Frantz Fanon and the Creation of a Post-national Public Sphere

Jessie Kabwila Kapasula Karim Aisha
Force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.¹

Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.²

Locating the origins of capital in the process that he dubs "so-called primitive accumulation," Marx points to violence as a historical necessity in the evolution of capital. He takes issue with proponents of the myth of political economy, and suggests that the original sin, so-called primitive accumulation, is misrepresented by the popular anecdote of the political economists: "Long, long ago, there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living" (873). Instead, as Marx goes on to show, "capital comes [into the world] dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt" (926).

But if force and violence, as Marx points out, were necessary instruments in the stage of primitive accumulation, in facilitating the transition from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist, and if force and violence were necessary to create the wage-labourer, then how do we read the violence of decolonization, especially since anti-colonial resistance has been seen as resistance to capital? How can the large-scale violence attendant upon the process of decolonization be seen as taking on the role of Marx's mid-wife, bringing forth a new society into the world? What is the nature of this new society that is given birth to by the "greater violence" which Fanon speaks of? For the purposes of this paper, I would like to explore how anti-colonial violence has been conceptualized by one of its proponents. I will first provide a brief account of Marx's concept of primitive accumulation, and then go on to discuss Fanon's slogan of "Terror, counter-terror, violence, counter-violence" (89), in order to lay out the logic whereby the revolutionary anti-colonial struggles, containing within themselves the promise of a significantly changed world, conversely resolved themselves into both a more intensive and extensive, restructured form of capital.³ Furthermore, I argue that Fanon’s dismissal, in Wretched, of the working class as an agent of change during decolonization is anything but a wholesale dismissal of the working class. The context of his oeuvre reveals that Fanon’s agent of change in the postcolonial world is indeed the global working class.

²Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1963), p. 61.
³Fanon, Wretched.
Fanon is a representative case not simply because his work comprises a manifesto of, and a rallying cry for liberation from colonial rule in Algeria, and from postcolonial exploitation; Fanon's writings also proved influential for a wide range of decolonization struggles around the globe—an influence that leads Stuart Hall to refer to Fanon's writing as the Bible of decolonization struggles. Insofar as Fanon is an actor in the struggle for Algerian independence—in 1956 he leaves his post with the French colonial administration at the Blida-Joinville psychiatric hospital in Algeria, and moves to Tunis in order to join the National Liberation Front—Fanon's collected writings, including his editorials for the F.L.N. newspaper, *El Moudjahid*, comprise crucial moments in the liberation movement. Focusing on *Wretched of the Earth* as a blueprint for a revolutionary struggle, while drawing from *Black Skin, White Masks* and from the essays in *El-Moudjahid*, as parts of a unified theoretical system, I would like to argue that decolonization marks the passing of the stage of primitive accumulation which was characteristic of the colonial system, and the birth of a "higher," globally intensive capitalism. What Fanon lays out is that decolonization is simply a first stage in the struggle for liberation, a stage that is marked by the forging of a collective along nationalist lines. In laying out the conditions whereby this national collective is forged, Fanon points to the double-bind of nationalism, suggesting that although this first stage of liberation from colonial yoke cannot be achieved except through the forging of a national consciousness, the nationalist project is also fundamentally a high-jacked project, in the service of the restructuring of capital, whereby the newly independent country becomes a subsidy of Western capitalism. It is in response to this "capital resurgent," that a second phase of struggle must be launched, and this is the stage that is marked by a collective struggle that supercedes the national consciousness, and that lays the foundations for a new universal consciousness, based on international solidarity against oppression and exploitation. But first, a note on Marx.

I

Marx describes primitive accumulation as the "prehistory of capital" (875); it is not the "result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure" (873). He uses the historical transformations in Britain in "the last third of the fifteenth century and the first few

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decades of the sixteenth" (878) as an example of the classic form taken by the process of primitive accumulation. This process begins in England via "the rapid expansion of wool manufacture in Flanders and the corresponding rise in the price of wool" (878). These events prompted the new nobility, "for which money was the power of all powers" (879), to embrace with full force the transformation of communal arable land into sheep walks, and the subsequent clearing of the estates, which takes a most drastic form in the Scottish Highlands. Marx cites as an example the methods used by the Duchess of Sutherland:

This person ... resolved, when she succeeded to the headship of the clan, to undertake a radical economic cure, and to turn the whole country of Sutherland, the population of which had already been reduced to 15,000 by similar processes, into a sheep-walk. Between 1814 and 1820 these 15,000 inhabitants, about 3,000 families, were systematically hunted and rooted out. All their villages were destroyed and burnt, all their fields turned into pasturage. British soldiers enforced this mass of evictions .... It was in this manner that this fine lady appropriated 794,000 acres of land which had belonged to the clan from time immemorial (891).

We get a further sense of the exacerbated violence in Marx's description of the expropriation of these people--a violence that is necessary to transform them, in stages, into workers. These expropriated people were permitted to rent about 2 acres per family the barren land next to the sea shore, where they tried to live on fish--until, of course, this nobility "scented some profit" in the fish, and let out the sea shore to London fishmongers, thereby expelling the Gaels a second time. It is through these and similar methods that the peasantry, in one fell swoop, was divested of the land that it had used to provide itself with the necessary means of subsistence, and was hurled into the labour market as free and rightless workers. The results were two-fold: the concentration of the means of production, for instance, land, sheep, tools, money, in the hands of a few, as well as the creation of a mass of producers who have to work for this elite class in order to provide the barest minimum of subsistence for themselves:

in the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch making that act as levers for the capitalist class in the course of its formation; but it is true above all for those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour-market as free, unprotected and rightless proletarians (876).
It is not only in this forced clearing out of the people that the violent nature of primitive accumulation manifests itself; indeed, violence and force also become necessary in order to compel these expropriated people to work, to conform to the discipline of the working day, and to gradually habituate the worker into accepting the discipline necessary for the capitalist mode of production. And in this, the elite makes use of the legal apparatus of the state and compels the workers, through "grotesquely terrorist laws into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage-labour" (899):

The rising bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, and uses it to 'regulate' wages, i.e. to force them into the limits suitable for making a profit, to lengthen the working day, and to keep the worker himself at his normal level of dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called primitive accumulation (900).

What is interesting to note here is that alongside this creation of a proletariat, was a recurrent preoccupation with the category of slavery. It was not only that the workers' condition was that of slaves, as is evident in the testimony from Le Chapelier, "rapporteur of the Committee" (904) on the law in the French Penal Code declaring that "every combination by the worker was 'an assault on liberty and the declaration of the rights of man'" (903). Marx quotes Le Chapelier thus:

'Granting,' says Le Chapelier, the rapporteur of the committee on this law, 'that the wages ought to be a little higher than they are ... that they ought to be high enough for him that receives them to be free from that state of absolute dependence which results from the lack of the necessaries of life, and which is almost a state of slavery,' granting this, the workers must nevertheless not be permitted to inform themselves about their own interests, nor to act in common and thereby lessen their 'absolute dependence,' 'which is almost a state of slavery', because by doing this they infringe 'the liberty of their former masters, who are the present entrepreneurs' (904).

Indeed, this phenomenon of slavery is what makes primitive accumulation what it is. The compulsion to work created by the expropriation of these human beings finds its ultimate manifestation in precisely this analytic of slavery; it is not coincidental that Marx talks of wage labour as wage-slavery. Those who were not forced by their circumstances to "earn their living," were forced by the law. The significance of the term wage-slavery becomes all
the more vivid when Marx describes the bloody legislation in Britain beginning during the reign of Henry VIII, "the history of which, as the history of the expropriation of the newly freed men ... is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire" (875): the proletariat created by the clearing of lands were turned into beggars and vagabonds who were legally forced to work:

if anyone refuses to work, he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler .... The master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as he can any other personal chattel or cattle (897).

Even the children of these slaves, branded with red hot iron with the letter S to indicate their status as slaves, are to be the profit-producing property of the master.

Indeed, the process of primitive accumulation is characterized by the forced creation of poverty, to alleviate which, the poor are transformed into wage-slaves, actual slaves, and what Marx calls "slaves of the parish" (897), the latter comprising those poor who could be employed by anyone "willing to give them food and drink and to find them work" (897). The difference between capitalist production and primitive accumulation hinges upon precisely this use of external force and violence: whereas during the stage of primitive accumulation, the worker has to be compelled, by circumstance, by law, or by violence, to work for another, the capitalist mode of production is characterized by the redundancy of this external use of force, when the worker has internalized the discipline necessary for work, and when the dependence of the worker on the capitalist system for sustenance, itself becomes the driving force.

It is not coincidental that this simultaneous fostering of wage-labour/slavery at home—that is, in the European motherland--because of the growing demand for labour, is accompanied by the rise and subsequent intensification of slavery in the colonies. In this regard, it is important to note that the historical stage of primitive accumulation corresponds with the emergence of the colonial mission, and is part and parcel of it. Indeed, the world-wide establishment of the capitalist mode of production could not have been made possible without the colonial era, and in this sense, colonialism, by its very essence, is a form taken by primitive accumulation. Marx himself gestures to this connection when he suggests that:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and
plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blacks, is all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation (915).

That the colonial enterprise was a necessary element of primitive accumulation becomes clear precisely in the role that it played in the slave trade and in the employment of slaves on plantations. While colonies such as India provided the grounds for loot and plunder, and later indentured labour to work on plantations in India itself and in Africa, the African colonies, for a long time, provided the labour power in the form of slaves, either kidnapped, or bought and sold by their own princes and chieftains, to work on plantations in the Americas: "the treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there" (918). Although Marx is primarily occupied with the form that primitive accumulation takes in Britain, he is, nevertheless, quite unambiguous about his position on colonialism, and slavery as a by-product of colonialism, as part and parcel of primitive accumulation:

While the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England, in the United States it gave the impulse for the transformation of the earlier more or less patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal (925).

This role of slavery and of the colonial enterprise in the stage of primitive accumulation finds a most powerful representation in Sidney Mintz's *Sweetness and Power*, where he describes the production and consumption of sugar as "Europe's greatest mass market for a foreign luxury."6 Speaking of the "two triangles of trade ... which arose in the seventeenth century and matured in the eighteenth" (43)--triangles of trade which exchanged slaves from Africa for commodities from the mother-country, and then shipped the products of slave trade to the mother country and to its importing countries--Mintz talks about the crucial role of the slave trade in the evolution of the capitalist mode of production:

The importance of these triangles is that human cargoes figured vitally in their operation. It was not just that sugar, rum, and molasses were not being traded directly for European finished goods; in both transatlantic triangles the only "false commodity"--yet absolutely

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essential to the system—was human beings.... In this instance, millions of human beings were treated as commodities. To obtain them, products were shipped to Africa; by their labor power, wealth was created in the Americas. The wealth they created mostly returned to Britain; the products they made were consumed in Britain; and the products made by Britons—-cloths, tools, torture instruments--were consumed by slaves who were themselves consumed in the creation of wealth (43).

Mintz describes the sugar plantation as an industrial enterprise, in order, then, to ask the question of what sort of economic system the plantations represented. He calls the development of slave labor on the plantation economy as "Europe's biggest single external contribution to its own economic growth" (55). While referring to the plantation as an "oddity," he reiterates that it could neither be called capitalistic, nor non-capitalistic; Mintz finally concludes by suggesting that even though "it was not 'capitalistic,' it was still an important step toward capitalism" (55).

Mintz calls attention to the inherently capitalistic nature of the plantation system by drawing a parallel between slaves and wage-labourers. He enumerates the differences between the two kinds of labour, and concludes with a "but," suggesting that the important thing is to note the point of similarity:

Like proletarians, slaves are separated from their means of production (tools, land, etc.). But proletarians can exercise some influence over where they work, for whom they work, and what they do with their wages. Of course, slaves too may have some freedom of maneuver, depending upon the nature of the system they live in. Yet because they were themselves chattels-- property--slaves in the New World during the period when plantations operated with feverish intensity could exercise their will only in the interstices of the system. Slaves and forced laborers, unlike free workers, have nothing to sell, not even their labor; instead, they have themselves been bought and sold and traded. Like the proletarians, however, they stand in dramatic contrast to the serfs of European feudalism, and they are propertyless (57).

In this regard, he is not too far away from Marx, and indeed, defends the parallel by quoting Marx himself:
freedom and slavery constitute an antagonism .... We are not dealing with the indirect slavery, the slavery of the proletariat ... but with direct slavery, the slavery of the black races .... Direct slavery is as much the pivot of our industrialism today as machinery, credit, etc. Without slavery, no cotton; without cotton, no modern industry. Slavery has given their value to the colonies; the colonies have created world trade; world trade is the necessary condition of large-scale machine industry. Before the traffic in Negroes began, the colonies only supplied the Old World with very few products and made no visible change in the face of the earth. Thus slavery is an economic category of the highest importance (Marx, quoted in Mintz 66).

While I agree with Mintz about the slavery/wage-labour parallel, and concede that the difference between slave and 'free' labour may be only a formal difference, I do not share his ambivalence about the plantation economy as capitalist. Instead, I would like to point out that precisely that formal difference means that the plantation economy is not so much an "oddity," as Mintz calls it, but forms a necessary component of the globalization of the capitalist mode of production. In that sense, slavery embodies, not only a response to the growing demand for labour power, but also, as Marx would have it, the disciplining, through force, of this labour for future initiation into the capitalist mode of production. This initiation has been effected at that stage when force is no longer needed, not only when the slave has been rent asunder from conditions necessary for his subsistence, but also when the slave has been disciplined enough so that he does not need to be “coerced” into working. This is the moment after which this slave will sell his labour "freely"--that is, when the institution of slavery proper can be safely abolished. In other words, the institution of slavery embodies at once, the brutalizing, schooling, nurturing, and socialization of the slave into becoming a “free” worker. The abolition of slavery, then, marks the point at which the capitalist mode of production comes into its own, when the material conditions necessary for the social relationship between the worker and the capitalist have adequate to the status quo: the slaves, once they have internalized the discipline, do not need to be slaves anymore, but perform the same tasks as proletarians.

II

If, as I have tried to show so far, the violence and brute force of colonialism, the slavery, plunder and murder were an essential part of the prehistory of capital, and indeed, the process whereby the capitalist mode of production takes root, then what does resistance
to colonialism mean? How are we to read the militant anti-colonial movements and the various nationalisms that emerged in the beginning of this century, and resulted in the process that we call decolonization? Is it the case that resistance to colonial rule meant resistance to capitalism? Or, vice versa, that resistance to capitalism necessitated anti-colonial resistance? In attempting to answer these questions, I would like to suggest that decolonization marked, even when it was resistance to capital, the point at which the ex-colonies had effectively been brought into the world capitalist system, and when external state control of the colonies was no longer necessary: the ex-colonies were sufficiently initiated into the structure of world capitalism, thus beginning the era of what is popularly known as neo-colonialism. It is this idea that I would like to explore by way of a reading of Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*. Indeed, Fanon's text exhibits an acute acknowledgment of the disciplinary nature of colonialism, and shows us how colonialism prepares the grounds for a capitalist relationship between the ex-colony and the metropolis, laying the foundation for the relationship between development and underdevelopment necessary for the expansion of capital.

One can detect the embryonic beginnings of the discourse of terror that becomes apparent in the later *Wretched of the Earth*, as early as *Black Skin, White Masks*, despite this latter text's almost studied eschewing of a call to arms. Here, in this early text, Fanon explores the disciplinary nature of colonialism and its effects on the colonized psyche, suggesting that the colonized is a divided being. This "self-division" of the Negro is a "direct result of colonialist subjugation" (17), and helps maintain this subjugation. Fanon uses the example of the schoolboy in Antilles, who "identifies himself with the explorer, the bringer of civilization, the white man who carries truth to the savages," and "subjectively adopts a white man's' attitude" (147). This identification entails a structure of disengagement on the part of the colonized from his own community and family. In other words, Fanon suggests that because the Negro desires, above all, to be a white man, he is not only divided within himself but also from his fellow-Negroes, so that any collective struggle in this state of affairs becomes impossible: "The truth is that the Negro race has been scattered, that it can no longer claim unity" (173). The question that arises organically out of the logic of this text but, interestingly, is not answered here, is: how are we to forge this unity among the colonized so that they rebel against colonial rule, rather than suffer the fate of Fanon's patient who, when told after recovering that he will be discharged, suffers a relapse: "the

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announcement of the liberation of black slaves produced psychoses and sudden deaths" on the part of the newly liberated people (220).

The answer to this question--an answer that becomes the central concern in Wretched--is only hinted at in Black Skin. It is when Fanon deals with the continued enslavement of the Negro even in the aftermath of the abolition of slavery, that we get a glimpse of what is to appear, full-blown, in Wretched of the Earth. In answering this question, Fanon suggests that the Negro has not become master through the abolition of slavery because the Negro did not struggle for his freedom, that in the process of being granted freedom, "the negro was acted upon" (220): “Historically the Negro steeped in the inessentiality of servitude was set free by his master. He did not fight for his freedom" (219). This sense of the necessity of a struggle against the colonizers becomes even more pronounced in Fanon's almost passing reference to the Vietnamese struggle for national liberation. Noting that "every time a man has said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act" (226), Fanon cautions that this solidarity will not come from "revival of an unjustly unrecognized Negro civilization" (226), not from a reactionary return to the past, but, as he points out in the case of the Vietnamese struggle against French colonialism, from looking forward, from "sacrifice" tendered for "the sake of the present and of the future" (227). Although the sense of a necessary violence does appear here, we only see a glimpse of this violence as directed towards the Vietnamese: they die, "fac[ing] death squads" with "serenity" (227), that is, almost passively receiving the act of the violence that is outside of themselves. In other words, we still do not get the active call to arms that is the hallmark of the later Wretched of the Earth. The result is that despite this sense of solidarity, Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks is also, finally, a discourse that implodes into the self, a discourse in which Fanon can ultimately declare, "I am my own foundation" (231)--that is, a discourse of the fragmented individual. The final lines of the text, intended as a "prayer", provide further indication of just this predicament: "O my body, make of me always a man who questions" (232).

Whereas Wretched of the Earth unequivocally advocates viol ent action on the part of the colonized, Black Skin White Masks ends in an ideal act, that of questioning, whereby the very body--"O my body"--of the colonized is itself exhorted to become a question mark, indicating further that as yet we do not have an answer to how this collective is to be forged. Despite these differences, however, the psychologistic Fanon of Black Skin must also be read in the context of his other writings, especially his articles in El Moudjahid that span the period between Black Skin and Wretched. In a series of three essays, collectively titled "French Intellectuals and Democrats and the Algerian Revolution," he warns against the
tendency of the colonizer to psychologize, to individualize the very term "colonialism": resistance to colonialism, which has "never ceased to be military conquest" for the French Democrats entails an "affective" resistance involving "human relations" that are "on an individual level, less racist, more open, more liberal types of behaviour," rather than a "recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination (81).§ Such anti-colonialism of the French, Fanon suggests, reduces colonialism, which is a social, "national problem [to] a psychological level" (81). In this context, indeed, it may be more pertinent to say that it is precisely the psychoanalytic concerns of Black Skin that lay the foundations for what emerges as a radically different drift of Wretched of the Earth, where Fanon takes this idea of collective struggle to its ultimate horizon, suggesting that only violence on the part of the colonized can forge the unity that the colonized peoples lack through the psychology of colonialism, and only through this forging of unity can the colonized be liberated. While returning, in the seminal Wretched, to the concerns of Black Skin, and while demonstrating the relationship between the universalizing mission of capital and historiography, Fanon suggests that the endeavour of the colonizer is to write the history of colonization in such a way that the history of the world becomes written not only in terms of the exploits of the colonizer, but also in terms of the civilizing of colonized territories, whereby the colonized become "condemned" to the passivity of some inorganic material being acted upon, processed, by the historiographical gaze:

The settler makes history; his life is an epoch, an Odyssey. He is the absolute beginning: "This land was created by us"; he is the unceasing cause: 'If we leave, all is lost, and the country will go back to the Middle Ages.' Over against him torpid creatures wasted by fevers, obsessed by ancestral customs, form an almost inorganic background for the innovating dynamism of colonial mercantilism.

The settler makes history and is conscious of making it. And because he constantly refers to the history of his mother country, he clearly indicates that he himself is the extension of that mother country. Thus the history which he writes is not the history of the country which he plunders but the history of his own nation in regard to all she skims off, all she violates and starves.§


9Fanon, Wretched, p. 51.
This culture of "immobility" (51), this lack of history, of which Fanon speaks, entails an arrest of the colonized into "compartments" (51)—a state of arrest into which the colonized is conditioned through fear for "[he] learns ... to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits" (52). To make history, that is to say, to rewrite history, would be to transgress those boundaries.

It is precisely this making of history in a project of culture-making, this transgression of boundaries, through a violent onslaught that Fanon prescribes. And in a sense, it is in this prescription that Fanon himself could be seen to be rewriting history, rewriting the master-slave relationship, specifically, rewriting and revolutionizing the Hegelian terrain of distinct masters and slaves. For if the Hegelian framework, and the liberal historiography that this framework encapsulates, disavows slavery in the name of freedom and independence, it does so with its "feet planted firmly in another paradigm, that of the ideology of wage slavery."¹⁰ It is the distortion of this liberal historiography when viewed through colonial lenses that we see in Fanon's illiberal discourse of terrorism—a discourse that provides the only avenue through which the native can rewrite history. What we find in Fanon, then, is not simply an inversion of the equation, through a reciprocal "Terror, counter-terror, violence, counter-violence" (89), but a suggestion that in the colonial situation everyone is always already a slave: first, because the fear that characterizes slavery is the lot both of colonial masters and slaves in this situation;¹¹ and second, because both dominance and resistance, for Fanon, are modes of work, the product of which becomes the crystallizing of the slave consciousness.

On one level, Fanon's rewriting of Hegel only goes so far; indeed, Fanon's appeal to "rehabilitate mankind, and make man victorious everywhere" (106), and to "reintroduc[e] mankind into the world, the whole of mankind" (106), recalls Hegel's final stage of Spirit coming to know itself which is marked by the harmony of the individual and the collective, the "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'" (110), the ideal towards which Spirit has been striving through history—a totality which can also be said to describe the striving of capital to remake

the whole world into one. If Fanon wants independence for the colonized through the work of violence, Hegel valorizes independence for the slave through a work ethic.\textsuperscript{12}

It is important to note, here, the apparent difference between Fanon and Gandhi, even though both occupy similar positions as political leaders in the struggle for national liberation in two different geographical arenas. While Fanon declares violence as necessary, Gandhi disavows the use of violence as a dangerous political strategy. Fanon's radical avowal of violence ultimately comes with a warning--that the ex-colonized will become simply a cog in the wheel of capital--while Gandhi's seemingly tame position of non-violence ends up pointing to a radical rejection of a form of capitalism. Indeed, Gandhi had warned against the Fanonian position a few years before Fanon writes his \textit{Wretched of the Earth}. In the context of the Quit India movement, Gandhi cautions his followers that recourse to violence would necessarily lead to acceptance of Western hegemony. In \textit{Indian Home Rule}, Gandhi suggests that it is necessary that the colonized refrain from using violence if they are to preserve what he calls "true civilization."\textsuperscript{13} He argues against the idea that technological progress is civilization, and suggests that civilization lies in that "mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty" (61), where the path of duty and morality lies in "mastery over our minds and passions" (61).

This "mastery over minds and passions" is part and parcel of the anti-consumerism that Gandhi advocates. To summarize, Gandhi uses individual self-denial as a political and economic strategy and suggests that it not only has to be operative in terms of refraining from violence, but also in keeping other appetites and desires in check, so that refraining from violence is part and parcel of individual and collective self-rule. On one level, violence is an appetite that needs to be curtailed; but on another, more material level, the use of violence, which requires the use of arms, therefore, Western technology, would make the colonized dependent on Western civilization, which for Gandhi, is in a state of decay. He suggests that Western civilization is marked by a "system of life-corroding competition" (61), and that passive resistance, or self-denial as the "ability to rule ourselves," entails passively refusing to give in to the Europeans' "wish to convert the whole world into a vast market for their goods" (41) and European technology; this route, he suggests, is the only way that could lead the colonized not only towards independence from European yoke, but also to the path of

\textsuperscript{12}G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). See in particular, the dialectic of the lord and the bondsman (pp. 111-19), and the section on "absolute freedom" where Hegel describes the French Revolution in order to suggest that the moment of absolute freedom, the temporary anarchy in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution necessarily turns into another set of hierarchies (pp. 355-63).

\textsuperscript{13} Mohandas K. Gandhi, \textit{Indian Home Rule} (Ahmadabad: Navjivan Publishing House, 1984 [1938]).
national self-sufficiency. In this respect, Gandhi's position can be said to be the idealist counterpart to Samir Amin's notion of economic delinking as the first step towards a polycentric world—a step that requires the third-world nation to wrest local control of capitalist accumulation before it can come out of the state of being a permanent periphery, forever dependent on the capitalism center.

Gandhi refers to this dependence on Western technology and the trappings of progress as slavery, and debunks the notion that merely throwing off the yoke of colonial rule would entail coming out of this state of slavery. Freedom from this slavery would only be brought about by refusal of European goods. Indeed, Gandhi's assertions alert us to the reality that just as slavery turns into wage-slavery, freedom from colonial rule can lead to yet another form of domination. In this respect, Gandhi's insistence on closing off the Indian economy, in particular the Indian market to Western goods, does not have to revert to Amin's insistence that the working-class in the metropolis is bought-off; instead, the very closing off of the Indian market to western goods raises the question of where the goods needed for Indian consumption will come from. Since Gandhi's answer is, Indian industry, then it follows that Indian capitalism needs to be developed, and if Indian capitalism needs to be developed, then the most effective agent of change becomes the Indian bourgeoisie. Accordingly, in the 1920s and 30s, roughly around the same time as mobilizing for the salt-march, Gandhi is traveling around the country breaking workers' strikes. Historian David Arnold, while focusing on Gandhi's role in breaking a massive strike at Ahmedabad, notes the centrality of Gandhi's adoption of the idea of "trusteeship" as a general principle—that the upper classes had to look out for the lower classes. As a result, Gandhi was opposed to picketing or to keeping out scabs even when he did support particular strikes. In fact Gandhi never developed a long-term orientation around the working class. On the contrary, Gandhi's main orientation was around the peasantry, especially after the fiasco of "Swaraj within the year" in 1920. By the 1940s, after the failed "individual satyagraha" campaign, Gandhi had

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14Gandhi's famous 1930 salt-march and promotion of indigenous industry are both examples of this non-violent assertion of independence from British goods and British rule. The British colonial apparatus had monopolized the extraction and sale of salt, while levying heavy taxes on its sale. Gandhi mobilized tens of thousands of his followers into marching from his ashram at Sabarmati to the sea at Dandi, where he broke the British law barring Indians access to the salt. Similarly, he insisted that each Indian hand-spin his/her own coarse cloth, on his/her own personal spinning-wheel, so that he/she does not have to depend on British manufactured cloth for the simple necessity of covering his/herself.


been made politically irrelevant--he is invited to a number of roundtables in England but these don't amount to much--and is not breaking strikes any longer; by this time, the national bourgeoisie had already oriented towards Nehru who has made it a point to win them over to state-sponsored industrialization schemes.

If for Gandhi, the transition to independence could mean slavery to a decaying Western civilization and western goods, the transition to decolonization may also be seen as running parallel to the transition from slavery to wage labour. The period of colonization would constitute, in this framework, the period of slavery during which the slave is conditioned and made dependent upon capital through work; and when the slave has been sufficiently made dependent, he can then be set free, to sell his labour freely. Similarly, when the colonies have been made sufficiently dependent upon social relations of capital, they can then be set free, to engage in these relations out of their own so-called volition. It would suffice to say, here, that the fortunes, or shall we say misfortunes, of ex-colonial countries have largely followed the logic of capital, that is to say, to act as the periphery which the centre can feed upon. Or, to put it in the metaphor of slavery/wage labour, to act as the proletarians--cheap labour--and market for the first world capitalist.

This conditioning of the colonies, through the duration of the colonial enterprise, into becoming part of a global capitalist network, becomes manifest in Fanon's analysis of the native. In Fanon's violent native, similar to Gandhi's Indian who needs to be warned and mobilized against Western goods, we find a desire for exactly the same material things that the settler has. The fear of the other becomes embodied in Fanon's settler as fear of the colonized who wants to appropriate the settler's place:

The colonized man is an envious man. And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive, 'They want to take our place.' It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's place.

Press, 2001), and Sumit Sarkar's Modern India, 1885-1947 (Delhi : Macmillan, 1983), provide overviews of Gandhi's role in breaking strikes during the 1920s and 30s.

17See for instance Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 358, where, through the reductive powers of the reflected gaze, the lord's independent self-consciousness, becomes the servile, dependent self-consciousness: “we can consider ourselves as 'slaves' in so far as we appear to the Other .... I am a slave to the degree that my being is dependent at the centre of a freedom which is not mine and which is the very condition of my being.”

18Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 39.
Fanon sketches the vast difference between the ghetto of the colonized and the glittering town of the settlers, suggesting that the native wants to live in the town of the settler, in the settler's house, and wants the settler's things. The colonial system has created a state of perpetual poverty for the native, which the native sees in stark contrast with the splendour of the settler's state; the contrast makes the native conscious of what he could have but does not. The native who has seen the settler's wealth is no longer content with what he has, or did have before his land was usurped; he now wants, needs, all the trappings of progress and civilization that he sees the settlers possess. The native has been schooled, through the colonial encounter, to want all those things, to demand these new needs, and is willing to use violence to get these things; this native cannot now go back to "how things were." He wants the settler's belongings--the car, the electricity, the paved roads of the settler's towns--for which the native is now willing to kill the settler so that he may take all those things from the latter.

As opposed to Gandhi, Fanon does not prescribe controlling these emotions. Instead, the creation of a new national consciousness, for Fanon, begins from this concept of envy, which goads the native towards the path of terror. It is the production of terror in the settler--terror of usurpation of place, property, and life--through violence that becomes work for the native, that defines his self-consciousness. What in the Hegelian framework held the slave in thrall, namely fear in the first moment, and the thing, the product of work, in the second moment, becomes in Fanon, precisely that which liberates the slave from his slavery. For in this framework, work itself becomes redefined as violence: "To work means to work for the death of the settler .... The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence" (86). And the imperative for decolonization, for this freedom through violence, becomes the manifestation of this demand for new needs, whether it be the settler's house, his wealth, the buildings or the railroads he has built, which the native can no longer do without. Violence, to the extent that it manifests the collective envy of the natives, then, become the marker of an emerging national consciousness and a national culture which is based upon a unity formed precisely through this violence--a unity which "introduces into each man's consciousness the ideas of a common cause, of a national destiny, and of a collective history" (93), as opposed to the "separatist and regionalist" (94) tendencies of colonialism, which works precisely by dividing the colonized into tribes and clans that feud perpetually amongst themselves:
For the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning.

The groups recognize each other and the future nation is already indivisible. The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way and in one direction (93).

It must not pass unnoticed that Fanon uses the category of work to analyze the violence perpetrated upon the settler on the part of the native. For Fanon, this violence is not simply a spontaneous outburst of emotion, an irrational response to oppression; not is it a result of suicidal desperation. Instead, the native finds his freedom in violence not only because by his violent actions, he has staked his own life and is not fearful of the settler or the threat of death that the settler's presence implies, but also because he has produced that revolution in the master-slave relationships whereby the settler has become fearful of him. If it is the case that the native finds freedom through violence, it is so precisely because through this violence, the native is able to produce that terror in the settler which defines the settler's slavery. For in this dialectic of terror, there is no way out for the settler but to work, to produce the conditions of his own slavery as the essential characteristic of his self-consciousness. The response to this terror that the settler feels is described again by Fanon as work: "The settler's work is to make even dreams of liberty impossible for the native. The native's work is to imagine all possible methods for destroying the other (92). This use of the analytic of work itself implies, albeit formally, that the native has already been compelled to accept the discipline of work necessary for the sustenance of capital. There is no way out but to accept that this work/violence is a necessary precondition for the process of decolonization, which is, first and foremost, an economic project.

It thus happens that freedom for the colonized can be effected only through following the logic implicit in the civilizing mission of capital, from whose perspective all earlier societies appear uncivilized, barbaric. For the colonizing mission becomes, albeit unwittingly, the nurturing, the goading, of the colonies into taking the steps towards integration into global capitalism. Even though it is not in the interest of the particular capitalist/colonizing states to relinquish control of the colonies, the colonies must be let go in the interest of the global domination of capital. Just as an individual capitalist is merely a cog
in the wheel of capital, so the particular capitalist countries are mere instruments in facilitating the global domination of capital.

This becomes manifest in Arrighi's description of the accumulation of capital as having undergone four systemic cycles so far, the demise of one cycle creating the conditions for the emergence of another cycle.\(^{19}\) He designates these as the Genoese, the Dutch, the British and the US systemic cycles of accumulation. He talks of the British cycle of accumulation as having risen out the ashes of the Dutch cycle, and suggests that Britain emerged as a new financial power in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars: "during the French wars, Britain's newly acquired commanding position in European high finance translated into virtually unlimited credit for its power pursuits" (160); surplus capital from all over Europe found its way into Britain after the wars, resulting in a "phenomenal expansion" (160) of the British capital goods industry. He talks of the British cycle of accumulation as territorialist, that is, a cycle during which economic expansion was dependent upon territorial expansion; the empire was crucial to the economic expansion of Britain.

Indeed, British hegemony in the European balance of power was augmented by the consolidation of the empire in India after the mutiny of 1857: "control over India meant command over financial and material resources --including military manpower--which no state, or likely combination of states, could match, and that no ruling group could for the time being challenge militarily" (165). Arrighi then notes how the British iron industry, combined with large scale mechanization of the textile industry, created jobs and businesses, which, when they were not needed within Britain itself, could be "dumped" (Jenks, quoted in Arrighi, 161) abroad in the colonies:

Between 1845-49 and 1870-75, British export of railroad iron and steel more than tripled and those of machinery increased nine-fold. During the same period, British exports to Central and South America, the Middle East, Asia and Australia increased some six-fold. The net that linked the various regions of the world-economy to its British center was visibly widening and tightening (161).

Given the profitable returns that control over an empire gave Britain, again, it was not in the interest of imperial Britain to give up control of the colonies; and violence on the part of the decolonized, combined with the intensified competition between the imperialist powers that

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resulted in the First and the Second World Wars--thereby making state control of the colonies economically unfeasible--became the willing midwife that unwittingly facilitated the birth of a new, “higher” form of capitalism. Arrighi calls this “higher” form of capitalism, the US systemic cycle of accumulation, characterizing this cycle as intensive as opposed to the extensive British cycle of accumulation). Around the 20s and 30s, the United States had already begun to emerge as a military and industrial power to "provide a wide range of subordinate and allied governments with effective protection and to make credible threats of economic strangulation or military annihilation towards unfriendly governments" (218). This new cycle of accumulation, built on the ashes of the extensive and territorialist British cycle of accumulation, brings forth a world which, during the colonial period had acted as an external barrier to capital, but now has been internalized through the structure of the multinational companies characteristic of the US cycle of accumulation. As Arrighi puts it:

combined with the size, insularity, and natural wealth of its own territory, this power enabled the US capitalist class to 'internalize' not just protection and production costs, .... but transaction costs as well, that is to say, the markets on which the self-expansion of its capital depended (218).

It is no coincidence that the terminal crisis of colonialism also coincided with the ascendancy of the US cycle of accumulation, in which Britain plays the role of facilitating the rise of US hegemony. Perhaps Perry Anderson's description best characterizes Britain's relationship to the US at this new stage: "the principal condition of Britain's continued empire after the Second World War was its glacis function for US global domination" (165).20 And when this new cycle of accumulation stabilizes, formal control of the empire becomes increasingly redundant.

20Perry Anderson, English Questions (London: Verso, 1992). Perry Anderson describes Britain's relationship with America in terms of the latter containing Britain's past and its future—a description that also comes with a warning to America: "Britain, then, not only witnesses the probable early beginnings in America of something like a vaster repetition of the same historical process it has undergone, in the absence of the same gyroscopes it has lacked, but also perhaps the signs of its ultimate generalization throughout the advanced capitalist world.... The British crisis has no solution in sight; and perhaps the time in which one was possible, as a national recovery, has passed. At the zenith of English capitalism, Marx declared that his portrait of it in Capital held a mirror of the future to the rest of the world. Now, towards its nadir, the superscription may read once again: De te fabula narratur" (192).
III

It is the creation of this new world, this new cycle of accumulation, that decolonization is part and parcel of. Fanon's native with an emerging national consciousness envisions this world as one where he will be able to make the settler work. The settler's slavery to work under threat of violence takes on a literal dimension in Fanon's use of Engels' quote:

In the same way that Robinson [Crusoe] was able to obtain a sword, we can just as well suppose that [Man] Friday might appear one fine morning with a loaded revolver in his hand and from then on the whole relationship of violence is reversed: Man Friday gives the orders and Crusoe is obliged to work .... Thus, the revolver triumphs over the sword, and even the most childish believer in axioms will doubtless form the conclusion that violence is not a simple act of will, but needs for its realization certain very concrete preliminary conditions, and in particular the implements of violence; and the more highly developed of these implements will carry the day against the primitive ones. Moreover, the very fact of the ability to produce such weapons signifies that the producer of highly developed weapons, in everyday speech the arms manufacturer, triumphs over the producer of primitive weapons. To put it briefly, the triumph of violence depends upon the production of armaments, and this in its turn depends on production in general, and thus ... on economic strength, on the economy of the state, and in the last resort on the material means which that violence commands.²¹

What we find in Fanon's use of this quote is a fantasy of making the colonizer work for the colonized through violence—a labour which occurs in two moments. First, it is the work that the colonizer must do in order to keep the native in his place; and second, it is work in the form of remuneration which the capitalist countries must make, as can be seen in Fanon's insistence that the colonizing countries "must pay" (103). He disagrees with Engels' suggestion that the effectiveness of violence in commanding work rests upon economic strength and instruments of violence and suggests that in this new international situation, and at this stage in capitalist development, there is no way out for the capitalist countries but to pay, and, so to say, work in developing the newly formed countries. In describing how violence will not be a lucrative option for the capitalist colonizers at this new stage, Fanon

sketches briefly the epic tale of capital, noting that capitalist development began by setting up the colonies as sources of "raw material which, once turned into manufactured goods" (65), could be marketed in the colonizing countries. At this moment, the situation has been reversed and the colonies have become the market for goods produced in the mother country: "the colonial population is a customer who is ready to buy goods" (65). If this is the case, Fanon concludes, domination by violence is not in the interest of these colonizing powers:

A blind domination founded on slavery is not economically speaking worthwhile for the bourgeoisie of the mother country. The monopolistic group within this bourgeoisie does not support a government whose policy is solely that of the sword. What the factory owners and finance magnates of the mother country demand is not that their government should decimate the colonial peoples, but that it should safeguard with the help of economic conventions their own 'legitimate interests' (65).

Fanon suggests that the capitalist countries must pay, by racing ahead to the future problems that capital will have to contend with if a "redistribution of wealth" (98) does not occur, and if the newly independent countries are left to their own devices in "climbing out of the morass [and] catching up with the other nations using the only means at hand" (95). The most dangerous of these problems, Fanon asserts, is that of the once-colony ceasing to provide a market for the mother-country's goods. For if the young nation is left on its own to contending with the forces of poverty and underdevelopment, it might "decide to continue [its] evolution inside a collective autarky" (105) with the result that in the capitalist countries,

[...]he machines will pile up their products in the warehouses and a merciless struggle will ensue on the European market between trusts and financial groups. The closing of factories, the paying off of workers and unemployment will force the European working class to engage in an open struggle against the capitalist regime. Then the monopolies will realize that their true interests lie in giving aid to underdeveloped countries (105).

In that scheme of events, if "through lack of intelligence ... the capitalist countries refuse to pay, then the relentless dialectic of their system will smother them" (103). In this sense Fanon's project reaches beyond simply resistance to direct colonial rule, for "the national liberation of colonized countries unveiling their true economic state"--a state whereby the "former dominated country becomes an economically dependent country" (98). But because
after independence, the long-term ravages of colonialism are exposed, the reality seems "even more unendurable" (98), for the colonized who will refuse to serve as market for Western capital. This threat of the dangerous road that the capitalist countries will have to follow if they do not provide reparations is punctuated by a hope that in coming to the aid of the developing countries, Europe will help to end the centuries of slavery faced by the Third World, and "to rehabilitate mankind, and make man victorious everywhere, once and for all" (106).

What is coincident with and related to this hope of "rehabilitating mankind," so to say, is a rehabilitating of capital, which is dying through lack of circulation for it is congealed and clotted in Europe. And it is here that we find Fanon's most cogent argument in favour of capitalist countries giving aid to the developing countries:

It happens that few [newly formed] countries fulfill the conditions demanded by the trusts and monopolies. Thus capital, failing to find a safe outlet, remains blocked in Europe, and is frozen. It is all the more frozen because the capitalists refuse to invest in their own countries. The returns in this case are in fact negligible and treasury control is the despair of even the boldest spirits.

In the long run the situation is catastrophic. Capital no longer circulates, or else its circulation is diminished. In spite of the huge sums swallowed up by military budgets, international capitalism is in desperate straits" (104).

What Fanon desires in the aftermath of decolonization--capitalist countries "helping" newly decolonized nations by giving them monetary aid--Marx had already talked about as the way in which capital expands and tightens its grips. He suggests, in Grundrisse, that "the tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome" (408). Indeed, the process of decolonization which parcelled the world off in discrete territories, forming nations, may even

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22Fanon prefigures the contemporary demand for reparations for victims of "slavery, colonialism, and racism," that was voiced by the South African President Mbeki, anticipating the expression of this demand at the United Nations World Conference Against Racism held at Durban in 2001. The demand created a rift during the preparatory meetings of the conference, with representatives from several western nations demanding that any call for such reparations be kept out of the agenda for the conference. The specific form of the reparations was also laid out at the NGO Forum for the Conference, whose draft declaration included as restitution, "the cancellation of odious debt for individual nation states, especially in Africa and South America," and redistribution of land usurped through racial practices in the past.

be seen as the process whereby capital posits internal barriers, in the form of national boundaries, to itself in order to surpass itself by overcoming these barriers. These newly created nations, then, provide the grounds for "the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation" (407), and fulfill the need for more and more points of exchange on which the expansion of capital depends. The international credit system in this newly decolonized world assumes the responsibility of creating these new points of circulation. What Marx described in the Grundrisse, as the English being "forced to lend to foreign nations" (416), in that case, the Yankee, "in order to have them as customers" (416), becomes a larger system, where it is not only the European powers that are lending and borrowing amongst themselves; now, it is the whole world which participates in this economy of credit-on the one hand, embodied by international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank which oversee this credit system, and on the other hand, manifested by individual first world nations lending to Third World nations so that the latter can continue to be the former's customers.  

In an earlier essay in El Moudjahid, Fanon has already described this continuing hold of the mother country over the former colony, even in the aftermath of independence-"nominal sovereignty" as opposed to "real independence" (121)-as the "yoke of economic oppression" (122). That colonialism was, first and foremost, an economic enterprise, and that the economic interest of Western capitalism had highjacked the decolonization movements, was exposed in the very first negotiations during the liberation struggle. During these negotiations, "the very first matters at issue were the economic interests: banks, monetary areas, research permits, commercial concessions, inviolability of property stolen from the peasants at the time of conquest, etc. ... Of civilizing, religious, or cultural works, there was no longer any question. The time had come for serious things, and trivialities had to be left behind" (121). Fanon identifies this stage of a higher capitalism as "neo-colonialism" (121), which "wrings" from the former colony "an economic dependence which becomes an aid and assistance program" (121). Indeed, this period of neo-colonialism, characterized by the "persistence of a rejuvenated colonial pact" (122) exposes "imperialism ... in its attempts to strengthen itself" (126); the ex-colonial countries are exposed as

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24See, as simply one example among many, journalist Greg Palast's expose of the central role that IMF played in bringing Argentina's economic crisis to boiling point by the end of 2001--a crisis that Argentina has still not recovered from. "Who Shot Argentina?" in International Socialist Review 21 (Jan-Feb 2002), pp. 26-28.

"wolves" trying to find, in the decolonized country with its newly demarcated borders, "isolated lambs to prey upon" (126).

This sense of a "capital resurgent" becomes even more apparent in Fanon's discussion of the competition between colonizing countries in the aftermath of the decolonization, or the demarcation of the "zones of influence" through the former mother country's attempts to ensure that the newly decolonized populations are prevented from "handling ... their [own] national riches" (122)--an independence that "compromises the economic equilibrium of the former occupant" (122). This demarcation of "zones of influence" is accompanied by a "gigantic struggle for the seizure of world markets" (123), which Fanon describes as having created the conditions of possibility for the ascendancy of the United States as a world power, resulting from the process of decolonization:

We have only to remember the violent interventions in the West Indian archipelago or in Latin America every time the dictatorships supported by American policy were in danger. The Marines who today are being landed in Beirut are the brothers of those who, periodically, are sent to reestablish "order" in Haiti, in Costa Rica, in Panama. The United States considers that the two Americas constitute a world governed by the Monroe Doctrine whose application is entrusted to American forces. The single article of this doctrine stipulates that America belongs to the Americans, in other words, to the State Department.

Its outlets having proved insufficient, it was inevitable that America would turn to other regions, namely the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa. There ensued a competition between beasts of prey; its creations are: the Eisenhower doctrine against England in the Middle East; support for Ngo Dinh Diem against France in Indochina; Economic Aid Commission in Africa announced by the presidential voyage of Mr. Nixon against France, England, and Belgium (123-24).
It is in the context of this competition between Western powers that we are to read Fanon's discussion of the pitfalls of nationalism. Indeed, Fanon elaborates on this prophetic warning in the *Wretched of the Earth* when he identifies the role that nationalism and the national bourgeoisie play in enabling the nation's participation in the world economy, thus describing the process whereby decolonization becomes a tool in the expansion and sustenance of global capital. While developing a comparison between a trade-union organization and the nation/nationalist party, Fanon suggests that the "birth of nationalist parties in the colonized countries is contemporary with the formation of an intellectual elite engaged in trade" (108). He stresses the collusion between the nationalist parties and the rising middle class and notes that the native intellectuals have studied in their respective mother countries the working of political parties. It is these very same intellectuals who make up the "young nationalist middle class, which is above all a class interested in trade" (108).

This nationalist middle class goes about its business by first enlisting the workers in the towns to the nationalist political parties. These nationalist parties are deeply distrustful of the people from the rural areas, who seem bogged down in "fruitless inertia"; the people in the country districts still live in the feudal manner, hemmed in by witch doctors, and tribal chieftains. This state of affairs, according to Fanon, is a direct result of colonial practices and policies: "colonialism has often strengthened or established its domination by organizing the petrification of the country districts," and "the full power of this medieval structure of society is maintained by the settlers' military and administrative officials." These chieftains and traditional authorities who get along pretty well with the colonial government, and who buttress the latter, are threatened by the burgeoning native middle class, whose values and ideals "call into question the very nature of unchanging, everlasting feudalism." This new middle class "with modern ideas ... mean[s] to dislocate the aboriginal society, and ... in doing so will take the bread out of their mouths." For these middle class nationalists "progress" is about shedding the "obscurantist ideas" that bolster the feudal class. The rising middle class needs the disappearance of the prohibitions and barriers that the feudal class puts up in the form of threats of excommunication upon the bulk of the native people, who would constitute the market for goods produced by the new middle class. In this sense, then, the new nationalist middle class,

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26Patrick Bond, *Fanon's Warning*
and the nationalist parties that are largely represented by it, become the champions of civilization and progress that are simultaneously the by-products and the necessary tools of capitalism. And just as this new middle class requires the termination of this feudal state of affairs, the expansion of capital, too, depends upon the transformation of this society into a stage of civilization, in comparison to which the present state of this society would "appear as mere local developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry." 27 The colonial government, on the other hand, insofar as it ensures that the feudal state of affairs continues, and, indeed, depends upon feudalism in the colonies, ceases, at this moment, to be the comrade of capital, and thus has to be thrown overboard in order to ensure that capital does achieve its higher form.

It is also important at this point to note that in Fanon's framework, this revolutionary activity of transforming violence against colonial rule into work can only be initiated by the lumpenproletariat, by what he refers to as the "workless, less than men" (130): "in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The proletariat in the colonized countries, on the other hand, has everything to lose; it has been bought off, and thus it is not in its interest to take up arms:

in the colonial territories the proletariat is the nucleus of the colonized population which has been most pampered by the colonial regime. The embryonic proletariat of the towns is in a comparatively privileged position. In capitalist countries, the working class has nothing to lose; it is they who in the long run have everything to gain. In the colonial countries the working class has everything to lose; in reality it represents the fraction of the colonized nation which is necessary and irreplaceable if the colonial machine is to run smoothly: it includes tram conductors, taxi drivers, miners, dockers, interpreters, nurses, and so on. It is these elements which constitute the most faithful followers of the nationalist parties, and who because of the privileged place they hold in the colonial system constitute also the 'bourgeois' fraction of the colonized people (109).

As opposed to the pampered proletariat, "the starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays" (61). This lumpenproletariat, consisting of the landless peasants who have gravitated towards the towns in search of employment, "constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary

27 Grundrisse, pp. 409-410
forces of a colonized people" (129). This lumpenproletariat forms the "urban spearhead" (129) of the rebellion. It is these "classless idlers" who will "by militant action discover the path that leads to nationhood" (130). In this sense, the overthrow of colonial rule constitutes the colony's version of a peasant revolution against the feudal state of affairs maintained by the colonial government.

It is this lumpenproletariat which the nationalist parties enlist to "do their dirty job" for them: "The unions, the parties, or the government in a kind of Machiavellian fashion all make use of the peasant masses as a blind, inert tactical force: brute force, as it were" (123). Although Fanon sees the comradeship between the nationalist middle class/native intellectual, on the one hand, and capitalism, on the other, he suggests that this middle class is incapable of carrying out its task. He speaks of this class as ignorant of the economy of its own country (151), since under the colonial system, the economy was run by the settlers, while members of the emergent indigenous middle class had nothing to do with it: "this economy has always developed outside the limits of their knowledge ... they have nothing more than an approximate, bookish acquaintance with the actual and potential resources of their country's soil and mineral deposits" (151). This middle class, after national independence, does not do anything to set up industries or to encourage innovations in the agricultural system which is the largest source of their revenue; instead, they continue to engage in exporting raw materials and unfinished goods to the capitalist countries, which process and market these products, thus pocketing the bulk of the profits: the newly independent countries go on "sending out raw materials ... [and] go on being Europe's small farmers, who specialize in unfinished products" (152).

In addition, Fanon suggests that in underdeveloped countries, the bourgeoisie does not really exist: "there is only a sort of little greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it" (175). Fanon contrasts this "false" bourgeoisie with the European bourgeoisie, which is "dynamic, educated, and secular [and has] fully succeeded in its undertaking of the accumulation of capital and has given to the nation a minimum of prosperity" (175). In contrast, the mission of the national middle class of the newly independent nations "has nothing to so with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the mask of neo-colonialism" (152). Fanon calls this class the "business agent" (153) of the Western bourgeoisie, and suggests that the national bourgeoisie of the developing countries takes on "the role of manager for Western enterprise, and it will in practice set up its country
as the brothel of Europe" (154). He cites the example of Latin America as representative of this brand of newly independent nations, warning that "the national bourgeoisie will be greatly helped on its way towards decadence by the Western bourgeoisies, who come to it as tourists avid for the exotic, for big game hunting, and for casinos" (153), while the bourgeoisie of the new nations is transformed into "organizers of parties for their Western opposite numbers" (153).

A similar state of lethargy and greed affects the landed proprietors. The big farmers, once independence has been declared, call for the nationalization of agricultural production, and, Fanon suggests, through scheming, manage to get a hold of the land previously owned by the settlers. Although Fanon's native—one class of this native—does get what he had desired of the settler, that is, the latter's place and property, it does not benefit the nation as a whole, but only a few. These new proprietors do not, subsequently, introduce new agricultural methods; nor do they "integrate their farming systems into a genuinely national economy" (154). Instead, in the name of the national effort, the landed proprietors exploit the agricultural workers. And, after decolonization, since it is masqueraded as being beneficial for the nation, this exploitation becomes "intensified and legitimate" (154). This landed bourgeoisie, as well as the middle-class in the towns, refuses to take any risks, and demands "solid investments and quick returns" (155). The profits are never reinvested in national production; instead, they are either invested in foreign banks, or spent on luxuries.

What Fanon brings home to us here is the double-bind, the catch-22, of the nationalist project: on the one hand is the ineptitude of the indigenous elite and the bourgeoisie in carrying out the task of building a nation, and the necessity of capital to find new outlets and passages for its circulation, in order that it does not atrophy for want of circulation. On the other hand is the need for global redistribution of wealth, and for capitalist countries coming to the aid of developing ones, which reproduced the structure of dependency. Fanon resolves this contradiction by visualizing decolonization as merely the first stage in launching a struggle against capital; at this first stage, capital rehabilitates itself, and in so doing, "addresses itself to the middle-class and to the intellectuals of the colonial country" (122). In this sense, decolonization also means a "rejuvenation of the colonial pact," which will necessitate a "second stage" of struggle, a stage that will be "decisive," because it will entail international solidarity:

All the colonial countries that are waging the struggle
today must know that the political independence that they will wring from the enemy in exchange for the maintenance of an economic dependency is only a snare and a delusion, that the second phase of liberation is necessary because required by the popular masses, that this second phase, because it is a capital one, is bound to be hard and waged with iron determination, that finally, at that stage, it will be necessary to take the world strategy of coalition into account (125-26).

It is in this context of a "new humanism" (126), of supranational solidarity, that Fanon's revision of the Hegelian ideal in Wretched—the "We" of "reintroducing mankind, the whole of mankind" (106)—is to be read. For the "future of every man today has a relation of close dependency on the rest of the universe" (126). Seen in this context, Fanon's dismissal of workers in the colonial countries becomes anything but a dismissal. In other words, the colonized workers' lack of interest, in mounting an effective challenge to imperialism, must also be read in the context of the essays in El Moudjahid, where Fanon suggests that the "fight for national dignity gives its true meaning to the struggle for bread and social dignity" (144). The struggle for national self-determination, then, becomes an integral stage in the process of developing an international solidarity of all oppressed classes, or as Fanon puts it, "belongs in the general process of man's liberation" (145). Here we find that the economic struggle of workers, whose immediate interests lay in making sure that the "colonial machine is to run smoothly," is transformed into a viable political struggle only through the struggle for "national dignity." And it is also this moment of transformation that is at the root of "the immense solidarity that unites the oppressed peoples to the exploited masses of the colonialist countries, despite the fact that this solidarity, especially at the point of "retreat of imperialism" (144), is fraught with crises that entail an "alienation" between the workers from the colonized and the colonialist countries: "At the critical point at which the colonized peoples fling themselves into the struggle and demand their independence a critical period elapses in the course of which, paradoxically, the interest of the 'metropolitan' workers and peasants seems to go counter to that of the colonized people" (145). But the interest only "seems" to go counter. In fact, the struggle for national liberation contains within itself the

possibility of cross-national solidarity. For the conditions for this solidarity arise directly from the national struggle of the colonized people—a solidarity that is two-fold: first, the "independence of a new territory is felt by the other oppressed countries as an invitation, an encouragement, and a promise" (145), and second, it is also in the "national struggle against the oppressor that colonized peoples have discovered, concretely, the solidarity of the colonialist bloc and the necessary interdependence of the liberation movement." It is in this sense that Fanon is to be read, not only as the Bible of decolonization, but also as the manifesto for an anti-imperialist struggle beyond decolonization, beyond the postcolony—towards a postnational world.

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