Interrogating public sphere and popular culture as theoretical concepts: on their value in African Studies

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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, concepts such as civil society and public sphere have been frequently used both as analytical tools as well as normative concepts deemed essential to a well-functioning liberal democracy. While their normative connotations and idealistic assumptions have been widely criticised in media studies, their analytical value has been less debated and more often than not taken for granted. Because of their theoretical roots in Western liberal thinking, scholars in African studies have, however, vigorously debated the extent to which these concepts (and particularly the concept of civil society) are useful in explaining and interrogating developments in Africa. Drawing on the debate in African studies on civil society and public sphere, this paper seeks to outline the critical approaches advocated by the Comaroffs, Mamdani and Ekeh. The paper argues that the concept of popular culture addresses some of the concerns brought up by critics of the concept of public sphere.

The genealogy of the concept of civil society and public sphere are inextricably linked and constitute fundamental building blocks of liberal-democratic political theory. While there has been a lively debate on the relevance of the concept of civil society in African studies, the concept of public sphere has been subject to less rigorous discussion and debate. It has often been deployed in rather loose ways and has frequently been used interchangeably with the concept of civil society. This paper starts by providing a brief outline of debates on civil society in African studies and argues that major criticism expressed by Africanists scholars on the concept of civil society could inform a more rigorous debate on the concept of the public sphere in African studies. Secondly, this paper seeks to demonstrate the value of the concept of popular culture in contributing towards a fuller and richer understanding of publics in Africa.

Civil society as policy recommendation
The concept of civil society gained popularity in the early 1990s and has often featured prominently in theories of democratisation. It emerged in the wake of the so-called ‘wave of democratisation’ in Africa. The conventional explanation of this wave reads as follows. With the demise of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a wave of democratisation ‘moves’ from Eastern Europe to Africa, leading to a gradual disappearance of governments under one-party rule and the introduction of multi-party regimes. Dominant factors attributed to democratisation in this ‘democratisation diffusion’
thesis are all domestic and can be summarised as the loss of legitimacy of the one-party state, economic decline and popular protests. It was believed that the existence of the Communist Eastern bloc lent some form of legitimacy to one-party states in the South but that the fall of Communism combined with the disastrous economic performance of most authoritarian regimes had depleted the legitimating principles available to the world’s dictators. This democratisation diffusion thesis is inextricably to what could be referred to as the ‘good governance’ discourse, popular as policy prescription among Western donors such as the British Department of International Development (DfID) whose 2006 White Paper was entitled *Making governance work for the poor.* In 2007, DfID also launched a £100 million Governance and Transparency Fund which according to them was designed to “help citizens hold their governments to account, through strengthening the wide range of groups that can empower and support them”.

In the ‘good governance’ discourse, poverty is thought to result mainly from poor governance at the national level. In this way, it masks the way in which global factors have been implicated in the declining legitimacy of African states and has made these states increasingly difficult to govern. In the 1990s, structural adjustment packages - which were introduced all over Africa on the advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – recommended African governments to promote economic liberalisation and to reduce state intervention in order to minimise government spending and to increase government income. A cut in spending was achieved through public sector reform, drastic decreases in expenditure on education and health and the abolishment of price controls on food. Provision of a range of export incentives was thought to lead to higher foreign currency incomes which would improve government budget deficits.

However, in reality, structural adjustment policies have had a disastrous impact on the lives of ordinary Africans and have resulted in thousands of workers being retrenched from their jobs. Hence, as Abrahamsen (2000) has argued, the wave of democratisation and the ‘emergence’ of civil society and popular protests in Africa should not so much be seen as the result of the democratising aspects of political liberalisation policies part of structural adjustment but it should precisely be considered as a result of the negative economic effects of structural adjustment and the concomitant growing levels of poverty among African populations. Structural adjustment packages profoundly reduced the legitimacy of many

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African governments. Hence, civil society protests could be understood as responses to the negative impact of structural adjustment.

Abrahamsen’s analysis problematises the democratisation diffusion thesis which primarily attributes democratisation to internal factors such as protests and the reduced legitimacy of Africa regimes. As she argues, this thesis has masked the external causes of democratisation and the way in which structural adjustment packages have contributed to the reduced legitimacy of many African regimes.

With concepts such as ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ at present dominating the development debate on Africa, it is easy to take these ideas for granted and to conclude that these have always been seen as intrinsically good values. However, this is of course not the case. While currently there seems to be a consensus that democracy is required for development, until the early 1990s it was argued that development could only be obtained in the absence of liberal democracy. In order to accelerate economic growth, it was deemed necessary to temporarily suspend democratic freedoms. However, with the growing hegemony of neoliberal ideas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, liberalisation of the economy and a retreat of the state were advocated in order to speed up economic growth. The state was seen as inherently bad for development; an increased role of civil society was often proposed as a solution that would improve state performance. It was therefore in the post-Cold War context that ‘democracy’ emerged as a precondition for economic growth.

Civil society increasingly began to emerge as programmatic ideal or policy prescription, and not only in grey literature but also in academic analyses. It was seen as both a counterweight to a ‘bad state’ and a replacement for a ‘reduced state’. For example, Harbeson (1994: 1-2, quoted in Lewis 2001: 5) argued that “civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago”. The emphasis here is on ‘missing key’ which suggests that Africa does not have a ‘civil society’, and that it therefore needs to be ‘established’. This is echoed in development policy reports such as for example the guidelines of DfID’s Civil Society Challenge Fund which state that “[m]ost Civil Society Challenge Fund projects involve a partnership based around the applicant helping to build the capacity of the southern partner to empower the poor”.

3 See: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/funding/civilsocietyguidelines08.asp (last accessed: 15 September 2008).
The strengthening of civil society was conceptualised as a means towards poverty reduction and good governance. Civil society was considered as intrinsically ‘good’ and as a powerfree zone which has the capability to hold the state to account. It is assumed that power is concentrated in the state and that by increasing the power of civil society, a more accountable government is created. This simplistic conceptualisation of power is very similar to what Foucault (1980: 122) summed up as to “cut off the King’s head”, i.e. the idea that just by cutting the King’s head off one is able to solve the problem of too much power vested in the state. However, this ignores the actual workings of power and the way in which power tends to be dissipated in networks. As Foucault has argued, power should be understood as a relational concept and not as emanating from a certain point. Foucault objected to the idea of power as a system of total domination and instead considered power as dispersed through a network of relationships. Following from Foucault, civil society can then not be seen as a zone where there are no conflicts of interests or struggles for power.

The rising popularity of the concept of ‘civil society’ in both policy and academic accounts on Africa should thus be understood against the background of the end of the Cold War and the introduction of multi-party rule in Africa. Increasingly, the African authoritarian state was blamed for poor economic performance. While previously a strong state was considered to be crucial for economic growth, the Washington consensus which emerged in the 1990s prescribed a reduction of the state and an increasing role for civil society. Civil society thus emerged primarily as policy prescription in order to improve the performance of African states. While the state was perceived as bad, civil society was considered to be inherently good.

**Civil society and the debate in African Studies**

The recurrent deployment of civil society as policy prescription for Africa in the 1990s provoked a response from scholars in African Studies who have argued that this prescription assumed that Africa did not have a ‘civil society’. This has profoundly masked the historical legacy of civil society organisations on the continent and also has excluded organisations which did not fit with prescribed ideas on civil society because these organisations were not defined in terms of opposition to the state but based on kinship, ethnicity or local ‘tradition’. Mahmood Mamdani, for example, has criticised the practice of carrying out ‘history by analogy’, i.e. to assume that “civil society exists as a fully formed construct in Africa as in Europe, and that the driving force of democratisation everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state” (1996: 13). Mamdani is concerned about the way in which the
concept of civil society has been deployed as normative concept, i.e. where it is expected to operate as a counterforce to the state.

Instead of using civil society as a programmatic and prescriptive tool, Mamdani proposes to use the concept as an analytical and historical tool. In this regard, Mamdani has advocated for “an analysis of actually existing civil society so as to understand it in its actual formation, rather than as a promised agenda for change” (1996: 19). In his book *Citizen and subject*, Mamdani (1996) describes what he calls the ‘bifurcated state’ in Africa which he considers to be a result of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism entailed the creation of a category of citizens who enjoyed full civil, political and economic rights, and the creation of a category of subjects who where denied these fundamental rights. Settlers were given citizen status and had access to the cities while natives were subjected to customary rule and were contained in rural ‘reserves’. Mamdani argues that civil society should be seen as primarily the creation of the colonial state. As Mamdani (1996: 19) argues, civil society was profoundly racialised and “[t]he rights of free association and free publicity, and eventually of political representation, were the rights of citizens under direct rule, not of subjects indirectly ruled by a customarily organised tribal authority”. This is what Mamdani calls the first historical moment in the development of civil society in Africa. The second moment is the moment of the anti-colonial struggle. Mamdani sees this period as profoundly a struggle of the ‘native’ strata, the subjects, to gain entry into civil society. That entry, that expansion of civil society was the result of an anti-state struggle, and the consequence was the creation of an indigenous civil society. Mamdani therefore does not consider the emergence of civil society in Africa as a recent phenomenon that took off in the 1990s but considers anti-colonial movements as perfect examples of African civil society organisations which later established themselves as governments.

In their edited volume *Civil society and the political imagination*, anthropologists John and Jean Comaroff (1999) also deem it necessary to move away from the Eurocentric tendency to limit civil society to a narrowly defined institutional arena. In their book, they advocate for the acknowledgement of African forms of association, often perceived as ‘uncool’, ‘partisan’, ‘parochial’ or ‘fundamentalist’ in donor policy discourses. Instead of asking what the idea of civil society can tell us about contemporary Africa, they propose to ask what a specific set of African cases can “tell us about the planetary appeal of the Idea of civil society” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 3). Given the historical roots of the concept of civil society in European eighteenth century thinking, the Comaroffs ask: what were the circumstances under which the idea of civil society gained prominence in the European
context, and what could civil society mean in the African context? Like Mamdani, they propose to look at ‘actually existing civil society’ instead of transposing a prescriptive concept of civil society onto Africa to assess its match with this concept.

Similarly, Wachira Maina (1998: 137) has argued for the need to open up the concept of civil society which will reveal a broader spectrum of associational life:

A shift in perspective from a preoccupation with organizations and institutions to an activity view of civil society. Those who focus on organizational forms and institutions do great injustice to civil society in Africa. Much that is both interesting and transformative in the continent occurs outside or at the periphery of formal organizational life. Spontaneous protects, laxity and lack of discipline and active non-cooperation with the State are important civil activities. […] Spontaneous, non-confrontational methods […] are safer ways of registering one’s disagreement with the government than more robust public activities such as protest marches, placard-waving and burning effigies.

By broadening the definition of civil society, issues not captured in conventional theories on civil society suddenly become visible. While civil society as policy prescription merely seeks to highlight the absence of civil society in Africa in order to justify intervention from Western donors who have a vested interest in a weakened state and a stronger civil society dependent on donor funds, deployment of the concept of civil society as explanatory concept assists in revealing a complex, vibrant, diverse and historicised picture of associational life on the African continent.

The public sphere in the Habermasian sense
While the concept of civil society has often been considered as a policy prescription, a similar tendency can be discerned in writings on the public sphere in Africa. Of course, both are fundamental building blocks of liberal-democratic political theory and considered as essential to a well-functioning liberal democracy. The term ‘public sphere’ is mostly associated with the German sociologist Jurgen Habermas who used the term in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society which was published in 1962 in German but translated into English in 1989 and has since then become very influential.

In this book, Habermas argues that the emergence of capitalism in European feudal
societies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enabled a new sphere or space for the exchange of ideas through rational communication. In the feudal era, public communication was always constrained by the power of the two most powerful feudal institutions: the church and the state. Both exercised a very considerable degree of control over the circulation of ideas and information. However, with the expansion of capitalist markets and production relations, a new space emerged between the church and the state which opposed the absolutist monarchical regime. Habermas argued that this space “may be conceived as a sphere where private people come together as public and discuss matters of common concern” (1989: 27). In the public sphere, individuals were expected to put aside their private interests and to deliberate about the collective good. Habermas argues that the emergence of such a level of collective discussion was unprecedented in history, and was sustained by the emergence of a network of theatres, coffee shops, newspapers, journals and debating societies.

Habermas considers the public sphere as a normative concept and as a precondition for ‘true’ democracy, just like civil society has been considered as a crucial counterweight to the state. For Habermas, public deliberation is essential in order to ensure that the policy preferences of citizens are informed and enlightened. He considers the public sphere as a space where public opinion is shaped. Politicians then take democratic decisions on the basis of debates in the public sphere. The function of the public sphere is to mediate between civil society and the state and it provides a space for rational debate which would give rise to a consensus on public affairs. Media act as conduits in this regard; they constitute a discursive space, a space in which issues of public concern are deliberated. Audiences are seen as citizens engaged in public dialogue in and through the media. Media are considered as important in carrying information that enables citizens to make informed political choices. Having access to information on e.g. political parties is taken as “the precondition for political knowledge and action, and the creation of citizenship” (Bignell 2000: 155).

In his book, Habermas presents the concept of the public sphere as a profoundly normative concept. For example, he describes a historical transformation from the ‘good’ eighteenth century public sphere to a decline in what he considers a ‘worsening’ public sphere in the nineteenth century. Habermas argues that in the nineteenth century communication and the exchange of ideas increasingly became dependent upon a new group of sponsors and patrons and upon new structures of authority which pose an increasing threat to the rationality of debate and the universalistic criteria by which arguments should be evaluated. For Habermas, the capitalist system gradually coming into place in the nineteenth century replaces monarchs, church and feudal lords with advertising, public relations and commercial
sponsorship of mass communication. In this transformation, the distinction between rational communication and the public representation of private interests increasingly becomes blurred. As capitalism progressively re-feudalises the public sphere, the selection and representation of information placed in the public domain is undertaken according to commercial or political interests rather than based on ‘pure’ reason and rationality. In this regard, the demise of public service broadcasting and the commercialisation and tabloidisation of media is often brought up as an example of the declining public sphere and the ‘dumbing down’ of public debate.

Habermases’ account of the public sphere has been criticised for a number of reasons. First of all, critics have argued that the Habermasian public sphere was essentially a bourgeois space and not as easily accessible as was implied in his book. For example, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1972) have argued that the public sphere is not the exclusive property of the bourgeoisie. They distinguish an elite and proletarian public sphere which exist simultaneously along class lines, are formed by different and often competing constituencies, and are not usually recognised as legitimate public spheres. As examples, they include phenomena such as labour strikes and football matches which operate outside the usual parameters of institutional legitimation, and constitute different arenas of self-expression by groups excluded from formal arenas of public discourse. Similarly, Todd Gitlin (1998) highlights a trend towards a segmented public sphere split into public sphericules which further undermines Habermases’ idea of a unitary public sphere. Nancy Fraser (1992) also argues against the desirability of a unitary public sphere as normative ideal. She accuses Habermas of idealising his liberal public sphere and of failing to examine non-liberal, non-bourgeois and competing public spheres. Fraser particularly highlights the way in which women were excluded from Habermases’ liberal public sphere.

Another point of contention in Habermases’ theory is his focus on rational-critical debate which arguably is based on an elitist conception of liberal democracy that precludes a more radical conceptualisation of democracy as dissensus and conflict (Mouffe 2000). Habermases’ idea of rational debate as a power-free zone is highly ideological and exclusionary. It presumes that particularly those with access to education and those with property can participate in a rational form of debate, therefore excluding those without education and property. In his account of the public sphere, Habermas assumes the possibility of a consensual world in which there is a shared, mutual understanding of the conventions of debate and a shared interest in the outcome of political and moral debates. The Habermasian public sphere is characterised by rational communication that is undistorted by interests or
power structures. This is in strong contrast to for example Foucault who questioned whether it even makes sense to speak of the possibility of ‘rational communication’ given that power relations permeate all of human relations. Foucault would firmly reject the possibility of a power-free zone of communication. Habermas does not deal with the exclusion that is involved in the designation of a particular form of communication as the rational and democratically legitimate norm.

Foucault would be more interested in investigating under what conditions knowledge is considered as true and under what conditions a public sphere is considered to be rational. For him, truth is something that is contingent and constantly changing while Habermas retains a firm belief in the Enlightenment project, in a single truth which he would define as the outcome of rational public deliberations. For Foucault, rationality and power are not two opposing categories, in the sense that one situation is characterised by power and the next step is to move towards consensus and rationality. Foucault does not deem it possible to conceive of a public sphere as a space which is free from power relations under the right circumstances. However, for Habermas, the absence of market pressures under capitalism - which according to him resulted in the decline of the public sphere in the nineteenth century - could lead to a ‘better’ public sphere. Foucault, on the other hand, considers power relations to be always prevalent and he prefers to see the public sphere as a site of political struggle and conflict rather than as a consensual space.

Like the concept of civil society, the Habermasian notion of ‘public sphere’ should thus be understood as primarily a normative concept. Although many African(ist) scholars have critiqued the concept of civil society, the concept of public sphere has predominantly criticized from the fields of media and cultural studies. Points of contention have been: the bourgeois character of the Habermasian public sphere, his assumption of a unitary public sphere and Habermases’ neglect of power relations within the public sphere.

The debate on the public sphere in African studies

While there has been a vigorous debate on the notion of civil society in African studies and a lively exchange on the public sphere in media and cultural studies, there has been less explicit theorising on the concept of the public sphere in African Studies. Peter Ekeh’s seminal 1975 article entitled Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: a theoretical statement probably springs to mind most immediately. In this article, Ekeh (1975: 111) argues that the Western experience of a unified public sphere, which the state and civil society both occupy, is not reflective of African social spaces:
If we are to capture the spirit of African politics we must seek what is unique in them. I am persuaded that the colonial experience provides that uniqueness. Our post-colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics.

Crucial to this colonial inheritance is Ekeh’s distinction between two publics: the primordial and the civic public. Ekeh argues that the post-colonial African state has not been successful in its hegemonic drive, so that the political space it occupies is by no means the only public space that exists in Africa. For Ekeh, the sphere of what he calls the primordial public “occupies vast tracts of the political spaces that are relevant for the welfare of the individual, sometimes limiting and breaching the state’s efforts to extend its claims beyond the civic public sphere” (1975: 107). Ethnicity offers a shared identity in Ekeh’s primordial public. He provides voluntary ethnic-based associations as example of primordial publics.

However, even though Ekeh uses the term ‘public’, one could argue it actually refers to the notion of civil society. Subsequent scholars have also primarily adopted Ekeh’s concept in this way. For example, Eghosa Osaghea (2006) has used Ekeh’s ideas to argue that Western scholars in their conceptualisation of civil society have only focused on those organisations that had the capacity to challenge the state, and hereby they have excluded ‘rural and kinship, ethnic associations’ from their analysis, which for Ekeh would belong to the ‘primordial public’. In this way, as Osaghae argues, they have made it appear that Africa does not have a civil society. Because of their particular definition of civil society, they have not fully appreciated associational life in Africa.

As Calhoun (1993) has argued, it is common for scholars to use the concepts of civil society and public sphere interchangeably. However, as he outlines, the concepts have very different connotations. For Calhoun, the public sphere refers to a discursive space of public deliberation whereas civil society implies some form of political organisation. Furthermore, civil society is defined by virtue of being a realm outside the state (often in opposition to the state although this has been fiercely contested in African Studies). The notion of the public sphere, on the other hand, is defined in opposition to a private sphere, i.e. the domain of the home or the space where private interests dominate. Hence, the public sphere partly overlaps with the state and civil society; it is a sphere where both the state and civil society articulate their interests.
While Ekeh’s work may not explicitly engage with the definition of public sphere as an arena of public debate, his acknowledgement of the bifurcated nature of publics in Africa is useful. As stated above, Fraser, Gitlin and Negt & Kluge have all criticised the unitary nature of the Habermasian public sphere. Ekeh similarly argues that colonialism resulted into two fundamentally separate publics: the primordial and civil public. If we for example look at the way in which media in Africa constituted public spaces during colonialism, these could be referred to as civic publics which mainly targeted settler audiences. Africans were fundamentally excluded from these publics, and hence forced to establish their own spaces in what Ekeh refers to as the primordial public. A focus on a unitary public sphere such as Habermas recommends then prevents us from seeing alternative publics that have emerged both during Rhodesia’s regime and in current-day Zimbabwe. It is therefore more useful to speak of publics in the plural sense than to construct a single public as it will bring to light the different publics which contest each other.

Apart from Ekeh’s work, scholars working on popular culture have also – albeit implicitly - addressed the issue of publics in Africa (Ellis 1989; James and Kaarsholm 2000; Schulz 1999, 2002; Spitulnik 2002). An advantage of conceptualising sites of popular culture as publics is that it avoids Habermas’s elitist connotation of his concept of the public sphere. Popular culture often engages, interacts and responds to official debates. The concept is frequently defined in terms of its oppositionality to power, as is apparent from Stuart Hall’s definition: “The people versus the power-bloc: this, rather than ‘class-against-class’, is the central line of contradiction around which the terrain of culture is polarised. Popular culture, especially, is organised around this contradiction: the popular forces versus the power-bloc” (1981: 238). Hall derives his definition from Antonio Gramsci who considers popular culture as the arena where hegemony is contested.

In this regard, popular culture can be seen as a public space where ordinary Africans are able to debate issues and bring up matters of concern. Karen Barber (1987: 2) has argued that the most important attribute of popular culture in Africa is its power to communicate because “for the majority of Africans, the arts are the only channel of public communication at their disposal”. And as Barber (1987: 3) points out, this is especially so in a climate where the ruling elite dominate public space:

In Africa ordinary people tend to be invisible and inaudible. In most African states, numerically tiny elites not only consume a vastly disproportionate share of the national wealth, they also take up all the light. Newspapers, radio and
television offer a magnified image of the class that controls them. Not only does the ruling elite make the news, it is the news – as endless verbatim reports of politicians’ speeches, accounts of elite weddings and birthday parties, and the pages and pages of expensive obituaries testify.

Hence, the importance of songs, jokes and drama as important channels of communication for people who are not being granted access to official media. Barber sees popular culture as a space that is dominated by “a pervasive sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, even though the boundaries between these categories may be highly porous and shifting” (1997: 4). However, this is not to suggest that popular culture is necessarily class-based. It is not per se related to a particular stratum of society. Barber considers the ‘popular’ more as a field of exploration rather than as a stable identity. Popular culture is defined in its opposition to ‘them’, often political elites.

A central problem with studies of popular culture, however, is that these sometimes end up naively celebrating agency. As Lila Abu-Lughod has argued, they begin to read “all forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be dominated” (1990: 41). But, as she argues, “[b]y reading resistance in this way, we collapse distinctions between forms of resistance and foreclose certain questions about the workings of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990: 42). In many ways, the study of popular culture and resistance should be seen as a response to the privileging of elite culture as worthy of studying and the ignorance of working class culture. Also, it was a response to Marxism which considered popular culture as escapist and as a repository of false consciousness. Cultural studies opposed these ideas and argued that popular culture was something worth studying and could even form the basis for social change. But to some extent, this point has now been made: the study of popular culture has been placed firmly on the agenda and cultural studies has almost become institutionalised as Johannes Fabian (1998: 139) points out in his book on popular culture in Africa:

As I look back on this project […] I conclude it is, or should be, both. It is a manifesto in that the conclusion can only be a plea for more attention to and better understanding of elements that, so far, seem to have been revealed mainly with the help of the concept of popular culture. It is an epitaph in that popular culture studies in Africa should probably be thought of as belonging to those self-liquidating disciplines, the need for which disappears to the extent that they are successful in accomplishing their work.
Similarly, Mbembe is concerned about what he calls “the rediscovery of the subaltern subject and the stress of his/her inventiveness” which has “taken the form of an endless invocation of the notions of ‘hegemony’, ‘moral economy’, ‘agency’ and ‘resistance’” (2001: 5). Mbembe has also been critical of the hydraulic models of domination and resistance that have long dominated the historiography within African Studies. Instead, he proposes a deconstruction of these oppositional models and draws attention to ‘popular’ rituals of power and subordination that seem to simultaneously ridicule and reinstate state power. Unlike Bakhtin’s notion of carnival as a ‘popular’ site of the inversion of hierarchies through ridicule and parody, Mbembe’s postcolonial subject enthusiastically participates in state power through its rituals of ratification. As an example, Mbembe mentions how during a political rally, Togolese poached the meaning of the party acronym RPT making it synonymous not with Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) but subverting the acronym’s meaning to “the sound of a fart emitted by quivering buttocks which can only smell disgusting” (2001: 6). So Mbembe argues that the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled “is not primarily a relationship of resistance or of collaboration but can best be characterised as convivial” (Mbembe 2001: 104). This relationship then robs both the dominant and those dominated of their agency and makes them both impotent. Mbembe speaks of an ‘intimacy of tyranny’ which according to him inscribes “the dominant and the dominated within the same episteme” (2001: 110, 128).

While Mbembe does not explicitly claim to build up his theoretical framework around concepts of ‘public sphere’ and ‘popular culture’, both implicitly play an important role in his account of the postcolony. In his book, Mbembe shows how the rulers make attempts to claim public spaces through their extravagant state ceremonies which display the grandiosity of their power but at the same time, he demonstrates how the ruled manage to carve out a space for themselves, therefore constituting their own alternative popular publics next to official publics. Mbembe’s work is also important because it does not uncritically celebrate agency but provides a more complex and nuanced account of power.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have highlighted the problems and opportunities that the concepts of civil society, public sphere and popular culture offer when used in African Studies. First of all, the concept of civil society as policy prescription and Habermases’ concept of the public sphere should both be seen as highly normative and idealised notions which have often been used to demonstrate Africa’s lack, i.e. the absence of a civil society or an inadequate public sphere
tightly controlled by government. These notions have therefore not always contributed towards a richer and fuller understanding of associational life and publics in Africa. Hence, it may be necessary, as Appadurai and Breckenridge (1995) have suggested, to determine the meaning of civil society and publics in the specific African context and to remove these concepts from their European baggage:

[…] to loosen the link between the word public and the history of civil society in Europe, and to agree that it be used to refer to a set of arenas that have emerged in a variety of historical conditions and that articulate the space between domestic life and the projects of the nation-state – where different social groups (classes, ethnic groups, genders) constitute their identities by their experience of mass-mediated forms in relation to the practices of everyday life. Public in this usage ceases to have any necessary or predetermined relationship to formal politics, rational communicative action, print capitalism or the dynamics of the emergence of a literate bourgeoisie. Thus the term becomes emancipated from any specific Euro-American master narrative and indicates an arena of cultural contestation in which modernity can become a diversely appropriated experience.

A major problem with Habermases’ public sphere is its privileging of rational-critical debate as a precondition for a ‘good’ public sphere. This assumes that there is somehow a clear definition of what this would involve and it assumes that it is possible to move from a situation characterised by power and conflicting interests to a consensual phase. In line with Foucault, I prefer to see publics as spaces of conflict and contestation. The notion of popular culture has been useful in understanding how this process of contestation evolves. However, sometimes accounts of popular cultures have ended up in uncritically celebrating agency and resistance. Mbembe, in this regard, has offered a more complex account of power that moves away from the dichotomy between domination and resistance which has characterised a lot of work in African Studies. While this paper merely aimed to offer a preliminary evaluation of work on the public sphere in African Studies, it has made an attempt to outline some ways in which a more engaged dialogue between political scientists and cultural studies scholars could potentially contribute towards a fuller and richer understanding of publics in Africa. It is hoped that CODESRIA’s December 2008 conference will contribute to a similarly vibrant debate on the public sphere in African Studies as has already occurred on the concept of civil society.
References


