

MAPUTO AND LUANDA



9 Maputo and Luanda

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This chapter examines two capital cities in lusophone Africa: Maputo, Mozambique, and Luanda, Angola, with a slight emphasis on the former. Despite undergoing initial mercantile and subsequent colonial exploitation by the same European power – Portugal – the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial contexts in these two cities all exhibit significant differences. Whether the similarities between them are greater than the dissimilarities – and the degree to which they also share similarities with other sub-Saharan cities – is difficult to assess given the great diversity across the macro-region (as this book illustrates). However, Maputo probably demonstrates more regional convergence with more sub-Saharan cities than Luanda at this time.¹

Urban geology

Pre-colonial patterns of settlement

Human settlement has been identified in and around Maputo since the first century in the Common Era through archaeological remains. The site provided a mix of seafood gathering, hunting and eventually agricultural potential for early human settlement. This, however, was not permanent, and temporary settlement based on shifting cultivation techniques, including pastoralism, continued as the basic form of human settlement up to and through most of the European mercantile period, as evidenced by the earliest historical records from Portuguese explorers and shipwrecked mariners from the mid-16th century onwards. Luanda, on the other hand, did not benefit from the relatively consistent seasonal rain, as did Maputo in the south-east of the continent, and its hinterland was dry and semi-arid. However, the cold Benguela current provided an abundance of fish, and fishing communities and some salt panning were established around the bay in fairly permanent form by the time of the Portuguese arrival in the late 15th century.²

The Portuguese can be seen as heading the first major wave of globalisation. Although Italian city states had been engaging in overland trade with the east for some time, this was not as widespread in terms of geographic impact.³ As part of this European mercantile expansion, Luanda (initially called São Paulo de Assunção) was founded in 1576 as a military requirement for Paulo Dias de Novais's 1571 concession of Angolan territory by the Portuguese crown (in a similar approach to that of the *capitanias* of early Brazil).⁴ The small fortified trading settlement of Luanda (this name was adopted in the 17th century) grew slowly during the next three centuries as Portugal concentrated its efforts in Asia and South America.⁵ Trade was mainly based on slaves, and the city became the main export port for slaves on the west coast of Africa for some time (Miller 1988). It remained, however, a fairly small settlement (from 400 inhabitants in 1621, it grew to only some 4 500 by 1810).

The fort dominated the bay on a promontory and was accompanied by other religious, military and administrative buildings in the Cidade Alta, whereas most of the housing and trading areas were on the lower beachfront in the Cidade Baixa, similar in urban form to contemporary Salvador de Bahia, where the majority of the slaves arrived.⁶ However, Brazil's independence from Portugal in 1822 and the official ending of the slave trade in 1836 created an exodus of the European population from Luanda, which stagnated until the mid-19th century, when Portugal sought other forms of raw-material exploitation based on agricultural plantations in the hinterland plateaux.

In 1544, the Portuguese navigator Lourenço Marques had discovered what is now Maputo Bay, although no permanent settlement was created for the subsequent sporadic trade visits of the Portuguese to the indigenous inhabitants of the area. The significant indigenous residential groups in the region around the bay of Lourenço Marques (which Maputo was called until independence in 1975) not only traded with the Portuguese, but also the Dutch (established at the Cape of Good Hope from 1652), French and English.⁷ The Portuguese subsequently founded their first settlement in 1752, but soon after also retreated north to their more established trading 'factories' at Inhambane, Sofala and Ilha de Moçambique. During this period, conflict between the various clan-based indigenous groups in the area and its hinterland continued to shift the indigenous human-settlement landscape, all based on shifting cultivation, but with a growing element of trade – initially predominantly ivory, although with a later introduction of slavery. Significant instability between the existing clans led to the formation of a more limited number of strong indigenous states, and territorial competition between the Portuguese, Boers and English underpinned the continued limited growth of the settlement.⁸ In 1858, there were only some 900 inhabitants in the settlement and its direct sphere of influence probably did not extend more than 10 km.

The situation changed dramatically, however, when gold was discovered in the Boer Republics – first at Lydenburg in 1873 and then subsequently in the Witwatersrand in 1886. The gold rush that ensued led to fast-developing trade through the port of Lourenço Marques, especially after the construction of the railway link to Johannesburg towards the end of the century. This coincided with the Berlin Conference in 1884/5, called for by Portugal, which was increasingly concerned about the encroachment into territory it considered to be under its control in the continent's east (Mozambique) and west (Angola) – challenged by Britain in the former case and Belgium and Germany in the latter.⁹

The colonial legacy

Having established European recognition of its overseas territories, Portugal was obliged by the agreements to demonstrate control; economically, it also wanted to begin different forms of exploitation. After several failed attempts at planting sugar and cocoa inland from Luanda, eventually cotton and coffee met with some success – especially the latter – in the high plateau some distance inland. Whereas slave trading had depended on African kingdoms supplying slaves and Afro-Portuguese

trading elites to commercialise them (all taxed by the Portuguese crown), the new colonial economic developments were based on settlers, and required subjugation of the indigenous states – mainly the Mbundu in the inland plateau and the Kongo in the north – towards the end of the 19th century. Similar military campaigns were waged in the north and south of Mozambique, with the eventual subjugation of the Gaza state in 1895 being of significance for the emerging port of Lourenço Marques, which became the country's capital from 1896, owing to the changing economy and links with South Africa. In the latter part of the 19th century, Lourenço Marques expanded rapidly in demographic and territorial terms, with land speculation rife and a series of public buildings and infrastructure being installed.

Similar trends were in evidence in Luanda, and in both towns indigenous urban settlement was also beginning to take place on the peripheries – called *musseques* in Luanda, a term which derives from the red, sandy soil on the higher land where these informal areas were established. At this time, vagaries in the international commodity market led to a decline in Angola's emerging plantation economy and, with this, the fortunes of Luanda, which only picked up again after World War I. Lourenço Marques, on the other hand, grew in trading and transport importance, as well as through the contractual establishment of migrant labour for the mines of South Africa, which was generally administered through the town.

Importantly, both towns were also the main entry points for settlers emigrating from Portugal, generally in search of colonial plantation and small-holding developments, although a significant proportion remained in (or returned to) the towns as small traders. The growth of this European population led to increasing racial segregation in terms of access to jobs, education, etc., despite the struggle by previously established local mixed-race and indigenous elites to retain their social, economic and political positions. For the majority of the indigenous people of these countries, colonial subjugation led to enforced labour and cropping, as well as state taxation and a general undermining of their pre-colonial patterns of economic as well as political and social activity. The Portuguese state created local chiefs to administer the territory, and in large areas of Mozambique for several decades, also awarded administrative and judicial rights to large concession companies due to its weakness in effective colonisation.

This inner colonisation of society led to a dual urban form emerging in Lourenço Marques and Luanda, as various attempts to control indigenous labour were never adequately implemented. Both cities grew rapidly in the first half of the 20th century: Maputo up to 44 700 by 1940 and about 90 000 by 1950, some three-quarters of whom were of 'indigenous' status, mostly in the growing *caniço* informal settlements¹⁰ to the north-west of the city centre. The population of Luanda grew to 50 000 by 1930 and 61 000 by 1940, with the majority of the growth being accommodated in *musseques* on the slopes above the city centre. World War II saw an economic boost for both countries, with a boom in coffee in Angola, as well as cotton, sisal and other exports in both countries – Mozambique's economy still being strongly linked to the industrialising Witwatersrand area. Limited industrialisation took

place in both Portuguese 'overseas territories' from the 1940s, mainly in the form of raw-material processing and some local production of consumer goods (food, beer, etc.). However, it was not until the change of foreign investment laws in Portugal, in a new political regime in the 1960s, that this began to have any marked effect. The late 1960s and early 1970s thus saw a new economic boom, similar to that in other newly independent neighbouring states, although Portugal was already having difficulty defending its colonies, both from the criticism of the international community and from internally created, but externally supported, independence movements.

The urban form produced in the colonial period was markedly dualistic, with the establishment of inner *ciudades de cemento* – permanent buildings aligned along leafy boulevards in southern European style (in the Cidade Baixo and Cidade Alto), most clearly represented in the first modern urban plans from the middle of the 20th century (Jenkins 2006b) – surrounded by areas of informal settlements. These areas were predominantly occupied by indigenous and mixed-race populations, although a significant part of this was on formally registered land in the names of (mostly) European settlers who 'farmed' land and rental housing, as the indigenes did not have land rights.¹¹

Infrastructure provision in the *musseques* in Luanda and the *caniço* in Lourenço Marques was minimal and overcrowding widespread. As the city populations expanded, these rings of informal settlement – which were largely ignored by the state in a *laissez-faire* attitude to urban planning and in-migration – eventually created difficulties for horizontal urban expansion, as did land speculation by the relatively small land-owning elite in both cities. The initial result was vertical expansion and densification in the inner cities – from the 1940s in the form of three-to-four-floor walk-up buildings, and from the 1960s with higher-rise developments with elevators. However, the urban expansion soon 'leapfrogged' the informal settlements into more peripheral land, with various urban boundary extensions and expropriation of indigenously controlled land for new developments. In Lourenço Marques this led to the creation of a new contiguous sister city (Matola) to the west, and in Luanda development pushed out along major access routes towards Viana (south-east) and Cacuaco (east). Much of the new permanent development was unauthorised or *clandestino*, as the state failed to keep up with the often frenetic pace of spurts of economic and physical development.

This form of urban development – mirroring that of Portugal – reflected weak government capacity to control land markets and produce urban plans with any realistic basis (Jenkins 2003a), as well as the limited nature of urban decentralised local government – all quite different from other colonial powers in the region. It also reflected tendencies in other realms of governance, where a pragmatic *laissez-faire* system tended to dominate practice, despite legislation. The *laissez-faire* approach had two sides, however – less formal control, but also more informal control. Thus, although the Portuguese state claimed its overseas territories were the most integrated in racial terms, compared with other colonies, social and economic discrimination was rife and repression continued long after other European powers

had adopted managed decolonisation processes. Also unlike other colonising powers, there was very limited engagement by the state in providing the indigenous population with schools, healthcare, infrastructure, etc. In the early 1970s, there was a realisation that this had now become necessary as part of the fight against liberation movements, and urban and rural areas were targeted by a late rush of new state investment. In Lourenço Marques this included new primary schools and water supplies being made available through the *caniço* peri-urban areas and some limited sites and services programmes being started, and there were similar activities in Luanda. This was, however, all too little, too late. It was, therefore, no wonder that the impact of struggles for liberation from colonial rule were so fierce and their effects so long lasting.

Post-independence urban policy and practice

Independence struggles by liberation movements were conducted rather differently in the two countries, although both were affected by the Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal in 1974. This was highly influenced by the liberation wars. At the time, around half of Portugal's GDP financed, and most of its armed forces were engaged in, the fighting in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde (MacQueen 1997). Rather than a gradual, managed decolonisation process, Portugal instituted a more or less immediate withdrawal, leading to a massive exodus of settlers and those who saw no future in the independent African states generally flooding back to Portugal (and to neighbouring South Africa, in the case of Mozambique), accentuating the demand for rapid political change in the metropole.¹² However, whereas Eduardo Mondlane had managed to bring the various Mozambican liberation groups together in the united *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Front), in Angola each movement continued to fight for control of the new state. It was the Marxist *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) that won the struggle by capturing Luanda and gaining UN recognition, with a subsequent short period of relative peace in the late 1970s.

After some initial military and social turbulence around independence in 1975, Mozambique was able to enter a relatively peaceful period, although sporadic attacks from (then) Rhodesia developed in the centre of the country. Angola, however, staggered on with internal conflict which developed into full-scale civil war between the three main liberation movements, all with different international backing (and ethnic links – see below). In time, after Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, Mozambique also was subject to South African-backed involvement and a form of proxy civil war, and this affected development opportunities in the 1980s through to the peace settlement in 1992. Angola's return to internal war in 1981 was also the focus of a peace settlement brokered in the early 1990s, but the country reverted to civil war in 1992–1994, after the elections, and again in the late 1990s, and only established peace in 2002, a decade later than Mozambique. These internal wars were driven mainly by the Cold War in the 1980s, with different sides of the international

conflict supporting different internal groups. However, this ideological stance was also overlaid in Angola's case by the struggle to control the oil and diamond wealth, and after the end of the Cold War, this continued to be the main rationale and source of differential funding for conflict.

The lack of peace severely affected both countries' development opportunities and also urban development. In Angola, the war was generally based in rural areas, but most towns were also affected, with many being taken as military strongholds, only to be contested, sometimes various times, with disastrous physical and human destruction. The highly financed nature of the war led to Angola experiencing more set-piece battles with widespread use of heavy artillery and bombardment. The effect was the destruction of much of the built environment in many secondary cities and towns, and an increasing concentration of the population in Luanda, which grew vertiginously through the 1980s and 1990s (Jenkins 2003b). From 475 000 in 1970 (the last full census to date), with 44% of the population in *musseques*, the city grew to an estimated 2 million in 1995 and 3 million in 2000 (CEHS/DW 2005), representing some 20–25% of the national population and 60% of the urban population. Luanda's population was estimated to have grown to between 4.7 and 5.4 million by 2010 (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a).¹³ The fact that oil was discovered offshore not long before independence led to the rapid development of exploitation, with no serious effect from the war – although the diamond region in the north-east was generally controlled by the opposition movement, UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The Angolan rural economy thus collapsed with no severe impact on the country's general wealth, which fuelled the war and vastly accelerated urbanisation.

In Mozambique, unlike Angola, the war was carried out mostly in rural areas, with only sporadic incursions into urban areas, which led to less concentration of the national population in Maputo in the far south, but also led to significant increased urban in-migration as rural development opportunities collapsed. This was due not only to the war, but also the exodus of skilled personnel and small-scale entrepreneurs (for example, most rural shopkeepers fled the countryside and many left the country); an over-reliance on large-scale state farms (taking over the mostly abandoned private-sector plantations); and a general lack of management skills and capital to continue supporting the existing agricultural production. Food security was hit by the collapse of the rural economy – be it plantation-based crops (as was the tendency in the centre of the country), small-scale farming and peasant cropping (in the north) or private sector farming (in the south) – and exacerbated by a series of droughts and floods, which affected the whole region.¹⁴

Whereas in-migration to urban areas had been controlled in a *laissez-faire* manner in the colonial period – especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as industries required labour and the state adopted a 'winning hearts and minds' approach – the independent government intrinsically applied no controls, which led to a surge of in-migration. By the first post-independence census in 1980, the (then combined) Maputo conurbation (renamed after independence and then including the sister

city, Matola) had reached some 755 000 – nearly 100% growth since 1970. By the 1997 census, the population of the combined cities (albeit once again separated administratively) was some 1.4 million, representing 9% of the total population and some 45% of the urban population nationwide. The city population was projected to rise to some 2.4 million by 2010, or approximately 12% of the projected national population (Jenkins 2000a).

While the general context of war/peace, and rural and other development options varied significantly between the countries in the post-independence period, the general attitude of the two governments to urban areas was somewhat similar. For instance, there was an implicit anti-urban bias in the dominant rural and agricultural development policies of Mozambique, made all the more explicit in the late 1980s with Operation Production, which tried to expel all ‘parasitic’ city dwellers from Maputo to spur on rural development in the least developed province of Niassa in the north-west. This had disastrous effects in social, economic and political terms¹⁵ (Jenkins 2001b). In terms of official urban development, the Mozambican government developed some new towns for agro-industry and accepted it needed to complete unfinished buildings, mainly in Maputo. However, these generally became offices for the growing state bureaucracy.

Government housing activity was focused on nationalisation (including abandoned and rented housing and all land) and state rentals of housing. However, this policy only represented a very small proportion of the total stock, even in Maputo where it was concentrated, let alone nationwide. Some alternative housing and urban interventions were undertaken by the central government in Maputo with UN assistance (Jenkins 1990), but there was limited assistance for the new non-elected city executive councils, although some indirect support for basic urban interventions was possible (Jenkins 1998). This situation continued through to the late 1980s, when the UN and other international agencies renewed their engagement with Mozambique (which had recently signed the Inkomati Accord with South Africa) and the UN and the World Bank engaged with housing policy, urban programmes and pilot projects in Maputo and Beira (Jenkins 2000b; Jenkins & Smith 2002).

In Angola, the government had less of a rural-development focus in its policy, due both to the war and the oil revenues. However, government attitudes to, and action in, urban areas were similar to those in Mozambique. Here, however, not all land was nationalised, but significant land holdings of Portuguese settlers were confiscated, as was abandoned property, including housing, subsequently rented through a state housing agency (most of this occurring in Luanda). Cuban assistance led to the construction by the state of some medium-rise housing, but tiny in quantity in relation to demand in Luanda (similar to East German housing assistance in Maputo). Self-help construction in Angola was awarded some more attention with a new law in 1982, but again with so few resources in relation to demand that it soon collapsed. In 1987, the UN also assisted with a pilot project of *musseques* upgrading in Angola, again, however, with no replication or general policy acceptance – although its community-based activities in service provision were continued by a local NGO,

Development Workshop, with strong international agency connections (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a, b). The World Bank started some studies in the country in the early 1990s with a view to urban-rehabilitation projects (as it had undertaken in Mozambique), but pulled out along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The UN activities that continued were mainly focused on monitoring urban growth, with limited action on the ground.

Urban realities

Influence of international agencies

International agencies have played rather different roles in Angola and Mozambique. In the former, they have had a rather tenuous engagement, given the government's position on the war and the economy – and especially the lack of fiscal transparency (Hodges 2001). International agency activity in Angola has been predominantly dealing with humanitarian aid, although some development activities have been implemented in the periods of 'no-war, no-peace', as they are known locally. The end of the war has led to a deterioration of relations, with a stand-off between the government, the IMF and the World Bank; the UN was requested to close its humanitarian aid offices in the country in 2008.

In general, Angola's attitude is that it does not need international agency assistance, as it has booming oil – and other mineral – exports, especially sought by China. More important for Luanda are bilateral and private-sector engagements which affect the city, such as China's promise to build 250 000 housing units nationwide with 50% around Luanda (high-rise flats), or joint-venture programmes such as Luanda Sul, with Brazilian capital engaging in mostly luxury, gated condominium housing developments in the rapidly sprawling southern edge of the city. In addition, in recent years there has been an enormous boom in private-sector building activity, as well as state-sponsored major urban infrastructure projects. Other bilateral agencies have been active in promoting diversified rural development and basic services delivery, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the British Department for International Development. These came together to help civil society and non-governmental organisations lobby during the unique opportunity for public comment on the proposed new land law for rural and urban areas (CEHS/DW 2005).

The influence of international agencies has been much more marked in Mozambique, where several multilateral and bilateral agencies have been active since independence and have made a significant impact, as the country has been heavily reliant on such assistance. This has been both in macroeconomic terms (e.g. humanitarian assistance in the floods and droughts, restructuring and debt relief) and policy development and investment, as private-sector investment has been limited and decreasing in impact – as is the case in most of the sub-Saharan African region (Jenkins, Smith & Wang 2006). Although the government's post-1992 new constitution opted not to denationalise land, long-term leasing arrangements permitted private-sector investment in rural development. However, in the 1990s, many multinationals

abandoned their agricultural activities in the semi-privatised plantations they took over with state partnership (e.g. Lonhro).

More recent inward foreign direct investment has been in mineral extraction, energy development and large-scale automated processing of basic minerals, such as aluminium. There has also been investment in tourism and a range of subsidiary secondary instruments facilitating economic activities such as banking and insurance. This has led to strong macroeconomic growth rates (relatively easy from such a very low starting position) and the country has been hailed as a success story by the World Bank and other international agencies. However, there is limited growth in employment and indeed a decrease in overall formal employment through privatisations and retrenchments in the formal sector (Hanlon & Smart 2008).

In Maputo, although the UN and the World Bank were active in urban development and housing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this changed with a shift in the focus of international agencies in the late 1990s towards supporting decentralisation and some urban management activities and minor pilot activities, mainly involving urban infrastructure and services (Jenkins 1998, 2000b; Jenkins & Smith 2004). However, the investment from international agencies in urban areas is minimal compared to rural areas – and minimal compared to the urban demand for services and, arguably, economic opportunity, which drives real (and generally ‘informal’) urban socio-economic life (Jenkins 2001a).

The impact of current globalisation

As can be seen from the above, the current phase of globalisation in the northern hemisphere (as opposed to the previous phases of mercantile expansion and colonial imperialism) has affected the two countries and capital cities in very different ways. Mozambique is still a relatively poor country in global terms, with a reliance predominantly on commodity exports (fishing and agriculture, and minerals and energy) for funding development, which is seen primarily as rural, despite a growing proportion of economic output becoming urban-based. Its economy is still closely tied to that of South Africa, especially in the southern part of the country, where Maputo lies and where economic development tends to be concentrated. Macroeconomic stabilisation has restricted the ‘wild west’ capitalism in the urban areas that was apparent in the immediate economic restructuring and liberalisation period of the early to mid-1990s. However, widespread development, especially in terms of employment, is limited. To date, globalisation has exacerbated socio-economic polarisation and has brought about the rise of a new wealthy economic elite joining the previous political elite, who have managed this transition quite easily. Despite this polarisation, widespread social unrest is tightly controlled, as will be discussed below.

In general, therefore, Mozambique has closely followed the advice and direction of the ‘Washington consensus’ and is not dissimilar to many sub-Saharan countries in its wider policy environment. Although urban growth is not as marked as in some other countries (e.g. Zambia), it is significant and becoming more so. Increasingly, the

proportion of the country's poor is shifting from rural to urban areas as in-migration continues, but, more importantly, natural demographic growth in urban areas accelerates differentially more than in rural areas, and poverty is only barely being held at bay. Some 60% of the urban population are still in absolute poverty and some 50% of the urban population are active in the informal sector, with much of this being economically marginal (Jenkins & Wilkinson 2002). New international and national investment is doing little to provide employment opportunities, and this is leading to growing crime and unrest as living costs rise, and possibly to a more overtly policed state.

The picture in Angola is rather different owing to its well-established petroleum and diamond exports, soon to be reinforced by other mineral extraction. The demand for these commodities – especially oil – is increasing at a time of uncertainty over world supplies. The main challenge for Angola will be how to use this high level of new income. To date, the political/military elite is firmly entrenching its position in the economy with limited opposition from others, as confirmed after the national elections in September 2008 and as government settled down to peacetime activity. The initial trend seems to be that this has led to accommodation among the contesting parties of the existing elite cadres, as opposed to access to power by new elites, as the political position of the latter does not represent the broader majority. It is estimated that at least 60% of Luanda's population is living in poverty, and some 55% of the workforce is engaged in the informal sector (Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002b). Angola's position of 'going it alone', in terms of the international agencies, may be dangerous when it comes to its evaluation of options, as these are chosen by existing power blocs, and the possibility of widespread economic diversification is unlikely, given these circumstances. Oil has been seen to be as much of a curse as a blessing in development terms for various countries.

Luanda thus presents an extremely polarised socio-economic profile with high and rapidly increasing urban poverty levels. Government's attitude to urban redevelopment is based on social exclusion, as the government assumes that the urban majority are war refugees and should 'return' to their places of origin, despite evidence that a growing proportion are urban-born and that those who are in-migrants have limited interest in relocating or options to do so (CEHS/DW 2005). Current urban development action in the capital is large scale, top-down and private-sector oriented (e.g. new housing developments, major infrastructure, new economic services, such as shopping malls, etc.). This clashes frequently with existing poor residents and those in the informal sector, whom government treats unfavourably in terms of human and other civil rights.

Both cities are clearly affected by the most recent wave of globalisation, and are to some extent the main points of its impact in these countries. Whereas previous global contact led to local/national political and economic change, with marked social and cultural impacts, the recent wave is also led by strong cultural penetration and associated social activity, as significant numbers of Mozambicans and Angolans engage with global culture. This is done via mass media – especially television, particularly *telenovelas* (TV 'soaps') from Portugal and Brazil, music videos via

MTV and the like, which have a major cultural impact on youth – and through wide social networking permitted by cellphones, and to a lesser extent, the Internet. It is, however, important to emphasise that all of these impacts are mitigated by the local dynamics – political, economic, social and cultural – to some extent through the structural peripherality of the majority, but also through proactive agency.¹⁶

The structure of housing delivery

In the above contexts, the vast majority of housing is delivered by so-called ‘informal’ household activity – that is, through land allocation or purchase and unauthorised ‘self-help’ (actually self-managed) building, or through the informal subdivision and rental of existing housing stock (Jenkins 2001a, 2001c, 2004, 2006a). In Maputo, since the liberalisation of housing in the early 1990s, more private investors have led to an upsurge of new upper middle-class housing in emerging suburban areas to the north and west, some in closed (gated) condominiums, with many funded through private rentals of privatised state housing in the inner city, and others through institutions such as state departments and international agencies. This previously pent-up demand seems to have stabilised, however, and there is now something of a hiatus in the formal-sector delivery of housing. This is particularly so for low- and middle-class housing, which requires housing finance mechanisms which are virtually non-existent. The financial sector is beginning to gear up to this, but the limited domestic savings do not provide an adequate base for widespread housing-finance schemes.

The state still directly and indirectly subsidises a very limited supply of housing for key workers, but most of the urban population have to fend for themselves. A significant proportion of the previously state-rented units were not privatised due to poverty, and these are declining into a state of dereliction. New land laws in the early 1990s seemed to provide an opportunity to upgrade and provide secure tenure for the urban majority in peri-urban ‘informal’ settlements, which probably represent more than 70% of housing stock. However, this process has been held up for a decade and a half through the insistence on new planning legislation – which, in effect, only postpones any responsibility by the state, in its limited capacity, to act. The lack of a clear urban policy undermines any attempts to develop a different vision for housing that would permit incremental upgrading through household investment, with land regularisation in parallel (Jenkins 2003a). Arguably, this is in the elite’s interest, as speculation on urban land and housing is a key source of income (Jenkins 2009).

The situation in Luanda is not substantially different, although even more extreme. The formal sector is restarting its housing delivery for higher-income groups – pioneered by the Luanda Sul joint partnership mentioned above – but the demand for this is limited. Massive new state investment in housing production has been promised by the newly elected government, but is likely to be focused on relocation activities for new urban economic investments. Although the capacity of the state to subsidise such housing is much stronger, it is still small in relation to social need and effective economic demand. As with Mozambique, state housing stock has been

privatised since the early 1990s, but represents a relatively small proportion of the overall housing stock. The vast majority of urban dwellers will continue to fend for themselves against state interference in informal settlements, which can only proliferate no matter what the government does, given the extremely high urban-population growth rates. More than 75% of the population are already seen as residing within informal areas of one sort or another (including many areas existing from the colonial period), and informal rental housing is very widespread – probably more so than in Maputo (CEHS/DW 2005).

Luanda's much larger scale and the concentration of the national economy within the city will tend to lead to continued rapid growth, and Luanda is likely to fall into the category of 'mega-city' in the coming decade, similar to Lagos. Maputo's more limited population and economic base, however, will probably see the city expand in line with many other large sub-Saharan African cities, such as Dar es Salaam. Whether peace will bring a significant redistribution of the population from Luanda remains to be seen (there has still not been any post-war census, and the one now planned will only report in 2012), but the negative effects of globalisation on rural development in Mozambique seem to be promoting significant growth of secondary and tertiary urban areas, which will increase in the next decades. And this may also become a phenomenon in Angola: certainly, secondary urban areas like Huambo are (re)developing fast. However, without diversification of the economy and increasing employment options for the majority, the informal sector will still tend to concentrate in the capital cities for the foreseeable future, as globalisation also concentrates wealth and power in these cities.

The cities in their national fabric

Ethnic composition

The differences in ethnic composition of the two cities are largely due to their geographical location and pre-colonial indigenous occupation. However, in the case of Luanda, the ethnic composition is much more affected by the recent wars. Maputo is located near the extreme south of the country and has a significant level of ethnic homogeneity, with two major clan-based ethnic groups sharing a similar language and cultural base.¹⁷ Apart from Portuguese settlers and a smaller contingent of other in-migrants,¹⁸ the colonial period led to a more diverse indigenous population. This included a relatively small mixed-race population (which was considerably affected by the exodus around the time of independence) and the institution of migrant and forced labour, which led to various other groups from the southern part of the country passing through and often settling in the city. These included Tonga and Chopi groups from around Inhambane north of the Gaza empire.¹⁹

After independence, a wider range of Mozambican ethnic groups became represented in the capital, including a small but influential number of the northern Makonde people, as they had served as an initial point of support for the liberation war and many were involved in the armed forces. Other large (and nationally dominant) ethnic groups, such as the Yao and Macua (north) and the Sena and Shona (centre/

Zambezi Valley) peoples, continue to be, however, proportionally quite under-represented – both in the capital and among its political, economic and social elites. The initial post-independence period also saw the exodus of most of the Portuguese and an influx of other nationalities to support the new government. The latter included fairly large groups of Tanzanians, exiles/liberation fighters from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa, and Soviet Bloc, Cuban and other politically motivated *cooperantes* from around the world.²⁰

The more recent post-independent Mozambican governments have deliberately attempted to create a more balanced ethnic (and gender) composition, but there is still a tendency for the dominant Frelimo government to be composed of people from the south (especially Changaan) or some of the historically supportive peoples in the north (e.g. Makonde). The initial attacks from Rhodesia led to the funding of armed opposition groups taken over by South Africa, which based themselves largely in the centre of the country. Hence there is a tendency for the Sena/Shona people to support the opposition party, Renamo, which was created as part of the early 1990s peace settlement, and there is a more general disaffection with the Frelimo-led government by other northern ethnic groups, such as the Macua. However, no clear regional-based ethnic politics has emerged at national level other than Renamo's tendency for support.²¹

Luanda, as noted above, had a very small indigenous population that only began to grow with the colonial development programmes of the early 20th century, and as such is much more ethnically diverse than Maputo. Apart from the Portuguese settlers (the majority of whom left around independence) and a relatively small but historically influential mixed-race population, the indigenous population is predominantly made up of people from the Kimbundu, Ovimbundu and BaKongo ethnic groups. The Kimbundu are a large ethnic group accounting for some 25% of the total Angolan population, living in the eastern hinterland areas of Luanda. (The country's name derives from the head of the Mbundu kingdom, the N'gola.) The Kimbundu have been migrating from the rural to the urban areas of Luanda and Malanje since the 1960s. The Kimbundu were aligned with the MPLA party, which won the independence struggle for control and has dominated government since. The Ovimbundu, from the highland plateau of the centre of the country, are the largest ethnic group in Angola, making up some 37% of the country's population. They were linked to the UNITA liberation and rebel faction, which now is in political opposition as part of the peace settlement of 2002. Many Ovimbundu fled to Luanda during the war, as the towns in their homeland (especially Huambo and Kuito) were heavily involved in military conflict, and there are significant numbers of them in the capital. The BaKongo originated in the ancient kingdom of the Kongo in the north of Angola (and across the Congo river) and represent some 14% of the national population. This ethnic group was aligned with the FNLA liberation movement (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* – National Front for the Liberation of Angola), supported by the US, China and Zaire, losing out, however, in the armed struggle. The FNLA became a political party before the 1992 national elections, in which it won some seats, but the parliament never sat as a result of UNITA's pulling

out and returning to war. The BaKongo are very influential in the commercial sector in Luanda. Despite the different alignments in liberation movements and the war, there seems to be little overt inter-ethnic rivalry in Luanda, and limited ethnic segregation in territorial occupation across the city.

Maputo also has limited ethnic polarisation in physical terms, with only a few *bairros* (neighbourhoods) with any historical ethnic links (e.g. Mafalala and the Macua minority). Although the nature of the political dispensation in Mozambique means that any ethnic tension is more likely to be played out in wider geographic terms – for example, opposition parties based in different city governments (and maybe even provinces when provincial governments become elected) – the situation is both reasonably open (e.g. fairly transparent election processes), yet at the same time, carefully stage-managed by the government (e.g. the level of decentralisation of power permitted to municipalities). As such, the impact of inter-ethnic friction on politics in Angola and Luanda is much more difficult to predict, as there has been little democratic opportunity (the first elections since 1992 were in 2008 and there was no strong opposition presence). However, there is a much stronger history of ethnic division – perhaps one of the reasons for the extremely hesitant moves to any form of political opening.

National cultural image of the capitals

The image of the city in Mozambique and Angola – as argued above – has been affected by the highly dependent nature of political and economic development predicated initially on a weak colonising power with limited traditions of managing urban development, and the dynamics of the geopolitical contexts for urban development. Hence, in the colonial period, cities were seen as the location of the political and economic settler elite and designed in a southern European style, culturally linking power and dominant values to urbanism – and effectively excluding the indigenous population from such opportunity, albeit informally via *laissez-faire* policies. Although the fascist colonial government espoused rural development and the concept of the noble rural worker, it celebrated the urban milieu for the ‘civilised’ – as evidenced in its grandiose, but economically and socially impractical, urban plans (Jenkins 2006b), which were very different from the explicitly segregated, pragmatic urban planning of the anglophone colonies in the continent. This radically changed with the coming to power of the liberation army elites, indoctrinated in Soviet, Chinese and Cuban approaches, which saw the cities as essentially parasitic on rural society, and made policy decisions which reinforced these values. However, this did not undermine their reliance on urban economies and societies for their support, especially those of the capital cities and their hinterlands. Hence, while instigating anti-urban policies, the administrations accepted the need to keep urban populations relatively content – for example, through food rationing and imports.

These images of the city have been expressed in cultural artefacts such as architecture, street nomenclature, monuments and public art. Up to independence, public art was predominantly in the form of statues (except for a few murals in public buildings).

In both cities, most of the classical Portuguese hero statues were pulled down, unceremoniously dumped and replaced with political figures – and in Luanda, with statues of indigenous heroes of resistance to colonial domination (Figure 9.1). In the post-independence period, Communist-style murals and wall paintings also appeared, notably at the Heroes Place near Maputo Airport, with its sinuous Latin American-style mural depicting the struggle for independence. Road nomenclature changed various times in both cities, including with regime change during the colonial period, but, ironically, with capitalism, roads named after socialist heroes, such as Karl Marx, have been retained.²²

As regards architecture, the earlier fascist colonial state in both countries opted for neoclassicism in general, albeit in a rather florid (almost baroque) form – although art deco also made its mark in architecture (especially in 1930s–1940s residential and commercial buildings). However, the economic acceleration process in the late 1960s permitted a new modernism to develop, which oscillated between the formal Modern Movement, associated with the state (see Figure 9.3), and more plastic versions of this, such as that of the renowned architect Pancho Guedes – associated with private architecture (see Figures 9.2 and 9.4).²³ Post-independence architecture became both more monumental and more utilitarian. New buildings were initially developed for functional reasons, often entailing the completion of buildings left unfinished and abandoned in the hasty decolonisation process. New residential architecture of the immediate post-independence period reflected the Communist Bloc assistance, with distinctive Russian, Cuban and East German influences. In both cities in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new parliamentary and other government buildings were produced with more architectural investment, usually following late Modern Movement styles. In Maputo, the 1990s peace and capitalist orientation led to a flurry of new residential architecture for the upper middle class, and the development of Luanda Sul in Luanda, arguably dominated by overdesigned postmodernism.

Sites of power and counter-power²⁴

Manifestations of power

The city as a site of power is manifested by the dominant power structures in the region and those outside of the region that impinge on it. Thus, in the pre-colonial period, the capital cities of both countries (at the time, small towns) were the physical manifestation of the mercantilism which created them as settlements, and were dominated by foreign interests. Power was contested between different foreign groups, with no clear hegemony, albeit with different manifestations of power. In Maputo (Lourenço Marques), there were initial struggles between European powers for control of trade and the indigenous groups of the hinterland. Eventually Portuguese dominance was established, but in a relatively limited territory outside of which indigenous groups also competed for control of the new trade opportunities.

The Portuguese dominance was further challenged externally by the new Boer

states and the British, leading to the colonial settlement, and internally by the local mixed-race elites that brought foreign and local power bases together. The prevailing need to retain territorial dominance through the race for colonial control, and the success in international agreements in this area, led to the relatively weak Portuguese state confronting the rural indigenous groups outside the urban areas, and semi-indigenous elites within the urban areas, and subordinating their powers – politically, militarily, economically and socially. Culturally, however, there was less domination, and cultural expression became an important channel for the contestation of power through, for example, song and dance, even within the core of colonial control, both urban and rural (Penvenne 1994).

This colonial hegemony was maintained in Mozambique not only through internal social engineering – that is, settler in-migration with limited *de jure* and extensive *de facto* segregation of social and economic opportunity – but also through external subordination of the colonial state to the regional economy of South Africa (especially migrant labour and transport services) and the wider world, through export commodity plantation trade. The main challenges to colonial power came externally, with pressure to modernise the economy in the later European industrial period, and engage with managed decolonisation (as other European powers had instituted after World War II). However, internally, a parallel and linked influence was the growing consciousness of the indigenous population in terms of education and politics. Education was often based on non-state schools, such as mission schools, and there was also growing worker resistance in urban areas (Cruz e Silva 2001; Penvenne 1994). International support for the struggle for independence was crucial, but more so was the collapse of the Portuguese state, and the new post-independence political elite that emerged was rooted psychologically in a rural, rather than urban, milieu, as noted above, and a proto-socialist hegemony.

Resistance to the new political dispensation came, as before, from outside (e.g. Rhodesia and South Africa, with US backing) and from within – in rural areas, from ethnic groups disposed to assist the Renamo party, but also eventually from growing urban dissatisfaction. This urban dissatisfaction was allayed initially through state rationing, but came to a head through actions like Operation Production in Mozambique. The main opposition power bases, however, remained rural throughout the civil war. The peace settlement brought some of this into the political domain, and was of a predominantly urban expression (as municipalities represented the only alternative to first-past-the-post national elections). However, the main players in the power contestation in the country remained the previous political elite in the ruling party, Frelimo, who managed to survive the transition to a great extent by extending their economic and political control to the new capitalist-oriented, multi-democratic regime. Manifestations of power in this period continued to be mainly rural (e.g. in policy and electoral mobilisation), despite the growth of importance of urban economic functions. The development policy that followed, largely a result of structural adjustment, was centred on rural development and the export of primary commodities. There were also other limited activities (e.g. largely automated industrial transformation of these commodities).

In all of this history, power has been increasingly manifested through forms of centralised authority – the indigenous states’ control of pre-colonial trade; the colonial settler-oriented export economy; the post-independence proto-socialist ‘counter-dependency’ experiment; and the post-war liberal democracy, with its reversion to export-led economic growth and continued anti-urban bias.²⁵ Manifestation of power in the city of Maputo has, therefore, passed through forms of central political, military and economic control. The fact that the majority of the urban inhabitants have limited engagement with this power in their daily lives and work has led to widespread ‘exit’ strategies, as opposed to ‘voice’, and a parallel, subaltern manifestation of this through cultural expression.

Channels for protest

Channels of protest against the colonial and postcolonial dominance of centralised control in Mozambique have been generally through non-engagement, with only a small minority engaged in direct protest. In the colonial period, state repression led to most direct protests being based outside the country, and although this is less the case in the post-independence period, nevertheless it is still only a minority who raise their voice in protest – for example, through independent local news-sheets, and sometimes with severe consequences, notably the murder of independent journalist and publisher Carlos Cardoso.

During the colonial period, organisations within civil society were deliberately restricted by the state, which exerted strong controls over the religious and recreational associations that were permitted to form. In the immediate postcolonial period, these controls, if anything, were extended through state- and party-based organisations for youth, workers, women, journalists, etc., and dissent was similarly dealt with in a summary manner. This has led to a reliance of horizontal forms of organisation within society based on kinship and proto-kinship mechanisms (Lundin 1991), which essentially have their roots in the pre-colonial period. However, the impact of the civil war and structural adjustment, with their associated urbanisation and informalisation, has led to challenges to such mechanisms – basically the transfer of emphasis from kin to proto-kin, and a much more flexible approach to reciprocity in social relations. Associational life has become much freer in this latter post-independence period, and this has also been part of the wider picture of redistributive socio-economic activity, especially through the widespread growth of churches, mostly the Pentecostal and syncretic forms, which, arguably, are taking over this role from traditional clan structures. However, these rarely provide channels for protest and the kinship and proto-kinship mechanisms are vehicles for ‘exit strategy’ survival rather than direct contestation through ‘voice’.

Consequently, there are few explicit channels for social protest in Mozambican society. However, as in previous periods, culturally embedded forms of protest continue their subaltern role, especially music, with rap becoming a vehicle of more explicit expression in recent times. However, such expression has to follow a fine line between protest and engagement, as the authorities can control its more

public expression (e.g. radio and television access). This tends to reinforce the self-containment of protest, leading to occasional flashpoints when this breaks down, with what seems fairly random and excessive violence on both sides – on the part of the protesters, but especially the state's reaction.

Sites of explicit protest

Explicit protest is generally urban in location, but does not only happen in the capital, Maputo. Protest occurs with more formal political intent through protest marches in some of the opposition-dominated cities, such as in the centre and north of the country. Reaction by the state authorities to most cases of explicit protest has been swift and brutal.²⁶ However, there have been two main sites of protest in Maputo against the last two political regimes, generally in the city streets, but taking different forms. One which has recurred is organised by Mozambicans who had once been young migrant workers in the now defunct German Democratic Republic. They were recruited by the German government and repatriated suddenly with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many of these *madjermanos*, as they are known, have had difficulty in reintegrating and adapting to the lack of formal-sector opportunities, and have demonstrated various times to be repaid the portions of their salaries that were paid to the government by Germany. A settlement was reached in late 2005, but sporadic demonstrations continue, the most recent of which was in March 2008.²⁷ These protests are organised and take place in the city centre and involve the collective invasion of government offices.

Another series of protests, less organised, but also involving a specific group, were arranged by those who were maimed in the civil war and who have protested in the city centre and other locations on various occasions about pensions and other state benefits, such as access to housing plots. These protests have often been violent and generally more or less spontaneous (e.g. in Matola in 2004). A different form of spontaneous protest was witnessed in February 2008 – riots in reaction to the government's fuel hike, affecting all minibus public transport in the city. These disturbances effectively closed down transport around the city – mainly at key access points between the peri-urban and central city areas, that is, outside the city centre. These protests were seemingly disorganised and effected mainly by young people, with some violence and destruction of property – especially to vehicles. This form of 'pent-up' social outburst has happened a few times before over other price rises, and in all cases the state's reactions have been severe.

This was evidenced again in early September 2010 when the central city area was effectively closed off by rioting mobs for three days of protest (and associated looting) over proposed rises in minibus-taxi fares and basic food prices. The protests were organised by cellphone text messages, and mostly involved youth. Eventually calm and order were restored with a considerable level of force. Soon after, the government announced continued subsidisation of these basic necessities. However, for how long is still unclear.

A key concern in Mozambique is that young people, already challenged by difficult access to education – and even more so, formal-sector employment (with informal employment becoming increasingly saturated in the urban economy) – and increasingly socially alienated in family networks which struggle to survive with the high dependency rates, will take the existing implicit subaltern forms of culturally based protest to the streets in explicit ways, albeit with limited organisation and/or objectives. In this situation, although deeply felt social concern may find some form of outlet, the opportunity for such ‘voice’ to have any impact is usually lost owing to repressive reaction. However, with few other options for voicing themselves, this may well be the tendency in future. As argued elsewhere,²⁸ there is an urgent need to integrate cultural issues with development strategies in less instrumental ways (e.g. not just advertising HIV/AIDS avoidance practices) in order to permit the youth, who represent a significant proportion of the national and urban population, a channel for expression which may well challenge the established order. Whether the current political regime feels itself sufficiently secure to permit this, or whether this would be seen as legitimate by wider society, is something that urgently needs to be explored.

Conclusion

As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Maputo and Luanda have distinct similarities due mainly to their mercantile and colonial pasts and initial postcolonial trajectories, and in this they also display structural differences from other sub-Saharan African capitals. The most obvious facets of similarity were weak colonial development and *laissez-faire* attitudes to urban development. Another key aspect of similarity is the evolution and current nature of the national state. Although the implementation of democratic representative elections in Angola was very recent (2008) compared with the past 14 years of such in Mozambique, both countries remain dominated by the initial, single, post-independence parties, and political opposition is weak and divided.

However, there are also significant differences between the capital cities, which derive initially from the pre-colonial context and underpin issues such as ethnic structure and even patterns of governance, and hence may have greater influence in the future. The nature of the immediate postcolonial conflicts led to increasing structural divergence, as have development options, and the social and economic impact of the more recent form of globalisation has a tendency to lead to even more divergence. A key aspect of the difference between these capital cities lies in the decentralisation of government. In 2008, Mozambique held its third successful autonomous local government elections and decentralisation is taking effect, albeit slowly,²⁹ including a few municipalities where opposition parties have power. However, Angola is only just beginning to move in this direction. One effect of this, however, is that Greater Maputo has problems of urban management stretching across two autonomous municipalities and two districts, subordinated to a province, whereas the whole of Luanda is governed as a province.

Within this context, the main national issue facing Mozambique is its relatively weak economic position and the choice between economic growth led by foreign direct investment – typically in mining, energy and possibly tourism and agriculture – and the need to create higher employment in rapidly growing urban areas, as well as rural. To date, urban areas in Mozambique remain low in terms of government policy priorities, yet they account for ever more of the population and provide real economic activity – Maputo being the main, but not exclusive, focus. Angola, on the other hand, has strong exports and capacity to invest, but the longer war in that country and higher levels of urban concentration will lead to difficult decisions on investment locations and target populations. With a significant proportion of the national population living in the capital it is inevitable this will be a prime site for public, private and individual investment, and thus may limit the extent to which the country can widen its longer-term economic development options. What is clear in both cities is that they will continue to play highly important roles in national political, economic, social and cultural life, as well as providing possible international linkages.

Although both capital cities continue to dominate the urban systems in each country, this domination is much more marked in Angola, as Luanda is many times the size of the second largest urban area. In the absence of more accurate data, this is generally considered to be Benguela, on the central south coast. In 2010, Luanda's population was certainly more than 5 million and maybe as high as 7 million, with Benguela's population probably still around a tenth of this.³⁰ The main urban areas of Angola remain the coastal ports (Benguela, Lobito, Namibe, Cabinda), although inland trading and administrative centres, such as Lubango and Huambo, are also rapidly expanding.³¹ Although estimates that put one-third of Angolans in the capital are probably excessive, Luanda clearly dominates national political and economic life, although this is likely to change as the country invests in development.

In Mozambique, Maputo also dominates the urban system, but in a much more qualified way. Maputo and Matola, as a conurbation, had a combined official total of 1.77 million inhabitants in the 2007 census. This compares with the next largest cities' populations: Beira (436 000), Chimoio (239 000) and Nampula (236 000), making Maputo four times the size of the second largest city.³² Although Mozambique's port cities continue to play their important historical role (e.g. Maputo/Matola, Inhambane/Maxixe, Beira, Quelimane, Pemba), according to recent observation, inland cities are now emerging as some of the fastest growing as the country nears its third decade of peacetime. These include Chimoio, Nampula and Tete. This seems driven by different factors – Chimoio, possibly by the problems in neighbouring Zimbabwe; Tete, as a result of large-scale foreign investment in mining and a new dam across the Zambezi; but also internal economic growth in agriculture and services, in the case of Nampula. Again, as argued above, Mozambique probably mirrors most sub-Saharan African countries in the development of secondary urban areas, whereas Angola may follow other petroleum-export-dominated states with continued high urban system differentiation. Nevertheless, in both countries, the capital is the centre for political and economic power and often of social and cultural change.

Given the tendency towards divergence in urban development, the extent to which colonialism is a useful reference point for understanding the longer-term trajectories of cities in the macro-region is questionable, and hence a 'postcolonial' structural analytical framework is inadequate. However, as with 'postmodernism', scholars are rather at a loss for an alternative, as they are with the much criticised analytical framework of 'formal/informal' urban milieu (Jenkins 2004). What seems to be needed is a new set of reference points for understanding what is – and can be – 'urban' in such a context, that is, new forms of emerging cities which avoid postcolonial and informal analysis.

As African countries enter into the major demographic change of urbanisation, they are doing so in uniquely economically challenged contexts. However, the frames of reference which tend to permeate urban studies are essentially still derived from the European experiences of early urbanisation and, as such, need to be substituted. One challenge to the development of such an analytical understanding of sub-Saharan Africa is the relatively weak 'intellectual superstructure' of the macro-region, with economies restricting higher education and indigenous research institutions, as well as other endogenous research traditions – hence the dominance of exogenous research. Particularly problematic in this respect is the tendency for limited fundamental research funding by international agencies – a classic example of this being the contemporary focus on 'best practices' (Jenkins & Smith 2004). As such, a significant portion of research undertaken in the region is still resourced by external agencies, and academic institutions (both internal and external) often become aligned with the form of limited self-critical research which pervades international agencies, due to lack of alternative funding sources. We thus see cities through lenses which have limited analytical power to challenge preconceptions, and our disciplinary traditions in academic circles limit this even more to 'monofocal' vision.

For urban research to have more significance, what is needed, arguably, is a trans-disciplinary inductive approach embedded in and arising from the African urban milieu, and not the deductive (and often reductive) approaches of urban research and studies which produce lists of worthy, normative exhortations, or meta-theoretical analysis which has little bearing on realpolitik or engagement with a contextually embedded, socio-economic and cultural understanding of African cities (Jenkins 2009). This is not to argue that African cities – or countries for that matter – can develop in isolation from global influences, but that they need to be understood, and proactively develop their own 'spaces' for agency, within such structural parameters, in a less externally conditioned manner – including intellectually. In doing so, however, researchers also must avoid the trap of associating the endogenous with the indigenous.

Notes

- 1 This chapter is based on extensive research and work in Maputo since 1980, with more limited experience in Luanda, especially during the past seven years, and draws on a series of previously published studies, particularly two city profiles – Jenkins 2000a; Jenkins, Robson & Cain 2002a, and a more detailed research paper on Maputo (Jenkins 1999), which themselves draw on myriad sources.

- 2 The Portuguese also tried to take over the important salt mines in the hinterland of the River Kwanza south of Luanda, but the indigenous interior states, for which this was an important trade item, successfully resisted (Birmingham 1999).
- 3 From a non-European standpoint, China was an earlier globalising state.
- 4 *Capitanias* were a feudal form of territorial allocation by the crown to Portuguese nobles, with conditions for protection and development. The city of Salvador de Bahia was founded in 1546 as one of the earliest similar forms of such fortified settlements in Brazil (Jenkins 2010).
- 5 For most of the first century of engagement in Angola, the Portuguese merchant adventurers concentrated their efforts on engaging in trade with (and trying to dominate) the relatively centralised Kongo kingdom, based at Mbanza Kongo (also known as São Salvador) in contemporary central north Angola (Birmingham 1999). In this, their approach was initially similar to mercantilist engagement in West Africa, which led to a different colonial form. However, Angola eventually developed the settler form of colonialism more prevalent in central, eastern and southern Africa.
- 6 Unlike the Spanish, the Portuguese did not adopt a rigid gridiron urban pattern, but developed more 'organic' urban forms, albeit determined by the three main 'powers': the military, the administration and the church.
- 7 The Dutch were in fact the first to try to occupy the bay, with a fortified outpost in 1721; they retreated in 1730.
- 8 During the first half of the 19th century, there were major changes in the political structure of the hinterland of the Lourenço Marques settlement, with the formation of strong militaristic Nguni states (Zulu, Swazi and Gaza), and a series of wars led to widespread displacements of the indigenous population, known as the Mfecane. In the 1840s, further disruption was caused by Boers trekking from the Cape, creating new states in the high interior plateau at Lydenburg and Zoutspansberg and trying to claim territory as near as 10 km from Lourenço Marques. Portugal finally negotiated the border with the Boer states in 1871, and subsequently with the British, who sought expansion north from their base in Port Natal (now Durban) in 1875. However, the range of influence of the Portuguese settlement was much smaller, given the establishment of strong indigenous states in Swaziland (west) and Gaza (north), each with their own spheres of influence.
- 9 Ironically, it was Britain's support which helped Portugal fend off most (but not all) of the challenges to the north and south of Angola, while undermining Portugal's attempt to link across the continent.
- 10 *Caniço* means cane, or reed, with which most houses were built. These were either rented – or built on land rented – from Portuguese settlers, although outside the city administrative limit, local chiefs allocated land to incomers, also for a fee, permitting peri-urban settlement.
- 11 Some mixed-race and *assimilado* land holders also engaged in this practice.
- 12 An estimated 200 000 people left Angola, and between 100 000 and 200 000 left Mozambique in this period.
- 13 If UN urban growth projections turn out to be correct, with 44% of the national population being urban by 2015 and 53% by 2030, Luanda could come to represent one-third of the national population by 2010.
- 14 Abrahamsson & Nilsson (1995) provide a good analysis of Mozambique's transition from colonial fascism, through proto-socialism to liberal capitalism.

- 15 In social terms, many transferred people died, and of those who survived, few returned. In economic terms, the national airline was made virtually bankrupt and the influx into Niassa just drove demand and not supply. In political terms, although the overt reaction was muted, it deterred many from supporting the government.
- 16 For an analysis of how local context and agency affect structural engagement with wider political and economic forces on urban land, see Jenkins 2009.
- 17 These included the longer-resident Ronga in the immediate bay hinterland and the mid-19th-century ingress of Nguni-originated Changaan (or Tsonga) based in the Gaza empire (now Province) to the immediate north.
- 18 Other in-migrants included the British, because of the port and railways, and some Chinese, Indian and Pakistani indentured labour.
- 19 In addition to ethnic classifications, the Portuguese state created the *assimilado* position for those of indigenous origin who proved themselves adequate as colonial subalterns through various forms of social assessment.
- 20 Although many of these subsequently left in the early 1990s with the changing geopolitics in the region, some remained as long-term residents.
- 21 The local government elections in November 2008 had a large turnout, but opposition parties lost ground and very few local governments were elected other than Frelimo.
- 22 The American School is situated on Av Karl Marx in Maputo.
- 23 Guedes left Mozambique at independence to teach at Wits University in Johannesburg, but, ironically, remains the best-known Mozambican architect outside the country.
- 24 This section focuses on Maputo, as the author has more direct personal experience of work and wider social life in Mozambique, on which this discussion draws to some extent.
- 25 Jenkins (2008) reviews this with reference to land access in Maputo throughout historical and contemporary periods. For analyses of the 'construction' of the new state and economy, see Alden (2001), Pitcher 2002 and Siteo 2003.
- 26 For instance, the imprisonment of 96 people in a small cell in the northern town of Montepuez in late 2000 after an opposition-party protest rally, when 75 subsequently died of suffocation.
- 27 This entailed some 16 000 former workers being paid an average of \$3 000 each, staggered over a period. The 2008 protests were related to a breakaway group from that which negotiated this settlement.
- 28 Challenges of urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa. Invited address by the author at the African Issues Symposium on AIDS, War and Urbanisation – African youth under pressure, International Development Centre, Open University, April 2008.
- 29 Mozambique is also moving towards some form of elected provincial government.
- 30 In 2003, the population of Luanda was estimated at more than 3 million, and three growth scenarios showed its population growing to 4.8 million (low projection), 5.5 million (medium projection) and 7 million (high projection). At that time, Benguela and Lobito had some 450 000 and Huambo some 250 000 inhabitants (CEHS/DW 2005).
- 31 The 2010 African Cup of Nations football tournament, hosted in Angola, hosted games in Luanda, Benguela, Cabinda and Lubango.
- 32 The National Census Institute has provided the urban populations of the provincial capitals; there are now officially 43 autonomous urban local governments, most of which are smaller than the provincial capitals, however.

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