Citizenship and Nation Making in Nigeria:
New Challenges and Contestations

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Abstract
Since the creation of the Nigerian nation by the colonial powers, the process of state and nation making, or nation building as it is often called, has remained a priority of its various post-colonial governments. This process has, however, remained problematic resulting in an attempted secession and civil war, and the politicisation of regional state formation. These challenges are in spite of the popular discourse about Nigeria as one indivisible nation. While Nigeria’s various components remain under one government, recent experiences of a wave of ethnic and religious violence define the nature of ‘one Nigeria’. Furthermore, many of Nigeria’s constituent units are regrouping under regional ethnic umbrellas, and thereby not only threatening nationhood but also nurturing the possibility of dissolving into ethnic kingdoms. It is argued that Nigeria’s recent experiences of ethnic disturbances are consequences of the failure of its nation-building strategy that has long negated ethnic identity and a true sense of belonging for some ethnic groups. While the constitution has provisions for full and inclusive citizenship, the practice bestows this right on some and denies this to others. I argue that the nature of citizenship must be factored in, especially aspects relating to how and under what circumstances it is inclusive, and I conclude that true and inclusive citizenship holds out the prospects for ending the current ethnic contestations and attendant violence, and for an alternative nation making strategy in Nigeria.

Résumé
Depuis la création de la nation nigériane par les puissances coloniales, le processus de construction de l’État et de la nation est demeuré une priorité pour les différents gouvernements post-coloniaux. Cependant ce processus a posé un certain nombre de problèmes, allant jusqu’à provoquer une tentative de guerre civile/sécession, ainsi que la politisation de la formation d’États au niveau régional. Ces défis existent bel et bien, malgré le discours populaire présentant le Nigeria comme une nation unie et indivisible.

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Bien que les différentes composantes de l’État nigérian soient regroupées sous un seul gouvernement, les récentes violences ethniques et religieuses remettent en cause l’unité du pays. En outre, la plupart des composantes de ce pays sont regroupées sous des ensembles ethno-régiomaux; elles constituent non seulement une menace pour la nation, mais pourraient éventuellement former des royaumes ethniques. L’on avance que les récents troubles ethniques qu’a connus le Nigeria sont la conséquence de l’échec de la stratégie de construction de la nation, qui a longtemps nié l’identité et l’appartenance ethnique de certains groupes. Bien que la constitution comporte des dispositions prévoyant une citoyenneté intégrale et inclusive pour tous, la pratique accorde ce droit à certains et non à d’autres. Je soutiens, dans cet article, qu’une citoyenneté véritable et inclusive pourrait mettre fin aux contestations et à la violence ethniques, et aider à l’élaboration d’une stratégie alternative de construction de la nation au Nigeria.

Introduction

Ethnicity is a concept that at once conjures up images of militias and warfare as well as images of groups proudly attired in costumes that distinguish them from others. Both for good or ill, this concept is integral to Nigeria’s nation building project and its overall development process and as such, a recurring decimal in the annals of its nationhood. It is also an important factor in Nigeria’s struggles for the conquest of illiteracy, disease and poverty, the troika for which independence was fought, and which has remained a permanent agenda of the various post independence regimes.

As is now well documented (Otite 1990, Suberu 1996, IDEA 2000:90, Mustapha 1998), what is today Nigeria was cobbled together from a plethora of various nationalities and or ethnic groups, many of whom had had little contact. During colonial rule these plural groups were run as separate Southern and Northern protectorates until the 1914 amalgamation. One Nigeria was thus created by political fiat. But the amalgamation, the ‘mistake of 1914’ as the late chief Obafemi Awolowo, a frontline nationalist once called it, did not resolve the problems of ethnicity and Nigeria’s multifarious composition. Chief Awolowo underscored this festering problem of integration or nation building by referring to Nigeria as a ‘mere geographical expression’. One manifestation of this challenge is the extent to which all the plural groups feel part of the whole, or alienated and disenfranchised. The challenge is how to forge a sense of nationhood and belonging such that all can proudly experience unity in diversity.

More recently still, there have been waves of unrest in which erstwhile neighbours are pitted against each other and those assaulted are told to ‘go home’ and are expelled from specific geo-physical spaces. Furthermore, the assailed ethnic groups are frequently referred to as ‘settlers’ by other groups who claim to be ‘indigenes’ of particular geo-political spaces. In these contestations, the same language once used to rally Nigerians of diverse origins in the anti-colonial struggles has resurfaced (Alubo 2001). Clearly the nation building agenda is being further imperilled by these new challenges and contestations.
Since the creation of the Nigerian nation by the colonial powers, the process of nation building has remained a priority of its various post-colonial governments. This process has, however, remained problematic, resulting in an attempted secession and civil war, and later, in some of the states being excised from the Nigerian nation by a leader of the 1990 coup d’état. These challenges, along with the wave of ethnic—some also with a religious colouration—struggles are in spite of the popular discourse about Nigeria as one indivisible nation. At issue therefore is not whether Nigeria is one or not but the nature of this unity, and how ethnicity plays such a prominent role.

Ethnicity is used here to embrace the politics of, as well as action(s) taken, ostensibly, in the prosecution of agendas based on the notion of common language, descent or tribe. Along similar lines, Osaghae has defined ethnicity as ‘the employment or mobilisation of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict, or co-operation’ (Osaghae 1995:11). Such ethnically motivated action might take the form of agitation for greater share of, or participation in, local, regional or nation-wide affairs, protests or even violence. It may also involve problems such as combating illiteracy through the building of schools, providing infrastructure such as safe drinking water and access roads, and in some cases, economic activities such as communal ownership of rice and food processing mills. In effect, ethnicity is not by definition negative or antithetical to the nation-building project. It however harbours the potential of being hijacked by ‘visionaries’ and ‘leaders’ and turned into a weapon for the furtherance of particularistic aims, and thereby threatening nation building. Ethnic agitation could also threaten Nigeria’s corporate existence as it weakens allegiance to the nation. The nature of state-citizen relationships also has the same potential for mobilising ethnic groups to rise in self-defence. In this sense, the absence of material benefits attached to citizenship (Nigeria has no social security system) compels people to turn to the ethnic group for assistance.

Ethnicity essentially derives from ethnic group or tribe (no pejorative connotation), a term which refers to a group which has common descent or lineage, language affinities and shared cultural patterns. ‘Ethnic group’ is a nominal concept in relations to circumstance of birth, or what sociologists call ascribed status in which individuals have no choice about being born Idoma, Hausa, Ibo, or any of the other 270 tribes. In everyday interactions, ethnic origin generates a sense of identity, and through common cultural symbols, solidarity as well. However, an ethnic group on its own may not necessarily lead to ethnicity, the latter concept being inventions and products of more recent experiences in the contestations for space and valued resources in the nation building process (Ikime 2002). Nnoli (1978:5) long recognised this distinction when he differentiated an ethnic group in itself from an ethnic group for itself.

Other scholars do not distinguish ethnicity from ethnic group. A recent documentation of Nigeria’s nation building process for example conflated the two concepts this way:

The concept of ethnicity refers to a social identity formation that rests upon culturally specific practices and a unique set of symbols and cosmology. A belief in common origins and a broadly agreed common history provides an inheritance of symbols, heroes, events, values and hierarchies, and confirm social identities of both insiders and outsiders. Ethnic culture is one of the important ways people conceive of
themselves... ethnicity is a social construct. It has to be understood within historical context how individuals are called on to accept ethnic identity as an explanation of who they are, what exists, what the world is, what nature is, and what men and women are like (IDEA 2000:92).

In what follows, I address the contemporary forms of ethnicity in Nigeria and how these impact on nation building. I also focus on how ethnicity can and does contribute to the development agenda. It is argued that Nigeria’s recent experiences of ethnic disturbances are a consequence of the failure of its nation-building strategy that has long negated ethnic identity and a true sense of belonging for some nationalities. While the constitution has provisions for full and inclusive citizenship, the practice bestows this right on some and denies same to others in particular geo-political space or in some circumstances. I contend that the nature of citizenship must be factored in, especially those aspects relating to how and under what circumstances the status of citizen is inclusive. The concluding section deals with the way forward. I argue that true and inclusive citizenship holds out the prospects for ending the current ethnic contestations and attendant violence, and for alternative nation building strategy in ways in which Nigeria can come to terms with ethnic pluralism as well as uphold full and inclusive citizenship for all.

Recent Ethnic Blowouts and their Implications for Nation Building

Addressing the spate of ethnic violence and disturbances in Nigeria, both the perennial and the recent wave, requires some understanding of historical roots of these ‘blowouts’. I have elsewhere contended (Alubo 2001) that modern Nigeria is haunted by its past history, part of which entailed the suppression of ethnic identities, supposedly for the purposes of nation building. At some period the emphasis was on the employment of:

Universalistic concepts of state and citizenship, with little regard to pre-colonial cultures of exclusion which impedes access of casts, women and some linguistic and social groups to full citizenship in the nation-state...

While the ‘nation-building’ project was going on, along with the rhetoric of national unity, old patterns of exclusion and domination were continued and new ones invented. Consequently, the reality of ‘nation-building’ was often that some ethnic groups consolidated their grip on state institutions to the exclusion of others. The promise of common citizenship remained largely unrealised (Mustapha 1998:27-28).

This strategy received a fillip from the post-civil war reconstruction period which in the context of military rule created more centralisation. This led to a situation in which the entire country reflected a military formation. The emphasis was on uniformity and centralised command as part of deliberate attempts to build the centre (Agbese 2002).

As part of the process, there were deliberate attempts to paper over pluralism and diversity in favour of perceived unity (Ikime 2002). Thus in 1975, the central government took over many regional economic corporations, media and universities. The takeover included the New Nigerian newspapers, and the Ahmadu Bello University owned by the Northern states, and
the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) previously owned by the Western region. Furthermore, states (such as North-central renamed Kaduna, North-west renamed Sokoto, East central as Anambra, South-east as Cross River, etc) were renamed, supposedly to tone down regional attachment and forge ‘integration’. Also, some of the previous acknowledgments of diversity in Nigeria, such as articulated in the first national anthem ‘... though tribe and tongue may differ, in brotherhood we stand’, were discounted in favour of perceived unity. But in spite of such unity, the reality of ethnic and regional cleavages are too glaring to be denied. This reality is at play in virtually all aspects of national life—from elections to appointments to location of projects in which some ethnic groups are favoured and others disadvantaged.

With reference to elective office, President Obasanjo’s 1999 victory was understood as a power shift or a change from the North whose Generals had ruled the country for most of the military era. In this sense, it was a shift from the North, or Hausa-Fulani, to the South-west or the Yoruba. Furthermore, the victory was also understood as compensation to the Yoruba nation, one of whose members won the 1993 election that was annulled by the military. A more glaring manifestation of the role of ethnicity was the run-up to the elections scheduled for April 2003 in which the major party in the Southwest or Yoruba land, the Alliance for Democracy, did not field a presidential candidate. Instead, it endorsed Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the People’s Democratic Party.

Rather than deny diversity, the very concept of nation building process demands that every unit should count. Furthermore, the concerns that come to the fore often differ from one group to the other. In some groups, it is domination by larger groups; in others it is control over resources such as land, oil or access to fishing rights. In this sense, what are manifested as ethnic blowouts are multidimensional challenges that might have been subdued for some time but suddenly forced to the surface by particular events as depicted in Annex 1.

In Nigeria, the challenges to national security and the failure of the approaches to nation building are manifest in several ways, some of which, as Mohammed Kuna has argued, could assume violent dimensions:

Today, these issues are violently resurfacing, sometimes with terrible consequences. Conflicts—religious, communal and ethnic- have been on the increase. It is estimated that there have been about 250 of such conflicts in Nigeria since the Maitatsine in 1980 which, together with the Tafawa Balewa (1991) and Zagon Kataf (1992) conflicts, constitute some of the most serious identity conflicts in recent times... Communal violence still rages in Delta State between the Urhobo, the Igbo and the Itsekiri; in Osun State between the Ife and Modakeke; in Benue state between the Tiv and Idoma; and in Taraba state between the Jukun and the Kuteb. Similar conflicts still rage in other parts of the country (Kuna 1999:71).

Central to these blowouts is the fear of domination by the ‘other’, the majority ethnic group. This fear is exacerbated by the allegations of state support to further the cause of the ‘other’ (Ibrahim 2003:120). In the contestations around local development, the picture of a zero-sum game emerges; i.e. the security of the one is a function of the destruction of the feared other.
This position explains the frequent outbreaks of ethnic violence as a perceived means to an end.

The return to democracy in May 1999 and the freer atmosphere it ushered in seems to have provided fertile grounds for more challenges to national integration and security. Most of the contestations involve the declaration of some ethnic groups as persona non grata and their physical elimination, burning of property and being forced to ‘go home’—as if they lived in a foreign country. As the table below illustrates, the challenges of ethnicity and nation building are real.

There is an obvious rise in ethnicity and regionalism of dimensions that resemble the build up to 1967 civil war (Ikime 2002, Osaghae 2002). As part of the new challenges, many of the various ethnic groups that constitute Nigeria are regrouping under regional and/or ethnic umbrellas, and the Nigeria nation, touted after the civil war as one and indivisible, faces the threat of dissolving into ethnic kingdoms. Thus, the Afenifere is campaigning for the Yoruba nation, the Arewa People’s Congress and the Arewa Consultative Forum for the Huasa-Fulani or the old North, the Ohaneze for Ibos, and the Middle Belts Forum and the Northern Indigens Interest Council for the Northern minorities (Madunagwu 2000). Similar associations exist for the southern minorities, such as the Niger Delta Forum. The old challenges of ethnicity, religion, and region are resurfacing. Rather than the one nation, which the amalgamation was meant to accomplish, and for which a civil war (1967-1970) was fought, these centrifugal forces persist and continue to challenge national security.

The rise in ethnicity and regionalism has also spawned para-military units such as the O’dua Peoples Congress, which is the youth wing of Afenifere, the Bakassi boys in the Eastern states, who while not necessarily part of the Ohaneze, have the potential for alignment; and the Egbesu boys in the Niger Delta. In most of northern Nigeria, there is also Yanbanga which have had a long history of maintaining security and law enforcement. While there might be no direct links between it and the Arewa People’s Congress, it is obvious which side the Yanbanga would defend in any regional contestation. These various militia groups enforce the law, dispense summary justice, and are de facto alternatives to the police and judiciary system, as well as operating as ‘parallel gangster outfits’ (Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2003:22, Ukiwo 2002). As a recent study by the War College discovered, the entire country is now neatly taken over by ethnic militias (War College 2002, see also Obasi 2002, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2003). This rise of ethnic militias, some of which have precipitated ethnic violence such as the October 2000 Yoruba- Hausa clash in Lagos, has disturbing parallels to the ethnic militia and the war lords phenomena in Liberia and Somalia (Ugboru and Oko 2000). Furthermore, many of the recent ethnic blowouts were actually prosecuted by marauding gangs of ethnic militias who killed, maimed and burned in the process of ethnic cleansing (World Organisation Against Torture 2002).

More recently, the phenomenon of militias has come to threaten the democratic process. In the July 2002 primaries to choose candidates at the third tier of government in Jos Plateau State, open violence flared between militia gangs. In a similar manner, the primaries in several states had to be suspended ‘when militias descended on the opposition’ (Ogbo 2002:47). These various militia groups in the political process might relate to contenting
polITICAL candidates, one spiritedly attempting to outdo the other. On the more general level however, there are common underlying issues in the rise of ethnic contestations:—the struggle for more participation in national affairs, economic opportunities, and the control of resources or revenue sharing. The issue of revenue has both a general divisive potential as well as often being connected specifically to oil and its control, which as Ibeanu (2003) has noted is a driving force of postcolonial development.

In addition to the relations between the regions and the centre, there are also intra-regional conflicts. These latter often relate to issues of, as in the lyrics of the Nigerian musician Sunny Okoson, who owns the land (Ubwa 2002); representation on local and traditional councils (Adamu 2002); and issues that distinguish one group, the indigenes, from others, the settlers. Among these conflict genres is the festering conflict between Ife-Modakeke both of who are of the Yoruba ethnic group, and the Amuleri-Aguleri, both of Igbo extraction. Other manifestations however pit one ethnic group against the other such the Uhrobo-Itsekiri, Ogoni-Adoni, and the waves of attacks against the Tiv ethnic group by the neighbours in Nasarawa and Taraba States (Ubwa 2002, Maier 2000, Kuna 1999, IDEA 2002, Otite and Albert 1999, Albert 2001). Irrespective of whether the contestations leading to the blowouts are regional versus the central or intra-regional, the threats to nation building are the same—a lack of a sense of belonging and feeling a part of one indivisible Nigeria. It is important to explore why these threats and challenges are emerging now.

Explaining Ethnic Blowouts: Theoretical Perspectives

A melange of theoretical perspectives has proffered explanations surrounding the issues of national integration and nation building. These issues have been addressed mainly from the following perspectives: functionalism and the difficulty in welding a united nation from the multiplicity of tribes; struggles for identity; and access to power and other valued resources. This latter perspective, which informs this essay, examines ethnicity and nation building from a political economy approach. Put otherwise, a materialist interpretation of ethnicity is attempted.

The first school, represented by Billy Dudley (1978), canvassed the position that while attempts must continue to be made to forge a united country, the sheer number of tribes in Nigeria makes this a difficult task; or as James O’Connell once expressed it, as the inevitability of instability (cited in Gana 2002: 23). The elite is blamed for manipulating ethnic differences and whipping up primordial sentiments to cause ethnic conflicts and frustrate nation building. This perspective does not specifically address issues of identity and sense of belonging, which rather than sheer numbers are the more crucial factors in integration.

Without explicitly addressing the issue of unity, a string of scholars (Toare 1999; Kuna 1998, Kuka 1993, Mustapha 1998) have addressed identity and national integration. Colonialism, these scholars contend, has, through the imposition of indirect rule, brought discrete and smaller tribes under the rulership of the dominant ones and thus created problems of identity and a sense of belonging. These smaller groups are dominated and marginalised in the scheme of things (Ikime 2002, Ibrahim 2002). This is particularly glaring in the Middle Belt, the
region that harbours ‘the largest number of ethnic nationalities and language groups’ (IDEA 2000:291). Though classified as part of the North, the Middle Belt was comprised of various ethnic groups whose identities and cultures were different. However, colonial rule subjugated these smaller groups under the emirates and other forms of political structures of the Islamic North. Many of the names of the minority ethnic groups and communities in the region were changed to more ‘Hausanised’ versions. It was a state of affairs against which the central Nigerian region has engaged in persistent struggle and sought emancipation. For these various ethnic groups, ‘the very idea of Middle Belt came to function as a vehicle for political mobilisation’ (IDEA 2000:291, Tyoden 1993, Egwu 2002).

These struggles have been aptly captured in a recent book suggestively titled The Right to be Different. This collection persuasively makes the point about the separate identity of the Middle Belt from the old North under which it had previously been subsumed (Bagudu and Dakas 2001; also James 2001, Toure 1999). With reference to culture, the book shows that unlike the predominantly Islamic North, the Middle Belt was mostly animist, and that

... before any interaction with the Hausa-Fulani, the various nationalities that make up the today’s Middle Belt had their respective cultures. For instance the famous NOK culture which writers date to between 900 BC-200AD... there were several other aboriginal practices that were antithetical to both Christian and Islamic tenets (Hon 2001:139).

Part of this distinct culture included the brewing and consumption of local alcohol called brukutu, muss, pito, sha, etc.—a taboo practice in Islam. These differences presaged the new waves of sharia or Islamic law in the North, including its ban on alcohol.

In a context of these differences on the one hand, and their age-old negation on the other, a struggle for identity was to be expected. This struggle was waged on the political and other fronts. The emergence of the United Middle Belt Congress, the policy of Emancipation of Solomon Lar, Plateau State Governor in the Second Republic, and the concept of Mzeit man Mzeit (this rallying cry in the struggle translates as ‘ours is ours’) in the Zagon Kataf area are part of the contestations for self- determination (IDEA 2000, Ibrahim 1995, Mustapha 1996, Adeyi 1997). Such struggles are in some sense a natural tendency, as:

Ethnic-regional conflicts tend to emerge at moments when groups perceive that they are being excluded from access to what they consider to be their right; be they linguistic, political, economic, administrative, commercial, religious, etc (Ibrahim 2000:41).

In the case of the Middle Belt, the situation has persisted since the founding of a united Nigeria. The politics of the region is further complicated by the myriad of ethnic groups, each struggling for an identity, and hence:

Since independence the middle belt has been a scene of frequent flare-ups. The Nigerian and international media describe the frequent clashes as religious, but in fact they stem from minority ethnic groups’ attempts to wrench themselves free from what they see as the domination by the Hausa-Fulani establishment. Other eruptions
involve disputes between neighbouring ethnic groups over land and access to political office. The people of a given area often claim they are the ‘indigenes’ and their enemies are the ‘strangers’ or the ‘settlers’ seeking to upset the mythical natural order of things (Maier 2000:194).

The more obvious illustrations are the emirs of northern Nigeria whose emirates include ‘pagan’ tribes. After independence, many of these tribes, hitherto subsumed under others, began to agitate for their own identity. These agitations also included issues of political representation (Mustapha 1997) as well as access to, and control of, resources (Meir 2000, IDEA 2000).

More recent experiences in the Middle Belt reveal a gradual breakdown, or at the very least, a suspension, of the pan-regional agenda. The same region which sought collective emancipation from Hausa-Fulani domination (see Adeyi 1997), has recently experienced the most violent forms of ethnic cleansing in Nigeria. Rather than the smaller ethnic groups uniting against the perceived Hausa-Fulani enemies, these smaller groups have engaged each other in wars, such as the Tiv and Alago (and other tribes such as the Eggon, Mada, and Fulani), Tiv-Jukun (Alubo 2002, Human Rights Watch 2002, Egwu 2002, Ubwa 2002). In this sense, it is important to investigate when ethnic differences are subdued for the pan-regional agenda of emancipation, and under what circumstances the latter comes to the fore. It appears that the in a context of keener competition for resources ‘spurred by the outbreak of a major economic crisis and the subsequent introduction of orthodox market reforms in the form of IMF and World Bank supported structural adjustment program’ (Egwu 2002:2), various nationalities are turning to ethnicity as a means of attaining advantageous positions. Hence, while there is a long-standing struggle against Hausa-Fulani domination, it is immediately more crucial to have unfettered access to land—even if this sets groups against each other—control over political appointments, and a voice. These issues are the key factors in the 2001 Tiv-Alago as well as the Tiv-Jukun crisis. In the latter, there is competition for access to resources between those that consider themselves ‘indigenes’ (the Jukun) and those that are considered as more recent ‘settlers’ (World Organisation Against Torture 2002:133).

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is replete with tales of ethnic conflicts, which, we argue, are ultimately materially motivated—access to land, public appointments which create other opportunities for valued resources and wealth, and the control of oil. Indeed,

Egwu provides empirical support [for the materialist interpretation] that communal identity remains a potent instrument of material advancement in Nigeria. He shows how the new patterns of accumulation, especially the transformation of agrarian based state to a rentier state, following the oil boom of the seventies, has accentuated the struggle for ethnic ascendance, geo-political advantage, personal accumulation and class domination. Add to these violent clashes engendered by land hunger wearing ethnic togas (Gana 2002:23)

In addition, other conflicts conflate ethnicity with religion such as the spate of disturbances in and around Jos since September 7, 2001 (Alubo 2002, Danfulani and Sati 2002). The
The immediate cause of this crisis was appointment of Alhaji Mukthar Mohammed as co-ordinator of the Federal Government Poverty Eradication Programme. The indigenes were piqued why such an important appointment should go to a settler (World Organisation Against Torture 2002: 111). These latter events which have continued to erupt sporadically pit the indigenous population against the Hausa-Fulani, who are also regarded as settlers. The bottom line is however the same—key appointments with all that they portend for material advantage.

These struggles for identity and self determination often take on a material expression in terms of control over resources such as the Niger Delta communities and oil revenue, or access to land in Zagon Kataf (see Maustapha 1997 and Meir 2000), or access to decision-making and political representation (Alubo 2000). While there are dominant ethnic groups at the centre, the nature of this domination is such that some of the minority ethnic groups at the centre are *de facto* majorities at the other levels. In this way, the ‘other’ is continuously being defined and redefined from the federal, state, and local government areas. In the Central region of Nigeria, for example, the Tiv, though a minority at the national level, are the largest ethnic group in the region. Furthermore, similar fears of domination, and denial of self-determination at the centre, are replicated at the regional and local levels, leading to the effectively tiered nature of minority and majority. Minority ethnic groups in this region make similar allegations against the Tiv as the others, including the Tiv, make against *wazobia* (the three majority ethnic groups) at the national level.

The contests for identity, access to and control over resources, and positions are further complicated by the practice (distinct from the principle) of citizenship in Nigeria. Citizenship as all-embracing—irrespective of tribe, religion and sex as expressed in article 42 of the 1999 constitution—actually receives short shrift in favour of other primordial considerations. The concept of indigene is prevalent in the country, a concept which refers to descent rather than place of birth. In effect, anyone born outside the native home of the tribe is regarded as a settler and there is no provision for converting to an indigene. There are elaborate processes to ensure that inclusive citizenship is discounted for the narrower concept of indigeneity. In most states in Nigeria certificates of indigene are issued to give indigenes privileges and opportunities (such as scholarships, employment), which are denied to others. Other Nigerians, including those who might have been born and lived their entire life in a location are called ‘settlers’, a practice which is central to many of the civil disturbances in Nigeria (James 2000, IDEA 2000, Philips 2000).

One recent documentation of ethnic violence highlights the settler/indigene distinction in bold relief:

> In terms of access to resources and opportunities in day-to-day life, the distinction between ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ is critical. In practice the two groups effectively have different rights, resulting in discrimination and inequalities of access in many fundamental areas of life and human well being. The impact was and remains particularly felt in education and employment, where an informal two-tier system operates. For example ‘non-indigenes’ have to pay higher fees to enter good public schools. While paying the same taxes as ‘indigenes’ ‘non-indigenes’ complain of discrimination and harassment in their search for employment especially in the civil ser-
vice and federal institutions, where many senior positions are seen as effectively
reserved for ‘indigenes’ (World Organisation Against Torture 2002:111).

This distinction between indigenes and settlers is at the root of some of the recent challenges
to the nation-building project. This is because indigeneity is by descent, which in addition to
violating the constitution, makes it impossible for ‘settlers’ to realise full and inclusive
citizenship in their place of domicile. In this sense, integration is problematic because a
settler cannot become an indigene irrespective of duration of residency (Mamdani 200), and
hence the reality that, as the Zairians say ‘a tree trunk does not become a crocodile just
because it has spent some time in the river’ (see Williams 2002:10).

The distinction between indigenes and settlers has translated to the denial of inclusive
citizenship rights to the latter. As the Justice Minister, Kanu Agabi, has stated, the operation of
indigene-settler dichotomy brings with it a level of discrimination to which even

Non-Nigerians are not subjected to the kinds of discrimination that (settler) Nigerians
are subjected. Whereas a Japanese or Korean may readily find employment in some
states, the same opportunity or privilege will often be denied a Nigerian with identical
qualifications. Against that background, a non-African who has the merits enabling
him/her to qualify for citizenship need not apply for citizenship as he already enjoys
rights and privileges which are denied Nigerians (Agabi 2002:3).

As I address in a later section, this discrimination has persisted in part because the executive
arm of government has pandered to the sentiments of indigenes against settlers.
Government has, in many cases, failed to match its rhetoric of full and inclusive citizenship
with the practice and hence the failure of nation building.

Perhaps, the most trenchant articulation of the indigene versus settler distinction is President
Obasanjo’s opening speech at the January 2002 retreat to address ethnic and religious conflict
in the central region. According to the President:

Many citizens are threatened and denied their God-given and constitutionally
guaranteed right to live and earn their living anywhere in our nation by such
monstrosities as ‘non-indigene’, ‘stranger’, ‘native’ or ‘settler’ constructions which
create huge barriers between our people. Very often, the irony is lost to our people that
every Nigerian is both an ‘indigene’ and a ‘settler’ and we pay a huge price when we
ignore this fact... it exposes all of us and all our primordial loyalties to the evils which it
generates... it militates against the imperative of the integration of our national
economy which demands that men and capital must be allowed to move freely and
grow wherever they choose (Obasanjo 2002:3-4).

In summary, experiences with civil disturbances invariably relate to the question: who is a
citizen? What are his/her rights and entitlements? They also illustrate that citizenship in Nige-
ria is tenuous and varies with space and time. Thus, an ethnic and religious group may be
persecuted in a particular region and told to ‘go home’, indicating that such groups do not
belong in the community. This variation also affects the nature of participation and sense of
belonging, and hence one requires some certification to participate or even to benefit from
resources. In modern Nigeria, the distinction between indigenes and settlers throws this denial of citizenship into bold relief. At the one level all are citizens of Nigeria under the constitution, but at the level of daily existence one group is favoured and the other is discriminated against. This essay adopts the perspective of ethnicity and ethnic contestations as expression of struggles for citizenship, identity and boundaries—and therefore part and parcel of the nation-building project.

Ethnicity as a Force in Development and Nation Building

Perhaps because of the violence and the attendant wanton destruction, ethnicity is more associated with negative factors such as violence. The positive aspects—such as a feeling of solidarity and ethnicity’s ability to galvanise people in a common cause—are frequently overlooked. In this section, I argue that ethnicity is a force both in nation building and in the development process, and as such could therefore be either positive and negative.

A central area in which ethnic solidarity has been used to further the development process is education. As the history of education in Nigeria (Fafunwa 1974) shows, the regions which had a head start did so in part because of collaboration with the missionaries. Often, the community was called upon to build schools which the missionaries took over and ran. It is therefore no accident that in regions where this occurred, access to secondary education was much easier. In most regions today there are community schools named after particular ethnic groups, (such as the Idoma Community School, Uhrobo College, etc). These names are in recognition of roles the entire group played in establishing the school. Like Western education itself, ethnic involvement in the establishment of educational institutions too seems to have rapidly spread from the Southern half and eventually to Middle Belt and to Northern Nigeria. In many parts of Southern Nigeria, the development agenda moved so rapidly that communities became torchbearers in the founding and running of schools. Fortunately, the modern Nigerian State appears to acknowledge this role and ‘partners’ with communities in providing staff and other kinds of assistance. In many of these cases, common descent is used as rallying point and as a reason why people must come together in the war against illiteracy.

It is revealing that some projects now demand community involvement as precondition. The current Universal Basic Education Project of the Obasanjo administration for example demands up to 40 percent community input as a precondition for benefiting from its self-help projects. Often, such contributions are canvassed on ethnic and lineage lines. In effect, the old practice of the ethnic group as a force in nation building and development is not only still alive but also a condition for benefiting from government resources.

The post-civil war reconstruction in Eastern Nigeria was facilitated more by ethnic challenges and the notion of nkanyi bu nkanyi (mine is mine) than the government’s ‘three Rs’—(reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction). In most communities in the war-affected areas, the damages would, perhaps, have remained to this day but for efforts of members in rebuilding roads, schools, markets and other facilities. The post-war reconstruction showed the determination of people to overcome setbacks and to move ahead in life. One could say
with little fear of contradiction that the war affected areas overcame this drawback and are now engaged in facing the same challenges of development as other areas on the basis of ethnic mobilisation. What is more, the communal spirit that the reconstruction has spurred has enabled several areas to obtain safe water and electricity through communal efforts and ‘launchings’, in Nigeria’s own version of harambee.

I conclude this section by noting that in most of Nigeria, the task of meeting everyday needs is being borne more by ethnic and community development unions than government. As I have noted elsewhere, there is the de facto emergence of self-governance in which government—at all three tiers—plays the role of Pontius Pilate in relation to the people’s daily lives. In a pervasive display of what the late Claude Ake called the irrelevant state,

Nigerians who were offered so much hope—and expectations—are now compelled to look after themselves, the best they can. Government’s presence or impact on their lives is either largely absent or even counter productive (excessive taxation for example). Thus, in both urban and rural communities, Nigerians tax themselves to provide their own parallel structures for water and power supply. The Nigerian people also maintain streets and highways just as many communities provide their own security outfits. The list is endless as even institutions like public primary and secondary schools, rickety as most have become, would have collapsed completely but for the efforts of communities via the Parents Teachers Associations.

So by some cruel turn of events and long neglect, what a colleague calls a new form of ‘self-governance’ has emerged, the very opposite of what millions toasted on October 1, 1960 (Alubo 2001).

A final aspect of the government’s contribution to stoking the fires of ethnicity is in the making of key appointments. In principle, of course, efforts should be made to give all citizens irrespective of ethnic background a sense of participation in governance. But in practice key appointments seem to be frequently guided more by the political calculus of the regime in power, and the extent to which such appointments strengthen its hold, than the broader goal of nation building and integration. The politics of appointments and the presence of a seeming preserve for indigenes is illustrated in the headship of federal institutions located in the states. Since about 1995, the headship of virtually all federal establishments such as Federal Government Colleges, including the ‘unity’ schools, Polytechnics, Colleges of Education, University and Research Institutions have gone to indigenes, often in complete disregard of other criteria such as seniority and experience. Such appointments further reinforce the indigene/settler divide and thereby weaken the foundations of nation building. For instance, in a contest for the position of Director-General of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in 2002, the Government of Plateau State contended ‘that it is their birthright to produce the head of any federal establishment located in the state’ (Salami 2002:3).

The issue of appointments is in addition to the extent of government’s seeming lack of evenhandedness in its reward and punishment system. There are persistent complaints that all Nigerian governments have favoured the three major tribes, popularly called the Wazobia,
to the exclusion of the minorities, when locating major projects and in making key 
appointments. Also, cases of the government’s heavy hand since the 1999 return to civil rule 
(such as in Odi in 2000 and in Zaki Biam and environs in 2001, see appendix I) have been 
largely among minority ethnic groups despite similar situations in majority areas.

To conclude, I have argued in this section that national development, still inadequate in terms 
of the percentage and levels of literacy, the numbers that have access to safe water, or other 
measures, would have been much lower but for ethnically propelled development projects 
and programmes. Through civil society associations suggestively named ‘development asso-
ciations’, various ethnic and community groups have risen to the challenge and ensured 
greater access to educational opportunities, safe water, and medical facilities—in a word, 
development. While these are certainly important contributions, they also serve to 
dialectically weaken allegiance to a central government or authority that has little impact on 
the people’s lives. Part of the challenge of ethnicity, nation building and development lies in 
the state fulfilling its part of the contract with its citizens rather than passing these off as self-
governance—even as the same government is spending millions on the health of those 
elected to ensure health equity for all. In one quarter of 2002 alone, the House of 
Representatives spent over N200 million on medical bills (Oshunkeye and Bakarae 2002:24). 
Rather than the cultivation of privileges for the elite, the challenge is for government to back 
citizenship with material provisions, or in the argot of the times, with dividends.

Facing the Challenges of Ethnicity, Nation Building and Development

The burden of this essay has been to illustrate the nature and manifestation of ethnicity in 
modern Nigeria and how this process impacts on nation building and the broader 
development agenda. I have illustrated that ethnicity and its violent expressions have become 
ferocious and frequent, particularly, since the return of civilian rule in May 1999. I have 
ascribed this wave of ethnicity to a combination of keen contests for scarce resources, the 
government’s practice of differential treatment of ethnic groups, and the denial of full and 
inclusive citizenship for all, irrespective of tribe or region of residence. Intricate structures 
have been woven to distinguish ‘indigenes’ from ‘settlers’, with many more rights, privileges 
and opportunities accorded the former than the latter. The result is a fierce competition 
leading to the conflicts which have wracked the country in recent years.

These contestations are destined to dog Nigeria for long time, unless and until the citizenship 
question is confronted. A regime in which citizenship is based on residency requirements, to 
be agreed and subsequently inserted into the constitution, rather than the current distinction 
between indigenes and settlers, holds out the promise of a diffusion of most of the current 
tension. This suggestion would require that those who currently have two homes (the ethnic 
land, and the location where they live, work and pay taxes) can only be residents of one, not 
both. The context of the manifestation of ethnicity further suggests the following:

- Government—federal, state and local council levels—need to re-examine the system 
of rewards and sanctions to ensure more equity and evenhandedness in both regions 
of majority and minority ethnic groups.
- The effective introduction of full and inclusive citizenship for all Nigerians including those currently referred to as indigenes and settlers. This will ensure a truer sense of belonging to the much desired ‘one strong and indivisible country’ as well as being in accord with constitutional provisions.

- Backing up of citizenship rights with more material advantages so that falling back on ethnic groups to weather the storm would become unnecessary.

These suggestions are perhaps radical in Nigeria at present, especially as they could potentially overturn the present system that sustains and reinforces the rise of ethnicity, by shifting identity from the tribe to the geo-political region of residence. But the suggestions also hold the potential for ending, or at least curtailing, the current and future ethnic contestations and attendant violence, and for an alternative nation building strategy where full and inclusive citizenship will be possible for all.

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Annex 1: Major Cases of Civil Unrest since May 1999

1. 31/05/1999 Warri-Delta

2. 21/05/1999 Kafanchan
   Disturbances ensued as a result of the installation of a new Emir of Jema’a, Alhaji M. Muhammed. The indigenes of Southern Kaduna said they denounced being ruled by the emirate system. This was however opposed by the Hausas. Thirty people were killed and properties destroyed. The death toll rose to 100 people the next day. People fled to safety zones, curfew imposed and anti-riot police were sent. *Guardian* 24th and 25th May 1999, pp. 1 and 2.

3. 6/05/1999 Escravos: Popo and Madandha
   Hostilities between Ijaw and Itsekiri youths. Ijaw youths in an attempt to rescue passengers on board a Diesel Vessel (belonging to an Ijaw man) that developed an engine problem midstream were allegedly attacked by the Itsekiri youths who claimed the vessel was in their territory. One soldier was wounded and 5 held hostage. *Guardian* 7/05/99 (6 pages). On 30/5/1999, the crisis escalated and death rose to 200 including 4 soldiers. 150 soldiers were deployed to the crisis area. *Guardian* 2/6/1999, pp. 1 and 2.

4. 15/5/1999 Taraba
   Cattle Fulanis and farmers clashed in Karin Lamido and Sanusi villages. In Karin Lamido, 20 villages were burned and many lives lost. In Sanusi Village, about 50 heads of cattle were killed. *Standard* 17/6/1999, pp. 1 and 3.

5. 15/5/1999 Wanton Village, Warri
   50 people were burnt to death while 8 people were beheaded and wanton looting of properties worth millions of naira. The youth said they wanted certain demands met. *Vanguard* 31/05/1999, pp. 1 and 2.

6. 16-17/07/99 Sagamu
   An alleged Hausa prostitute killed by the Oro Masquerade during their festival during which there was a no-go-out at night order as from 12 midnight. The Hausa retaliated. About 100 people died and scores of others wounded. The police were accused of being lax. The Hausas fled to their ancestral home. President Obasanjo visited the place and relief materials were provided. *Tell*, 2/8/1999; *ThisDay*, 24/7/99, pp. 15-19.

7. 22/07/99 Kano
   The fleeing Hausas back in Kano told tales of woes leading to a retaliatory attack on the Yorubas and other ethnic groups. Over 300 dead and properties worth millions destroyed. 47 persons were arrested. Relief materials were provided by the Federal Government when the President visited Kano. *ThisDay*, July 24-25, 1999. *Tell*, 9/8/1999, p.20.
8. 0/8/1999 Oroto village, Ondo
Crises between the Ijaws and the Ilajes. Obasanjo ordered immediate deployment of soldiers to the area following the refusal of the two communities to embrace peace. The Ilajes were fighting to claim their land at Ajapa. Twenty-five people lost their lives. Many sustained injuries. The President visited the feuding area and relief materials were provided. *ThisDay* 9/8/1999, pp 1-2.

9. 2/8/1999 Anambra

10. 20/11/1999 Odi
Egbeseu boys and the Nigerian military who came for reprisal attack to avenge the killing of 12 policemen. Fifty soldiers lost their lives. Total demolition through shelling of Odi town and hundreds of people Over 50 houses were torched over boundary adjustment involving communities in Akwa Ibom and Abia States.

11. 20/11/1999 Odi

12. 20/11/1999 Bayelsa
Closure of petroleum black market in Bayelsa resulted into fracas. 50 people lost their lives in the fracas and another 30 were executed by soldiers. *Tell* 29/11/1999 p. 22.

13. 7/2/2000 Akwa-Ibom and Abia
Over 50 houses were torched over boundary adjustment involving communities in Akwa Ibom and Abia States.

14. 21/2/2000 Kaduna
Sharia war as Christian protest through peaceful demonstration to stop Kaduna State in its bid to introduce Sharia in the State. An estimated 1000 people killed and properties worth millions were destroyed. Soldiers and anti-riot police were sent. *Newswatch* 6/3/2000, pp. 8 – 21; *Newswatch* 5/6/2000 p. 37.

15. 18/3/2000 Eleme and Okrika, Rivers

16. April 2000 Nkpor, Anambra
Conflict as a result of control of Nkor main market. 10 lives were lost and properties worth millions destroyed. 3 children belonging to a traditional chief were burnt while asleep. *Punch* 4/4/2000, p. 1 and 6.
17. April 2000  Gbokama (Rivers)
Disagreement between elected representation and leaders of MOSSOP. 5 people were killed and properties destroyed. Youths kidnapped and maimed police. 7 pick-up vans were burnt, 2 belonging to the Police. *Punch* 13/4/2000, p. 1 and 2.

18. July 2000  Ikare (Ondo)
Feud between the two recognized traditional rulers in the town, the Owale and Olukare. 3 lives lost and 40 people injured and 20 houses including the only police station in the community were burnt. *Guardian* 4/7/2000, back page.


20. 10/10/2000  Lagos
OPC attacked the Embassies of USA, Bulgaria and Italy in protest of alleged killing of 2,500 Nigerians in Libya. 3 policemen were wounded and an unidentified person lost his life. *Newswatch* 23/10/2000, p. 29; *Tell* 23/10/2000.

21. 1/12/2000  Okigwe (Imo)
Scores of heavily armed soldiers and police stormed Okigwe in search of MASSOB leaders. Scores of people were killed. Cars were shot and people arrested. Residents of the town fled to the bush and nearby villages. *ThisDay* 3/12/2000, pp. 1 and 2.

22. 4/1/2001  Godogodo (Kaduna)

23. 15/2/2001  Olumaibin
This violence erupted among factions of Ijaw youths over the control of cash paid out by the oil multinational, Shell, to certain interest groups. 20 people were killed and several houses were razed, compelling residents to relocated to neighbouring villages. *ThisDay* 25/2/2001, p. 3.

24. 30/3/2001  Kano
Clash between rival groups of gangsters known as Yan-daba. 34 people allegedly killed and 80 persons arrested by the police. *Standard* 4/4/2001, pp. 1 and 2.

25. 12/01.2001  Okene
Renewed hostilities between youths from Iddoji and Iddozumi communities. Five people were killed and property worth thousands destroyed. The Speaker House of Assembly asked the youths for ceasefire. *Vanguard* 14/1/2001, p. 2.

26. 6/2/2001  Owo (Ondo)
Tussle over chieftaincy tool of Olowo of Owo. 5 people were killed and 20 injured. *Guardian* 8/12/2001, p. 3.
27. February 2001 Yenogoa, Bomo West Central LGA
Festering fracas, which started last year involving youths and community de-
velopment over the control of royalties accruable to the community from the
oil company operating in the area. 60 people were killed. Anti-riot policemen
were dispatched. *Vanguard* 20/2/2001, p. 1 and 2.

28. 3/3/2001 Calabar
Fighting between 2 rivalry factions of PDP at a ward congress. Many people

29. 19/3/2001 Kogi and Borno
In Borno, 9 people were killed during a reprisal attack from cattle rearers. In
Kogi 2 people were killed in a factional fight. Several people were wounded.
*Vanguard* 21/3/2001 back page.

30. 30/3/2001 Ogoni
As a result of an age-long dispute over a piece of land between the Dayor and
Dekan communities, people lost lives and property destroyed. 4-truck load of
armed policemen were sent there. *Vanguard* 4/4/2001.

31. 3/4/2001 Oduum, Quaan Pan
Between the Tiv and Kwalla people. 40 lives were lost and properties de-
stroyed. It was alleged to be a Fulani attack. The
Fulansis claimed it was an attack to avenge the killing of a Fulani man, his wife
and 3 kids. All the Tivs in the area fled for safety. *Guardian* 14/4/2001, pp. 1,
10 and 11.

32. 7/4/2001 Kaduna
Creation of 20 new chiefdoms and 62 new districts in Zangon Kataf LGA brought
hostilities between the Bajju and Ikalu ethnic groups leaving 4 people dead

33. 12/4/2001 Wase, Plateau State
Communal clash between Bogghom and Tarok Communities, over ownership
of economic trees, Mangu and locust bean. 7 lives were lost and property
worth millions destroyed. Anti-riot police were dispatched there. *Vanguard* 19/

34. 24/4/2001 Shendam, Gidan-Zuru (Plateau)
A spillover of the clash between the Tiv and the Kwalla people of Quaan Pan,
101 houses were burnt and policemen (50 conventional and 40 mobile police-
men) were sent to the area. Up to 20 people lost their lives. The villages of
Gidan Zuru and Makera Agu which are predominantly Tiv were deserted. The
*Guardian* 28 and 30 April 2001, pp. 2 and 3.

35. May 2001 Onitsha, Anambra State
This crisis was a gun battle between ABS (Bakassi) and the Nigerian Police.
The ABS challenged an order to leave the State, 12 Policemen were seriously
36. May 2001 Ifelodun LGA (Kwara)
A suspended ANPP Chairman in an entourage of 30 vehicles attempted to
resume duties against the order of a High Court. In the ensuing melee 23
people were injured and 12 vehicles were destroyed, *The Vanguard* 17/5/

37. May 2001 Obigo, Port Harcourt
MASSOB Vs Police over attempt by police to stop the former from hoisting
the Biafran flag in a border town, which lies between Aba and Port Harcourt. 3

38. 12/6/2001 Azara, Nasarawa State
As part of an ongoing communal crisis, the Chief of Azara Village, Musa Ibrahim
was killed; widespread violence between the Tiv Vs Alago, Hausa and Fulani
ensued.

39. 26/6/2001 Obi (Nasarawa State)
The crisis (from the slaying) resulted in the displacement of over 50,000 Tiv

40. 6/9/2001 Yalla Ezekwe Community
Clash between Christians and traditionalists in the bid to observe the annual
festival of sacrifices preparatory to the new yam festival. The Christians who
were also having their conference were attacked. Churches were torched and
all Christians were sent on exile. Police vehicles were smashed. *Newswatch*
29/10/2001, p. 12.

41. 12/10/2001 Kano
Osama bin Laden riots in protest of US attack on Afghanistan led to the death
of up to 200 people, scores were injured, several vehicles, houses, and
15/10/2001, pp.1 and 2.

42. 02/1/2002 Zaki Biam
Soldiers, invade 5 villages in Benue State including Gen Malu's house in re-
prisal attack “to recover the murdered 19 soldiers and arms and ammunition.

43. 02/1/2000 Mambila
Clash between armed youths and the Fulani “settlers”. About 50 people were
killed. About 20,000 Fulanis emigrated to the neighbouring Cameroun. 9 and
13 Jan, 2002 of *ThisDay*, p. 3 and back page.

44. 6/1/2002 Loko
Dispute over possession and usage of a fishpond located in Ayole village in
Loko district. 100 persons were killed by a group suspected to be Fulani and
45. **January 2002** Vwang District, Jos South, Plateau State
An attack by the Fulanis suspected to be connected with the killing of some Fulanis during the September 7, 2001 Jos crisis. 18 persons were killed by a group suspected to be Fulani. *ThisDay* 2/1/2002, *New Nigerian* 3/1/2002, p. 3.

46. **18/1/2002** Danja, Katsina
Clash between the Police and market crowd. The fracas ensued when a cart pusher was beaten by policemen after the cart pusher accidentally nudged the policeman with the cart. 10 people including policemen were killed. *Trust* 21/1/2002, p. 1. *ThisDay* 22/1/2002, p. 1.

47. **2/2/2002** Idi Araba, Mushin and Morgan Street (Lagos)
Hausa Vs. OPC. The clash started when a young Hausa man went into the bush to ease himself near OPC secretariat. The OPC arrested the boy demanding for Naira 2,500.00. The boy was manhandled. In the ensuing fracas, 100 people lost their lives, 460 injured and property worth millions of naira destroyed. There were countless refugees. *Newswatch*.

48. **Kogi**
Conflict between Epielo in Benue and Adupi community in Kogi over ownership of a well allegedly dug by Epielo on a piece of land belonging to Adupi community. 28 houses burnt and several people injured *New Nigerian* 3/2/2002, p. 16.

49. **Calabar**
Clash between residents of Ikonelu in CRS and Oku Iboku in A/Ibom several lives were lost and properties work millions of naira destroyed. Over 20 houses torched and more than 2000 people displaced. *New Nigerian* 20/2/2002, p. 26.

50. **Enugu**
14 worships die after a church crusade in Enugu in a stampede. Political opponents accused Nnamani, the state governor. That 2 people who came in a Peugeot 504 car on approaching the adoration center fired canisters of poisonous substance that made people who inhale it to collapse. *Newswatch* 15/3/2002.

51. **19/2/2002** Delta
A reprisal attack by the police on Obiaruku community after burning the police station in February. 10 youths were killed, 176 people injured while property of 291 people were destroyed. The crisis started over alleged ineptitude of the police to handle armed robbery attack in the area especially the Afribank robbery which occurred on the 18/2/2002 along Sapele road. *Newswatch* 8/4/2002, pp. 52-55.
52. March 2002  
Kasa in B/Ladi LGC-Plateau  
Reprisal attack by the Fulani community as retaliation for the September 2001 killing in the area.

53. 2/5/2002  
Gakana and Khan LGC  
PDP Ward and LG Congress at Eto-Baba and Angwan Rukuba ended in a sharp disagreement between the 2 rival groups. 20 people were killed. Houses and vehicles destroyed many innocent people wounded. *Newswatch* 25/5/2002, pp. 44 – 45, *ThisDay* May 5, 2002, p. 3.

54. 5/5/2002  
Gokana and Khan LGC  

55. 26/3/2002  
Yelwan-Shendam, Plateau State  
Disagreement between a Moslem driver and a non-Moslem cyclist. The cyclist was allegedly knocked down by the driver. Conflict ensued over compensation or repair of the motorcycle. This sparked off a crisis in which 21 people were killed and properties destroyed. Soldiers and police were drafted to the area. *DailyTrust* 1/7/2002, pp. 1 and 2

56. March 2002  
Makurdi  
Fresh communal clash between Awe LGC and Guma both in Nasarawa and Benue state respectively. 7 people were killed and several houses burnt. *New Nigerian* 28/3/2002, p. 32.

57. June 2002  
Makurdi  
Conflict erupted when a power saw operator cut down a tree, which fell on a Tiv man's farm. This resulted first into seizure kidnapped by the Igedes and Tiv respectively. In the ensuing feud, 3 people were killed and property worth millions of Naira destroyed. *New Nigerian* 16/4/2002, back page.

58. June 2002  
Barakin Ladi  
Hostilities between Fulani and native Beroms. 300 people were feared dead and several injured. *ThisDay* 20/6/2002, p. 2.

59. 5/7/2002  
Wase  
Sectarian clash as a result of June 27 communal crisis between Hausa Fulani and Tarok. 20 people killed and properly worth millions destroyed. The crisis re-occurred as a result of allegation that Christians in the area passed a law prohibiting their daughters from going out with Moslems. *Newswatch* 05/08/2002, p. 3.

60. 5/7/2002  
Nembe (Bayelsa)  
Second attempt at PDP primaries to select the flag bearers for the August 10 elections. 8 persons were killed, 5 hospitalised and 20 mission. *ThisDay* 12/7/2002, p. 4.
61. July 2002

Wase (Plateau)

Attack by about 500 mercenaries believed to come from Niger and Chad on Wase inhabitants. 15 people including a police died. *ThisDay* 28.7/2002, p. 3.

62. 20/7/2002

Nembe (Bayelsa)


63. Nov. 2002

Kaduna

Violence was ignited by a publication in *ThisDay* Newspaper 16/10/2002 to the effect that Prophet Mohammed might have married one of the contestants in the on-going Miss World Beauty Pageant. Muslim youths in reaction rampaged, burnt churches, hotels and killed Christians. The violence spread to Bauchi where some churches were burnt and Aba and Owerri where some Muslims were molested in reprisal for the killing of Christians in Kaduna, *Newswatch* and *Tell*, December 16.

64. June 2002

Yelwa (Plateau)


65. 14/10/2002

Heipang (Plateau)

There was a night attack by Fulani on the village and 10 people were killed and properties destroyed. *DailyTrust* 15/10/2002, pp. 1 and 2.

66. 22/10/2002

Maza (Plateau)

As part of festering crisis in the State, Hausa-Fulani indigenes attacked the community. Five people were killed. *Daily Trust* 24/10/2002, pp. 1 and 2.

67. 7/3/2002

Sokoto

Peaceful demonstration by Hausa-Fulani to protest treatment meted to their kith and kinds in other parts of the country since the Sharia issue took violent dimension in Kaduna. A church was burnt, another vandalised. The main market in the city closed. Dan Fodio University and Shehu Shagari COE all in Sokoto were closed down indefinitely. Policemen were drafted to the troubled spots. *Standard* 8/3/2002, p. 1.

68. 27/3/2002

Damboa (Borno)

This religious clash erupted as a man volunteered his residential quarters for church services. The said residential quarters were razed down by Muslims who protested the conversion of the residential building to a church. All churches in Damboa were burnt. About 20 people lost their lives and several victims rendered homeless. Over 100 refugees were recorded. Police drafted to the crisis area. *Standard* 30/3/2002, pp. 1 & 2.
69. April 2002 Toto (Nasarawa)
This was a communal clash between Bassa and their Egbira counterparts over 100,000 Bassa people were displaced to refugee camps. *Standard* 15/4/2002, pp. 1 & 3.

70. 13/4/2002 Agyaragu
This was a clash between Eggon youths and the police. Troubled started as a result of a newly created district, Akunza, out of Agyaragu. 16 people were killed including 3 policemen. A police post was burnt. Cars smashed and properly worth thousands destroyed. Many people were injured. *Standard* 16/4/2002, pp. 1 and 3.

71. 13/5/2002 Gboko (Benue)
Gboko indigenes took to the streets denouncing the privatization of Benue Cement Company and subsequent control of major shares by Dangote. 4 vehicles belong to the Federal Government were burnt. *Standard* 14/5/2002, pp. 1 and 2.

72. 28/6/2002 Ojota (Lagos)
At Ojota motor park near Lagos, conflict erupted between the Yorubas and the Igbo luxurious bus operators. The Yorubas hired out youths to force the luxury bus operators out accusing them of messing up the place with urine and faeces. Over 300 people lost their lives and 30 vehicles were destroyed.

73. September 2002, Zaria
Normal student union electioneering took on religious dimensions pitting Muslims against Christians; over 40 people, mostly female students were killed. *Weekly Trust* 4/10/02.

74. September 2002, Aba
Annual Igbo day celebration broke into factions between Uka/Ngwa Vs the Ohaneze, several lives and property were lost. *Punch* 5/10/02.

75. October 2002, Ikom Crisis
A fresh hostility erupted at Ikom, Cross Rivers, when Ofara Natives launched a revenge attack against their Nselle neighbours, killing 10 people in the process.

76. October 2002, Damaturu, Yobe
A fracas between the police and drivers led to city wide rioting.

77. October 2002, Langtang and Wase LGA, Plateau
Reprisal attack by Fulani herdsmen on the two LGAs as part of the continuing unrest in Plateau, *Punch* 5/10/02 p.3

78. October/Nov., 2002, Vande Ikyo /Obudu
A reported kidnap of an Obudud man led to communal clashes between his ethnic kin and the Tiv in the neighbouring state, thought to have kidnapped him. Over 18 people were killed.
79. 11/12/2002, Admawa state
Clash between Fulani cattle herders and Dafur natives who accuse the former of vandalizing farms, over 10 people were killed, Daily Trust December 10, or 11 or 12 Weekly Trust 4/10/02 were killed.

80. 12/12/2002, Rim Village, Plateau
Fulani herdsmen invaded Rim community under cover of darkness, killing people and burning houses. Civil unrest has been intermittent in Plateau state since September 7, 2002. ThisDay December 14, 2002, p.1

81. February 2003, Warri
State primaries to elect candidates for the April 2003 election degenerated into ethnic clashes between the Urhobo and Itsekiri resulting in the death of over 20 people

82. 18/02/2003 Jato-Aka, Benue state
A major clash between supporters of the ruling PDP and the opposition, ANPP led to death of up to eight people and torching of several houses. Newswatch, March 17, 2003 p.41.

83. March 2003, Dume, Adamawa state
Reprisal attack by the Fulani community on ethnic Dume, over 100 people including 8 policemen and two soldiers were killed. Daily Trust, March 4, 2003, Vanguard March 6, 2003, p.1-2.

84. March 2003, Sagamau, Ogun state
Trouble was sparked off by the accidental killing of a vigilante youth mistaken by the police for an armed robber. The Oba’s place and several other places were torched, and up to two people were killed. ThisDay, 18/3/03 p.1

85. March 2003, Rural Warri
Some local youths engaged in oil bunkering were involved in a shoot-out with the Nigerian Navy in which up to five military personnel and some youths were killed. The incident led to widespread rebellion forcing the deployment of troops and the Head of Army Staff took personal control of the operation. Over 100 people died and 10 villages were razed. The crisis compelled withdrawal of Shell, Totalfina elf and Chevron-Texaco from oil operations. Up to 40% of Nigeria’s crude oil production was lost as a result of the crisis. ThisDay 18/3/03, p.6

Source: Elaigwu 2002, various newspapers and magazines.