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**CENTRE DE DOCUMENTATION ET D'INFORMATION DU CODESRIA**

**DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE/INSTITUT SUR LA GOUVERNANCE DÉMOCRATIQUE  
Dakar - Senegal, 26/07-13/08/2010**

**CORRUPTION, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE  
AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

**CORRUPTION, GOUVERNANCE DÉMOCRATIQUE  
ET IMPUTABILITÉ**

**Bibliography / Bibliographie**

**CODESRIA**

Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV  
BP 3304, CP 18524, Dakar, Senegal.  
Tel.: (221) 33 825 98 22/23  
Fax: (221) 33 824 12 89

**Website:** <http://www.codesria.org>

**Twitter:** <http://twitter.com/codesria>

**Facebook:** <http://www.facebook.com/pages/CODESRIA/181817969495>

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## Introduction

In line with its mandate of developing, promoting, consolidating, and disseminating the highest quality of research on and about Africa, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) will hold a **Democratic Governance Institute** from **26th July to 13th August, 2010 in Dakar, Senegal**. The CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute is an interdisciplinary forum which brings together African scholars undertaking innovative research on topics related to the broad theme of governance.

The theme for the 2010 Institute is **“Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability”**.

In this framework, the CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre (CODICE) has compiled this bibliography. Various sources of bibliographic data have been used among which the CODESRIA data bases.

The bibliography is in two sections; the first section lists the documents in hard copy and the second, the documents in electronic format which are available on request. Classified alphabetically by author, the selected references are either in French or in English.

The Call for Application for the Gender Institute is in the annex of this bibliography.

We hope that this bibliography will be useful, and suggestions for its improvement are welcome.

Have a fruitful Institute.

En conformité avec son mandat de développement, de promotion, de consolidation et de diffusion d'une recherche de haute facture sur l'Afrique, le Conseil pour le développement de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique (CODESRIA) organise un **institut sur la gouvernance démocratique** du **26 juillet au 13 août 2010 à Dakar (Sénégal)**. L'institut sur la gouvernance démocratique du CODESRIA est un forum interdisciplinaire qui réunit des chercheurs africains qui entreprennent des recherches innovantes sur des sujets liés au thème général de la gouvernance.

La session 2010 porte sur le thème **« Corruption, gouvernance démocratique et imputabilité »**.

Dans cette perspective le Centre de documentation et d'information du CODESRIA (CODICE) a élaboré cette bibliographie. A cet effet, différentes sources d'information bibliographique ont été utilisées parmi lesquelles les bases de données du CODESRIA.

Cette bibliographie est divisée en deux parties, une première partie regroupant les documents en format papier et une deuxième réunissant les documents en format électronique qui sont disponibles sur demande. Les références sélectionnées sont classées alphabétiquement par auteur et sont soit en anglais soit en français.

L'appel à contributions lancé pour les besoins du l'institut sur le genre est annexé à la présente bibliographie.

Nous espérons que cette bibliographie vous sera utile et le CODICE est à l'écoute de toutes suggestions permettant son éventuel enrichissement.

Bon institut.

**CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre  
Centre de documentation et d'information du CODESRIA (CODICE)**

**PART I / 1<sup>ère</sup> PARTIE**

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'Never Expect Power Always': Electricity Consumers' Response to Monopoly, Corruption and Inefficient Services in Nigeria

*African Affairs*. Vol. 103, n° 410, Jan., 2004, p. 51-71

**Abstract:** The supply of electricity, undoubtedly the key energy source for industrial, commercial and domestic activity in the modern world, falls far short of demand in many developing countries. In Nigeria, state monopoly has compounded rather than resolved the energy crisis. The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), established by decree in 1972, epitomizes the utter failure of state monopolies in the power sector. This and other state-owned enterprises have been the target of recent attempts at reform through privatization, deregulation or liberalization. This article analyzes developments in the Nigerian power sector, focusing on internal and external factors in NEPA's crisis, reform measures by successive governments, and the plight of consumers and their reactions to these circumstances, and comments on the ongoing and proposed reforms of the power sector.

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**PART II / 2<sup>ème</sup> PARTIE**

**ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS**

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## II – Electronic Documents–Documents électroniques

### 1. ABBOTT, Kenneth W.; SNIDAL, Duncan

Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption  
*The Journal of Legal Studies*. Vol. 31, n° 1, Part 2, Jan., 2002, p. S141-S178

**Abstract:** Standard rational choice analysis explains many but not all aspects of the highly political process of international legalization. Because law engages and affects not only the interests of actors but also their normative values, the development and operation of legal regimes can be understood only by considering both motivations together. We develop a simple model of the interaction of "value" and "interest" actors that shows how their different logics of behavior and distinctive strategies drive the politics of legalization-both in particular episodes and through deeper interrelationships over time. To demonstrate our argument empirically, we analyze how various turning points in the development of the 1997 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-bribery Convention can be fully understood only as resulting from the interplay of values and interests. Our analysis thus blends rational choice with normative or constructivist approaches to provide a richer account of international legalization.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3085611.pdf>

### 2. ADETULA, Victor A. O.

Money and Politics in Nigeria  
 Abuja: IFES-Nigeria, 2008. – 172 p.

**Introduction:** This book is a product of two seminars on the theme of 'money and politics' held by IFES at the University of Jos and the University of Ibadan in May 2006. It addresses the dimensions of political corruption in Nigeria that has begun to attract the attention of various stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process.

Since the return to electoral politics in 1999, and particularly after the 2003 general elections, Nigeria's political parties have been criticized by the media, academics, observers and the electorate for corrupt and unbridled use of money in politics. The anti-corruption initiatives of the administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo provided a suitable environment for some civil society groups to engage governments and other stakeholders on the issue of corruption and its effect on governance. There exists an awakened consciousness in Nigeria about the danger of political corruption including political finance malpractices. However, the question remains whether the rise in consciousness translates into new social values and attitudes for stakeholders government, election management bodies, political parties, civil society in the electoral process and in the way they interact with money and politics...

**Source:** <http://www.ifes.org/files/MONEYandPOLITICSinNigeria.pdf>

### 3. AFRICAN UNION, Addis Ababa

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  
 Addis Ababa: African Union, 2003. – 29 p.

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### 4. AZFAR, Omar; LEE, Young; SWAMY, Anand

The Causes and Consequences of Corruption  
*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 573, Jan., 2001,  
 p. 42-56

**Abstract** In recent years, economists have come to recognize that corruption is not just an aberration or a nuisance; it is a systemic feature of many economies, which constitutes a significant impediment to economic development. The authors present an overview of the literature on the causes and consequences of corruption and briefly comment on some policy issues, drawing on recent research, including their own.

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**5. BÄHRE, Erik; ELYACHAR, Julia; IKUENOBE, Polycarp**

How to Ignore Corruption: Reporting the Shortcomings of Development in South Africa.  
*Current Anthropology*. Vol. 46, Issue 1, Feb2005, p. 107-120

**Abstract** : This article focuses on the shortcomings of development in South Africa. It has been a decade since South Africans were liberated from the oppressive apartheid regime, but unfortunately they have still not been freed from the corrupt practices that were part and parcel of it. Increasingly, studies have revealed the extent of the ongoing corruption in South Africa. A survey that asked respondents how likely it was for bribes to be demanded by public officials provides some indication of the magnitude of this problem.

**Source**: <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

**6. BAKO-ARIFARI, Nassirou**

La corruption au port de Cotonou : douaniers et intermédiaires  
*Politique africaine*. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 38-58

**Résumé** : Symboles de la corruption institutionnalisée et tarifée, la douane et le port de Cotonou sont traversés par des réseaux de professionnels de la corruption dont la compétence est fonction de leur maîtrise des circuits de redistribution de faux-frais, de leur capacité à conclure des arrangements ou à « privatiser » les moindres interstices étatiques faiblement régulés. L'État, pris en otage par différents segments sociaux et politiques, est réduit à avaliser des situations de fait accompli.

**Source** : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083038.pdf>

**7. BLUNDO, Giorgio ; OLIVIER DE SARDAN, Jean-Pierre**

La corruption au quotidien : introduction  
*Politique africaine*. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 5-7

**Résumé** : Deux disciplines ont depuis longtemps dominé les études sur la corruption : la science politique et l'économie politique 1. Et l'on peut s'étonner du peu de travaux socio-anthropologiques existant sur ce thème 2 : en effet, les données empiriques d'ordre « qualitatif » et « intensif » que peuvent produire l'anthropologie ou une certaine sociologie, à travers observations, études de cas, entretiens approfondis, recensions ou analyses de contenu, sembleraient aptes à procurer une meilleure connaissance des mécanismes de la corruption, comme des représentations et des pratiques des acteurs, connaissance impossible à établir avec les seuls sondages d'opinion et autres questionnaires.

**Source** : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083005.pdf>

**8. BLUNDO, Giorgio ; OLIVIER DE SARDAN, Jean-Pierre**

La corruption quotidienne en Afrique de l'Ouest  
*Politique africaine*. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 8-37

**Résumé** : Les résultats présentés ci-dessous et dans les pages de ce dossier font suite à un an et demi de recherches de terrain et d'enquêtes documentaires menées en équipe au Bénin, au Niger et au Sénégal, sur le thème de la « petite corruption quotidienne », banalisée et systémique, au sein de la sphère publique (administrative et politique).

**Source** : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083008.pdf>

**9. BLUNDO, Giorgio ; OLIVIER DE SARDAN, Jean-Pierre**

Sémiologie populaire de la corruption  
*Politique africaine*. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 98-114

**Résumé** : L'analyse d'un corpus d'expressions populaires désignant les transactions corruptives permet de distinguer entre le niveau des discours construits, débouchant sur les configurations idéologiques relatives à la corruption, et celui du vocabulaire employé, qui concerne le champ sémantique de la corruption. Il apparaît que les pratiques corruptives sont justifiées et « euphémisées » par leur grande proximité ou interpénétration avec des pratiques sociales communes et « normales ». Les mots et les discours participent ainsi à une même entreprise de banalisation.

**Source** : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083098.pdf>



**10. BLUNDO, G.; OLIVIER DE SARDAN, J.P.**

La corruption au quotidien en Afrique de l'Ouest Approche socio-anthropologique comparative: Bénin, Niger et Sénégal

Paris : École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2001. – 284 p.

**Introduction :** Les résultats présentés ci-dessous font suite à un an et demi d'enquêtes de terrain et d'enquêtes documentaires menées au Bénin, au Niger et au Sénégal, sur le thème de la « petite corruption quotidienne », banalisée et systématique, au sein de la sphère publique (administrative et politique). Nos recherches concernent plus précisément les domaines suivants :

- Les transports et la douane (dans les trois pays) ;
- La justice (dans les trois pays) ;
- La santé (au Bénin et au Niger) ;
- Les marchés publics (au Bénin et au Sénégal) ;
- La fiscalité locale (au Sénégal) ;
- Le traitement de la corruption dans la presse (dans les trois pays) ;
- Le « scandale » de la coopération italo-sénégalaise.

Cette recherche trouve son origine dans des expériences de recherche précédentes, individuelles et collectives, conduites par les membres de l'équipe sur la décentralisation, les pouvoirs locaux, la santé publique, les projets de développement, la gestion des ressources locales. Lors de ces enquêtes, les thèmes de la corruption et des dysfonctionnements administratifs apparaissaient constamment dans les propos de nos interlocuteurs.

Ainsi, la corruption a été aussi pour nous une « porte d'entrée » vers d'autres phénomènes. Car cette recherche nous a menés plus loin, au sein de la routine des administrations et de l'État au quotidien, au coeur des relations entre services publics et usagers. Se sont ouvertes ainsi des perspectives fécondes pour une socio-anthropologie des cultures professionnelles, des itinéraires administratifs ou encore de l'éthique de la fonction publique.

**Source :** <http://www.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/workingpapers/corruption.pdf>

**11. BONTRAGER UNZICKER, Andrea D.**

From Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization Brings a Multilateral Agreement against Foreign Bribery

*Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*. Vol. 7, No. 2, spring, 2000, p. 655-686

**Introduction:** While virtually every country in the world outlaws the bribery of its own public officials, the United States has been the only country, since adopting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, to make the act of bribing a foreign public official illegal. In recent years, however, countries around the world have joined the anticorruption movement. The culmination of this growing movement resulted in a ground-breaking 1997 Convention agreed to by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a Paris based organization made up of twenty-nine industrialized countries. This Convention came into force on February 15, 1999, and requires the twenty nine member countries and five non member signatories to ratify their own national laws against the bribery of foreign government officials.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20644747.pdf>

**12. BRINKERHOFF, Derick W.**

Assessing Political will for Anti-Corruption efforts: an Analytic Framework

*Public Administration & Development*. Vol. 20, n° 3, Aug. 2000, p. 239-252

**Abstract:** This article focuses on analyzing political will as it relates to the design\ initiation\ and pursuit of anti-corruption activities[ The article elaborates an analytic framework for political will that partitions the concept into a set of characteristics: indicators\ and elaborates the external factors that influence the expression and intensity of political will in a particular situation[ The conceptual model identifies the links among the characteristics of political will and these external factors\ and traces their resulting influence on the support for\ design of\ and outcomes of anti-corruption reforms[ The conceptual framework for political will draws upon analysis and field experience with implementing policy change in a variety of sectors\ including anti-corruption[ The article closes with recommendations on the practical applications of the framework.

**Source:** <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/108384/session4I.pdf>

**13. BROWNSBERGER, William N.**

Development and Governmental Corruption - Materialism and Political Fragmentation in Nigeria

*The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 21, n° 2, Jun., 1983, p. 215-233

**Abstract:** Some have tried to explain corruption in the Third World by reference to anachronistic traditions and to the special pressures on officials in developing countries. In this article, I argue that, at least in the case of Nigeria, the roots of corruption go deeper, to a materialism and a political fragmentation that are the products of a moment in development. After a schematic review of the relevant literature, I examine the causes of Nigerian corruption, and conclude with the suggestion that the future of good government depends on an expansion of the private economy.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/160773.pdf>

**14. COLDHAM, Simon**

Legal Responses to State Corruption in Commonwealth Africa

*Journal of African Law*. Vol. 39, n° 2, 1995, p. 115-126

**Introduction:** Few countries in the world can claim to be free from corruption and none of these is to be found in Commonwealth Africa.' Even though administrative incorruptibility was one of the boasts of the British colonial service, low-level corruption was common during the colonial period and indeed served to bolster the colonial system.<sup>2</sup> Since African states obtained political independence, levels of corruption have markedly increased, regardless of official ideology or economic approach, and in many countries corruption is both pervasive and endemic. Changes of government are often accompanied and, in the case of military coups, justified by commitments to eradicate the corrupt practices that allegedly characterized the previous regime. Corruption is an obstacle to economic development and to political integration, and most African governments (cynically or not) avow the need to combat it. Pressure on governments to act has increased in recent years and comes from two sources. The emergence of pro-democracy forces has drawn large numbers of people into the arena of political debate and organization and this in turn has led to demands for openness and accountability on the part of government. Moreover, foreign donors and international financial institutions are today less willing to condone corrupt practices on the part of African governments. They stress the importance of good governance and accountability and the need to link economic reconstruction with institutional reform...

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/745629.pdf>

**15. CRAGG, A. W.**

Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption

*International Journal*. Vol. 53, N° 4, Autumn, 1998, p. 643-660

**Introduction:** I Here can be few Topics at this Juncture in the development of human civilization that are more in need of careful exploration than ethics and capitalism. It is now virtually the unanimous view of political leaders in both the industrialized and the developing worlds that capitalism, or, as some put it, a free market economy, is the only viable model for organizing efficient and productive economies. This view, emerging as it has from the dramatic, non-violent, worldwide collapse of communism,<sup>1</sup> is no longer remarkable. What is striking is the way in which the emergence of this global consensus has been paralleled by the emergence of a 'global market-place.' The phenomenon of globalization is significant because of the way in which increasingly free and global markets appear to have undermined both the willingness and the capacity of governments to exercise their traditional responsibilities for co-ordinating economic with social development. The result is a global market whose operation appears often to be quite divorced from any recognition that development or increasing economic wealth is of value not for its own sake but only insofar as it leads to improvements in the quality of life of the people and the communities that make it possible.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40203720.pdf>

**16. BLUNDO, Giorgio**

« Dessus-de-table ». La corruption quotidienne dans la passation des marchés publics locaux au Sénégal

*Politique africaine*. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 79-97

**Résumé :** L'étude des mécanismes concrets de la passation des marchés publics locaux au Sénégal dévoile un véritable système, où les pratiques de corruption transactionnelle sont devenues la norme, dans le contexte d'une commande publique politisée qui a engendré la prolifération d'entreprises " fictives " spécialisées dans la captation des ressources publiques. Dans ce domaine, petite et grande corruption sont les pôles d'un même continuum, qui relie les modestes détournements de matériaux de construction aux formes les plus sophistiquées de corruption " légale ".

**Source :** <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083079.pdf>

### **17. BRÄTIGAM, Deborah A.; KNACK, Stephen**

Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

*Economic Development & Cultural Change*. Vol. 52, Issue 2, Jan 2004, p. 255-285

**Abstract:** This article explores the institutional impact of high levels of foreign aid and the way they are delivered. More than a decade ago, the World Bank argued that 'underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance'. Poor quality institutions, weak rule of law, an absence of accountability, tight controls over information, and high levels of corruption still characterize many African states. Aid levels have been reduced in many parts of Africa. Yet in many countries with poor governance records, aid continues to contribute a very high percentage of government budgets.

**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

### **18. DALOZ, Jean-Pascal**

Nigeria: Trust Your Patron, not the Institutions.

*Comparative Sociology*. Vol. 4, Issue 1/2, Feb 2005, p. 155-172

**Abstract:** In Nigeria, trust and mistrust remain a permanent and sensitive issue. This obviously concerns elite-population relationships or rather – when considering the personalized and particularistic aspects of political life-between patrons and their dependants. This issue of trust is also crucial when it comes to relations among "Big Men" leading factions cutting across communities. Emphasizing the lack of confidence in the institutions and the difficult question of reliance within informal clientelistic networks, this article proposes interpretations based on the study of socio-political relations in a long-term perspective.

**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

### **19. EKER, Varda**

On the Origins of Corruption: Irregular Incentives in Nigeria

*The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 19, n° 1, Mar., 1981, p. 173-182

**Abstract:** Corruption is a wide-spread phenomenon in the developing world. The term is usually reserved for 'the practice of using the power of office for making private gain in breach of laws and regulations nominally in force', or as more flamboyantly defined by M. McMullan, 'a public official is corrupt if he accepts money...for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, that he is under duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reason's Corruption is thus a description of activities emanating from and related to officialdom. Irregular activities among private individuals are a matter of private enterprise. They are not usually classified as corruption, but as straightforward theft, fraud, embezzlement, and the like. Why is it that the bureaucracy appears to indulge in pecuniary misconduct more often and more flagrantly in developing countries? For the purpose of this article the conditions under which corruption flourishes may be divided into those that are 'necessary' and those that are 'sufficient'. As in logical formulae, to achieve perfection both are needed; but various levels of corruption will occur whenever the sufficient conditions are present even in the absence of rapid economic development. The necessary conditions are: (i) the existence of surplus national wealth, and more importantly, (ii) a high growth rate of national wealth, and (iii) a great concentration of political and economic decision-making power in officialdom. The sufficient conditions may be loosely referred to as (i) the moral code, and (ii) the authority structure.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/160611.pdf>

## 20. ELLIS, Stephen

Africa and International Corruption: The Strange Case of South Africa and Seychelles  
*African Affairs*. Vol. 95, n° 379, Apr., 1996, p. 165-196

**Introduction:** The subject of corruption has emerged at the top of the agenda in recent dealings between African governments and the Western donors on whom many are heavily dependant. It is notoriously difficult to define corruption but it is generally understood to entail the use of an official position for purposes of private enrichment or illegitimate advantage. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a stream of books on corruption in Africa or on closely related concepts such as neo-patrimonialism, prebendalism and kleptocracy. Particularly since a World Bank report in 1989 explicitly spoke of a 'crisis of governance' in Africa south of the Sahara, much of the discussion of corruption south of the Sahara has been subsumed in a wider debate on governance. The literature on corruption or on governance in Africa more generally tends to adopt a national perspective, investigating how national elites use corruption or manipulation of public policy to enrich themselves and maintain themselves in power. It is rather less frequent, at least in the academic literature, to encounter detailed studies of the relationship...

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/723700.pdf>

## 21. FLANARY, Rachel; WATT, David

The State of Corruption: A Case Study of Uganda  
*Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 20, n° 3, Jun., 1999, p. 515-536

**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to provide an evaluation of Uganda's current strategy to fight corruption. Like many countries on the African continent, Uganda has deemed it necessary to make attempts to reduce and control corruption within the public sector. As awareness of the deleterious and debilitating effects of corruption has grown, so too have both internal political factors and external pressures from aid donors increased in order to push for fundamental change in this respect. In terms of the donors, many have stipulated specific conditions relating to a good governance agenda based upon adherence to public integrity and minimum standards of public conduct. Sensitivity to pressure also stems in part, from a wish by government to be seen to be actively responding to donor concerns. Internal pressures stem from a growing desire by the public to demand accountability from those in government.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993319.pdf>

## 22. GREENSTONE, J. David

Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi: A Comment on Local Politics in East Africa  
*Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol. 8, n° 2, Jan., 1966, p. 199-210

**Introduction:** At the end of his suggestive political analysis of Nairobi, Herbert Werlin asserts that a major goal for Kenya politics "is to build up the basis for co-operation" (p. 197). Cooperation existed in Kenya under British colonialism; it exists in Britain today. Lack of cooperation at present makes it more difficult for Kenya and Nairobi to solve acute social and economic problems. For Werlin, cooperation requires an educated, public-spirited citizenry, a politically conscious, reform minded business class, and a corps of dedicated professional administrators (p. 197). Cooperation requires a modern social order which in American cities has functioned to encourage "good government". But this very modern concept of cooperation tells us more about where Kenya and Nairobi ought to go than how they should get there. Once cooperation is achieved, the government administration will be more efficient in combating poverty and ignorance. But such cooperation by different social and political groups, all of whom are dedicated to the general interest, is as much an effect of economic and social development as a cause. In fact, the politics of many American cities was at first characterized not by disinterested cooperation but by vigorous individual self-interest and even the outright corruption which Werlin deplores in Nairobi...

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/177705.pdf>

## 23. GUPTA, Akhil

Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State  
*American Ethnologist*. Vol. 22, n° 2, May, 1995, p. 375-402

**Abstract:** In this article I attempt to do ethnography of the state by examining the discourses of corruption in contemporary India. I focus on the practices of lower levels of the bureaucracy in a small north Indian town as well as on representations of the state in the mass media. Research on translocal institutions such as "the state" enables us to reflect on the limitations of participant-observation as a technique of fieldwork. The analysis leads me to question Eurocentric distinctions between state and civil society and offers a critique of the conceptualization of "the state" as a monolithic and unitary entity.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/646708.pdf>

#### 24. HANLON, Joseph

Do Donors Promote Corruption?: The Case of Mozambique

*Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 25, n° 4, 2004, p. 747-763

**Abstract:** Donors inveigh against corruption, yet give more aid to corrupt governments. Debate continues on the causes of developing country corruption, but with little consideration of the possibility that the behaviour of donors may unintentionally promote corruption. This article looks at the example of Mozambique, where corruption grew rapidly in the 1990s. It argues that the donor community is prepared to tolerate quite blatant corruption if the elite rapidly puts into place 'market-friendly' policy changes. The article notes that the Mozambican elite is divided, but the group which challenged high level corruption also criticised World Bank adjustment policies; donors opted for the corrupt faction that told the donors what they wanted. Donors try to avoid the issue by concentrating on institutional reform, which the corrupt faction has so far been able to bypass. The issue is compounded by Mozambique's reputation as one of the World Bank's few success stories in Africa, and donors are reluctant to besmirch that image by publicly raising the corruption issue.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993744.pdf>

#### 25. HARSCH, Ernest

Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa

*Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 31, n° 1, Mar., 1993, p. 31-48

**Introduction:** As the news of President Moussa Traoré's overthrow spread through Mali in March 1991, large crowds of people poured into the streets of Bamako, Segou, Kati, and other towns to exact retribution, culminating weeks of popular unrest. They went after prominent officials, military officers, and members of the wealthy elite that had prospered during the 23 years of Traoré's authoritarian rule. Customs and tax offices, traditional centres of high-level corruption and embezzlement, were systematically burned, their files taken or scattered, their staff put to flight. Big merchants, accused of collaborating with the ousted regime and benefiting from state favours, saw their shops emptied and destroyed. Though disorganised and apparently beyond the control of any leadership, the crowds carefully spared vital economic installations - but not the Bamako offices of the Caisse centrale de coopération économique (C.C.C.E.), seemingly tainted by its role as the main channel for French financial aid to the Government.'

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161342.pdf>

#### 26. HARRISON, Graham

Corruption as 'Boundary Politics': The State, Democratisation, and Mozambique's Unstable Liberalisation

*Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 20, N° 3, Jun., 1999, pp. 537-550

**Abstract:** This article begins by looking at the historical development of corruption in Mozambique, associating it with the breakdown of the party-state and the civil war. Following from this historical context, attention is paid to contemporary forms of corruption and their relationship to broader economic changes. It is argued that structural adjustment has created an unstable political economy in which social boundaries are unclear and/or in flux. Because of this general condition, the well placed and the desperate have elaborated strategies of corruption in order to enrich themselves or provide a basic standard of living, respectively. More specifically, the article looks at: the impact of rapid changes in the economy and an associated growth in an acquisitive and individualised social attitudes; the procedure of privatisation; the effects of budgetary austerity; and the effects of a massive increase in national/international flows of value. The article concludes by considering the political responses to the association of corruption with structural adjustment, most clearly embodied in the term *cabritalismo*--a conflation of the Portuguese for corruption and capitalism.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993320.pdf>

**27. HEINEMAN Jr., Ben W.; HEIMANN, Fritz**

The Long War against Corruption

*Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 85, n° 3, May - Jun., 2006, p. 75-86

**Introduction:** A Ways to Go Since The mid-90s, the issue of corruption has gained a prominent place on the global agenda. International organizations, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN, have adopted conventions requiring that their members enact laws prohibiting bribery and extortion. International financial agencies, notably the World Bank, have announced programs aimed at ensuring fair and open contracting for their projects and stopping misappropriation by government officials. Most nations have enacted some type of anticorruption law. International business groups have promulgated model codes of behavior, and multinational corporations (MNCs) now claim to be implementing antibribery programs. The leading nongovernmental organization (NGO) in this area, Transparency International, has conducted analysis and advocacy through chapters in over 100 nations. The international media report instances of corruption in high places virtually every day (often at great risk). ..

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031968.pdf>

**28. HUSTED, Bryan W.**

Wealth, Culture, and Corruption

*Journal of International Business Studies*. Vol. 30, n° 2, 2nd Qtr., 1999, p. 339-359

**Abstract:** This paper examines the impact of national wealth, income distribution, government size, and four cultural variables on the perceived level of corruption in a country. The study finds that corruption is significantly correlated to GNP per capita, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Significant interaction effects occur in collectivistic and high power-distance countries. Suggestions for future research are developed.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/155316.pdf>

**29. IBABA, Ibaba Samuel; EBIEDE, Tarila M.**

Ending the poverty trap in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria

*Journal of Social Development in Africa*. Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2009, p. 65-89

**Abstract:** Nigeria is one of the most populous countries on the African continent. While the country is well-endowed in respect of natural resources, research has revealed a consistent increase in the incidence of poverty. The poverty level was 28.1 percent in 1980, 46.3 percent in 1985, 42.7 percent in 1992, 65.6 percent in 1996, and 54.4 percent in 2004. The trend shows no signs of abating. The country is divided into six geo-political zones, namely the South-West, South-East, South-South, North-West, North-East and North-Central. It is in the South-South zone that the Niger Delta region, which is the focus of this paper is situated. The Niger Delta region is rich in terms of natural resources, including oil, and yet poverty is pervasive. This paper investigates the poverty trap in the Niger Delta region. The main focus is the determination of policy options that may enable people in the region to escape the poverty trap. The analysis shows that uncontrolled population growth and loss of capabilities are the fundamental causes of the poverty trap. Bad governance and corruption too were identified as major challenges to ending the poverty trap in the region. The suggested policy options are essentially hinged on population planning, development and capability development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

**30. IFEKA, Caroline**

Playing Civil Society Tunes: Corruption and Misunderstanding Nigeria's 'Real' Political Institutions

*Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 28, n° 89, 2001, Sep., 2001, p. 461-465

**Introduction:** Mamdani (1996) argues that the contemporary African state is bifurcated between (modern/progressive) urban society configured with civil institutions and individual rights, and on the other, traditional/backward) rural society ruled by custom and common rights. This naive view, recently critiqued by O'Laughlin (2001) in regard to Mozambique, is influential.

Donors share some of this vision. They believe contemporary wars in Africa, communal violence, poverty and Aids reflect bad governance practices with customary roots, e.g. dictatorships, child labour, persisting

superstitious beliefs as witchcraft and ritual sacrifice of human beings, and endemic corruption. 'Good governance' requires modernisation of African societies by a revival of dilapidated democratic institutions and civil society.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4006621.pdf>

### 31. JOHNSTON, Judy; KOUZMIN, Alexander

Who Are the Rent Seekers? From the Ideological Attack on Public Officials to the "Pork Barrel" Par Excellence - Privatization and Out-Sourcing as Oligarchic Corruption  
*Administrative Theory & Praxis*. Vol. 20, n° 4, Dec., 1998, p. 491-507

**Abstract:** From the original Berle and Means (1932/1991) provocative thesis about the increasing unaccountability of professionalized managers to shareholders of corporations to the imposition of principal-agent prescriptions on altruistic and competent public officials, who actually engages in rent-seeking behavior in increasingly globalizing economies, is a remarkably undiscussed issue. With the original critique of rampant rent-seeking within private sector governance structures, the "slur" of rent-seeking has found its way, via ideological projection, onto the shortcomings of bureaucratic processes and public officials operating under competing fiscal and complex rationalities. An historical and ideologized projection of such dysfunctions within public sectors writ-large has occurred namely in the hands of neo-classical and public choice economic theorists. Yet such a portrayal of public sector bureaucratic rent-seeking may be just a convenient and convincing rhetoric to mask the ultimate rent-seeking behaviors of other powerful actor groups. Governments have clearly been persuaded by the rhetoric as is evident in their promulgation of strategic policies related to enhancing global business opportunities which, seemingly, benefit elite capitalists to the exclusion of just about everyone else. The neo-classicists, by condemning their public bureaucracies as the cause of inefficiency and rent-seeking set governments along destructive paths of action which reduce state capacity and open up traditional government businesses to the private sector. Highly controversial assumptions are the basis upon which a remarkable edifice of small, impotent and de-skilled governance has been "reinvented." The ungovernability thesis is an effective way of linking both an economistic and libertarian wish to reduce government, but rent-seeking assertions underpinning privatization and out-sourcing rationales continue to ignore the pressing questions about the structure of organization and the pathologies of managerial prerogatives-an ignorance that severely distorts organizational and inter-agent complexities confronting the requirements of a re-regularity governance imperative in globalizing and vulnerable economies. Out-sourcing, as the newer legitimization for down-sizing, de-skilling public sector competencies and reducing agency mandates, should be construed as a form of long-term capture of the public sector, by both corporate and management-consultant interests alike. Conflict of interest requirements on behalf of politicians and senior bureaucrats apart, out-sourcing needs to be construed as asset-stripping-a form of fiscal "corruption" in the hands of oligarchs within the private sector who remain prime beneficiaries of such arrangements and, more disconcertingly, by public sector oligarches now pressed into the legitimization services for such "corrupt" practices-all in the name of effecting putative efficiencies in globalized public sectors. Yet rent-seeking is not confined to public officials.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25611312.pdf>

### 32. KAYES, D. Christopher

Organizational Corruption as Theodicy  
*Journal of Business Ethics*. Vol. 67, n° 1, Aug., 2006, p. 51-62

**Abstract:** This paper draws on Weber's theodicy problem to define organizational corruption as the emerging discrepancy between experience and normative expectation. Theodicy describes the attempts to explain this discrepancy. The paper presents four normative principles enlisted by observers to respond to perceived corruption: moral dilemma, detachment, systematic regulation, and normative controls. Consistent with social construction, these justifications work to either reaffirm or change prevailing social norms in the face of confusing events. An exemplar case involves perceived corruption in the business of mountain climbing as represented through the 1996 Mt. Everest climbing disaster. The events illustrate how theodicy informs descriptive accounts of corruption and expose two limitations of normative models of ethics.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25123851.pdf>

### 33. KEEN, Ellen

Fighting Corruption through Education  
Budapest : Open Society Institute, 2001. – 43 p.  
Source: <http://www.hrea.org/pubs/keen2000.pdf>

**34. KLOPP, Jacqueline M.**

Pilfering the public: the problem of land grabbing in contemporary Kenya.  
*Africa Today*. Vol. 47, Issue 1, winter 2000, 21 p.

**Abstract:** Focuses on land grabbing through irregular privatization of public lands by the government in Kenya. Implication of political liberalization for land-grabbing; Land grabbing as a patronage resource and instrument to maintain control by public officials; Evidence of political corruption and violence by the practice of public land privatization.

**Source :** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=17&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

**35. KPUNDEH, Sahr John**

Gouvernance et Economie en Afrique : la corruption en Afrique  
Maryland : IRIS, 2001. – 10 p.

**Introduction :** Comment définir le phénomène de la corruption en Afrique? Il prend diverses formes et se présente à différents niveaux<sup>1</sup>. La corruption « accessoire » est le fait d'individus ou de petits groupes qui Profitent d'une occasion. On peut en voir des manifestations dans la sollicitation et l'acceptation non planifiées de dessous de table (des policiers qui barrent des routes pour exiger des conducteurs qu'ils parent des pots-de- vin, une sous-estimation fiscale, un détournement de fonds... ) Une telle corruption A petite échelle est répandue en Afrique de l'Ouest. Bien que les gains et les récompenses soient en général faibles, elle peut être relativement coûteuse globalement et irrite de nombreuses personnes qui en sont les victimes.

**Source :** <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN006219.pdf>

**36. LEIKEN, Robert S.**

Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic  
*Foreign Policy*. N° 105, winter, 1996-1997, p. 55-73

**Introduction:** Official corruption-the misuse of public power for private profit or political gain-represents a hazard to free trade and investment, a threat to democracy and development, and, in collusion with international crime, a danger to national security and public health and safety. No foreign policy issue affects Americans more, yet few have received less attention from the foreign policy community. But a revolution in public opinion is transforming this issue. The hardships of global competition have exhausted voters' patience with government excesses and misconduct. The popular outcry against corruption has activated officials and diplomats already concerned about the harmful effects of crime and bribery on international security and commerce. Consequently corruption is stealing into the precincts of foreign policy. Corruption, money laundering, and drug smuggling have become the subjects of international treaties and assistance programs and now preoccupy international economic organizations as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The combination of popular protest, international pressure, and government reform may supply the antidote to the current epidemic of corruption

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1148973.pdf>

**37. LODGE, Tom**

Political Corruption in South Africa  
*African Affairs*. Vol. 97, n° 387, Apr., 1998, p. 157-187

**Abstract:** Public opinion suggests that political corruption is entrenched in South Africa. Comparative experience does not indicate that the historical South African political environment was especially likely to nurture a venal bureaucracy; as a fairly industrialized and extremely coercive state the apartheid order may have been less susceptible to many of the forms of political corruption analysts have associated with other post-colonial developing countries. Democratization has made government less secret, inhibiting corruption in certain domains but through extending government's activities opening up possibilities for abuse in others. Today's authorities argue that the present extent of corruption is largely inherited and indeed certain government departments, notably those concerned with security and the homelands, as well as the autonomous homeland administrations themselves, had a history of routine official misbehaviour. After describing the distribution and nature of corruption in South African public administration this article concludes that a substantial proportion of modern corruption occurs in regional administrations and certainly embodies a legacy from the homeland civil



services. A major source of financial misappropriation in the old central government, secret defence procurement, no longer exists but corruption is stimulated by new official practices and fresh demands imposed upon the bureaucracy including discriminatory tendering, political solidarity, and the expansion of citizen entitlements. Though much contemporary corruption is inherited from the past, the simultaneous democratization and restructuring of the South African state makes it very vulnerable to new forms of abuse in different locations.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/723262.pdf>

### 38. LUO, Yadong

Political Behavior, Social Responsibility, and Perceived Corruption: a Structuration Perspective

*Journal of International Business Studies*. Vol. 37, n° 6, Nov., 2006, p. 747-766

**Abstract:** This study unites the three lenses - political behavior, corporate social responsibility, and corruption - and evaluates the way in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) manage political and social forces in a foreign emerging market. Using the theory of structuration as the conceptual foundation, we propose that an MNE's propensity to cooperate with the host government is positively related to its philanthropic contribution and resource accommodation, whereas its propensity to be assertive with the host government is positively associated with its emphasis on ethics and organizational credibility. We argue that when perceived corruption in the business segment increases, an MNE's propensity to cooperate and be assertive with the government decreases, its focus on ethics heightens, and its philanthropic contribution diminishes. As to the three-way interactions, when perceived corruption in the business segment increases, MNEs that focus more on ethics have a greater propensity to use arm's length bargaining to deal with the government, whereas those focusing less on ethics have a greater propensity to use social connections to deal with the government. Our analysis of sample MNEs in China generally supports these propositions.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4540382.pdf>

### 39. MAWENYA, Awadi Sadiki

Empêcher la corruption dans les marchés publics en Afrique  
SAIIA, 2008. – 11 p.

**Résumé :** La corruption dans les marchés publics est la principale cause de pauvreté en Afrique. Elle est encouragée par une gouvernance médiocre et une législation faible. Selon des études crédibles, la corruption pourrait coûter au continent jusqu'à 148 milliards de dollars par an. Cependant, elle peut être contrée s'il y a une volonté et un savoir faire.

Le professeur Awadi Sadiki Mawenya est un activiste anticorruption reconnu et un membre fondateur de FACEIT (Front against Corrupt Elements in Tanzania). Il conclut que la corruption est rampante et s'accroît sur le continent, mais qu'elle peut être contrôlée grâce à une législation forte, l'engagement du gouvernement et le soutien du secteur privé.

Il déclare : « la corruption dans les marchés publics est un problème complexe pour lequel il n'y a pas de solution unique. Combattre la corruption nécessite un ensemble complet de mesures qui doivent être mises en oeuvre simultanément. La première ligne de défense est de s'assurer d'un cadre légal solide qui inclut une loi anticorruption avec une vraie autorité et des sanctions efficaces. » Il pense que la promesse inhérente à l'Afrique est possible si les pays agissent maintenant.

**Source :** [http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/saiia\\_sop\\_09\\_mawenya\\_20080901\\_fr.pdf](http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/documents/saiia_sop_09_mawenya_20080901_fr.pdf)

### 40. MCMULLAN, M.

A Theory of Corruption.

*Sociological Review*. Vol. 9, Issue 2, Jul. 61, p. 181-201

**Abstract:** The article focuses on social aspects of corruption in West Africa. There is corruption in all governments and in the public services of all countries. Some countries, however, suffer from a greater degree of corruption than others. People sympathetic to African and other nationalist movements are sometimes tempted to brush aside corruption as being a passing phase of no real political or social importance. In a country where there is a great deal of corruption, political attacks on people in positions of power are easy to mount and easy to get popular support for. Much of the political history of some unfortunate countries could be told as the "ins" being accused, correctly, by the "outs" of corruption; popular indignation at the corruption causing the replacement of the "ins" by the "outs," who in turn become corrupt and are attacked by a new group of "outs." Corruption adds

an incalculable hazard to the normal thickets of bureaucratic procedure. The final bribe is never paid. Investors and entrepreneurs are dismayed and frustrated, and may find that the unofficial cost of starting an enterprise is too great for it to be profitable.

**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

#### **41. NATIONS UNIES, Washington**

Convention des Nations Unies contre la corruption

Washington : Nations Unies, . – 46 p.

**Source :** [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications\\_unodc\\_convention-f.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_unodc_convention-f.pdf)

#### **42. NIELSEN, Richard P.**

Corruption Networks and Implications for Ethical Corruption Reform

*Journal of Business Ethics*. Vol. 42, n° 2, Jan., 2003, p. 125-149

**Abstract:** The problem this article focuses on is not the isolated individual act of corruption, but the systematic, pervasive sub-system of corruption that can and has existed across historical periods, geo graphic areas, and political-economic systems. It is important to first understand how corrupt and unethical subsystems operate, particularly their while not becoming what we are trying to change. Twelve key system elements are considered that include case examples from Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and North America. A key operating feature of corruption sub-systems is that they are relatively stable networks rather than exceptional, independent, individual events. Drawing on social network, social movement, and action-learning theories, six theory building propositions concerning ethical corruption reform are developed.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25074949.pdf>

#### **43. ODHAMBO, Walter; KAMAU, Paul**

Public Procurement: Lessons from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

Paris: OECD, 2003. – 50 p.

**Abstract:** This paper presents a comparative analysis of the public procurement system in three East African countries: Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In response to both domestic and international pressures, these countries have recently undertaken important initiatives to make their public procurement systems more efficient and transparent in line with international procurement guidelines. The experience of the three countries with the reforms has been quite varied. While Tanzania has moved fast with the reforms and has already put in place a legislative framework for public procurement, Kenya and Uganda have yet to enact procurement legislation. In Kenya, a number of significant changes have already been effected through a ministerial gazette notice pending the coming into force of a Procurement Act. There is also an urgent need for strengthening institutions involved in public procurement, as these institutions tend to lack technical and human resource capabilities.

**Source :** <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5lgsjhvj7843.pdf?expires=1279640723&id=0000&accname=guest&checksum=6155BB283667E3163C047ABA5AF6C730>

#### **44. OLIVIER DE SARDAN, J.P.**

A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?

*Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 37, n° 1, Mar., 1999, p. 25-52

**Abstract:** As far as corruption in Africa is both conspicuous and generalised, it has to be studied from the viewpoint of the participants. This article starts with six general theses on corruption in Africa, which place it within a broader 'corruption complex', and emphasise its routine nature, the stigmatisation of corruption despite the absence of effective sanctions, its apparent irreversibility, the absence of correlation with regime types and its legitimacy to its perpetrators. Corruption is then shown to be socially embedded in 'logics' of negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority and redistributive accumulation. Any anti-corruption policy must face up to these realities.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161467.pdf>

#### **45. OLIVIER DE SARDAN, J. P.**

L'économie de la corruption morale en Afrique

*Politique africaine*. N° 63, octobre 1996, p. 97-116

**Introduction :** La corruption qui sévit aujourd'hui dans l'ensemble des L pays afri- cains est inlassablement évoquée dans les conversations privées. Tout le monde s'accorde à en reconnaître et à en déplorer l'ampleur croissante.

Cependant elle n'est pas devenue pour autant un objet d'étude à part entière pour la sociologie ou l'anthropologie, surtout du côté francophone, où la corruption n'est guère évoquée qu'au fil de travaux consacrés à d'autres thèmes, pour l'essentiel les systèmes politiques africains (1). Certes les enquêtes empiriques sur un tel sujet sont plus difficiles à mener que sur des sujets plus classiques ou moins N chauds n. Cependant, en d'autres époques ou en d'autres lieux, les sciences sociales se sont intéressées directement à la corruption, de l'empire romain ou de l'empire byzantin à l'Europe de l'Est communiste et post-communiste, des machines politiques contrôlant les villes américaines aux sociétés méditerranéennes...

Source : <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/063097.pdf>

#### 46. OLIVIER DE SARDAN, J.P.

"La corruption en Afrique dans le contexte de crise"

Paris : ORSTOM, 1997. – 19 p.

**Introduction :** Tout le monde, en Afrique même, associe l'accroissement assez général de la corruption au contexte de crise et d'appauvrissement. A cet égard, il faut sans doute distinguer la "grande corruption" (celle qui se pratique au sommet de l'Etat: présidents, ministres, directeurs de services importants, directeurs d'entreprises publiques ou semi-publiques) et la petite corruption" (celle des policiers, douaniers, commis, infirmiers, secrétaires...). La grande corruption serait une cause (annexe) de la crise ("ils s'enrichissent et pillent l'état pendant que nous souffrons..."), alors que la petite corruption en serait une conséquence (31 faut bien se débrouiller pour manger...).

Source : [http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins\\_textes/pleins\\_textes\\_7/carton01/010018387.pdf](http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_7/carton01/010018387.pdf)

#### 47. OLU-OLU, Olufayo

Corruption by Example: Legalizing the Illegal as a Means of Survival in Modern Nigeria.

*Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2008, p. 1-12

**Abstract:** This study examines the behavioural consequences of the public outcry on corruption by the Nigerian citizens especially the top ranking officers and leaders of government. A sample of 873 respondents cutting across twelve professions was interviewed through a carefully designed questionnaire. The research was complimented with secondary data sourced from other anti-corruption agencies. Findings reveal a total disgust for corruption for its apparent smearing of the country's image in the international community, but that the war against it would be hard to win since the acts are perpetrated by policy makers themselves. It, however, suggested a number of factors which if religiously executed could reduce the cases of corruption to the barest minimum.

Source: <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

#### 48. OSOBA, S.O.

Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives

*Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 23, n° 69, Sep., 1996, p. 371-386

**Introduction:** Corruption is a global phenomenon, intelligible only in its social context. It can be defined as anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms, and which undermines the authorities' capacity to secure the welfare of all citizens. In Nigeria it became the principal means of private accumulation during the decolonisation period, in the absence of other means, and came to shape political activity and competition after independence. All subsequent regimes, military and civilian, have been pervaded by corruption. Aided and enhanced by oil revenues, this has created a deepening crisis of kleptocracy, shown in its most extreme form since 1984. It results in a combination of scandalous wealth among the ruling class with growing poverty, misery and degradation among the mass of Nigerians. Political life has become dominated by winner-take-all factional struggles, political cynicism and violence, while the economy and social institutions have been driven into decay. Corruption has thus become a way of life in Nigeria, one which existing governments neither wish to, nor can, control. Combating corruption requires a popular participatory democracy able to monitor and hold to account those in charge of the state and the treasury.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4006378.pdf>

**49. Publication of Report on the Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey 2000**

*Journal of African Law*. Vol. 45, n° 2, 2001, p. 233-235

**Introduction:** The Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) is a group of public and non-governmental organizations that have joined forces in an effort to combat corruption in Ghana. The GACC includes the Serious Fraud Office, Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice and the Institute of Economic Affairs. In order to establish a solid empirical base for developing effective strategies to combat the problem, in 2000 a national survey was undertaken covering households, business enterprises and public officials. The results are contained in the Report on the Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey that was published in February 2001. This provides a detailed insight into the phenomenon of corruption in Ghana and is based on the views of 1,500 households, 500 business enterprises and 1,000 public officials interviewed throughout the country between May and June 2000.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3558961.pdf>

**50. REINIKKA, Ritva; SVENSSON, Jakob**

Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda  
*Journal of the European Economic Association*. Vol. 3, n° 2/3, Apr. - May, 2005, p. 259-267

**Abstract:** What are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning? We argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption. We illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment. A newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools (parents) with information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. The campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrolment and student learning.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40004969.pdf>

**51. ROBERTSON, A.F.**

Misunderstanding corruption

*Anthropology Today*. Vol. 22, Issue 2, April 2006, p. 8-11

**Abstract:** The article reports that corruption and money laundering listed at the top by Royal African Society (RAS) to cause damage to Africa. In the World, The World Bank calculated that a trillion of dollars is paid in bribes annually. The RAS has also estimated about 140 million dollars are lost to corruption in the continent.

**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

**52. RODRIGUEZ, Peter; SIEGEL, Donald S.; HILLMAN, Amy; EDEN, Lorraine**

Three Lenses on the Multinational Enterprise: Politics, Corruption, and Corporate Social Responsibility

*Journal of International Business Studies*. Vol. 37, n° 6, Nov., 2006, p. 733-746

**Abstract :** Scholars who analyze multinational enterprises (MNEs) recognize the complex relationship between international business (IB) and society. However, compared with other IB topics, research on politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility - 'three lenses' on the MNE - remains somewhat embryonic, with unresolved issues regarding frameworks, measurement, methods, and theory. This presents unique opportunities for integration and extension of disciplinary perspectives, which we explore in this article. We provide an introduction to potential linkages across these three lenses, an agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research, and a review of the papers in the JIBS Focused Issue.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4540381.pdf>

**53. RUHE, John A.; DAVIS, James H.**

Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes

*Journal of Business Ethics*. Vol. 43, n° 4, Apr., 2003, p. 275-288

**Abstract:** Globalization has increased the need for managers (and future managers) to predict the potential for country corruption. This study examines the relationship between Hofstede's cultural dimensions and how

country corruption is perceived. Power distance, individualism and masculinity were found to explain a significant portion of the variance in perceived corruption. A significant portion of country's risk, trade flow with U.S.A., foreign investment, and per capita income was explained by perceived corruption.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25074999.pdf>

#### 54. RYAN, Leo V.

Combating Corruption: The 21st-Century Ethical Challenge

*Business Ethics Quarterly*. Vol. 10, n° 1, Jan., 2000, p. 331-338

**Abstract:** Combating and overcoming corruption in business and in political affairs is one of the most important issues facing business and professional ethics in the 21st century. That corruption exists is a fact. That corruption is widespread and spreading is a common perception. Many believe that corruption is culturally induced. Some believe corruption to be so much a part of the fabric of some societies as to be unquestioned and unassailable. Or, is it simply a myth that corruption is a matter of culture?

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3857717.pdf>

#### 55. SANDHOLTZ, Wayne; GRAY, Mark M.

International Integration and National Corruption

*International Organization*. Vol. 57, n° 4, autumn, 2003, p. 761-800

**Abstract:** We argue that greater degrees of international integration lead to lower levels of corruption, which we define as the misuse of public office for private gain. We theorize that international factors affect a country's level of corruption through two principal channels. One acts through economic incentives, altering for various actors the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt acts. The second mode is normative. Prevailing norms in international society delegitimize and stigmatize corruption. Countries that are more integrated into international society are more exposed to economic and normative pressures against corruption. We therefore test the following hypothesis: the more a country is tied into international networks of exchange, communication, and organization, the lower its level of corruption is likely to be. The analysis of data from approximately 150 countries strongly confirms our expectation.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3594846.pdf>

#### 56. SHLEIFER, Andrei; VISHNY, Robert W.

Corruption

*The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 108, n° 3, Aug., 1993, p. 599-617

**Introduction:** This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2118402.pdf>

#### 57. SMITH, Gerald H.

The Dichotomy of Politics and Corruption in a Neopatrimonial State: Evidence from Sierra Leone, 1968-1993

*Issue: A Journal of Opinion*. Vol. 25, n° 1, 1997, p. 58-62

**Introduction:** The scholarly studies on political corruption in Africa are not conclusive, given the lack of knowledge of how neopatrimonialism contributes to state corruption. This is an important omission. There are obvious relationships between regime types and the likelihood, nature, and extent of political corruption.' The analysis of political corruption in Sierra Leone has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between neopatrimonialism and state corruption. Kpundeh indicates that administrative corruption in Sierra Leone was a common phenomenon during the All People's Congress (henceforth APC) tenure. Several corruption cases with national political ramifications were common during APC's tenure. Kpundeh provides evidence regarding several major corruption scandals that were unearthed during APC's tenure.<sup>3</sup> He indicates that in 1982 the first major corruption scandal referred to as "Vouchergate" was unearthed; "Squandergate" in

1984 and "Milliongate" in 1987 were to follow. The proliferation of national corruption scandals was a distinguishable feature of the Siaka Stevens era.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1166251.pdf>

### 58. SVENSSON, Jakob

Eight Questions about Corruption

*The Journal of Economic Perspectives*. Vol. 19, n° 3, summer, 2005, p. 19-42

**Introduction:** Some years ago I interviewed the chief executive officer of a successful Thai manufacturing firm as part of a pilot survey project. While trying to figure out a good way to quantify the firm's experience with government regulations and corruption in the foreign trade sector, the CEO exclaimed: "I hope to be reborn as a custom official." When a well-paid CEO wishes for a job with low official pay in the government sector, corruption is almost surely a problem! The most devastating forms of corruption include the diversion and outright theft of funds for public programs and the damage caused by firms and individuals that pay bribes to avoid health and safety regulations intended to benefit the public. Examples abound. A conservative estimate is that the former President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, looted the treasury of some \$5 billion—an amount equal to the country's entire external debt at the time he was ousted in 1997. The funds allegedly embezzled by the former presidents of Indonesia and Philippines, Mohamed Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos, are estimated to be two and seven times higher (Transparency International, 2004). In the Goldenberg scam in Kenya in the early 1990s, the Goldenberg firm received as much as \$1 billion from the government as part of an export compensation scheme for fictitious exports of commodities of which Kenya either produced little (gold) or nothing at all (diamonds) ("Public Inquiry into Kenya Gold Scam," 2003). An internal IMF report found that nearly \$1 billion of oil revenues, or \$77 per capita, vanished from Angolan state coffers in 2001 alone (Pearce, 2002). This amount was about three times the value of the humanitarian aid received by Angola in 2001—in a country where three-quarters of the population survives on less than \$1 a day and where one

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4134971.pdf>

### 59. SZEFTTEL, Morris

Between Governance & Underdevelopment: Accumulation & Africa's 'Catastrophic Corruption'

*Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 27, n° 84, Jun., 2000, p. 287-306

**Abstract:** Capital eschews no profit, or very small profit, just as nature was formerly said to abhor a vacuum. With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A certain 10 per cent will ensure its employment anywhere; 20 per cent will produce eagerness; 50 per cent positive audacity; 100 per cent will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per cent and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both. Smuggling and the slave trade have amply proved all that is here stated.

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4006601.pdf>

### 60. SZEFTTEL, Morris

Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption & the Governance Agenda

*Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 25, n° 76, Jun., 1998, p. 221-240

**Abstract:** This paper reviews empirical evidence concerning government errors of commission and omission in Africa. Seen in the context of international comparisons, how do African states measure up in the defensive functions of avoiding government excess? ...

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4006544.pdf>

### 61. SZEFTTEL, Morris

Clientelism, Corruption & Catastrophe

*Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 27, n° 85, Sep., 2000, p. 427-441

**Abstract:** In the previous issue of this journal (ROAPE 84), the author argued that international anti-corruption efforts created conflicts between aid donors and African debtor governments because they attacked the ability of local interests to control and appropriate state resources. The control of corruption is an essential element in the legitimation of liberal democracy and in the promotion of global markets. However, it also threatens the local accumulation of wealth and property (dependent as it is on access to the state) in post-colonial Africa. This

article explores another dimension of this problem, namely the way in which clientelist forms of political mobilisation have promoted corruption and intensified crisis. Clientelism has been a key mechanism through which political interests have built the electoral support necessary to ensure access to the state's resources. In turn, it has shaped a politics of factional competition over power and resources, a politics obsessed with the division of the political spoils. The article argues that this process is not unique to Africa. What is different, however, is that factional conflict and its attendant corruption have had such devastating consequences. This reflects the particular forms which clientelism has taken on the continent. There is a need, it concludes, to find ways to shift African politics towards issues of social justice and government performance and away from a concern with a division of the state's resources.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4006662.pdf>

## 62. TAVITS, Margit

Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

*American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 51, N° 1, Jan., 2007, p. 218-229

**Abstract:** This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians--as well as to create incentives for performance--declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4122915.pdf>

## 63. TAYLOR, Scott D.

Divergent Politico-Legal Responses to past Presidential Corruption in Zambia and Kenya: Catching the 'Big Fish', or Letting Him off the Hook?

*Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 27, n° 2, 2006, p. 281-301

**Abstract:** The prosecution of past elected presidents for corruption in office is an option that has recently entered the public discourse in several of Africa's nascent democracies, progressing farthest in Zambia, followed by Kenya. That such moves could be contemplated, let alone initiated, responds to frequent policy demands to 'do something about corruption'. Moreover, prosecution poses a challenge to the scholarly literature on neo-patrimonialism, which suggests that presidential corruption is endemic--indeed, expected--in Africa because it is culturally embedded; in this view, societal clients habitually defer to their 'big men' patrons, a culture of impunity prevails, and prosecution is therefore inconceivable. This research suggests that new norms and mechanisms of accountability emerge from targeting 'the big fish' through presidential prosecution. Nonetheless, the constraints on such bold action in fragile African democracies remain severe. This article seeks to explain why prosecution was pursued in Zambia, but appears to have languished in Kenya, despite a number of initial similarities between the two states.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4017675.pdf>

## 64. THEOBALD, Robin

Lancing the Swollen African State: Will It Alleviate the Problem of Corruption?

*The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 32, no. 4, Dec., 1994, p. 701-706

**Introduction:** International concern over the pathology of political corruption increases apace. The last five years have witnessed a proliferation of organizations, conferences, and meetings dedicated to analysing the phenomenon as well as proposing workable policies of containment and control.' This rising concern is a consequence partly of accelerating globalisation which not only increases awareness of the incidence and appalling scale of corruption but, more seriously, allows the contagion to infect the international system of trade and finance as a result of the activities of organized crime syndicates, money launderers, arms dealers, and the like. Furthermore, the ending of the cold war has meant that the 'great' powers are now having to confront the consequences of their longstanding indulgence, in the interests of political expediency, of sundry seedy dictators and their cronies; kleptocrats who seemed to devote much of their incumbency to transferring millions of dollars, sometimes billions, from the public treasury into Swiss bank accounts.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161572.pdf>

**65. TIDJANI ALOU, Mahaman**

La justice au plus offrant. Les infortunes du système judiciaire en Afrique de l'Ouest (autour du cas du Niger)

Politique africaine. N° 83, octobre 2001, p. 59-79

**Résumé :** La corruption qui se développe dans les appareils judiciaires prend forme dans un cadre structurel encourageant les acteurs à inventer des règles qui détournent la justice de sa fonction. La corruption repose sur des mécanismes variés qui assurent sa production et sa reproduction. Ces mécanismes renvoient aux principales caractéristiques de l'État africain. La dynamique des structures judiciaires pose de sérieuses limites aux processus de démocratisation en cours, dont on sait qu'ils ont besoin d'une justice saine pour se consolider.

**Source :** <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/083059.pdf>

**66. TIGNOR, Robert L.**

Political Corruption in Nigeria before Independence

*The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 31, n° 2, Jun., 1993, p. 175-202

**Introduction:** Political corruption is widespread in contemporary societies, and is regarded by some analysts of the Third World as the single most important obstacle to economic development and political integration. Certainly the frequent regime changes which have occurred in Africa in the last several decades have been accompanied by charges of gross administrative malfeasance and promises to introduce honest government. Perhaps no country in the continent has devoted more attention and energy to continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria. Indeed, from the late colonial period up until the present, critics of those in power have lamented the level of venality, and numerous published reports have catalogued a wide range of iniquities and called for reform.

**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/161001.pdf>

**67. Transparency International, Berlin**

Global Corruption: Report 2009, Corruption and the Private Sector

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. – 493 p.

**Introduction:** It may be that in no other time in history have entrepreneurship, private economic activity and markets been more important and intertwined with the economic prosperity, political stability and environmental sustainability of societies than they are at present. The financial crisis and the economic turmoil that this crisis has triggered have thrown this insight into sharp relief.

The private sector can be a source of dynamic innovation and growth. Nonetheless, as Transparency International's Global Corruption Report 2009 clearly demonstrates, it can also fail to live up to its potential, if corruption goes unchecked, and turn into a destructive force that undermines fair competition, stifles economic growth and political development and ultimately undercuts its own existence.

Despite prominent corruption scandals and the lack of transparency and accountability that has been shown to lie at the root of the financial crisis, there has been encouraging and real progress towards stronger corporate integrity. Corporate performance in the fight against corruption often does not yet match corporate commitments, however. Crucial corruption risks, as well as loopholes in transparency, accountability and oversight, persist across all industries and all countries. Dynamic markets continue to produce new and subtle corruption challenges.

**Source:** [Global\\_Corruption\\_Report\\_2009\\_170909\\_2\\_web\[1\]A\[1\].pdf](http://www.transparency.org/pdfs/Global_Corruption_Report_2009_170909_2_web[1]A[1].pdf)

**68. Transparency International, Berlin**

Rapport mondial sur la corruption 2009 : la corruption et le secteur privé

Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2009. – 480 p.

**Introduction :** Il est possible qu'à nulle autre époque, l'esprit d'entreprise, les activités économiques privées et les marchés aient été plus importants et plus liés à la prospérité économique, la stabilité politique et le développement environnemental durable des sociétés, qu'ils ne le sont aujourd'hui. La crise financière et les turbulences économiques qu'elle a provoquées ont mis en lumière cette réalité.

Le secteur privé peut être une source de dynamisme en matière d'innovation et de croissance. Cela étant, comme le démontre clairement le Rapport mondial sur la corruption 2009 de Transparency International, il peut également ne pas se montrer à la hauteur de son potentiel et se transformer en une force destructrice



qui fragilise l'équilibre concurrentiel, asphyxie la croissance économique et le développement politique et, à terme, menace sa propre existence, si la corruption se poursuit en toute impunité.

Source: GCR 2009 French FINAL NM[1].pdf

### 69. UNDP, New York

Anti-corruption Practice Note.

New York: UNDP, 2004. – 35 p.

**Introduction:** The negative impact of corruption on development is no longer questioned. Evidence from across the globe confirms that corruption impacts the poor disproportionately. Corruption hinders economic development, reduces social services, and diverts investments in infrastructure, institutions and social services. Moreover, it fosters an anti-democratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. It also undermines efforts to achieve the MDGs. Corruption therefore reflects a democracy, human rights and governance deficit that negatively impacts poverty and human security.

Since 1997, UNDP has been involved in accountability, transparency and integrity (ATI) programs as part of its interventions to strengthen democratic governance, initially through the Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT). UNDP's corporate policy paper, *Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance* (1998), highlighted the importance of addressing corruption as a development phenomenon.

However, it did not elaborate on how to develop specific ATI and anti-corruption measures and effectively integrate these initiatives into larger development programmes.

Source: <http://www.uneca.org/itca/governance/Documents/Anti%20Corruption%20Note%20FINAL%20VERSION%20031704.pdf>

### 70. UNION AFRICAINE, Addis Abeba

Convention de l'Union Africaine sur la prévention et la lutte contre la corruption

Addis Abeba : UA, 2003. – 27 p.

Source : [http://www.africa-union.org/Official\\_documents/Treaties\\_Conventions\\_fr/Convention%20sur%20la%20lutte%20contre%20la%20corruption.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_Conventions_fr/Convention%20sur%20la%20lutte%20contre%20la%20corruption.pdf)

### 71. UNITED NATIONS, Washington

United Nations Convention against Corruption

Washington: United Nation, 1996. – 43 p.

Source: [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications\\_unodc\\_convention-e.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_unodc_convention-e.pdf)

### 72. VAN DEN BERGHE, Pierre L.

Parasitism and Corruption: State Behavior in the Throes of Deepening Global Crisis

*Politics and the Life Sciences*. Vol. 13, N° 1, Feb., 1994, p. 29-30

**Introduction:** There is much that I agree with a wrong's analysis but I would carry his indictment of the state much further. I question his benign view of the state? that it "exists to protect its subjects against predation from other states," and that such protection constitutes "the ultimate rationale for the indispensability of the state." The state may be inevitable under present circumstances, but human evolution has demonstrated that it is eminently dispensable. The "rationale" of indispensability is, in fact, a myth, albeit unfortunately a widely believed myth. The paradigm for state formation is the gang, which also shakes down its victims for "protection." States are simply established, hegemonic mafias. It is probably true that most states initially organize violence for external predation, and this is what initially leads to the explosion of reactive state formation in region after region of the world over the last seven millennia. But once the states in a region have become deadlocked in a balance of terror and once the agricultural carrying capacity of the region has been reached, the pickings of external predation become small and hazardous, and states invariably turn to internal parasitism on their own societies. Taxes quickly overshadow booty. Thus, the state is the ultimate protection racket, the consummate social parasite. I like to define it as a killing machine controlled by the few to steal from the many. ..

Source: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4235993.pdf>

**73. WALT, Johan van der; BOTHA, Henk**

Democracy and Rights in South Africa: Beyond a Constitutional Culture of Justification.  
*Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory*. Vol. 7, Issue 3,  
Sep. 2000, p. 341-362

**Abstract:** There is a story about a songwriter who went on a camping trip one weekend with his publisher. They were hiking with their backpacks when they came around a bend and suddenly saw a mountain lion. Both of them froze in place, and the cat began snarling and moving slowly towards them. As they stood there, the writer noticed the publisher was quietly taking off his backpack. The writer said, 'What are you doing? You can't outrun a mountain lion.' The publisher replied, 'I don't need to outrun the mountain lion; I only need to outrun you.' [2]  
**Source:** <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=11&hid=111&sid=255cca3e-087c-49cd-b045-73ffa99a876c%40sessionmgr110>

**74. WEITZEL, Utz. BERNS, Sjors**

Cross-Border Takeovers, Corruption, and Related Aspects of Governance  
*Journal of International Business Studies*. Vol. 37, n° 6, Nov., 2006, p. 786-806

**Abstract:** We use a panel of 4979 cross-border and domestic takeovers to test the relation between host country corruption and premiums paid for local targets. Host country corruption is negatively associated with target premiums, after correcting for other governance-related factors such as political stability, legal systems, and financial disclosure standards. We estimate that deterioration in the corruption index by one point (on a 10-point scale) is, on average, associated with a reduction of 21% of local targets' premiums. Our results do not support the notion that local corruption constitutes a significant market barrier to foreign investors; rather, it represents a discount on local takeover synergies, which affects foreign and domestic acquirers alike. However, we find that the major effects of corruption can alternatively be explained by government effectiveness, pointing towards an endogenous relationship between bribery and bureaucracy.  
**Source:** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4540384.pdf>

**75. WORLD BANK, Washington**

Chapter 5: Designing Effective Anticorruption Strategies

**Introduction:** The previous chapter presented a comprehensive set of instruments for combating corruption. The challenge remains to draw lessons from the typology of corruption for prioritizing, sequencing, and combining reforms to design the most effective strategy for the particular contours of the problem in different countries. By unbundling corruption, the goal is to develop more effective targeting of anticorruption measures to strike at the main sources of the persistence of corruption. Differentiating the causes and consequences of corruption across countries should help to set priorities, to identify and evaluate opportunities for entry into serious anticorruption work, and to develop more realistic expectations regarding the necessary time horizon of reforms in different contexts. At the same time, designing an effective anticorruption strategy will always depend upon a detailed understanding of the particular nature of the political, economic, and social landscape in each country which goes well beyond the simple typology presented in this report. This landscape will strongly condition the extent to which different types of instruments will work effectively.

**Source:** [Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Anticorruption5/\\$File/chapter5.pdf](http://web18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Anticorruption5/$File/chapter5.pdf)

**PART III / 3ème PARTIE**

**ANNEXES**

**ANNOUNCEMENT – ANNONCE – ANUNCIO**

### III - Annexes: Announcement/Annonce/ Anúncio

#### CODESRIA DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE 2010

##### Theme: Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability

Date: 26/07-13/08/2010

Dakar, Senegal

Call for Applications: Resource Persons and Laureates

CODESRIA is pleased to announce the 2010 session of its annual Democratic Governance Institute and to invite interested researchers to submit proposals for consideration for participation in the Institute which is scheduled for 26 July – 13 August 2010, in Dakar, Senegal.

The CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute is an interdisciplinary forum which brings together African scholars undertaking innovative research on topics related to the broad theme of governance. The aim of the Institute is to promote research and debates on issues connected to the conduct of public affairs and the management of the development process in Africa. The Institute was launched in 1992 and has been held every year since then in Dakar, Senegal. It serves the critical function of forging links among a younger generation of African intellectuals and meeting the scientific needs of these intellectuals in terms of access to recent documentation, participation in current debates, the retooling of their research capacities, and the updating of their conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches. Increasingly, the Institute appeals to the interests of African policy intellectuals and civil society activists as well, thereby permitting a judicious mix of researchers, activists, and policy makers to be achieved in the admission of participants. In general, a total of fifteen African researchers drawn from across the continent and the Diaspora, and a few non-African scholars participate in the Institute each year.

#### Objectives:

The main objectives of the Governance Institute are to:

1. encourage the sharing of experiences among researchers, activists and policy makers from different disciplines, methodological and conceptual orientations, and geographical/linguistic zones on a common theme over an extended period of time;
2. promote and enhance a culture of democratic values that allows Africans effectively to identify and tackle the governance issues confronting their continent; and
3. foster the participation of scholars in discussions and debates about the processes of democratisation taking place in Africa.

#### Organisation:

The activities of all CODESRIA institutes centre on presentations made by resident researchers, visiting resource persons, and the participants whose applications for admission as laureates are successful. The sessions are led by a scientific director who, with the help of invited resource persons, ensures that the laureates are exposed to the range of research and policy issues generated by or arising from the theme of the Institute for which they are responsible. Open discussions drawing on books and articles relevant to the theme of a particular institute or a specific topic within the theme are also encouraged. Each of the laureates selected to participate in any of the Council's institutes is required to prepare a research paper to be presented during the course of the particular institute they attend. Laureates are expected to draw on the insights which they gain from the Institute in which they participate to produce a revised version of their research papers for consideration for publication by CODESRIA. For each institute, the CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre (CODICE) prepares a comprehensive bibliography on the theme of the year. Access is also facilitated to a number of documentation centres in and around Dakar.

#### The 2010 Session: Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability

The proposed theme for the 2010 Institute is Corruption, Democratic Governance and Accountability. Corruption has become a major political, policy and advocacy issue that presents major challenges for research. It is at the heart of academic and policy discussions on governance, development and aid, and features prominently in most governance monitoring indexes. In some strands of the academic literature on African politics and development, corruption is presented as a key aspect of the patronage system that is said to be the dominant trait of African politics. Yet corruption is a worldwide phenomenon about which the most widely held

view in conventional development discourse is that it has an overall corrosive effect on national and regional development as it undermines state capacity and the efficient delivery of public goods and services. Corruption is also widely recognised across the board by citizens of Africa and by civil society activists, policy makers in government, the private sector, sub-regional and regional organisations, and donors as a major problem. Corrupt practices and problems of accountability also exist in civil society organisations and in the private sector. Besides, corruption is a problem which, both in the short-term and over the long-run, has a potentiality to destabilise and discredit the democratic project. There is therefore a need for the costs of corruption on the lives and livelihoods of the citizenry and its consequence for the accumulation of national wealth and well-being to be properly documented.

Many African countries score poorly in all governance indexes that include corruption as a measure. Within African countries themselves, the citizens rank corruption very high up in their list of the core impediments to national and sub-regional development and progress. Governments have come under domestic and external pressure to take measures to contain corruption and corrupt practices. All over the continent, various types of anti-corruption commissions and agencies have been established with varying jurisdictions and mandates. Public campaigns, mostly through the media, have also been mounted to exhort the citizenry to join in the official fight that has been declared against corruption. The effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies and campaigns has itself been a subject of broad governance interest across Africa. Overall, there is a broad consensus that much more effort needs to be deployed by governments to fight corruption successfully.

The 2010 Governance Institute will focus on the corruption, democratic governance and accountability interface. Participants will be encouraged to engage in a critical, nuanced and historicized analysis of corruption and the challenges it poses for democratic governance and accountability, and to come up with innovative theoretical/conceptual perspectives and identify opportunities for new and more effective policy interventions.

Sub-themes to be covered will include the following:

1. Conceptual and theoretical approaches to corruption and accountability
2. The roots and dimensions of corruption in Africa;
3. Leadership, institutions, state capacity, civil society and corruption in Africa
4. Poverty, social inequality, and corruption in Africa
5. Globalization, multinational corporations, international development partners, the aid regime, and corruption
6. International, regional and sub-regional frameworks and mechanisms for fighting corruption in Africa
7. National anti-corruption institutions and programmes;
8. The adverse consequence of corruption for governance, democracy and development;
9. Reasons for the inefficacy of the intervention/remedial measures that have been taken to date;
10. Fresh strategies and approaches for combating corruption;
11. The role of social movements in the anti-corruption struggle
12. Where do people encounter and participate in corruption; e.g., points of demand or delivery of goods and services like education, health, transportation?
13. What are the conditions of possibility and of persistence of corrupt practices? What are, if any, the risks for the actors involved, and for ordinary citizens, etc.?
14. What are the drivers of corruption in our concrete African situations?
15. Why is it that a large number of people while presumably opposed to corruption, do, reluctantly, participate in corruption?
16. Accountability of public officials

### **The Director**

For every session of its various institutes, CODESRIA appoints an external scholar with a proven track-record of quality work to provide intellectual leadership. Directors are senior scholars known for their expertise in the topic of the year and for the originality of their thinking on it. They are recruited on the basis of a proposal which they submit and which contains a detailed course outline covering methodological issues and approaches; the key concepts integral to an understanding of the object of a particular Institute and the specific theme that will be focused upon; a thorough review of the state of the literature designed to expose laureates to different theoretical and empirical currents; a presentation on various sub-themes, case-studies and comparative examples relevant to the theme of the particular Institute they are applying to lead; and possible policy questions that are worth keeping in mind during the entire research process.

The Director of the Institute will amongst others

- participate in the selection of laureates;
- identify resource-persons to help lead discussions and debates;

- design the course for the session, including the specification of sub-themes;
- deliver a set of lectures and provide a critique of the papers presented by the resource persons and the laureates;
- submit a written scientific report on the session.

In addition, the Director is expected to (co-)edit the revised versions of the papers presented by the resource persons with a view to submitting them for publication in one of CODESRIA's collections. The Director also assists CODESRIA in assessing the papers presented by laureates for publication by the Council. CODESRIA is in the process of selecting a Director for the 2010 Institute.

### **Resource Persons**

Lectures to be delivered at the Institute are intended to offer laureates an opportunity to advance their reflections on the theme of the programme and on their own research topics. Resource Persons are, therefore, senior scholars or scholars in their mid-career who have published extensively on the topic, and who have a significant contribution to make to the debates on it. They will be expected to produce lecture materials which serve as think pieces that stimulate laureates to engage in discussion and debate around the lectures and the general body of literature available on the theme.

Once selected, resource persons must:

- submit a copy of their lectures for reproduction and distribution to participants not later than one week before the lecture begins ;
- deliver their lectures, participate in debates and comment on the research proposals of the laureates ;
- review and submit the revised version of their research papers for consideration for publication by CODESRIA not later than two months following their presentation.

### **Laureates**

Applicants should be African researchers who have completed their university and /or professional training, with a proven capacity to carry out research on the theme of the Institute. Intellectuals active in the policy process and/or in social movements/civic organisations are also encouraged to apply. The number of places offered by CODESRIA at each session of its institutes is limited to fifteen (15) fellowships. Non-African scholars who are able to raise funds for their participation may also apply for a limited number of places.

### **Applications**

Applications for the position of **resource persons** should include:

- an application letter ;
- two writing samples ;
- a curriculum vitae ; and
- a proposal, not more than five (5) pages in length, outlining the issues to be covered in their proposed lecture.

Applications for **Laureates** should include:

- an application letter;
- a letter indicating institutional or organisational affiliation;
- a curriculum vitae ;
- a research proposal (two copies and not more than 10 pages), including a descriptive analysis of the work the applicant intends to undertake, an outline of the theoretical interest of the topic chosen by the applicant, and the relationship of the topic to the problematic and concerns of the theme of the 2010 Institute; and
- two reference letters from scholars and/or researchers known for their competence and expertise in the candidate's research area (geographic and disciplinary), including their names, addresses and telephone, e-mail, fax numbers.

An independent committee composed of outstanding African social scientists will select the candidates to be admitted to the institute.

The **deadline** for the submission of applications is set for **31st May, 2010**. The Institute will be held in Dakar, Senegal, from **26 July to 13 August, 2010**.

All applications or requests for further information should be addressed to:

**CODESRIA Democratic Governance Institute**

Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV

BP 3304, CP 18524, Dakar, Senegal.

Tel.: (221) 33 825 98 21/22/23

Fax: (221) 33 824 12 89

E-Mail: [governance.institute@codesria.sn](mailto:governance.institute@codesria.sn) - Website: <http://www.codesria.org>

**INSTITUT SUR LA GOUVERNANCE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CODESRIA**

**Thème: Corruption, gouvernance démocratique et imputabilité**

Date: 26/07-13/08/2010

Lieu: Dakar, Sénégal

**Appel à candidatures pour la session 2010 : personnes ressources et lauréats**

Le Conseil pour le développement de la recherche en sciences sociales en Afrique (CODESRIA) a le plaisir d'annoncer la session 2010 de son institut annuel sur la gouvernance démocratique. Il invite les chercheurs à soumettre leurs candidatures afin de participer à cet institut devant se dérouler du 26 juillet au 13 août 2010 à Dakar (Sénégal).

L'institut sur la gouvernance démocratique du CODESRIA est un forum interdisciplinaire qui réunit des chercheurs africains qui entreprennent des recherches innovantes sur des sujets liés au thème général de la gouvernance. L'objectif de l'institut est de promouvoir la recherche et des débats sur les questions liées à la conduite des affaires publiques et la gestion du processus de développement en Afrique. Lancé en 1992, l'institut est, depuis lors organisé chaque année à Dakar (Sénégal). Il sert essentiellement à établir des liens entre la jeune génération d'intellectuels africains et à répondre aux besoins scientifiques de ceux-ci en termes d'accès à la documentation récente, de participation aux débats actuels, de renforcement de leurs capacités de recherche et de mise à jour de leurs approches conceptuelles, théoriques et méthodologiques. De plus en plus, l'institut suscite un intérêt chez les décideurs, les intellectuels et les militants africains de la société civile, d'où l'importance d'arriver à un mélange judicieux de chercheurs, de militants et de décideurs lors de la sélection des participants. En général, une quinzaine de chercheurs africains provenant des diverses régions du continent et de la diaspora, ainsi que quelques chercheurs non africains, participent chaque année à l'institut.

**Objectifs:** Les principaux objectifs de l'institut sur la gouvernance sont les suivants:

1. Encourager le partage d'expériences entre chercheurs, militants et décideurs de disciplines, d'orientations méthodologiques et conceptuelles et de zones géographiques/linguistiques différentes sur un thème commun ;
2. Promouvoir et renforcer une culture de valeurs démocratiques qui permette aux Africains de bien identifier et de s'attaquer aux problèmes de gouvernance auxquels leur continent est confronté ;
3. Encourager la participation des universitaires aux discussions et aux débats sur les processus de démocratisation en cours en Afrique

**Organisation:** Les activités des instituts du CODESRIA sont basées sur des présentations faites par des chercheurs locaux, des personnes ressources étrangères et des participants dont les candidatures ont été retenues. Les sessions sont dirigées par un directeur scientifique qui, avec le soutien des personnes ressources invitées, s'assure qu'un large éventail de recherche et de questions politiques, suscitées ou soulevées par le thème de l'institut dont ils sont responsables, sont exposés aux lauréats. Des discussions ouvertes sur des ouvrages et des articles portant sur le thème de l'institut ou sur un sujet spécifique relatif au thème sont également encouragées. Chaque participant sélectionné à l'un des instituts du CODESRIA doit rédiger un article scientifique destiné à être présenté au cours de la session concernée. Les lauréats doivent s'inspirer des idées découlant de l'institut auquel ils participent pour produire une version révisée de leur article qui sera examinée en vue d'une publication par le CODESRIA. Pour chaque institut, le Centre de documentation et d'information du CODESRIA (CODICE) prépare une bibliographie complète se rapportant au thème de l'année. Les participants auront également la possibilité d'accéder à un certain nombre de centres de documentation situés à Dakar et dans ses environs.

**La session 2010: Corruption, gouvernance démocratique et imputabilité**

Le thème proposé pour l'institut 2010 est « Corruption, gouvernance démocratique et imputabilité ». La corruption est devenue une question centrale, tant en matière politique que de plaidoyer, qui pose d'importants défis pour la recherche. Elle est au cœur des débats académiques et politiques sur la gouvernance, le développement et l'aide, et figure en bonne place dans la plupart des indices de suivi de la gouvernance. Dans certains volets de la littérature académique sur la politique et le développement en Afrique, la corruption est présentée comme un aspect essentiel du système de favoritisme perçu comme le trait dominant de la politique en Afrique. Pourtant, la corruption est un phénomène mondial pour lequel l'opinion la plus répandue dans le discours du développement conventionnel est qu'il a un effet corrosif global sur le développement national et régional puisqu'elle sape les capacités de l'État ainsi que la fourniture efficace de biens et de services publics. La corruption est aussi largement reconnue comme un problème majeur à tous les niveaux, par les citoyens d'Afrique, les militants de la société civile, les décideurs au sein des gouvernements, le secteur privé, les

organisations sous-régionales et régionales et les bailleurs de fonds. Les pratiques de corruption et les problèmes d'imputabilité existent aussi dans les organisations de la société civile et le secteur privé. En outre, la corruption est un problème qui, dans le court terme comme dans le long terme, peut déstabiliser et discréditer le projet démocratique. Il est donc nécessaire que les conséquences de la corruption sur la vie et la subsistance des citoyens ainsi que sur l'accumulation de la richesse nationale et le bien-être soient correctement documentées.

De nombreux pays africains sont mal classés dans les indices sur la gouvernance qui incluent la corruption comme critère. Dans les pays africains même, les citoyens considèrent la corruption comme étant le principal obstacle au développement national et sous-régional et au progrès. Une pression interne et externe est exercée sur les gouvernements afin qu'ils prennent des mesures afin d'enrayer la corruption et ses pratiques. Partout, divers types de commissions et d'organismes de lutte contre la corruption, avec des compétences et des mandats différents, ont été mis en place sur le continent. Des campagnes publiques, principalement à travers les médias, ont également été menées pour exhorter les citoyens à se joindre à la lutte officielle déclarée contre la corruption. L'efficacité même des organismes et des campagnes de lutte contre la corruption est un sujet d'intérêt majeur en matière de gouvernance à travers l'Afrique. Cependant, il existe un large consensus comme quoi beaucoup plus d'efforts doivent être déployés par les gouvernements pour lutter avec succès contre la corruption.

L'institut 2010 sur la gouvernance mettra l'accent sur le lien entre la corruption, la gouvernance démocratique et l'imputabilité. Les participants seront encouragés à s'engager dans une analyse critique, nuancée et historicisée de la corruption et des défis qu'elle pose pour la gouvernance démocratique et l'imputabilité, à proposer des perspectives théoriques/conceptuelles et à identifier les opportunités pour des interventions politiques nouvelles et plus efficaces.

**Les sous-thèmes à traiter seront les suivants:**

1. Les approches conceptuelles et théoriques de la corruption et de l'imputabilité ;
2. Les racines et les dimensions de la corruption en Afrique ;
3. Le leadership, les institutions, la capacité étatique, la société civile et la corruption en Afrique ;
4. La pauvreté, les inégalités sociales et la corruption en Afrique ;
5. La mondialisation, les firmes multinationales, les partenaires internationaux au développement, le régime d'aide et la corruption ;
6. Les cadres et mécanismes internationaux, régionaux et sous-régionaux de lutte contre la corruption en Afrique ;
7. Les institutions et programmes nationaux de lutte contre la corruption;
8. Les conséquences néfastes de la corruption pour la gouvernance, la démocratie et le développement;
9. Les raisons de l'inefficacité de l'intervention/des mesures de redressement prises jusqu'à ce jour ;
10. Les nouvelles stratégies et approches de lutte contre la corruption;
11. Le rôle des mouvements sociaux dans la lutte contre la corruption ;
12. Où les gens font-ils face ou participent à des actes de corruption, par exemple les points de demande ou de fournitures de biens et de services dans des secteurs comme l'éducation, la santé, le transport?
13. Quelles sont les conditions qui rendent les pratiques de corruption possibles et persistantes? Quelles sont, le cas échéant, les risques pour les acteurs impliqués, les citoyens ordinaires, etc.?
14. Quels sont les moteurs de la corruption dans nos situations concrètes en Afrique?
15. Pourquoi un grand nombre de personnes, vraisemblablement opposées à la corruption, participent-elles à contrecœur à des actes de corruption?
16. L'imputabilité des agents publics.

**Le Directeur :** Pour chaque session de ses différents instituts, le CODESRIA choisit un universitaire ayant une compétence avérée pour en assurer la direction intellectuelle. Les directeurs sont des chercheurs de haut niveau réputés pour leur expertise sur le sujet de l'année et pour l'originalité de leur pensée sur ce thème. Ils sont recrutés sur la base d'une proposition qu'ils soumettent et qui contient un plan de cours détaillé couvrant les questions et approches méthodologiques, les concepts clés essentiels à la compréhension de l'objet d'un institut particulier et le thème spécifique qui sera mis en exergue, une revue approfondie de la littérature visant à exposer les lauréats aux différents courants théoriques et empiriques, une présentation sur les divers sous-thèmes, des études de cas et des exemples comparatifs pertinents pour le thème de l'institut qu'ils demandent de diriger, et d'éventuelles questions politiques qui méritent d'être retenues pendant tout le processus de recherche.

Le directeur de l'institut devra, entre autres,

- Participer à la sélection des lauréats;
- Identifier des personnes ressources pour aider à mener des discussions et des débats;
- Concevoir les cours de la session, y compris la spécification des sous-thèmes ;



- Faire une série de conférences et soumettre une évaluation des communications présentées par les personnes ressources et les lauréats;
- Rédiger et soumettre un rapport scientifique relatif à la session.

En outre, le directeur devra (co-) éditer les versions révisées des communications présentées par les personnes ressources en vue de les soumettre pour publication dans l'une des collections du CODESRIA. Le directeur devra également assister le CODESRIA dans l'évaluation des communications présentées par les lauréats pour publication. Le CODESRIA a déjà entamé le processus visant à sélectionner un directeur pour l'institut 2010.

**Les personnes ressources :** Les cours devant être dispensés durant l'institut sont destinés à offrir aux lauréats l'occasion d'approfondir leurs réflexions sur le thème retenu ainsi que sur leurs sujets de recherche. Les personnes ressources doivent, par conséquent, être des chercheurs chevronnés ou en milieu de carrière qui ont beaucoup publié sur le sujet, et qui peuvent apporter une importante contribution aux débats. Elles doivent produire des supports de cours qui servent de matière à réflexion incitant les lauréats à engager la discussion et le débat sur les cours et toute la documentation disponible sur le thème.

Une fois sélectionnées, les personnes ressources doivent :

- Soumettre un exemplaire de leurs cours pour reproduction et distribution aux participants au plus tard une semaine avant le début du cours;
- Dispenser leurs cours, participer aux débats et commenter les propositions de recherche des lauréats ;
- Revoir et soumettre la version révisée de leurs notes de cours pour publication par le CODESRIA au plus tard deux mois après leur présentation.

**Les lauréats :** Les candidats doivent être des chercheurs africains ayant terminé leur formation universitaire et/ou professionnelle et ayant une capacité avérée à faire de la recherche sur le thème de l'institut. Les intellectuels actifs dans les processus politiques et/ou dans les mouvements sociaux et les organisations de la société civile sont également encouragés à se porter candidats. Le nombre de places offertes par le CODESRIA pour chaque session de ses instituts est limité à quinze (15). Les chercheurs non-africains qui peuvent financer leur participation peuvent faire acte de candidature pour un nombre de places limitées.

**Les dossiers de candidatures :**

Les dossiers de candidatures des **personnes ressources** doivent comprendre :

- Une demande de candidature ;
- Deux exemplaires de publications;
- Un curriculum vitae ;
- Une proposition de cinq (5) pages au plus décrivant les questions qui seront couvertes dans le cours proposé.

Les dossiers de candidatures des **lauréats** doivent comprendre :

- Une demande de candidature ;
- Une lettre attestant de l'affiliation institutionnelle ou organisationnelle;
- Un curriculum vitae ;
- Une proposition de recherche (de 10 pages au plus en deux exemplaires), comprenant une analyse descriptive du travail que le candidat veut entreprendre, un résumé exposant l'intérêt théorique du thème choisi par le candidat, ainsi que les relations entre le sujet et la problématique et les centres d'intérêts pris en compte par le thème de l'institut 2010 ;
- Deux lettres de référence de chercheurs connus pour leur compétence et leur expertise dans le domaine de recherche du candidat (du point de vue géographique et concernant la discipline), avec leurs noms, adresses, numéros de téléphone et/ou de fax et adresses électroniques.

Un comité indépendant composé d'éminents spécialistes africains en sciences sociales procèdera à la sélection des candidats.

La **date limite** de soumission des candidatures est fixée au **31 mai 2010**. L'institut se déroulera du **26 juillet au 13 août 2010** à Dakar (Sénégal).

Toutes les candidatures ou demandes de renseignements complémentaires devront être adressées à l'adresse suivante :

**Institut sur la gouvernance démocratique du CODESRIA**  
Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV  
BP 3304, CP 18524, Dakar, Sénégal.  
Tel.: (221) 33 825 98 21/22/23 - Fax: (221) 33 824 12 89  
E-mail: [governance.institute@codesria.sn](mailto:governance.institute@codesria.sn) - Site Web: <http://www.codesria.org>

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**INSTITUTO DE GOVERNAÇÃO DEMOCRÁTICA**

**Tema: Corrupção, Governação e Prestação de Contas**

Data: 26 Julho – 13 Agosto, 2010

Local: Dakar, Senegal.

**Apelo a candidaturas para a sessão de 2010: Pessoas recurso e laureados**

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O CODESRIA tem o prazer de anunciar a sessão de 2010 do seu Instituto de Governação Democrática anual e de convidar os investigadores interessados a submeter propostas para apreciação para participação no Instituto que está agendado para 26 de Julho – 13 de Agosto de 2010, em Dakar, no Senegal.

O Instituto de Governação Democrática do CODESRIA é um fórum interdisciplinar que junta académicos africanos que realizam investigação inovadora sobre tópicos relacionados com o tema amplo da governação. O objectivo do Instituto é promover a pesquisa e os debates sobre questões relacionadas com a condução das questões públicas e a gestão do processo de desenvolvimento em África. O Instituto foi lançado em 1992 e tem sido realizado desde então em Dakar, no Senegal. Serve a função crítica de forjar laços entre a geração jovem de académicos africanos e responder às suas necessidades científicas em termos de acesso a documentação recente, participação em debates actuais, o reforço das suas capacidades de investigação e a actualização das suas abordagens conceptuais, teóricas e metodológicas. O Instituto atrai cada vez mais os interesses dos intelectuais da política africana, bem como dos activistas da sociedade civil, permitindo consequentemente que se consiga uma mistura judiciosa de investigadores, activistas e responsáveis por políticas na admissão de participantes. Geralmente, um total de quinze investigadores africanos de todo o continente e da diáspora, e alguns intelectuais não africanos participam anualmente no Instituto.

**Objectivos:**

Os principais objectivos do Instituto de Governação são de:

1. encorajar a troca de experiencias entre investigadores, activistas e responsáveis por políticas de diferentes disciplinas, orientações metodológicas e conceptuais, e zonas geográficas/linguísticas sobre um tema comum durante um período de tempo alargado;
2. promover e enaltecer a cultura de valores democráticos que permitem à África identificar e resolver eficazmente as questões de governação com que o continente se confronta; e
3. fomentar a participação de académicos em discussões e debates sobre o processo de democratização que ocorre em África.

**Organização:**

As actividades de todos os institutos do CODESRIA centram-se em apresentações feitas por investigadores residentes, pessoas recurso visitantes, e os participantes cujas candidaturas para admissão como laureados forem aceites. As sessões são orientadas por um director científico que, com a ajuda de pessoas recurso convidadas, assegura que os laureados sejam expostos a uma série de questões de pesquisa e de políticas geradas ou que surgem de um tema do instituto pelo qual eles são responsáveis. As discussões abertas em torno de livros e artigos relevantes para o tema de um instituto particular ou um tópico específico dentro do tema são também encorajadas. Cada um dos laureados seleccionados para participar num dos institutos do Conselho deve preparar um artigo de investigação a ser apresentado no decurso de um instituto particular no qual participa. É esperado dos laureados que se baseiem nas novas perspectivas do conhecimento que obtêm no instituto no qual participam para produzir uma versão revista dos seus artigos de investigação para apreciação para publicação pelo CODESRIA. Para cada instituto, o Centro de Documentação e Informação do CODESRIA (CODICE) prepara uma bibliografia abrangente sobre o tema do ano. O acesso é também facilitado a uma série de centros de documentação dentro e à volta de Dakar.

**A sessão 2010: Corrupção, Governação Democrática e Prestação de Contas**

O tema proposto para o Instituto de 2010 é Corrupção, Governação Democrática e Prestação de Contas. A corrupção tornou-se numa grande questão política, de políticas e de advocacia que apresenta grandes desafios para a investigação. Faz parte do centro das discussões académicas e de políticas, desenvolvimento e ajuda, e marca de forma proeminente a maioria dos índices de monitoria de governação. Em algumas correntes da literatura académica sobre política africana e desenvolvimento, a corrupção é apresentada como um aspecto chave do sistema de clientelismo que é considerado como o traço predominante da política africana. No entanto, a corrupção é um fenómeno mundial sobre o qual a posição mais mundialmente exprimida no discurso

convencional do desenvolvimento é que ela tem um efeito global corrosivo sobre o desenvolvimento nacional e regional pois mina a capacidade do Estado e a eficiente prestação de serviços e bens públicos. A corrupção é amplamente considerada como um grande problema pelos cidadãos da África, pelos activistas da sociedade civil, pelos responsáveis por políticas no governo, pelo sector privado, pelas organizações regionais e sub-regionais, bem como pelos doadores. As práticas corruptas e os problemas de prestação de contas existem também em organizações da sociedade civil e no sector privado. Para além disso, a corrupção é um problema que, tanto a curto como a longo prazos, tem um potencial para destabilizar e desacreditar o projecto democrático. Por conseguinte, é preciso que os custos da corrupção nas vidas dos cidadãos e as suas consequências na acumulação de riqueza nacional e bem-estar sejam adequadamente documentados.

Muitos países africanos têm uma baixa pontuação nos índices de governação que incluem a corrupção como uma das medidas. Dentro dos próprios países africanos, os cidadãos classificam a corrupção como muito elevada na sua lista de obstáculos fundamentais para o progresso e desenvolvimento nacional e sub-regional. Os governos estão sob pressão interna e externa para tomarem medidas para conter a corrupção e as práticas corruptas. Em todo o continente, vários tipos de comissões e agências anticorrupção foram criadas com várias jurisdições e mandatos. Foram também organizadas campanhas públicas, principalmente através dos órgãos de comunicação social, para exortar os cidadãos a se juntarem na luta oficial que foi declarada contra a corrupção. A eficácia das agências e das campanhas anticorrupção foi alvo de interesse dos governos em África. Globalmente, há um consenso amplo de que têm que ser feitos mais esforços pelos governos para se lutar com sucesso contra a corrupção.

O Instituto de Governação 2010 focalizar-se-á na interface da corrupção, governação democrática e prestação de contas. Os participantes serão encorajados a se envolverem numa análise crítica e historizada da corrupção e dos desafios que ela coloca para a governação democrática e prestação de contas, e chegarem a perspectivas teóricas/conceptuais inovadoras, bem como identificarem oportunidades para intervenções novas e mais eficientes.

Os subtemas que serão cobertos:

1. Abordagens conceptuais e teóricas à corrupção e prestação de contas;
2. As raízes e as dimensões da corrupção em África;
3. Liderança, instituições, capacidade do Estado, sociedade civil e corrupção em África;
4. Pobreza, desigualdade social e corrupção em África;
5. Globalização, corporações multinacionais, parceiros de desenvolvimento internacionais, o regime da ajuda e a corrupção;
6. Quadros internacionais, regionais e sub-regionais e mecanismos de luta contra a corrupção em África;
7. Instituições e programas nacionais anticorrupção;
8. As consequências adversas da corrupção para a governação, democracia e desenvolvimento;
9. Razões para a ineficácia das medidas de intervenção/ de remediação que foram aplicadas até agora;
10. Novas estratégias e abordagens para o combate contra a corrupção;
11. O papel dos movimentos sociais na luta anticorrupção;
12. Onde as pessoas se encontram e participam na corrupção, ex., pontos de procura, entrega de bens ou prestação de serviços como a educação, saúde, transportes?
13. Quais são as condições de possibilidade e de persistência de práticas corruptas?
14. Quais são os factores que levam à corrupção nas nossas situações africanas concretas?
15. Porque é que muitas pessoas, embora presumivelmente opostas à corrupção, participam relutantemente na corrupção?
16. Prestação de contas dos funcionários públicos.

### **O Director**

Para todas as sessões dos seus vários institutos, o CODESRIA designa um intelectual externo com um registo de qualidade de trabalho reconhecido para fazer a liderança intelectual. Os directores são académicos seniores conhecidos pela sua perícia no tópico do ano e pela originalidade do seu pensamento sobre ele. Eles são recrutados com base numa proposta que eles submetem e que contém uma descrição detalhada do programa cobrindo questões metodológicas e de abordagens; os conceitos chave integrais para um entendimento do objecto de um instituto particular e o tema específico sobre o qual se focalizará; uma revisão minuciosa do estado da literatura destinada a expor os laureados a diferentes correntes teóricas e empíricas; uma apresentação de vários subtemas, estudos de caso e exemplos comparativos relevantes para o tema do instituto particular ao qual eles se candidatam para liderar; e possíveis questões de políticas que valham a pena ter em mente durante todo o processo de pesquisa.

O director do Instituto irá, entre outras coisas:

- participar na selecção de laureados;
- identificar pessoas recurso para ajudar a orientar as discussões e os debates;
- conceber o programa para a sessão, incluindo a especificação de subtemas;
- dar uma série de palestras e fazer uma crítica dos artigos apresentados pelas pessoas recurso e os laureados;
- submeter um relatório científico escrito da sessão.

Para além disso, é esperado do director que ele (co-) edite as versões revistas dos artigos apresentados pelas pessoas recurso com vista a submetê-los para publicação numa das colecções do CODESRIA. O director apoia também o CODESRIA na avaliação dos artigos apresentados pelos laureados para publicação pelo Conselho. O CODESRIA está no processo de selecção de um director para o Instituto 2010.

### **Pessoas recurso**

As palestras dadas no instituto destinam-se a oferecer aos laureados uma oportunidade para avançar nas suas reflexões sobre o tema do programa e sobre os seus próprios tópicos de pesquisa. As pessoas recurso são, por conseguinte, académicos seniores ou académicos a meio da sua carreira que publicaram muito sobre o tópico, e que têm uma contribuição significativa a dar para os debates sobre esse tópico. Eles produzirão materiais para as palestras que servem como pontos de reflexão que estimulam os laureados a se envolverem em discussão e debate em torno das palestras e toda a literatura disponível sobre o tema.

Depois de seleccionadas, as pessoas recurso deverão:

- submeter uma cópia das suas palestras para reprodução e distribuição aos participantes o mais tardar uma semana antes do começo das palestras;
- fazer as suas palestras, participar nos debates e comentar sobre propostas de investigação dos laureados;
- rever e submeter a versão revista dos seus artigos de pesquisa para consideração para publicação pelo CODESRIA o mais tardar dois meses a seguir à sua apresentação.

### **Laureados**

Os candidatos deverão ser investigadores africanos que completaram a universidade e/ou formação profissional, com uma capacidade demonstrada de levar a cabo investigação sobre o tema do instituto. Intelectuais activos no processo de políticas e/ou em movimentos sociais/organizações civis são também encorajados a se candidatar. O número de lugares oferecidos pelo CODESRIA em cada sessão dos seus institutos está limitado a quinze (15) bolsas. Os académicos não africanos que consigam mobilizar fundos para a sua participação podem também candidatar-se a um número limitado de lugares.

### **Candidaturas**

As candidaturas para o cargo de **pessoa recurso** deverão incluir:

- uma carta de candidatura;
- duas amostras de textos produzidos;
- um curriculum vitae ; e
- uma proposta de não mais de cinco (5) páginas, descrevendo as questões que vão ser cobertas na sua palestra proposta.

As candidaturas para os **Laureados** deverão incluir:

- uma carta de candidatura;
- uma carta indicando a afiliação institucional ou organizacional;
- um curriculum vitae ;
- uma proposta de investigação (duas cópias de no máximo 10 páginas), incluindo uma análise descritiva do trabalho que o candidato pretende levar a cabo, uma descrição do interesse teórico do tópico escolhido pelo candidato, e a relação do mesmo com a problemática e as preocupações em relação ao tema do Instituto 2010; e
- duas cartas de referência de académicos e/ou investigadores conhecidos pela sua competência e perícia na área de pesquisa do candidato (geográfica e disciplinar), incluindo os seus nomes, moradas e telefone, e-mail e número de fax.

Um comité independente composto por cientistas sociais proeminentes irá seleccionar os candidatos que serão admitidos ao instituto.

O **prazo** para a apresentação de candidaturas é **31 de Maio de 2010**. O Instituto será realizado em Dakar, Senegal, de **26 de Julho a 13 de Agosto de 2010**.

Todas as candidaturas ou pedidos de mais informação deverão ser enviados para:

**CODESRIA Instituto de Governação Democrática**

**CODESRIA**

Avenue Cheikh Anta Diop x Canal IV

BP 3304, CP 18524, Dakar, Senegal.

Tel.: (221) 33 825 98 21/22/23

Fax: (221) 33 824 12 89

E-Mail: [governance.institute@codesria.sn](mailto:governance.institute@codesria.sn)

Website: <http://www.codesria.org>