

Editorial

Creating African Futures and Creating CODESRIA Futures

The year 2014 is the year of CODESRIA's 14th General Assembly. The General Assembly is the most important governing organ of CODESRIA. The scientific conference of the General Assembly is also the most important scientific event of the general assembly year, given the importance of the theme of the conference, the extent of the mobilization of members of the community and of colleagues in our partner institutions to participate in it, the agenda setting role that this conference often plays. This year's General Assembly will be no different. The theme of the conference, *Creating African Futures in an Era of Global Transformation: Opportunities and Prospects*, will, it is hoped, incite the scholarly community to initiate research programmes and participate in the public and policy debates on the transformation of Africa, and our societies, cultures and governance systems in ways that work for all Africans.

Prospective studies, and multidisciplinary studies on how various sections of our societies perceive, think about, and prepare or relate with the future in other ways are in short supply in African universities and other research institutions. The debates at the scientific conference of the 14th General Assembly, we hope, will lead to more research being done on how we are, at various levels, trying to create futures for Africa and Africans in their diversity, but also in unity. The research community also needs to engage the African Union's *Agenda 2063*, as well as with debates on *The Africa we Want*.

In addition to the scientific conference of the General Assembly, CODESRIA will also be holding two other major conferences this year: a conference to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Council; and a conference on 'International Justice, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa: The ICC and Beyond'.

The role that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been playing in the international justice system, and its interventions have become major issues in Africa, to the extent that the African Union has had to make it a key agenda item of its summits. Much of the passionate discussions on the potential impact of the interventions of the ICC on African institutions and on peace and reconciliation processes in several African countries do not seem to be backed by social research. This conference (to be held in Dakar in July 2014) will be preceded by a series of studies on international justice and alternative institutions of justice in Africa. It will also look beyond the legal issues, and consider the political dimensions, as well as the relationship between justice and reconciliation.

The celebration of CODESRIA's 40th anniversary began with a press conference held in Dakar on 1st February 2013, 40 years after the first meeting of the executive committee of CODESRIA was held in Dakar. There have been several other events commemorating the anniversary in the course of the past year or so. *Building on 40 Years of Research and Knowledge Production for Africa* is the theme of the concluding conference that will be held in Dakar 10-11 June 2014. We invite members of our community to join us in celebrating 40 years of achievements, and in reflecting on how to interpret the CODESRIA mandate and develop appropriate mechanisms that will enable CODESRIA to fulfil the mandate in the changing regional and global context we are in today.

The conference will focus on a few major, cross-cutting issues and themes that have been and continue to be at the heart of the intellectual agenda of CODESRIA: the epistemological issues and how to bridge the knowledge divides within our own communities as well as at the global level; crises, transitions and revolutions – i.e. change in all its forms, the pace it has taken in different contexts and at different moments, over the years, the main actors and issues in the change processes, etc.; development and transformation; the future, and the new frontiers in research. We will also be re-examining CODESRIA itself: its structure and governance.

Therefore, it is also about creating CODESRIA futures. Indeed, following up on discussions held during the 13th General Assembly in Rabat (December 2011), the Executive Committee set up an Internal Review Committee to carry out a review of CODESRIA's structure, membership, and governance. The Committee, chaired by Thandika Mkandawire, former executive secretary of the Council, has begun its work and is engaged in broad consultations with members of the community and will present its draft report to participants in the 40th anniversary conference. The debate on CODESRIA will continue on other forums, and will also be taken up at the 14th General Assembly.


As in all other years, there will also be many other seminars, workshops, symposia and conferences on the various issues of themes that the Council is addressing through its programmes. This, we believe, speaks to the vitality of the Council and of the African research community.

Long live CODESRIA!

Ebrima Sall
Executive Secretary

Alex Bangirana
Head, Publications


RFGI WORKING PAPERS



No. 1: *The Effects of REDD+ on Forest People in Africa: Access, Distribution, and Participation in Governance*

by Emily Anderson and Hisham Zerriffi


ISBN: 978-2-86978-592-2
Pages: 92



No. 2: *Review of REDD+ and Carbon-Forestry Projects in RFGI Countries*

by Mukundi Mutasa


ISBN: 978-2-86978-591-5
Pages: 88



No. 3: *Social Protection in REDD+ Initiatives: A Review*

by Rebecca L. Rutt

ISBN: 978-2-86978-593-9
Pages: 116



No. 4: *Studying Local Representation: A Critical Review*

by Prakash Kashwan


ISBN: 978-2-86978-594-6
Pages: 76



No. 5 : *Choix, Reconnaissance et Effets de la décentralisation sur la démocratie*

par Jesse C. Ribot

ISBN : 978-2-86978-595-3
Pages: 60



No. 6: *The re-emergence of customary authority and its relation with democratic government*

by Emmanuel O. Nuesiri

ISBN: 978-2-86978-596-0
Pages: 72

The Responsive Forest Governance Initiative (RFGI) is a research and training program, focusing on environmental governance in Africa. It is jointly managed by the Council for the Development of Social Sciences Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC). Natural resources, especially forests, are very important since they provide local governments and local people with needed revenue, wealth, and subsistence. Responsive local governments can provide forest resource-dependent populations the flexibility they need to manage, adapt to and remain resilient in their changing environment. RFGI aims to enhance and help institutionalize widespread responsive and accountable local governance processes that reduce vulnerability, enhance local wellbeing, and improve forest management with a special focus on developing safeguards and guidelines to ensure fair and equitable implementation of the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and climate-adaptation interventions.

Debates

A Multi-polar World in the Making: Opportunities and Risks for Africa¹

After congratulating the Centre of African Studies of the University Institute of Lisbon for organising and hosting this international conference, may I take this opportunity to express my gratitude, in the name of CODESRIA, for the honour and privilege of addressing this distinguished assembly of African and Africanist scholars on a theme of burning actuality.

My presentation revolves around three interrogations:

1. Is the world we live in today multi-polar?
2. What are the challenges and gains of Africa from the ongoing re-shuffling of world order?
3. What is the responsibility of the human and social scientist in this rapidly changing world?

First question

The rise of new economic powers from the midst of the developing/third world is undoubtedly the major shift of this early twenty-first century. Global economic governance and international relations have begun to sense the impact of such a shift. However, the characteristics of any potential new international order remain unclear. Multi-polar or not multi-polar? That is my first question.

It was Jim O'Neal, then leading analyst in Goldman Sachs, who devised the acronym 'BRICS' in an article he wrote in 2001 entitled 'The World Needs Better Economic BRICS'. The acronym referred to the so-called 'emerging economies' of Brazil, Russia, India, and China which he recommended as 'the economic future of the world-economy'. His assessment was based on macroeconomic data, especially taking into account demography, GDP growth and availability of strategic natural resources. The term caught on, and the BRICS (with a capital S after South Africa – whose economic performance during a period of recession surpassed that of the

Fatima Harrak
President
CODESRIA

'developed world' – joined the group), became an actual group.

At first, the BRICS met regularly to discuss major issues of global economic development – climate change, currency baskets, modernization, innovation-based progress – then progressively started speaking out on 'hot-spot.' situations, emerging international conflicts, reform of international institutions...

In the context of the 'global financial crisis' which hit the Western bloc very hard and which marked the halt – if not the end – of the US 'uni-polar moment' and the decline of US power, prestige and authority, the BRICS coalition was cautiously welcomed in the developing world as an original 'model of international cooperation' between states which showed respect towards each other's cultural and historical specificities.

And because the BRICS represent peoples from four continents – Eurasia, Africa and South America – and because they make the case for a more just and equitable world order, they quickly became the subject of controversial debate: with some thinking of them as the avant-garde of the anti-imperialist struggle, others as the sub-imperialist agents of the Triad, and yet others arguing that they were both. In any case, the appearance of the BRICS was thus perceived as the budding of a 'multi-polar world'.

Indeed, the BRICS' stance on certain international conflicts, their efforts to restructure some international institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank...) and attempt to create new structures on the world scene

are indirectly contributing to weakening the power of the 'Triad', to use Samir Amin's term. But this does not make the BRICS, or the other emerging economic powers, anti-imperialists. There is more to anti-imperialism than geopolitics. What about the internal class struggles within BRICS countries? What about the relations of BRICS countries to each other? And what about the relation of the BRICS countries to the non-BRICS countries in the South? And what do we do with the 'rate of growth' variable – which is the very 'raison d'être' of the BRICS – which is already flinching, as the economic depression lingers on and/or deepens?

Yes, we live a 'polycentric' world, a world in the process of re-composition, and which is very different from the relatively stable cold war era. However, the world-system's structural crisis is moving so fast, and in so many different and uncertain ways, that it does not assume sufficient stability that can allow us to ascertain yet the advent of a 'multi-polar world'.

Yet, speculation runs high on the nature of the new world order in the making. For the World Bank and its former President, the twenty-first century witnessed the multi-polarization of the global economy. The Third World as well as 'the old world of fireside chats among the G7 leaders' were decreed dead.

In his speech before the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V), the President of the African Development Bank declared that, 'At this time of anemic global growth, it is the emerging markets that have provided much needed economic energy. The multi-polar world has proved to be a multi-polar source of strength and diversity.'

For Chinese – and other BRICS – scholars and officials, the global balance of power has changed as a result of the rise of the

emerging economies, and this is contributing to the acceleration of the long-awaited and much-hoped for process of world multi-polarization. The twenty-first century is thus hailed by the emerging economic powers as the century of the birth of a multi-polar growth world where all civilizations will realise development and prosperity together.

Among American and European scholars and experts there is almost consensus on the fact that Washington and the G8 generate less power and that new actors are on the rise, but they consider that we are still a far cry from a multi-polar world. For these, the US remains the dominant economic – and military – power. Huntington, who has accustomed us to his buzz-words, described the world we live in as ‘uni-multi-polar’: for him, the fact that there was only one superpower did not mean that the world was ‘uni-polar’, but neither was it multi-polar; it was ‘uni-multi-polar’. Huntington has thus denied the crusader Bush the glory of his ‘uni-polar moment’.

This particular Huntington formula did not catch on; and we have other unsuccessful formulas: ‘selective multi-polarity’ (military bi-polarity, economic multi-polarity and moral multi-polarity – since the moral authority of Western leadership is questioned); ‘multilayered and culturally diversified ‘multi-polarity’ (a two-tier structure – the US and China in the first tier, and the second tier comprises most regional powers like India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Japan, the large European states and the remaining members of the G20).

There are, however, a few American and European scholars and analysts who have dared announce the advent of a ‘post-Western multi-polar world’ – post-Western because the core of the economic and geopolitical activity is shifting away from the West, and multi-polar because the West no longer has the financial means to dominate. The most dramatic act symbolizing this shift being the recourse to the \$700 billion loan from China to save Wall Street from collapse. For these analysts, of course, the ‘uni-polar moment’ is over.

But is it really over? Today, as we observe the unfolding of the numerous crises and hotspots around the world, we have the impression of a ‘déjà vu’. The world we live in is still a world made up of the ‘West and the rest’, but a West with a new style:

‘macho’ ‘uni-polarity’ has been replaced by ‘slick’ and ‘cool’ uni-polarity. I hope that this transition moves us progressively towards some form of multi-polarity in which the West will still play an important role not as a hegemon but as a coalition builder, a power broker and a balancer.

Until then and in spite of its relative decline – or maybe because of its relative decline – the Triad will continue to deploy all the economic, financial and military means at its disposal in order to perpetuate its domination.

Africa and the re-composition of world order – Opportunities and Challenges

I would have spared you the reference to the scars of this continent left by colonialism, slavery, the splintering into small and artificial countries, the long history of resource exploitation, the dictates of structural adjustment and IMF democracy...if Sakozy’s Dakar speech was not still resonating in our ears:

The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history. The African peasant ... only knows the eternal renewal of time, rhythmized by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this imaginary world where everything starts over and over again there is no place for human adventure or for the idea of progress.²

A voice from ...the not too distant past! Indeed, less than a decade ago the world of Africa’s European partners was ‘tired of Africa’, dubbed as the “hopeless” continent. Today, we are stunned to hear and read the same PR agents pay tribute to ‘the lions on the move’, celebrate ‘Africa rising’, appreciate the ‘dynamic African market’, and recognise the ‘growth opportunities for investors’....

What has changed in Africa to explain this sudden shift from deeply entrenched ‘Afro-pessimism’ to dramatic ‘Afro-optimism’?

One – During the last decade Africa’s economies have grown, and grown faster than those of almost any other region. You know the details: exports are booming and export markets have become more diversified, foreign direct investment has increased six-fold over the past decade... and all the other indicators are in the green.

Two – This economic performance was made possible by the intervention of the emerging economic powers. The global shifts in economics and politics of this early twenty-first century have not only offered Africa enormous opportunities for economic transformation. They have also put forward a more resilient pattern of economic growth. Indeed, during this last decade Africa has benefited from its deepening ties with the emerging economies. Trade with China helped insulate African countries from the full impact of the 2008 financial crisis and was instrumental in fostering a strong recovery.

The value of Africa–BRICS trade has grown nine-fold over the past decade – while the share of the region’s exports going to OECD countries fell from 70 per cent to 50 per cent over the past decade. Africa has also attracted significant amounts of inward investment from the BRICS. Most of this originates in China, though India, Brazil and other emerging economies’ contributions have also grown in importance.

This happens at a time when the economic and financial recovery in the United States remains fragile, and when the European Union – still Africa’s largest market and largest aid provider – continues to be locked into a cycle of austerity and low growth. The situation in Europe and the US had and will continue to have negative repercussions on the level of US and EU investment and aid to Africa.

This rapid economic growth brings with it immense opportunities:

- African economies are becoming more integrated with high-growth emerging markets.
- The region’s vast mineral wealth is driving growth and attracting foreign investment.
- As the centre of gravity in the world economy moves south and east, the emerging forms of global economic governance could/might provide Africa with a greater voice.
- Meanwhile, the revolution in information and communication technology could create an opportunity for Africans to ‘leapfrog’ – and directly adapt new innovations.

But African governments still have to face up to numerous and serious challenges:

- The economies of emerging markets are themselves intertwined with

those of Europe and the United States, so Africa is still vulnerable to the effects of a further slowdown in the advanced economies. African governments should thus seek to diversify trade and establish linkages to wider markets.

- The 'land grab' and food-security in Africa: While foreign investment in productive farming can be beneficial, governments need to remain vigilant in guarding against speculative activity and the risk of displacement of smallholder African farmers.
- Extractive economy: Current patterns of FDI are focused on quick-profit-yielding mining industries, especially oil and other precious/rare minerals. This pattern of trade could trap Africa in areas of low value-added production with limited scope for the productivity gains needed to sustain high growth, generate employment and develop linkages to the local markets and the other sectors of the economy. Governments should direct FDI to the processing of primary products into exportable manufactures.
- Infrastructure: Infrastructural weaknesses are still an economic-growth bottleneck in Africa. Africa's traditional development partners have tended to neglect infrastructure financing, and have found it difficult to develop good models of aid-supported public-private financing arrangements. China and the African Development Bank are doing a lot in this field but much more needs to be done.
- Education and Regional integration: Together with infrastructure, investment in education and the promotion of regional integration contribute to creating the wider conditions for further development. They all require broader and deeper public-private partnerships.
- Industrialization: The discriminatory trade arrangements under the Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) with the United States continue to hamper the growth of industrialization and related tertiary activities. African governments should endeavour to remove these obstacles when re-negotiating these agreements.
- The management of development assistance: Africa continues to be more dependent on aid than any other region in the world. Considering the economic constraints of the tradi-

tional donors, African governments are called upon to use the aid, whether in the form of aid grants or concessional loans, more effectively and act more on the mobilization of domestic resources.

Thus, in spite of the good economic performance of the last decade and the promising trend of African economies, there are still many challenges ahead, especially when we take a look at the quality of this growth. Yes, many countries across Africa are becoming richer, but whole sections of society are being left behind. After a decade of buoyant growth, almost half of Africans still live on less than \$1.25 a day, wealth disparities are increasingly visible, too many children are hungry and too many young people are without jobs. Governments are failing to convert the rising tide of wealth into opportunities for their most marginalized citizens. Unequal access to health, education, water and sanitation is reinforcing wider inequalities and small farmers have not been part of the growth surge either. So, the celebration of 'Africa Rising' is not complete if we do not at the same time celebrate growth and the quality of growth!

Moreover, the level of armed violence is increasing and armed conflicts are perpetuating instability in the continent. Identifying the numerous military coups, separatist movements, terrorist actions or the disguised global struggle for the control of natural resources as 'low intensity conflicts' neither makes these conflicts less destabilizing nor less hampering for the efforts of development of the continent.

It is no surprise then that the widespread and fast-moving wave of youth protests that has swept the world since 2011 started from Africa. It was in Tunisia – 'Ifriqiya' – the north African country which gave its name to the continent – that the first spark of the 'youth uprisings' was ignited. And let us not forget that pre-revolutionary Tunisia had an excellent economic record and excellent indices of growth. These social uprisings which denounce political and economic systems that are seen as serving vested interests rather than the public interest are spreading across Africa and even across the world. All these uprisings have in common a shared anger over inequalities seen as unjust; concern over youth unemployment; and,

frustration with corrupt and unresponsive governments. They also have in common a dynamic and phenomenal youth protest which is playing a leading role in these uprisings.

Whether we look at this wave of global social protest as a fall-out from the global financial crisis, or a continuation of the 1968 movement, or a corollary of the ICT revolution, the protestors who are gathering in 'Tahrir squares' around the world seem to have tapped into a deep reservoir of global public anger over an unjust and inequitable world-system, a system dogged in serving the interests of the few to the detriment of the majority.

What role for the Social Scientist?

This outburst and rapid proliferation of social movements around the world is a sort of 'wake up' call to the social scientist, not the social scientist-expert in charge of 'quick fixes' for the policy-makers but the committed social scientist whose ethical duty is to take part in the edification of a more just and equitable society.

At this stage in human history, it is indeed imperative that social scientists make sense of the systemic crises of our contemporary societies before putting forward the principles that would make for the continuation of a dignified and sustainable human life on this planet. The knowledge which has been accumulated until now, with all its imperfections, the experience of forms of social and institutional organization with all its shortcomings, and the concepts, categories and models of thought with all their limitations, make it possible today for the committed social scientist to face the great challenge of explaining and contributing to the solution of crises in practically all spheres of social life. Certainly, the scopes and consequences of the crises that we are witnessing are unpredictable, but they constitute a challenge, and in any case a test, for our capacity to sustain, to question, to propose and to imagine new paradigms of civilization.

This is, indeed, the direction of the discussions started by and among world scholars such as Bourdieu, Boaventura de Souza e Santos, Amartya Sen, Wallerstein, Anibal Quijano, Samir Amin, Mahmood Mamdani, Sulayman Bachir Diagne and others. It is the sense of the ongoing

debates and collaborative projects within and between CODESRIA and CLACSO. It is the direction of the debates within the World Social Forum and other world fora which share the same epistemological and ethical concerns. These discussions, as well as the rich debates we had during these last three days in Lisbon within the framework of the fifth round of ECAS, illustrate our hope and determination to

contribute towards the imagination of a just and peaceful world and the conception of a sustainable, inclusive and harmonious human civilization.

Notes

1. Speech by the President of CODESRIA at the fifth European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) on 27–29 June 2013 in Lisbon.

2. Le drame de l'Afrique c'est que l'homme Africain n'est pas assez entré dans l'histoire. Le paysan africain ne connaît que l'éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. Dans cet imaginaire ou tout recommence toujours, il n'y a de place ni pour l'aventure humaine ni pour l'idée de progrès.

Egypt: Revolution or Restoration?*

In less than three years – January 2011 to August 2013 – Egypt has experienced two massive uprisings of historically unprecedented scale. The first of these uprisings broke the impasse that had beset Egyptian politics since the defeat of 1967 – especially since the advent of Sadat at the helm of the Egyptian state – and in the process overthrew the Mubarak dictatorship. The second, more recent and even larger uprising, dubbed by some as 'June 30 Movement', was essentially pre-emptive, to stop the Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth Ikhwan, the Arabic term) in its tracks as it sought to erect its own one-party autocracy. In both cases, the mass movement achieved with electric speed its most immediate objective: the overthrow of an existing dictatorship in the first case, and undoing of a rising authoritarianism in the other. In both cases, especially in the second uprising, the Egyptian working class played a significant role, despite the fact that it has been beaten down through extreme repression for almost half a century. In both cases, however, the primary beneficiary of the uprisings was a formidable rightwing force. But for the 'spring of the people' in 2011, for the most part a secular uprising of the left-liberal forces, the Ikhwan could have never dreamed of forming a government in Egypt so easily. The more recent uprising of June/July 2013, featuring possibly the largest popular demonstration in human history, could put an end to the Ikhwan's authoritarian outrages only through a military takeover, in effect a coup d'état, which was itself supported by not only an alliance of the Mubarakists, Nasserists and other liberals but also by very large sections of the popular masses as well as sections of the left.

Aijaz Ahmad
Nehru Memorial Museum
and Library, New Delhi

For all their spectacular demographic and performative grandeur, neither of these uprisings can be judged 'revolutionary' even in the limited sense that the Nasserist Free Officers' coup of 1952 could be deemed as such. The Nasserists introduced fundamental systemic shifts very swiftly through such measures as abolishing the monarchy as well as feudal privileges, redistributing landholdings, restructuring foreign alignments in an anti-imperialist direction, building a public sector and adopting a whole host of policies that favoured the poorer and lower middle classes. Nothing remotely resembling that has been either promised or projected in 2011 or 2013. Many sectors in these popular mobilizations have certainly set forth such demands in general terms. However, the various groupings that have alternately contested and/or exercised governmental power during these two and a half years, including the one now in place, have had no interest in disturbing the reactionary order of domestic class relations and international alignments that arose some forty years ago after Nasser's death and with the rise of Sadat who put in place the twin policies of Infitah ('Open Door' to imperialist capital) in the domestic economy and alignment with the US/Israeli axis on the one hand, the Gulf monarchies on the other, in foreign relations. All that remained firmly in place, even during the rule of the Pan-Islamist Ikhwan. Most attention has been focused on the issue of 'democracy' which is itself

understood narrowly in terms of a stable electoral system.

The Aftermath of 2011

In the long run, the achievement of the 2011 uprising may turn out to have been more substantial and foundational, in the sense that it did overturn the tradition of one-party governments that has been a constant feature in Egyptian politics since the dissolution of the monarchy and which degenerated under Sadat and Mubarak into outright dictatorship in the service of corruption and capital. The overturning of one-party government did add to the quantum of liberal freedoms while principles of a constitutional order and parliamentary elections were upheld, at least formally. However, what succeeded the one-party system in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak's fall was what one might call a 'guided democracy'. As the army is overseeing the transition in the present conjuncture of 2013, so did the army supervise the transition in 2011. The Ikhwan rose to electoral power very much in consequence of the way the army had supervised the transition. What the mass movement demanded immediately after Mubarak's departure was not parliamentary elections – indeed, it demanded that elections be postponed until after the political field had been properly organized for it – but the convening of a constituent assembly that would represent all major political forces in the country, notably the ones who had actually executed the successful rebellion against the dictatorship. A modern, secular, progressive constitution that safeguarded the interests of the working classes, women, religious minorities and other disadvantaged sections of society was a prerequisite for democratic elections. It was also expected that any

genuinely democratic constitution would greatly curtail the privileges of the armed forces. On the other hand, it was also quite obvious that any immediate move to hold elections would inevitably favour the Ikhwan, as the best organized and extremely well-funded political force in the country, and the Mubarkist bourgeoisie which commanded not only wealth and a political machine that had garnered votes in the fake elections conducted by Mubarak himself but was also deeply entrenched in organs of the state, including the judiciary, the civil bureaucracy, and the security agencies.

Having lost Mubarak as their leader, and having to respond to popular pressures for the first time in decades, the Armed Forces saw the opportunity to stage elections that would be contested mainly by the Ikhwan and other Islamists on the one hand, and Mubarakists on the other, as a win-win situation. Militancy of the mass movement could be sapped by getting them excited by the prospect of 'democratic' elections; the Armed Forces could win back their prestige by being seen as the guarantors of electoral democracy; and one of the two forces of the extreme right would then emerge as the new, elected, democratic government. The popular demand for first convening a constituent assembly was therefore rejected and the electoral process was speeded up. In the country as a whole, the Islamists turned out to be the only truly organized force and the two wings of Egyptian Islamism, the Ikhwan and the Salafists, swept the parliamentary elections, capturing, between them almost three-fourths of the parliamentary seats.

The presidential elections turned out to be rather different, though not entirely. First, there was some mild excitement about confrontation between two wings of the Ikhwan itself, represented by Muhammad Mursi who eventually won and Abu al-Fatih, a veteran leader who had left the Ikhwan as late as 2009 and was now contesting the presidency as an independent. The latter represented the 'reform' wing of the Ikhwan who wanted them to be logically consistent in their claim to be 'moderate' and 'constitutional' and wanted to turn the Ikhwan into something like the Turkish AKP of Mr. Erdogan and an Islamic cousin, so to speak, of European Christian Democracy. Mursi, on the other hand, was aligned both with the traditional wing, led by the Supreme Guide, Mohammad Badie, as well

as the neoliberal supplement to the traditional one, led by the billionaire Khayrat al-Shatir, second only to the Supreme Guide. The real surprise of those presidential elections was that in the first round, with so little preparation, Hamdeen Sabbahi, the left-Nasserist candidate, won over 21 per cent as against 25 per cent for Mursi. The Mubarakist was made to win more than Sabbahi, and the latter, seeing an electoral victory of an Army-backed Mubarakist candidate – 'Mubarakism without Mubarak', so to speak – as the main danger at the time, shifted his vote to Morsi against the Mubarakist candidate, as did many of the smaller progressive groups. Morsi herefore won with over 50 per cent of the vote. Even so, the army, with its backers deep in the shade, took almost a week to declare him a winner. He and the Ikhwan had to give extensive guarantees; and, for all we know, the guarantees were given.

Morsi soon announced that he would abide by the Camp David Accords and the consequent Treaty with Israel. He took to addressing Shimon Peres, his Israeli counterpart, in his presidential letters as «my dear friend» and got Hamas to shift from Damascus to Qatar. He negotiated, or took credit for negotiating, a deal between Hamas and Israel that brought an immediate truce between the two parties after a savage bombing spree by the Israelis – a deal in which Egypt, led by Morsi, guaranteed that Hamas will no longer launch any rockets into Israel without any reciprocal guarantee from Israel. There is reason to believe that part of the price that Hamas paid was that Morsi agreed to close most of the tunnels on which the people of Gaza rely for the delivery of essential goods to them. The larger price extracted from Hamas was that it would break its alliance with Syria and Hizbullah.

Morsi took a delegation of 80 businessmen to China, among whom were luminaries of the business elite aligned with Mubarak and his son, Gamal. He closed his embassy, not in Tel Aviv but in Damascus, and called for jihad in Syria. He imposed on Egypt a constitution which safeguarded all the privileges of the Armed Forces but fired some of the generals, appointed new ones, and thought that the new appointees would be loyal to him. The main thing he forgot was that his own real vote was only 25 per cent, that he received the other 25 per cent and therefore became President because

others, mainly Left Nasserists, transferred their vote to him. He forgot that, strictly as a member of the Ikhwan and despite all the financial resources of the Ikhwan, he represented very much a minority of voters and that the vote that gave him the presidency was the vote of an anti-Mubarakist, anti-dictatorial majority. He simply refused to represent all those who made him president and acted essentially as a usurper on behalf of a cultish Ikhwan that no longer knew just where it belonged between a jihadist version of Pan-Islamism and neoliberal version of how servants of empire were to conduct themselves.

We shall soon return to the question of Morsi's performance in the presidency, so shocking that the majority of the Egyptian people seem to have turned against him within a year – and, that too in the midst of a revolutionary crisis. Let us first clarify a few things about the Ikhwan, though.

The Ikhwan: Some Background

The phenomenon of the Egyptian Ikhwan is not widely understood and this is not the place to delve into the intricacies. Some things need to be said, however. First, they are not some old-fashioned, half-crazed, clerical lot. They are socially conservative but their neo-traditionalism is thoroughly modern. Their mass base is, of course, very broad but their cadres are drawn overwhelmingly from the urban, educated, professional and/or mercantile classes. They have been around for some 80 years and had already become a substantial force in Egyptian politics by the 1940s. Since Nasser suppressed them in the next decade, they have been patronized by a variety of the Gulf kingdoms (primarily by Saudi Arabia for decades, then by Qatar more recently) which means that the organization itself has had access to billions of dollars and it counts a whole galaxy of billionaires and millionaires among its central and provincial leaders; countless others have made money either in the Gulf or in businesses inside Egypt. The legendary Khayrat al-Shatir – the recently imprisoned billionaire, second-in-command of the Ikhwan, a close comrade of Mursi – is the most famous of these Rich and Beatific. They are in competition against the Mubarakist bourgeoisie but bourgeois enough themselves, in fact more inclined toward neoliberalism than the statist bourgeoisie of yore – and

certainly more neoliberal than the Armed Forces who control at least 25 per cent (some analysts say 40 per cent) of the Egyptian economy, thanks, precisely, to their association with the state. The IMF would undoubtedly find the Ikhwan more congenial.

Their access to virtually unlimited funds from the Gulf monarchies has meant that they have been able to establish their organization, open fine offices, establish charities, schools, clinics, mosques, marriage halls, local credit facilities etc, in all corners of the country, rural as well as urban. As the neoliberalizing, corrupt, increasingly bankrupt state withdrew from the task of providing basic amenities to the populace, the Ikhwan stepped in, took over some of those functions and, aside from propagating religious piety and social conservatism, also turned large sections of the populace into clients who could then serve, in the fullness of time, as vast pools of vote banks in case they were to fight elections. With the Mubarak regime they had a peculiar relationship of competitive collaboration. Some would be sent to prison from time to time, but also to parliament at other times; and, so long as they refrained from jihadi activities and did not pose a direct threat to Mubarak, they were allowed to expand their bases and institutions in society at large. The Gulf monarchies, whose largesse the Mubarkist bourgeoisie also enjoyed, ensured that much freedom for the Ikhwan.

Pandering to Islamism is an old imperial addiction. The US-Saudi dalliance dates back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. By the time of the Truman Doctrine, political Islamism was already seen as the great bulwark against communism. The first Ikhwan delegates arrived in the White House in days of Eisenhower. When Obama came to Cairo to address the Muslim world in 2009, soon after getting elected as US President, leaders of the Ikhwan were seated in the front row as main recipients of the message: your sort of Islam is good for us. However, that is not the only variety. Between Truman and Obama, all varieties of Islamism have served imperialism well. How else could the US fight the Soviets in Afghanistan except with the aid of various sorts of Islamists; leaders of al Qaeda, initially a CIA creation, came from dissident factions of the Ikhwan. How could the massive uprising in Tunisia, the starting-point of all upheavals in the Arab world in 2011, be

managed so well without the prior patronage of An-Nahda by the British and French intelligence services? And, in Syria today, there is not a single shade of Islamism, from the most 'moderate' to the most jihadist, but starting with the Ikhwan in Hama and Homs, that has not been mobilized – by the Americans and the French, the Turks, Saudis, Qataris, and what have you – to topple the Baathist government, at the cost, already, of over a hundred thousand lives. Essentially, the nefarious love affair between the US and Islamists that fully blossomed in Afghanistan some twenty years ago is bearing its fruit in Syria today.

It is well to remember that virtually every Islamist group, faction, or tendency that is active in the Arab world today, not to speak of many other countries with majority or substantial Muslim populations, especially among the Sunni populations, is either an ally or a branch or an offshoot or a dissident faction of the Ikhwan. The issue of the containment of the political ambitions of the Ikhwan is not a minor or a local issue. Egypt is in the eye of the storm today because it is the primary home. Much else is also at stake.

In the interim: Morsi in Power

Morsicame to the presidency of Egypt not because his party could garner a majority of the votes, not only because other political forces voted for him so as to prevent the Mubarakists from capturing power, but also, and primarily, because he compromised with the army as well as its US and Israeli patrons, and because it was convenient for all concerned to have him form the government and thereby assimilate the mass movement to the capital-o-parliamentary illusion. Domestication of the mass movement was the real issue. How did Morsi execute, or fail to execute, his primary task? Basically, he alienated everyone other than his hardcore Ikhwan constituency. In the process, he broke all his electoral promises and paved the way for his own downfall.

The Ikhwan had promised that they would run no candidates for constituencies reserved for independents, but they contested those seats and garnered some of them. They had promised that they would work for a constitution that would be acceptable to all. Instead they packed constitution-making bodies with their own candidates, ignoring other constituencies – workers, women, the Coptic minorities,

other components of the mass movements – and passed a constitution tailored to their own specifications, pushing it through in a referendum with a mere 30 percent participation in which only a quarter of the voting-age population actually voted in favour of that constitution. He simply ignored the fact that two dozen members of the constitution-making body had resigned in protest and used the opportunity to get a much more Islamist constitution; or that the judiciary had refused to supervise the referendum, thus rendering the exercise legally invalid. The army's prerogatives were preserved nonetheless, which enraged large sections of the population who despised those privileges.

Morsithen invented a legislature for himself by declaring that the ceremonial upper house was the real parliament; he appointed most of its members while only 7 per cent were in fact elected. He lowered retirement age for judges, retired a large number of them and appointed his own men to the judiciary. Coptic school teachers were charged with blasphemy, while prominent members of the mass movement were charged with acts of subversion. Knowing that the Ikhwan were a political minority and that he had won the presidency with the vote of others, he nevertheless proceeded to appoint a cabinet that disregarded the coalition that had elected him and, instead, appointed an almost exclusively Ikhwan cabinet. He ignored the popular demands for an economic policy favourable to the popular classes, and instead tried to please the IMF by promising 'austerity' in government spending, curbing the public sector that still accounted for almost half the national economy, and refusing to put together a policy for stimulating employment. In November 2012, Mursi suddenly announced that he was arrogating supreme legislative authority to himself and that the judiciary had no authority to challenge his executive decrees. Then, equally suddenly, he appointed more than a dozen provincial governors, most of whom were from the Ikhwan, or salafists; one was actually member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiya, heretofore a jihadi outfit.

The list of such arbitrary, authoritarian actions is long. In sum, Morsi acted as if he had an overwhelming mandate to turn Egypt into an Ikhwan-led, quasi-theocratic state. Juan Cole has rightly called the sum

of Morsi's actions 'a creeping coup'. The uprising of 2011 did not really die down at any point, neither during the interim army rule, nor during the electoral process, nor during Morsi's tenure. As Morsi's outrages piled up, larger coalitions began to take shape, at the level of mass discontent as well as among the elite politicians. Morsi's peculiar combination of arrogance and incompetence, and his one-point agenda of ensuring Ikhwan dominance and perfecting single-party rule, accomplished the extraordinary feat of uniting virtually all other forces in society – Mubarakists and Nasserists, the 6 April Movement and the Salafist Nour party, a variety of youth groups, the Coptic Church and the legendary Al-Azhar Seminary, not to speak of a large section of the liberal elite and dozens of smaller political parties – against himself and against the Ikhwan more generally. The great uprising of 30 June came only after several waves of protests, demonstrations and strikes over six months or so. Tamarud (literally 'Mutiny' or 'Rebellion', though often translated in the English media as 'Rebel') which announced its formation on 1 May and is credited with organizing the mass signature campaign against Morsi and with being the central force behind the 30 June mass mobilization, basically provided a point of convergence for all the political forces that had come together against the Ikhwan; the 6 April Movement, for instance, mobilized two million signatures for the Tamarud campaign through its nation-wide network. All kinds of figures have been flying around. Tamarud had called for a mobilization of 16 million people; after the event, it was claimed that 33 million Egyptians, more than a third of the population, participated, while 20 million signatures were claimed for a petition that called for Morsi to resign, the Shura Council to be dissolved and Head of the Constitutional Court to be appointed as Interim President to oversee the drafting of an amended constitution and to hold fresh parliamentary elections. No mechanism exists to verify the numbers, either of actual people participating in the 30 June protests or even the claimed signatures. The proclaimed numbers are undoubtedly an exaggeration, perhaps a very considerable inflation. However, even if one accepts only half that number – say, 16 million protesters on a single day – it still makes the June 30 Movement the largest urban protest in history.

Even as the popularity of Morsi plummeted in the polls from 60 per cent at the beginning of his tenure to mere 19 per cent at the end of one year, and even as the protest wave grew and the country started grinding to a slow halt throughout the month of June, Morsi kept talking of 'conspiracies' and failed to react in a conciliatory fashion. On 23 June, General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, the military chief and Defence Minister, notified Morsi that he had a week to resolve the crisis. Morsi responded with minor concessions. The protests of 30 June came when that week elapsed. Al-Sisi then issued a 48-hour ultimatum. The game was up.

The 'road map' that al-Sisi and his men announced soon after the military takeover was virtually identical to the Tamarud's charter of demands, suggesting that understandings had been reached some time earlier among the various constituencies that had come together against the Ikhwan's burgeoning authoritarianism and that the coup had been in the making for some time. Saudi Arabia was quick to announce approval of the regime and to offer, together with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a package of \$16 billion – outright cash, oil, investments – in supporting finance. The Saudis further announced that they would step in with more aid in case the western countries cut off any of the aid to Egypt.

Israelis launched a diplomatic offensive and unleashed the Israeli lobby in Washington to persuade the Obama Administration not to touch US aid to Egypt. Not that Obama had any such intentions. John Kerry, his Secretary of State, had been in Saudi Arabia and had toured selected countries during the last week of June as the coup was being prepared in Cairo, and his immediate response after the coup was that the Egyptian Army was 'restoring democracy'. A large number of the Ikhwan were arrested in UAE. In a mysterious and still unexplained development, the Emir of Qatar, still in robust health, abdicated in favour of his suave son; it is said that the CIA handed him the marching orders signaling that he had overplayed his hand in supporting the Ikhwan and the Jihadis all across the Middle East, including Syria. It is widely understood that funding to those Jihadis would be curtailed and monies from the Gulf monarchies would now be funnelled mainly to the so-called Free Syrian Army, currently not more than

a phantom, which is nevertheless to be resurrected through this finance, western weapon deliveries and, possibly, fresh waves of recruitment via Jordan. Turkey, ruled today by a 'moderate' version of the Ikhwan which has imprisoned some 400 officers of the secular army, was the only major country in the region raging against the coup in Egypt.

The essential point here is that different forces had – and still have – different agendas. The objective of the peoples' coalitions was to prevent the rise of an Ikhwan dictatorship after the fall of the Mubarakist dictatorship. On a regional plane, Saudis saw an opportunity to settle their scores with Qatar, a chief patron of the Ikhwan in the region in its competition against the Saudis, as well as the Turkish government which is itself a part of the global configuration of the Ikhwan. Morsi was pliant enough in his policies toward the Israelis but, as he began to lose inside Egypt, the Israeli decided to back the Egyptian armed forces which had been cooperating with them for over three decades. The US was perfectly content to appear to be unhappy about the coup, try to bring the Mubarakist and the Ikhwan wings of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to mutual accommodation, and, failing that, just go back to the old clients in the company of the Saudi and the Israelis. The combination of imperialist, Zionist, monarchist forces can work with the Armed Forces as happily as with the Ikhwan. That the aspirations of the mass movement could be thwarted in the very moment of their success has to do with the balance of forces that obtained at a very specific conjuncture, nationally and internally. This ought not to be used to debunk the mass movement itself – even to suggest that there was something 'fascist' about the movement, as some otherwise liberal-left academics have tended to do.

The Triangular Contest

Much reporting in the West, including most of the western Left, proceeds as if Egypt has only two political actors, the Ikhwan and the military, which are then said to represent, respectively, democratic legitimacy (Morsi's selected government) and dictatorship (al-Sisi's 'coup'). Upeavals in Egypt are then seen through this prism of essentially a bi-polar struggle between them. There is a further presumption that Egypt, and Muslim majority countries more generally, are

gripped by a great tussle between varieties of Islamism, the jihadist/Wahabi/takfiri Islam versus 'moderate' Islam, which then quickly leads to a generalized disposition that favours the 'moderate' Ikhwan' as against failed secularism, the 'jehadis' (seen as an entirely different breed), military dictatorship etc: in all this, the Ikhwan come to represent the golden middle, the Third Way. For much of the western left, then, three consequences follow. First, relative underrating of the sheer demographic size of – and varied political outlooks within – the mass movement which is on the side of neither the Ikhwan nor any other kind of authoritarian rule. Second, they view the Ikhwan as the underdog. Third, utter bewilderment at the fact that the western governments which were only recently seen as partisans of the Ikhwan are now reluctant to cut off aid to Egyptian government and armed forces despite the 'coup' against the Ikhwan-led 'democracy'.

Egypt does not have two main political actors, the Military and the Ikhwan, between whom we have to choose, but three – the third being the Mass Movement. The first two, the Military and the Ikhwan, are the only seriously organized political forces capable of contending for power. The third actor, the Mass Movement, is very much larger than either of the other two but, on the whole, highly disorganized. There is undoubtedly a well-organized trade union movement that has been growing impressively for almost a decade now, and which has gained not only in numbers but also in experience and sophistication since January 2011. There are a number of relatively small leftwing parties that include various shades of Marxism, Communism and Trotskyism. The April 6 Movement that arose initially in support of a sustained strike wave among Egyptian workers, absorbing many from the earlier Kifaya movement and some other currents, is a fine example of an independent group that is engaged in upholding a practical connection between mass initiatives and organized protest. There are militant sections among Nasserists, etc., not to speak of autonomous women's groups, student organizations, neighbourhood committees and so on. So, one cannot say that the popular movement is bereft of organizations altogether.

However, the enormous unity of purpose that is achieved time and again in crucial moments of the general uprising has yet not developed mechanisms of enduring organizational structures that can combine concrete forms of popular democratic decision-making with representative organs that can speak for the movement as a whole as events unfold over months and, now, years. Tammarud, for instance, suddenly appeared on the scene, barely two months before the June 30 mobilizations, and occupied centre-stage in the whole process. Where did it get its resources? There are credible reports suggesting that some among the Mubarakist and Nasserist bourgeoisie provided the funds. That may or may not be true but there is reason to be skeptical.

The cult of spontaneity is also rampant, as is the glorification of leaderless movements. Demographic size and militancy of the mass movement can greatly shape the march of events but, in the decisive moments, only the organized forces, either of the Ikhwan or the Military, are capable of contending for state power. During the uprising against Mubarak, the secular Mass Movement made an alliance with the Ikhwan and then, after disorganizing itself, saw the Ikhwan move methodically to capture electoral power. In the more recent preemptive uprising against the growing Ikhwan autocracy, the Mass Movement made an alliance with the Military and was then unable to prevent either the Ikhwan or the Military from using brutal methods.

This configuration can be transformed only when the Mass Movement is able to develop a clear agenda of its own for progressive social transformation, develop institutionalized mechanisms for mobilizing the masses around that agenda, and evolve its own organizational and leadership structures so that it does not become a victim of its own attachment to infinite spontaneity it is not always forced to align itself with one or the other dominant, rightwing force, in a subordinate position. Added to this is a widespread notion of electoral results as something sacrosanct, regardless of the power of money and various other forms of coercion (including outright criminality in some cases) that go into the garnering of votes. That sense of electoral sanctity converges with the Democracy Promotion premises promoted by the US State Department, so that there now prevails a peculiar left-right convergence in which

the left itself seems to speak of democracy in exactly the language of capital-o-parliamentarian high liberalism: the institutional trappings of capitalist states is what 'democracy' has now come to mean. This leads to two alternative consequences. Those who oppose the coup ignore the arbitrary and authoritarian ways of the Ikhwan when in power, underrate the centrality of the mass uprising in recent events, and insist on Morsi's electoral 'legitimacy' – in effect arguing that once the people have done their duty at the ballot box they should go home and passively wait for the next round of elections regardless of how irresponsible the conduct of their elected representative may be. On the other hand, those who support the coup now hope that the Army will ensure a more transparent, better procedure for restoration of that same liberal democracy, albeit under the aegis of a different faction of the ruling class. The new dispensation too shall be judged not so much by its socio-economic content or international alignments but by tenets of liberal electoral systems.

We seem to no longer ask ourselves just what is wrong with the prevailing electoral systems and in what ways would they have to be altered before we can recognize them as 'democratic'. Take, for instance, the idea of the right of recall that arose on the left as far ago as the Paris Commune, i.e., the idea that if the elected representatives of the people break their promises and act against the mandate given to them, the people have a right to recall them regardless of how much or how little of their term they have served. How do you recall your representatives if the constitutional structure allows no such right? The liberal answer is that you must then use the available legal machinery, however irresponsible it may be to that right of recall. The logic of the insurrectionary process that has been at work in Egypt is that you construct a popular will in the streets, for all to see, and bring things to a crisis. Insurrectionary legitimacy in this sense is not the same as liberal legitimacy. The fact that fascists have also used extra-parliamentary methods against liberal governments does not invalidate the right to rebel from the left.

This author is no admirer of the Egyptian generals and the ongoing campaigns in the Egyptian state media to elevate General Al-Sisi to the stature of Nasser

are at least very premature if not altogether absurd. One known fact about al-Sisi is that he served as Egypt's intelligence chief and, in that capacity, worked very closely with intelligence services of Israel, US and Saudi Arabia. That record does not inspire confidence. Our main point is that the use of military force is always a set of concrete contextual questions; what has brought it about? Where is it likely to lead? What are the social forces it represents, nationally and internationally? We should be wary of the democracy/dictatorship discourse as it is framed by liberal imperialism. Confrontations between men like Morsi and al-Sisi ought not be treated as some sort of a morality play. These are deadly games, between well-organized historic blocs, designed to contain the revolutionary possibility in Egypt.

Revolution, Restoration

History is replete with mass upheavals that are characterized by what Antonio Gramsci, the great Italian Marxist, called the 'Revolution/Restoration dynamic'. In other words, they are situations that are objectively revolutionary but the possibility of revolution is swiftly contained through a preemptive counter-revolution, primarily because there is no organized revolutionary force to fight off the preemption. Egypt's misfortune is that the two forces that are organized enough to contend for state power are forces squarely of the Right, even the extreme Right, namely the Ikhwan and the Military establishment and its Mubarakist allies, whereas the largest force, the Mass Movement, is much too disorganized, far

too fragmented, a considerable portion of it far too unhinged, ideologically, to contend for state power and must therefore see others take the power for which the mass movement itself has created the opening. Offensives of the mass movement are therefore constantly reduced to a defensive position wherein the movement gets pushed more and more from the central position to the margins and is unable to accomplish much more than try to influence and pressurize one or the other of two organized forces.

This structural weakness is what makes it possible for the imperialist/zionist/monarchist alliance to retain an initiative in choosing which of the rightwing forces it will support and finance in any given conjuncture. There is a very real possibility that a brutal military dictatorship shall be imposed, or that, if the current government proves too responsive to popular demands, the Ikhwan shall be brought back, in some sort of rightwing parliamentary coalition, after they have offered even more iron-clad guarantees to Israel and the IMF. This is the framework of alternatives which the US/EU/Israeli/Turkish/Saudi combine is likely to pursue. Success of this project in the foreseeable future cannot be ruled out.

However, regardless of the problematics of 'restoration', the long-term consequences of these uprisings shall be no less profound than those of the Revolution of 1919. After some forty years of autocracy and despair, in which struggles were waged constantly but were punctually pushed into localization and defeat, the

majority of Egyptians have risen to take hold of their own history and have seen for themselves what mass action in unity can achieve. Overthrow of two dictatorships in a matter of two and a half years is no minor matter. These are historic gains and must not be overlooked even as we condemn the excessive force used by the Egyptian army and other security agencies, as well as the violence perpetrated, especially against the Coptic minority, by the Ikhwan and sundry Islamists.

Very large sections of the Egyptian masses who have been on the move for almost three years have gained much experience and are still highly vigilant. It seems very unlikely that the current military dispensation can simply restore the status quo ante or devise a plan of stabilization that does not incorporate at least a part of the popular demands. That will depend on future paths that the Mass Movement takes. In any case, none of the dominant actors – the Military, the Ikhwan, the Mubarkist bourgeoisie, the Nasserists – can resolve the underlying socio-economic crises that have produced the mass rebellion. Short of a radical restructuring of domestic class relations and international alignments, there is a real possibility of social breakdown, slow slide into anarchy or even civil war, and a much longer period of dominance by the Armed Forces and other apparatuses of the national security establishment than is envisaged by the more enlightened supporters of the coup.

* First published in *Frontline*, 20 September 2013.

Gender and Citizenship in the Global Age / Genre et citoyenneté à l'ère de la mondialisation

Edited by / Sous la direction de Laroussi Amri & Ramola Ramtohul

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 348 p., ISBN: 978-2-86978-589-2

This book is a product of the CODESRIA Gender Symposium

Ce livre est une compilation des articles issus du Symposium sur le genre du CODESRIA

One of the major issues this book examines is what the African experience and identity have contributed to the debate on citizenship in the era of globalisation. This volume presents case studies of different African contexts, illustrating the gendered aspects of citizenship as experienced by African men and women. Citizenship carries manifold gendered aspects and given the distinct gender roles and responsibilities, globalisation affects citizenship in different ways. It further examines new forms of citizenship emerging from the current era dominated by a neoliberal focus. This book is not exclusive in terms of theorisation but its focus on African contexts, with an in-depth analysis taking into consideration local culture and practices and their implications for citizenship, provides a good foundation for further scholarly work on gender and citizenship in Africa.



The Elusive Dream: Constructing a Viable Democracy in Egypt

The Youthful Tide

Revolution came to Egypt in a heady moment in January 2011. It was a largely joyous and peaceful affair. With due respect to all those who suffered, and especially all those who laid down their lives, in the clashes and conflicts that accompanied that seminal event, given the scale of the crowds involved, it was still a largely peaceful affair. It was driven by youth, who were able to strike a chord with the people and to generate the enormous crowds that became the hallmark of the Egyptian revolution: youthful activists, and crowds, enormous crowds that would see the people of Egypt reclaim their future.

It is normal that youth, who are less emotionally attached to the order in which their elders found a place, even if a marginal place, should feel that if that social order rejects them, they owe it no allegiance. They can and will replace it with one more sympathetic to their aspirations and their dreams.

After their journey from childhood to adulthood and the emptiness of unemployment stretching for weeks, months and years, they see their society through the prism of an anger nurtured by years of unfulfilled assurances and bankrupt policies.

Society sees in these unemployed youths a living condemnation of its policies, a breathing reminder of its failures. The politicians' statements sound hollow even to their own ears, as they guiltily repeat the slogans and the empty promises that other politicians have made before them.

But the explosive energy and creative abilities of these youths is available to the summons of experience. The traction of political dissent is capable of attracting their participation and of rousing their dormant powers like a fire signal in the night.

The Seductive Power of the Crowd

As one, two, three and more youths congregate, they become a crowd, a

Ismail Serageldin
Bibliotheca Alexandrina
Egypt

crowd that begins to acquire a personality of its own. Unlike the crowds that are part of the congestion of daily life of Egyptian urban centres, these crowds have a sense of purpose and direction. I watched the phenomenon take shape before my eyes as, even walking into the crowds, one could be enveloped in their seductive embrace, partake of their mood, and swell their ranks with the contribution of our presence. Crowds are more than a collection of individuals. A crowd is a novel creature that emanates from the aggregation of people, through the togetherness, the merging of the one and the whole, the melting of the person into the collective, as the individual is assimilated into the crowd.

But subsequent events were to pile the disappointments of shattered expectations on the agony of violence and the dreaded hand of death claiming young lives in the endless rounds of confrontations that pitted masses of people against the arrayed forces of the state or simply against other masses of people driven by different ideals and expectations.

And the crowds changed. For crowds have character and purpose, have personality and power.

The big crowds were replaced in many places by small bands. Strange bands of thugs appeared among the revolutionaries. Crime became rife in the streets. Vandalism and destruction emerged. The *Institud'Egypte* was set ablaze. Its collection of books put at risk, and its two centuries of recollections largely destroyed. Elections and a new regime would change the constellation of the actors, and direct different crowds to different purposes. But the streets remained the agora of the people, who went there despite the uncertainties of crime and the vagaries of confrontations.

But these were now more cynical, smaller crowds.

Briefly, the idealism of the crowds was re-ignited in the crowds that were mobilized by the three-month effort of the youth-driven movement *Tamarud* or Rebellion, which sought to harness the alienation and the anger against the Muslim Brotherhood regime headed by its now elected president Mohamed Morsi. They succeeded beyond anyone's dreams. The crowds that went out on 30 June 2013 were larger than those that had ended the Mubarak regime three years earlier. And, again, they were largely peaceful crowds, who occupied all the squares of Egypt. They would force the transition. But the dedicated crowds of Islamists who supported the continuation of the regime, though much smaller, made up for their smaller numbers with a higher degree of commitment and even zealotry to their cause. Confrontations would follow. The crowds, ever the crowds, would remain the favoured means of political expression.

The Difficult Transformation

But there were other forces at work. There were competing visions of a future Egypt. Those who wanted a state organized along the lines of their visions of Islamist principles, those who wanted a western-style democracy, and even those who hoped to craft a democracy that would be uniquely Egyptian.

The Muslim Brotherhood, a movement which for eighty years has tried to build a society moulded on their vision of Islam, and which had been fought and persecuted by most of Egypt's rulers over the decades, were finally able to assume power by the ballot box, first in parliament then the presidency. But in their eagerness to consolidate their positions, they alienated all the forces in Egypt: from the leftists and Nasserists to the liberals and even the Salafists who share their vision for an Islamist future.

The people were mobilized and the crowds came out again. And the deep cleavages in Egyptian society became

manifest. But the vast majority of the people rejected the rule of the Brotherhood. The rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood included their erstwhile Salafist allies. The Army supported the coalition of the disaffected and the confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters became inevitable. And the vast majority of the people who had overthrown the Muslim Brotherhood presidency now supported the army and police in their confrontations with the Brotherhood. Crowds would demonstrate again. Blood would flow.

Blood

Blood had been spilled before, but now it was with a new vindictiveness and anger. The hopes for national reconciliation receded. The crowds, ever the crowds, now had a different edge to them. Crowds and blood had become endemic on the Egyptian political scene.

Our dreams still drive us forward, even if the dream of a functional democracy including all in its pluralistic embrace seems more elusive than it ever was, it continues to inspire us and it challenges us to overcome the ugliness of violence and the horror of the blood....

An invisible layer of blood is caked over the political landscape, and it shall never be the same again. The blood of innocent victims and combatants alike.

That blood that ended the innocence of the revolution fueled by people power

It haunts our memories

It blurs our vision

It poisons our mind with thoughts of revenge and retaliation.

And keeps the dream of democracy just out of our reach

The elusive dream that gives meaning to our search

That gives grandeur to our struggles

That brings purpose to our quarrels.

But we must recognize that the promise of democracy will not be realized overnight. The fears of the few should not be allowed to determine the course of

action that we pursue. We continue to pursue that elusive dream that seems just out of reach, forcing us to transcend our current limitations and become better people, forging our determination into the lattice of that desired future.

Pursuing the Elusive Dream

Whatever their failures, their limitations and their shortcomings, the various rulers that have governed Egypt in the last three years have confronted forces that they little understood and certainly did not control. Shifting alignments reflected changing patterns and configurations of a bewildering array of social and political actors.

The rulers lacked leadership and vision and tried to master and use the old levers of power as they tried to dismantle them and create new instruments of governance – a tricky challenge in the best of circumstances, and an almost impossible task under the rapidly shifting realities of the volatile Egyptian politics of today.

And today, if the prospect of an Islamist future has receded, the spectre of the autocratic state is re-emerging. Where is the central concept of the reassertion of the role of the citizen? Where is the fundamental truth of Egypt's revolution? The idea that democracy is the participation of the people in crafting their own destiny.

Revolutions do not necessarily recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse.

There are many who support strong action against the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. Some hope that this can be done without a return to autocracy.

And there are those who want to actively work to avoid the return of autocratic force, the hated centrality of coercive power so long dominant in the Egyptian State.

There are those who, committed to the high ideals of the revolution, want to defend the virtues of rebellion as well as the importance of liberty.

There are those who feel that they cannot be quiet as the centralized and oppressive state reasserts itself, those who cannot

find virtue in a fugitive and cloistered condemnation between friends, and who insist to sally forth and seek out 'the adversary', to destroy that adversary's power. Yet because they perceive that adversary only dimly, they concentrate their anger at the symbols of that power: the public buildings that symbolize governance, and the men whose job it is to defend the law and the existing order of things, be their uniform that of the police or the army.

There is a strange joy to the contest... The magic of the crowds, the attraction of destruction, the assertive exhilaration of the destructive act, the liberation of the moment of vandalizing a hated building in the dust and heat of conflict or the mad logic of the crowd.

When enraged by blatant miscarriage of justice, the disillusioned joined the engaged and the committed and marched on the halls of power and the palaces of justice. An act of defiance and rejection of the old/new order that asserts rejection even if it does not endorse alternatives. It is the centrality of the crowds' act of the defiance that brings about the fusion of private obsession and public fact.

Some have started to reject the crowds, to reject the vague and uninstitutionalized mechanism of power that they represent. They believe that the nation is in danger, and that the economy faces an abyss. Some even consider that the abyss is the certain outcome of the continued upheavals on the streets...

Others have abandoned reason altogether, and certain of the truth of their vision or their cause will not even listen to arguments or see the evidence of a different reality. They plunge madly into the abyss of certitude.

Between the certitude of the abyss and the abyss of certitude, the tangled web of Egyptian politics tries to make sense of the post-revolutionary reality. It tries to reclaim a future, with a glimpse of utopianism, to snatch that luminous elusive future from the jaws of the projected dystopia. That luminous elusive dream that keeps driving us forward. And we will not stop until we turn that dream into reality.

The Veil: A Flag of the Muslim Far Right

Marieme Helie Lucas is an Algerian sociologist and founder of the organizations: “Women Living Under Muslim Laws” and “Secularism is a Women’s Issue”. In this interview, conducted by Iranian exiled feminist leader, **Maryam Namazie**, she presents a provocative view of the controversy over the face-veil ban in France – an issue which has paradoxically seen Western progressives making common cause with Muslim conservatives, and Western conservatives purporting to act in the name of feminism. This interview is presented in the spirit of airing iconoclastic perspectives and broadening the scope of debate on an issue where conflicting definitions of civil liberties have created much confusion.

Maryam Namazie: Limitations on the veil in schools and an all-out ban on the *burqa* or *niqabare* often seen to be authoritarian. Your views?

Marieme Helie Lucas: First of all, it is useful not to conflate the two issues: that of veiling girls in schools and banning the face covering. I will thus answer them as two separate questions.

When talking of veils in schools, one automatically refers to the veiling of under-aged girls, i.e., not the veiling of women. The question thus becomes: who is to decide on girls’ veiling – themselves or the adults who are in charge of them? And which adults?

I know of only one book that looks at this issue; it is a pamphlet entitled *Bas les Voiles* (by Chahdortt, Djavann, Gallimard, 2003) that was published by an Iranian woman exiled in Paris at the time when the Stasi Commission in France was collecting the views of concerned women (and men) before the adoption of the new law on religious symbols in secular state schools. The author states that the psychological damage done to girls by veiling them is immense as it makes them responsible for men’s arousal from a very early age. This point requires special consideration given the new trend to veil girls as young as five as shown in the numerous campaigns throughout North Africa.

The author goes on to explain that the girl’s body is thus turned into the site of

**Marieme Helie Lucas
& Maryam Namazie**

‘fitnah; (seduction or source of disorder), meaning that she cannot look at it or think of it in positive terms. This attitude builds girls that fear, distrust, and feel disgust and anguish at their own bodies. At such an early age, little girls have no way of countering this shaping of their self; they are entirely under the thumb of anti-women men. The women growing up from these psychologically damaged girls are likely to need a lot of help to be able to reconsider themselves and their bodies in more positive terms, to reconstruct their self-image, to conquer their bodily autonomy, to abandon guilt and fear – and to give back to men the responsibility of their sexual acts. I think it would be very useful for more women researchers to delve into the psychological damage done to girls who are veiled from an early age.

Also, who is the ‘adult’ in charge of protecting the girl-child’s rights? The state already plays this role on numerous occasions, such as in preventing families from performing FGM (female genital mutilation) on girls, or in preventing forced marriages, for instance. Why should it not also take responsibility in preventing the deep psychological damage induced by wearing a veil before adulthood?

Maryam Namazie: Why should the state be seen as authoritarian when it prevents the veiling of girls but not when it protects them from FGM?

Marieme Helie Lucas: It is interesting to remember that groups of lefties and feminists (alas!) in Europe and North America defended ‘the right to FGM’ in the seventies as a ‘cultural right’ and denounced ‘western imperialism’s’ attempts at eradicating the practice in Europe. At no point was any reference made to the struggles of women on the ground to eradicate it in the limited parts of Africa where FGM was practiced both by animists, Christians and Muslims. We see the same pattern replicated regarding ‘the right to veil’, which is now seen as a

‘religious right’ despite the fact that numerous progressive interpreters of the Qu’ran have stated that it is not an Islamic injunction. What strikes me is the imbalance in treatment of ‘authoritarianism’ by those on the left and in the human rights community in Europe and North America. Millions of women in predominantly Muslim set-ups have been assassinated for standing for their right not to be veiled (so far, veiled women are not assassinated for wearing a veil in Europe, nor in North America, even if it is true that they may be verbally attacked by far-right racist individuals, who, may I emphasize, are then taken to court and generally convicted – as should be the case).

I wish the magnitude of the vociferous defense of veiled women’s ‘choice’ and ‘right to veil’ by ‘progressive people’ would be matched with their defense of women slaughtered for not veiling. But what we see, instead, hidden behind the left and human rights community’s unilateral defense of the human rights of veiled women, is in fact a clearly political position. ‘Progressives’ have chosen to defend fundamentalists who they depict exclusively as victims of US imperialism, rather than the victims of fundamentalists, i.e., amongst others, the millions of unveiled women who have resisted their diktats as well as the millions of secularists, agnostics, atheists, and so on who have been abandoned as ‘westernized’ or even ‘allies of imperialism’! History will judge this short-sighted political choice just as it did the cowardice of European countries at the onset of Nazism’s rise in Germany.

With regard your question, I can only speak from my perspective as an Algerian living in France at the time of the debate on the two French laws that are incriminated the world over as being ‘anti-Islam’: the law on veiling in schools and the ban on face covering. These are two different issues and in France they have been treated separately.

The ban on religious symbols in state secular schools is done in the name of secularism, whilst the ban on the face covering is done in the name of security. The *burqa* has been added to other forms

of face covering such as masks (outside a carnival setting) or full motorbike helmets (when not riding) as all of these are routinely used to protect the identity of rioters or ‘terrorists’. (As an Algerian old enough to have lived through the Battle of Algiers during the liberation struggle from French colonialism, I know for certain that veils were used to carry arms and bombs from place to place – hence I cannot be surprised that full face coverings are added to the list of forbidden outfits.)

Let me deal with veiling in schools.

The situations of France and Britain are very different.

France is a secular country that, since the French revolution, separated the new secular state from the political influence of the Church. The secular laws that established this separation date from 1905 and 1906, way before any immigration from predominantly Muslim-majority countries. Article 1 of the 1906 law guarantees freedom of belief and practice. Article 2 of the same law states that beyond this guarantee of fundamental individual rights the secular state will have nothing to do with religion and its representatives. The state will not recognize churches, nor fund them, and so on. In the words of a modern analyst of secularism, Henri Pena Ruiz, the state declares itself ‘incompetent in religious matters’. Beliefs become a private matter, and established religions (at that time mostly the Catholic Church) lose all political power over the state. The secular state will simply ignore them as political entities. Citizens are the only partner the state recognizes, through democratic election processes.

It is a consequence of the definition of secularism as a separation of state and religion that, since 1906, displaying ‘any symbol’ of religious or political affiliation is forbidden in exclusively two specific situations: for both personnel and pupils in primary and secondary secular state schools (i.e. for under-aged children, and not including universities where students are of adult age), and for civil servants in contact with the public.

The rationale for this is that children come to the schools of the Secular Republic (where education is free) to be educated as equal French citizens, not as representatives of any specific community. Education as equal citizens is a powerful tool against communalism and

the divisive specificities that lead to unequal legal rights within a given country, as is already the case in Britain, with the so-called ‘sharia courts’ becoming parallel legal systems in family matters.

Similarly, civil servants when in contact with the public have to perform their duties as representatives of all citizens of every ethnic or religious background, and that is why they are requested not to display their affiliation within the time frame when they represent the Secular Republic.

This is a far cry from, for instance, British police stations, where one can request to be heard by a policeman of his or her own cult or ethnic group as if a civil servant cannot be educated not to be biased, and is necessarily first and foremost faithful to his or her ‘community’ rather than to fellow citizens.

Maryam Namazie: It is thus in the name of secularism that veiling has been outlawed in secular state schools and for civil servants in France, just as crosses or *kippas* have. Interestingly, the emphasis is on the veil, not on crosses or *kippas*. Why? And who is behind this hierarchy?

Marieme Helie Lucas: What blurred the issue was that the rightwing president Sarkozy passed the new law in 2004 whilst trying to rally the xenophobic far-right in favour of his candidacy. There was no need for such a new law; the 1906 law merely had to be applied.

The right and far-right forces in France have never stopped attacking the 1905-6 secular laws for the past 100 years. They have now found active and powerful partners in Muslim fundamentalist far-right forces which also want to dismantle secularism and to return to the stage when religions had political power and official representation. It is clear that while different religions will compete at a later stage – if they are to succeed in their attempt to eradicate secularism in France – they are useful allies to each other. Just watch how representatives of the Catholic Church and Jewish high authorities support practically every demand by Muslim fundamentalists! The issue of the veil in primary and secondary schools in France is but one of the many demands they constantly devise to fundamentally challenge the laws of the Secular Republic.

Isn’t it ironic that laws passed a century ago, at a time when there was virtually no immigration from Muslim-majority countries, now pass off, the world over, as laws against Islam? This alludes to the expertise of Muslim fundamentalists in media communications.

Coming back to the issue of the veil and the *burqa* in the UK, let me state that Britain is not a secular state. The Queen is the head of the Anglican Church, thus it cannot root its ban of the *burqa* or *niqabor* even head scarf on secular laws dating back to more than a hundred years nor show its commitment to free and quality non-confessional education for all children as is the case in France.

Britain has devised an alternative definition of secularism, not as separation, but as equal tolerance by the state vis-à-vis all religions. Thus the state in Britain interacts with religions, and considers ‘churches’ (or the like in other religions) as political partners and representatives of communities. It is this which leads to communalism and cultural relativism. Isn’t it high time for Britain to return to the original definition of secularism and to a form of democracy in which citizenship is at its centre?

What we see happening is the fragmentation of people, of fellow citizens, into smaller and smaller competing entities that each demand different rules are applicable to them and their ‘community’ in the name of cultural and religious identities. Laws that were voted by all citizens are challenged for the benefit of supposedly divinely ordained laws – a direct attack on the very principle of democracy. We see the eradication of the notion of citizenship, and this will have drastic political consequences in the near future. All in the name of rights!

Maryam Namazie: What happens to a woman’s right to choose her clothing? Some would say forcing women to unveil is on par with forcibly veiling them.

Marieme Helie Lucas: I would like to first point out the fact that the debate is formulated in ‘western’ terms. To my knowledge, women in Muslim contexts are not prevented from veiling and that’s the vast majority of supposedly Muslims in the world. In most instances, they are forced to cover, to various degrees, often by law, and we have yet to hear a worldwide outcry about their situation.

In sharp contrast, we hear so much about the poor women 'forced to unveil' in non-Muslim contexts – mostly in Europe and North America – but I have yet to find where this happens; nowhere to my knowledge. The limitations on veiling, in specific circumstances in France, have been addressed in my response to the previous question (under-aged girls are requested not to veil only within the premises of secular state primary and secondary schools and *burqa*-clad women are requested to uncover their face for purpose of identification; the rest of their body, hair, and head can be covered as they like). Also, as per my knowledge, when veiled women are verbally or physically attacked, there are tribunals to defend them against any form of aggression. In actual fact, the debate is reduced to the right to veil in Europe and North America with no regard for the resistance to veiling everywhere in the world and the dire circumstances for resisters. This reduction is utterly unacceptable to me.

On the one hand, there are millions of women worldwide forced to veil who risk their liberty and lives when they transgress veiling orders. They are abandoned to 'cultural' and 'religious' rights with no analysis of the far-right political forces manipulating and hijacking culture and religion for political gain under the politically correct pretext that US imperialism misused the defense of women's human rights to conceal its economic reasons for invading Afghanistan and that 'whites' are racists. On the other hand, there are women of the diaspora in Europe and North America whose 'right to veil' is defended by a politically correct coalition of the left and human rights defenders who show little interest in the numerous cases of young women trying to escape forced veiling.

Maryam Namazie: Isn't there some disturbing imbalance in such an utterly discriminatory political choice between those whose rights deserve to be defended and those who don't qualify? Could these champions of our rights publicly clarify their reasons for such a hierarchy of rights?

Marieme Helie Lucas: Clearly the question here exclusively refers to the 'right to choose' of women who want to veil in Europe and North America and that this is a very limited and partial way of addressing the problem; it means

'disappearing; the vast majority of concerned women.

About 'choice' in general, much has already been written by feminists about how much freedom one can expect in situations where women have no say either legally, culturally, religiously or otherwise. Recently, a powerful academic article by Anissa Helie and Mary Ashe, 'Multiculturalist Liberalism and Harms to Women: Looking Through the Issue of the Veil' (published in UC Davis' *Journal of International Law and Policy*, Vol. 19.1, 2012), concluded that 'proponents of veiling often insist on an individual 'women's right to choose (the veil)... Crafted by the theoreticians of radical Islam (who usurp the mantra of supporters of abortion rights for women), such slogans can confound Western liberals who, afraid of being labelled racist, fall into the trap of cultural relativism.'

I would, however, go back even further to the old debate sparked by Marx on workers' 'freedom to work' at the time of Britain's industrialization, i.e. a time when in order to not actually starve and die, workers' only 'free choice' was to work 14 hours a day in hellish circumstances that also killed many of them, including women and children under the age of 10.

Maryam Namazie: Women in many countries where Muslim fundamentalists rule and terrify populations have the same 'choice' that workers had in a Britain that was industrialising: to die of starvation or survive a little bit longer as slaves / to die because they resist fundamentalists or survive as slaves. Great 'choice' indeed! Is that the only alternative women are offered by cultural relativists?

Marieme Helie Lucas: The number of women assassinated by family members, as well as by fundamentalist armed groups, or imprisoned by fundamentalist states in our various countries on all continents for the simple reason that they do not conform with veiling diktats should at the very least count as more important in the eyes of human rights defenders than the 'plea of veiled women' who may occasionally have to cope with racists' comments in 'the West'.

How can one dare compare, for instance, the 200,000 victims of the 'dark decade' (the 1990s) in Algeria, a vast majority of whom were women assassinated by fundamentalist armed groups, mostly ignored and abandoned to their fate by

international human rights organizations, with a handful of veiled women yelled at in Paris or London? Yes, how dare one compare? This accepted inequality of treatment only shows that for human rights organizations and left parties, the West is still the centre of the world, and what happens there – however small and marginal – takes precedence over the many crimes committed elsewhere.

I would like to point out an interesting blind spot in the analysis of the left and human rights crowd, which if it were taken into account would prevent the reducing of the issue to 'individual choice'.

The number of veiled women in the streets of European capitals has been steadily growing over the past two decades only. Their number is not proportional to a significant increase of migrant populations. These women do not wear their national costumes (including head covering or not) but the Saudi veil instead, which never existed in other countries. There is a growing number of women adopting the most drastic form of not just hair covering but of face covering.

Maryam Namazie: In light of this, how can this form of veiling be seen as a cultural issue when it in fact eradicates all traditional forms of hair covering and of national and regional dress?

Marieme Helie Lucas: How can this form of veiling be seen as a religious issue when progressive theologians and scholars of Islam on all continents keep demonstrating that veiling women is not a religious prescription, that it is a cultural one, circumscribed to the Middle East, both for men and women, adapted to its climate, and common to all religious groups as should be largely demonstrated by Christian iconography that depicts the Virgin Mary and all the holy women that shared the life of Christ in his times as well as Jewish women as veiled? Why not rise in defense of all these endangered cultures? How can they not make the link between the propagation of the Saudi veil and Saudi funding of most of the mosques and religious organizations that have been popping up in European capital cities? How can they not see this form of veiling as fundamentalism's political flag? How can they not link its propagation with the other political activities of Saudi (and Qatari) imperialism? How can they not make a political analysis of this sudden explosion of veiled women in the diaspora? How can

they reduce it to 'individual choice' of individual women in the wake of such a massive and sudden new phenomenon?

If, let's say, there was a sudden spread of nuns' outfits, concomitantly in Italy, France and Spain, and if Catholic women in visible numbers would aggressively assert their right to be clad as 'true Catholics' (a modern invention that would be contested by respected Christian theologians – just as this new rage for veiling is contested by numerous progressive Muslim theologians and scholars of Islam that neither the left nor human rights organizations ever quote in defense of unveiled women against the inaccurate claims made by fundamentalists)? Wouldn't the left point at the right and far-right political movements hidden behind this supposedly religious revival? Wouldn't the left analyze it in political terms, rather than in religious ones, and denounce it? If there were rumours, or examples of 'improperly' clad Catholic women being coerced into this outfit, or beaten up, or forcibly secluded, or killed, wouldn't human rights organizations start looking into it? Wouldn't they defend the victims? Wouldn't they denounce these as human rights violations? Or would all these supposedly progressive forces continue to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses and to the cries for mercy of victims? Would they focus on the 'right to veil' of Catholic women?

It is clear to me that by reiterating the claims of fundamentalists over women, without even checking out the most blatant of their lies, the left and human rights crowd only betray their fear of being labeled 'Islamophobic'. They unwittingly (I hope) reinforce fundamentalist views which claim they are the only legitimate representatives of Islam, and that their opponents are anti-Islam.

This is what is behind the question of 'choice': it places the debate away from any political analysis that would point at the right and far-right nature of fundamentalists' manipulation of the veil. The right and far-right views of the supremacy of the individual are rooted in economic liberalism.

Maryam Namazie: Whilst we might consider secularism a precondition for women's rights, Islamists consider Sharia law a precondition for women's rights in the way they see them. Who is to say who is right? They would argue

secularism is a western concept and a form of cultural colonialism.

Marieme Helie Lucas: I object to using the term 'sharia law'. It presupposes that there is somewhere written a body of laws that are used by all Muslims. A simple overview of laws in Muslim-majority countries shows that there is no such thing. The vast diversity of laws in predominantly Muslim contexts show that laws have different sources: from giving legitimacy to local cultural practices (FGM passing off as Islamic in some regions of Africa), to different religious interpretations (for example, Algeria legalized polygamy whilst Tunisia banned it using exactly the same verse of the Qu'ran but with a different reading of it!), to using laws of former colonizers (such as the ban on contraception and abortion in Algeria, using the 1920 French law), and so on. It would therefore be a huge mistake to think that all the laws in Muslim-majority countries have their source in religion.

'Sharia' is a term coined by fundamentalists in order to make believe that such a body of laws exists; using the term just allows more people to believe in its existence. Exactly just as media started using other terms coined by fundamentalists, such as *jihad* (which means a spiritual fight within oneself to come closer to God, rather than a 'war' with weapons, as they interpret it); or 'the Islamic veil' when they propagate Saudi veiling; or 'Islamophobia' when one challenges their views on Islam... Do not use the language of the enemy! It gives credibility to their lies...

As I have already pointed out, there are lots of places in the world where veiling is compulsory and no forced unveiling anywhere. Not even in primary and secondary schools in France, because ultra-orthodox families have a choice to enroll their daughters in religious schools... The only obligation of families is to send their daughters to school, but the choice of that school is not within the mandate of the secular state.

And nowhere are women forced not to wear a veil in public; they are only asked in France to not cover their face. Hence secularism neither veils nor unveils women. Undoubtedly, however, fundamentalists' interpretation of supposedly divine orders aims at veiling women. Secularism is not an opinion nor is it a belief; it is exclusively a definition and a

regulation of the position of the state vis-à-vis religion. Either the state interferes with religion or it does not. Secularism is the formal set-up in which the state does not interfere with religion. We should not accept any other definition of secularism.

As for the accusation of secularism being a western concept, haven't we heard that of feminism for decades? But if we are to look into history, especially the history of women in Muslim contexts, we find out that many women, for centuries, fought for what is now considered feminist ideas and women's rights, that they dedicated themselves to literature, poetry, women's education, politics, legal rights for women, just as is the case now, and that they were supported by enlightened men and women, both believers and atheists, just as is the case now. Anyone interested in exploring some of these stories from the past should read *Great Ancestors* by FareedaShaheed and Aisha Shaheed (published by Women Living Under Muslim Laws).

Similarly, there have been many supporters of secularism in Muslim contexts over the past centuries, just as there are many today. That includes atheists, agnostics and believers who thought and still think religions benefit from the fact that political power does not interfere with personal beliefs or spirituality. Today, the former Great Mufti of Marseilles is a strong supporter of secularism in France, as are many progressive imams who go public every Sunday in a religious TV show on French Channel 2 about their support for French secularism which guarantees freedom of belief and freedom of practice.

So the real question for me is: why don't we hear more about such Muslim supporters of secularism and why won't the media give less public space to the expression of fundamentalist hatred for secularism? It is yet another fundamentalist distortion to present facts in the light of secular law being against divine law...

Recent surveys show that about 25 per cent of the population in France declares itself atheist, and the percentage is the same among supposedly Christian and supposedly Muslim individuals. But the percentage of all those who declare themselves in favour of secularism rises to 75 per cent, and is identical for presumed Muslims and presumed Christians.

There are strong movements for secularism in all so-called Muslim countries, whether in Pakistan, Algeria or Mali. Citizens go public in support of secularism, risking their lives in places where fundamentalists run armed groups that attack their opponents.

Why are photos of their public events and street demonstrations never seen outside their national media?

Maryam Namazie: Some will say this raises the question of how far we are willing to allow the state to intervene in private matters such as the way we dress. Your comments?

Marieme Helie Lucas: If we do agree that this sudden rise of specific veils worldwide passing off as the Islamic veil is neither cultural nor religious but a political flag that fundamentalists use in order to increase their political visibility at the expense of women, then we must also admit that wearing this form of veil – now – in Europe and North America has a political purpose; the women who wear it, whether they are aware of it or not, are wearing the flag of a far-right political party. Hence I could hardly agree with the formulation: ‘a woman choosing how to dress’. This veil is definitely not to be equated to wearing high heels versus flat shoes, or miniskirts versus trousers. It is not a fashion; it is a political marker. If one decides one is going to wear a swastika as a brooch, one cannot ignore its political meaning; one cannot pretend one does not care for the fact that it was the ‘flag’ of Nazi Germany. One cannot pretend one just likes its shape. It is a political statement.

Women from all over Asia and Africa who wear a face covering or *burqa* today, whether they do so in Europe and North America or whether they wear it in their own countries, are wearing a form of veiling that they have never seen before, except if they grew up in a very specific and limited part of the Middle East. They cannot pretend they are going back to their roots and wearing the dress that their foremothers wore centuries ago, nor can they pretend that they wear it for religious reasons. Muslims were Muslims for centuries without wearing such an outfit: in South Asia, they were wearing saris, or in the Sahel they were wearing *boubous*... Today, *burqa*-clad women wear an outfit that was unseen and unheard of until a couple of decades ago when fun-

damentalist political groups ‘invented’ the *burqa* as their political flag.

Hence if the state were to regulate *burqa* or the *niqab*, it would not regulate ‘the way we dress’, nor would it deal with a personal taste in fashion, but with publicly wearing the political sign of an extreme right movement.

It may be the role of the state to do so. This can be debated. But what is not debatable is that women wearing the *burqa* today are in the grip of a transnational far-right movement. Whether *burqa*-clad women are aware of the present-day political significance of their veil or whether they are alienated into the fundamentalists’ politico-religious discourse is irrelevant.

Maryam Namazie: In practice, how can restrictions be put in place (also looking at the French example) without further inflaming racism and bigotry against Muslims and immigrants and what is the connection between the two? I ask this given that some will argue that criticism of the veil and *niqabis* racist.

Marieme Helie Lucas: In that case, is resistance to *niqab/burqa*/head scarf and any other form of veiling to be labelled “racist” in our countries too? Were the women who chose to die rather than to veil in Algeria in the nineties all racist against their own people and against their own faith as many of them were believers in Islam?

Can’t we stop thinking ‘the West’ is the centre of the world? What about the Sudanese woman who at this very moment in Khartoum risks flogging and imprisonment for refusing to veil? What about the numerous Iranian women who have been jailed for decades for wearing ‘un-Islamic’ dress?

Racism, xenophobia, marginalization of and attacks on migrants (or people of migrant descent) have always been there. At the beginning of the twentieth century in southern France, there were pogroms against Italian migrants who ‘came to steal the bread of French workers’ – sounds familiar today, doesn’t it? There were numerous dead and wounded. But if we look at French citizens whose family names betray an Italian origin today, they are fully integrated and no one even thinks of contesting their belonging to the French nation. It is the same for Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks or Poles and Russians who all came to live in

France in recent history, became French citizens and have now “melted” into the general population.

There are a growing number of well-known people in France with Arabic names (and often erroneously presumed Muslim); they are professors, lawyers, medical doctors, scientists, journalists, film makers, actors, bankers, computer experts, entrepreneurs... This signifies their incorporation into the nation just like the Italians, Spaniards... less than a century ago.

A beautiful play entitled *Barbes-Cafe* was shown last year in different cities of France. It was entirely the work of people of Algerian descent, most of whom fled fundamentalists’ death threats and attacks on them in the nineties. This play is a hymn to emigration using popular songs in Arabic from the beginning to the end of the 20th century and traces the history of emigration from North Africa, the pain and longing of migrants and the terrible conditions of work, but it also celebrates the law that allowed families to join workers, the free and secular education for their children, the solidarity between indigenous and migrant workers in unions and left parties and so on. It ends with images of those of migrant North African descent who ‘made it’ and opened the gate for generations to come. It is a manifesto of hope, albeit not trying to conceal the hardship many workers faced – for their children and grandchildren to become a part of France.

October 27 was the anniversary of the March For Equality and Against Racism that four young men and women, French citizens of North African origin, initiated in October 1983. They started from Marseilles and walked for two months throughout France, visiting towns and villages, speaking to their urban and rural fellow citizens, denouncing racist crimes and discrimination, and advocating the equality of all citizens. They also denounced the label ‘Muslim’ that was imposed on them for reasons of geographical origin. Along the way, other citizens of all origins joined them and started marching with them. When they arrived in Paris, 100,000 people had gathered to welcome them and support their goals.

It is not predetermined that oppressed people or victims of discrimination turn to far-right movements. In such circumstances, people have a choice to become revolutionaries or fascists. The

fundamentalist response to racism is a fascist response. We should not under any pretext grant them any legitimacy. We should support people's movements for equality and full citizenship.

Fundamentalists have a keen interest in making sure they get the benefit of racist incidents; just like the traditional (xenophobic) far-right political movements, they need to radicalize their troops and recruit more people to their cause. Both these apparently antagonistic far-right forces share the same goal: they welcome bloodshed. Hence they are prepared to provoke racist incidents. In the past few years, fundamentalist inhabitants of a Paris neighbourhood started praying in the streets and blocking traffic for hours on Fridays. The pretext was that their local mosque was not big enough. But for sure the Great Mosque of Paris, only a few

tube stations away from them was/is permanently quasi-empty. Police watched on without doing anything and this has now been going on for more than seven years. The only response, of course, came from a far-right group which launched public invitations to share a 'wine and pork' aperitif on the very same streets on Sundays.

The cowardly left should have taken this into its own hands, demanding that people vacate the public space if they have not received police authorization to occupy it as is legal. The cowardly left is prepared to ignore provocations by Muslim fundamentalists because they do not want to be seen as 'Islamophobic'. In a way, one feels they do not make a difference between believers in Islam and the far-right supposedly religious movement that feigns to represent all Muslims.

It was in the hope of avoiding a confrontation with Franco that European governments, including the then socialist government of France, refused to help and to protect the legitimate government of the Republic of Spain. It was with the hope of avoiding a confrontation with the well-behaved Hitler that European governments went to Munich and allowed the invasion of Poland (actually Czechoslovakia – WW4R) by Nazi troops. History shows that cowardice in politics leads nowhere and that everyone has to pay the price for not standing for principles and rights in due time.

Victims of racism need to be defended, including legally; social and political problems need to be addressed by social and political means, not with religious ones.

* (This interview was originally published at <http://ww4report.com/node/12854>).

Leadership in Africa: From Autocracy to the Voice of the Voiceless

I would like to thank Ahmed Samatar for organizing this roundtable and inviting me to speak. I am not going to dwell on the first two questions – what is leadership and if and why it is important – in order to go directly to the lessons we have learned about leadership in Africa during the last 50 years. Since the ASA is made up of very smart people, I am sure that you will figure out the answers to the first two questions out of our discussion. My main argument is that there is a leadership deficit in postcolonial Africa, and that we need to overcome it by replacing autocratic rulers with genuine representatives of the people, the voice of the voiceless.

Mainstream political science has a tendency to indulge in verbal gymnastics in lieu of serious analysis of social reality. In this regard, our political leaders have been given all sorts of names: educated elites, modernizing elites, presidential monarchs, big men (but no big women, although Joyce Banda and Ellen Sirleaf Johnson can surely stand their ground today when it comes to “bigness”), etc. A select group was even once designated as the new breed of African leaders!

In June 1998, Gérard Prunier and I were invited to speak at a one-day seminar on conflicts in Africa by the Swedish

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, USA

I would like to thank Ahmed Samatar for organizing this roundtable and inviting me to speak. I am not going to dwell on the first two questions – what is leadership and if and why it is important – in order to go directly to the lessons we have learned about leadership in Africa during the last 50 years. Since the ASA is made up of very smart people, I am sure that you will figure out the answers to the first two questions out of our discussion. My main argument is that there is a leadership deficit in postcolonial Africa, and that we need to overcome it by replacing autocratic rulers with genuine representatives of the people, the voice of the voiceless.

Mainstream political science has a tendency to indulge in verbal gymnastics in lieu of serious analysis of social reality. In this regard, our political leaders have been given all sorts of names: educated elites, modernizing elites, presidential monarchs, big men (but no big women, although Joyce Banda and Ellen Sirleaf Johnson can surely stand their ground

today when it comes to “bigness”), etc. A select group was even once designated as the new breed of African leaders!

In June 1998, Gérard Prunier and I were invited to speak at a one-day seminar on conflicts in Africa by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. During the discussion, the moderator asked us to comment on this notion of new breed of African leaders, a category that then included Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), and Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea). By coincidence, Prunier had an article on the subject by Marina Ottaway, which extolled the virtues of these great and dear leaders, and proceeded to approvingly read the catalogue, in which they were described as self-reliant nation-builders and practitioners of good governance.

When my turn came to respond, I begged to disagree; pointing out that the two men from my neighborhood in the Great Lakes Region were not self-reliant at all, being among the highest recipients of foreign aid from their Western allies. One of them, Uganda's Museveni, was hardly new, having been in power since January 1986, and presiding over a very corrupt system. Other than Mbeki, whose country's strong private sector and viable civil

society could temper autocratic tendencies, the other leaders, and particularly Museveni, Kagame and Isaias, were accomplished dictators. I added that it was most insulting to compare them favorably with some of our founding fathers, among whom Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, and Samora Machel had shown real commitment to pan-Africanism and self-reliance, by giving total support to armed struggle in Southern Africa, thus exposing their own countries to destabilization by the fascist and racist states.

Fifteen years later, it is evident that there is no major distinction between the first generation of leaders and the supposedly new breed, who all cling to power through force and electoral authoritarianism, including the jailing of their most prominent opponents. Kagame has won his two presidential elections by 95 and 93 per cent of the vote cast. Both Kagame and Museveni have also forged strong alliances with the United States in order to strengthen their repressive apparatuses, without which they cannot retain control. While Isaias's rule is literally a nightmare for Eritreans, many of whom have died in the Sinai and the Mediterranean in their attempt to flee to a better life in Europe, Museveni and Kagame are responsible for crimes against humanity, which have resulted in over six million deaths in my country, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Moreover, Museveni's wife of 40 years, Janet Kataaha, is a cabinet minister, and their 39-year old son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba is a brigadier general in the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF), in which he is the commander of the praetorian guard. As it is customary with our life presidents in Africa, Muhoozi is being groomed for dynastic succession as the next president of Uganda. Same old breed of autocratic rule, isn't it?

Leadership Deficit in Africa

Africa suffers from a leadership deficit. During the struggle for independence, virtually all the classes of colonized Africans united in a national alliance against colonialism, led by the petty bourgeois élite. This alliance broke down following independence, because the liberation struggle had masked the conflicts of interests between the petty bourgeoisie and the popular masses. As brilliantly described by the historian Jacob Ade Ajayi, ordinary people had expected

that independence would bring about both freedom and material prosperity (or what I would call democracy and social progress). These "expectations of independence" were not fulfilled. Meanwhile, the nationalist leaders who had led the independence struggle went on to accumulate power and wealth in order to join the ranks of the rich and superrich of today's world. With the exception of the fight against apartheid and for total decolonization, these leaders would give only lip service to the pan-African project of self-determination politically, self-reliance economically, and pan-African solidarity internationally.

This breakdown of the national alliance has been clearly analyzed by Amílcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon. Cabral makes two critical points in this regard. The first is that since the people expected the expansion of the space of fundamental rights and liberties long violated by the colonialists, the nationalist leaders had a moral obligation to ensure a better life for the people in liberated territories. In a directive to the cadres of the African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape Verde (PAIGC), he wrote as follows:

Always remember that the people do not struggle for ideas, for things in the heads of individuals. The people struggle and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle, but in order to gain material advantages, to be able to live a better life in peace, to see their lives progress and to ensure their children's future. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, working for peace and progress – independence – all these are empty words without meaning for the people, unless they are translated into a real improvement in standards of living. It is useless to liberate an area, if the people of that area are left without the basic necessities of life.

In the second place, Cabral raises the question of whether the postcolonial state can achieve this objective within the framework of the colonially inherited structures of the state and the economy in a world system based on unequal exchange. In other words, the fundamental question that Cabral raises is to know whether an independent state based on the same system of capitalist exploitation as the colonial state can satisfy the basic needs of African workers and peasants. Answering this question in the negative, Cabral asks his followers

in the same directive "to destroy the economy of the enemy and build our own economy." He went on to underline this incompatibility between the inherited colonial economy and state machinery with the needs and aspirations of ordinary Africans in an informal talk with a group of African Americans on October 20, 1972 in New York:

We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country in order to make everything possible for our people. ... Some independent African states preserved the structures of the colonial state. In some countries they only replaced a white man with a black man, but for the people it is the same. ... The nature of the state we have to create in our country is a very good question for it is a fundamental one. ... It is the most important problem in the liberation movement. The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence.

For Cabral, as for Fanon, the point of departure is a rejection of neocolonialism and the neocolonial state. When they talk of "the lack of ideology" as one of Africa's major problems, they refer to the lack of commitment to a democratic developmental state in which the leaders choose to identify fully with the deepest aspirations of the people rather than with the world system, its dominant classes and the anti-social policies of the financial institutions under their control. Unfortunately, only a handful of African leaders can be said to have been "born again" as defenders of their people's interests. The majority of leaders, on the other hand, continue to manage in a rather routine fashion the raw materials based and export-oriented economies of Africa. In so doing, they are likely to remain the objective allies of the dominant interests of capitalist globalization, which are the main beneficiaries of raw materials exports and capital flight to the markets of the North and those of the emerging economic powers of China, Brazil and India. By refusing to "follow the path of revolution," as Fanon wrote over fifty years ago, such leaders are content with playing the neocolonial role of intermediary between advanced capitalism and their people. The major

consequences of this option are the development of a state bourgeoisie, or what Fanon called a “bourgeoisie of the civil service,” bent on using state institutions as a means of self-enrichment; the deeper underdevelopment of the country; and the further impoverishment of the popular masses. Having betrayed the revolution, postcolonial rulers have broken their organic links to the masses of the African people.

From Autocracy to the Voice of the Voiceless

Thus, to overcome its leadership deficit, Africa needs to generate new leaders who identify fully with the aspirations, needs and interests of African workers and peasants. The history of the DRC or Congo-Kinshasa provides two examples of the possibilities of transforming leadership from autocracy to the “voice of the voiceless.” I am using the name of a prominent human rights NGO whose founder, Floribert Chebeya Bahizire, was assassinated by the Joseph Kabila regime during the night of June 1-2, 2010 in Kinshasa. Chebeya’s organization, La Voix des Sans Voix (VSV) was founded in 1983 and has done an excellent job in documenting and denouncing human rights violations, including extralegal killings, arbitrary arrests, and corruption.

The first and perhaps the most important example of constructive and transformative leadership in the Congo was the work of progressive Lumumbists in support of a popular insurrection whose participants called it the movement for a “second independence.” Interestingly, the very concept around which the insurrection was organized was not a product of academics or petty bourgeois intellectuals. It came out of the political practice of the organic intellectuals of the peasants of the Bandundu province, who had formulated their own notions and ideas to understand the post-independence situation.

For these people, the independence won from the Belgians on June 30, 1960 had failed because it did not fulfill their aspirations for freedom and material prosperity. The new black rulers were different from the former white rulers in skin color, but were liars and no different with respect to looking after their own welfare and in oppressing the people. They were the «new whites.» But in order to maintain themselves in power, they

continued to rely on the “old whites” for advising, training, and equipping the repressive apparatus of the state. The first independence had failed; there was need for a “second independence.”

Congolese peasant intellectuals had thus done an analysis of the transition from colonialism to neocolonialism that is quite identical to the two-phase theory of national liberation by Amilcar Cabral. During the first or national phase, that of the struggle for independence, all strata of the population are united in the fight against the colonial system. When independence is achieved, the second or social phase becomes a period of class struggles, and the interests of the élites and the masses diverge. During this phase, according to Cabral, the fundamental task of liberation is the struggle against neocolonialism.

In the Congo, as Alain Badiou and François Balmès have written concerning the ideological resistance of ordinary people in general, the ideas of the popular masses against exploitation and oppression did not remain dormant until professional intellectuals or revolutionaries appeared to guide their materialization. For the masses, too, have their own intellectuals, as we have learned from Antonio Gramsci. However, the rebellions through which ordinary people’s ideas and sentiments are expressed have very little chance of changing the system radically in the absence of modern organizational resources necessary for a long and protracted struggle. These resources include a leadership capable of analyzing the balance of forces correctly, and of charting an appropriate course of action. In the Congo of the early 1960s, the only group that was well placed to play this leadership role was that of the radical wing of the Lumumbist camp, whose leaders included Pierre Mulele.

Mulele attempted to systematize the ideas, notions and thoughts of the masses into a coherent analysis of the situation and a revolutionary program of action for purposes of transforming it radically. His systematization was done through a Marxist-Leninist framework of class analysis together with a Maoist strategy of political education and guerrilla warfare. Schoolteachers, nurses, state and company clerks and secondary school students formed the ranks of disciplined

cadres that he trained for the struggle. They joined unemployed urban youths and peasants in what became a profoundly popular and rural insurrection. Begun in 1963, the insurrection ended in 1968 with Mulele’s return to Kinshasa under false promises of national reconciliation, and his brutal execution by Mobutu’s generals. Since time does not permit a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the second independence movement, its major lesson for us today is the collaboration between the organic intellectuals of ordinary people and revolutionary intellectuals in order to give voice to hitherto voiceless strata of the population. This collaboration did establish a truly constructive and transformative leadership that Africa needs for democracy and social progress.

The second example of the emergence of a non-autocratic and a new type of leadership for the voiceless is the phenomenon of *parlementaires-debout*, or “street parliamentarians,” which arose in Kinshasa in December 1992 in the wake of the Sovereign National Conference. This political reforms and constitutional forum took place as part of the democratization wave that swept Africa in the early 1990s, for purposes of interrogating the past and charting a new course for the future. The fact that conference proceedings were broadcast live on national radio and television turned this forum into a great educational experience for the country as a whole, giving ordinary people the ability to influence the proceedings through letters and other means, strengthening civil society, and making citizens better informed about their country’s realities.

Discussing politics on the sidewalks near newspaper stands became so popular that finding correct information, analyzing it publicly, and taking action to influence future developments gave rise to the idea of imitating what the politicians were doing. Thus, if the latter were to sit in the transitional parliament established by the national conference, young people in Kinshasa thought that they, too, could become parliamentarians, albeit those standing in the shade of a tree rather than sitting at the People’s Palace to deliberate on public affairs. The first street parliament in downtown Kinshasa was eventually duplicated with a parliament in every commune. These forums debated current issues, took decisions, and

sought ways of implementing them. Major actions included publicly denouncing opposition politicians who were seen as faltering in their resolve for democratic change, and organizing rallies and demonstrations in support of various demands of the democracy movement. Although supportive of democracy leader Etienne Tshisekedi and providing him with whatever protection they could for his safety, the “street parliamentarians” were independent of him and his party, the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS). Unfortunately, the UDPS failed to establish a strong working alliance with this youth political organization, and to use it as a recruiting ground for the future leaders of the country.

Conclusion

For purposes of promoting and consolidating democracy and social progress, Africa does not need modernizing elites, big men or women, or a “new breed of leaders” who are in fact militarists and dictators. The most appropriate leadership is likely to emerge from mass-based organizations in which revolutionary intellectuals work hand in hand with the organic leaders of our peasants, workers, women, and the youth. Following Chebeya’s example as a human rights activist in the DRC, the leadership emerging from these mass-based organizations must consist of women and men of integrity. They must

represent veritable democratic forces, imbued with patriotism and enjoying the people’s confidence. Given the interests at stake economically and strategically in the larger world, these women and men must of necessity be irreproachable nationalists and pan-Africanists, and personalities who would defend against all odds the highest interests of their respective nations and of Africa as a whole.

* Panel Presentation for the ASA Roundtable on “Leadership in Africa: Who is Minding the Commons?”

56th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Baltimore Marriott Waterfront Hotel, Baltimore, MD. November 21-24, 2013.

Ten Steps to Dictatorship: Why the Grassroots Movement in Haiti is Taking to the Streets Against the President

At great personal risk, Haitians have been demonstrating massively in cities throughout the country for the last several months calling for President Michel Martelly to step down. They held demonstrations even on 30 September and 17 October, dates of important coup d’états in Haitian history, and 29 November, the date of an election-day massacre in 1987.

By choosing these historically significant dates, the Haitian grassroots majority is clearly saying they want an end to Martelly and to the 10-year UN military occupation that followed the coup that overthrew elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on 29 February 2004. Martelly’s police force brutally broke up some demonstrations with tear gas and beatings.

Demonstrators reported that police used a very ‘powerful’ gas, which surprised them in its potency and aerial reach. In late October 2013, students in Cap-Haitien, demonstrating to support teachers demanding an increase in pay, were tear-gassed so viciously that 60 were injured, four seriously.

The next day, students in the State University of Port-au-Prince, demonstrating in support of attorney Andre Michel (see #7 below), were gassed for hours, even after they had been pushed back to their campus. The gassing went

Michel Martelly
Haiti Action Committee

on so long that some legislators went on the radio to demand that it be stopped.

On 6 November, lawyers marched in Port-au-Prince demanding an end to threats against and harassment of those willing to take on cases involving Martelly’s corruption. They also called for the resignation of the chief prosecutor. And on 7 November, thousands marched, chanting ‘Aba Martelly’ (Down with Martelly). Haitian police attacked the demonstration with tear gas and beatings. Three people were shot and wounded.

Who Is Michel Martelly?

Martelly grew up during the 27-year dictatorship of Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and his son, Jean Claude ‘Baby Doc’. He reportedly joined the Duvalierist death squad, the Tonton Macoutes, at the age of 15, and later attended Haiti’s military academy. Under Baby Doc, Martelly, a popular musician, ran the Garage, a nightclub patronized by army officers and members of Haiti’s tiny ruling class. After Baby Doc’s fall in February 1986, a mass democratic movement, long

repressed by the Duvaliers, burst forth and became known as Lavalas (‘flood’), from which emerged Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a popular liberation theology Catholic priest, who was elected president in 1990 with 67 per cent of the vote in the first free and fair election in Haiti’s history. Martelly quickly became a bitter opponent of Lavalas, attacking the popular movement in his songs played widely on Haitian radio.

Martelly was closely identified with sympathizers of the 1991 military coup that ousted former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’, the *Miami Herald* observed in 1996, and ran with members of the vicious FRAPH death squad from that period, infamous for gang rapes and killing with impunity.

On the day of Aristide’s return to Haiti in 2011, after eight years of forced exile in South Africa, and two days before the ‘run-off’ election, Martelly was caught in a video on YouTube insulting Aristide and Lavalas: ‘The Lavalas are so ugly. They smell like s**t. F**k you, Lavalas. F**k you, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.’

The Fraudulent Presidential Election of 2010-2011

In the presidential election cycle of 2010-2011, Haiti’s Electoral Council banned Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas Party from

participation, which de-legitimized the whole corrupt process. Voter turnout was less than 25 per cent in the primaries and less than 20 cent in the "run-off." The top two candidates announced after the sham primaries were the wife of a former pro-Duvalier president and the son-in-law of Rene Preval, the president at the time. Martelly was declared third, but his supporters demonstrated violently. An OAS commission, with the full support of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who flew to Port-au-Prince at the height of the Egyptian revolution, ruled that Martelly had finished second. He received \$6 million from an anonymous donor in Florida to hire a PR firm that had worked on the campaigns of Felipe Calderón in Mexico and John McCain in the U.S.

Corruption

Corruption scandals have followed Martelly since he refused to divulge who funded his campaign for president.

• Bribes

Award-winning Dominican Republic journalist Nuria Piera broke the story in April 2012 (later reported in Time) that Martelly was alleged to have accepted \$2.6 million in bribes during and after the 2010 election to ensure that a Dominican construction company would receive contracts under his Presidency.

In addition, the vote to make Laurent Lamothe the Prime Minister is known in Haiti as the "tout mounjwenn vote" ("everyone got their cut" vote).

• Surcharge on international calls and money transfers for "education"

Questionable new taxes have also fed controversy. A \$1.50 tax on money transfers and a 5 cent per minute tax on phone calls to Haiti are alleged by Martelly to support education, but the poor majority continue to face unaffordable school fees, and critics say no money from this tax has gone to schools. Moreover, Haitian teachers have been marching to demand back pay. Martelly's new taxes were not ratified by or presented to Haiti's Parliament, making them illegal.

• Travel Expenses

When traveling, which he does often, Martelly's entourage receives an outrageous per diem from the Haitian government. According to Senator Moïse Jean-Charles, Martelly gets \$20,000 a day, his

wife \$10,000 a day, his children \$7,500, and others in his inner circle get \$4,000 daily.

A plan to establish an illegal parallel customs system to circumvent legislative control

This allegedly involved the selling of a membership card and gun to anyone who wanted to be part of the Martelly gang. The membership privileges included tax-exempt status at customs. The program had to be scratched when US DEA complained about members facilitating drug transport on the strength of their membership.

Rewriting and Undermining Haiti's Constitution

The overthrow of Baby Doc in 1986 led to the creation of a new democratic Constitution in 1987, ratified in a referendum by an overwhelming majority of Haitians. It recognized Haitian Kreyol as an official language, along with French, and legalized Vodun, the spiritual practice of the majority of Haitians. It provided for grassroots participation in national decision-making, decentralized the nation's finances and political structure, and provided for protection of human rights. On June 12, 2012 Martelly announced new amendments, which concentrate executive power and herald the return of Duvalier-style dictatorship. The new illegally amended Constitution, written by non-legislators, and never seen nor voted by the Parliament prior to its publication creates a top down method of choosing a Permanent Electoral Council to run elections, undermining grassroots participation and centralizing control from above.

It allows the president to appoint the prime minister after merely "consulting" the heads of the two chambers of Parliament instead of requiring Parliamentary ratification. In cases of "presidential vacancy," the new amendments make the prime minister the provisional president, so presidents can resign, appoint the prime minister to succeed them, and thereby maintain perpetual control.

New amendments provide that a "general budget" and a "general expenditures report" can replace line item annual budgets, thus limiting parliamentary oversight of the budget.

New amendments return Duvalier era and other retrograde laws, including:

- A 1935 law on "superstitious beliefs," which would ban Vodun once again
- A 1977 law establishing the Court of State Security to increase state surveillance and repression.
- A 1969 law that condemns all "imported doctrines", thereby attacking freedom of thought and freedom of association. Violation of this new law can result in the DEATH PENALTY. The 1987 Haitian Constitution had eliminated the death penalty.

Restoring the Army

In one of the most popular moves of his administration, President Aristide disbanded the hated Haitian army in 1995. Since the coup that overthrew Aristide for the second time in 2004, UN troops and police, currently numbering 8,754 uniformed personnel, have occupied Haiti. One of Martelly's campaign promises was to restore the Haitian Army, and now new Haitian troops are being trained by Ecuador and Brazil. In addition, well-armed former military and paramilitary personnel have occupied militia camps since early 2012, supported by Martelly.

Return of the Death Squads

Martelly has issued pink identity cards with a photo for \$30 to selected supporters, promising many benefits to those who hold them, like jobs and impunity from prosecution. During the Duvalier period, every Tonton Macoute received a card that provided many privileges, like free merchandise from any store entered, entitlement to coerced sex, and fear and respect from people in general.

Senator John Joel Joseph has identified Senators that he claims are marked for assassination. He identified the people who have been paying the "hit squads" on behalf of Martelly. He denounced one of the men as an escaped criminal who had been caught red handed with a "near death" victim behind his vehicle. Said victim sent the police to a house where two more victims could be found. Senator Joseph identified the leader of the death squad and his vehicle, denouncing the group as the one which recently assassinated a grassroots militant. He accused the president and his wife of pressuring the chief of police to remove the senators' security detail, in order to facilitate their assassinations. He denounced a previous instance when

Martelly tried to pressure former police chief Mario Andresol to integrate a hit-man into the police, to assassinate Senator Moise Jean Charles.

Death of a Judge

Martelly set up his wife and son as head of governmental projects, but with no parliamentary oversight. A Haitian citizen, Enold Florestal, filed suit with attorney Andre Michel before Judge Jean Serge Joseph, maintaining that the Martellys were siphoning off large amounts of state monies, which the Haitian Senate has no jurisdiction over. Judge Joseph moved the case to the next judicial level, which required depositions from the Martellys and various governmental ministers. Enraged, Martelly and Prime Minister Lamothe called two meetings with the judge (which they deny took place) to demand he kill the case, the second on July 11. The judge drank a beverage offered him at that meeting.

On July 12 Judge Joseph became violently ill and died on July 13. Haitian police arrested Florestal on August 16 after viciously beating him, and Haitian authorities have issued a warrant for the arrest of Attorney Michel, who has gone into hiding. A commission of the Haitian Parliament is now calling for the impeachment of Martelly based on illegal meetings with the judge, interference in legal matters, and threats to those involved in the case.

Since then Enold Florestal and his brother, who's completely uninvolved with the case, have been arrested and remain in jail. On October 22, police stopped Attorney Andre Michel and demanded to search his car. He refused without a judge present to prevent tampering or planting of evidence. The action quickly turned into a standoff between police forces and a large crowd that was gathered to defend Michel. Michel was eventually summoned to appear in court the next day.

In court the prosecutor told the judge he did not have charges to file, but for Michel to not leave the courtroom. Several Deputies and Senators who were present whisked Michel out of the courtroom and took him to an unknown location, where he remains at the time of writing.

Corrupting the Judiciary and Parliament

The Martelly regime is working to establish executive control over the

judicial system through the use of "controlled" prosecutors and judges. In violation of the constitution, he appointed as Supreme Court chief justice, Anel Alexis Joseph, who is 72. Haitian law says a judge must be 65 or under to be named to this position. The chief justice also leads the commission that regulates the entire judicial system, so Judge Anel Alexis Joseph is using his power to block an investigation into the death of Judge Jean Serge Joseph and to protect Martelly and his henchmen from all legal challenges, thereby granting impunity.

Martelly has also corrupted the legislative branch that could bring charges against members of the executive. He ordered the arrest of Deputy Arnel Belizaire in spite of parliamentary immunity and his legal council's advice. He has so far failed to call elections for 10 Senate seats in January, and is trying to force the 10 Senators whose terms he says are up (they say in 2015, not 2014) to leave office. Since elections have still not been held for 10 additional seats, if these new 10 seats are vacated, it would leave the 30 member Senate without a quorum, allowing Martelly to dissolve the Parliament and rule by decree.

Reactionary Economic Policy

Martelly enforces the Clinton Bush plan for economic "development" of Haiti through sweatshops, tourism, and the selling of oil and mining rights to transnational corporations. Under this plan, money donated for earthquake relief has been used to build a duty free export manufacturing zone in the north of Haiti, which was not affected by the earthquake, and several luxury hotels in Port-au-Prince. The Clinton Bush Haiti Fund made a \$2 million equity investment in a hotel called the Royal Oasis, to give foreign tourists and investors an "oasis" to escape the miserable conditions under which the majority of Haitians live. At the same time, the Martelly regime viciously represses the economic activities of the poor super majority. The phone and money transfer taxes cut into their incomes. Taxes have been arbitrarily increased on imports, affecting small merchants. Thugs wearing masks have burnt markets in different cities, causing merchants to lose capital they had been accumulating for years, forcing them to raise new capital through usury loans. Street vendors are

harassed and removed forcefully, then after hours, their stands are looted.

Duvalierism Returns to Haiti

Martelly warmly welcomed the January, 2011 return to Haiti of Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, one of the most brutal dictators of the 20th century, after his decades of luxurious exile in France. Duvalier still has many supporters in Haiti, some of whom are armed and have a history of killing political opponents. Martelly's government is filled with Duvalierists: hardline former Haitian army officer David Bazile is now Interior Minister. Magalie Racine, daughter of notorious former TontonMacoute militia chief Madame Max Adolphe, is Martelly's Youth and Sports Minister. Public Works Secretary of State Philippe Cinéas is the son of longtime Duvalierist figure Alix Cinéas, who was a member of the original neo-Duvalierist National Council of Government (CNG) which succeeded Duvalier after his fall in 1986. In addition, Duvalier's son, Francois Nicolas Jean Claude Duvalier, is a close advisor to Martelly.

Conclusion

A major objective of the Duvalier dynasty was to institutionalize dictatorship through death squad brutality, supported by the United States and other powers. Martelly is an example of their policies having come to fruition. He's restoring a government of impunity per the Duvalier era, building an administration of right wing ideologues who believe in dictatorship, and who collaborate to sidestep all legislative and judicial controls.

His goal is to implement extreme neo-liberal economic policies on behalf of Haiti's less than 1% with control over all natural resources. The people will be at their mercy for factory work and other "subservient" positions, under the boot of a UN occupation force of 8,754 army and police personnel, the beginnings of a restored army, paramilitary training camps, death squads, gangs and mafias that use the cover of the corrupted executive and judicial systems to operate.

The Haitian majority does not accept this return to the bad old days, however, and has been actively and massively protesting this repression for the past year. They deserve the support and solidarity of freedom loving people everywhere.

The Logic of Nuremberg

In March 2013, General Bosco Ntaganda, the ‘Terminator’, former chief of military operations for the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, voluntarily surrendered himself at the US embassy in Kigali and was flown to the headquarters of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague. The chargesheet included accusations of murder, rape, sexual slavery, persecution and pillage, offences documented in detail by Human Rights Watch over the last ten years. Ntaganda’s trial, scheduled for 2014, will follow that of Thomas Lubanga, the UPC’s president, who was convicted in 2012. There seems to be no question about the justice of the proceedings. At the same time, however, the UN Security Council has been pursuing a strategy of armed intervention in eastern Congo, using troops from South Africa and Tanzania, against the rebel groups Ntaganda and others commanded. Both initiatives – the prosecution of rebel leaders for war crimes and military operations against their personnel – are taking place when peace talks between government and rebels are well underway. This, then, is a co-ordinated military and judicial solution for what is also, and fundamentally, a political problem. Inevitably with such solutions, the winners take all.

Where mass violence is involved, there is always a choice between the judicial approach, enforced by the victors or by external powers, which tends to exclude the losing parties from any political settlement, and negotiation, which necessarily involves all parties in discussions about the future, whatever the crimes they have committed. After the Cold War, our response to mass violence has largely been determined by the model of Nuremberg: in Rwanda or Sierra Leone, Congo or Sudan, international criminal trials are the preferred response. The problem here is that mass violence is not just a criminal matter, since the criminal acts it involves have political repercussions.

This is not to say that no one should be held responsible for violence; merely that it is sometimes preferable to suspend the

Mahmood Mamdani
Makerere University
Kampala

question of criminal responsibility until the political problem that frames it has been addressed. The clearest alternative to the Nuremberg model that has emerged since the trials concluded in 1949 is the complex set of negotiations known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which brought an end to apartheid in the 1990s. (It is worth bearing in mind that D.F. Malan’s National Party embarked on its 45-year racist experiment in South Africa while the Nuremberg courts were still in session.)

Contemporary discourse on human rights is silent about the end of apartheid. The tendency is to reduce this remarkable development to the single, exceptional personality of Nelson Mandela. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is lionised but CODESA is largely forgotten, and Africa’s abiding problem – violent civil war – is said to require a different solution: the atrocities committed are so extreme, the argument goes, that punishment must come before political reform. Nuremberg-style criminal justice is the only permissible approach. But there are lessons to be learned from CODESA, and its language of compromise and pragmatism, for present-day conflicts in Africa.

Nuremberg was the result of a debate among the victorious powers on how to deal with the vanquished. Churchill argued that the Nazis had forfeited any right to due process and should be summarily shot. Henry Morgenthau, the US Treasury Secretary and a close friend of Roosevelt, agreed; he went further and said that Germany’s industries should be dismantled so that it would never rise again as a world power. Henry Stimson, Roosevelt’s War Secretary, took a different view. So did Robert Jackson, a Supreme Court justice, though Jackson was clear that ‘you must put no man on trial under forms of a judicial proceeding if you are not willing to see him freed if

not proven guilty ... the world yields no respect for courts that are organised merely to convict.’ Truman was impressed by Jackson’s speech and three weeks later appointed him as Nuremberg’s chief prosecutor.

The credibility of Nuremberg was based on its claim to due process. For their part, the accused preferred to be tried by the US than by anyone else. They expected softer treatment from the Americans partly because the Americans had for the most part enjoyed a grandstand view of the war, and partly because they were likely to be allies of Germany in the coming Cold War. The trials also need to be understood as a symbolic and performative spectacle. For Washington, Nuremberg was an opportunity to inaugurate the new world order by showcasing the way a civilized liberal state conducts its affairs. With the air full of cries for revenge, Jackson told his audience at Church House in London: ‘A fair trial for every defendant. A competent attorney for every defendant.’

The accused were charged with four crimes: 1. conspiracy to wage aggressive war; 2. waging aggressive war (together, these charges were referred to as ‘crimes against peace’); 3. war crimes (violations of the rules and customs of war, such as mistreatment of prisoners of war and abuse of enemy civilians); and 4. crimes against humanity (the torture and slaughter of millions on racial grounds). The concept of crimes against humanity was first formulated in 1890 by George Washington Williams – a lawyer, Baptist minister and the first black member of the Ohio state legislature – to describe the atrocities committed by King Leopold’s regime in Congo Free State, and it was this charge that made Nuremberg the prototype for what has come to be known as victims’ justice. Nonetheless, conspiracy to wage war and its actual waging (1 and 2) were defined as the principal crimes on the Allies’ chargesheet: crimes against humanity were subsidiary. The Allies were divided on this order. The French disagreed that waging war was a crime in law: it is what states do. The Tokyo trials took more than twice as long as the trials of the principal figures at Nuremberg, partly because of

substantial dissenting opinions. Justice Radhabinod Pal of India argued that conspiracy had not been proved; rules of evidence were biased in favour of the prosecution; aggressive war was not a crime; and the judgments were illegal because they were based on *ex post facto* grounds. The trial, in his view, was a 'sham employment of the legal process'.

A more serious problem arose from the fact that only the losers were put on trial. The victors appointed both the prosecutor and the judges. Didn't Truman's order to firebomb Tokyo and drop atomic devices over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to untold civilian deaths when the war was already ending, inflict 'gratuitous human suffering' and constitute a 'crime against humanity', to use the language of the court? Hadn't Churchill committed a crime against humanity when he ordered the bombing of residential areas of German cities, particularly Dresden, in the last months of the war? Most agreed that the British bombing of civilian areas killed some 300,000 and seriously injured another 780,000 German civilians.

The emphasis on the last of the four charges – crimes against humanity – began to fade as the trials drew to a close: the beginning of the Cold War marked a change in US attitudes, away from the imperative of retribution towards accommodation. The fate of Alfred Krupp was a clear-cut instance. By the First World War the Krupps were Europe's leading manufacturers and suppliers of guns and munitions. During World War Two the family business owned and managed 138 concentration camps across Europe. The family used slave labour to build and man their factories and arm Germany: they were allowed to select workers from concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war and to requisition factories in occupied countries. In 1948 Krupp was charged with crimes against humanity and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Two and a half years later he was released and his assets restored in an American-led amnesty.

Central to the kind of justice dispensed at Nuremberg was the widely shared assumption that there would be no need for winners and losers (or perpetrators and victims) to live together in the aftermath of victory. In a short period of time, the Allies had carried out the most far-reaching ethnic cleansing in the history of Europe, not only redrawing political boundaries but moving millions

across state boundaries. The overriding principle here was that there must be a safe home for survivors, and in 1948 the state of Israel itself became a model for the form of restitution to which survivors were entitled. The term 'survivors' is itself an innovation of post-Holocaust language: it applies to yesterday's victims, whose interests must always be put first in whatever new political order follows a period of mass violence. In Rwanda today, as in Israel, the state governs in the name of the victims.

Nuremberg was ideologized at the end of the Cold War. Stripped of its historical and political context, the 'lesson of Nuremberg' was turned into a prescription: criminal justice is the only politically viable and morally acceptable response to mass violence. As the paradigm of victims' justice, Nuremberg became the cornerstone of the new human rights movement. But there is one inescapable characteristic of victims' justice: a defendant is either innocent or guilty. And it follows from this approach – which may be wholly appropriate in an apolitical context, where the future of a society does not hang in the balance – that perpetrators who are found guilty will be punished and denied a life in the new political order. This can be a dangerous outcome, as South Africans on both sides knew when they sat down to negotiate the end of apartheid.

*

It has become a commonplace that the South African transition was led by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC was set up as a surrogate Nuremberg in which the opponents of apartheid sat in judgment over its operatives. As with Nuremberg, the TRC's claim to have granted amnesty in return for truth-telling should be seen as a performance. For one thing, the TRC process individualized the victim, which made symbolic but not political sense, since it was precisely the legal definition of entire groups as 'racial' communities that made apartheid a crime against humanity. For another, the TRC defined a human rights violation as an act that violated the individual's bodily integrity, when most of the violence of apartheid had to do with the denial of land and livelihood to large populations defined as inferior 'racial' groups (forced removals, pass laws and so on). At the TRC the normative, institutional violence of

apartheid took second place to the spectacular violence experienced by far smaller numbers of leaders and activists and carried out by perpetrators whose actions were seen as a matter of personal responsibility.

The TRC displaced the logic of crime and punishment with that of crime and confession. In fact it set aside the violence of the apartheid state – which was enshrined in law, if not legitimate – and focused on the excesses of its operatives. And crucially it held individual functionaries criminally responsible only for violent actions that would have constituted crimes under apartheid law. Other acts – ordering the demolition of homes, for instance – were deemed to be lawful. The TRC was in this sense quite unlike Nuremberg, where the laws of the Reich were never used in mitigation of a criminal act. For this reason, the TRC was unable to compile a comprehensive record of the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime, as Nuremberg had for the crimes of the Nazis. The TRC was essentially a special court, convened in the shadow of apartheid law, whose work did not address the legalized exclusion, oppression and exploitation of a racialized majority.

In his foreword to the TRC's five-volume final report, published in 1998, Desmond Tutu celebrated the commission as evidence of the ethical and political magnanimity of the victims, but the real change had taken place before the TRC was set up. CODESA had also promised amnesty to the perpetrators of violence, though not in exchange for truth-telling but, crucially, for joining the process of political reform. The negotiations were conducted with the aim of ending political and juridical apartheid. They involved inevitable compromises on both sides, without which the transition could not have been achieved.

CODESA was a recognition by both sides that there was little prospect of ending the conflict in the short term and that this meant each accepting that its preferred option was no longer within reach: neither revolution (for the liberation movements) nor military victory (for the regime). If South Africa offers any lesson, it is an argument for moving swiftly from the best to the next best alternative. The ANC were quick to grasp that if you threaten to put your opponents in the dock they will have no incentive to engage in reform: far from criminalizing or demonizing the other side, as it must have been tempted to do, the

ANC leadership decided to treat it as a political adversary. Trials embody the ideal of justice, but the criminal process eliminates the people whose co-operation is needed to negotiate an end to the conflict. However unspeakable, the violence in South Africa was a symptom of the deep divisions in civil society that drove it. Nuremberg-style trials would never have addressed these divisions. And there would be no Israel for victims: victims and perpetrators, blacks and whites, would have to live in the same country.

CODESA unfolded in fits and starts. During the first phase, which began at the end of 1991, each side tried to muster a consensus – or at least a clear majority – within its own ranks. In March 1992, following a series of by-election victories for the ultra-right Conservative Party, which had refused to be part of CODESA, the ruling National Party called a whites-only referendum on the state of negotiations so far: an overwhelming majority approved of the process. CODESA II got underway in May, but was thrown into disarray by the Boipatong massacre the following month: Mandela accused the government of complicity with the Inkatha Freedom Party killers and the ANC withdrew from the talks, embarking instead on a ‘rolling mass action’ campaign, which brought the movement out on the streets. Bilateral negotiations between the ANC and the NP eventually resumed despite the formal breakdown: each side had used political violence, and the threat of more, to mobilize its supporters and paralyse the opposition, a strategy that underlined the urgency of talks. In September the two sides signed a Record of Understanding: a democratically-elected assembly would draw up the final constitution, within the framework of principles agreed on by a meeting of negotiators appointed by all parties.

As the ANC prepared to make historic concessions, Joe Slovo, the general secretary of the Communist Party, wrote an article in the party journal, the *African Communist*, proposing a power-sharing arrangement. As part of the deal, the bureaucracy of the ancien régime (including the police, the military and the intelligence services) would be retained and there would be a general amnesty for apartheid enforcers in return for full disclosure of their deeds. Slovo did not need to state the obvious: the real *quid pro quo* for these concessions was not

transparency about the regime’s murderous past but a comprehensive dismantling of legal apartheid and the introduction of electoral reforms that would pave the way for majority rule.

A ‘multi-party negotiating process’ began on 5 March 1993, driven forward by the two main protagonists, the NP and the ANC. Things got off to a sluggish start but, once again, political violence – this time the assassination of the ANC/SACP leader Chris Hanu – concentrated minds. The parties agreed on 1 June that elections would go ahead the following year, in April. The shared sense that storm clouds were gathering made it possible to truncate discussions on fundamentals such as constitutional principles and the fine points of the constitution itself. The result was an interim constitution, ratified in November. Key decision-making power was delegated to technical committees (to be assisted by the Harvard Negotiation Project), in order to forestall or break deadlocks in the negotiations. With the interim constitution, the protagonists – and the country – reached a ledge in the course of a rapid and dangerous ascent. The slender legitimacy of ‘sufficient consensus’ was the justification that allowed the ANC and the NP to keep up momentum. The fact that binding principles had been agreed on by unelected negotiators, and that the constitutional court had been given power to throw out a constitution drafted by an elected assembly, were flagrant violations of the democratic process. Yet growing numbers of South Africans came to see them as a political necessity.

The constitutional principles that emerged included a number of key provisions. The first was the independence of the Public Service Commission, the Reserve Bank, the Public Protector (an ombudsman), the Auditor General, schools and universities. The second was a constitutionally guaranteed Bill of Rights that enshrined private property as a fundamental right. The clause providing for the restoration of land to the majority population was placed outside the Bill of Rights. Where property rights were in contention, as they were between white settlers and black natives, the former appeared to enjoy a constitutional privilege as a result of the Bill, the latter only a formal acknowledgment of ‘the nation’s commitment to land reform’. Even greater concessions were made at provincial and municipal level, with hybrid

voting systems that precluded absolute black majority control in local government and made it impossible for taxes to be levied in white areas for expenditure in black areas. White privilege was, in effect, entrenched in law in the name of the transition. The outcome of CODESA was mixed. It traded criminal justice for a political settlement and offered a blanket amnesty in return for an understanding (‘sufficient consensus’) that led inexorably to the dismantling of legal apartheid. At the same time, it put a constitutional ceiling on measures of social justice that would have allowed majority rule to propel dramatic or meaningful change.

*

The Nuremberg trials ended in 1949 with the Cold War in full swing; CODESA convened two years after the Cold War was formally concluded. Clearly, the kind of realpolitik in play during the closing stages of Nuremberg was also a defining force in the CODESA experiment, but the paradigm had undergone a radical change from the pursuit of victims’ justice to what might be thought of as survivors’ justice, if we take the term ‘survivors’ in the broadest sense to include everyone who emerged from forty years of apartheid: yesterday’s victims, yesterday’s perpetrators and yesterday’s beneficiaries-cum-bystanders.

South Africa’s transition was preceded by a political settlement in Uganda at the end of the 1980-86 civil war. The outcome of the war was a political stalemate: one side, the National Resistance Army, had ‘won’ militarily in the Luwero Triangle (a small part of the country) but had no organized presence elsewhere. Political resolution took the form of a power-sharing arrangement known as the ‘broad base’, which gave cabinet positions to opposition groups that agreed to renounce the use of arms. Contrast this with the Ugandan government’s perplexity in the face of a more recent insurgency led by the Lord’s Resistance Army. The International Criminal Court issued warrants against LRA leaders in 2005, a fact that makes an inclusive settlement difficult: the combination of continuing armed hostilities and the court’s involvement appears to have ruled out any political deal for the moment. All the government can do is to ensure that the LRA’s military campaign is exported to neighbouring countries.

In Mozambique, six months after the South African elections in 1994, there was

another impressive election, which followed a 15-year civil war. The peace process in Mozambique decriminalized RENAMO, a guerrilla opposition aided and advised by the apartheid regime, whose practices included the recruitment of child soldiers and the mutilation of civilians. A retribution process in Mozambique would have meant no settlement at all: RENAMO's commanders and figureheads were brought into the political process and invited to run in national and local elections. The 'broad base' deal in Uganda, the South African transition and the postwar resolution in Mozambique were all achieved before the ICC came into existence.

Nuremberg's epic dispensation of victors' justice, with its uncompromising findings of guilt or innocence, is not a good model in the context of civil wars where victims and perpetrators often trade places in unpredictable rounds of violence. No one

is wholly innocent and no one wholly guilty: each side has a narrative of victimhood. Like victors' justice, victims' justice demonises the enemy – quite likely the close neighbour – and proscribes any role for this outcast in a post-conflict society. The logic of Nuremberg – and by extension of the ICC – tends to drive parties in a civil war away from inclusive solutions towards segregation and dismemberment: military victory and the formal separation of yesterday's perpetrators and victims into rival political communities, distinguished by new boundaries if necessary.

Human rights may be universal, but human wrongs are specific. To think deeply about human wrongs is to wrestle with the problems that give rise to acts of extreme violence, which in turn means that victim narratives must be circumscribed within a 'survivor narrative', less fixated on perpetrators and particular atrocities

such as Boipatong or Srebrenica, and more alert to continuous cycles of violence from which communities can eventually emerge. For this to happen there can be no permanent assignation of a victim identity or a perpetrator identity.

The South African transition began as a pragmatic search for a second-best solution: a way out of a cul-de-sac where military victory had evaded both sides, and criminal trials were out of the question. Most colonized societies experienced one or another form of civil conflict as they divided on the question of who was complicit in colonial rule and who was not, and continue to divide on who does or does not belong to the nation, and qualifies for citizenship. Like the TRC, CODESA was scarcely a radical project for social justice. But it turned its back on revenge and gave the living a second chance.

Edward Snowden: A Healing Voice

Like many people, I was surprised to hear of Edward Snowden's decision to leave his job and move toward Hong Kong in search of a place where he could reconcile his conscience with his understanding of humanity and the US Constitution. Ever since, I have been trying to understand how he had come to a decision that, one may be certain, others contemplated, but then did not pursue for reasons that are not important, at this point, to figure out.

As days, weeks, months passed, most citizens of the US had difficulties in assessing Edward Snowden's act: was he a hero or a traitor? In the midst of these hesitations, his father embraced him tightly. (His mother may have done the same, but more discretely, so discretely in fact, that no one but herself and Edward and his father know about it). It was a very encouraging and courageous act even if it had to be handled, as too many things have to, in these days, with the help of a lawyer.

Is this lawyerly mediation of father-son love a sign of the times we are living in?

Solidarity, generosity, love, – natural as humans for thousands of years – cannot be expressed without consulting lawyers,

Jacques Depelchin
Ota Benga Alliance
DR Congo & USA

expert navigators in protecting humans from being liquidated by other humans. So blinded by the exercise of power with impunity, they and/or their lobbyists cannot see how such insanity has led to a slow, possibly irreversible process of annihilation of values that once defined humanity

In these turbulent and confusing times, the striking quality of Edward Snowden's voice may account for the silence it has tended to generate among his fellow humans. In the ideological dictionary of how to catalogue him, the specialists are at a loss, between honouring him as a hero and castigating him as traitor. Yet, his voice has come out as clear as crystal, as simple as a healing voice echoing his own conscience, a conscience fine-tuned to how it was defined thousands of years ago when humans began to gain a conscience of themselves as different from animals.

As one reads Ancient Egyptian texts, especially around the concept of *Mâât* (justice, balance, ethics, solidarity, etc.), it is not difficult to see the connection between Snowden's *Ba* (inner spirit, soul, conscience, according to the Ancient Egyptians) and that of *The Man In Dispute of His Ba*, a text from the 12th dynasty (see Miriam Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature. Vol. 1: The Old and Middle Kingdom*, UCLA Press, 1975) It is not difficult to imagine Snowden debating with his *Ba* on how to decide what to do in the face of doing work that told him that it was not right.

As in that text from the 12th dynasty (1990-1785 BC), one could imagine Snowden thinking like that man:

To Whom Shall I Speak Today
The Constitution shows one way
My bosses kept messaging me:
stay away
From your conscience
They would say
Insisting you are
Too young to know anyway
The right from the wrong way

Still I kept asking myself
 To Whom Shall I speak today
 While being encouraged to go
 against the right way
 To Whom Shall Speak Today
 Facing solitary incarceration
 Because I cannot help say
 Yes to my conscience

Knowing what he did and what he was being asked to do, it is not difficult to imagine how he first tried to push his conscience away, silence it, telling himself that his job was to follow orders and not think about the bigger issues of whether it was right or wrong. But his conscience or his *Ba* kept coming back, sometimes in the middle of the night. He may not have thought the same as The Man from the text in Ancient Egyptian 12th dynasty, but it is also clear that it is those words that led him to look for people with whom he could share the load weighing on his conscience/*Ba*. The pain from the load was too much. Like any reasonable human being he looked for help, searching for someone he could speak to, without facing punishment concocted by generations of misguided, gone astray guardians of laws built on lies, violence, still unacknowledged crimes against humanity.

We do know that our brain/body still react physically/psychically in ways that were learned from thousands of years ago, whether in the face of threatening danger or in the face of dilemmas dealing with life issues. Living as human beings means

that one is permanently connected to one's conscience. That umbilical cord that connects us to primordial times has never been severed, but it will come under severe strain, now and again. In times past, land and conscience were as inseparable as any of the organs that make humans what they are. Inheritors of that crime against humanity see nothing wrong in cashing in on that original impunity by invading the soul/conscience of every single human being to own it as they owned the land they conquered.

Could it be that the difficulties of figuring out how Edward Snowden decided to do what he did stem from a station in the evolution of humanity that is showing signs of being split from its conscience? Put in another more brutal fashion: could it be that one of the consequences of the way humans are being organized economically, politically, scientifically, culturally, religiously [is that] humanity as we have known it is being liquidated, along with its history, and being replaced by a species fashioned to respond without resistance to the rules and regulations that are being imposed in all spheres of life, all of them rooted in the impunity that sanctioned the severing of the land from people whose conscience kept repeating:

You are the guardian of the land
 Earth, air, water one way
 As Corbin Harney used to say
 Only one way to stay
 The integrity of humanity
 Let no one take your land away

Because not long after
 They will take your conscience away
 They turned the land into a commodity
 With names like plantation, reservation,
 Bantustans, colonies, commonwealth,
 francophony, Lusophony
 How far is humanity from unrecoverable
 cacophony(hibernation, isolation,
 desolation?

Liquidation?

The signal is clear: do not listen to your conscience, especially if it tells you to denounce something that is damaging to other members of humanity.

Looked at from such an angle, Edward Snowden's voice and action can be seen as healing gestures in a world increasingly being pushed to self-annihilation by practices that emphasize, single-mindedly, the competitive search for self-enrichment. In the face of such a disaster, should one be surprised that a person with a highly sensitive conscience could not help but follow it? When a healing voice, like Edward Snowden's, emerges in the midst of an undeclared war against humanity, one can be certain that such a voice is the result of massive healing energy being expressed from different segments of humanity. This voice is not an isolated cry. Could it be the water breaking preceding the birth of a renewed conscience and affirmation of fidelity to humanity?


This article was originally published at:
<http://wordpress.otabenga.org/cmswo...>

Trade and Industrial Development in Africa: Rethinking Strategy and Policy

Edited by Theresa Moyo. Dakar, CODESRIA
 2014, 404p. ISBN: 978-2-86978-538-0

*The book is a product of the Guy Mhone conference on
 'Rethinking Trade and Development in Africa'*

This book revisits the perennial challenge that scholars, economists, and politicians have been grappling with since the 1960s. Development, in this book, has been defined in a context that projects it as a multidimensional and complex process which seeks to enhance the human, social, economic and cultural welfare of the people. This book calls for a rethinking of trade and industry for Africa's development. It uses data drawn from national development plans and strategies, and trade and industry issues have been prioritized at the continental level, in key policy documents. On the whole Africa's industry and trade performance have been poor in spite of national, regional, and continental plans. The contributors to this volume propose some alternative strategies and policies which are necessary for trade and industry to grow and to contribute to the wellbeing of Africa's people. It calls for a developmental trade and industry policy which, fundamentally, must be people-centred. African states should invest time, energy and resources to develop policies which will take into consideration African realities. The different contributors are aware that Africa has experienced strong economic growth in the recent past but this growth has largely been due to a strong demand for Africa's primary commodity exports.



New Threat to Economic Role of the State*

The economically successful developing countries like Malaysia are characterized as having a strong developmental state'. But this role of the state is coming under attack in new global rules being created.

Two new trade agreements involving the two economic giants, the United States and European Union, are leading a charge against the role of the state in the economy in developing countries.

Attention should be paid to this initiative as it has serious repercussions on the future development plans and prospects of the developing countries. The role of the state, or of government, in development is a subject of long-standing and important discussion. In fact some economists and analysts consider it perhaps the most important issue that determines the difference between economic success or failure in developing countries. The immediate post-colonial period saw a tendency to a strong state, including government ownership of some key sectors, including industry and banking. Past decades have witnessed a wave of privatization across both rich and developing countries. But the state still owns or controls utilities, infrastructure, public services, banks and a few strategic industries in many developing countries.

State enterprises or commercially-run companies owned by or partially linked to the government play an important role in many a developing country.

Private companies also receive state assistance and support in many ways, including loans to small and medium enterprises and farmers, subsidies and tax breaks for research and development or technology purchase, preferences in government procurement, infrastructure provision including in special economic zones. Countries provide incentives for foreign companies, such as tax-free status. However, the state also has special treatment for local companies, such as grants, cheaper-than-normal credit and subsidies, and government contracts.

The developmental role of the state in developing countries is now coming under

Martin Khor
South Centre,
Geneva

attack from developed countries. This is promoted by the big companies in the US, Europe and Japan, which seek to enter the markets of developing countries which are the source of their future profits.

The support given by the state to domestic companies are seen by the multinational companies as a hindrance to their quest for expanded market share in developing countries. They are thus seeking to change the worldview and policy framework in developing countries, to get them to reduce the role of state enterprises as well as to curb the government's promotion of local private companies.

The two latest big attempts towards this are through the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). A sub-chapter on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a prominent part of the TPPA, which was negotiated in Kota Kinabalu.

The United States and Australia are leading the move to have rules to discipline the role of the government in the economy, through a two-pronged approach. First, to get government or other monopolies to behave in a 'non-discriminatory' way, including when they buy or sell goods and services. This includes that they may not give preferences or incentives to the local firms.

Second, companies that are linked to the government (including through a minority share) should not get advantages vis-à-vis other firms in commercial activities. Of course, the developed countries that are proposing this are thinking of their companies – how they can get more access to developing countries' markets.

In the TTIP, a US-European Union agreement, negotiations for which started earlier in July, the European Union is preparing a sub-chapter on state-owned

enterprises, with rules that seem quite similar to what the US and Australia are proposing in the TPPA.

Although the TTIP only involves Europe and the US directly, the rules it sets are intended to have consequences for other countries. According to press reports, the two economic giants are planning that the rules they set in the TTIP will become the standard or template for future bilateral agreements that also include developing countries. They also hope that these rules will be internationalized in the World Trade Organization, which has over 130 member states.

The EU's position paper on SOEs says that its aim is to 'create an ambitious and comprehensive standard to discipline state involvement and influence in private and public enterprises'. It adds that 'this can pave the way to other bilateral agreements to follow a similar approach and eventually contribute to a future multilateral engagement'. In other words, the constraints on the role of the state, and the reduction of the space for the behaviour or operations of state-linked companies, will become the way of the future for all countries, if the US and European plans succeed.

What is moving these countries in this direction? It is quite well known that the negotiating positions of the developed countries are greatly influenced and in fact driven by their big companies. Their trade policy makers and negotiators usually act on behalf of these companies. Reports by the specialist trade bulletin *Inside US Trade* show how corporate groups like the US Chamber of Commerce and the Coalition of Services Industries have been pushing for the new rules on state-owned enterprises, and also how they are targeting to open up the markets of developing countries, especially China.

These attempts to curb the role of the state in the economy are worthy of serious study and counter-action. Developing countries that succeeded in economic development were able to combine the roles of the public and private sectors in a partnership that advanced overall

national development. Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and China, have pioneered this model of public sector collaboration with the private sector.

Those few developing countries that managed to get development going were all driven by the 'developmental state',

or the leadership role of government in establishing the framework of economic strategy, and the collaboration between the state, state enterprises, and commercial companies, including those in which the state has an interest.

If developing countries like Malaysia have to come under new international

rules that curb the role of the state and that re-shape the structure of their economy, then the prospects for future development will be adversely affected.

*November 2013. <http://www.southcentre.int/question/new-threat-to-economic-role-of-the-state/>

Amilcar Cabral and the Pan-African Project

I would like to thank President Pedro Pires and the Amilcar Cabral Foundation for inviting me to this Forum. This is the third time I have come to Praia for another scholarly forum on the exemplary life and work of Amilcar Cabral, following the international symposia of 1983 and 2004. Building on my contribution to the second symposium, which is in line with one of this forum's objectives to discuss 'the thought of Amilcar Cabral in the contemporary perspective', my paper will focus on the lessons we can draw from Cabral's revolutionary thought for the successful implementation of the African national project. As one of the leading figures of African nationalism and the national liberation struggle, Cabral was committed to the large consensus that emerged on the eve of decolonization that the total emancipation of Africa from both colonialism and neocolonialism required the implementation of a national project of democracy and development through self-determination politically, self-reliance economically, and pan-African solidarity. Since this developmental vision is best achieved through continental or regional integration, I prefer to call it 'the pan-African project'. For pan-Africanism in deeds and not in words is a *sine qua non* for the successful implementation of this project.

In the contemporary perspective, the three components of the pan-African project can be described as democratic governance, reconstruction and development, and pan-African solidarity, both within the continent and with the African diaspora worldwide. In his speeches and writings, as well as in his directives on the administration of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, Cabral touched on all of these subjects with clarity and a rich array

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, USA

of ideas that are likely to be useful to the African continent today. Given the current challenges of nation building and state building in Africa, there is need to pay greater attention to Cabral's thought on these three topics. While looking at the lessons of Cabral's thought for the postcolonial state in Africa today, I hasten to add that I am not competent to address the question of why these lessons have not been effectively learned and put into practice in Guinea-Bissau.

Democratic Governance

Elsewhere, I have defined democratic governance as 'the management of societal affairs in accordance with the universal principles of democracy as a system of rule that maximizes popular consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the expressed interests and needs of the public'. These universal principles include the rule of law, popular legitimacy and participation, as well as the accountability and alternation of elected officials. There is also a direct link between democratic governance and the human rights-based approach to development, which is founded on the values, standards and principles enunciated in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and all other major international human rights instruments. In this regard, democratic governance implies the following:

- People's human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected, and thus allowing them to live with dignity;
- People have a say in decisions that affect their lives, not only nationally through free, fair and transparent elections, but also through participation in local governance structures;
- People can hold decision makers accountable not only through regularly held elections but also in recall elections and peaceful protests;
- A vibrant civil society and a free, independent media, to provide alternative solutions to public issues;
- A system of checks and balances based on the separation of powers, with independent judicial and legislative branches of government;
- Effective civilian control of the military and other security forces;
- Women are equal partners with men in private and public spheres of life and decision-making;
- People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute; and
- Economic and social policies are responsive to people's needs and aspirations, and mindful of the needs of future generations.

Nearly all of these principles and attributes of democratic governance are found in the various texts of Amilcar Cabral. These include his most famous texts such as 'The Weapon of Theory' and 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure of Guinea', the PAIGC programme, some party directives, interviews, and his New Year's message of 1973. The point of departure for Cabral's vision of a democratic developmental state in

postcolonial Africa is his total rejection of neocolonialism and the neocolonial state. In an informal talk with African Americans on 20 October 1972 in New York, Cabral had this to say on the state in Africa:

We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country in order to make everything possible for our people. ... Some independent African states preserved the structures of the colonial state. In some countries they only replaced a white man with a black man, but for the people it is the same. ... The nature of the state we have to create in our country is a very good question for it is a fundamental one. ... It is the most important problem in the liberation movement. The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence.

This is the fundamental issue for postcolonial Africa with respect to democratic governance: whether the colonial state is destroyed or survives in a neocolonial garb under African rulers. For the colonial state was incompatible with democracy. Colonized peoples were subjects with obligations to their distant rulers in imperial capitals and their immediate European masters in the colony, and not citizens with human and democratic rights. In the Congo, the brutality and naked violence of the colonial state were captured under the term 'ButaMatari', which literally means 'the crusher of rocks'. This was the nickname given to Henry Morton Stanley, King Leopold's colonial agent, for the wanton brutality to which he subjected Africans to and the terror provoked by the dynamite he used to blow up mountains in building a road from Matadi near the Atlantic Ocean to Kinshasa. Eventually, the term became used to refer to the colonial state and Belgian colonial officers, and continues to be used today to refer to 'government'. As Crawford Young points out, although the term 'ButaMatari' was particular to the Belgian Congo, 'its evocative imagery can be projected onto the much larger domain' of the African colonial state.

By its nature and functions, the colonial state was a *butamatari* state. Political

repression was its underlying basis, as it operated through force and authoritarianism. As such, it was indeed organized or 'naked violence', as memorably defined by Frantz Fanon. Moreover, according to Jean Suret-Canale, total despotism was the organizational model of the colonial state at each territorial level of administration: the centre, the region or province, the district, and the lowest European-administered administrative unit. Likewise, Ruth First reminds us that the colonial state was 'military in conception and organization', and describes its essentially bureaucratic character as follows:

The colonial bureaucracy ruled; as Louis XIV had proclaimed of himself, it was the state: though with this difference, that the administrator-kings of the colonial services were not even of the country; and for all their insistence that they were motivated not by political but by administrative needs, it was the needs and the politics of the metropolis which almost exclusively determined the fate of the colonial subject.

These authoritarian, bureaucratic, despotic and violent features of the colonial state, whose methods of rule consist of intimidation and repression by the bureaucracy, the military and the police are not compatible with democratic governance. For Cabral, decolonization must imply rupture with the colonial past. There must be a change in the form of state, from a despotic to a more democratic system of governance based on leaders who are elected and accountable to their citizens. Thus, looking at Guinea-Bissau with most of its territory under PAIGC control in 1972, Cabral sees it as being 'comparable to an independent state, part of whose national territory, notably the urban centers, is occupied by foreign military forces'. Consequently, with the liberated areas as a prefiguration of Cabral's model of a postcolonial state, free and democratic elections were held in a two-phased process by which citizens elected representatives to the regional councils (CRs), and the latter were to elect representatives to the People's National Assembly (ANP) as the supreme organ of popular sovereignty. Consistent with parliamentary democracy, the ANP 'was created on the basic principle according to which power comes from the people and must serve the people'.

Even before the fundamental law of Guinea-Bissau was adopted, the PAIGC programme had already spelled out the key aspects of the democratic system to be established. It consisted of a republican, democratic and secular government; the organization of power based on free and general elections; and the total transformation of the inherited colonial administration into democratic structures for national and local administration. In liberated areas, village councils were already the embodiment of the practice of decentralization, with increased participation by women and young people (as each council consisted of three men and two women), and people having a say in decisions that affected their lives. Such a system of local administration was more consistent with Cabral's notion of 'cooperative democracy' than a system based on opportunism, clientelism, promotion of primordial ties, telling lies, etc., as in many African countries today. Cooperative democracy is also more conducive to institution building, greater freedom of expression, people's power and excellence, than local governance systems based on authoritarianism and corruption. At the national level, Cabral insisted on civilian control over the military, a very important issue in view of the fact that militarism does flare up from time to time around the continent.

Reconstruction and Development

In the economic field, as in politics, Cabral's starting point was the same: 'Destroy the economy of the enemy and build our own economy.' This was one of the eight directives on theoretical and practical guidance that the PAIGC secretary-general sent to his party cadres in 1965 on the implementation of the decisions of the First Party Conference held at Cassaca in February 1964. This sixth directive is the one that contains one of the best known and most profound passages from Cabral's writings:

Always remember that the people do not struggle for ideas, for things in the heads of individuals. The people struggle and accept sacrifices demanded by the struggle, but in order to gain material advantages, to be able to live a better life in peace, to see their lives progress and to ensure their children's future. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, working for peace and

progress – independence – all these are empty words without meaning for the people, unless they are translated into a real improvement in standards of living. It is useless to liberate an area, if the people of that area are left without the basic necessities of life.

I have heard in my own country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and there are testimonies from elsewhere in Africa, of old people asking intellectuals when this ‘independence of yours’ is going to end, so they could go back to the political order, economic stability, and social benefits of the 1950s. While this might be a minority position, it is nevertheless a strong indictment of the failure of the postcolonial state to provide at the very minimum the basic necessities of life; maternities, health centres and schools with adequate equipment, furniture and supplies; and good roads and transportation facilities to make it easier for peasant farmers to bring their produce to urban markets. At the same time, these social and economic benefits of the last major decade of colonialism in Africa were not sustainable, particularly in urban areas, to which millions of people who had been denied access to them by colonial-era influx control measures moved in search of a better life. Since the raw material-based and export-oriented colonial economy was not established to serve the interests of African workers and peasants, the only way to meet the basic needs of ordinary Africans and satisfy the interests of their youth for greater integration in the modern world is to heed Cabral’s call by destroying it and reducing it to ashes.

For Cabral, liberation from colonial domination is meaningful only when it goes beyond the political realm to involve the development of ‘production, education, health facilities and trade’. With respect to property rights, four types of property were to be recognized: personal, private, co-operative, and state. Priority was to be given to the development, modernization and transformation of agriculture, with a view to ensuring prosperity and preventing agricultural crises, drought and famine. Here again, as in the political sphere, the liberated areas were to serve as a prefiguration of the postcolonial state. There, and later on in the postcolonial state, the ruling party was to focus on the following tasks:

[D]evelop agricultural production both by extending the cultivated areas

and by improving farming methods, with more care in farming and by increasing the range of crops. Pay special attention to the development of food crops (rice, maize, manioc, potato, beans, vegetables, bananas, cashew nut, oranges and other fruit trees). Pay special attention to the care of cattle and breeding livestock (pigs, chickens, sheep, etc.) to cattle fodder and to the preservation of grazing land. Demand an effective control over fires, to avoid the destruction of our forest and bush. Employ all spare time of the armed forces with help to farmers, above all at harvest time. ... Help the smiths to carry on developing their skill, notably in the making and repair of farm tools. Intensify the production of coconut, palm oil and other oils, the manufacture of ‘home made soap’ and all the other products of use to the population and traditionally made in our country. Make preparations to bring back into operation soon the saw-mills abandoned by the settlers. Develop exchange (mutual aid) between families in one village and between villages. Establish collective farming areas for some crops such as the banana, pineapple and fruit trees. Form through experience and whenever conditions are favourable simple co-operatives for farm production. Hand over properties (orchards, cattle) abandoned by their owners to a local committee to use and manage them.

The transformative agenda of reconstruction and development outlined here is ambitious but doable. It is consistent with the view of Africa’s most prominent economist, Samir Amin, that the continent cannot develop without an industrialization strategy based on the modernization of agriculture and the production of capital goods in Africa. The greatest challenge for African countries is to be able to conceive and execute development strategies that are likely to satisfy the deepest aspirations of the popular masses for economic development and material prosperity. The question that Cabral raises is a simple one. Are African leaders going to make common cause with their people by opting for those policies likely to meet the latter’s needs, or are they going to side with the international bourgeoisie and accept the antisocial development strategies and policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank? Beyond the choice of economic policy by African governments, there is even a more

fundamental question that Cabral has raised, i.e., can an independent state based on the same system of economic exploitation as the colonial state satisfy the needs of African workers and peasants? Since the answer to this question is obviously negative, the reality is that the African postcolonial state has a choice to make between the interests of its own people and the constraints of the world system. This is why Cabral calls on African revolutionaries to destroy the colonial economy and build a new and more people-friendly economy.

That reconstruction and development are yet to take place in much of postcolonial Africa is an indication of the fact that most of our leaders have refused to follow the revolutionary path advocated by Fanon by opting for the easier road of enrichment within neocolonial structures. The major consequences of this option include the emergence of an African oligarchy whose main aim to use state power as a means of personal enrichment, the deepening of underdevelopment in most of our countries, and the impoverishment of the popular masses. Instead of establishing democratic developmental states, we are faced with the political economies of plunder, a subject on which Mbaya Kankwenda has published an excellent analysis with respect to the DRC.

Pan-African Solidarity

As the third component of the pan-African project, pan-African solidarity is indispensable for the practice of democratic governance as well as the successful implementation of reconstruction and development. At the memorial service for Kwame Nkrumah on 13 May 1972 in Conakry, Cabral on behalf of the African liberation movements renewed their ‘pledge to the total liberation of Africa and the progress of African peoples’. This commitment to African liberation and solidarity with African peoples was grounded less on racial considerations than on moral and legal principles of international solidarity. For example, in the informal talk with African Americans cited above, Cabral made it clear that while he was happy to be with his brothers and sisters of African descent anywhere in the world, he would have much preferred being with people who were both brothers/sisters and comrades. The lessons he had learned from the Congo and Ghana, where Patrice Lumumba and Nkrumah were betrayed by

their own Congolese and Ghanaian brothers, respectively, were too bitter to forget.

Cabral did not live long enough to see the Organization of African Unity (OAU) amend its policy of non-interference in the international affairs of member states through the creation in 1993 of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Through this mechanism, and its successor, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), Africa is no longer reluctant to send peacekeeping missions to countries having internal conflicts. There is no doubt that Cabral would have supported this development, both in the name of pan-Africanism and in respect of international legal instruments such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and UN resolutions. In a declaration of 12 December 1962 to the Fourth Commission of the UN General Assembly, he made an eloquent presentation of the liberation struggle in Africa as a contribution to the implementation of the UN resolution on decolonization, in which colonialism is depicted as an international crime:

When in Elizabethville or in the Congo bush a soldier of Indian, Ethiopian or other nationality falls under the fire of the enemy, he is one more victim who has given his life for the cause of the UN. ... When in our country a comrade dies under police torture, is assassinated in prison, is burned alive or falls under the bullets of Portuguese guns, for which cause is he giving his life? ... For us, the only difference between the Indian soldier, the Italian pilot or the Swedish administrator who dies in the

Congo and our comrade who dies in Guinea or the Cabo Verde islands is that by acting in our country for the same ideal we are simply anonymous soldiers for the UN.

Today, AU electoral observer missions, expert review teams for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), disaster assistance teams, and peacekeeping missions are all indispensable measures of pan-African and international solidarity for peace and security in the continent. They help promote democratic governance and help promote enabling conditions for reconstruction and development, particularly in countries emerging from crises or armed conflicts. In the face of externally-sponsored terrorism and balkanization as in Mali and in Eastern Congo, capacity development of regional security mechanisms is all the more urgent, given the weaknesses of national armies to cope with well-armed militia groups. Arms trafficking; trafficking in narcotics; poaching of elephants, rhinoceroses and rare animals; illegal mining and trade in precious metals and ores; and the growing threat to forests, fisheries and farming land are among issues for which solutions must be found regionally and continentally.

Finally, some forty years since Cabral held a meeting with 120 people representing a wide range of African American organizations and after the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam in 1974 and the Seventh Pan-African Congress in Kampala in 1994, the recognition of the African diaspora as a sixth region of the AU is a step in the right direction in connecting the struggles of Africans and peoples of African descent all over the

world. Although the exact manner in which the diaspora will participate in AU activities remains to be clarified, what is encouraging is the recognition of the potential benefits that this connection may have for both Africa and its diaspora.

Conclusion

Forty years after his odious assassination, Amilcar Cabral's brilliant thought remains relevant for contemporary Africa, and will continue to inspire African revolutionaries throughout the twenty-first century. This paper is a modest attempt to show its relevance with respect to the pan-African project and its key components today, namely, democratic governance, reconstruction and development, and pan-African solidarity. Over fifty years of African independence have demonstrated the correctness of his call to African patriots to destroy the colonially-inherited structures of the state and the economy in order to create new and more people-friendly structures of what is currently known as the democratic developmental state. His leadership within the African liberation movements, his close association with Kwame Nkrumah during their Conakry years, and his overall advocacy of pan-African and international solidarity of progressive forces, clearly demonstrate his conviction that such solidarity is essential for the success of democracy and development in Africa. Cabral's place in the pantheon of the world's revolutionary leaders of the twentieth century is well established.

* Paper presented at the Amilcar Cabral Scientific Forum Organized by the Amilcar Cabral Foundation held in Praia, Cape Verde, 19-20 January 2013.

L'Encre des savants : réflexions sur la philosophie en Afrique Souleymane Bachir Diagne

Présence africaine – CODESRIA, 124 p. ISBN : 978-2-86978-584-7

Partant de ce fait que la philosophie africaine connaît aujourd'hui un important développement et fait l'objet de nombreuses publications, l'auteur examine le champ de question et l'espace de débat que constitue l'activité philosophique en Afrique pour présenter ici à la fois un « précis » de cette activité et un exposé de ses propres réflexions sur les thèmes les plus importants autour desquels elle s'organise. L'on peut considérer en effet, constate-t-il, que pour l'essentiel quatre grandes questions constituent les enjeux majeurs de la réflexion philosophique africaine : premièrement celle de l'ontologie en relation avec les religions et l'esthétique, deuxièmement celle du temps – plus particulièrement de l'avenir et de la prospective –, troisièmement celle de l'oralité et des implications de sa transcription/traduction, quatrièmement enfin celle, politique, des socialismes. Ces grandes questions posent aussi celle, fondamentale, et qui les traverse, des langues et de la traduction.



Amílcar Cabral as a Promoter of Pan-Africanism

The occasion of the 40th anniversary of the assassination of Amílcar Cabral, gives us the opportunity to celebrate the contribution of this great pan-African to the unification process of Africa. This is especially significant as 2013 was also the year in which we celebrated and reflected upon fifty years of the history of the African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The commemorations evolved around the desire for a more affirmative ownership of the development processes by Africans themselves. Agenda 2063, launched by the African Union with the support of the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank, is supposed to be the rallying point for a new vision that will help Africans define what they want for the next fifty years.

Having been fortunate as an impressionable young man to have served under the tutorship of Mario de Andrade, to see myself now involved in developing a pan-African ideal for 2063 is both enriching and thrilling. These current circumstances make me return over and over again to the never-ending source of Cabral's knowledge. However, I do this with the full awareness that Cabral's hagiography may not always be a recommendable path. Cabral is important because he always fought against the societal tendency to use an aura of mystery as a means to ensure people forgot about a hero entirely. It is worth quoting him:

During the great revolutionaries' lives, the oppressing classes reward them with never ending persecutions (...). After their death, they try to make them harmless icons, they canonize them, so to speak, surrounding their name with a certain aura, in order to "comfort" the oppressed classes or nations, and to mystify them-, doing so, they empty the revolutionary doctrine, depreciate it and destroy its revolutionary strength (Cabral 1976).

With this same level of awareness and respect, I will present some arguments that may allow better understanding of how Cabral first embraced and thus helped to conceive the Pan-Africanist ideal.

Carlos Lopes
United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa

1. Pan-Africanism as ideology

According to Thandika Mkandawire, the relation between the African intellectuals, Pan-Africanism and nationalism is, at the same time, symbiotic and contradictory (Mkandawire 2005). Ali Mazrui adds that one can imagine intellectualism in Africa without the Pan-Africanism but the opposite is not possible. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, in turn, says that the African nationalism had been from the beginning influenced by the Pan-Africanist concept, without which it would be meaningless. Ki-Zerbo also infers that without its national liberation dimension, Pan-Africanism would be an absurdity. This means that it is impossible to talk about Pan-Africanism without referring to the intellectuals that conceived it. They are the protagonists of the political formulation that led to nationalism and national liberation (idem).

Henry Sylvester Williams first outlined Pan-Africanism. His main idea was to defend black people all over the world against abuse and exploitation. Another American man, W. E. B. DuBois, revisited the idea but added the question of rights to the concept. When George Padmore from Trinidad, and Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, later joined Du Bois, Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, and Dudley Thompson from Jamaica to jointly plan and hold the Pan-African Manchester Congress in 1945, their manifesto was centred on the urgency of African independence. Nkrumah himself would go through several phases of political evolution on his thought about Pan-Africanism. The formation of the OAU in May 1963, when Nkrumah was already the President of Ghana, marks the birth of a more pragmatic and less idealistic idea of Pan-Africanism, in spite of its proclamation of complete integration of the continent. Between Du Bois's vision and the Jamaican Marcus Garvey's vision, the debate is still polarized: with

some wanting rights, and others wanting struggles (Devés-Valdés 2008).

The young Africans who, during the same period, used to meet in Lisbon in the Centre for African Studies and were committed to what they called 're-Africanization of their spirits' in the pursuit of the aspirations of the Manchester Congress, were testimony that the influences were not confined to the Anglophone protagonists or to the cultural movement of the Harlem Renaissance. Amílcar Cabral and his companions read Jorge Amado and the Brazilian social literature, the socialist thinking edited in Brazil, and discovered the magazine *Présence Africaine* and its spreading of negritude and the so-called Black poetry.

In *Présence Africaine* the polarizing debate is rather between Léopold Sédar Senghor, who promoted a Pan-African ideal based on ideas, culture and aesthetics, showing that Negritude is a value that integrates a universal whole and without which Pan-Africanism would have no meaning or coherence, a sort of counterpoint to the Hegelian principle; and Aimé Césaire, from Martinique (who seems to be the creator of the term 'Negritude'), who, due to his connections to the French Communist Party,¹ brought more political content to the concept.

In 1947, the Senegalese Alioune Diop founded *Présence Africaine* in Paris. Six years later, Mário de Andrade, the group's 'librarian' who used to gravitate around the Casa dos Estudantes do Império in Lisbon, with its main intellectual figures being Francisco José Tenreiro (from São Tomé e Príncipe) and Amílcar Cabral himself, connected with Alioune Diop in the search for networking, rather than employment. Later, he became the Secretary of Alioune Diop and in this role he participated in the organization of the first Congresses of African Writers and Artists in London, Paris and Rome.

The struggles for independence were now taking shape. The ones that were most noticeable were those that arose as a result of their protagonists being in the limelight, such as Ghana, Kenya or Sékou Touré's

Guinea; although the prime influence came from the Algerian FLN. All, without exception, refer to Pan-Africanism; nevertheless clear divisions were later to echo in the process of creating the OAU, between the moderate ones in the Monrovia group and the more radicals in the Casablanca group.

Amílcar Cabral extended his fronts of intervention beyond just Guinea and Cape Verde, during his period of mobilizing. The African Revolutionary Front for Independence (Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência) and, after, the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas) were originally created by Amílcar Cabral. After him, it was Mário de Andrade who led both organizations in their objectives and intellectual work. These were more accurate ways of bringing an organizational structure to their ideals – clearly Pan-Africanist.

The ideological framing of Pan-Africanism was done with a wide range of actors. Among these Amílcar Cabral emerged as an important intellectual common denominator in the 1960s. His interpretation of Pan-Africanism separated itself from the racial vein. Actually, since its beginning, Pan-Africanism struggled with two strong but contrasting domains: geography and race, the continent or the black personality. The genesis of the concept was built by a diaspora deprived of its umbilical link with the African land. It was therefore natural that a major importance would be given to the racial factor, defining the black subject as a common denominator of the Pan-African goals. In the United States and, consequently, in the Caribbean, *jus sanguinius* had always prevailed over *jus solis* in all the power distributions.

According to the great Palestinian thinker Edward Said,

“the mind needs order, and order is achievable by registering and discriminating everything, placing everything that the mind is conscious about in a safe and easy place to track, therefore giving things a role in what the economy of both objects and identity that form an environment is concerned” (Said 1997) This means that abstract constructions such as race and geography are human creations that enable the definition

of alterities: the ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Brought to the political dimension, these constructs are the prototype of an ideological definition, which is seen as the human manifestation of a deep belief or the proclamation of a positioning in the power scale.

Cabral soon understood the risks of a racial deriving of the Pan-Africanist principles. His declarations about the struggle for national liberation not being a struggle against the Portuguese or the white people, his pedagogical explanations about the so-called African clothing and traditions not being so different from those of other people in other historical moments are widely quoted. His permanent concern was not to indulge in the debate of colouring Pan-Africanism; otherwise he chose to define the national liberation struggle as a cultural factor, since it was a demonstration of the peoples’ ability to retrace their paths in history.

Pan-Africanism and culture

With Cabral, the relationship between culture and history has such a degree of sophistication that one can find it in all the current books about African philosophy (Hallen 2002). His contribution stands out because of the originality in the use of Marxist categories of analysis, never mimicking Nkrumah and other leaders of that time. Cabral refused labels and used to position himself without any inferiority complex. He was refined.

Another possible comparable figure, remarkable at that time, might be the Caribbean-born Algerian Frantz Fanon. It seems that Cabral was highly influenced by the psychiatrist, who had played a crucial role in the ideological setting of FLN. At least three concepts thoroughly used by Cabral have a direct correlation with the prior postulates developed by Fanon: the definition of unity, the lack of ideology in Africa and the struggle for the place in history.

Fanon was seriously concerned about the interpretation of the reasons for the disunity and contradictions within the struggle. At the end of his life he got severely disappointed with Nkrumah – he went to represent FNL in Accra after the independence of Ghana. He wanted to quit his function in Accra, preferring to leave the city comfort and headed to the North of Mali, to support the Front (it

seems curious that nowadays one fights battles in the same places that have nothing to do with this prominent history). Said says that *“the epistemological error of fundamentalism is to consider that the “foundations” are a-historical categories, not subjects of, and therefore out of the critical scrutiny of the true believers, that one assumes that accept them in good faith”* (Said 1997). In fact, the struggle against fundamentalisms explains the concern of both Fanon and Cabral about unity.

In the process of analyzing Lumumba’s difficulties to unite those fighting for independence in Congo, Fanon observed that it would not be possible to have one Africa fighting against colonialism and another African colluding with the agents of colonialism. His last book *Les damnés de la Terre (The Wretched of the Earth)*, published in 1961, Fanon elaborates about the economic cooperation of Nigeria in Liberia or the integrative political cooperation between Mali, Guinea (Conakry) and Ghana, as examples of unity (Adi/Sherwood 2003).

Following on from this, Cabral devoted the essential message in his political writings to the question of unity. His analysis of various types of resistance weakens, in a pedagogic way, the contradictions between several interests of both group and class in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The concept of a unified Guinea-Cape Verde itself, within the major Programme of the PAIGC, is justified by the historical reality and by the wish of unity coherent with Pan-Africanism. Cabral knew well the Capeverdean nativist strand, refractory to a purely African identity, but he would despise it as a classist expression.

In what relates to the lack of ideology, it was a question of proving the need for own will, an ongoing debate, nowadays used with a new cloth: ‘appropriation’. In fact, it has to do with the same commitment claim signed by the three entities, ECA, AfDB and AU – the one that I referred to in the beginning of this article.

Cabral managed to explain in a graphical form the question of unity, as something that has to be based on the inside. It is worth quoting him:

When the African people put it simply that “no matter how hot is the spring

water, it does not cook rice", he enunciates, with shocking simplicity, a basic principle, not only from physics but as well from political science. In fact we know that the direction of a moving phenomena, no matter its external condition, depends mainly of its internal characteristics. We also know that in the political sphere, not matter how beautiful and attractive the reality of others might be, we can only truly transform our own reality on the basis of its concrete knowledge and on our own efforts and sacrifices (Cabral, 1976).

In 1960, from Accra, and a year before his death, Fanon earlier wrote that the major problem that threatened Africa was the fact that the African bourgeoisie that came to power thought that it was possible to make politics like one does business – he was referring to the absence of its own ideology (Adi/Sherwood 2003). Fanon also explained racism in the same way. For him, it was another expression of the inability to see past the present: the proof of hierarchy imposed by the colonizer in order to consolidate his control; but also a way of both rejection and destruction of the culture of the colonized. It was an ideological weapon of denial, of the non-acknowledgement of the other's place in History. Cabral revisited this topic and turned it into one of the basic principles for his explanation of the national liberation fundaments: the search for a place in History, and thus, a supreme demonstration of a people's capacity to validate his culture. Cabral says that: 'our peoples, no matter their stages of economic development, have their own History' (Cabral 1976).

These indirect dialogues between the intellectual achievements of Fanon and Cabral have influenced the third generation of Pan-Africanists, although it has not been possible to close the debate about these questions. One still revisits the same topics, with the precariousness of a major lack of knowledge of the Pan-African narrative itself.

Pan-Africanism and the identity issue

According to Claude Dubar, identity is not what is necessarily identical, but rather the result of an identification contingency. It is a mix between differentiation and generalization. The

former one – differentiation – has to do with the individuality of a person or of something in relation to something else. The second one – generalization – has to do with the common denominator of a whole. The identity paradox lies in the fact that it is also unique to be what is shared. One can only solve this paradox taking into account the common element of both operations of differentiation and generalization: the identification from and for the other (Dubar 2000).

The meaning of all of this is that identities vary according to the context, and, of course, according to History. As human abstract constructions, they represent a portrait of a specific moment or period. Applying it to the debate on Pan-Africanism, this means that the identity construction that takes territory or race into account can change according to realities. Nothing is static in identity. The media evolution and the reach of the new ways of contacting and networking, allowed by the new technologies, strengthen the plural identities. For this same reason, Pan-Africanism offers a completely different reading from the 1950s. At the same time, Pan-Africanism still offers an appealing door to the past, serving as a political reference and even as an anchor to better set the demands of development that is based on a major regional integration.

In Europe one refers to the European spirit or project, in Asia to the Asian values, in the Arab world to the Arab Spring. These are contemporary forms of identity valorization. Pan-Africanism was prior to all of them, maintaining an extraordinary reference force. The reasons of this longevity may be found, partially, as Said refers, in the fact that: '*imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself through dramatizing distance and difference between what is close to here and what is far*' (Said 1997). Pan-Africanism has been changing along time, maybe due to its historic path, but also by its own success, as an ideology, as an identity issue.

Cabral and Mario de Andrade were concerned about identity as a way of making a mockery of the Pan-Africanism ideology, right from an early stage, alerted by the totalitarian derivations of Sékou Toure, Nkrumah and Kenyatta. In order

to protect the movements associated to these risks, Cabral and Andrade increased their pleas for a popular and direct democracy. This democracy has shown to be a weak response to the tendencies that were earlier revealed as very strong.

Cabral's famous strong appeal for the small bourgeoisie suicide must be read as a euphemism to confess the derivations of the nationalist movements, or their misuse. In fact, it was about an indirect confession that the historical process, an expression much in use during the 1960s, would walk its own path. And so we have arrived at the present moment, where only the present main protagonists must be accountable for the choices that concern us. Cabral played his part. Let's play ours!

Note

1. Which he later denounced as unable to transcend its own prejudices.

Mário de Andrade can be credited as the one who brought together the intellectuals of the Cabral generation (as Mário de Andrade affectionately called them) and the movements around *Présence Africaine*.

References

- Aid, Hakim and Sherwood, Maria, 2003, *Pan African History. Political figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*. London: Routledge.
- Cabral, Amílcar, 1976, *Aarma da teoria*, vol.1. Lisboa: Unidade e Luta, Seara Nova.
- Devés Valdés, Eduardo, 2008, *O Pensamento Africanosul saariano*. CLACSO EDUCAM, Rio de Janeiro.
- Dubar, Claude, 2000, *La crise des identités*. PUF, Paris.
- Hallen, Barry, 2002, *A short history of African Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Lopes, Carlos, 2008, Africa and the challenges of citizenry and inclusion: the legacy of Mário de Andrade. Dakar: CODESRIA, Dakar.
- Lopes, Carlos, 2011, *Os desafios da África contemporânea. O legado de Amílcar Cabral*. São Paulo: UNESP.
- Thandika Mkandawire (ed.), 2005, *African intellectuals*. London/New York: CODESRIA/Zed Books.
- Said, Edward, 1997, *Orientalismo*. Lisboa: Livros Cotovia.

Accumulation by Dispossession: Climate Change and Natural Resources Governance in Africa *

Global economic and political initiatives, allied with national governments and other national and multilateral players, are driving a process of massive land alienations in the developing world. The land alienations are located in a narrative of promoting Foreign Direct Investment which will stimulate the modernization of the agricultural sector through large-scale commercial farming, and thus ensure 'development' and food security. The impacts of the land alienations on local livelihoods and food security are predictable. What is less clear is how land alienation will impact social organization and in particular local institutional coherence and the governance of natural resource use at the local level. It can be anticipated that because land grabs also result in significant displacement of communities as well as loss of land and natural resource rights, these upheavals will weaken local governance capacities, especially in contexts already characterized by compromised local governance institutions such as contemporary Liberia after 133 years of predatory colonial rule and 14 years of civil war, or Ethiopia also ravaged by recurrent drought after decades of military rule and civil war.

Over the last decade or so, unprecedented amounts of land have been concessioned, leased or sold by developing country governments at bargain basement prices to new investors with the support and funding of international financial institutions and hedge funds. 'In developing countries, as many as 227 million hectares of land – an area the size of Western Europe – has been sold or leased since 2001, mostly to international investors' (Oxfam 2011:2). These expropriations are rationalized through a development discourse. While it remains challenging to get official data on contemporary land deals from registries, various studies have effectively demonstrated a recent marked increase in land transfer (Arezki et al 2011; Anseeuw et al 2013), with Africa being the main target of the land rush. Of the publicly reported deals, 948 land acquisitions

James Murombedzi
CODESRIA
Dakar, Senegal

totalling 134 million hectares are located in Africa. This compares with 43 million hectares reported for Asia, 19 million hectares in Latin America, and 5.4 million hectares in other regions, particularly Eastern Europe and Oceania (Anseeuw et al 2012). There are also significant variations in sizes of land transfers between countries (Arezki et al 2011). In addition to land acquisitions for agriculture and other productive purposes, it would appear that most speculative land deals are done in Africa (Hall 2011).

Africa is the site of most of these new investments in land because land is cheaper in Africa than anywhere else. This is possible because it is customary land that is expropriated. The land's prices are arbitrarily set by governments in negotiations with the investors which typically do not include any consultations with or prior informed consent of the affected communities. Again, this is possible because landholders under customary tenure regimes are considered to be merely in possession of the land without any real legal status in most African countries. Within customary tenure regimes, commons lands are even more vulnerable to expropriation as they are not physically possessed, are deemed to be under-utilized or unutilized, and thus can be expropriated in 'national interest' through government-led interventions as part of the 'national development' process. Yet the commons have been demonstrated to play a vital role in local livelihoods, and are at the base of many local natural resources governance institutions. Thus destabilization of the commons is likely to have significant ramifications for local governance.

The current wave of extensive foreign land alienation and the intensification of export-oriented large-scale farming has in many ways continued the process of

accumulation by dispossession that was characteristic of earlier phases of colonialism in both settler and non-settler colonies in Africa (Moyo et al 2013). An enduring outcome of these historical processes in the agricultural sectors has been the creation and consolidation of social relations of production that are based on repressive agrarian relations. These social relations also defined the nature of the state and the extent to which citizens could participate in governance (Mamdani 1996). Agrarian labour relations are based on specific land-labour utilization relations that are created principally through land dispossession. Land ownership is central to the emergence of these agrarian labour relations. Land owners are typically hirers of labour while the landless are forced to sell their labour power.

The mechanisms, scale and pace of land acquisitions in Africa have led to the phenomenon being dubbed 'The New Scramble' for Africa:

Fifty years ago the decolonization of Africa began. The next half-century may see the continent recolonized. But the new imperialism will be less benign. Great powers aren't interested in administering wild places any more, still less in settling them: just raping them. Black gangster governments sponsored by self-interested Asian or Western powers could become the central story in 21st-century African history.

Capitalist economic growth is fundamentally a process of accumulation. In its neo-liberal phase, this accumulation has been achieved through a sustained process of dispossession, reminiscent of dispossession processes of the colonial era. In Africa this is evident through such processes as land grabbing by global financial interests assisted by the state, and other forms of resource expropriation. The land is usually concessioned to foreign investors for purposes of investing in export crop production. The state in most cases will guarantee tenure security (usually in the form of very long-term leases), tax breaks, as well as repatriation of profits and other favourable

terms of investment. As with colonial dispossession, the combination of land alienation, extra-economic regulation and taxes will turn the agrarian economies of participating countries into labour reserve economies reliant on cheap domestic labour, and sometimes also on migrant labour.

In the agriculture concessions sector, it would appear that the justification for allocating land away from the peasantry and smallholders to large-scale commercial agriculture, in addition to FDI and its contribution to GDP, is the 'modernization' of the agrarian sector. Much of Africa's land is held under customary tenure regimes of one form or another. Only a small proportion of these lands are under permanent agriculture. Predominantly across the continent, smallholder agriculture consists of a mix of rain-fed crop production and pastoralism. The absence of individualized title and the predominant farming systems have led to national governments and international organizations such as the World Bank arguing that arable lands are underutilized in Africa. Thus the World Bank has referred to the continent's millions of square kilometres of unfenced savanna as 'the world's last large reserve of underused land'. The solution to Africa's food insecurity challenge is thus seen in the modernization of the sector by replacing small-holder agriculture with large-scale commercial agriculture.

The displacement occasioned by agricultural commercialization is not considered problematic in this perspective, which views formal wage labour in the large concessions as superior to self-employment on the peasant farms. Self-employment of the peasantry, which does not fit the neo-classical criteria of employment, is not considered to contribute to GDP. In addition, displacement also removes access to land and natural resources for the peasant household. Even for those households that remain on the land as labour tenants or sharecroppers, they experience new tenure insecurities under the modified agrarian relations. More information is required to understand the extent to which wage labour actually produces better returns than self-employment and other livelihood forms available to the peasant household. The different forms of farm and non-farm employment that emerge from the new land use patterns

and social and economic conditions under which labour is employed after these radical land distributions should also be assessed, as should the tenure implications of the leasing of land to concessionaires, and the implications of wages and tenure on food security.

The dispossession and proletarianization of the peasantry is contested in many different ways by the dispossessed. But principally the contestations focus on the conditions under which labour is deployed in the accumulation process (led by labour movements) and the distribution of the benefits of accumulation (or rather the privatization of the benefits of accumulation by a small national and global elite (this contestation is usually led by social movements and NGOs). The resultant struggles waged by the dispossessed to improve their material conditions must also be explored and analyzed.

Dispossession and displacement have the potential to create the labour reserve economy produced by settler colonialism in Africa. In this economy, the peasantry is confined to small patches of unproductive land, insufficient in both qualitative and quantitative terms to sustain the ability of a peasant household to reproduce itself, thus forcing members of the household into the wage-labour economy. The labour reserve also serves to subsidize wages by providing at least some of the subsistence needs of the household. Typically, the household then deploys its male members into wage labour while the female members remain as unwaged labour in the subsistence sector to meet the reproduction deficits of the wage laborers. This represents a regressive feminization of labour in the peasant sector.

The predominant policy argument that agriculture modernization through large-scale commercial farming generates employment and consequently leads to improved livelihoods and food security is contrary to existing evidence. For instance, evidence from South Africa, where agriculture in the former homelands was decimated by apartheid policies, indicates that the main cause of hunger and malnutrition is not the shortage of food but, rather, inadequate access to food by some categories of the population. Moreover, among such groups, food insecurity is endemic. This is because these groups depend on food

supplies purchased from commercial sources, and are thus dependent on direct or indirect access to cash to secure their food supplies. Access to cash is not secure as unemployment levels are high. Such a scenario is likely to be replicated throughout the continent as rural populations are displaced by land grabs and forced into wage labour, in situations where the opportunities to sell their labour are limited or non-existent. Across the continent, the poor and food-insecure generally have a narrow economic resource base with few options for expanding their incomes, either on- or off-farm.

The land alienations are occurring at a critical moment in the historical trajectories of devolution of natural resource governance in Africa, and are rationalized through a discourse of good governance and pro-poor development. The importance of 'good governance' for economic development, poverty reduction and growth in Africa has been emphasized by multi-lateral financial institutions, aid agencies and academics over the last decades. Governance and policies are about how trade-offs and conflicting interests are dealt with in a given society. Social institutions, laws and policies are shaped by power relations between stakeholders in the society. These stakeholders' practices influence, enforce or contest laws, policies and regulations as well as the conditions under which rights, benefits, and entitlements to services and livelihoods are produced and distributed. Institutional arrangements develop and are modified by changes in the distribution of entitlements, rights and obligations.

Institutions that have evolved over long periods of common property management, and which have become highly sophisticated in governing relations between stakeholders at the local level, and between local and other stakeholders, will be distorted by land alienations, leading to the weakening of local regulations regarding resource use and thus precipitating unprecedented natural resource degradation. This is likely to have negative ramifications for adaptation to climate change, reduce the potential of the commons to contribute to food security, and lead to downstream erosion of the capacities of local communities to exercise their citizenship rights in society.

A lot of data is now being generated and interpreted on the processes, outcomes and effects of the current wave of land alienations in Africa. The debate covers a wide range of subjects, including the economic, social and political implications of these dynamics. This proposal is to contribute to this emerging debate through secondary research which will use existing data, combined with supplementary data generated from selected case study countries, to analyze the implications of the land alienations for natural resource governance and local livelihoods in communal tenure systems in the context of climate change.

The foundational hypothesis guiding this investigation is that land alienation is occurring in communal tenure regimes precisely because the African states have maintained ambiguous legal status of these regimes in order to allow for arbitrary state intervention in the governance of lands and natural resources held in common. Consequently, institutional capacity to govern the commons is already compromised by the high levels of existing state interventionism. Large land alienations in these regimes will constitute an unprecedented shock leading to rapid institutional atrophy as communities are displaced, land and resource rights are lost and livelihoods are redefined. These shocks will not only erode local governance capacities, but will also redefine local state relationships in ways that may compromise the democratization process on the continent.

* Building on Marx's concept of 'primitive accumulation' of capital, David Harvey (2003) uses the concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' to describe contemporary processes of expropriatory capital accumulation. Thus in addition to the speculative financialization, stock promotions, ponzi schemes etc. of the twenty-first century, the new forms of dispossession include enclosures of the commons, the commodification of nature, culture, histories and intellectual creativity; corporatization of

public assets; privatization of public utilities, and so on (Harvey, D. 2003: 145-52 passim)

References

- Anseeuw, W., Alden Wily, L, Cotula, L. and Taylor, M., 2012, 'Land Rights and the Rush for Land: Findings of the Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project'. ILC, Rome.
- Anseeuw, W.; Lay, J., Messerli, P., Giger, M. and Taylor, M., 2013, 'Creating a public tool to assess and promote transparency in global land deals: the experience of the Land Matrix'. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 2013, Vol. 40, No. 3, 521-530
- Arezki, R., Deininger, K. & Selod, H., 2011, 'What drives the global land rush?' IMF Working Paper. IMF Institute.
- Behnke, R. and Kerven, Carol, 2013, Counting the costs: replacing Pastoralism with irrigated agriculture in the Awash valley, north-eastern Ethiopia. IIED Climate Change Working Paper No.4. March 2013. London.
- Government of Liberia, 2006, 'Executive Order No 1 Government of Liberia Forest Sector Reform: Adopting the Recommendations and Report of the Forest Concession Review Committee and promoting transparency, benefit sharing, and public participation in forest and natural resource management in Liberia'. Monrovia.
- Government of Liberia, 2009, 'Poverty reduction Strategy Government of Liberia, 2010'. Report of the Special Presidential Committee to investigate an alleged Carbon Credit Concession Agreement between the Liberian Government and Carbon Harvesting Corporation of the United Kingdom.
- Government of Liberia, Governance Commission, 2010, 'Liberia National policy on Decentralization and Local Governance'. Monrovia.
- Hall, R. 2011, 'Land grabbing in southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush'. Paper presented to the STIAS (Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies) Colloquium on land reform, agrarian change and rural poverty in Southern Africa, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 8-9 March. IUCN, 2011.
- Harvey, D., 2003, *The New Imperialism*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
- IUCN, (nd), 'The Land We Graze: a synthesis of case studies about how pastoralists' organizations defend their land rights'. Nairobi: IUCN.
- Levitt, T., 2012, 'Special report Crisis or rebirth? The future of Ethiopia's pastoralist tribes'. <http://www.theecologist.org/News/ne...viewed 27/11/2013>.
- Moyo, S., and Chambati W., eds, 2013, 'Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Colonialism'. CODESRIA: Dakar.
- Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia & International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, 2010, 'Pastoralism and Land: Land Tenure, Administration and Use in Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia'. PFE, IIRR and DF. Nairobi.
- Ribot, J.C., 2009, 'Authority over Forests: Empowerment and Subordination in Senegal's Democratic Decentralization', *Development and Change*, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 105-129.
- Oxfam, 2011, 'Land and Power: The growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land'.
- Pearce, F., 2013, 'Choosing crops over cattle: Are African governments taking pastoralism seriously?'. <http://wle.cgiar.org/blogs/2013/03/...>
- Scoones, I., 1995, 'New directions in pastoral development in Africa', in: I. Scoones ed., *Living with Uncertainty. New directions in pastoral development in Africa*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd.
- Siakor, S., 2012, 'Uncertain Futures: The impacts of Sime Darby on communities in Liberia'. World Rainforest Movement and Sustainable Development Institute, Monrovia, Liberia.
- Siakor, S. and Knight, R.S., 2012, 'In Liberia, A Nobel Laureate's problem'. *The New York Times*, 21 January 2012.
- Whitman, J., 2012, 'Land Grabs and Food Sovereignty'. *International Viewpoint*, IV, 449 - June.

Kenya's Civil Society and Extractive Industries: Buying into Neoliberalism?

It is astonishing that after over a century of resource extraction on the African continent, accompanied by a bloody colonial history, decades of war in mineral-rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the gradual impoverishment of communities living in resource-rich areas, civil society in Kenya does not interrogate extraction from a historical and informed perspective.

Civil society organizations are often tasked with the difficult and painstaking work of advocating on behalf of, or in solidarity with, communities engaged in battles with some of the world's most powerful companies and governments. While many have worked tirelessly, prioritizing the views of the communities they work with, others have found their niche within the now dominant neoliberal economic framework, unable or unwilling to challenge the basic underlying principles of this framework.

In November of last 2013, civil society organizations hosted a seminar on the extractive industries in Kenya. Titled 'Kenya's New Natural Resource Discoveries: Blessing or Curse?' and organized with the aim of addressing potential opportunities, challenges, impacts and policy implications of Kenya's newly discovered resources, including oil, this was a rare opportunity to have an open and informed debate about the implications of mining, oil and resource extraction in the country.

Kenya extracts soda ash, limestone, gold, cement and gemstones, but its resources are not exploited on a scale comparable to neighbouring Tanzania, Uganda or the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the recent discovery of commercially viable oil reserves in Turkana (<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/...>), the impending arrival of a new port and oil refinery on the island of Lamu, enormous rare earth and titanium deposits found in Kwale (<http://allafrica.com/stories/201307...>), and discoveries of gold in Narok and Migori (<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/...>)

Zahra Moloo
CCTV/Al Jazeera
Nairobi, Kenya

www.businessdailyafrica.com/...) have caught the eye of new investors, hungry to turn a handsome profit from the country's untapped resources.

One would think that these discoveries would signal alarm for the civil society organizations whose objective is, presumably, to advocate for the rights of communities living on or around these deposits of wealth. Combined with a myopic and simplistic vision of development embodied in 'Vision 2030' (<http://www.vision2030.go.ke/>) and promoted by the current conservative government of Uhuru Kenyatta, the future of Kenya's marginalized communities living in resource-rich areas is precarious to say the least.

Perhaps civil society organizations do not understand the urgency of the looming changes that are coming to this country. Aside from Tax Justice Network Africa's highly relevant analysis on illicit financial flows and transfer pricing during the extractives conference, and a few sensible points and analysis raised by participants from Ghana and other countries, the framework of the conference seemed to pander to the very same neoliberal agenda that has enabled and perpetuated a decades-old colonial pillage of resources across the continent.

The conference began, astonishingly, with an introduction by the Kenyan Chamber of Mines, a body formed in the year 2000 whose stated purpose is to 'represent the interests of Kenya's miners, exploration companies and mineral traders'. Its representative mentioned briefly that a company called Aviva Mining, owned by African Barrick Gold, was embarking on an exploration project along Ndori Greenstone Belt in Western Kenya (<http://www.africanbarrickgold.com/e...>).

Not a single person batted an eye at the mention of African Barrick Gold, a company among the five largest in Africa and majority owned by Canadian mining giant, Barrick Gold. In July 2013, the London legal firm, Leigh Day, announced (<http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2013...>) that it would be suing African Barrick Gold and North Mara Gold Mine Limited, on behalf of villagers from North Mara, Tanzania, for liability in the deaths and injuries of local villagers.

According to Leigh Day, "the claims relate to incidents occurring over the last three years, including one in which five young men were shot and killed on 16 May 2011". African Barrick Gold earlier came under scrutiny for a toxic chemical spill into River Thigithe in North Mara, which reportedly had serious health impacts on the villagers living in the area (<http://www.miningwatch.ca/fr/node/6356>). Clashes between villagers and police at the North Mara gold mine have continued in 2014 (<http://allafrica.com/stories/201401...>) and, at African Barrick Gold's Buzwagi Gold Mine, villagers complain that their water sources have been contaminated and their homes destroyed by the mine (<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fe...>)

Despite North Mara's proximity to Kenya, only a few kilometres from the border, no mention was made of these recent events. Nor was there any mention of the messy and complex history of the titanium project in Kwale District in Kenya, where a company called Tiomin initially wanted to mine the mineral on land occupied by villagers in Maumba and Nguluku in 2005. At the time, villagers were infuriated at the crumbs offered in compensation for the land they would lose. Now in the hands of a company called Base Resources, the titanium project is scheduled to begin extraction in 2014 (<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014...>) 'after being delayed since 2006 due to financing constraints, environmentalist protests, compensation disputes with local farmers and government red tape.'

In DRC, among the wealthiest countries in the world, a decades-old conflict fueled by reserves of minerals worth \$24 trillion dollars (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.a...>) has devastated the country. During a presentation about communities seeking to benefit from a mine operated by Anglo gold Ashanti in Mongbwalu, nothing was said of the company's alleged dubious connections with a rebel group that carried out an attack on Mongbwalu in which hundreds of people were killed between 2002 and 2003 (<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fi...>)

AngloGold Ashanti has also recently come under scrutiny (<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fe...>) for allegations that the security officers deployed around its gold mine in Geita, Tanzania, have killed a number of people including a 16-year old boy and villagers scavenging through the company's mine dumps for remnants of gold. In Colombia, near the la Colosa mine owned by Anglogold Ashanti, two activists were assassinated last year for their alleged opposition to large-scale mining projects in the area (<http://nacla.org/blog/2013/11/12/le...>).

Resistance Here and Elsewhere

Lest we forget our history, it is important to remember that mining and resource extraction were pillars of the colonial enterprise on the African continent. Those who are today celebrated for their role in resisting imperial domination were wholly opposed to the siphoning off of resources to the colonial metropolis: Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in 1961 following his staunch opposition to the Belgian-backed secession of mineral-rich Katanga state (<http://www.theguardian.com/global-d...>); Author, playwright and activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995 with eight other Ogoni activists by President Abacha in Nigeria, for mobilizing against oil giant, Royal Dutch Shell (<http://www.theguardian.com/business...>); and

many other ordinary people who have given their lives to fighting against injustice.

Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first president, argued in favour of leaving the country's resources in the ground until Tanzanians themselves developed the skills to mine them for the benefit of the country.

Elsewhere in the world, individuals, communities and even governments have started taking more concerted action against multinational mining companies whose forays into various countries invariably result in devastating social and environmental consequences. In 2010, the government of Costa Rica denied a subsidiary of Canadian company, Infinito Mining, a concession to build an open-pit gold mine in a tropical forest. The country is now facing a \$1 billion lawsuit for having rejected the company's plan (<http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/cana...>).

Last year, Romanian citizens took to the streets in the thousands to protest a controversial mining project by Canadian company, Gabriel Resources Ltd, which would have razed mountaintops to extract silver and gold (<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/fe...>). The country's parliament finally voted against the project in November.

From Romania to South Africa to Papua New Guinea, and even Turkana, communities are rising up, mobilizing against the layered and varied injustices that accompany large-scale mining practices.

But here in Nairobi, it is business as usual. A few civil society organizations are advocating to leave the minerals in the ground. Others have mentioned the first and foremost principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent of communities (<http://www.culturalsurvival.org/new...>), and its relevance to those who are willing to fight for their lands, who dare to say no. But there was little to no serious engagement

with these questions during the discussion.

Instead, we talked about Corporate Social Responsibility as a progressive solution and the World Bank's redress mechanisms for human rights abuses. It is a given, without the consent, for instance, of those in Turkana who staged protests against Tullow Oil in 2013 (<http://allafrica.com/stories/201310...>), that extraction will go ahead. We are not asking, 'Should we mine or extract? Should communities have to relocate from their ancestral lands for a mining project? Should this be our vision of development? What do those communities say?' We are already asking, 'What can we do to make it better? How can we make this new enterprise nice and clean? How can we engage with companies and convince them to be responsible?' Rather than having communities from Kwale, Turkana, North Mara, Geita or the Niger Delta give testimonies about their very real first-hand experiences with large-scale mining and oil companies, we listen to NGO representatives who have flown in from other countries.

It is astonishing that after over a century of resource extraction on the African continent, accompanied by a bloody colonial history, decades of war in mineral-rich countries like the DRC and the gradual impoverishment of communities living in resource-rich areas, civil society in Kenya does not interrogate extraction from a historical and informed perspective.

Of course, many have not been at the frontline of resistance. Yet at the very least, the voices of communities who find themselves suddenly sitting on top of a gold mine or an oil well, communities whose livelihoods will be threatened by companies churning out billions of dollars of profit every year, should not be drowned out by a sanitized and watered-down perspective that fits within a framework of business as usual.

Mandela's Legacy

Reflections on Mandela

To reflect on Mandela, is to reflect on greatness...

Not to mourn his death but to celebrate his life.

His passing gives us all pause to take the measure of our own lives...

The measure of our love, our stability, our loyalty, our dedication and our capacity to rise above the mundane and aspire to give meaning to our lives.

Be not afraid of greatness: some are born great, some achieve greatness and some have greatness thrust upon them.

– Shakespeare

Nelson Mandela is one of the few people on this earth who truly achieved greatness. Greatness uncontested by friend or foe. Greatness that evoked awe at the nature and magnitude of the achievement, but that also elicited love and affection for Mandela the human being, in addition to admiration and appreciation for Mandela the political leader. He was a unique leader, in whose actions countless souls found inspiration.

Determination, commitment, deeds and words fused into an indissoluble entity... a life lived in greatness, marked by the

Ismail Serageldin
Bibliotheca Alexandrina
Egypt

tenacity of commitment to principles and beliefs in the face of an implacable foe, first in open conflict, then in his refusal to abandon his principles for 27 long years in prison, 27 long years of a determined spiritual resolve, a lifetime and more, and onward to dismantle Apartheid, establish democracy and bring about the reconciliation of his people and lead his nation to greatness...

He belongs to a pantheon of greatness that few stars inhabit: People who fought, but whose names shine not because of military victories but by the power of their example and their moral and political decisions. From Umar ibn Al-Khattab, who protected the pluralism of Jerusalem in the seventh century, to Lincoln who gives a blanket amnesty to his opponents after leading the Union forces to victory and ending slavery in nineteenth century America, to Nelson Mandela who withstood conflict and ordeal to achieve the spiritual and political transformation of a nation of many peoples, and inspired the world.

He recognized the call of duty and in so doing responded to the call of destiny, for himself and for South Africa. For it is through the living labours of public persons that societies become nations, and nations become great. For in the action of these public figures, if they are sound, society will prosper, but if they are inspired and inspiring, societies will rise above what they thought themselves capable of, nations become great, and lay the foundations for continued future greatness. And through such inspiring deeds and words, do public persons lay a claim to immortality.

Nelson Mandela was undoubtedly one of those immortal leaders. He now belongs to history, but we are fortunate to have lived in his time and to have been witness to his magical allure, his saintly demeanour, his twinkling mischievous eyes, his humour and his wisdom. We have witnessed his mind and his heart at work, and admired his unique combination of political genius and human warmth, his vision of the 'Rainbow Nation' and how to make it a reality.

In affection, and admiration, we say our farewell to you, Madiba, our teacher, by word and deed. May you rest in Peace, and may your legacy live forever.

The Place of Work in African Childhoods / La place du travail chez les enfants

Edited by Michael Bourdillon & Georges Mulumbwa

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 252 p., ISBN: 978-2-86978-597-7

This volume is about how work enters and affects the lives of children and young people in Africa, taking for granted neither the traditional values surrounding children's work, nor international standards against it. The discussions focus on empirical observations of the lives of African children, the work they do, its place in their lives, and what the children say about it. Many African societies run their affairs on the ingrained notion that children must work as part of their process of growing up. Children, thus, participate in their families and communities through the work they do in the house, in the fields, in crafts – in whatever their families do. Their work is perceived as part of their education in the broadest sense. Such views are, however, antithetical to the dominant views in Europe and North America which see childhood as a time of learning and play; a time of freedom from responsibility and economic activity.



Mandela's Legacy: A Man of Many Parts

Nelson Mandela – whose followers and admirers often referred to by his clan name, Madiba – passed away on 5 December 2013, at age 95. He was undoubtedly one of the most inspirational figures in the period since World War II: A humane visionary with exemplary courage, gentle but firm in his dealings and demeanour, proud in the face of racist humiliations, with monumental patience and indomitable revolutionary will to liberate himself and his people from the Apartheid system into which he was born. Dismantling Apartheid in the 1990s was one of the great events of the turbulent twentieth century, even though the manner of its dismantling was deeply marred by the fact that the critical negotiations which made it possible came in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, in a significant coincidence, those negotiations on the issue of South African settler colonialism ran parallel to those other negotiations, on Israeli settler colonialism, which led to the Oslo Accords. Mandela and Arafat had more in common than easily meets the eye. Both were revolutionaries in non-revolutionary times, and both fought first with the gun, then offered an olive branch to their oppressors, in search of dignified peace between very unequal antagonists. In both cases, the question was starkly posed: is Dignity possible with Inequality?

Mandela was a man of many parts; a man for all seasons as it were. His political career began in the 1940s, with demands for quite modest reform that fell far short of racial equality but sought to protect the professional and entrepreneurial interests of the black middle class. The demands were radicalized by government refusal. The more the apartheid government refused, the more radical the demands became, eventually culminating in a commitment to armed struggle and the founding of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK, in short form; and translated as 'Spear of the Nation'), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) which carried out its first guerrilla action in the last days of 1961. In this phase of his life he is said to have been inspired by Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. He received military training in

Aijaz Ahmad
Nehru Memorial Museum
and Library, New Delhi

Morocco and Ethiopia during the summer of 1962 but was then arrested on 5 August 1962, soon after his return to South Africa. He renounced use of armed struggle only in 1993 but there is no evidence that he actually ever participated in it. For, having been arrested in 1962, he was to be released from prison only in February 1990, well after he had initiated negotiations with the white settler government for peace, reconciliation and abrogation of apartheid rule. By the time those negotiations were concluded and he became the first President of post-Apartheid South Africa in May 1994, he was being widely portrayed as a man of peace and non-violence in the mould of Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King.

Nelson Mandela's relationship with communism has never been very clear. We know that as early as 1955 Mandela advised Sisulu, his senior in ANC, to seek weapons from the People's Republic of China. We also know that Mandela was a key figure in ANC's recourse to armed struggle and that the armed wing of the ANC was established in 1961 with the active participation of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) which always remained at the centre of that armed wing. Immediately after his death, SACP deputy general secretary Solly Mapaila claimed that Mandela was a long-time member of the party and that it was denied in the past for 'political reasons'; the party's lengthier statement went on to say that '...At his arrest in August 1962, Nelson Mandela was not only a member of the then underground South African Communist Party, but was also a member of our party's central committee.'

The difficulty, however, is that Mandela himself always denied that he ever had any such relationship with communism, or held convictions of that kind. More recently, Ronnie, a longtime senior member of both the ANC and the SACP,

has also denied that Mandela was ever a member of the latter; 'I would have known,' he remarked. During the Rivonia trial after his arrest, at the height of his political radicalism, Mandela emphatically claimed that the Freedom Charter, the key programmatic document of the ANC, was 'by no means a blueprint for a socialist state' and that 'the ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection, ever condemned capitalist society'. In his autobiography, *Long March to Freedom*, published more than two decades later (1994), just as he was ascending to the South African presidency, Mandela was to write: 'There will always be those who say that the communists were using us. But who is to say that we were not using them?' That's just about right: 'using them'. The ANC was a conservative force when Mandela first joined and even after the radical turn that Mandela and his close associates introduced into its politics, it remained a small party based primarily in the frustrated black middle class. Origins of the alliance with the communists were purely pragmatic. As Charles Longford was to write after Mandela's death:

As an insignificant political force, removed from the black working classes and the poor, ANC stood little chance of generating any meaningful political pressure that might affect change. They needed the black majority. That is why they turned to the South African Communist Party.

The first phase of Mandela's political activism, before he was sent to prison, in 1962, was the time of high tide for socialist, anti-colonial and generally revolutionary movements all over the globe, so that an alliance between nationalists and communists was by no means odd or exceptional. It was during that time that socialist revolutions swept through China and Cuba; the two great European empires, the British and the French, were dissolved; revolutionary wars broke out in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria and elsewhere; the Non-Aligned Movement arose as a significant force in global affairs. Liberation was the watchword of the times

and Mandela was at the time ideologically comfortable in that world. By the time he came out of incarceration in 1990, the Chinese counterrevolution had been in power for over a decade; the Soviet Union was in the process of fragmentation; European social democracy was succumbing to neoliberalism; Arab secular nationalism had been defeated; and radical nationalist regimes across Asia and Africa had become mere caricatures of themselves. Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India when Mandela was sent to prison; by the time he came out, even Indira Gandhi was dead and India was experiencing the very first wave of its neoliberal transformations. Capitalism was triumphant across the globe, and the world to which Mandela returned was not even remotely the world he had left behind. He took the measure of the changes and changed himself accordingly.

Nelson Mandela shall always be remembered, for centuries to come, as the noblest, the most formidable among those who led South Africa out of the apartheid nightmare. He shall be remembered even more as the man who refused to fight white racism with the weapon of black racism, or to forge a majoritarian racism against the racial minority – the racism of the victor against the racism of the vanquished. For him, being African was a matter not of race but of trans-racial belonging in which whites and blacks could share equally, if racial privilege was abolished. All through his own sufferings, and the sufferings of his people he held fast to the universalist belief in the equality of all human beings, beyond race, religion or nationality. This universalist belief was there not only in the moment of his triumph during the 1990s but from the earliest days of his victimization by the apartheid regime. Facing the death penalty during the Rivonia Trial, he spoke eloquently of the Equality he envisaged as normative moral value for all humanity at the end of his speech in court, on 20 April 1964:

I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

In different circumstances, such words could perhaps be treated as the expression of a familiar kind of liberal conscience. In the concrete circumstance of a black prisoner facing an all-white court in apartheid South Africa, under threat of death, those same words come to command a very different kind of majesty and heroic resonance. In the event, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, of which he actually served twenty-seven years. The fundamental moral grandeur of Nelson Mandela resides in that universalist vision in the midst of a racist society.

By the time he passed away, his fame had reached mythic proportions. For all the years when he was the acknowledged supreme leader of the anti-Apartheid movement, even through all those twenty-seven prison years, western governments and media corporations routinely called him a ‘terrorist’, ‘communist’, ‘dangerous Marxist revolutionary’ etc. However, once he started negotiations with the white regime during the 1980s, though still inside the prison, those same governments and corporations took to bestowing more and more international stature upon him. Those negotiations were held against the specific backdrop of the Tripartite Accord that was reached between Cuba, Angola and South Africa built upon undertakings whereby 50,000 Cuban soldiers withdrew from Angola in exchange for the independence of Namibia and South Africa’s commitment to stop the over and covert wars that were destabilizing neighbouring countries. It took another year and two months of negotiations after that agreement for Mandela to be released.

Thanks to the progress towards reconciliation during those negotiations, he was released from prison in 1990, a framework for the protection of white interests in wealth and property was put in place, the whole system of racist laws was abolished, democratic elections were held, and Mandela assumed the Presidency of South Africa in May 1994. By the time he relinquished the presidency in June 1999, first-rate sainthood had been bestowed upon him, pretty much on the model of Mahatma Gandhi. Mercifully, Mandela himself had a sense of wry humour about it. When John Pilger, the well-known journalist, asked him about this elevation to sainthood, Mandela replied: ‘That’s not the job I applied for.’

It is difficult to imagine another figure who has received so many public honours from all corners of the globe, over 260 in all, including the Nobel Prize, the Bharat Ratna, the Nishan-e-Pakistan, the US Presidential Medal of Freedom, and the Order of Lenin from the erstwhile Soviet Union. That he would receive the US Presidential Medal in 2002 is ironic considering that his name was eventually removed from the State Department’s list of ‘terrorists’ only in 2008, six years after he had received that Medal. Mandela had, of course, addressed the joint houses of the US Congress well before that, twice: in 1990, soon after being released from prison, and again in 1994, upon assuming the South African Presidency. Only in the American scheme of things is it possible to bestow upon someone the highest honour that the US can give to anyone but also keep the same person on the list of ‘terrorists’ – just in case!

Thatcher and Reagan – not to speak of the *New York Times* – used to refer to Mandela as a ‘terrorist’ well into the 1980s. By the end of that decade he was being invited to address the US Congress, a rare event for anyone but especially one who was not a head of state or an international dignitary. What had changed by then? The common answer would be: Mandela’s moral stature was such that even the US government had been forced to recognize it. There is undoubtedly some truth in that, but things might be more complex. Another way of putting it is like this: Mandela received the Order of Lenin in 1990, the last recipient before the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and the US began showering honours on him that same year. Is there any significance to this historical coincidence? Or, we may recall that Mandela relinquished the Presidency in 1999 and, only two years later, in 2001, George Soros was to tell the Davos Economic Forum, ‘South Africa is in the hands of international capital.’ When, precisely, did post-Apartheid South Africa fall into those hands: after 1999 or before?

II

Nelson Mandela was born to a royal family in Transkei and therefore took elite privilege and high status for granted. He trained as a lawyer and did not finish a degree but obtained a diploma that allowed him to practice. He fled home to avoid a traditional arranged marriage, and moved to Johannesburg where he set up

South Africa's first black law firm in 1952, together with his friend Oliver Tambo, who later became president of the ANC. (Mandela himself became ANC President in 1991 when Tambo relinquished that office due to failing health.) The government banned him for the first time that same year. He spent the next ten years between prison and the revolutionary underground. When the ANC's famous Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955 he watched the proceedings secretly from the sidelines.

Mandela was arrested and imprisoned on 5 December 1955, exactly 48 years before his death, and appeared, in a long list of 156 detainees, as one of the main accused in the infamous Treason Trial that began in 1956 and ended only in 1961 when he was acquitted, along with the last thirty of the one hundred and fifty-six. Defendants in the trial included key figures of the ANC and the CPSA, whose names would haunt the history of Apartheid thereafter: Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, Ahmed Kathrada, Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Lionel Bernstein, Alex La Guma, Lionel Foreman and many others.

While Mandela was still fighting his case in the Treason Trial, a state of emergency was declared and the ANC was banned after the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, so that he was again among those who were detained under the Emergency as well. After his acquittal in March 1961 he went underground. By June of that year he got involved in organizing the armed struggle. In January 1962 he secretly left South Africa, travelling to a number of African countries, including Morocco and Ethiopia, where he received military training, as well as the UK. Upon his return he was again arrested, never to leave prison for the next twenty-seven years and spending eighteen of those years, 1964 to 1982, at Robben Island, a little patch of land off the South African Coast, which had once served as a leper colony, then alternately as prison or as naval base, and then, from 1961 onwards, as a high security detention centre for leaders and activists of the ANC – Mandela, Sisulu, Zuma and others – where communications with the rest of the world were cut.

We might add that Oliver Tambo was released early for lack of evidence and immediately went into exile, settling in

London from where he supervised the activities of the ANC and its solidarity networks – most importantly, the formation of the South African Democratic Front – as the organization's General-Secretary, then Deputy President, Acting President, and finally its President from 1967 onwards, until Mandela himself took over the office in 1991. Tambo was not to return to South Africa until 1990. Thabo Mbeki, who served as Mandela's Vice President after the end of Apartheid and then succeeded him as President, similarly went into exile in 1962 and returned in 1990. Jacob Zuma, the current President who succeeded Mbeki, went into exile later, in 1975, but also returned in 1990 together with all the other exiled leaders when the ANC was unbanned and Mandela released to pave the way for a post-Apartheid settlement. The subsequent trajectory of South Africa seems to have been profoundly shaped by the fact that most of the ANC leaders, some of whom were also important members of the SACP (Mbeki was member of the central committee; Jacob Zuma joined in 1963 and was elected to the Politburo in 1989), spent virtually the whole period of the revolutionary struggle either in prison (such as Mandela and Sisulu) or in exile (most of the others).

Some of these exiles, such as Tambo, were stationed primarily in western capitals. Some, such as Mbeki, criss-crossed between Western locations and the African countries bordering South Africa – Mozambique, Angola, Namibia – where ANC officials as well as the fighters of both the CPSA and ANC were stationed, not only to infiltrate South Africa but also to participate in anti-colonial warfare in those countries; in Angola, for instance, South African partisans fought alongside militants of the MPLA and the Cuban armed units. Some others, such as Zuma, were concentrated mainly in those neighbouring countries and, often, their battlefields. Inside the country, the famous leaders such as Mandela and Sisulu, were held incommunicado in high-security prisons and had no contact with the movement and its militants, whether inside the country or in exile, for roughly the two decades when anti-apartheid struggles, including the armed struggle, were at their most intense.

Thus, the armed struggle was often led not by ANC cadres, strictly speaking, but by communists, such as Joe Slovo and

Chris Hani (who of course also participated in ANC activities). Moreover, armed struggle in all of Southern Africa, as in many other liberation movements from Vietnam to Palestine, was highly dependent on the socialist bloc for arms, training etc, and was thus much less an effect of the ANC alone. The revolution, however, was less the work of armed units, but more of the black working classes and poor masses. Those incessant uprisings and mass actions in the black townships and the hinterland were the combined work of the Democratic Front which brought together over 400 organizations, including the CP and ANC undergrounds, as well as the Black Consciousness Movement of Steve Biko which often seemed to overshadow the ANC as such. Thus, while some of the key leaders were physically safe either in prison or in exile, at varying distances from the scenes of fighting, some of the most heroic and promising leaders were killed in battle or fell to assassins' bullets, most notably Chris Hani, an illustrious communist and the key leader of the armed struggle. His assassination in 1993, on the eve of the accord between Mandela and de Klerk, was a key event because Hani had incorruptible revolutionary zeal and influence and charisma second only to Mandela's. Hani was expected to lead the struggle against the kind of South Africa that emerged after those accords.

In this respect, the situation in South Africa was somewhat reminiscent of the Algerian Revolution. Leaders like Ben Bella (the first post-revolutionary president) were captured early and came out of prison with unsullied reputations of legendary proportion; they could negotiate away anything and yet be held in highest esteem. Other men, like Boumedienne (the second president), stayed put in neighbouring Tunisia and rose to political power after the French withdrawal on the strength of the Army of the Exterior that had remained intact, in command of men and materials, while those who fought the bitterest battles on Algerian soil were largely decimated. In South Africa, the accord was negotiated by Mandela, the famous prisoner with matchless moral authority; other leaders then returned from exile to take charge of the state that had been transformed by the blood of others.

The significant parallel is with the contrast between the originating aspirations of the

two movements and the post-revolutionary outcomes. In Algeria, the famous Tripoli Programme was promulgated virtually at the end of the war of Independence, in June 1962, in the very last meeting of the leadership of the National Liberation Front (FLN) before the factional conflicts of that summer broke out. The programme was chiefly the work of Redha Malek, Mohamed Bedjaoui, and Mohamed Benyahia, and proposed a 'socialist option' for Algeria's development. It envisioned the nationalization of foreign interests, the inauguration of agricultural cooperatives and an industrial economy largely in the state sector. The programme viewed the recently signed Evian Accords with France as neocolonialist because the accords guaranteed the French colons their full property rights and included an article which stated that 'Algeria concedes to France the use of certain air bases, terrains, sites and military installations which are necessary to it.' The agreement specifically permitted France to maintain its naval facilities at Mers El Kébir (which also had an underground nuclear facility) for another fifteen years. So, the description of the Accords as 'neocolonialist' was apt, even though two of the main movers of the Tripoli Programme were members of the Algerian delegation that had signed the Evian Accords; they had obviously been overruled by the majority in the delegation led by Krim Belkacem (who was to be later accused of ordering the murder of Abbane Ramadane, the legendary leader and moving spirit behind the Soummam Congress which had given to the FLN its basic contours). With a leadership so divided, it is no wonder that even more murderous disputes broke out among factional groupings soon thereafter. In any case, the relevant fact is that French capital re-entered Algeria on an increasingly elaborate scale while government of the FLN kept degenerating into a spectacularly corrupt and authoritarian bureaucracy, which is what it is to this day.

The career of the ANC as it started inching toward power, and especially after it formed the government, has not been notably different – in fact, may have been much worse in most respects.

III

In January 1990, as he was emerging from prison and the ban on ANC was getting

lifted, Mandela wrote to the Mass Democratic Movement, in words reminiscent of the promises of the Tripoli Programme:

The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC, and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable. Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is unavoidable.

On 11 July 2013, John Pilger published a piece on his interview with Mandela after the ANC had taken hold of power, had abandoned the black working classes and the poor to their fate, and launched a wave of brisk privatizations and deregulations, which led, among other things, to fabulous enrichment of the new ANC elite, Mandela's close associates and cabinet ministers in particular. Pilger reports that when he said to Mandela that it was all contrary to what he had said in 1990, the latter shrugged him off with the remark 'for this country, privatization is the fundamental policy'. Not only that! Mandela was frequently seen in the company of the most corrupt of his ministers even after he relinquished power and in fact supported Zuma's bid for the presidency. In power, Zuma, himself a former communist leader, acted very much like the Russian oligarchs bred by Yeltsin. Typical among those companions of Mandela was Cyril Ramaphosa, a former mine workers' union leader, a deputy president of the ANC (and presidential contender), who became a billionaire board member of the corporation that owns the Marikana mine where South African police shot down 34 striking Black miners in cold blood in August, 2012. Mandela himself was not corrupt in that sense, but favours that wealthy businessmen did to him in such matters as building of his post-retirement home are well known.

All that was more or less written into the kind of transition that was made when the key apartheid structures were abolished. The agreement which ended apartheid and established majority rule based on universal suffrage also allowed whites to keep the best land, the mines, manufacturing plants, and financial institutions, and to export vast quantities of their wealth without restriction. Eighty per cent of the privately owned land in the country

is still in the hands of the whites, down from eighty seven percent under apartheid. A South African communist told me in the late 1990s while Mandela was president: 'we now run the economy they own'. In state policy, the neoliberal turn that had been initiated by the apartheid regime in its latter years was to be extended greatly under ANC rule. Thabo Mbeki – once a member of the central committee of the CPSA – trained in Economics in England and in guerrilla warfare in the Soviet Union. He was an eminent leader of the ANC who criss-crossed continents during the 1970s and 1980s to connect the exiled political leadership with the externally based military units. As vice president under Mandela and President of South Africa after him, he could, in the fullness of time, gleefully say, 'Just call me a Thatcherite.' It was all a bit like Oslo and the career of the PA thereafter. Self-enrichment is at the heart of all the varieties of Thatcherism. Or, as Deng Xiaoping famously said: 'It is glorious to be rich.' Today's South Africa is part of the global counter-revolution.

The white ruling elite had prepared for such outcomes with great deliberation. It had methodically nurtured a new Black entrepreneurial and professional class through loans, subsidies etc, whose interests predictably came into conflict with those of the black working classes and the poor who were the mass base of the anti-Apartheid struggle in all its aspects. Like any typical national bourgeoisie in postcolonial Africa and Asia, members of this newly confected class aspired to little more than becoming intermediaries between global capital and the national market. Meanwhile, the famous 'talks about talks' began with Mandela soon after he was moved from Robben Island to Pollsmoor prison in 1982, where he could receive guests who included many luminaries from the regime, including such figures as Neil Bernard, director of the National Intelligence Agency. Seven years were to elapse before this process of reconciliation was to progress sufficiently for Mandela to be meeting, secretly and still as a prisoner, with the white minority President, De Klerk. The following year, he was released from detention altogether.

White South African mining magnates, billionaires and businessmen were meanwhile meeting the exiled leaders of the ANC, such as Mbeki, in European capitals, to offer deals and hammer out

the economic structure of post-Apartheid South Africa; a favourite meeting place was a majestic mansion, Mells Park House, near Bath, in England. The IMF backed up the effort with the offer of a loan in 1993 and US-trained ANC economists were soon to huddle together with World Bank officials to map out detailed blueprints for a neoliberal, crony-capitalist future. Those leaders of the ANC who had spent long years in neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia had internalized the corrupt ways and authoritarian personality traits typical of the elites in those countries. It was in the interest of the white minority that owed most of the wealth even in the new South Africa to integrate a section of the ANC elite into the capitalist class so that they too would act in the interest of the class as a whole.

Equally disastrous was the disarray in communist ranks in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Mandela might or might not have been a member of the CPSA, but we do know that Mbeki and Zuma – the second and third presidents of South Africa whose corruptions became the stuff of legend – were high-ranking members in the party's executive bodies. Not only that. In precisely the period following the dismantling of Apartheid, when South Africa needed massive construction of public housing for the black working classes and the poor who had been condemned to segregated housing in the shanty towns – for the very people, in other words, who had actually made the revolution – the privatization of housing was supervised by none other than Joe Slovo, the chair of the CPSA and famous leader of the armed struggle, who was now looking to the World Bank for advice.

Ronnie Kasrils – member of the national executive committee of the ANC from 1987-2007 and, concurrently a member of the central committee of the CPSA from December 1986 to 2007 – published a damning and self-damning piece on this subject in *The Guardian* of 24 June 2013, entitled, 'How the ANC's Faustian pact sold out South Africa's poor'. Kasrils would know. After the 1994 elections, he became a Deputy Minister of Defence for five years, then Minister of Water Affairs for the next five, and then Minister of Intelligence for four more years until he resigned. He was thus a Minister throughout the successive presidencies

of Mandela and Mbeki. Here is a longish quotation from that article:

What I call our Faustian moment came when we took an IMF loan on the eve of our first democratic election. . . . Doubt had come to reign supreme: we believed, wrongly, that there was no other option; that we had to be cautious, since by 1991 our once powerful ally, the Soviet Union, bankrupted by the arms race, had collapsed. Inexcusably, we had lost faith in the ability of our own revolutionary masses to overcome all obstacles. . . by late 1993 big business strategies – hatched in 1991 at the mining mogul Harry Oppenheimer's Johannesburg residence – were crystallising in secret late-night discussions at the Development Bank of South Africa. Present were South Africa's mineral and energy leaders, the bosses of US and British companies with a presence in South Africa – and young ANC economists schooled in western economics. They were reporting to Mandela. An ANC-Communist party leadership eager to assume political office (myself no less than others) readily accepted this devil's pact, only to be damned in the process.

IV

Mandela was an amalgam of moral courage and universalist convictions in his social vision, and of increasingly capitalist, even neoliberal convictions in matters of political economy as well as a peculiarly advanced toleration for the corruption of his colleagues.

One is reminded, then, of Marx's double-edged dictum: 'men make their own history but only in circumstances given to them'. When Mandela first joined the ANC it was an ineffectual, conservative platform meant to plead for minor concessions from the whites-only regime. He and his close comrades – Sisulu, Tambo and others – turned it into a fighting outfit for radical demands of racial equality. They soon made a close alliance with the Communist Party and organized an armed struggle that shook not only the regime but also the neighboring countries and their colonial masters. Armed struggle in South Africa preceded and then was inextricably linked to armed struggles in Namibia, the Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe). Mandela had played a crucial role in initiating the ANC into that armed

struggle, was then imprisoned well before he could himself play any substantial or coherent role in that struggle, and yet, as the country's most famous prisoner, he came to symbolize almost the totality of southern African struggles.

The Freedom Charter of 1955 can be considered as the key document of the re-founding of ANC on new premises and it was under the influence of Mandela and his like-minded comrades that the Charter went on to specify that a democratic South Africa, liberated from the scourge of apartheid, would be a country not of whites only or blacks only but of all those who reside in it, regardless of racial origin. This universalist humanism was the hallmark of the vision that he sought to realize through a revolutionary movement. He never shirked from the necessity of armed struggle when no other option was available but he always insisted that armed struggle was a strategy of last resort that was thrust upon him and his comrades by oppressors whereas he much preferred a negotiated settlement.

It is certainly true that he was in prison through virtually the whole period of the mortal struggle between the forces of apartheid and the forces of liberation which unfolded through the quarter century of his incarceration. In that sense, he became more a symbol of that resistance than an active leader or combatant in the field of battle, and then came out of prison only when a negotiated settlement was at hand. However, three things need to be added immediately. First, not even that long period of incarceration could dent, let alone kill, his indomitable spirit. His resolve remained the same, as did his commitment to humanist values beyond racial or personal hatreds. Second, his stature was such that when a final settlement was to be made, none other – not the senior leaders in exile, nor leaders and commanders stationed in neighbouring countries – could be the final negotiator with the opposing apartheid regime. Mandela alone retained that authority to represent Black South Africa as a whole. Transition to post-Apartheid peace would come with his consent, or peace would not come. This unrivalled authority, of course, implies a unique responsibility for what followed. Third, in his generous acknowledgement of those who had actively supported the people of South Africa he was fearless of, and impervious

to, the effect his open expressions of gratitude would have on his enemies.

During his trip to the US in 1990, soon after getting released from prison, he was eloquent in his praise for Fidel, Arafat, and Qaddafi whom he called his 'comrades-in-arm'. Knowing how the term 'human rights' was being used by the US in its pursuit of imperialist power, Mandela deliberately said of those three that, 'There is no reason whatsoever why we should have any hesitation about hailing their commitment to human rights.' He thus made an important point. Open, even armed support for the struggle of the South African people was one of the prime touchstones of how much one cared for human rights in the true sense of the word, and western powers had punctually failed that test. He went personally to Cuba to thank the Cuban people for their support and for the fact that Cubans had fought and died side by side with Africans to destroy the racist and colonial regimes in half a dozen countries. His oration in Havana on that occasion was quite the equal of the oration that another great African revolutionary, Amilcar Cabral, had delivered in that same city.

It is difficult to say why he knowingly settled for a neoliberal dispensation in the course of reaching a settlement for the dismantling of the political and legal structures of the Apartheid regime. Five different hypotheses have been offered to explain this. One, that as descendant of a traditional royal family and then member of the black professional middle class, Mandela was surely opposed to white racial privilege but did not have any serious anti-capitalist commitments. Second, that he wanted to secure total victory on issues of racial equality and democratic rights of majority rule while postponing other battles to another, later historical phase. Third, that the general

collapse of the socialist bloc, Third World anti-imperialist nationalism, the myriad 'African socialisms' etc., had left him so unhinged, so bereft of alternatives, so acutely aware of an unfavourable balance of power on the international scale, that he felt compelled to settle for much less than he desired. Fourth, that he, with all his moral grandeur, was surrounded by men – his own comrades of a lifetime – men like Mbeki and Zuma and countless others – who had been so corrupted in the process that he simply did not command the supra-human resources that would make it possible for him to concentrate on completing the arduous process of deracialization of state structures and also, somehow, stemming the rot in other spheres. Fifth, that the issue of Mandela's personal role is quite secondary to the fact that what happened in South Africa after the advent of black rule was structurally very similar to what has happened in a host of Asian and African countries after decolonization: the rise of the national bourgeoisie as a class rapacious in its exploitation and oppression at home but dependent and comprador in its relations with global capitalism. As Fanon memorably said: the historical phase of the national bourgeoisie is a useless phase. Much worse than useless, we may now add after far greater accumulation of horrors than what Fanon might have imagined.

There is probably some truth to each of these propositions. The tragedy of it all is that it was during the presidency of one of the most inspiring figures of our time that racial apartheid in South Africa was replaced by a class apartheid so severe that perhaps a majority of the blacks are now worse off today than ever before, relative not only to the white property-owners but also those privileged black ones who have amassed fabulous


fortunes since the apartheid state structures were undone. It all became very much worse under Mbeki and Zuma but the foundations were laid earlier, in the process of the negotiations and then in those early years of the democratic republic when Mandela was at the helm of affairs.

It is just as well that Mandela had the grace to not want a second term for his presidency. He preferred to recover his independence of spirit and his stature as a moral voice without the trappings of office. As president, he could never have described Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, as 'Bush's foreign minister'. Nor could he in that capacity have so off-handedly said that, 'If there is a country that has committed unspeakable atrocities in the world, it is the United States of America.' He was one of those rare human beings who only get diminished by the holding of office, no matter how high the office may be, especially as others surrounding him have already been diminished by the ambition and corruption from which Mandela did not entirely extricate himself. Freed from the ceremonies of state, Mandela, in roughly the last decade of his life, recovered that moral grandeur which had been his throughout his life until he started making all those compromises as negotiator and then as first President of the Republic. The stirring farewell the people of South Africa gave him was well deserved, and a more sober assessment of his life, his achievements and his shortcomings can now begin. There are, in any case, ample resources in his legacy for a new generation to invoke his name yet again as they set out to fight for a better South Africa.

Gender, Politics and Sustainable Land Utilisation: A Comparative Study of Pre-Fast Track and Fast Track Resettlement Programmes in Zimbabwe

Onias Mafa, Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 252 p., ISBN: 978-2-86978-590-8

The agrarian reform dynamics in Southern Africa have to be understood within the framework of colonial land policies and legislation that were designed essentially to expropriate land and natural resource property rights from the indigenous people in favour of the white settlers. Faced with a skewed distribution and ownership of land in favour of former colonial settlers, the new independent states are faced with the daunting task of redistributing land equitably as a way of correcting the colonial injustices in land tenure and use. This comparative study on Zimbabwe's agrarian reforms may provide countries such as South Africa and Namibia with valuable lessons, as these countries attempt to implement sustainable agrarian reforms



Mandela: Could he have Negotiated a Better Deal at independence?

Could Mandela have used his moral authority to usher a socialist revolution in South Africa? as some on the left appear to believe. I will come back to this later. It is a much bigger question than say, 'Could he have negotiated a better deal at independence?' The answer to the latter question I believe is, yes, he could have. On reflection, I am convinced that Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) need not have settled for so little after 100 years of a titanic, heroic struggle of the people since 1912, the year the ANC was born. To be honest, the 1994 deal produced a little mouse out of a mountain of a struggle! And it is this little neo-colonial mouse that is roaring today while the mountain is levelled down. The people were depoliticized immediately following the 1994 agreement, a process I witnessed firsthand.

I have been engaged in the debate with many a South African comrade (including several leaders in the ANC, the South African Communist Party – S A C P , Congress of South African Trade Unions – COSATU, the Pan-African Congress – PAC and the Black Consciousness Movement - BCM) during my years at the University of Dar es Salaam (1973-79) and later in Zimbabwe (1982 to 2005). This was at the height of the South African armed struggle.

For a short spell, Ruth First was a tutor in a course I taught at Dar. Joe Slovo (her husband) was leading the *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the military wing of the ANC and was soon to become the General Secretary of the SACP. We had discussions and differences over a number of issues – including, the nature and character of corporate capital in South Africa (see further below), and the role of the armed struggle. During the 1990-94 independence negotiations, Slovo broke a stalemate in talks with his idea of the 'sunset clause' and for a coalition government for five years following a democratic election. I was in Zimbabwe by that time, and I visited South Africa frequently. I had taken the view that the

Yash Tandon
Infosys
Bengaluru

'sunset clause' was a mistake, a view I still hold. The ANC could have negotiated a better deal. The balance of forces had shifted significantly in favour of the freedom fighters, especially after the decisive defeat of apartheid South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 at the hands of Cuban and Angolan forces. The ANC, in my view, missed an historic opportunity during the 1990-94 negotiations.

This point is a moot point now. Nonetheless, it is a significant point and historians will come back to it again and again. The issue will not go away.

Coming now to the bigger question: 'Could Mandela have used his moral authority to usher a socialist revolution in South Africa?' Here I believe that whilst he could not have ushered a socialist revolution, the ANC could have achieved much more for the people than what they have in the last 18 years.

I draw partially from my experience in Uganda. I was member of a movement in the struggle first against the brutal regime of Idi Amin (1972-79) and subsequently the regimes of Obote and Museveni (since 1980). Our movement – the Uganda National Liberation Front – formed the post-Amin government for the period May 1979 to April 1980. A conscious political decision by some of the leading forces of our movement was that time was not ripe to embark on a 'socialist road'; for us it was necessary, first, to secure national independence from the dictatorship of global capital. Applying our experience to South Africa, I would say that even today (let alone when South Africa had its first democratic election in April 1994) the struggle is for national independence from the domination of global capital. This is precisely one of the issues on which we had differences with

our comrades in the ANC and the SACP in the 1970s and 1980s. They argued that South Africa already had 'national' capital; which we said was an illusion. It is still the case that there is very little capital in South Africa that is truly 'national'.

The strategic and policy implications of the above point are enormous. Instead of consolidating national independence to build national capital, the post-apartheid government opened the doors to global capital. Where the apartheid regime was seriously trying to develop 'Boer national capital', the post-apartheid government opened up the gates to the free flow of global capital into and out of South Africa.

There is no space to elaborate on this point, but a few illustrative examples might help. One, the government deregulated the capital account resulting in massive capital exit. Two, it allowed, for example, Old Mutual (a dominant life insurance firm) to demutualize, and de facto converted over 100 years of workers' savings into share capital, and open to purchase in global capital markets. Three: it entered into a partial Free Trade Agreement with the European Union which opened South Africa (and almost by default, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)) to European imports without very limited corresponding benefits, a situation that bedevils South Africa's relations with its neighbours to this day. Four: it committed itself to repaying the pre-1995 apartheid debt under the illusion that this would build confidence with the international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) and the global market to attract foreign direct investment. It is my strong contention that South Africa ought to have unilaterally repudiated all apartheid-incurred illicit debts. I find it incomprehensible that independent South Africa should pay for debts incurred as a result of crimes against humanity. Five: the negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United Kingdom that preceded democratic elections. Finally: the 1996 GEAR – the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution – strategy. It set

the country, I believe, into a reverse gear: many of the gains of the struggle for independence were lost in the process. Evidence of this is visible all over South Africa today.

The views above are not the wisdom brought by hindsight. Indeed, many in South Africa had addressed these concerns at the time. But the ANC and the SACP were basking under the sunshine of the 'rainbow nation', and a few hard facts of life escaped their scrutiny. Actually, looking back I would go further to say that it would have been better for the independent government of South Africa to have made an alliance with Boer capital (for example, in the banking sector) than with global capital

(represented by the likes of the Anglo-American and the Old Mutual).

Let me return, briefly, to what Mandela might have done with his huge moral capital. In 1898, the Russian revolutionary, Georgi Plekhanov, wrote a famous book called *The Role of the Individual in History*. In it he subscribed to the 'great men' theory of history with a very important caveat. For them to change the course of history they must understand the underlying social and economic forces that define that course. Plekhanov argued that Marxism provided a good basis for understanding the movement of the forces of capitalism which is the dominant mode of production of the times.

To this, I would add a caveat of my own. Marxism is not a simple science. There are no ready-made answers to existential challenges. Leaders like Lenin, Mao and Fidel Castro made errors, for sure, but they learnt from practice as they went along, and changed the course of history for their nations, and for the world.

Mandela was a great man, a great humanist, may be even a 'saint'. But he saw his role as uniting his people across race and tribe, and left the nitty-gritty of state affairs to the ANC and the SACP. These, not Mandela, might be judged by history to have taken the nation to the depressing situation in which the bulk of the poor and the workers find themselves today.

Pratiques d'esclavage et d'asservissement des femmes en Afrique: les cas du Sénégal et de la République Démocratique du Congo

Sous la direction de Ndèye Sokhna guèye

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2013, 100 p., ISBN : 978-2-86978-559-5


Ce livre est une sélection des communications issues du quatrième symposium sur le genre, organisé par le CODESRIA en collaboration avec le Centre de Recherche Afro-arabe au Caire en Egypte. La question de l'esclavage et de l'asservissement a été le plus souvent étudiée sous l'angle de la dynamique atlantique. Cette analyse prenait surtout en compte les différences liées à la race, à l'ethnicité, à l'âge, à la classe ou la religion. Toutefois, le rôle et la place des femmes ainsi que les hiérarchies de genre, compris dans le sens de rapports sociaux de sexe, étaient très peu abordés. Les travaux présentés dans cet ouvrage, poursuivent la réflexion de plus en plus engagée, sur l'esclavage et l'asservissement des femmes, surtout contemporains, pour en saisir la complexité et exprimer la pluralité des expériences et des contextes, notamment à travers des exemples tirés du Sénégal et de la République Démocratique du Congo. Les différentes contributions dans ce volume proposent une nouvelle production de connaissances sur la question de l'asservissement des femmes, en démontrant les logiques sociales et les systèmes de représentation qui le sous-tendent. Il en ressort une image plus complexe des interactions historiques, socio-économiques, politiques, culturelles et religieuses complexes à l'origine de la persistance de l'esclavage et de l'asservissement dans certains pays africains.




Historiographie africaine, Afrique de l'Ouest - Afrique Centrale

Thierno M. Bah

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 288p. ISBN: 978-2-86978-599-1



Le contenu du manuel est avant tout la synthèse de lectures d'ouvrages variés, de revues spécialisées et de thèses qui permettent un regard à la fois panoramique et précis sur la production historique et la pratique du métier d'historien. Ce manuel est aussi une mise en cause inspirée d'un point de vue personnel, et se veut un témoignage de la génération d'historiens africains formés, dans les années 1960, au sein des nouvelles institutions universitaires créées en Afrique. Enfin, ce manuel veut être autre chose qu'un bilan ; il est un questionnement sur la manière dont l'histoire se fait et il permettra aux étudiants de comprendre le processus de production du savoir historique, en Afrique et sur l'Afrique, les conditions et modalités de cette production, les thématiques et éventuellement les controverses.



The Youth and Identity Question in Africa.

Edited by nicodemus Fru Awasom and Almon Shumba

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 264p., ISBN: 978-2-86978-598-4

This book demonstrates new ways of conceptualising youth in Africa and presents African youth from different African countries as a social category that has confronted and combined the global and the local with a variegated strategy based on their particular circumstances. In essence, contributors to this volume, have reconceptualised African youth with more methodological rigour and presented them in multiple spheres as a strong social group and social symbol, and as both expressions and agents of social innovation and creativity against multiple challenges in their everyday lives, particularly against a backdrop of seismic global socio-economic transformations.

Post-Referendum Sudan: National and Regional Questions

Edited by Samson Samuel Wassara and Al-Tayib Zain Al-Abdin Mohammed

Dakar, CODESRIA, 2014, 228 p., ISBN: 978-2-86978-588-5

The fate of Sudan, by then the largest country in Africa, was clearly decided when results of the referendum vote were announced in February 2011. Policy makers, scholars and the international community began to grapple with critical issues that might arise after the independence of Southern Sudan. Particularly, this book sought to examine and analyse future relations between the two countries that emerged as consequence of the referendum result in 2011 and how their neighbours would be affected by complex relationships once Southern Sudan declared independence. Frameworks for analysis are drawn mostly from economic, political, social and peace analysis. Studies draw on historical, cultural, economic and geopolitical contexts. The book sheds light on potential explosive issues that, if badly managed, would escalate into violence and would destabilise the countries having common borders with Sudan. The studies that scholars have contributed to this book are the way forward for helping the two Sudans to cope with the results of the 2011 referendum vote.

