
The Crises of Postcoloniality in Southern Africa: SADC and Conflict Intervention in Zimbabwe

Martha Mutisi

Introduction

This chapter appraises the role of the Southern African Development Community in conflict intervention in Zimbabwe, following the decade-old conflict between the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). From 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe experienced political conflict which had huge social and economic ramifications including violence against civilians, disputed election results, internal displacement, hyperinflation, massive exodus of Zimbabweans and subsequent international isolation of the country. The close to a decade-old conflict resultantly had contagion effects in the Southern African region, hence the label, 'the sick man of SADC' (Gavin 2007:35). Although the conflict appeared protracted, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s intervention particularly the mediation by former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, finally paid off resulting in a negotiated political agreement.

This chapter pays special attention to the regional organisation's role in negotiating democratic and electoral reforms and the subsequent political agreement between the parties, the ZANU-PF and the MDC. SADC's seminal achievement in the ZANU-PF/MDC dispute was demonstrated by its successful facilitation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) that was signed by the ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations on 15 September 2008, paving way for the Government of National Unity. As this chapter demonstrates, despite scoring colourful marks through the GPA, SADC's conflict intervention in Zimbabwe is fraught with complexities stemming from the organization's partiality, SADC's principle of non-interference and some level of incoherence and incongruence within the regional organization. As a postcolonial organisation comprising of fellow

comrades who fought the liberation struggle against colonialism and which advances a pan-African ethos, SADC is largely compromised especially when dealing with political novices who espouse a neo-liberal agenda such as the MDC. Indeed, SADC's initial benign response to the Zimbabwe crisis, the length of time taken to reach the negotiated settlement and the stalemate experienced during the post-agreement phase further reflect the limits of SADC's multilateral engagement on Zimbabwe. The chapter concludes by calling for the transformation of SADC from a non-interfering liberators' club to a supra-national entity that is not only more directive in its conflict intervention efforts but also more citizen-centred when addressing political disputes.

The Political Conflict in Zimbabwe: Anatomy of the Actors

Zimbabwe is a former British colony that obtained independence in 1980 following a prolonged and bloody armed struggle that came to an end through negotiations known as the Lancaster House Conference. One of the outcomes of the peace talks between nationalist movements and the colonial government, represented by Ian Smith, was the Lancaster House Agreement, a negotiated settlement that ushered in a ceasefire, subsequent post-conflict elections and ultimately Zimbabwe's independence. For the past 33 years, Zimbabwe has been under the leadership of President Robert Mugabe and the party, Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The July 2013 elections witnessed the re-election of the President and a resounding win by the ruling party.

In the late 1990s – close to two decades after independence Zimbabwe became the theatre of a political dispute that involved the ZANU-PF and the opposition, MDC, whose consequences extended to civil society and ordinary civilians. The key actors in the Zimbabwe conflict include the major political parties, the ZANU-PF and the MDC formations, MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC-M led by Arthur Mutambara and the MDC, led by Welshman Ncube. Unlike many conflicts in Africa that have an ethnic or religious undertone, the Zimbabwean conflict is uniquely political in its orientation as the major point of difference between ZANU-PF and the MDC is largely at the ideological and political level. Although in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's independence in the early 1980s, there were massacres known as *Gukurahundi*,¹ which were committed by ZANU-PF on the Ndebele people in the name of pursuing insurgencies; the post-2000 conflict between the two political parties was largely driven by divergent political agendas not ethnicity. Generally, both the ZANU-PF and the MDC parties encompass an almost even Shona and Ndebele membership, although during its formation, the MDC managed to attract more Ndebele followers who felt left out in the post-independent development agenda of Zimbabwe. The MDC has since split into three formations, namely MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-N led by Welshman Ncube and MDC-M which is led by the current Deputy Prime Minister, Arthur Mutambara.

Political Ideology of the ZANU-PF

Founded in 1963, the ZANU-PF is led by President Robert Mugabe who according to the political ranks of the party is the First Secretary. ZANU-PF is a political party born out of the struggle against colonial rule, hence the reference to a 'nationalist and revolutionary liberation party'. Through its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the ZANU-PF party organised a guerrilla movement against the colonial regime of Ian Douglas Smith, leading to the Lancaster House negotiations that ushered in Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The first democratic elections held in independent Zimbabwe witnessed the ZANU-PF winning the majority of parliamentary seats, and subsequently becoming the ruling party in Zimbabwe, a position that the party held until the March 2008 elections. As a result of its access to security machinery and state media, the ZANU-PF has for the past 30 years controlled the conduct of elections, hence the conclusion that Zimbabwe is a 'militarised form of electoral authoritarianism'² (Bratton and Masunungure 2008). Since the liberation war, violence has been central to ZANU-PF's mobilization of support and consolidation of power. Bratton and Masunungure (ibid) make reference to Goran Hyden (2006)'s 'movement legacy' thesis, arguing that the ZANU-PF has not fully transformed itself from an armed liberation movement into a democratic political party, as is often demonstrated by the party's employment of guerrilla strategies of violence especially during crises. The Matabeleland, the controversial fast-track land reform exercise hailed as *The Third Chimurenga*,³ the 2005 urban clean-up campaign called *Operation Murambatsvina*⁴ as well as the violent post-2000 elections are episodes indicative of the ZANU PF's reliance on violence as a necessary means to an end. In a speech in 1980, the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe (1980:12) declared '... our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote ... shall have been the product of the gun. The gun, which provides the votes, should remain its security officer, its guarantor'.

Over the past decade, Zimbabwe emerged in the limelight due to cases of political violence, especially in the context of elections. Nonetheless, it is important to note that violence has been used as tool for political survival even as far back as the colonial era. During the colonial era, acts of violence were committed by both the colonisers and the nationalist movements. To challenge colonialism, nationalist movements waged wars of liberation, which although they led to the 1979 negotiated settlement, had huge ramifications on the civilian population. The history of liberation in the ZANU-PF has somewhat contributed to the political party's sense of entitlement to patriotic history. Kriger (2005) contends that the ZANU-PF's strong conviction that it owns Zimbabwe's history by liberating the country from British rule partly accounts for the party's deep intolerance of opposition. In fact, in the current narratives and debates, it is evident that the ZANU-PF political and military elites find little respect for opposition parties

that have emerged in post-independent Zimbabwe, especially those whose leaders have no 'war credentials'. In fact, President Mugabe and the so-called 'securocrats' have repeatedly made statements that dismiss the MDC on the basis of lack of liberation war history. At an election campaign rally held in Silobela, Central Midlands, prior to the June 2008 run-off election, President Robert Mugabe reiterated this message by declaring: 'We fought for this country and a lot of blood was shed. We are not going to give up our country because of a mere X. How can a ballpoint pen fight with a gun?'⁵

The ZANU-PF's highest decision-making apparatus, the Politburo, largely comprises of liberation ex-combatants or those with 'war credentials'. These office bearers not only publicly declare their steadfast allegiance to the principles of sovereignty and anti-colonialism but they also make decisions affecting the party and government (Raftopolous 2009). Additionally, the ZANU-PF has enjoyed the support of 'securocrats',⁶ which is a term that has been adopted to describe the leaders of Zimbabwe's security sector institutions such as the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the air force of Zimbabwe (AFZ), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe Prison Services (ZPS). These security sector institutions form a cumulative alliance known as the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF), whose leaders have in several instances publicly declared their support to President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF and their denunciation of the MDC and Morgan Tsvangirai, in particular.

The ZANU-PF espouses the African liberationist and nationalist tradition, which is characterised by a strong leadership and pan-Africanism. The ZANU-PF ideology is often exhibited in anti-Western and anti-capitalism narrative that underscores sovereignty, independence and a sense of ownership of patriotic history. Unfortunately, this position often exudes elements of intolerance to opposition as well as an absolute disregard for those who did not participate in the liberation struggle. Since 2000, one of the most frequently used campaign slogans by the ZANU-PF is 'Zimbabwe will never be a colony again'. During the 2008 election campaigns, the ZANU-PF's catchphrase was '100 per cent Empowerment, Total Independence', placing more emphasis on economic independence and undoing imperialism. The ZANU-PF's pan-African inclination is shared by many liberation political parties in the Southern African region, including the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) of Tanzania, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA). President Robert Mugabe is a paragon of African nationalism who commands unquestionable allegiance from fellow African liberation movements.

Bratton and Masungure (2008:47) summarize five key elements that characterize the ZANU-PF as a political party: an ideological belief in its right to rule in perpetuity, a party machinery that penetrates the organs of the state, a corrupted

economy vested in the hands of party loyalists, an institutionalised role in policy making for military commanders, and a heavy reliance on violence. The authors contend that ZANU-PF not only controls the state security and governance machinery, but it also has the capacity to orchestrate organized and institutionalized violence against all sources of dissent. Apart from the July 2013 elections, most of the country's post-independent polls were marred by allegations of violence leading to commentators arguing that violence was central in the retention of power by the ruling party. Subsequently since independence, no opposition political party has ever succeeded in completely wresting political power from ZANU-PF despite the regular and consistent conduct of elections in Zimbabwe. Mostly as a result of its command and control system and the longevity of its tenure as a ruling party, the dichotomy between the ZANU-PF party and government is blurred and in some cases, decisions by ZANU-PF organs such as the Politburo and Central Committee automatically influence Cabinet decisions. Bratton and Masunungure (2008:46) observe that 'The ruling party and public administration are fused, and organizational structures are conflated at all levels – the party is married to the state'.

During the early days of post-independent Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government practiced what was then labelled as 'scientific socialism', which entailed the provision of social services like education, health and housing to the population at little or no cost. Criticised by many as populist and economically unsustainable, this humanistic-socialist ideology is responsible for the massive gains in educational advancement and broadened social service provision that were witnessed in the first decade of independence. The humanistic-socialist ideology was partly accounted for by the 'crisis of expectation' at independence where masses expected the new black government to deliver to them services they could not access during colonial rule. However, a decade later, Zimbabwe embraced neo-liberalism and capitalism as evidenced by the launch of the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that demanded austerity measures by the state as well as the reduction of the civil service budget. ZANU-PF leaders who were supporters of broad-based development were gradually converted to elites, embracing a bourgeoisie outlook, and soon some were owning and running businesses against a background of rising levels of poverty and eroding income among the population. Based on such attributes, Chingono (2010:14) concludes that 'ZANU-PF is a typical representation of a party whose characteristics and policies are overly shaped by *partocracy* ...'.⁷

Despite the above observations, the ZANU-PF continues to exhibit its support for redistributive policies such as land reform programmes that witnessed the acquisition of land from white commercial farmers and distribution to black farmers. Additionally, the ZANU-PF continues to champion indigenisation policies such as the proposal to ensure that 51 per cent of business shares are owned by local Zimbabweans. The redistributive ideology is based on the argument by the

ZANU-PF that the party seeks to undo the impact of colonialism and imperialism by empowering Zimbabweans economically. Despite this bold goal, the ZANU-PF has been criticised by the opposition, civil society and the international community for a political ideology and economic policies that alienate private business, disrespect private property and reward political elites instead of genuinely empowering poor people.

The MDC Political Ideology

Established in September 1999 under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC emerged in the political scene of Zimbabwe, following the ZANU-PF's almost two decades of domination. There had been other opposition parties that existed in Zimbabwe before the MDC, and these include the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), the Forum Party of Zimbabwe (FPZ) and the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD). However, the MDC was the first opposition party to pose a credible, critical and sustained political challenge to the ruling party since independence. This opposition party was readily embraced by a diverse and huge constituency comprising labour, civil society, academia and former commercial farmers. As a result of this competition, the relationship between the ZANU-PF and MDC was often characterized by militant politics, polarization and violent clashes.

When it was established, the MDC branded itself as a labour party, and this was befitting as the party's President, Morgan Tsvangirai, was a former Secretary-General of a labour union, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The MDC's leaning towards labour is explicable because the party emerged in the context of declining economic and living standards in Zimbabwe, rising unemployment rates and an increasing gap between the rich and poor which were cumulative outcomes of an unstable economy, inequitable distribution of resources and corruption. Additionally, the MDC political ideology was centred on a neo-liberal democratic agenda, demanding change in governance, and especially being critical of the *de facto* one-party state Zimbabwe had become owing to more than two decades of ZANU-PF rule. The change agenda of the MDC can be understood given the context in which this political party was formed. For more than a decade now the MDC has been a source of frustration for the ZANU-PF, which was used to being a political hegemony since the 1980 independence.

Apart from its major identify as a labour party, the ideology of the MDC is difficult to define and categorise, mostly owing to the eclectic nature of its membership. Some scholars posit that the MDC has no political ideology as its political manifestos are always in a continuous state of flux. However, this author underscores that the party does have an ideology although the task of dispensing this ideology is made challenging by the variegated nature of its membership. As

a party emerging during the period of emerging politico-economic challenges in the country, the MDC received massive support from civil society and interest groups such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). In addition, the MDC also received support from white commercial farmers whose fate was threatened by government's land reform programme. As such, the MDC was born as a coalition party, based on an unusual alliance between working class people, civil society,⁸ employers and professionals. While on the one hand, the interests of these disparate groups were often difficult to reconcile for the political party leadership, on the other hand, the nascent, novel, assorted and contemporary nature of the MDC politics brings vibrancy and diversity to its decisions and policies. However, this and the eclectic dimension of the MDC explain the party's split of 2005 that led to the two MDC formations, the one led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and the other led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M).⁹ In 2011, the MDC-M subsequently split again with Welshman Ncube leading the MDC-N and Arthur Mutambara retaining leadership of the MDC-M.

Ideologically, the original MDC formation espoused its narrative as being based on the concept of social democracy¹⁰ and transformation, as evidenced by its slogan, *Chinja Maitiro!* (Change in the way things are done!). When it emerged as an opposition party, much of the focus of the MDC political architecture and energies have been expended towards opposing the approaches and values of the ZANU-PF. This call for change has its roots in the perception that the ZANU-PF thrives on political patronage and dictatorship, and that the party has outlived its usefulness to the citizens. In the early 2000s, the 'change narrative' resonated with a wide array of Zimbabweans who were disenchanted by patronage politics and poor governance by the ZANU-PF and their attendant effects such as declining living standards and rising unemployment rates. Being a labour-driven political party, the MDC's biggest constituency resided in Zimbabwe's urban areas where the party has won the bulk of its votes since 2000. The ZANU-PF, on the other hand, has historically commanded popular support from the rural areas whose population bought into the promises brought about by the land reform programme.

On several political occasions (the 2000, 2005 and 2008 elections), the MDC managed to upset the ZANU-PF during elections by collecting a substantive percentage of the popular vote yet despite its popular appeal to the electorate, the MDC has not wholly succeeded in ousting the ZANU-PF party electorally. This was partly due to the ZANU-PF's control of the security and electoral apparatus, an uneven electoral climate as well as the MDC's own organisational deficiencies and limited political capacity to find creative ways of engaging the populace and challenging the ZANU-PF. Muleya (2008) labels the MDC as 'structurally brittle', politically paralysed and lacking in leadership, hence its failure to deal with the challenges posed by the hardened ZANU-PF regime. Perhaps

this is why Makgetlaneng (2008:1) observes that the MDC ‘... has no position on imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, globalization and north-south relations. Despite acute problems confronted by the masses of the Zimbabwean people on a daily basis, its strategy and tactics have been failing to meet their demands and needs’.

Currently, however, the MDC is split into three factions: one led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), another led by Welshman Ncube (MDC-N) and another one led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). The first MDC split took place in 2005, with the Tsvangirai faction opposing the MDC’s participation in senatorial elections, and a faction led by Welshman Ncube deciding to go ahead and participate in these controversial elections. A further split of the MDC-M happened in 2011, followed a January 2011 congress which witnessed Welshman Ncube ascending to the presidency while Mutambara was reduced to a mere party member. Mutambara allegedly contested the legitimacy of the party structures which emerged from the congress elections. However, a February 2011 High Court ruling barred Mutambara him from conducting any business on behalf of the MDC or presenting himself as president or principal of the party. As a result, Ncube represented the MDC in the July 2013 elections; while Mutambara went on to form his own MDC-M party, though he did not contest in the 2013 elections.

The ZANU-PF/MDC Conflict: Origins, Manifestations and Outcomes

The relationship between the MDC and ZANU-PF has been characterized by a violent rivalry ever since the formation of the opposition party in 1999. Power politics, governance, ideological differences and issues of resource distribution are central to this conflict. On the one hand, the MDC is perceived by the ZANU-PF to be a party espousing the neo-imperial agenda that seeks to disrobe Zimbabwe of its sovereignty. On the other hand, according to the MDC, poor policy choices by the ZANU-PF have often resulted in socio-economic and political complexities that subsequently led to the coagulation of opposition against the ZANU-PF by the year 2000. Examples of inept policy decisions include the massive one-time compensation offered to war veterans during 1997 despite the lack of budgetary means to support this gesture. Yet another erroneous policy move was the decision by government to send approximately 11,000 troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 to support President Laurent Kabila against invasion by Rwandan and Ugandan forces. The move was made without budgetary considerations and against a toughening economic environment caused by the adoption of the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes, hence its unpopularity with citizens who saw it as ostentatious. The cumulative impact of such policy decisions was economic implosion and a growing frustration with the ZANU-PF. Indeed, during this period, the ZANU-PF’s ‘patriarchal mode of liberation’ (Campbell 2003) had now become exhausted, irrelevant and

illegitimate in Zimbabwe. The MDC emerged in this context of the ZANU-PF's increasing unpopularity and the relationship between the two parties has been contentious ever since. The emergence of the MDC was accompanied by subsequent significant political gains and international recognition, thereby alerting the ZANU-PF to the reality that a new neo-liberal political dispensation in the name of popular democracy was underway. For a decade, the MDC has been a source of frustration for the ZANU-PF, as it has resonated with a significant population of Zimbabweans and in certain cases; the party has largely triumphed over the ZANU-PF during elections despite the challenging electoral environment. Although it did not wrestle power from the ruling party, the MDC scored notable challenges against the ZANU-PF which include the successful rejection of a government-proposed constitution, and the party claimed significant votes during the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections.

The relationship between the main political parties can at best be described as a belligerent rivalry. While on the one hand, the opposition criticises the ruling party's extreme patronage politics, the ZANU-PF on the other hand perceives the MDC as a counter-revolutionary force that threatens to reverse the gains of independence. In fact, in the ZANU-PF narrative, the MDC is a surrogate of the British and a 'puppet of the West', which has been orchestrating the 'regime change' agenda.¹¹ The ZANU-PF also criticizes the MDC for being opposed to redistributive policies that seek to economically empower ordinary Zimbabweans such as the land reform programme and the indigenisation agenda. The MDC and ZANU-PF also have differing perspectives on the issue of imposition of sanctions in Zimbabwe. While the ZANU-PF argues that sanctions are illegal and that they are an imperialist tool meant to dislodge the government and facilitate regime change, the MDC on the other hand argues that these are targeted sanctions that were imposed on recalcitrant individuals in the ZANU-PF who were blocking democratic change in Zimbabwe.

As a result of these divergent ideologies and perspectives on the challenges facing the country, the emergence of the MDC was met with the closure of political space as well as increasing radicalization and re-assertion of control by the ZANU-PF. When the MDC was formed, the ZANU-PF government's initial response was to employ heavy and contentious tactics against the opposition and civil society (Makumbe 2002; Meldrum 2004; Hammar 2005) and violent episodes such as the violent fast-track land reform program dubbed the *Third Chimurenga*, the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections as well as an urban clean-up campaign known as *Operation Murambatsvina* attest to this (Makumbe 2002; Dorman 2007; Kriger 2005). In addition, the government enacted tougher legislation that curtailed a number of freedoms for citizens and civil society, including the Broadcasting Services Act, the Private Voluntary Organizations Act Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The confrontational rivalry between the ZANU-PF and MDC became increasingly protracted with

heightened levels of political violence and unabated economic decline becoming appendages of the conflict. However, after an elongated process of negotiations that were facilitated by the SADC-mandated mediator, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, the ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations reached a negotiated settlement known as the Global Political Agreement on 15 September 2008. The following segment of this chapter will analyse in detail the strategic role played by SADC in intervening in the Zimbabwe conflict.

The Context of SADC Intervention: A Political Analysis of SADC

Established in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the intention of coordinating development efforts and fostering socio-economic cooperation and integration in the region, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been the centrepiece of Southern Africa's economic development and political cooperation. The history of SADC can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, when the leaders of countries that had won independence through liberation movements mobilised and galvanised support towards political, diplomatic and military cooperation against colonialism in Southern Africa. Later in 1980, this cooperation crystallised to become an entity called the Frontline States (FLS). SADCC was transformed into SADC in 1992, which witnessed the policy transformation of the organization from mere focus on development cooperation towards political and security cooperation. With time, SADC's focus turned towards promoting peace and security and spearheading conflict resolution efforts in member countries. Since the 1990s, SADC has been involved in a number of conflict interventions, some of them military and others adopting a stance of peaceful resolution of disputes. Examples of military interventions include the SADC intervention in Lesotho, code named *Operation Boleas* which aimed at containing a suspected *coup* in August-September 1998 and the SADC military engagement in the DRC under the auspices of the SADC Allied forces from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia following the invasion of DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. On the pacific dimension of conflict intervention, examples include the SADC involvement in Madagascar following the 2009 unconstitutional change of government and currently the intervention in Zimbabwe towards facilitating the implementation of a negotiated agreement between the major political parties.

Now comprising 15 member states, the regional organisation has evolved to become quite influential in the region and in the continent, as the SADC countries account for more than 40 per cent of Africa's population. Structurally, at the helm of SADC is the Supreme Council, which comprises Heads of States of the member countries, and is headed by a Chairperson (a sitting President of a member state), who guides conversation on key issues brought to the attention of the organisation. SADC has different units that are mandated to carry out specific activities that enhance regional cooperation, including the Organ on Politics, Defence

and Security (OPDS) and the SADC Troika that is tasked with conflict intervention mandates.

SADC and Conflict Intervention in Zimbabwe

Assigning a Mediator to the Zimbabwe Conflict

The more directive role played by SADC during the GPA negotiations in 2008 is similar to that played by the frontline states during the Lancaster House negotiations of 1979. When the Lancaster House negotiations were stalling, frontline states were prepared to use coercive measures against the nationalists, ZANU and ZAPU, in order to get them to truly commit to negotiations and the outcome. In the same manner, in the prelude to the Global Political Agreement, SADC shifted from its non-interference philosophy to adopt a more forceful stance to push for a negotiated settlement. Following the March 2007 incident where opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and high-ranking members of the MDC were attacked by some members of the Zimbabwe Republic police, the SADC strategy for intervention in Zimbabwe became more forthright as evidenced by the emergency SADC meeting in Dar-es-Salaam whose outcome was the formal designation of President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa as the mediator of the dispute between the ZANU-PF and the MDC. Keen to avoid regional isolation and condemnation, the ZANU-PF subsequently participated in the inter-party negotiations. Although widely criticised for being partisan and too soft on Robert Mugabe, Thabo Mbeki's mediation in 2007 is credited with negotiating important electoral reforms, including Amendment 18 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe that was supposed to facilitate credible elections in Zimbabwe, according to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The March 2008 elections that followed these negotiations resulted in the MDC winning parliamentary seats and Morgan Tsvangirai winning the majority of the vote ahead of Robert Mugabe. However, Tsvangirai was short of the 50 per cent votes needed to become the outright winner, hence the decision to have a run-off election in June 2008.

Presiding Over GPA Negotiations

Following the continued deterioration of the Zimbabwe crisis, the patience of certain African leaders was waning. Some elements within SADC, including President Ian Khama of Botswana and the late Zambian President, Levi Mwanawasa, openly denounced the actions of the ZANU-PF government and the violence that had engulfed the country. SADC was also under pressure from the international community, respected senior African citizens and local civil society activists to take stronger action on Zimbabwe. In June 2008, former South African President, Nelson Mandela described the conflict in Zimbabwe as a 'crisis of leadership' while the former Chairperson of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, abhorred the ZANU-PF's political

assault and electoral violence. Even other political players erstwhile known to be supporters of the ZANU-PF could not help but express their concern at the deteriorating conditions in Zimbabwe. On 24 June 2008, the African National Congress issued a statement saying it was 'deeply dismayed by the actions of the Zimbabwean government, which is riding roughshod over hard-won democratic rights'. The ANC added that it would not remain 'indifferent to the flagrant violation of every principle of democratic governance'. Jacob Zuma, then President of the ANC, described the situation in Zimbabwe as 'out of control', underscoring how the situation in Zimbabwe departed radically from the ANDC values. These comments coming then from Deputy President Zuma could be interpreted as being reflective of the frustration by the ANC of the seemingly lack of progress that the then mediator, Thabo Mbeki, was recording towards addressing the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Additionally, Zuma and the ANC's comments need to be examined using the lens of South Africa, being the regional powerhouse in SADC and ultimately feeling responsible for the regional challenges that would ensue should the Zimbabwe conflict not have been effectively and timely addressed.

In addition, mounting pressure from the civil society organisations in SADC member states also forced the organization to revise its approach on Zimbabwe. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a strong ally of the African National Congress, indicated its disdain about the crisis in Zimbabwe and pressured SADC to take a more decisive action. In April 2008, COSATU prevented a ship from China that was destined for Zimbabwe and loaded with armaments from docking in South Africa, arguing that arms acquisition at that time would escalate the conflict in Zimbabwe. Growing pressure from the international community, especially the deepening universal criticism of the SADC non-interference principle, also influenced a more forthright SADC intervention. The European Union, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand renewed their targeted sanctions against the ZANU-PF in acts of disapproval of the situation. Although SADC and the Western international community did not agree on solutions to the Zimbabwean crisis, such internationalization of the Zimbabwean crisis further pressured the SADC to seek what they deemed as an 'African solution' to the Zimbabwean crisis. SADC leaders realized that their cautious approach on Zimbabwe and subsequent inaction would make all those arguments about 'African solutions to African problems' look like mere rhetoric.

SADC Ruling on the 2008 Elections

By 2008, SADC had amplified its disapproval of the worsening situation in Zimbabwe. At a SADC summit held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in March 2008, the Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete said the Zimbabwean crisis required 'urgent attention' from SADC leaders (Afro News 2008) On 12 April 2008, following the post-election violence in Zimbabwe, an emergency SADC Summit was

convened in Lusaka, Zambia, where the late President Levi Mwanawasa urged SADC to 'push Zimbabwe onto the regional agenda and to invite Tsvangirai'. Following the controversial June 2008 run-off election, SADC concluded that the election 'did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe' and recommended a continuation of the SADC mediation. Against this background, a report by Solidarity Peace Trust (2008:12) notes that 'Growing criticism of Mugabe within the SADC and the AU and their unwillingness to sanction his presidential 'victory' provided Mugabe with clear signals that his support base in the region and the continent had declined'. Even though President Thabo Mbeki still used 'quiet diplomacy',¹² developments in and outside Zimbabwe dictated a more directive mediation role for the mediator. President Mbeki's numerous trips to Zimbabwe between July 2008 and September 2008 reflected this urgency for a negotiated settlement. The more forceful intervention from SADC subsequently led to the September 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. The successful negotiation of the GPA demonstrates the capacity of SADC to intervene in conflicts affecting the region.

SADC Conflict Intervention in Zimbabwe in the Post-GPA Phase

Overall, the sentiments among the political actors and the general populace are that the regional intervention on the Zimbabwe crisis did well towards providing a platform for the political parties to move beyond the political stalemate. The facilitated negotiations and dialogue by SADC through President Mbeki and now President Zuma have facilitated a dissipation of the increasing levels of political violence that there was in Zimbabwe in the post-2000 era. Through the SADC-mediated GPA, the then diametrically opposed ZANU-PF and MDC political counterparts have been able to work together as a coalition government. September 2012 was the fourth anniversary of the GPA. The signature of the Global Political Agreement was followed by the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) whose immediate mandate was to bring temporal peace while preparing for long-term and durable peace. The GNU has been associated with bringing a sense of economic progress and democratic reforms as well as mitigating the decade-long political violence.

Another area where there has been a significant shift, albeit incredible challenges, is on the constitutional review process. The proposed draft of the new Constitution was signed by the management committee and later the Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) and subsequently was presented at the second All-Stakeholders' Conference in October 2012. Despite achieving this milestone, the revision of the Zimbabwe Constitution was surrounded by controversy and political manoeuvring, as well as a huge delay. There are still contentious issues in the new constitution in which the major political parties have not found agreement, and these include the presidential powers, the stipulation that presidential candidates

should have running mates, and the appointment of judges by the President as well as the proposal for dual citizenship to be legalized.

Although the GPA is one of the seminal achievements of SADC's conflict resolution effort, there is still an evident political stalemate in Zimbabwe, and it is epitomised by the partial implementation of GPA provisions. As a result, Zimbabwe is still in transition mode as negotiations are still inconclusive; hence the need for the continued SADC engagement of Zimbabwe. Responding to the need for engagement in the post-agreement phase, the new SADC-appointed mediator President Jacob Zuma of South Africa, who took over from the former President Mbeki, continues to engage with the principals of the ZANU-PF and the MDC. The post-GPA facilitation role of President Zuma is meant to ensure that the major provisions of the 2008 Global Political Agreement are implemented. To SADC's credit, the organisation has taken a dedicated stance towards ensuring that the political agreement is not only monitored and evaluated but also the facilitator Jacob Zuma has been engaged in follow-up on specific post agreement processes being undertaken by parties in Zimbabwe, including constitutional review, design of an electoral roadmap as well as facilitating discussions on security sector reform.

Nonetheless, from a broader perspective, there has not been significant departure of President Zuma's intervention strategies from those of Thabo Mbeki. There were numerous post-GPA mediation sessions by Zuma and countless SADC meetings focusing on Zimbabwe although not all the outstanding GPA reforms agreed upon in September 2008 were implemented. Additionally, there is discordance of opinion between the ZANU-PF and the MDC on the question of the continued sanction regime in Zimbabwe. In fact, President Zuma and SADC's round criticism of the sanction regime against President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF are indicative of the partisan nature of SADC, and their spirited support of the liberation icon, President Mugabe. This has resulted in few observable shifts in ZANU-PF behaviour since the signing of the GPA. The benign demeanour of the South African-led SADC intervention certainly brings attention to the limits of SADC's engagement with Zimbabwe. Evidently, within SADC apart from the imperative to move Zimbabwe out of its political lethargy, there are evidently other considerations to take note of, including the history and relations among the former liberators and the protection of the doctrine of sovereignty. From the foregoing analysis, it is arguable that SADC lacks adequate political will towards effectively addressing the political impasse in Zimbabwe.

Understanding the Limits and Complexities of the SADC Intervention in Zimbabwe

A major limit to SADC's intervention in conflict in the region is the absence of a dedicated mediation support office or team within the peace and security architecture of a regional body. Currently, SADC's organ for mediation support is the SADC Troika, which taps into the resources of a SADC Mediation Reference

Group. The SADC Mediation Reference Group has not been very active towards providing mediation support to the envoys and mediators who have been mandated by the regional body to address crises in the affected member states. As a result, most of the mediation enterprises of SADC have been conducted on an *ad hoc* basis, with limited human resources and administrative capacity as well as miniscule political muscle. The current SADC mediation in Zimbabwe that is being led by President Jacob Zuma of South Africa relies mostly on the South African team comprising of Lindiwe Zulu, South Africa's International Relations Adviser, Charles Nqakula, who is President Zuma's Political Adviser and the South African Special Envoy, Mac Maharaj. While this team is fully capacitated in its own right and has the requisite political aptitude for mediation support, it is important for the Zuma mediation to be viewed as a SADC initiative. However, the current mediation composition makes it appear as if it is a bilateral mediation initiative between South Africa and Zimbabwe rather than a SADC-mandated mediation.

Additionally, it is important to understand that SADC does not have extraordinary powers over member states and cannot decree particular courses of action. This means that the organization thrives on consensus and persuasion as strategies of bringing about desired change. Furthermore, SADC is a political organisation that represents interests of member states as well as leaders from those states; hence its treatment of the Zimbabwe conflict has been fraught with allegations of partisanship. The relationship between SADC and the ZANU-PF is one of a shared history of the struggle against colonialism, hence the criticism by Nathan (2006) that the regional organization is merely a club of anti-colonialists. The liberation parties within SADC not only galvanise around a shared history, but they continue to develop and strengthen their relationships as evidenced by the creation of the Southern African Association of Liberation Movements in 2001. As a result of the notion of 'African solidarity', SADC's public criticism of Robert Mugabe has been malignant given the high regard for President Mugabe's pivotal role in supporting liberation movements in the region (Hendricks 2005). In African political relations, political power comes from both seniority and solidarity (Mahmud 2001:138). As such, within SADC, President Robert Mugabe is not only a senior or veteran nationalist, but he is also considered as 'the champion of a colonially injured continent' (Bomba and Minter 2010), who seeks to put an end to the unjust colonial order. In addition, President Mugabe is widely respected in SADC for his role in helping the institution during its nascence particularly for coordinating the peace and security issues of SADC. Perhaps Thabo Mbeki's statement below best describes how powerful 'African solidarity' has been in influencing SADC's actions towards Zimbabwe:

The fight against Zimbabwe is a fight against us all. Today it is Zimbabwe, tomorrow it will be South Africa, it will be Mozambique, it will be Angola; it will be any other African country. Any government that is perceived to be strong, and to be resistant to imperialists, would be made a target and be undermined.

So let us not allow any point of weakness in the solidarity of the SADC, because that weakness will also be transferred to the rest of Africa (Mbeki quoted in Mawere 2007).

On the other hand, the relationship between SADC and the MDC is often characterized by mistrust and something closer to disdain as the ZANU-PF has succeeded to portray the MDC as a foreign-sponsored party that plays to the dictates of Western imperialists (Chigora and Dewa 2006). Furthermore, in a region where liberation political parties dominate and politics of dissent is treated suspiciously, supporting an opposition party, particularly if it is labour-driven, would be considered politically suicidal. By supporting Mugabe, fellow SADC statesmen are also being pragmatic in preventing winds of dissent from spreading into their countries. As a self-preservation strategy of collectively ensuring political survival and regime security, these African leaders would rather not support the MDC cause, as this would be tantamount to endorsing a labour-based model of popular democracy.

In addition, SADC's intervention in Zimbabwe is made even more complicated because of the governance deficit in the region. With the exception of South Africa, the Southern African region hosts numerous small economies, which are characterised by weak states and undemocratic regimes, a scenario that effectively militates against effective multilateral conflict intervention. In addition, the majority of the SADC region comprises half-backed democracies, *de jure* and *de facto* one-party states like Namibia and Angola as well as authoritarian monarchies like Swaziland and Lesotho. Against this background, it is difficult for many SADC leaders to vociferously denounce the conflict-ridden relationship between Zimbabwe's ruling party and the opposition.

Furthermore, SADC's conflict resolution in Zimbabwe is incapacitated by the policy of non-intervention. The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation underscores a commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and good neighbourliness, among other values. In addition, the Protocol emphasises the preference for peaceful means for conflict resolution by adopting methods such as conciliation, negotiation and mediation. Since SADC is not a supra-national entity, it has had to rely on persuasion rather than outright intervention, an approach that could explain the lack of finality in the Zimbabwe conflict. Despite the decade-old onslaught against opposition and civil society by the ZANU-PF, SADC did not respond as decisively as anticipated, especially to the violence, closure of political space, human rights violations and electoral controversies in Zimbabwe. Although the 2002 elections were described by *The Economist* as 'a coup by ballot box' (2002:14), and the SADC Parliamentary Observer Mission concluded the electoral conditions were unfavourable for democratic participation, President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi who was then SADC Chair declared that the same elections were substantially free and fair. Similarly, SADC endorsed the 2005 elections despite being ridden by violence, intimidation

of the opposition and skewed media coverage in favour of the ZANU-PF (Kriger 2005). The fact that it took SADC approximately eight years to be able to publicly criticize the ZANU-PF for the situation in Zimbabwe is a test of the credibility of the concepts of 'African Renaissance' and 'African solutions to African problems'. It could also be a reflection of the challenges of public diplomacy.

What complicates SADC's effective intervention in Zimbabwe is the centrality of the land in the Zimbabwe conflict (Moyo 2000). Despite the controversial manner in which it was undertaken, Zimbabwe's *Third Chimurenga* arguably was an attempt to address the socio-economic and racial imbalances that were created by the colonial system (Moyo 2000; Raftopoulos 2003). The imperative for addressing land inequities in post-independent Zimbabwe was undeniable given the skewed nature of the land distribution. As such, for SADC member states to denounce Mugabe's land reform policy could be a politically wrong move that could be interpreted as endorsing colonial imbalances. In addition, judging from the same history of racial land imbalances and the current socio-economic and political temperature in southern Africa, including the increasing urban-rural migration and contention among ruralites in Africa, scholars (Moyo 2000; Palmer 2000; Moyo & Yeros 2005) posit that southern Africa has unresolved agrarian issues. Such scholars predict that most of the SADC countries are all faced with the prospect of having to deal with land redistribution sooner or later. For SADC member states, criticizing the land reform policy would be interpreted as preempting to their populations that they would not consider engaging in such a policy. This position explains why SADC has not been vocal about the *Third Chimurenga* despite the concern that the land reform process was initially accompanied by violence.

SADC's intervention in Zimbabwe demonstrates the challenges of multilateralism in conflict resolution given that the regional institution comprises different member states that have differential interests, histories and abilities. Within SADC, there are different perspectives on the Zimbabwe situation, hence the prolonged, fractionalised and often unresolved debates about how to address the Zimbabwe situation. In SADC, there is evident discord among member states, especially between those states that have democratic policies and those that have authoritarian tendencies. Tensions within SADC over the appropriate policy to pursue toward Zimbabwe have crippled the organization's ability to be forthright in urgent situations. From 2000-2010, the differential opinions and interests among SADC members were reflected in the strategy of addressing the Zimbabwe crisis. Botswana and Zambia were among the few member states that roundly and publicly criticised the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe while Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa backed President Mugabe. In the absence of sufficient normative congruence, it has become difficult for regional organizations to resolve disputes, achieve cohesion and act with common purpose in crisis situations (Melber 2004).

In addition, arguably, SADC has traditionally been a platform for claiming, displaying and utilizing regional power and alliances. The history of tension within SADC can be traced back to 1998, when Zimbabwe, with the support of Namibia and Angola made a decision to send troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo even though the South African government opposed this move. This created a rift within SADC, as South Africa then had just joined SADC four years back and was perceived by other member states as a newcomer trying to set and control the regional agenda. As South Africa is the SADC-designated mediator in the Zimbabwe conflict, there is a semblance of careful treading in regional politics by SADC member states, including South Africa, to avoid the tensions of the late 1990s. It is often said that SADC states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise their functional cooperation as well as contradict the principles of solidarity and pan-Africanism – and the cautious approach towards Zimbabwe demonstrates this perception.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the role of the Southern African Development Community as an institution that is increasingly involved in promoting peace, security and development. Both at the normative and operational levels, SADC has come a long way in promoting good governance, development and guaranteeing peace and security in Southern Africa. SADC's role in Zimbabwe rose to prominence particularly during the 2007-2008 period when it took a more authoritative role in mediating the conflict between the ZANU-PF and MDC. The more decisive approach to conflict resolution was well rewarded as evidenced by the signing of the Global Political Agreement between the ZANU-PF and the MDC in September 2008.

However, SADC is not without its challenge as the regional organisation is evidently a political and partisan institution that currently seems to serve the interests of heads of states rather than ordinary citizens. Despite brokering the Zimbabwe GPA in 2008, it is also apparent that SADC has had a woefully flawed reputation of peace making which is reflected in SADC's inability to be forthright and concerted in urgent situations. SADC's lack of extra-judicial powers and its reliance on persuasion and mediation has often limited its efficacy in fully resolving the Zimbabwe conflict, especially given the intransigence of the ZANU-PF regime. Third, the whole issue of multilateralism in the context of diverse interests among member states has meant that there is often no unison with regards to how the Zimbabwean situation is to be handled. The inadequacies of SADC are reflected in the length of time it took to reach a negotiated agreement as well as in the continued stalling of GPA implementation in Zimbabwe.

SADC's experience in intervening in Zimbabwe compels an interrogation of the concepts of collective security and concerted conflict intervention. While the regional body is composed of different member states with differing national interests, in some cases, it is nonetheless important for SADC member states to

demonstrate resoluteness, a shared vision and concerted efforts when addressing the challenges relating to a particular member state. Additionally, SADC needs to engender frameworks, policies and practices of mediation in its regional peace and security arrangements. It is essential for SADC-appointed facilitators and current structures of conflict intervention to have access to sustained mediation capacity support. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation also known as the SADC Troika is currently tasked with facilitating mediation or appointing facilitators to crises in the region. The SADC Troika and appointed mediators would need to be supported by a robust regional peace and security architecture, hence the need to set up a SADC Mediation Unit and to strengthen the capacity of the SADC Mediation Reference Group, which is currently a structure tasked with mediation support for the regional organisation.

Additionally, a key lesson emerging from SADC's intervention in the Zimbabwe political crisis relates to the composition of actors at the peace negotiations. During negotiations for the GPA, a recurring strategy for the mediator, Thabo Mbeki, was his emphasis on 'quiet diplomacy', which occurred at the Track I level. Track I Diplomacy targets political and military elites, and usually underscores the need to reach a peace agreement. On the other hand, Track II Diplomacy would include non-state actors who can influence the peace processes, and these actors include civil society, academics, religious leaders as well as community and traditional leaders. In future mediations, SADC mediators and peace envoys should make concerted efforts to include Track II actors in negotiations and other forms of political dialogue, as well as in the post-agreement phase.

Even though this chapter has paid attention to SADC's challenges, this does not in any way belittle the role of SADC in conflict resolution. Indeed, the regional organisation has demonstrably grown over the years, and its capacity for conflict resolution continues to be tested and enhanced. SADC's intervention in Zimbabwe was not only pivotal in getting to a negotiated settlement, the GPA, but the outcome of such negotiations has also afforded Zimbabwean citizens a temporal reprieve from the downward political and socio-economic spiral. Given the growing role of SADC in conflict intervention, it is important for the regional organisation to play more directive intervention roles in current conflicts and to serve the interests of the SADC populace rather than the heads of states.

Notes

1. Bratton and Masunungure base their observation about 'electoral authoritarianism' on A. Schedler (ed.), 2006, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
2. Literally translated, *Gukurahundi* refers to 'the first rains which wash away the chaff before the spring rain.' *Gukurahundi* is an operation that occurred in post-independent Zimbabwe, specifically from 1982-1987, when Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, through a special military group known as the Fifth Brigade, instituted an armed response to a rebellion in Matebeleland that was allegedly led by then ZAPU leaders and the late

nationalist Joshua Nkomo. Reports, though unconfirmed by government indicate that in the process of stamping out this insurgency, Ndebele civilians were massacred and estimates indicate about 10,000- 20,000 Ndebeles died during this operation. *Gukurabundi* ended when the Unity Accord was signed and the two political parties (ZANU and PF ZAPU) merged into one political party known as the ZANU-PF. One report that details *Gukurabundi* is *Gukurabundi in Zimbabwe: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980–1988*, 2007, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Johannesburg: Jacana Press.

3. The *Third Chimurenga* is a phrase coined by the ZANU-PF to refer to the post-2000 farm occupations under the compulsory land acquisition scheme, which was first led by war veterans and peasants, and then endorsed by the government. The ZANU-PF regards land reform as another form of liberation struggle that seeks to address post-independent structural and racial inequalities. However, this land reform program is also remembered for the violence that accompanied and perceived disrespect for the rule of law. The result was loss of property, exodus of white commercial farmers, international isolation of the country and subsequent crippling of the economy.
4. *Operation Murambatsvina* (which literally means, clean out the rubbish) was launched and executed by the government of Zimbabwe on 19 May 2005. This blitz lasted for three weeks and it witnessed the demolition of various settlements including housing and informal structures in Zimbabwe's urban areas.
5. Quote from President Robert Mugabe, candidate for the 27 June run-off election candidate addressing a political rally in Silobela, Central Midlands on 15 June 2008. For details see the article by: Jan Raath and Catherine Philp, 'Robert Mugabe warns Zimbabwean voters: How can a pen fight a gun?', *The Times*, 17 June 2008. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4152337.ece> Date accessed 12 October 2009.
6. The term 'securocrats' was coined to refer to Zimbabwe's top officials who lead Zimbabwe's key security institutions including the Chief of Police, Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshall Perence Shiri, as well as the Commander of the National Army, General Constantine Chiwenga.
7. According to Chingono, *partocracy* emerges from the dominion and supremacy shown by values, ideologies and their historical background.
8. Notable civil society organizations which facilitated the birth of the MDC include the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe National Students' Union (ZINASU) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).
9. In this chapter, the two MDC parties are hereinafter referred to as the two MDC formations or simply MDC or MDC-T and MDC-M (based on the last names of the political leaders of each of the two MDCs – Tsvangirai and Mutambara). The two MDC formations came about as a result of the split of 2005 that was an outcome of disagreements over whether or not the party should contest the Senate elections in Zimbabwe.
10. In 2000, Morgan Tsvangirai, during an interview with Patrick Bond, explained the MDC ideology: 'We are social democrats. The MDC can never be pure ideologically, because of our broad orientation. Besides, social democracy is a half-way house, a spaghetti mix. In our case, the main characteristic is that we are driven by working class interests, with the poor having more space to play a role than they do now. But one of the components is an element of participation by business, which is just not able to develop under present conditions.' See 'A New Zimbabwe: Tsvangirai Interviewed', by Patrick Bond, *Southern African Report*, SAR, Vol. 15 No. 3, May 2000.

11. Regime change is defined or presented pejoratively by ZANU-PF to imply that the MDC seeks to illegally and unconstitutionally oust from power,
12. 'Quiet diplomacy' is the phrase used to describe the approach being used by Thabo Mbeki in his efforts to end the Zimbabwean political crisis. It entails a mediation style that is characterised by 'skilful negotiations, conducted with tact, persistence, and impartiality, but without fanfare'. Mbeki prefers to hold private discussions with the ZANU-PF and MDC, away from the media spotlight. Scholars posit that 'quiet diplomacy' was originally developed by the late Dag Hammarskjöld, the late Swedish UN Secretary-General. For details, see: Bennet, A le R. 1995. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1995, p. 157.
13. Thabo Mbeki's statement at the Extra-Ordinary Southern African Development Community Summit of Heads of State and Government in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 29 March 2007.

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