisions which suggest that public funding should be spread across a broader set of domestic and foreign providers. The issue of foreign presence was also raised as it implies that governments can decrease public funding for higher education, thereby jeopardising domestic publicly funded institutions. These issues present new challenges to the realisation of academic freedom in higher education institutions in Africa.

In his introductory remarks, Ebrima Sall, the Executive Secretary of CODESRIA outlined the council’s engagement with issues of academic freedom in Africa. He noted that an Academic Freedom and Human Rights Programme had been established in CODESRIA since the early 1990s. The various initiatives developed around this programme have placed it at the forefront of the fights for the defence of academic freedom and the social responsibility of African academics and researchers. The starting point of this programme was the adoption, in November 1990, of the Kampala Declaration which states, among others, that “Every African intellectual has the right to pursue intellectual activity, including teaching, research and dissemination of research results, without any hindrance, and subject only to universally recognised principles of scientific enquiry along with high ethical and professional standards”. Since the Kampala Declaration, CODESRIA has developed a large number of activities, including: support to research, the publication of research results and organisation of regular conferences in African countries, to discuss and review the progress and constraints related to the issues of academic freedom in African universities. Besides, these conferences provided opportunities to review the reforms undertaken by African higher education and research institutions.
The January 2011 South Sudan Self-determination Referendum and Possible Consequences for Sudan and the Region

Report of a CODESRIA Mission to Khartoum

Sudan is in the throes of a political crisis, with one of Africa’s longest civil wars (between the north and the south), military coups and Islamist regimes, the conflict in Darfur, tensions in the Nuba Mountains and other kinds of political problems. On top of all this, the Sudanese President has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In 2005, the international community helped in getting the main rival forces in the decades old North-South civil war to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that led to the establishment of a Government of National Unity (the Government of Sudan, GoS) and a Government of South Sudan (GoSSS). The CPA thus ushered in a six-year transition period during which the parties to the Agreement are supposed to work towards ‘making unity attractive’, so that the Sudanese people would want to continue to live together, hopefully in what would be a united, secular, and democratic state. The transition period should end with a referendum in which the people of South Sudan will say whether they want independence or to stay within Sudan.

By all indications and assessments, unity does not seem to be more attractive now than it was in 2005 when the CPA was being signed. If current developments run their course, then the most likely outcome of the January 2011 referendum will be independence of the South.

The independence of South Sudan will probably be the most important political development in Africa since the end of Apartheid. It would be the second case of a break up of an African country after independence (the first being Somalia).

Dire expectations abound. Most expect Africa’s first NGO-run state, or state run by consultants in the South and the continuation of the North-South war, except that now it will be between two sovereign states, and thus have the potential of drawing in other states on either side.

This situation has been widely anticipated by, among others, International NGOs, the African Union, regional and foreign states, even Africanist intellectuals in the West. The only constituency that had yet to provide any input, let alone leadership, is that of African intellectuals.

This is the intellectual void that CODESRIA has begun to fill since August 2009, starting with a planning trip to Khartoum. A three-person CODESRIA team visited Khartoum from August 29-31 and held informal meetings with Sudanese researchers based in key universities and research institutions. The team comprised Sam Moyo (President), Ebrima Sall (Executive Secretary) and Mahmood Mamdani (Past President). The objective of the visit was to explore a possible agenda for a program of activities that would help broaden and deepen an African academic engagement with the ongoing political process in Sudan. Such an engagement should also help strengthen the presence of Sudanese academics in the African research community and the engagement of the African research community with the realities of Sudan.

Context

The CODESRIA visit was undertaken with two objectives in mind.

The strategic objective was to strengthen ties with the Sudanese social science community. CODESRIA recently organized a conference on higher education at University of Juba. On their part, individual Sudanese academics have been active in CODESRIA from its founding in the early 70s. In the main, however, Sudan has been a peripheral country in the development of CODESRIA’s activities on the African continent.

Non-African foundations and universities, which have in the past set up several regional networks involving leading Sudanese universities, have been far more active than CODESRIA in shaping the direction of social science research in Sudan. An initiative by the Volkswagen Foundation has networked researchers from three Sudanese universities [Ahfad, Juba and Khartoum], and those from universities of Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Moi with researchers at the University of Breiman in Germany. Christian Michelson Institute has organized the Macro-Micro Project, which aims to monitor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005, which marked the end of a decades old war between the Sudanese state and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by the late John Garang. Other initiatives include the University for Peace, based in Costa Rica, and its Addis Ababa affiliate, and the North-South Institute, Ottawa.

The immediate aim of the visit flowed from our understanding of the ongoing political processes in Sudan. This was clearly stated in the team’s preparatory memo, circulated to those we hoped to meet during the visit.

The CODESRIA team held meetings with Sudanese researchers at Khartoum University, Ahfad University for Women, Juba University, as well as meetings with non-university intellectuals. The idea was to keep the numbers at each meeting small enough to all present an opportunity to participate fully in the discussion. We tried to focus the discussion on the following issues:
1. Is the initiative to broaden and deepen an African intellectual engagement with the political process in Sudan at this particular time worthy and feasible? If yes,

2. What are the key issues around which to organize this engagement?

3. Who should be the key participants and audiences in such a program?

4. What is the range of activities (multi-topic conferences, single-topic workshops, a lecture series, focused research groups, a newsletter and so on) that will best promote such an engagement?

5. Where should these activities be organized? In one or multiple locations? In Sudan or outside? In either case, in which locations and institutions?

**A Synopsis of the Discussion**

There was a remarkable identity of views among those we met on the main features of the present situation. Everyone seemed to agree that the situation is highly polarized and polarizing. Most obviously, there seem to be two governments, rather than a single government of national unity: there is the central government [GoS] which functions as more of a government of North Sudan, and then there is the Government of South Sudan. Both ruling parties, the National Congress Party (NCP) in the North and the SPLM in the South, seem to be driven by worst case scenarios. Both seem to be preparing for cessation as the most likely outcome if present trends continue. There is a widespread fear that cessation may not be organized and smooth, but a violent divorce.

The politics of identity is highly polarized. One side feels that Africa has been appropriated by some and fears exclusion as ‘Arabs’. The other side fears that the demand for unity conceals the ambitions of a thinly disguised ‘civilizing mission’ of a largely unrefomed Northern establishment. The SPLM leadership we met, most often asked: true, cessation will bring disaster, but can any disaster be worse than all the disasters resulting from one single Sudan? The few who were hopeful in this context argued that it is time to re-imagine the nation. The unity game, they said, is almost over and there is need to think of creative alternatives, such as a loose confederation.

Most admitted that the fears linked to cessation are not being discussed openly. Many intellectuals, whether academics or politicians, expressed the view that in the absence of any win-win scenario, with the middle ground rapidly shrinking, there is urgent need for the participation of a third party that is African and is seen to have an impartial, academic, point of view.

**Issues**

1. Politics and Culture
   - The ongoing debate on identities in Sudan: Arab and African
   - The historical relationship of politics to culture, and of the state to cultural identities: thus a critical analysis of assimilation (civilizational projects), segregation and the acceptance of cultural differences.

2. Political Violence
   - Lessons of the war in the South: from independence on.
   - Possible anti-dotes to an ongoing militarization, the spread of small arms and the proliferation of militias.

3. The CPA and the Census
   - A critical analysis of the CPA, in both its formulation and implementation
   - The census and the debate surrounding it.
   - Analyzing the role of the International Community, particularly the Big Powers and Regional States.

4. Exploring the Middle Ground between Unity and Separation
   - Discussing a range of outcomes beyond unity and separation: e.g., a confederation
   - Are there alternatives to a referendum?
   - Preparing for separation in both the North and the South
     - How to avoid political fragmentation [thus Somalization] and promote peaceful development
     - Promoting a new type of cooperation between the North and the South
   - A focus on border communities – such as Nuba Mountains, Blue Mountain, and possibly Darfur – which are likely to bear the direct and immediate consequences of separation.

5. The Role of African Outsiders
   - Bringing to bear lessons of the African experience, of planned partitions [Ethiopia/Eritrea], unplanned partitions [Somalia], failed partitions [Biafra/Nigeria], and other outcomes of deep internal crisis [South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and so on.]

**Participants**

Academics at the University of Juba pointed out that whereas the debate in Sudan was strongly political, the intellectual debate was weak. SPLM intellectuals argued that it is not always easy to separate the intellectual from the politician, especially where the struggle is nationalist. Participants at the Ahfad discussion emphasized that a useful distinction would be one between different kinds of intellectuals: professional intellectuals in the academia vs those in politics, as opposed to intermediate intellectuals in civil society and religious organizations. They emphasized the need to focus on academics when it came to research-related activities, but the entire range of intellectuals when it came to a discussion of the immediate political process in Sudan.

**The Juba Workshop (17-18 May 2010)**

A consensus emerged over the two days of discussions that the CODESRIA August 2009 mission to Khartoum held with the universities of Khartoum, Juba and Ahfad that the discussion should begin in the South (Juba) and then be extended to the north (Khartoum). The impact of meetings in the South would be high even if the logistics may be more difficult. The SPLM leadership promised to help out with organizing logistics in the South.

On 17-18 May 2010, CODESRIA, in collaboration with the Universities of Juba and Khartoum, and Ahfad University for Women, Sudan, therefore held an international symposium on the Political Process in Sudan with a particular focus on the 2011 Referandum over the future of South Sudan.
The symposium brought together the leadership and several senior scholars from the three Sudanese universities that co-organised it with CODESRIA, including the President of Ahfad University, an Advisor to the Vice Chancellor and Professor at Khartoum University, the Dean of the School of Social Sciences at Khartoum University, the Current President, a former President, the current Executive Secretary, and the Head of Research of CODESRIA, the Minister of Higher Education and representatives of the Office of the Vice President, three representatives of the African Union High Level Panel on Sudan led by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki (the Mbeki Commission), the Resident representative of the World bank in Juba and three World Bank Consultants, representatives of the east Africa offices of IDRC and OSIEA, and several other scholars and senior officials from the GoS and GOSS.

The discussions focused on four themes:

i) the CPA, how it has worked out, difficulties encountered, etc

ii) African experiences in matters of unity and separation, and in finding original solutions that are their own making and that work for the people directly concerned, such as the South African solution to and handling of the legacy of Apartheid;

iii) The 2011 Referendum, and post-referendum issues

iv) An agenda for further research, dialogue and action.

Note

See Reim Atabani’s report on the CODESRIA-University of Khartoum-University of Juba-Ahfad University for Women Symposium held in Juba on 17-18 May 2010 in this issue.

The Political Process in Sudan and the 2011 Referendum

Report on the Symposium organized by CODESRIA in collaboration with the University of Juba, the University of Khartoum and Ahfad University for Women on 17 – 18 May 2010 in Juba, Sudan

This symposium was the outcome of discussions that took place during a CODESRIA executive-level mission to Sudan in August 2009. After assessing the country’s political situation, meeting with scholars and considering the potential contributions of the African social science research community, CODESRIA’s leadership organised the symposium to encourage open dialogue on the current political situation in Sudan, the 2011 referendum on self-determination in the South, and the potential role of the academia in Sudan’s policy-making and political processes. Scholars, researchers, government officials, members of the international community and legal practitioners gathered for what turned out to be a successful, stimulating and productive discussion, with the intention to hold a workshop in Khartoum thereafter.

This symposium took place at a critical moment in Sudan’s history, between the national elections conducted in April this year and the Southern Sudan referendum on self-determination scheduled for January 2011. The referendum on self-determination was included as a provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), a document signed in 2005 between the North’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the South’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The CPA ended Sudan’s civil war with the promise of political transformation, which was meant to take place over an interim period that will end in 2011, the same year of the historic referendum.

Many in the international community have predicted further instability in Sudan or even war after the referendum, often polarising the narrative on political processes in Sudan. Furthermore, for the past several years, the Darfur conflict has attracted the attention and energy of stakeholders, both inside and outside of Sudan, at the expense of the North-South issue. More positive and productive support is required for the current political processes, and these are critical to peaceful conduction of the referendum and regional stability.

In this spirit, CODESRIA’s Sudan initiative hopes to contain any further vulnerability by moderating the impact of the likely secession of the South, which might divide Africa’s largest country. Voices in the African academic community should share relevant experiences and contribute intellectual insight to debates on the secession since Sudan’s future has implications for the African continent as a whole. Such engagement can go a long way to inform and mitigate discussions – both within Sudan and abroad – on the country’s future prospects and serve as a model in the future.

Since the role of the intellectual has been marginalised from the public sphere in many African states, CODESRIA recognises its responsibility to amplify their voices at the same time as it contributes an impartial, academic view to the discussion on self-determination in Sudan. CODESRIA, however, firmly believes that Sudan’s future must be decided by the Sudanese themselves, and thus plans to play a supportive role in the activities they prioritise. The Sudanese are best served by their taking full ownership of the process, avoiding undue interference from external groups and privatising the political process where found counter-productive.

Opening Session: CODESRIA and University Representatives

The purpose of this symposium was to gather Sudanese scholars and leaders to discuss the current political situation of their country, and its future, benefitting from the support and contributions of their African peers. It was a significant event, considering the historic absence of African scholars from policy-making and political processes all round the continent.
Despite this, there was a notable absence of political leadership, particularly in the North. Nevertheless, the discussion was productive and their participation is anticipated in upcoming events.

University representatives at the symposium, Professor Gassim Badri (President of Ahfad University), Professor Al Tayib Zain Alabdin (Advisor to the Vice-Chancellor of Khartoum University) and Dr. Hamad Hawi Omer of Juba University, commended CODESRIA having taken the initiative to host the symposium and noted that Sudan’s relations with CODESRIA have declined since a period of joint activities that took place during the 1980s. CODESRIA, according to its President, Professor Sam Moyo and Executive Secretary, Dr Ebrima Sall, hopes to develop a stronger partnership with Sudanese scholars. They will be given space to take ownership of the symposium and, in the medium and long term, CODESRIA will support their contributions to a political solution for the 2011 referendum and its aftermath that is fair, just and equitable to all Sudanese.

**Keynote Address**

The Guest Speaker, Dr. Peter Adwok Nyaba, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, explained that two current trends in the Sudanese academy are stifling the advancement of higher education and research. First, social science research has no influence on public policy in Sudan. The knowledge available in universities is not being utilised by either government officials or the public, in part because there is no guiding principle of interaction between them — aptly illustrated by the absence of policy makers at this academic symposium despite the high stakes of their decisions related to the referendum. The second trend is that universities not only fail to produce new knowledge and encourage progress, but they refuse both. Sudan should therefore open its doors to CODESRIA to help it support research activities and publicise, beyond Sudan’s borders, the discussions going on domestically. Africa should understand what is happening in Sudan. Dr. Nyaba promised to draft a document in support of CODESRIA’s initiative in Sudan while he noted the pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism conflict in Sudan, which further complicate the relationship between the production of knowledge and national policy. Certain national issues, however, are obvious and so do not require research — considering the dangerous times, leaders and intellectuals simply need to act fast.

**Keynote Lecture: Professor Mahmood Mamdani**

Regardless of whether the southern Sudanese choose unity or separation, there are two reasons the 2011 referendum is a historic moment: the vote will usher in a new political order, and it is a rare and historic opportunity for self-determination, which comes once in several generations at a great cost of political violence. While CODESRIA supports African unity, it bears in mind that unity does not always develop in a linear, top-down fashion, since political unity can only be the outcome of political struggle. In fact, unity may transpire not only from force — a legacy of imperialism — but also from freedom. The independence of one territory from another offers new possibilities for forging more positive bilateral relations between the predecessor and successor states. Regarding the political process that leads to independence, the sovereignty of a state and the self-determination of a people do not have to be contradictory where sovereignty is won through self-determination. This is the example of Eritrea and will potentially hold true in South Sudan.

The right to choose independence is secured as a result of both internal and external factors, though one may have greater influence than the other; in Eritrea, the internal military victory was most significant, but where there was no victory in South Sudan, pressure from America after September 11th and the fear of invasion (Iraq’s fate) may have solidified the inclusion of self-determination in the CPA. Looking ahead, there is an urgent need to develop state capacity in South Sudan and to deal with political violence, which is possible no matter the outcome. To deal with political violence, the challenge is to focus internally, rethinking the state in terms of what makes a citizen while at the same time allowing for non-politicised cultural diversity.

**Discussion of Keynote Lecture**

Following the keynote lecture, participants debated whether internal or external factors had more influence towards the signing of the CPA. Several believed that to take external events as a determining factor in the settlement for self-determination neglected internal dynamics of both the Sudanese regime and the region. Others noted that if drivers of the political process were external, this was as a result of the internal initiative failing. The discussion then questioned the role of Arabisation and Islamisation on national policy. Participants also noted that the strategy of both the NCP and the SPLM was to isolate the other. Sudan’s real problem, however, has long been a lack of legitimisation in the political process and a unilateral tendency in governance. These problems are evidence of how democracy has been unsuccessful as a concept and an instrument of change in Sudan. A lack of imagination, however, is less present in the government than it is in the opposition, which has sometimes abdicated its responsibilities to the project of political transformation. Looking ahead to independence, what issues arise out of identity? In order to incorporate marginalised identities and accommodate pluralism, there must be a re-think on the role of the state in African countries towards being a real democratic developmental state.

**The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Origins, Key Components, Implementation**

The discussion on the CPA was introduced by Professors Hassan Ali Al Haj and John Gai Yoh. The panelists presented different narratives of CPA negotiations and implementation, but agreed that the interim period has been compromised by deep mistrust and partisan polarisation from both signatories of the CPA. Looking back at negotiations, the process and political context had a determining influence on the substance of the CPA. Influencing factors include both internal and external power dynamics and conflicting expectations of the interim period — factors which have similarly challenged CPA implementation over the past five years. Regardless, the CPA probably could not have solved the historic problems arising from state development in Sudan, key among them being marginalisation, with its usual possibility of leading to separation. In fact, considering the two parties’ differing interpretations of CPA provisions and the challenge of implementing the agreement, secession was always possible. In order to address the remaining ten critical post-referendum issues in a productive, timely manner, it is vital for the parties to confront the political environment in Sudan, determine the role of the international community, and agree on the functions and tasks of the relevant CPA-mandated government commissions.
Discussion on the CPA
Discussion about the CPA analysed implementation as a measure of the interim government’s success and considered its implications on national unity. Most agreed that unity has been undermined by partisan interests, profound mistrust and differing interpretations of the CPA. The CPA was variably described as a conversion of ideas into action for the SPLM and as a roadmap for democratic transformation, with the question being whether the possibility ever existed for either party to fully implement the CPA. Reasons why this might not have been possible include the parties’ respective political strategies, level of commitment, and the availability of resources. The NCP and the SPLM have maintained a pragmatic, if not opportunistic, relationship during the interim period that in the end fell short of encouraging cooperation in ways that would bolster unity. Separate government entities have developed in the north and south that will continue to operate separately after self-determination. When assessing the success of the past five years, however, it is important to keep context in mind: namely, the economic and financial factor in CPA negotiations, the pressure on parties to sign, and to what extent the agreement did or did not represent each side’s strategic interests. One consequence of the interim period is that, although the CPA provided for national reconciliation, it was not realised, the failure of which will be felt in the months preceding the referendum.

African Experiences
Panelists comprising Dr. Paschal Mihyo, Professor Chris Landsberg, Carlos Cardoso, Cheikh Tidiane Ben Amar Kane, Njeri Karuru and Abdul Mohamed imparted African experiences of self-determination and secession, offering lessons that could benefit Sudan as it seeks a political solution to the possibilities created by self-determination. Chief among these lessons were the importance of creating a developmental state in Sudan, being inclusive of a diversity of political and ethnic groups in both the north and south, and supporting the challenge of coexistence after secession by seeking common values and constructing a special bilateral relationship. In Angola’s Cabinda area, the question of self-determination shows how calls for secession emerge from unmet demands for social justice, wealth distribution, and social and economic development. This suggests that a developmental state must be on the agenda for the south. Furthermore, such political issues should be resolved by negotiations, redistribution, and inclusiveness. Zanzibar and Tanzania illustrate a union that worked as a result of policy-based negotiations, economic partnership, capacity development, and policy-making that enabled long-term cooperation and coexistence. The union succeeded in no small part because capacity building was taken seriously by the government of Zanzibar, the resulting policies of which shifted negotiations away from speculation and strengthened overall stability. South Africa demonstrates that where there exists a racial dynamic of oppression, this must inform an equitable and just political agreement for it to be sustainable. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a new political order must come not only from fairness, but also from broad participation of political parties from across the spectrum. The lesson of Senegal is that religion can play a role in building bridges based on common values. Coexistence will continue to be a problem in Sudan even if the south secedes. For this reason Sudan’s regions must focus on common interests and values - not only in politics but in civil society as well. Based on Kenya’s experience, Sudan should consider very seriously ethnic-based issues, particularly internal divisions, following secession. Once the outsider leaves, how will the dynamics of ethnicity work out in a multiparty system? The case of Ethiopia and Eritrea proves the merits, even the necessity, of constructing a special relationship between a new state and its former territory to support mutually beneficial partnerships and regional stability.

Roundtable Discussion on the 2011 Referendum and Post-Referendum Issues
Professor Al Tayib Zain Alabdin, Martinson Oturomoi, Professor Hamad Hawi, Liz Gaere, and Abdul Mohamed led the roundtable discussion. Since all indications are that unity has missed its chance, the participants agreed that it is more realistic to discuss post-referendum arrangements than unity, including how to support an amicable separation between north and south. A positive relationship between the two regions is a high priority, meaning Sudan’s current status quo must change. Both parties are responsible for the weakened possibility of unity, with the remaining post-referendum issues highlighting how they have operated parallel policies over the interim period. Despite this and despite the complexity of post-referendum issues, it is still possible – in fact, necessary – for the parties to reach a framework agreement that will anchor negotiations by outlining principles of cooperation. Beyond this, there is also a need to discuss the most pressing issues in Sudan, namely governance and inclusiveness, which will not be resolved by secession. It was advised that these negotiations be done exclusively by the Sudanese themselves, without consultants. Leading up to the referendum, there is also a responsibility for the parties to create an enabling environment, meaning security, access to media and citizen education. Ultimately, preparation for the referendum bodes well for either unity or secession as it leads to capacity-building in the south.

Discussion: 2011 Referendum
Discussion of the referendum expanded on the idea of how to make secession – rather than unity – attractive, further stressing the urgent need for a political framework agreement for negotiating post-referendum issues. Participants wondered whether unity ever could have been made attractive, and noted that there are northern separatists in Sudan as well as southern separatists. For discussing post-referendum issues, negotiators from the north and south need one general guiding principle – possibly integration – which if implemented would augur well for both the short and long term. The point of an amicable divorce now is to create enough mutual economic and other cooperation and space for positive bilateral relations that unity will be an option in the future. There is a question, however, of whether it is viable to achieve under separation what could not be achieved under unity? To explore that possibility, stakeholders should be determined enough to find an authentic solution to the unique situation in Sudan.

Moving Forward: The Engagement of CODESRIA/African Intellectuals with the Political Process in Sudan
Nureldin Satti chaired a discussion among the participating African scholars about their potential role in Sudan. They reflected on the fact that a disconnect has developed between the intellectual and political class in African societies, limiting
the role of academics in conflict resolution and socioeconomic development. A lack of resources and an absence of democratic debate also prevent scholars from infusing ideas into decision-making processes. Should academics broaden their public participation, however, they must not serve simply as policy advisers; scholars, in their public engagement, must also be critics. To develop this capacity, CODESRIA is engaging Sudan through various academic and public partnerships, which in the near future may include, but are not limited to, public forums, seminars, research projects, a possible referendum monitoring mechanism, training, conferences and public debates. The aim will be to support policy-making on the referendum process, develop the capacity of Sudanese universities, facilitate collaboration between scholars from both the north and the South, and foster an environment for academics and civil society to engage in dialogue without discrimination. Throughout this process, African scholars should understand that they should approach Sudan not with answers, but with experiences. Sudanese scholars will help establish priorities as the partnership moves forward since any solutions to the issues discussed will have to be reflective of the Sudanese themselves. Ultimately, broader change in Sudan must come through social, economic and cultural engagement; it will not happen through politics only.

**Conclusion**

The Political Process in Sudan and the 2011 Referendum was a symposium intended to facilitate engagement between the Sudanese academic community and policy makers, create space for open discussion of the referendum and its relevant issues, connect African and Sudanese scholars, and renew CODESRIA’s relations with the Sudanese social science community. The event was successful in every of its initiative, indicating a promising future of CODESRIA’s engagement with Sudan.

The forum was notable for discussing and potentially contributing to policy-making on a current, polarising political issue, namely the southern referendum on self-determination in Sudan. The academic contributions balanced the referendum conversation and guided it towards a broad analysis that contextualised it and its implications for Sudanese in particular, and Africans in general. The conversations were rich in reflection and the wisdom of experiences that have the ability to serve Sudan in the near future, illustrating the value of involving African scholars in political processes. The political dialogue was itself significant for bringing together northerners and southerners and also including their African peers. Participants at times presented conflicting narratives of the political processes and differing opinions on how to move ahead, but the forum accommodated all voices through honest, open debate that ultimately enriched the understanding of the issue. Panelists reflected on the interim period as a means of understanding Sudan’s present situation, and shared experiences from other African states to offer lessons for Sudan’s political leadership and further situate the country’s politics.

The discussions produced several themes and proposals that were forward-thinking even as they reflected on the past. Analysis of CPA implementation highlighted the threat of partisan polarisation on Sudanese politics, which risks compromising the opportunities presented by secession to forge new, positive bilateral relations between the north and the south based on mutual economic and other interests. Participants stressed that a principal aim of the coming year must be to emerge from the practice of self-determination with a constructive relationship between the north and south. Likewise, the project of unity, broadly defined, should continue after the referendum. Some noted the trend of the region toward integration, recommending this principle as a keystone of negotiations. Participants also considered the importance of political legitimisation, inclusiveness, ownership and careful preparation for the referendum in the months ahead. Most participants agreed on the need for more popular consultation among civil society and the resolution of contentious issues (i.e. border demarcation) prior to voting. A recurring theme in the discussions was the behaviour of the political leadership over the past five years, reflecting the reality that the NCP and the SPLM have a monopoly over the political processes and, thus, the future of Sudan.

A final idea that arose from the dialogue is that outside experience cannot be a substitute for the shared vision Sudanese develop for themselves. The Sudanese are best served by articulating and taking ownership of their particular concept of a post-referendum Sudan. The international community is best positioned to help with the details once a framework has been developed. Ultimately, the Sudanese should lead the process of making decisions since it is the Sudanese who will live with their outcome.
CODESRIA supports the creation and operation of professorial chairs in Pan-African studies within the framework of its mission of facilitating research in social sciences in Africa. Two chairs have been benefitting from this support to date: the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere chair in Pan-African studies at the University of Dar-es-Salam, held by Prof. Issa Shivji as the recipient, and the Kwame Nkrumah chair at the University of Ghana under Prof. Koffi Anyidoho, a writer, poet and member of the CODESRIA Executive Committee. Other chairs are under consideration at different universities on the continent.

The first intellectual festival week was conducted in September 2008 under the auspices of the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Chair. This year’s edition ran between 12 and 15 April 2010 under the theme: “The Arusha Declaration.” This Declaration, made by President Nyerere in February 1967, was meant to define Tanzania’s vision for development. It advocated socialism as the most suitable system for the wellbeing of all citizens and for the liberation of Africa from imperialism, domination and exploitation. The Arusha Declaration posits that the basis of development is agriculture. Its preconditions were stated as: i) human resources (the population), ii) land, iii) good policies, and iv) good leadership.

This year’s festival provided an opportunity to participants with a chance to revisit, but most importantly to reaffirm these options through various activities: an inaugural lecture, delivered by Samir Amin, who was the festival’s Guest of Honour, on the theme: “The long walk toward socialism.” Samir Amin explained the nature and the causes of the “recent” economic crisis which started in the United States before spreading to affect the whole world.

According to Samir Amin, the emergence of new super powers (China, India, Brazil) and the on-going democratisation process in Africa, namely the access to power through elections, to name but a few, are far from being the solutions. In fact, this process fails from questioning the fundamental underpinnings of the liberal system and the marginalisation of Africa. On the contrary, China, in the same way as the West, participates in the exploitation of natural resources in Africa and takes land away from Chinese farmers. It therefore cannot be the solution.

Africa remains important in this context (and is becoming even more so) while Africans are leaguing against the imperialistic visions. What is then the solution? Samir Amin calls for a reflection on the development of the middle class, the implementation of equitable agrarian policies, the reinvention of the democratisation process, the negotiation of a global system and the need for African intellectuals to face up to their responsibilities.

CODESRIA played an active role in the festival by organising the Round-table on “The Role of CODESRIA in the Creation of a Pan-African Intellectual Community”. This session was coordinated by Sam Moyo, President of CODESRIA, Zenebeworke Tadesse, and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba both former presidents of CODESRIA, F.E. Senkoro, member of the Executive Committee, and Bernard Mumpasi Lututala, current Deputy Executive Secretary of CODESRIA. The need to produce knowledge that is useful to Africa and for the mobilisation of African intellectuals around the challenges of Africa today were highlighted throughout the presentations and debates. The conclusion was that CODESRIA has a major role to play in championing multidisciplinary research that transcends language, gender, and region.

The following activities which took place during the festival are worth highlighting:

- Samia Nkrumah, daughter of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, on the theme “Reflections on the Pan-African vision of Dr Kwame Nkrumah”;
- Professor Utsa Patnaik of the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, on “The issue of land in the neoliberal system”;
- The round-table on “Socialism and Rural Development” coordinated by several academics and dignitaries in the fields of science and politics (among whom was Uganda’s Deputy Prime Minister);
- Launching by Samia Nkrumah of a course on “Thoughts and Practices of Pan-Africanism” by Professor Bertram Mapunda;
- Debates on economic science teaching and research in Africa;
- Launch of “Africa’s Liberation – The Legacy of Nyerere”, during which Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary General of the Organisation of the African Unity, (OAU) paid a vibrant homage to the work of Julius Nyerere.

The Second Julius Nyerere Intellectual Festival week turned out to be a high level moment of exchanges on a burning question: How (or can we) free Africa from the yoke of the liberal economic system and the domination of super powers? The festival’s programme invited for a solution based on the fundamentals of the Arusha Declaration, the remedy proposed by Samir Amin were based on two main agents which are meant to compliment have had a tendency to contradict each other. These are the intellectuals and the political leaders. The former, who were supposed to produce knowledge and propose solutions relevant to our condition to help the political leaders become on the continent to counter present and future challenges have not worked well.
Two distinguished members of CODESRIA, Professor N’Dri Assie-Lumumba and Professor Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo were awarded, for their respective scholarship, the 2010 Distinguished Africanist Award by the New York State African Studies Association (NYASA) on March 27, 2010. The awards were part of the activities marking this year’s edition of NYASA’s Annual Conference at SUNY Binghamton on the theme ‘GLOBAL-AFRICA, GLOBAL-ASIA: Africa and Asia in the Age of Globalization’.

The Distinguished Africanist Award is ‘awarded to an academic by the NYASA Executive Board for outstanding contributions to the field of Africana Studies in New York’. In the past, other awardees have included Chinua Achebe, Ali Mazrui, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Mahmood Mamdani and Micere Mugo.

**N’Dri Assie-Lumumba** is Professor in the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell, and a member of the graduate fields of Education, International Development, International Agriculture and Rural Development, and Cornell Institute of Public Affairs (CIPA). A lifetime Fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science since 2006, Assie-Lumumba has published extensively on various areas, with particular expertise on higher education, comparative and international education, gender/women and equity. Professor Assie-Lumumba’s scholarship includes her editorial works for several prestigious professional journals mostly in North America, Africa and Asia, numerous articles published in refereed journals, book chapters, and peer-reviewed monographs. Her article ‘Educational and Economic Reforms, Gender Equity and Access to Schooling in Africa’, published in 2000 in the *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, won the 2001 ‘Joyce Cain Award for Distinguished Research on African Descendants’ given by Comparative and International Education Society in recognition of ‘an outstanding article that demonstrates academic rigour, originality, and excellence, and contributes to a better understanding of the experiences of African descendants’.

Her extensive publications include her authored, edited and co-edited books: *Higher Education in Africa: Crises, Reforms, and Transformation* (CODESRIA); *Cyberspace, Distance Learning, and Higher Education in Developing Countries: Old and Emergent Issues of Access, Pedagogy, and Knowledge Production*; *African Voices in Education; Les Africaines dans la Politique: Femmes Baoulé de Côte d’Ivoire; Women and Higher Education in Africa: Reconceptualizing Gender-based Human Capabilities and Upgrading Human Rights to Knowledge*, a Spani edition of which has just been published in Spain. Translations for publication in French, Portuguese, Arabic, and Chinese are also in progress. Her ongoing research projects include ‘Generations of African Intellectuals and Development of African Universities’ being carried out with partial funding from the Cornell Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the Cornell Institute for Social Sciences. Professor Assie-Lumumba is currently a member of the Scientific Committee of CODESRIA.

**Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo** is Professor of Political Science at Wells College where he has served as Chair of the Division of Social Sciences and Chair of the Department of Public Affairs, and is currently Chair of the Department of International Studies. He is a Visiting Scholar in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University, and also Adjunct Professor of Government in the Graduate Program of the Department of Government at Suffolk University. Professor Lumumba-Kasongo is Chercheur Associé at l’Institut d’Ethnosociologie at Université de Cocody, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and co-founder of the Centre Panafircan d’Études et de Recherches en Relations Internationales et en Education pour le Développement (CEPARRED). He is the Editor-in-Chief of *African and Asian Studies*, a social science journal published in the Netherlands, and member of the editorial committees of many other refereed journals.

Mahmood Mamdani bags Honorary Doctorate at Addis Ababa University*

**CODESRIA Publications**

Former President of CODESRIA (1998 – 2002), Professor Mahmood Mamdani was on Saturday 24 July 2010 awarded the honorary Doctor of Letters degree by the Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. Mamdani was honoured with the Doctor of Letters *honoris causa* by the university, together with three others, namely H.E. Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa (Doctor of Laws *honoris causa*), Ethiopian athlete Halle Gebresellassie (Doctor of Humane Letters *honoris causa*), and Australian doctor Catherine Hamlin (Doctor of Medical Sciences *honoris causa*).

Addis Ababa University described Mamdani as ‘a truly outstanding student of Africa’ who has ‘written insightfully and comprehensively on the crucial challenges facing African public life’, and unreservedly expressed its pride in attesting to his achievements as an ‘eminent African scholar and a renowned, cosmopolitan public intellectual’. The citation on Mamdani, and his remarks on receipt of the award are not only captivating, but also an encouragement to the present generation of true pan-Africanists as well as an inspiration to young and upcoming African scholars. The two speeches are therefore presented below.

**Citation on Mahmood Mamdani**

A truly outstanding student of Africa, you have written insightfully and comprehensively on the crucial challenges facing African public life. The range of your brilliant scholarship is remarkable: the crippling legacy of colonialism and empire; citizenship and statehood in Africa; the theory and practice of human rights; genocide and civil war in Africa. You have also addressed contemporary bigotry and intolerance with special attention to Islam.

The eloquent, vigorous and independent voice you bring to contemporary debates on Africa has received wide recognition. You have held distinguished academic positions, among which are: Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University, New York City; former President, Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar; Founding Director, Center for Social Research, Kampala. You were also named one of the top hundred public intellectuals in the world by the publication *Foreign Affairs* in 2008, attesting to the fact that your voice has won the favor of many beyond the academic community.

Addis Ababa University is proud to acclaim an eminent African scholar and a renowned, cosmopolitan public intellectual.

Upon the recommendation of the Senate, and by the authority vested in me by the Board, I have the honor to confer upon you the degree of Doctor of Letters *honoris causa*.

**Mamdani’s Remarks**

I first heard of Addis Ababa University in 1973, the year I got my first teaching job at the University of Dar es Salaam. Addis, like Dar, was a university in ferment during those years. They were times when we were sure of ourselves: we knew what we were up against, and we knew where we were going. We were against monarchy, against dictatorship, against neo-colonialism, against imperialism. And we were for socialism, sometimes for democracy, but always for socialism. Socialism had become a language in which we spoke to one another. For some, it was a badge; for others, it was a brand name.

We were the first generation of post-independence African intellectuals. We thought in historical terms. We knew that history was moving, more or less like a train, heading to a known destination, and none of us had any doubt that we were on that train. We were certain that the future would be better than the past, much better. If there would be violence, it would be revolutionary, the violence of the poor against the rich, the oppressor against the oppressed. Good revolutionary violence would do away with bad counter-revolutionary violence.

Two decades later, we found ourselves in a world for which we were least prepared. Not only was it a world drenched in blood, but the battle lines were hardly inspiring. There was little revolutionary about the violence around us: instead of the poor rising up against the rich, we could see poor pitted against poor, and rich against rich. This was hardly the final struggle promised in the International – *la lutte finale* – beyond which would lie the rosy dawn of socialism. It seemed more like the fires of hell. The most fitting metaphor for that quagmire was the Rwanda genocide of 1994.

A few months after the genocide, I found myself in the town of Arusha in Tanzania, as one of over hundred participants in a conference called by CODESRIA to reflect on the Rwanda genocide. During the conference, the discussion focused on the history that had led Rwanda to the genocide. Then someone introduced an element of doubt: he reminded us that precisely when the genocide was engulfing Rwanda, in the latter half of 1994, another seminal event was unfolding in another part of Africa. This was the transition from apartheid in South Africa. I remember asking a question: if someone had told us a decade before, in 1984, a time when the struggle against apartheid in South Africa was at its bloody height, but also a time when President Jouvenal Habyarimana was calling for reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda; if someone had told us then that a decade hence there would be a genocide in one of these countries and a reconciliation in another, how many of us would have identified the location of the two developments correctly? There was silence in the room.

Later, when I set about writing a book on colonialism and apartheid, and another on the genocide in Rwanda, I had time to reflect on the question. As post-apartheid South Africa and post-genocide Rwanda began writing their histories afresh, we realized that history is not a story with a predestination. Those determined to forge a different future begin by rethinking their history. History is not a train set out on a fixed journey. As our sense of destination changes, so does our perspective on the past, our sense of history. The difference between 1984 and 1994, not just in South Africa and Rwanda but elsewhere too, was not just made by history, but by politics. The possibilities offered by politics were in turn defined by the ability of those in the present to imagine a different future. The difference lay in this: whereas in South Africa, they dared imagine a future beyond apartheid; in Rwanda, they remained locked in the world of Hutu and Tutsi, the world of 1959.
Thus, my message to you: today, more than ever, we need the capacity to imagine different futures. In 1973, in Dar and in Addis, we thought of ourselves as being in transition to an already known destination, first it was a transition to socialism; after the fall of Soviet Union, the convention was to think of a transition to democracy; after 9/11, it became a transition to modernity. Common to all three was the conviction that the journey had a fixed destination. It was a road map with a predestined goal. Our role was only to exert effort, for the train was already on course.

I have little doubt that the world into which you are graduating is changing rapidly. Not only is American power declining in a relative sense, the world that we have known since 1492 – when European settlers first stepped into the New World – the world shaped by Western power, is also visibly changing. Experience has taught us that there is no given destination. The destination is negotiable. If I am right, you will need the courage and the creativity to imagine the destination and the skill and tenacity to forge a political consensus around that imagination.

Keep in mind that the journey you will embark on has no fixed destination. Where you go will depend on you and those around you. The better you understand the nature of forces defining your choices, the more you will be able to gather in your own hands possibilities of forging the future. I wish you the best in the journey ahead.

* Professor Mahmood Mamdani is currently Executive Director of the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda.
Methodological Workshop on the New Phase of Governance Monitoring

In collaboration with the Committee on Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), in May 2010, in Abidjan, CODESRIA organised a workshop to launch a new phase of monitoring governance initiated jointly by the two partner institutions. The aim of this initiative is to renew and strengthen the establishment of a monitoring framework of indicators, and promote governance as an ongoing review process, punctuated by the production of quarterly reports. The meeting provided an opportunity for its participants to harmonise approaches to research, refine their tools and agree on indicators.

New Comparative Research Networks (CRN)

The number of proposals received is almost the same as last year’s. In total, 70 applications have been registered for the 2010 Comparative Research Networks. Following is the analysis made on all proposals:

- **Applications submitted**: 70 CRN proposals from 25 countries among which 2 are in the Diaspora
- **Geographical distribution**: based on the 25 countries where the proposals came from, coordination assignments were distributed by region as follows: North Africa; 2; Southern Africa; 4; East Africa; 5; West Africa; 9; Central Africa; 3; Diaspora: 2
- **Gender**: In terms of the coordination of the networks, 50 were assigned to men and 20 to women
- **Working languages**: 46 proposals were submitted in English, 19 in French and 5 in Portuguese.

**List of 2010 CRNs**

1) CRN Cameroun, South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe/ André Ntonfo, Coordinator
   Football’s Fandom in Africa as Popular Art: A Multidisciplinary Approach

2) CRN Tchad, Mali and Togo/ Angèle Ramadji Beguy, Coordinator
   Maternal Mortality Reduction in Africa: Comparative Analysis of National Policies in Mali, Chad and Togo

3) CRN Uganda/ Stella Nyanzi, Coordinator
   Contextual and Structural Factors that Contribute to Young (Refugee and Displaced) Women’s Vulnerability and Resilience to HIV/AIDS in Uganda

4) CRN Sénégal, Switzerland and Côte d’Ivoire/ Mahamadou Sall, Coordinator
   Young African Refugees: Psycho-social Aspects, Identity and Resilience. A Comparative Research on Côte d’Ivoire, Sénégal and Switzerland

5) CRN Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique/ Miguel de Barros, Coordinator

6) CRN Zanzibar, Mauritius/ Abdul Sheriff, Coordinator
   Transition from Slavery: The Tale of Two Islands in the Indian Ocean

7) CRN South Africa, Ghana and Uganda/ Olujimi Adesina, Coordinator
   Beyond Social Protection: Social Policy in Rethinking Africa’s Development: A Comparative Study of Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa

8) CRN South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius/ Francis Nyamnjoh, Coordinator
   Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), mobility and the reconfiguration of marginality in Southern Africa

9) CRN Ghana and Burkina-Faso/ Mansah Prah, Coordinator
   Girls’ and Women’s Educational Aspirations, Sexuality and Missed Chances: Filling in the Gaps. Case studies from primary, secondary and tertiary institutions in Ghana and in Burkina Faso

10) CRN Congo/ Jean-Christophe Boungou Bazika, Coordinator
    Impact of Trading with China on regional integration within the ECCAS: Analysis of the Trans-border Trade between the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo

New National Working Groups (NWG)

Forty-nine (49) applications were received for the 2010 National Working Groups, in comparison to seventy-six (76) applications received in 2009. The proposals came from the 5 geographical regions, namely:

- **West Africa**: 18
- **East Africa**: 8
- **Central Africa**: 7
- **North Africa**: 2
- **Southern Africa**: 14

19 countries were represented based on the following linguistic distribution:

- 9 anglophone countries / 8 francophone countries / 2 lusophone countries;
- 23 proposals were written in English; 17 in French; 9 in Portuguese;

There were 49 coordinators: 41 males and 8 females.
List of 2010 National Working Groups (NWG)

1) NWG Uganda/ Joseph Matovu, Coordinator
   Patients’ Empowerment for Self-care in HIV/AIDS Care and Treatment in Uganda

2) NWG Nigeria I/ Kolawole Olu Owolabi, Coordinator
   Legal Structures, Ethical Norms and the Control of Corruption for the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria

3) NWG Kenya/ Daniel Muthee, Coordinator
   Addressing effects of Post-election Violence on Young Children in Kenya: Using Stories, Narratives, and Songs for Peace Building/ Coordinator: Daniel Muthee

4) NWG Tanzania/ Ng’Wanza Kamata, Coordinator
   Tanzania’s Political economy under neoliberalism: Contestation or Compliance?

5) NWG Nigeria II/ Jeffrey Isima, Coordinator
   Security Governance in Nigeria: The Informal Dimension

6) NWG Senegal I/ Aminata Dia Ba Sow, Coordinator
   Access to Land, Status and Roles of Rural Women of the Senegal River in the Promotion of Food Security: The Example of the Rice Sector

7) NWG Malawi/ Amon Kabuli, Coordinator
   Youth on the Move: Assessing Socio and Economic Factors Impacting Youth Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction Strategies in Rural and Semi-Urban Areas of Malawi

8) NWG Senegal II/ Diatou Thiaw, Coordinator
   Climate Change, Poverty and the Situation of Children in Eco-geographical Zones in Senegal: The Case of Casamance and the Groundnut Basin

9) NWG Mozambique/ Katia Palm, Coordinator
   From Invisibility to the Light: Women, Household, Violence and the New Law in Mozambique

10) NWG Cape Verde/ Arlindo Mendes, Coordinator
    Socio-cultural Practices of Alternative Medicine

Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP)

The CDP programme includes a dozen research centres, universities and civil society organisations, jointly conducting research and capacity building in West Africa on themes covering economic development, democracy and conflict resolution. This consortium also makes available to countries in the sub-region and ECOWAS, reference data and data elements that have a specific purpose in relation to key challenges they are facing.

The teams engaged in this programme have held their methodology workshops for 2010 between January and February. A meeting of the Steering Committee of the programme was also held in June. This meeting brought together the team coordinators and the main coordinators of the programme, namely CODESRIA and ASC Leiden.

Programme on Gender

From 25 to 27 October 2010, the 7th Symposium on Gender, under the theme ‘Gender and Migration in Africa’, will be taking place in Cairo, Egypt. This symposium will be held as usual in collaboration with the Arab and African Centre for Research (AACR), based in Egypt. The symposium will be part of the ongoing discussions on gender relations and migration in Africa, the socio-political and economic implications it brings, the economic dimension of migration and the risks and benefits posed by this phenomenon. This meeting will also be an opportunity to discuss different forms of migration from a gender perspective.

Reforming the Malawian Public Sector

Retrospectives and Prospectives

Edited by Richard I.C. Tambulasi
CODESRIA, Dakar, 2010, 110 pp

This book examines decentralization, performance contracting, and public-private partnerships as key aspects of the reforms and comes to the conclusion that at best, it can be argued that the failures have been due to poor implementation and this could be attributed to the fact that the process was led by donors who lacked the necessary institutional infrastructure. The book uses the 2005/6 fertilizer subsidy programme, which the government embarked on despite donor resistance that it went against market models, but which turned out to be overwhelmingly successful to demonstrate the state’s developmental ability and potential.

Price/Prix: Africa / Afrique 7 500 FCFA -- Outside Africa / Hors Afrique www.africanbookscollective.com

ISBN: 978-2-86978-314-0
### Training, Grants and Fellowships

#### CODESRIA Prize for the Best Doctoral Thesis in Social Sciences

The thesis that won this prize this year is ‘Anarchism and Syndicalism in South Africa, 1904–1921: Rethinking the History of Labour and the Left’ by Lucien van der Walt, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. The prize consists of:

1. the possible publication of the thesis;
2. the possible publication of French and Portuguese versions of the thesis;
3. presentation of the results of the thesis in some universities;
4. grant of 1,000 USD.

#### Training Grants and Fellowships: 2010/2011 Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutes</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Directors</th>
<th>Number of Participants by Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Dakar, 2010</td>
<td>Gender and Sport in Africa’s Development</td>
<td>Dr Monia Lachheb</td>
<td>Ghana 1; Cameroon 4; Zimbabwe 4; Botswana 1; Swaziland 1; South Africa 2; Kenya 1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Dakar, 2010</td>
<td>Corruption, Democratic Governance and August, 2010</td>
<td>Dr Said Adejumobi Accountability</td>
<td>Cameroon 2; Togo 1; Benin 1; Senegal 2; Rwanda 1; Nigeria 5; South Africa 1; Swaziland 1; Egypt 1; Ivory Coast 1; Kenya 1; Uganda 1; Congo 1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child and Youth Dakar, 2010</td>
<td>The Place for Work in African Childhodss</td>
<td>Prof. Michael Bourdillon</td>
<td>RDC 2; Ghana 2; Congo 1; Ethiopia 1; Cameroon 3; Mali 1; Kenya 2; South Africa 1; Ivory Coast 1; Chad 1; Senegal 1; Zimbabwe 1; Norway 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Policy and Society in Africa Dakar, 2010</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS and the Discourse of the “Outsider” in Africa</td>
<td>Prof. Cheikh Ibrahimia Niang</td>
<td>Cameroon 3; RDC 2; Congo 1; Togo 1; Burkina Faso 1; Senegal 2; Mauritania 1; Kenya 3; Nigeria 3; Tunisia 1; France 1; USA 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Methodology Workshop Coordinator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinator</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Scientific</th>
<th>Number of Participants by Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa Oran, 2010</td>
<td>Fields and Theories of Qualitative Research</td>
<td>Omar Derras</td>
<td>Morocco 5; Algeria 8; Tunisia 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### SEPHIS

| Extended Workshop Dakar, 2010         | Historicizing Gender and Sexuality in the Global South | Charu Gupta | South Africa 2; Zimbabwe 1; India 4; Barbados 1; Ecuador 1; Egypt 1; Cameroon 1; Colombia 1; Kenya 1 |

#### Advanced Research Fellowships Dakar, 2010

| Nigeria 2; Senegal 2; Ivory Coast 2; Uganda 1; Cameroon 1 |

#### Textbooks Programme Dakar, 2011

| Kenya 1; Tanzania 1; Senegal 1; Botswana 1 |

#### Small Grants Programme Dakar, 2011

| Nigeria 7; Zambia 1; South Africa 2; Rwanda 1; Zimbabwe 2; Kenya 3; Burundi 2; Benin 2; Ivory Coast 1; Madagascar 2; Burkina Faso 1; Mali 2; Senegal 7; Congo 3; RDC 1; Ethiopia 1; Guinea Conakry 1; Swaziland 1; Niger 1; Cameroon 3 |
The Annual CODESRIA-SEPHIS Lecture Tour seeks to encourage connections between different research traditions and networks in the South by inviting an established scholar from another part of the South, representing a specific social/historical school or scholarly approach, to give a number of lectures in selected African universities. It is rotated amongst the sub-regions of the African continent. In 2009, Botswana and Lesotho hosted the tour on behalf of the Southern African region. The tour, which took place from 1 to 14 June 2009, had as guest lecturer Maria del Pilay Troya of FLASCO, Ecuador.

The topic of her lecture, which is to be published by CODESRIA and SEPHIS, was ‘Discourses on Citizenship of Women in the Global South: Lessons from Ecuador’. The lecture was warmly received by the audiences made up of academics and civil society activists in both countries, as it touched on a very crucial issue affecting female empowerment in Africa–citizenship. The tour also provided Maria with the opportunity to establish links with colleagues working on gender studies in Lesotho and Botswana and to make plans for a reciprocal visit by a Botswana gender specialist to Ecuador.

Alternative Methodology Workshop 2009 took place in Bamako, Mali from 5 to 10 of August 2009. The workshop was the third in the series to be organised by CODESRIA-SEPHIS and the first with French as the working language. It was thus a groundbreaking workshop and a very important effort by CODESRIA and SEPHIS to meet the needs of development research and researchers in Africa. The workshop had as theme: Oral Sources as Alternative History.

The workshop director was Prof. Theodore Nicoue Lodjou Gayibor, former rector, University of Lome and foremost African expert on oral history. He was assisted by Prof. Doulaye Konate of the University of Mali and Prof. Seydou Camara of the African Studies Institute, Mali. The ten laureates of the workshop were doctoral candidates from universities in Francophone Africa who were mainly historians. The first part of the workshop covered the theoretical issues involved in conducting research, using oral sources in Africa.

The second part of the workshop covered the practical aspects of doing research, using oral sources with the example of research, carried out on the Mande of Mali with oral sources by Prof Seydou Camara. The third part of the workshop focused on the dynamics and use of oral sources in contemporary African states and societies. It focused principally on the use of oral sources in the construction of memory by African states, societies and peoples. The combination of the practical and theoretical lectures and the highlighting of the importance of oral sources to the functioning of contemporary societies were highly welcomed by all the participants.

The Equity Policy Dialogue was the first policy dialogue to be organised by the CODESRIA-SEPHIS programme. The theme of the Equity Policy dialogue, which was held in Dakar, Senegal, from the 1 to 3 October 2009 was ‘Corruption: Critical Perspectives from the South’. The dialogue, which lasted three days, drew participants from all over the Global South (Africa, Latin America and Asia) and from a diverse range of disciplines (Economics, Sociology, Political Science, Law, Anthropology and Philosophy).

The Equity Policy Dialogue brought together experts from all regions of the South, with the goal of facilitating the exchange of ideas between activists, researchers and policy makers on equity issues in order to generate policy-relevant knowledge, promote the use of social science research in policy formulation, and the development of methodological tools for evaluating the impact of social and economic development policies on equity. The Dialogue was coordinated by Dr Said Adejumobi, Chief, Public Administration Section & Coordinator of the African Governance Report (AGR) at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He also presented the keynote address titled ‘Corruption in Africa: A Theoretical Consideration’.

The policy dialogue sessions took the form of open forum discussions centred on keynote presentations, and papers covering sub-themes such as conceptual and theoretical approaches to corruption in the south; history, culture and corruption; perceptions and interpretations of corruption; political and economic perspectives and the social dimensions of corruption. The uniqueness of the SEPHIS Equity Dialogue on corruption was in its focus on the encouragement of Southern voices in the debate on corruption and in the challenging of the dominant view of corruption as a characteristic of the Global South.

More important was the emphasis of the dialogue, as reflected in its theme, on the relationship and the importance of corruption to issues of equity in the Global South and the need to come to terms with and understand in detail such connections. The dialogue underlined the fact that the issue of corruption required a critical, nuanced and historicised analysis which took on board the trajectory of the development experience of Southern countries, specifically, their political, ideological, institutional, socio-cultural and political context and the place of the Global South in the global economy.

Conclusion

During its activities in 2009, the CODESRIA-SEPHIS programme, through a focus on building a sustainable platform for strategic discussions about development paradigms by research and training in the history of development, reinforced CODESRIA’s quest for ‘alternatives that consolidate and extend the social sciences as a body of knowledge that is relevant for understanding and transforming livelihood for the better’.

South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development (SEPHIS)
The CODESRIA Publications and Dissemination Programme continues to make steady progress in its key function of providing accessibility and visibility for research findings on Africa, both within and outside the continent. Hence, the first half of the year has, as usual, been devoted to publishing the Council’s research findings as books, articles in journals, or as policy research reports, and as well engage in publication collaborative and dissemination activities. There is no doubt that CODESRIA’s focus on what needs to be done to promote the emergence of better African societies, based on principles of good governance and human security, are being pursued strongly, as can be seen in the publications so far released.

**Book Series**

1. Reforming the Malawian Public Sector: Retrospectives and Prospectives, edited by Richard I.C. Tambulasi  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-314-0

2. Saviors and Survivors, Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, by Mahmood Mamdani  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-317-1

3. From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners’—Examining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics, by Michael Neocosmos  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-306-5

4. Gender, Sport and Development in Africa: Cross-cultural Perspectives on Patterns of Representations and Marginalization, edited by Jimoh Shehu  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-307-2

5. Genre et Sport dans le développement en Afrique : la conquête des femmes, edited by Monia Lachheb  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-320-1

   **ISBN:** 978-1-906387-85-3

**Monographs**

   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-303-4

2. The Concept of First Lady and Engendering of Politics in Nigeria, by Kunle Ajayi  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-304-1

**Journals**

1. *Africa Development*, Volume 34, Number 2, 2009  
   **ISSN:** 0850-3907

2. *Africa Development*, Volume 34, Number 3&4, 2009  
   **ISSN:** 0850-3907

   **ISSN:** 1024-0969

   **ISSN:** 1027-4332

   **ISSN:** 0851-2914

   **ISSN:** 0851-7592

   **ISSN:** 0850-8712

8. *Africa Review of Books*  
   **ISSN:** 0851-7592

**Research Reports**

1. Genre et sécurité au Sénégal : une intégration à poursuivre  
   (co-published with AMLD) Fatou Sarr  
   **ISBN:** 978-9-29222-074-7

   By Jibrin Ibrahim & Dauda Garuba  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-315-7

3. A Study of Ghana’s Electoral Commission  
   By Emmanuel Debrah, E. Kojo Pumpuni & Emmanuel Gvimah-Boadi  
   **ISBN:** 978-2-86978-316-4

**Book Presentation**

Book presentations are one of the avenues for creating visibility for CODESRIA publications. We have however had only one presentation so far, and this was on the book Armée et politique au Niger edited by Idrissa Kimba. The presentation took place on 5 March 2010 at the Librairie Clairafrique, Dakar. It is hoped that other book presentations would hold before the year runs out.

**Trade and Co-publication Collaborations**

Two of our publications listed below have been co-published; one with Fahamu Books and the other with Alliance pour la migration, le leadership et le développement (AMLD).

The strengthening of our co-publishing arrangements with different publishers continues, presently with the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) press in South Africa for the production of *The Meanings of Timbuktu* (French and Arabic editions), "The Capital Cities of Africa", "Africa Focus 2009", and "Annotated Bibliography". A meeting has been held with the HSRC on these titles.
New titles for co-publication have also been proposed to Karthala in Paris and Zed Books in UK, while planning to complete negotiations with new commercial publishers.

New distribution outlets on the continent are going to be opened while strengthening the distribution of CODESRIA publications through Mosuro the Booksellers Limited (Ibadan, Nigeria), University Bookshop, Makerere (Kampala, Uganda), Edition CLE (Yauonde, Cameroon) and and Librairie Clairafrique (Dakar, Senegal).

CODICE

Managing CODESRIA’s Presence on the Web

Since February 18, 2010, CODESRIA has activated the renewed version of its Web site (http://www.codesria.org/). It is available in English, French and Portuguese versions. It presents a new mapping and its information architecture makes navigation easier across the various Web site content headings. The site has become much more interactive, allows easy communication with the different programme officers and automatic access to the most recent information posted online, thanks to an RSS flux facility. This makes it possible for as many as may wish to subscribe to CODESRIA’s mailing list to receive announcements on all the Council’s activities. Now the Web site can be updated regularly by CODICE team via the Web from any log-on point.

The Council’s information on the new Web site has been organised under ten major headings: research programmes, training, publications, conferences, online resources, fellowship, announcements, schedule and topical events. Major innovations include:

• introducing the Secretariat staff, with profile description and pictures to facilitate identification;
• posting online not only key-documents like CODESRIA Charter, Strategic Plan and Annual Reports, but also a wide range of public statements on various issues and tributes paid to social science research community members;
• a catalogue of CODESRIA’s most recent publications which may be searched by theme, country and region;
• an online catalogue of CODICE library (http://www.codesria.sn/);
• a list of useful resource links for the social science research community;
• schedule of CODESRIA’s public activities;
• social science news, supplied notably via the RSS flux, of specialised social science research Web sites;
• a list of main acronyms and a glossary of terminologies used;
• a list of frequently asked questions and model answers;
• an RSS flux giving access in real time to Web site updates;
• localisation of CODESRIA on Google Maps and provision of all necessary information to get there by bus, cab, etc.

Web site counters showed that about 39,000 Net surfers visited the site between the date of its activation and May 31, 2010. On a monthly average, the number of visitors increased from 3,000 in February to 10,500 in March; 11,000 in April and 13,000 in May, 2010. Average daily visitors numbered 432 with a peak of 557 reached on April 23, 2010. A detailed analysis of links hosted with some Web sites revealed about 16,600 links to CODESRIA’s Web site. The main Web sites which visitors transit through to get to our site numbered 48 with Google topping the list (494), followed by Peace and Collaborative Development Network (320), International Sociological Association (254), OSSREA (223), Centre population et développement (148), Méditerranée (145), Danish Development Research Network (114), CODICE online catalogue (98), UCAD (86), etc.

Visitor Distribution between the various Web site Content Headings

Visitor trends between the various headings showed that most visitors were attracted by announcements (28.2%), followed by publications (16.3%) and lastly information on CODESRIA (11.8%).

Fellowship announcements alone accounted for 56 per cent of total visitors to announcements. However, these statistics should be relativised owing to the fact that all announcements did not remain online for an equal period of time due to in-built constraints in their respective formulations.

Lastly, 420 Internet surfers’ visit to CODESRIA’s recent publications were as follows: Chercheurs et décideurs (440), African Union and New Strategies for Development in Africa (334), Armée et politique au Niger (149), Saviors and Survivors (143), 137 visited “The Meanings of Timbuktu” (137), and Les frontières de la citoyenneté en cote d’ivoire (100). Now, as soon as a publication is sent to the printer, it is immediately put online on our site as advance information to prospective users and to ensure that CODESRIA is the first to break information on it.

CODESRIA’s activities can now also be followed on Twitter, by logging on to http://twitter.com/codesria. As of now, over hundred institutions (OSSREA, NAI, HSRC, SSRC, CRASC, IDRC, ROCARE, WDR, FIFA, SANGONet, EUFORIC, Africa Renewal, Jeune Afrique, ONG Afrique, US Government, etc.) and individuals have registered for information on CODESRIA’s activities. Besides, about forty links to Twitter accounts which might be of interest to the social science research community have been proposed through this account. This Twitter account has allowed us to be present on social networks, to increase distribution channels of information on our activities and build a better image for CODESRIA.
Free Full Text Online Resources for Social Science Research

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. | African e-Journal Project  
http://africa.msu.edu/AEJP/ |
| 2. | African Studies Journals @ Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_studies_journals |
http://www.africanstudiesrepository.org/ |
| 4. | African Studies Internet Resources, Columbia University  
| 5. | AtoZ. Selected electronic journals focused on Africa  
http://atoz.ebsco.com/home.asp?id=2749 |
| 6. | Cairn.info  
http://www.cairn.info/accueil.php |
| 7. | Les Classiques des sciences sociales  
http://classiques.uqac.ca/ |
| 8. | Connecting Africa  
http://www.connecting-africa.net/ |
| 9. | Directory of Development organisations  
http://www.devdir.org/ |
| 10. | Directory of Open Access Journals  
http://www.doaj.org/ |
http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/ |
| 12. | Eldis - Gateway to Development Information  
http://www.eldis.org/ |
| 13. | Encyclopédie Diderot et D'Alembert  
http://portail.atilf.fr/encycopedie/ |
| 14. | Erudit.org  
http://www.erudit.org/ |
| 15. | Gallica  
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ |
| 16. | Google books  
http://scholar.google.com/Google livres  
http://books.google.fr/books |
| 17. | Google Scholars  
http://scholar.google.fr/  
http://scholar.google.com/ |
| 18. | Hyper articles en ligne (HAL)  
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
| 19. | Hyper articles en ligne Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société (HAL-SHS)  
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
| 20. | The International Reporter Resource Network (IRN)  
http://www.reporter.no/IRN/index.html |
| 21. | Persée : Portail de revues en sciences humaines et sociales :  
www.persee.fr/web/guest/home/ |
| 22. | Project Gutenberg  
http://www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Main_Page |
| 23. | Répertoire des ressources électroniques. Groupe Transversal Ressources Documentaires  
| 24. | Revues.org : Portail de revues en sciences humaines et sociales :  
www.revues.org/ |
| 25. | Revues électroniques en accès libre  
http://www.inist.fr/spip.php?article69 |
| 26. | Les signets de la Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF)  
http://signets.bnf.fr/ |
| 27. | UNBISNET, United Nations Bibliographic Information System  
http://unbisnet.un.org/ |
| 28. | World Bank / Banque Mondiale  
http://www.worldbank.org/  
http://donnees.banquemondiale.org/frontpage |