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بعث أفريقيا الغد في سياق التحولات المعولمة :

Politics of Natural Resources Management and Accountable Systems in the Delivery of Water Services in Uganda



CODESRIA


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Abstract

The politics of natural resource management, conservation and service delivery have become prominent issues in recent policy discourses. Specific interest has been directed at the nexus between the effect of politics and management of these resources on one hand and the impact on accountability systems, on the other. The influences of politics on managerial behavior, including the way managers of such services respond to accountability systems has similarly emerged as a central perspective in public administration. In this respect, the meticulously coordinated arrangements and patterns of service delivery, for example, those that ensure the effective, efficient and sustainable delivery of water services in urban areas have become relevant areas of analysis. This paper is intended to interrogate the influence of politics on accountability systems in the management of water resources by establishing (a) the nature of politics in the management of water resources in Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) , (b) the levels of compliance to established accountable systems by managers in the provision of water services and (c) the effect of politics on the management of water services, accountability systems and the consequent capacities developed to provide water services in the authority. The paper is developed from a study conducted using a descriptive and correlational research design. Data was collected using questionnaires administered to 1086 randomly selected respondents from KCCA jurisdiction. Data was analysed using descriptive and multivariate regression methods using the SPSS software. From the perspective of conventional political analysis, findings indicate that the management of water delivery systems was more about utility maximization and self-interest than serving the public good largely due to the acerbic influence of politics. The management orientation was devoid of the participation of lower-level employees and water consumers, evidence of adverse political influence in the management of water services delivery patterns. The level of compliance to accountable systems was negligible in the provision of water services, suggesting the compromising and repulsive effect of politics on water services management. Politics negatively influenced water services management structures, significantly overlooking accountable systems and promoting self-interest. Again from the findings, it was established that politics fosters flawed accountable systems in the provision of services that consequently supports egoism rather than the public good . It was hence recommended that accountable public water delivery systems should be promoted through sustained reforms that insulate senior MWE, KCCA, NW&SC bureaucrats from politics following the rationale of the public value theory. This recommendation addresses the challenges for maximizing self-interest, rent-seeking and advocates for promotion of public interest. In this respect, the accountability system parameters which have been largely sacrificed on the altar of short term political interests by politicians and bureaucrats' self-interest whose influence in the delivery of water services has been on a rather narrow scope will similarly also restored.



1. Introduction

Water resources, which include underground, aerial (vapour and rain) and surface (spring, well, pond, river, lake, sea, ocean), state managed water systems, constitute one of the natural resources without which all forms of life are threatened; and on which most state-controlled human activities including regulation, public provisioning and policy execution depend (United Nations, 2005). Water supports all forms of human, terrestrial and aquatic life by playing a critical role not only in the production of food and energy on which life depends but also in providing the environment in which some forms of life are entirely sustained (United Nations-Water, 2012a; Salvati & Marco, 2008). According to the Water Resources Management Framing Paper (2013), all the forms of livelihoods as well as the framework in which they are managed are directly linked to state capacity to efficiently deliver services such as clean and safe water for drinking and cooking, water for sanitation and hygiene, and water for energy production, fishing, agriculture, transport and navigation, industry, recreation and for livestock keeping well as maintenance of the integrity of the ecosystems (Walmsly & Pearce, 2010). Water resources and how well they are managed in the public sector are also at the core of almost activities that propel the development of societies all around the world (United Nations-Water, 2012b; Schilling & Chiang, 2011; Batey, Sue & Baumol, 2008).

The management of water resources is therefore at the core of ensuring the wellbeing and development of societies in a sustainable manner. This management is defined as the development and implementation of policies, strategies, standards and priorities based on which water is extracted, treated, protected, allocated, and distributed so that it can be affordably accessed and optimally utilized by all citizens and other species in the ecosystem in a sustainable manner within a given policy environment (Matyama, 2013; Grafton & Hussey, 2011; Chartres & Varma, 2010;). According to United Nations (2005), the various human and ecological demands that come to bear upon water resources imply that the management of these resources has to be conducted using an Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), an approach that has been internationally accepted as the way forward for efficient, equitable, satisfactory and sustainable water supply (McMullen, 2012; United Nations, 2012c).


Since the demands are equivalent to the needs that water resources must satisfy, they also imply that the management of these resources and the political environment within which they are administered has to involve many actors, who, fortunately, can be categorized as government, private water service providers and water consumers (Ballet, Kouamékan, Koffi & Komana, 2010; United Nations, 2005). In Uganda, the involvement of government as an actor is constitutional as per Parts XIII and XXVII (i) of the national objectives and directive principles of state policy and Article 189 (7) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Practically, the involvement of different actors makes water service structural management a public process (Samra & McLean, 2007), and this therefore underscores the



politics involved in this process. Indeed, Henrik-Serup (2014) observed that politics permeates everything that happens in the management of public affairs.

Politics carries different meanings to different people. It has therefore been differently defined by various scholars since the times of the great philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (Henrik-Serup, 2014; Ryan, 2012; Schmidt, Bardes, Shelley, 2011; Thompson, 2009; Knapp & Wright, 2006; Hay, 2004; Flinders, 2001). The various conceptions of politics even compelled Hanley (2010) to advise that this concept should not be limited to any one set of activities—it can apply to any class of purposeful human behaviors involving more than one individual. It is consequently imperative to develop an operational definition of politics before it is analyzed. Drawing upon the relevant aspects of its various definitions, particularly the definition given by Harold Lasswell cited in Hanley (2010), politics is in this paper conceived of as all state actions undertaken in water service management to promote either self-interest or public interest by autocratically, aristocratically or democratically influencing who gets what, when and how. Politics is defined this way because it occurs in form of such actions to influence the management structures of water services delivery and what this management can do as far as provision of water services is concerned. This is well-articulated by many public service management theories, including the public interest theory, self-interest theory, public choice theory, and the public value theory, amongst others (Rhys & van de Walle, 2012; Tegeret-Kiplangat, 2012; Hertog, 2010; Coats, 2006).


As politics gets played in the of management water resources, it affects the level at which water is extracted, treated, protected, allocated, and distributed so that it can be affordably accessed and optimally utilized by all citizens and other species in the ecosystem in a sustainable manner (Baietti, Kingdom & van Ginneken, 2006). This essentially implies that the nexus between politics and the levels of accountable systems in water service delivery arrangements is an important perspective for analysis since public access and utilization of clean and safe is dependent on these relationships (Borgerhoff-Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005). The fact that national politics plays in water resource management, and thus, affects the levels of adherence to accountable systems by managers implies that it can be questioned to what extent diverse actors other than government influence how water services are managed. This is one key question that this paper raises, especially what political considerations lead to inefficiencies in water service management structures in many countries worldwide under the influence of politics (Ghana Integrity Initiative, 2011; Baietti *et al.*, 2006). The management structures for water services provision are not accountable to the extent that they even compelled the 192-member United Nations General Assembly to declare access to clean and safe water as a human right (United Nations, 2010). This was after the Assembly realized that globally, close to 900 million people; most of them in sub Saharan Africa, did not have access to clean and safe water and that about 1.5 million children under the age of five years died annually because of water-related diseases (United Nations, 2010).



Uganda recognized access to safe and clean as a fundamental right much earlier as per Parts XIV and XXI of the national objectives and directive principles of state policy prescribed in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Providing satisfactory access to safe and clean water is therefore a constitutional requirement in Uganda. The political will to realize this right was reiterated when Uganda committed itself to attaining the seventh pillar of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which requires halving the proportion of the world's population without access to clean and safe water by 2015. Uganda further reaffirmed its stand by committing itself to ensuring that 77% of its rural population and 100% of its urban population have access to clean and safe water by 2015 (Uganda's National Development Plan, 2010-2015). These targets are higher than the 75% that Uganda needed to attain the MDG by 2015 (Ministry of Water and Environment, 2010). Following the Poverty Eradication Action Programme (PEAP) framework that guided its development agenda, Uganda pursued the realization of this right using not only the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) to manage all water resources and the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NW&SC) to manage piped water, but also local governments to manage extraction of underground water and protection of wells and spring water resources, as well as private water service providers (Ministry of Water and Environment, 2013). What is not analyzed, however, is the influence of politics in the water management structures and patterns of accountable systems.

Despite the operations of all these water service providers, only about half a year is left to reach 2015, but the available statistics indicate that Uganda is still far from attaining its planned water supply targets. According to the MWE (2013), Ugandans who have access to clean and safe water are 64% in rural areas and 69% in urban areas. These proportions appear impressive as they suggest that most of the Ugandans have access to clean and safe water. They however, show that 36% of Ugandans in rural areas and 31% of those in urban areas do not have access to clean and safe water but are also equally silent on the role of politics in this service distribution pattern. These proportions suggest that over a third of Uganda's estimated 37 million people are yet to realize their fundamental right to safe and clean water. What is more, the statistics further raise questions of responsible, accountable, effective and efficient services delivery to the public which the paper particularly focuses on.

Not realizing this right is a serious matter, even if it is happened to a minority of citizens. It is a threat to good health and ultimately an issue that makes inquiry into accountable systems in the delivery of water services in Uganda a pertinent issue (United Nations, 2010). Besides, despite the abundance of freshwater resources in Uganda, their utilization is still far from satisfactory. This is evidenced by the seasonal floods and droughts that destroy many livestock and crop farms in different parts of Uganda, leading to food insecurity and hunger, but also polluting water sources (Shively & Hao, 2012; Birner, Cohen & Ilukor, 2011). This whole scenario causes concern, leading to questioning the level at which water service delivery systems operate in Uganda, how accountable and how this level is explained by the politics in water resource management in Uganda. Taking Kampala Capital City Authority



(KCCA) as a case in point, the purpose of this paper is to answer this question by meeting the following objectives: To establish the nature of politics played in the management of water resources in this jurisdiction, establish the level at which accountable systems are adhered by managers in the provision of water services and analyze the effects of politics on water service management and accountable systems to provide water services in the jurisdiction. The indicators used to meet these objectives were identified from the literature reviewed below.


2. Theoretical Review

2.1 Theories, indicators of management and accountable systems

The theoretical perspective applied in this paper is developed by combining the rationales of the public interest theory, self-interest theory, public choice theory and the public value theory. The public interest theory was developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou based on Platos' premise that the ideal political community is that in which property is owned in common and serves common interest (Hertog, 2010; Munyaradzi, 2005). Based on the premise that service provision is inherently inefficient and inequitable when left to operate on its own, this theory postulates that this inefficiency or inequity needs to be corrected through regulation so that it responds to public demand in a satisfactory manner (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Regulation is needed in terms of formulating and enforcing policies, standards, guidelines and plans that ensure that instead of serving selfish interests of particular individuals or groups of people, services are provided to benefit society as a whole (Armstrong & Sappington, 2007; Carlton & Picker, 2005; Crew & Kleindorfer, 2002).

The rationale of this theory was applied in this paper to analyze the nature of regulation that takes place in the management of water resources, political perspectives of the regulations and how this affects adherence to established accountable water supply systems by managers. It is imperative to point out that the rationale of the public interest theory works only when the regulating body does not serve the private interests of the regulators, but the interest of the entire society in which it operates, something scholars acknowledge is difficult (Abdel-Nour, 2003). The theory ascribes the regulating responsibility to government, which itself a self-interested political player, but still assumes that government is a neutral body. This assumption is however, not always true. While government officials are expected to work in the interest of the public, implementing the policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, this does not always happen. This is well explained by the self-interest theory and the public choice theory.


The self-interest theory is premised on the utility maximizing rationality advanced based on the capitalistic principle regarding the rational man. The theory advances a view that man is selfish and all his behaviour is motivated by the desire to maximize his own utility. This theory views self-interest as one's personal profit, benefit, advantage to the exclusion of regard for others; self-interest expresses itself in one's devotion, concern for and pursuit of



own welfare without regard for others (Munyaradzi, 2005). Its rationale is well-summarized by Robert (2005) that the average human being is about 95 percent selfish. Perhaps no one captured the political rationale of the self-interest theory better than Machiavelli who, as cited by Munyaradzi (2005), argued that a prudent ruler (or service provider) cannot, and must not, honour anything that places him at a disadvantage. Karl Marx cited in Munyaradzi (2005, p.88) warned however, that pure pursuit of self-interest can be dehumanizing because it tends to be individualistic, treats others mechanistically and has no regard for humaneness. Aristotle (cited in the same source) had recognized this tendency earlier and arguing that a good man is a lover of self, Aristotle observed that man should profit himself by doing noble acts that benefit others. This was also sounded by Adam Smith (cited in Haseler (2000, p.66) by arguing that the natural effort of every individual is to better his own condition, but in so doing, he tends to also better the condition of society. The rationale of the self-interest theory is also expounded on by the public choice theory.

Essentially, the public choice theory dispels the notion that people in the public sector seek to maximize net benefits to society as a whole. It posits that the behaviour of everyone that participates in the provision of public services is such that they all act in a way that seeks to satisfy self-interest as opposed to and at the expense of public interest (Mueller, 2003). Politicians, bureaucrats, private service providers and consumers, all seek to maximize the satisfaction of their own utility. Consumers want government and private companies to provide services that meet their welfare needs satisfactorily (Waterson, 2003). Similarly, politicians want to satisfy their political agendas, thereby focusing much attention on power consolidation, wealth accumulation, patronage, and public reputation (Tegeret-Kiplangat, 2012). At the same time, as bureaucrats act as utility-maximizers of their selfish interests, thereby working to increase their reward and incentive budgets, private service providers want to maximize their profits (Le Grand, 2007). In the end, no one serves in public interest. Therefore, government policy is driven by individual interests of politicians, powerful forces (rent seekers) and the bureaucrats (Rhys & van de Walle, 2012). The rationale of this theory was adopted in this paper to explore the nature of interests displayed in the management of water resources and how they affect bureaucrats' adherence to accountable water service provision systems. The rationale of the public choice theory suggests that no one can serve in the interest of the public. The public value theory has however, been developed as a new paradigm for public management intended to reconcile these opposing interests.

The public value theory was developed by Mark Moore to improve the New Public Management approach and its Reinventing Government variant (Andrews, 2010). Mark Moore developed the public value theory based on the premise that the realm of public services is different from the realm of services provided based on markets, competition and choice. He argued that effectiveness is realized in public service management when the efforts of public sector managers are evaluated not in the economic marketplace of individual consumers but in the political marketplace of citizens and the collective decisions of representative democratic institutions (Clarke *et al.*, 2007). Following this argument, the



public value theory advances a notion that citizens are more than consumers and ought to be able to influence the design and delivery of services. But how responsive to the demands of citizens are the bureaucrats in policy implementing organs? Service providers have to develop a continuous dialogue with their authorizing environment (citizens) so as to serve it in a manner that satisfies its very needs in an effective and efficient manner (Cowell, Downe, Martin & Chen, 2012).

The involvement of citizens can allow service providers to develop targets that relate to outcomes genuinely valued by the public. It also helps service providers to develop a clear sense of how they respond to the service preferences of the citizens (Walker & Enticott, 2004). The rationale of the public value theory suggests that its proper application can help service providers to consult with citizens, thereby becoming knowledgeable about how to improve efficiency, effectiveness and fairness in service delivery based on citizens' socioeconomic and political aspirations. This rationale was applied in this paper to further explore the involvement of citizens in the management of water resources and how it affects the accountable water provision systems in Uganda, particularly in KCCA.

2.2 Politics and accountability systems

The concept of politics has been differently defined by different scholars. For instance, Harold Lasswell cited in Hanley (2010) defined it as that which determines who gets what, when, how. David Easton cited from the same source defined it as the authoritative allocation of values for a society. Politics has also been defined as an art or science exercised by one or more people with an intention of influencing others in one way or another.ⁱ It is further defined as intrigue or maneuvering within a political unit or group in order to gain control or power. Politics refers to the methods or tactics involved in managing a state or government.ⁱⁱ Ryan (2012) defined politics as the practice and theory of influencing people at an individual or civic level to the purpose of directing them toward a desired destiny. Leftwich (2004) defined politics as actions involving making and enforcing collective decisions. Hay (2010) considered it as actions involving compromising, building consensus and forming coalitions. This definition is also given by Hanley (2010) who adds that politics includes all behaviour applied to determine who gets what, when and how in a situation where there are two or more people.

Henrik-Serup (2014) described politics as the art and power of influencing resource distribution. According to Gooby (2013), politics is the activity by which differing interests are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community. Politics is also described as an activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live or which govern what they do when pursuing desired welfare (Hay & Wincott, 2012).

The foregoing definitions are just some of the many others given by various scholars since the times of the great political philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. They suggest that politics



carries different meanings to different people. The definitions therefore allude to the need to analyze the nature of politics contextually. This nature is therefore analyzed in this paper by drawing upon the relevant aspects of the various definitions, particularly that given Harold Lasswell. It is contextualized as all actions carried out in the management of water resources with intent to influence who gets what, when and how. This definition was considered to be comprehensive enough to cover the analysis of all forms of politics that take place in the management of these resources in a manner that affects the level at which accountable systems are used to provide water services. Indeed, actions pertaining to the ‘what’ dimension of this definition allude to taking decisions regarding ‘the kind of water’ to supply in terms of type, quantity and quality. The specific actions involve deciding how much and what quality of water to supply (should it be treated, bottled, piped, borehole, unprotected or protected spring, well, pond, valley dam, pumped, channeled river, extended lake or rain water or other types?). The actions conducted to influence ‘when’ to supply the determined type of water involve deciding the delivery timelines while actions that involve determining ‘who’ pertain to deciding the people to whom water should be delivered (should they be in urban or rural areas, the poor or the rich, and which regions and communities to supply). Finally, actions regarding the ‘how’ dimension involve deciding the methods to use to supply water. The methods used to deliver services, including water services tend to include autocratic, aristocratic or democratic methods (Hanley, 2010). These methods apply whether the services are provided by government or the private sector. It should be noted that although all these forms of politics are usually at play in the management of water resources in relation to accountable systems, those that characterize this management in Uganda, are yet to be clarified; hence the need for this paper.

The high-handed method may be despotic, involving the use spiteful and unquestionable directive commands, orders or decrees to determine how water services must be provided (Maseti & Gumede, 2011; Hanley, 2010). It may be overbearing involving the use of commands and instructions, not in cruel but in a somehow permissive way about how water and other resources should be supplied. Under any of these high-handed methods, the exercised politics does not require consulting, compromising, building consensus, or enlisting support from others. The methods demand nothing less or more than obedience to the dictator’s orders (Fisk, undated). Autocratic methods tend to be loathed by those dictated upon, but they can be effective and efficient and can translate into delivery of satisfactory services, especially when the decisions are made in public interest (Lindblad, 2010). This is because they involve one person evaluating possibilities, making and enforcing decisions through other people without their input (Fisk, undated). This makes decision-making and implementation fast and unimpeded (Fisk, undated; Maseti & Gumede, 2011). They can also be inefficient, ineffective and inequitable in the sense that they can result into delivery of very unsatisfactory services when their intent is to promote self-interests of the dictator (Puni, Ofei & Okoe, 2014). In the public sector, while public interest involves the desire to serve for the common good, self-interest takes many different self-seeking forms, including the desire to




patronize others, to serve a favoured few, to entrench oneself in power, building power bases, and other forms (Hill, Gordon & Kim, 2004). In the private sector, public interest expresses itself in form of concern for and demonstration of social responsibility (Hertog, 2010). Self-interest is expressed in form of profit-maximization through exploitation of others (Abdel-Nour, 2003).

The aristocratic method was first introduced in the scholarly world by Aristotle having developed it from oligarchy, observing that it involves a privileged few, usually the top echelon of government (cabinet), private company or members of the economic elite and policy-planning group, determining how to deliver a service under consideration.ⁱⁱⁱ This method is usually manifested in the use of service delivery policies, plans, strategies, standards and regulations formulated by cabinet or top decision-makers of a private company (Dye, 2000). This method involves planning for and delivering services to the public or targeted communities (in case of private service providers), but it does not require consulting with them.^{iv} The method therefore tends to rely on limited knowledge or information about the actual needs of those for whom the formulated service delivery policies, plans, strategies, standards and regulations are to serve (José Izquierdo, 2013). However, according to the elite theory as discussed by Gonzalez (2001), the initiators of the policies, plans, strategies, standards, and regulations, usually the heads of ministries or departments concerning the services under consideration, have to enlist the support of other members of the decision-making group so as to build consensus regarding the intent, expected benefits and proposed implementation methods, requirements and the human, material and financial resources needed to realize the intent and expected benefits (Bottomore, 1993). This consensus is particularly needed when the intent is to regulate the self-interest of service providers for the purpose of promotion public interest (Foldvary, 2009).

The democratic method connotes the use of participation and involvement of all stakeholders in the management of service delivery (Billgrena & Holme, 2008; Choi, 2007). Its use implies that service delivery management is conducted by making consultations with relevant stakeholders to seek their views, listening to and acting in line with the views, and building consensus with the stakeholders (Thakadu, 2005). This implies that the management is based on knowledge of the needs of citizens (Measham, 2007). Bartley et al. (2008) observed that the public sector realizes this form of participation through decentralization yet Shackleton et al. (2002) believed that it is easily realized through devolution.

2.3 Management of water resources and services delivery

The available literature indicates that the analysis of water resource management should be conducted following the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach (Kuenzer *et al.*, 2012; Rahaman, Varis & Kajander, 2004; Falkenmark & Folke, 2000; Global Water Partnership (GWP), 2000, 2004a, 2004b). IWRM is defined as a management approach that promotes coordinated development and management of water in relation to other natural resources and in a way that maximizes citizens' water-related welfare in an



equitable manner and without compromising the sustainability of the ecosystems (Global Water Partnership (GWP, 2000). This approach is particularly recommended because it promotes the realization of what is referred to as the Dublin principles passed at the International Conference on Water and the Environment in 1992 (Rahaman & Varis, 2005). According to Biswas, Varis and Tortajada (2005), these principles are three and they include:

- (a) The principle of social equity, which focuses on making policies that ensure that all water users, particularly those in marginalized and poor communities, have equal access to a sufficient quantity and quality of water necessary to sustain human well being.
- (b) The principle of economic efficiency, which emphasizes making strategies that yield the greatest benefit to the greatest number of water users possible using the available financial and water resources.
- (c) The principle of ecological sustainability. This principle requires that aquatic ecosystems are acknowledged as users and that adequate allocation is made to sustain their natural functioning.

According to Lovell, Mandondo and Moriarty (2002), the realization of above principles necessitates those in charge of water management working closely with and for all water users. This alludes to the use of a comprehensive, participatory planning and implementation approach involving both central and local governments (Holling & Meffe, 2002). This is the only way water can be supplied in a manner that enables it to serve its different uses in agriculture, maintenance of eco and human health and life, and as a source of household income and government revenue (Kuenzer *et al.*, 2012). This approach is cross-sectoral and flexible because it attempts to bring together all groups that matter in ensuring that forms of life that need water have adequate access to its supply. The IWRM seeks to create a water supply environment that enables realization of human access to water as a right as well as sustainable development and use of all water-dependent individual, household, company and government assets (Rahaman *et al.*, 2004). The approach achieves these ends based on rational, just and informed choices, priorities, policies, standards, strategies and practices. Its effectiveness depends on supportive political will and commitment, capacity development, adequate and equitable financial allocation and disbursement, and effective monitoring and evaluation (Falkenmark & Folke, 2000).

2.4 Accountable systems

Accountable systems are regarded as mechanisms by which services are sustainably delivered to their consumers not only as planned (effectiveness) but also in an efficient and satisfactory manner (Chukmaitov *et al.*, 2014; Marsha, 2010). The use of these systems ensures that services are provided in a manner that maximizes the quantity and quality of service outputs and outcomes at a cost as minimum as possible (Robinson & Dolan, 2010). They ensure that




the planned level of services is delivered in a manner that satisfies consumers in terms of both quantity and quality (Terrell *et al.*, 2011). These systems are able to ensure that satisfactory services are provided in the most efficient and effective manner by ensuring that everyone participating in making service delivery decisions is not only answerable for the decisions but also responsible for ensuring that the decisions are implemented as they should (Devers & Berenson, 2009). The systems operate in such a way that they make participants not to waver from the expected course of action, but to work as high performing teams (Fisher, Staiger, Bynum & Gottlieb, 2006). They promote observance of what may be referred to as a networked sense of responsibility in the delivery of services, since they ensure that all people participating in this delivery are not only motivators but also watchdogs of each other (Chukmaitov *et al.*, 2014).

Accountable systems in the delivery of services trace their origin and have been widely applied in the health sector. Literature indicates that healthcare services began to be delivered in a satisfactory manner when the responsibility to provide these services was extended from individual health workers to the entire system applied to deliver the services (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Wilen & Stone, 1998). Not only did the extension cause health workers to start working collaboratively and keeping watch over each other so as to ensure credible fulfillment of each other's healthcare responsibilities and collective accountability for the quality and equity of the provided care. It also revealed that all public services could be delivered in a planned and satisfactory manner if accountable delivery systems were adopted in all sectors of central and local governments (Maccarthaigh & Boyle, 2014; Su Wild, 2006).

According to Dubnick (2005), the rationale for adopting accountable public service delivery systems across the board was based on the observation that holding public officials individually accountable did not yield desired results. Many of those who tended to be held liable as individuals were usually not the ones or the only ones responsible for what was at stake. They were just victims or a part of a group of government officials who could not be held answerable without holding the entire system accountable (Dubnick, 2005). The justification for the shift to accountable systems is that whatever the managed natural resources, related welfare needs are effectively satisfied as planned not only when the responsible public officials are held accountable individually but also when the whole system applied in the management operates in an accountable manner (Gregory, 2012). That is, in a manner that translates into optimal delivery and realization of the planned quality of public services (Kellert, Mehta, Ebbin & Lichtenfeld, 2000) based on the doctrine of collective accountability (Petersson, 2008; Gilbert, 2006; Mellena, 2006).

The foregoing observations indicate that the use of accountable systems ensures that all actors in the management of service delivery work with a shared sense of responsibility which translates in providing services efficiently, effectively and in a satisfactory and sustainable manner. The systems are therefore needed to ensure that water supply is maintained at a level that not only guarantees citizens' satisfactory access to clean and safe water but also



facilitates the ecosystem to remain healthy (Mercer & Christensen, 2011; Baietti *et al.*, 2006; Borgerhoff-Mulder & Coppolillo, 2005). The level at which these systems are used to facilitate the provision of water services in Uganda, particularly in Kampala district is however, still questionable owing to the failure to supply water as planned and in a satisfactory manner. This is why this paper is needed to clarify the situation.

3. Methodology

The study from which this paper is developed was designed as a descriptive and correlational study. This design was used because it was suitable to apply in order to meet the objectives of the study. Indeed, as Neville (2007) observed, the descriptive part of the design was appropriate to facilitate elucidation of the nature of politics played in the management of water resources and the level of using accountable systems, thereby meeting the first two objectives of the study as they were. As Al-Mahmood (2011) noted, the correlational part was used to facilitate establishing the effect of the politics played in the management of water resources on the level of using accountable systems in water supply.

The population of the study consisted of regulators, public and private providers (bureaucrats) and consumers of water services in KCCA. Regulators were represented by MWE political leaders and bureaucrats. Public water service providers were represented by bureaucrats in NW&SC (representing central government) and KCCA (representing the local government in Kampala). Private water service providers were represented by water sellers and those using privately supplied water in Kampala. Water service consumers were represented by heads of all households in this authority. All households were considered because Kampala is an urban conurbation whose water supply target was set at 100% as per Uganda's National Development Plan (2010-2015). This implies that all households were expected to have access to and consume clean and safe water services. So, the household heads had information to provide about their participation in the management of water resources and about how the established accountable the systems were adhered to by managers in water provision structures. Water service delivery regulators and providers were considered because they obviously had information to provide about the two variables. Efforts to establish the private water sellers and providers in KCCA were futile due to lack of records about them. So, their population size was considered infinite. Consequently, the size of their sample was determined using a formula for estimating a statistically representative sample from an infinite population. As discussed by Kothari (2005), this formula is as stated below:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 p (1-p)}{d^2}$$

Where d is the margin of error permitted in the selection of the sample. The 95% confidence level was used to select the sample, which implies that d was 5%. Z is the z-value corresponding to the 95% confidence level, implying that $z = 1.96$. p is the proportion of the



population with the desired attributes. Kathori (2005) noted that for infinite populations, p is assumed to be equal to a half the population. So, $p = 50\%$. Therefore $(1-p)$, which is the proportion of the population without the desired attributes, is given as $(1 - 50\%) = 50\%$. Hence, filling in the formula above,


$$n = [(1.96)^2 \times 50\% \times 50\%] \div (5\%)^2 = (3.8416 \times 0.25) \div 0.0025 = 0.92198 \div 0.0025 = 384.16 \approx 384$$

The review of the reports of Ministry of Water and Environment (2011), Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2007), National Water & Sewerage Corporation (NW&SC) (2013), and Mwanje and Ssenkibirwa (2013) revealed the population sizes of other categories of respondents as summarized in Table 1. It should be noted that table also shows the selected number of respondents per category as given by Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) Sample Determination Table cited in Amin (2005: 454).

Table 1: Sample Distribution by Category, Number and Applied Sampling Technique

Category of respondents	Population size (Kampala)	Expected sample	Determination criteria	Actual sample
MWE	492	217	Krejcie & Morgan	170
NW&SC	580	234	Krejcie & Morgan	197
KCCA	308	169	Krejcie & Morgan	137
Private water service providers	Infinite	384	Kothari's formula	198
Water consumers (household heads)	306,178	384	Krejcie & Morgan	384
Total		1388		1086

The sample was selected using simple random sampling so as to give each respondent an equal chance of participating in the study. This was based on the view of the definition of politics adopted in this study. This was because for each category, every respondent had something to say not only about the politics played in the management of water resources at their respective levels but also about how accountable systems are used in the delivery of



water services. Data was collected using questionnaires designed according to the variables of the study. The questionnaires were tested for validity using the content validity test and for reliability using the Cronbach Alpha method of internal consistency. The computed content validity indices were 0.779 for regulators' questionnaire, 0.766 for bureaucrats' questionnaire, 0.809 for private providers' questionnaire and 0.897 for consumers' questionnaire. The Alpha coefficients computed for these questionnaires were 0.749, 0.777, 0.783 and 0.799, respectively. These indices were all greater than 0.7 which, according to Booth, Colomb and Williams (2008) and Field (2005), is the minimum acceptable threshold. The questionnaires thus contained highly valid and reliable items. Data was collected after getting permission from the authorities of the selected agencies and Local Council I Chairpersons of the villages from where heads of households were selected. Efforts were also made to explain to the respondents the purpose of the study and to seek their willingness to participate in the study. Ethical issues were addressed. Confidentiality was promised by telling respondents that their names were not required and that all their responses were to be handled confidentially.


The data was analysed using the SPSS program, particularly its descriptive version, ANOVA, factor analysis and multivariate regression analysis methods. The descriptive method was used to establish the nature of politics and effect on accountable systems in the supply of water services. Respondents' perception of the variables was measured using a 5-point Likert scale of responses running from strongly disagree (1) to disagree (2), not sure (3), agree (4) and strongly-agree (5). As far as politics was concerned, respondents who on average scored 4.5–5.0 implied that it was played in a manner that highly promoted self-interest on the self-interest scale or public interest on the public interest scale. Regarding the accountable systems' scale, these respondents meant the use of these systems was high. Respondents who scored 3.5–4.49 on the politics scale meant that the interests were promoted at a low level. They also meant that the level of using the systems was low. Respondents who scored 2.5–3.49 on average implied that they were uncertain not only of the nature of the played politics but also of the level of using the systems. Respondents who scored 1–2.49 implied that the played politics did not promote any of the interests mentioned and also that the systems were not used. ANOVA was applied to establish differences in the perception of variables. Factor analysis was used to identify the significant measures of the variables. Multivariate regression was used to establish the effect of politics in the management of water resources on the level of using accountable systems in the supply of water services.

4. Findings

The findings are presented according to the objectives of the paper.

4.1 Politics, management and patterns of accountable systems


The objective in this section focused on establishing the nature of politics played in the management of water resources in KCCA. The variable of politics was established by administering a number of indicators of politics and asking respondents to show their



opinions on each indicator using a strongly disagree-strongly agree response scale. Descriptive analysis of the responses led to findings summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: Responses on Politics Played in the Management of Water Resources in Kampala District

Indicators of Played Politics		Mean Response on parameters of politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig .
Type	Specific indicators	MWE (n = 170)	Private providers (n = 197)	Private providers (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 198)	Private providers (n = 384)			
Self interest	No decision can be made to supply water when it is not in line with the President's agenda	4.76	4.66	4.63	2.35	N/A	4.06	24.66	.000
	Water service delivery policies are designed without prior gathering of information about the needs of water service consumers	4.63	4.70	4.77	4.76	4.96	4.75	15.07	.000
	Decisions on type of water services to provide are made following the agenda of the ruling political party	4.81	4.39	1.35	N/A	N/A	3.53	32.66	.000
	Decisions on the quality of water to provide are made based on the personal agenda of top bureaucrats	2.02	2.22	1.39	4.76	N/A	2.46	29.07	.000
	Decisions on the type of water to provide are made based on what the personal agenda of the bureaucrats	2.05	2.33	1.35	4.56	N/A	2.46	33.30	.000
	Decisions about when to provide the water are made by members of the top management only	4.55	4.75	4.71	4.86	N/A	4.65	1.07	.607
	When preparing budgets for water service delivery, efforts are made to	4.73	4.69	4.57	4.70	N/A	4.68	1.93	.460



Indicators of Played Politics		Mean Response on parameters of politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig .
Type	Specific indicators	MWE (n = 170)	Private providers (n = 197)	Private providers (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 198)	Private providers (n = 384)			
	ensure that staff remuneration is well catered for								
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by the minister only	2.32	1.72	1.89	N/A	N/A	1.88	1.19	.498
	Decisions on who to provide water to are dictated by topmost bureaucrat only	2.02	2.32	1.32	4.53	N/A	2.42	36.33	.000
	Decisions followed to provide water are dictated by top management members only	4.93	4.70	4.53	4.73	N/A	4.64	1.34	.467
	Unquestionable instructions are given to employees to carry out tasks that meet what bosses want	4.51	4.75	4.65	4.83	N/A	4.67	2.32	.363
	Water supply tasks are allocated to employees democratically	1.31	1.71	1.81	N/A	N/A	1.38	1.49	.463
	Employees freely negotiate their rewards with management	1.30	1.70	1.60	N/A	N/A	1.33	1.69	.461
	Decisions on which type and quality of water services to deliver are reached through consensus	2.07	2.38	1.37	1.51	N/A	1.46	3.13	.303
	Employee meetings are held as forums for generating ideas needed to make decisions about how best to deliver water services	2.37	2.33	1.37	1.34	N/A	1.68	1.73	.461
	Total	4.02	4.09	4.33	4.53	4.9	4.4	20.53	.00



Indicators of Played Politics		Mean Response on parameters of politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig .
Type	Specific indicators	MWE (n = 170)	Private providers (n = 197)	Private providers (n = 137)	Private providers (n = 198)	Private providers (n = 384)			
						6	1		0
Public interest	Disagreements in making of water supply decisions are solved through consensus with stakeholders	2.32	1.33	1.45	1.35	N/A	1.43	1.83	.460
	Data is gathered from the public to guide decisions on quality of water needed to meet public water needs	2.43	2.24	1.95	1.47	1.88	1.56	.990	.699
	Data is regularly gathered from the public to guide decisions about the type of water required to meet public water needs	1.63	1.55	1.61	1.41	1.03	1.51	1.97	.390
	Policies used to deliver water services are formulated based on information gathered about water service needs of consumers	1.58	2.33	1.11	1.19	1.09	1.30	1.99	.388
	Decisions to provide water services are democratically made in line with the promises made to citizens as per the president's manifesto	3.67	3.55	4.05	3.53	N/A	3.98	1.05	.490
	Decisions about the provision of water are autocratically made in the best interest of all targeted water consumers	4.53	4.66	4.55	4.86	N/A	4.53	1.94	.390
	Water consumers are allowed to lobby for the quality of water services to deliver to them	1.53	1.56	1.77	1.98	1.03	1.56	1.57	.466



Indicators of Played Politics		Mean Response on parameters of politics per respondent category					Total Mean Response	F	Sig.
Type	Specific indicators	MWE (n = 170)	Private providers (n = 197)	Water providers (n = 137)	Water consumers (n = 198)	Water providers (n = 384)			
	When preparing water supply budgets more emphasis is given to the requirements needed to provide services than on staff rewards	2.44	2.47	1.45	1.47	N/A	1.76	1.98	.391
	Decisions on provision of water are dictated by only the political head but in manner that ensures that all water consumers are catered for.	2.33	2.49	1.49	1.37	N/A	1.88	2.08	.331
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by only the topmost bureaucrat officer but in a manner the benefits all water consumers	2.30	2.40	1.46	1.66	N/A	1.77	2.02	.333
	Decisions followed to provide water are made by members of top management only but in a manner beneficial to all water consumers	3.55	3.50	3.51	3.70	N/A	3.58	1.69	.464
	Total	2.37	2.33	2.39	2.03	2.34	2.32	2.18	.330

Note: N/A means that the item was not applicable to the respondent category.

An analysis of the mean distribution in Table 2, particularly that corresponding to the total rows, reveals that on average respondents agreed (mean = 4.41) to the various indicators of politics played to promote self-interest. This suggests that the politics played in the management of water resources promoted self-interest but at a low level. The corresponding F-value (F = 20.53) was significant at the .01 level of significant (Sig. = .000). This implies that the perception of politics played in this management differed significantly across the different categories of respondents. Indeed, while private providers (mean = 4.53) and water consumers (mean = 4.96) felt strongly that the played politics promoted self-interest at a high




level, MWE (mean = 4.02), NW&SC (mean = 4.09) and KCCA (mean = 4.33) officials showed it promoted this interest at a low level. These differences were also reflected in the specific indicators. For instance, apart from private providers, respondents strongly agreed that all decisions made to supply water were in line with the president's agenda. This implies that the president's interests were highly prioritized in the management of water resources. The played politics also promoted the self-interest of political heads in central government and of bureaucrats in MWE, NW&SC, KCCA and top management in private providers, especially with regard to designing water service delivery policies (mean = 4.75), making decisions about the type of water to provide (mean = 4.65), and developing water delivery budgets (mean = 4.68). Other findings are similarly interpreted. It suffices to note that the mean responses corresponding to measures of public interest indicate that it was not promoted. The only exceptions where the played politics promoted public interest, moreover at a low level, included making provision of water decisions in the best interest of targeted consumers (mean = 3.98) and government provision of water services according to the promises made to citizens by the president (mean = 3.53).

4.2 Compliance with accountable systems by bureaucrats and provision of water services

The need to ascertain the level of compliance with accountable systems by management structures for provision of water services in KCCA was deemed important in order to understand the relationship between politics and service delivery . It was approached using the same method applied to analyze other themes of the paper. Findings are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Responses on the Level of compliance with accountable systems in the Provision of Water Services

Indicators of accountable system	Mean Response on the level of compliance with accountable systems per Respondent category					Total Mean Response	χ^2_{obs}	Sig
	MWE (n = 170)	NW&SC (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	providers (n = 198)	(n = 384)			
Employees work collaboratively for the purpose of ensuring that responsibilities assigned to each of them as accomplished as	2.36	2.46	3.66	4.06	N/A	2.96	34.69	.000



Indicators of accountable system	Mean Response on the level of compliance with accountable systems per Respondent category					Total Mean Response	χ^2_{obs}	Sig.
	MPWLE (n = 170)	WVLE (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	providers (n = 198)	others (n = 384)			
planned								
Employees watch over each other to ensure that allocated resources as used authentically distributed	2.01	2.19	3.95	4.56	N/A	3.35	24.28	.000
All employees are held collectively responsible for implementing water service provision decisions	2.22	2.02	2.09	2.07	N/A	2.03	2.00	.303
Employees encourage each to stay focused on doing assigned responsibilities without wavering	1.64	1.99	2.01	3.72	N/A	2.43	29.02	.000
Cost incurred to treat water is low when compared to all the water provided to consumers	2.03	2.22	2.32	3.69	N/A	3.30	13.07	.000
The cost incurred to distribute treated water to final consumers is low when compared to the number of supplied consumers	2.33	2.23	2.02	3.76	N/A	3.36	17.03	.000
Water supply is consistent everyday	1.67	1.33	1.73	3.98	1.04	2.37	40.09	.000
Supplied water is enough to meet the water needs of all household consumers in KCCA	3.60	3.55	3.75	3.79	1.09	2.48	30.07	.000
Supplied water is not contaminated in any way	2.34	2.44	2.42	3.68	1.45	2.46	24.20	.000
Irrespective of where they live, all members of households in KCCA can access the supplied water without any obstacle.	1.07	1.30	1.63	2.38	1.64	1.37	1.19	.500
Total	2.34	2.33	2.42	3.56	1.41	2.3	12.0	.00



Indicators of accountable system	Mean Response on the level of compliance with accountable systems per Respondent category					Total Mean Response	χ^2_{obs}	Sig
	MWE (n = 170)	NW&SC (n = 197)	KCCA (n = 137)	providers (n = 198)	consumers (n = 384)			
						6	2	0

The findings in Table 3 indicate that on average, while MWE (mean = 2.34), NW&SC (mean = 2.33), KCCA (mean = 2.42) and consumers (mean = 1.41) disagreed, private providers agreed (mean = 3.56) to the various indicators of using accountable water supply systems in the delivery of water services. There was therefore a significant difference in the perception of using these systems across the respondent categories ($F = 12.02$, $Sig. = .000 < .01$). This difference implies that while the systems were used by the private water service providers and at a generally low level, they were not used in MWE, NW&SC and KCCA. It is important to note that although public and private service providers indicated that they used the systems in cases like ensuring that supplied water was enough to meet consumers' water needs, the consumers felt otherwise.

4.3 Effect of politics on policy management structures and accountable systems

This objective was intended to analyse the effect of politics on the management structures of water resources on the level at which accountable systems were used to provide water services in KCCA. The effect was established using the multivariate regression method of the SPSS after applying factor analysis not only to establish the significant measures of the parameters of politics and of the level operating within the accountable systems, but also to build this level as a global component. Findings are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Effect of Politics Played in the Management of Water Resources and effect on Accountable Systems in Water Services delivery systems in Kampala


Indicators of	Statistics predicted on the use of accountable systems and its indicators				
	Effectiveness	Quality	Equity	Efficiency	Overall level of operating within accountable systems



politics played in water service management		Constant	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	R-Square	Adjusted R-Square	F	Sig.
Self interest	Autocratic	1.301	-.117	-.107	-.101	-.201	.201	.200	5.083	.001
	Aristocratic	7.661	-.130	-.132	-.280	-.309	.350	.349	9.555	.000
	Democratic	4.053	-.108	-.102	-.208	-.137	.106	.109	2.085	.002
Public interest	Autocratic	8.807	.375	.012	.252	.427	.331	.300	9.087	.000
	Aristocratic	1.109	.073	.013	.032	.024	.096	.093	0.165	.306
	Democratic	1.010	.101	.275	.021	.031	.025	.103	2.089	.021

From Table 4, the Adjusted R-Square values, their corresponding F-values and levels of significance indicate that politics played in the management of water resources to promote self-interest affected the level of using accountable systems in Kampala district in a significant manner. When politics was played autocratically, the effect was 20% (Adjusted R-Square = .200, F = 5.083, Sig. = .001 < .01). In case it was played aristocratically, the effect was 34.9% (Adjusted R-Square = .349, F = 9.555, Sig. = .000 < .01) and when it was played democratically, the effect was 10.9% (Adjusted R-Square = .109, F = 2.085, Sig. = .002 < .01). Therefore, politics caused the most significant effect when it was played aristocratically. The corresponding Beta coefficients indicate that all the politics that was played in this management to promote self interest had negative effects on the use of accountable systems. The effects were more negative when politics was played aristocratically and the use of the systems was most affected in terms of its efficiency (Beta = -.309) and equity (Beta = -.280).

In contrast, politics affected the level of using accountable systems significantly when it was played to promote public interest autocratically (Adjusted R-Square = .300, F = 9.087, Sig. = .000 < .01) and democratically (Adjusted R-Square = .103, F = 2.089, Sig. = .021 < .05). The effect was not significant in case politics was played to promote public interest aristocratically (Adjusted R-Square = .093, F = 0.165, Sig. = .306 > .05). The Beta coefficients indicate that all the politics that was played to promote public interest had positive effects on the use of accountable systems. The most significant and positive effects were caused by autocratically played politics and the use of the systems was mostly affected in terms of efficiency (Beta = .427) and effectiveness (Beta = .375). It should be noted that although democratically played politics did not translate into a significant effect on the overall use of accountable system, it




had the biggest positive effect on the quality (Beta = .275) that these systems could deliver in public interest.

5. Discussion of Findings

The findings in Table 4 indicate that the nature of politics in the management of water resources affected the level at which accountable systems were adhered to in the delivery of water services in KCCA. The findings therefore confirm the observations made by Henrik-Serup (2014) that politics affects everything that happens in the management of public affairs. The findings are particularly consistent with Samra and McLean's (2007) argument that politics permeates even the management of water resources and everything that this management does. Furthermore, results in Table 4 indicate that as far as the management of water resources in KCCA was concerned, the effect politics had on accountable systems was twofold.

In the first instance, politics had the effect of promoting self-interest as it affected the level of adherence to accountable systems, irrespective of whether it was domineering, with nobility considerations or democratic relationships. This effect implies that as long as politics resulted in the promotion of self-interest, it significantly constrained accountable systems in the delivery of water services. Constraining the adherence to systems in a significant manner implies that self-interest politics considerably lowers the possibility of delivering water services at a desired level of quality and in an effective, equitable and efficient manner. The findings suggest therefore that when politics promotes self-interest, it discourages compliance with accountable systems and hence, the realization of quality, effectiveness, equitability and efficiency in the provision of water services. Since accountable systems are adopted in the management of public services with intent to promote public interest, the fact that adherence to them is constrained by politics that promotes self-interest is not surprising. It is in fact expected based on the rationale of the self-interest theory and that of the public choice as discussed by Robert (2005), Munyaradzi (2005), Haseler (2000) and Tegeret-Kiplangat (2012), amongst other scholars. As the rationale of these theories maintains, when the purpose is to promote self-interest, all effort is devoted to self utility maximization at the exclusion of others. As politicians and bureaucrats seek to satisfy their selfish interests, they do not pay attention to ensuring that services are delivered to the public in an effective, equitable, efficient and satisfactory manner. They do not mind whether the services satisfy public needs or not. All they do is maximize self-interest based on the capitalistic principle as explained by the rational model.

Findings in Table 4 indicate that politics that constrained the use of accountable systems in the most significant manner was that which was high handed. The same findings further show that this type of politics constrained mostly the equity and efficiency that would be realized through the use of these systems. Since politics was defined in this paper as the type of politics involved in by those in top management positions, these findings imply that it was mostly these individuals who due to the nature of politics constrained the efficiency and



equity that would have been realized through adherence to established accountable systems. Findings in Table 2 indicate that these individuals constrained the systems' efficiency by prioritizing their own interests when budgeting for water supply. They did not even gather information about water supply needs of the public, implying that they did not pay attention to knowing these needs. In fact, delivering water services without adequate prior knowledge of the water needs explains why the delivered water services did not satisfy water consumers as shown in Table 3. The fact top bureaucrats and managers in the private sector did not pay much attention to delivering water services in public interest explains why even the following of decisions that the top management had benefits to all water consumers which did not translate into a significant effect as far as accountable systems were concerned, its positive nature notwithstanding (Table 4).

Since access to clean and safe water is a fundamental human rights in Uganda, including KCCA, politics exercised to promote self-interest in the delivery of such water needs to be averted. Findings suggest that using regulation through formulation of policies, standards and strategies as discussed by Armstrong and Sappington (2007), Carlton and Picker (2005) and Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) may not help avert this type of politics. As Abdel-Nour (2003) observed, regulation of this type works only when the regulating body does not serve the private interests of the regulators, but the interest of the entire society in which it operates.

This was how not the case. As shown in Table 2, the formulation of policies, standards and strategies was not in public interest and it did not promote the use of accountable systems (Table 3). Fortunately, findings indicate that politics that promotes self-interest can be reduced sustained public reforms whose rationale is to public interest theory and public value theory using other means. This type of politics is suggested by the findings in Table 4 as revealed by the second form of effect discussed below.

The second form of effect that politics had on management of water resources and on accountable systems was positive and significant. The findings in Table 4 indicate that the type of politics that caused this form of effect was that played autocratically and democratically in order to promote public interest. The fact democratic politics that promoted public interest encouraged the use of accountable systems supports Lindblad's (2010) observation that even though autocratically exercised politics tends to be loathed by subordinates, it can be effective and efficient and can translate into delivery of satisfactory services, especially when the dictatorial decisions are made in public interest. Findings in Table 2 indicate that this was exactly the case. Respondents strongly agreed, thereby showing that there were decisions made autocratically to provide water in the best interest of targeted water consumers. These were in fact the decisions that contributed much to the positive effect of autocratic politics on the use of accountable systems.



Apart from the nature of politics, the effect of politics that was democratically exercised in public interest was also positive and significant (Table 4). This effect indicates that if politics is played democratically in public interest, it encourages significant use of accountable systems in the delivery of water services. From findings in Table 4, this effect is mainly felt in terms of delivering the desired quality of water. The same findings show however, that effect of democratically exercised politics was weaker than that of autocratically played politics. This was because democratic politics was applied at a low level and mainly in form of making decisions to provide water services in line with the promises made to citizens as per the president's manifesto Table 2). Other forms of democratic politics were not applied. For instance, information about water consumer needs was not regularly collected from the public, water consumers were not lobbying for desired water quality, and policies used to deliver water services were not formulated based on information gathered from consumers (Table 2). These findings suggest that there was no public participation and involvement in the management of water resources. This confirms the earlier observation that the delivery of water services was not based on knowledge of consumers' needs. It is therefore, not surprising that delivered water services were not satisfactory, equitable and effective (Table 3). A positive effect suggests however, that improving the use of democratic politics in the management of water resources will lead to improved use of accountable systems in the delivery of water services.

Findings indicate that adherence to accountable systems in the delivery of water services by managers in KCCA by management was low. Findings also show that when politics in the management water resources promotes self-interest, it constrains the use of accountable systems, irrespective of the nature. When politics in this management promotes public interest, it encourages the use of these systems. Politics in public interest encourages especially the quality of water realized through the use of the systems. That played in public interest promotes especially efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the use of these systems.

6. Conclusion and recommendations

Despite the advances in the water service delivery patterns and a range of other services in Uganda's urban areas since the 1990s, results of the study highlighted a rather sluggish pace to improve the scope of services as well as their quality which does not in many respects match the expectations of a significant number of citizens. The evidence for the levels of discontentment have their origins in the country's politics where results suggest a corrosive effect on the service management structures and patterns of accountable systems that are portrayed as skewed in favour of self-interest and the political system, largely ignoring their mandate to serve the public. Indeed, the levels of compliance to established accountable systems by managers in the provision of water services were found to be too low, suggesting a need for sustained reforms in the sector for strengthening the service management structures while weakening the ministerial control of the service delivery systems.



From a policy perspective, it is clear that a responsive and more publicly accountable system needs to be established and consolidated through sustained reforms that address the legal provisions which politicians exploit to chip away at the capacities of public bureaucracies. In this way, it can be argued that the effect of politics on the management of service structures and accountability systems for efficient delivery of services will be greatly improved. In addition, the aims of democratising public service delivery and bringing about growing inclusive and accountable systems will be realised through a responsive, reliable and efficient system that attempts to insulate policy implementation organs from politics.

Furthermore, the relationship between political considerations in public service delivery systems as well as the current incongruities in the wider natural resource management structures imply that the obstacles in service delivery mechanisms are indeed a result of the adverse effects of politics on policy management structures. For example, the current problems in the management of water services which include pathetic governance and accountability, weak financial management, high vacancies in critical senior water management positions, high infrastructure backlog for extension of water service coverage, and in some instances, inability to deliver even a core of basic water services efficiently and effectively; can be understood in this framework.

Quite clearly, the attempts by government and MWE, the political institution responsible for overseeing the performance of NW&SC and potential address of these problems, have yielded only limited success. Part of the challenge has been an attempt by bureaucrats to operate with political establishment considerations rather than executing their mandate of delivering responsible, accountable, effective and efficient services to the public. As such there is a need for a coherent policy framework that responds to the varied social, economic, technical and administrative context of established accountable systems so that planning, financing and support in the service structures is tailored to the unique perspective within the requirements of the current public service delivery structures.

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
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
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
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
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
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